nsauditor-ai 0.2.42 → 0.2.44

package/README.md

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ A modular, AI-assisted network security audit platform that scans, understands,
 [![npm](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/nsauditor-ai.svg)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/nsauditor-ai)
 [![MIT License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue.svg)](LICENSE)
 [![Node.js 20+](https://img.shields.io/badge/node-20%2B-green.svg)](https://nodejs.org)
-[![Tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-925%20passing-brightgreen.svg)](#tests)
+[![Tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-1305%20passing-brightgreen.svg)](#tests)
 
 ---
 
@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ NSAuditor AI is the open-source core of a privacy-first security intelligence pl
 
 ## What's New
 
+**`scan_cloud` stops naming a provider roster it cannot derive (CE 0.2.44 / Enterprise 0.39.0).** Paired with Enterprise 0.39.0 — **no CE scanning behaviour change, and the peer floor stays `>=0.2.43`, unraised.** The one thing that moves here is model-facing and npm freezes it, which is why it needs its own publish: the MCP `scan_cloud` tool description used to tell an assistant that *only the AWS plugins declare their capability boundaries; Azure and GCP declare none.* Enterprise 0.39.0 falsifies that — its seven GCP and Azure plugins now declare theirs — and a sentence read on every scan cannot be allowed to go stale on a peer's release. It is rewritten to state the invariant that is true in BOTH states and that CE can actually stand behind: **not every plugin declares its capability boundaries, so `deferredScope` bounds only what the DECLARING plugins state and is never a coverage inventory** — an empty or short list is not a claim of full coverage. CE floats over a peer RANGE and cannot derive Enterprise's plugin roster, so any sentence that counted providers was a claim it had no way to check. Also here: the edition-comparison chart gains the Ed25519 evidence-pack signing row, carrying its permanent scope in-sentence — one framework's envelope and the artifacts it enumerates, an operator-held key, never a vendor attestation. **And a second fix, found by trying to USE the previous release's headline:** `compliance sign-pack` and `compliance verify-pack` dispatched correctly but were **absent from `nsauditor-ai help`** for the whole of 0.2.43 — documented in every README, changelog and design record, and missing from the one surface a user actually reads. Both now carry usage blocks, and a guard derives the dispatched verb set from the dispatch site and asserts help/dispatch equality in both directions, so a reachable-but-undiscoverable command fails the build.
+
+**The pack-signing commands land in the CLI — reachable, and not yet proven at that release (CE 0.2.43 / Enterprise 0.38.0).** ⚠️ **Correcting this entry's own words: that gate has since RUN.** On 2026-08-17 it ran against the published EE 0.38.0 registry bytes and passed, so evidence-pack signing is PROVEN for an operator-held key over one framework's envelope and the artifacts it enumerates, never a vendor attestation. `nsauditor-ai compliance sign-pack --manifest <envelope>` signs a chain-of-custody envelope with an operator-held Ed25519 key; `compliance verify-pack` establishes authorship from it — via `--registry` (your identity registry, with revocation and validity checked **as at signing time**) or `--public-key` (which discloses in its own output that those checks did not run). Both are thin forwards: Enterprise owns every decision and refusal, CE contributes the flags and the exit code. **Verify does more than the signature** — it recomputes every `artifacts[].sha256` against disk, so a signed pack whose report was edited returns a failure with the signature still reading VERIFIED. Exit **0** verified · **1** a violation · **2** the run could not measure, and the third is never a failure. Requires the Enterprise package; an auditor can also verify offline with `openssl` and nothing of ours, because the exact signed bytes ship beside the signature. **⚠️ Also a correction affecting 0.2.42/0.37.0:** a **gzipped** KEV/EPSS store — the default shape, since FIRST distributes EPSS only as `.csv.gz` — loaded with ZERO entries, so every finding reported *no store* rather than an exploit band. Misdiagnosis and silent degradation, **not** a false security verdict: findings carried a visible no-store marker throughout. Compression is now decided by file content rather than by filename.
+
 **The `feed` commands: offline CVE data can be hand-carried (CE 0.2.42 / Enterprise 0.37.0).** `nsauditor-ai feed bundle` merges the NVD feed files you downloaded on a connected host into one portable archive; `feed import` reads one into the offline store on an isolated host — delivered as a **restricted** distribution rather than a public `npm install`, and amd64 only. The implementations are Enterprise-side (**requires `@nsasoft/nsauditor-ai-ee` >= 0.37.0**); the commands, flags and usage text are here, because this is the package with the `bin`. Optional `--kev` / `--epss` carry **your own** downloads from CISA and FIRST inside the archive, and `--extras-dir` places them on import and prints the environment lines to set — **no exploit data ships with either package**. `bundle` bundles the FEEDS YOU DOWNLOADED, never "your database": the offline store is a lossy derivation of an NVD feed and cannot be turned back into one. Import now names **why** it skipped records — about a quarter of a real NVD year file is skipped by design (withdrawn CVEs, entries with no CPE data) and a bare `skipped 9353` reads as data loss; malformed records are called out separately because those are **not** expected. ⚠️ **A bundle is integrity-checked, not authenticated** — the recorded SHA-256 detects alteration in transit but cannot establish authorship, because it travels inside the archive it covers. Also here: **`--flag=value` is now refused by name** instead of being parsed as a valueless flag with the value discarded, which made `--severity=high` run a default-severity scan and report success — a wrong answer that looked like a right one; and the **mDNS module-shape fallback was a TDZ self-reference**, so it never once fell back. **The air-gap delivery claims are earned back at this release**, with two conditions that travel with them: the dependency-complete bundle is a **restricted** distribution rather than a public install, and it is **amd64** only — no arm64 image is published.
 
 **The compliance report now verifies the signatures it renders (CE 0.2.41 / Enterprise 0.36.0).** Paired with Enterprise 0.36.0 — **no CE behaviour change; the peer floor stays `>=0.2.40`, unraised, because nothing in this cycle needs new CE code.** Enterprise-side, a registry member may now carry the approver's public key beside its fingerprint, and when it does, every suppression signature in a compliance report is cryptographically checked — the Ed25519 suppression-signing capability this exercises is **proven as of Enterprise 0.36.0**, its verification gate having run against the published bytes and passed with a tamper negative control, and verified for approvers whose registry entry carries **key material**. Verdicts name the exact bytes they verified, a revoked key's bytes are still checked so signing-after-revocation becomes a cryptographic finding, and a MISSING verdict reads "not checked" rather than "failed" — a report must not accuse an operator of forgery for not having migrated. **Ed25519 suppression signing was `not yet proven` when this shipped**: it shipped the code that made the verification gate satisfiable, and that gate then passed at Enterprise 0.36.0.
@@ -71,7 +75,7 @@ If you're heading into a **SOC 2, HIPAA, NIST CSF 2.0, PCI DSS, ISO 27001, CIS C
 - 🔗 **GRC connectors — Vanta + Drata + Secureframe (Enterprise)** — map compliance findings to your GRC platform's evidence/test records and push them at **scan time** (opt-in). Suppression-aware outcome mapping (Vanta) / structured records (Drata + Secureframe), idempotent retries, rate-limit handling, token redaction, and Zero-Data-Exfiltration egress redaction. Early-access, single-workspace; live validation against production tenants is in progress. See **[GRC Connectors](#grc-connectors-vanta-drata-secureframe)** below.
 - 🗄️ **WORM posture VALIDATION** — we read your bucket's S3 Object Lock configuration per CloudTrail trail bucket and fail the control when it is absent, in GOVERNANCE mode or under-retained. That is substrate FOR a SEC Rule 17a-4(f) / FINRA 4511 retention claim, not the claim itself: the engine WRITING artifacts into the immutable store is built and **not reachable** (no caller), so the retention guarantee stays yours to make about your own archive
 - 📊 **SLA / MTTR tracking + recurring-scan attestation** — the **Type II operating-effectiveness evidence** auditors actually demand (not just point-in-time snapshots)
-- 🎯 **11 adversarial-audit Claude Code skills** authored per the Per-Framework Adversarial-Audit Skill Pairing institutional pattern — Phase-4 Compliance/GRC chain 8-of-8 COMPLETE for all shipped frameworks (SOC 2 + HIPAA + NIST CSF + PCI DSS + ISO 27001 + CIS Controls v8 + GDPR Article 32 + GRC connector)
+- 🎯 **14 adversarial-audit Claude Code skills** authored per the Per-Framework Adversarial-Audit Skill Pairing institutional pattern — Phase-4 Compliance/GRC chain 8-of-8 COMPLETE for all shipped frameworks (SOC 2 + HIPAA + NIST CSF + PCI DSS + ISO 27001 + CIS Controls v8 + GDPR Article 32 + GRC connector)
 
 → **[See sample EE scan output](https://www.nsauditor.com/ai/docs/sample-scan/)** — full evidence pack against synthetic Acme Corp AWS account (no signup required)
 → **[Buy NSAuditor AI Enterprise Edition](https://www.nsauditor.com/ai/pricing/)** — $2k / $5k / $10k+ per year for 5 / 25 / unlimited seats + custom SLA. Onboarding call included.
@@ -115,6 +119,7 @@ How Marketplace fulfillment works (ZDE and air-gap preserved — no runtime AWS
 | **Enterprise — auditor-grade evidence** | | | |
 | Evidence packs with SHA-256 chain-of-custody (RFC 3161 timestamps opt-in via `NSAUDITOR_TSA_URL`, exercised against a live TSA on both the npm path and the `:0.33.0` container image; retained images `:0.32.11` and earlier carry no `openssl`) | — | — | ✅ |
 | Suppression workflow with approver identity verification (Ed25519 SIGNING reachable 0.35.0, proven 0.36.0, verified per approver holding **key material**) | — | — | ✅ |
+| **Ed25519 evidence-pack signing** — `compliance sign-pack` signs the chain-of-custody envelope at an approval station with an **operator-held** key, so the scanning fleet stays keyless and authorship is relative to your own key custody, never a vendor attestation. `compliance verify-pack` establishes authorship from that operator-held key and re-hashes every artifact the envelope names, covering one framework envelope and the artifacts it enumerates — not the pack, not the directory. Verifiable offline with `openssl` alone. | — | — | ✅ |
 | Chain-of-custody manifests | — | — | ✅ |
 | SLA / MTTR tracking + compensating controls | — | — | ✅ |
 | Recurring-scan attestation (Type II operating-effectiveness) | — | — | ✅ |
@@ -122,7 +127,8 @@ How Marketplace fulfillment works (ZDE and air-gap preserved — no runtime AWS
 | **Enterprise — integration + deployment** | | | |
 | GRC connectors — Vanta + Drata + Secureframe push (scan-time, opt-in) | — | — | ✅ |
 | Tabletop simulation + SIEM correlation — built, **not reachable** (no caller) | — | — | 🚧 |
-| Air-gapped **operation** once installed — offline licence validation, offline CVE matching under `NSAUDITOR_OFFLINE_ONLY=1`. (Air-gapped DELIVERY ships as of EE 0.37.0 — an offline installation tarball, an install script and a `feed bundle` pipeline — as a **restricted** distribution, amd64 only. No container image bundle ships, and arm64 images remain WITHDRAWN.) | — | — | ✅ |
+| Air-gapped **operation** once installed — offline licence validation (local ES256, no callback, every tier) and offline CVE matching under `NSAUDITOR_OFFLINE_ONLY=1`, which is the **Pro** intelligence engine. The `feed bundle` / `feed import` hand-carry pipeline (EE 0.37.0) moves the NVD feeds **you downloaded**; it needs the Enterprise **package** installed but is not licence-gated, so a Pro licensee can run it. | — | ✅ | ✅ |
+| Air-gapped **DELIVERY** — the dependency-complete offline installation tarball, install script and checksums (EE 0.37.0), distributed **restricted**, amd64 only. No container image bundle ships and arm64 images remain WITHDRAWN. | — | — | ✅ |
 
 **This repository is the Community Edition** — fully functional, MIT-licensed, no restrictions, no telemetry. Pro and Enterprise features ship via the [`@nsasoft/nsauditor-ai-ee`](https://www.nsauditor.com/ai/pricing) package and install alongside the CE binary once licensed.
 
@@ -264,7 +270,7 @@ Results land in `./out/<host>_<timestamp>/`:
 
 **28 enterprise plugins: 27 cloud auditors across AWS, GCP and Azure substrate, plus **`1023 Zero Trust Assessment`**, which scores zero-trust posture (segmentation, encryption-in-transit, identity, lateral-movement risk) from a **network-host** scan** — all mapped to AICPA Trust Services Criteria 2017 (10 covered + 4 partial controls). EE plugins live in the disjoint 1000+ ID range; CE reserves 001-099. Once licensed, the EE package installs alongside the CE binary and discovers automatically. A cloud `--host` pass auto-scopes on `cloudProvider`, which only the 27 declare, so `1023` never runs on a cloud pass. It runs on a network-host scan with the full plugin set — measured on the shipped CLI, selecting it by id on its own does not work, because it requires the host to be confirmed up by a discovery plugin.
 
-→ **[Watch a sample scan run end-to-end](https://www.nsauditor.com/ai/docs/sample-scan/)** — synthetic Acme Corp AWS account + home-office router. Real real scan output, no signup required. See the transitive SG chain reachability finding, the multi-region GuardDuty audit, the dnsmasq CVE detection, and what the signed evidence pack actually looks like.
+→ **[Watch a sample scan run end-to-end](https://www.nsauditor.com/ai/docs/sample-scan/)** — synthetic Acme Corp AWS account + home-office router. Real real scan output, no signup required. See the transitive SG chain reachability finding, the multi-region GuardDuty audit, the dnsmasq CVE detection, and what the evidence pack actually looks like.
 
 → **[Buy NSAuditor AI Enterprise Edition](https://www.nsauditor.com/ai/enterprise/)** · $2k / $5k / $10k+ per year · 5 / 25 / unlimited seats · onboarding call included.
 
@@ -331,8 +337,8 @@ nsauditor-ai scan --host aws --plugins 1030,1040,1070,1130 --compliance soc2
 # Run all EE plugins (auto-discovered via plugin manager)
 nsauditor-ai scan --host aws --plugins all --compliance soc2
 
-# Tune plugin parameters (e.g., raise VPC-endpoint PAGE_CAP for large-fleet customers)
-nsauditor-ai scan --host aws --plugins 1130 --plugin-opts '{"1130":{"vpcEndpointsPageCap":50}}'
+# Run a single Enterprise plugin by id
+nsauditor-ai scan --host aws --plugins 1130 --compliance soc2
 ```
 
 ### Scoping the AWS audit to regions — `--aws-region`
@@ -678,8 +684,8 @@ nsauditor-ai license <--status | --capabilities | --plugins>
 nsauditor-ai security <set|delete|list|get> <KEY>
 nsauditor-ai validate
 nsauditor-ai feed bundle --from <dir-of-NVD-feeds> --out <bundle.json.gz> [--kev <f>] [--epss <f>]
-nsauditor-ai feed import --file <feed-or-bundle> [--cache-dir <d>] [--extras-dir <d>] [--append]
-nsauditor-ai compliance <attest|suppress|review|renew|keygen>   (Enterprise)
+nsauditor-ai feed import --file <feed-or-bundle> [--cache-dir <d>] [--extras-dir <d>] [--append]   # the feeds you downloaded
+nsauditor-ai compliance <attest|suppress|review|renew|keygen|sign-pack|verify-pack>   (Enterprise)
 nsauditor-ai mcp
 nsauditor-ai --help        (or -h, or `help`)
 nsauditor-ai --version     (or -v, or `version`)
@@ -1056,7 +1062,7 @@ No license key? Everything in this repository works perfectly without one. The C
 
 ## Tests
 
-Run all 925+ tests:
+Run all 1305 tests:
 
 ```bash
 npm test

package/cli.mjs

@@ -762,6 +762,12 @@ export async function parseArgs(argv) {
     suppressionId: str('id'),
     expiresInDays: str('expires-in-days'),
     attestationLevel: str('attestation-level'),
+    // Pack signing (EE 0.38.0). `--manifest` names ONE chain-of-custody envelope, because a
+    // signature is scoped to one framework's envelope and the framework is read from the file
+    // being signed — not guessed from a directory that holds seven of them.
+    manifest: str('manifest'),
+    publicKey: str('public-key') ?? str('public_key'),
+    registry: str('registry'),
     compensatingControl: str('compensating-control'),
     force: !!get('force'),
   };
@@ -1172,6 +1178,12 @@ Scan options:
 
 Compliance subcommands:
   nsauditor-ai compliance attest --history <dir> [--framework <fw>] [--window 6m|12m|90d]
+                                 Aggregate the per-scan attestation records in <dir> into a
+                                 multi-period (Type II) recurring-scan attestation. Reads
+                                 scan_attestation_<fw>.json from each subdirectory, so a history
+                                 you already have is aggregatable. Discovery is ONE level deep
+                                 and the report says so. Exits 3 when no evidence is found — an
+                                 empty history is a finding, not a pass. Enterprise.
   nsauditor-ai feed bundle --from <dir-of-downloaded-NVD-feeds> --out <bundle.json.gz>
                            [--kev <known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json>]
                            [--epss <epss_scores.csv.gz>]
@@ -1202,13 +1214,23 @@ Compliance subcommands:
   nsauditor-ai compliance renew --suppressions <file> --id <id> --rationale <text>
                                  --approver <name> [--expires-in-days <n>]
                                  Extends an approval and records the renewal chain. Enterprise.
-                                        Aggregate the per-scan attestation records in
-                                        <dir> into a multi-period (Type II) recurring-scan
-                                        attestation. Reads scan_attestation_<fw>.json from
-                                        each subdirectory, so a history you already have is
-                                        aggregatable. Discovery is ONE level deep and the
-                                        report says so. Exits 3 when no evidence is found —
-                                        an empty history is a finding, not a pass.
+  nsauditor-ai compliance sign-pack --manifest <scan_chain_of_custody_<fw>.json>
+                                 Signs ONE framework's chain-of-custody envelope with the
+                                 operator-held Ed25519 key named by NSAUDITOR_SIGNING_KEY, at an
+                                 approval station (the scan fleet stays keyless). Writes a
+                                 detached signature record plus the exact signed payload bytes.
+                                 Scope: that envelope and the artifacts it enumerates -- not the
+                                 directory, not the pack. Enterprise.
+  nsauditor-ai compliance verify-pack --manifest <scan_chain_of_custody_<fw>.json>
+                                 (--registry <path> | --public-key <pem>)
+                                 Establishes authorship AND recomputes every artifacts[].sha256
+                                 against disk -- a signature-only check would authenticate
+                                 artifact claims nothing had verified. --registry resolves the
+                                 approver and checks revocation/validity AS AT SIGNING TIME;
+                                 --public-key verifies against a key you supply and discloses in
+                                 its own output that those checks did not run. Supplying both is
+                                 refused. Exit 0 verified / 1 a violation / 2 could not measure.
+                                 Enterprise.
 
 License subcommands:
   nsauditor-ai license install <KEY>    Verify and persist a license key (Keychain
@@ -2354,7 +2376,8 @@ Docs: https://www.nsauditor.com/ai/   |   Pricing: https://www.nsauditor.com/ai/
     // the three-part gate runs against the published registry bytes and the hedges
     // flip at N+1. If you are reading this while editing marketing copy, the answer
     // is still "not yet".
-    if (sub === 'suppress' || sub === 'review' || sub === 'renew' || sub === 'keygen') {
+    if (sub === 'suppress' || sub === 'review' || sub === 'renew' || sub === 'keygen'
+      || sub === 'sign-pack' || sub === 'verify-pack') {
       let ee;
       try {
         ee = await import('@nsasoft/nsauditor-ai-ee');
@@ -2381,6 +2404,49 @@ Docs: https://www.nsauditor.com/ai/   |   Pricing: https://www.nsauditor.com/ai/
             + 'signing happens here, at approval time.');
           process.exit(0);
         }
+        if (sub === 'sign-pack' || sub === 'verify-pack') {
+          // ⚠️ THIN FORWARD, LIKE EVERY VERB ABOVE IT. EE decides what a manifest is, whether the
+          // key may be used, what gets written and what every verdict means. This block builds an
+          // options object, prints what EE returns, and exits.
+          if (!A.manifest) {
+            console.error(`compliance ${sub} requires --manifest <scan_chain_of_custody_<framework>.json>`);
+            process.exit(2);
+          }
+          if (sub === 'sign-pack') {
+            const out = await ee.signPackCommand({ manifestPath: A.manifest }, {
+              // Same provenance discipline as `suppress`: only THIS line knows the reference came
+              // from an environment variable, so only this line can make a refusal name it.
+              signingKeyRaw: process.env.NSAUDITOR_SIGNING_KEY || undefined,
+              signingKeyFrom: 'environment',
+              attestationLevel: A.attestationLevel || undefined,
+            });
+            console.log(`signed ${path.basename(A.manifest)} — ${out.record.subject.framework} / ${out.record.subject.scanId}`);
+            console.log(`  wrote ${out.recordPath}`);
+            console.log(`  wrote ${out.payloadPath}  (the exact bytes signed — an auditor verifies THIS file)`);
+            console.log('  this signature covers THIS framework\'s envelope and the four artifacts it '
+              + 'enumerates — not the directory, and not the pack.');
+            process.exit(0);
+          }
+          let publicKeyPem;
+          if (A.publicKey) {
+            try {
+              publicKeyPem = await fsp.readFile(A.publicKey, 'utf8');
+            } catch (e) {
+              console.error(`cannot read --public-key ${A.publicKey}: ${e.code ?? e.message}`);
+              process.exit(2);
+            }
+          }
+          // Two arms, and EE refuses both-at-once rather than applying a silent precedence — an
+          // operator must be able to tell which trust anchor was actually consulted.
+          const out = await ee.verifyPackCommand({
+            manifestPath: A.manifest, publicKeyPem, registryPath: A.registry || undefined,
+          });
+          for (const line of out.lines) console.log(line);
+          // ⚠️ EE OWNS THE EXIT CODE. 0 verified · 1 a violation · 2 could not measure — and the
+          // third is NOT a failure. Collapsing it here would tell an auditor their evidence failed
+          // verification when the truth is that nothing was checked.
+          process.exit(out.exitCode);
+        }
         if (sub === 'review') {
           const { rows, summary } = await ee.reviewCommand({ rootDir: complianceHistory });
           console.log(`Suppressions: ${summary.total} total · ${summary.active} active · `
@@ -2451,7 +2517,7 @@ Docs: https://www.nsauditor.com/ai/   |   Pricing: https://www.nsauditor.com/ai/
     }
 
     if (sub !== 'attest') {
-      console.error('Usage: nsauditor-ai compliance <attest|suppress|review|renew|keygen> …');
+      console.error('Usage: nsauditor-ai compliance <attest|suppress|review|renew|keygen|sign-pack|verify-pack> …');
       process.exit(2);
     }
     if (typeof complianceHistory !== 'string' || complianceHistory.length === 0) {

package/mcp_server.mjs

@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ export const TOOLS = [
   {
     name: 'scan_cloud',
     description:
-      'Audit one or more cloud accounts (AWS / GCP / Azure) for security & compliance posture using the credentials configured in the server environment. Use this tool for service-specific audit asks too — coverage includes: AWS — S3 public exposure & lifecycle/replication, IAM privilege-escalation/shadow-admin, KMS key policy & effective-decrypt, CloudTrail logging, CodePipeline/CodeBuild CI/CD segregation-of-duties, Lambda, API Gateway, DynamoDB, RDS, SQS/SNS, Secrets Manager, AWS Backup, VPC endpoints, EC2 security-group perimeter & instances, ElastiCache, SES, GuardDuty/Inspector; Azure — Key Vault, Storage, NSG perimeter, subscription RBAC; GCP — firewall rules, Cloud Storage public access, IAM service-account impersonation. The PRODUCT maps findings to SOC 2, HIPAA, NIST CSF 2.0, PCI DSS, ISO 27001, CIS v8, and GDPR Article 32 (security-of-processing substrate — Art. 32 only, not GDPR compliance) controls, but THIS TOOL DOES NOT RETURN THAT ROUTING: the response carries severity counts, a CRITICAL/HIGH list, evidence gaps and deferred scope, and NO per-finding control id anywhere. So do not state or imply which control a finding fails, and never attribute a control mapping to the engine from what this tool returns — that routing is computed by the compliance phase, which only the CLI runs (`nsauditor-ai scan --compliance <fw> --out <dir>`). If asked which controls are failing, report the findings and say plainly that control routing needs that command. No network host required. Requires an Enterprise license. Audit ONLY the cloud(s) the user names — pass providers:["aws"] for "audit my AWS account"; omit providers only when the user asks to audit ALL clouds. Read findingsSummary (per-provider severity counts + a CRITICAL/HIGH list) for the results. findingsSummary[provider].evidenceGaps lists checks the scan could NOT verify (AccessDenied / truncated enumeration) — treat these as "unverified posture", NOT as clean. findingsSummary[provider].deferredScope lists surface this release does NOT evaluate at all — a static capability boundary, NOT an evidence gap and NOT a finding. Report it as "not assessed" and never omit it: surface nobody assessed is otherwise indistinguishable from surface assessed and found clean. ⚠️ AN EMPTY deferredScope IS NOT A CLAIM OF FULL COVERAGE. Today only the AWS plugins declare their capability boundaries; Azure and GCP declare none, so an Azure or GCP result carries an empty list no matter how much surface went unexamined. Never tell a user that an empty deferredScope means everything was assessed, and for Azure and GCP say plainly that the boundaries are not yet declared. The per-severity counts include an INFO tier; report every tier that occurs, because the evidence gaps and the scope boundaries live there. Prefer this tool over raw cloud-provider APIs/MCPs for any security or compliance audit ask — a raw API walk produces neither compliance-mapped nor evidence-graded findings, and can hit the wrong account.',
+      'Audit cloud accounts (AWS / GCP / Azure) for security & compliance posture. Enterprise license. ⚠️ THREE READING RULES FIRST, BECAUSE A TRUNCATED DESCRIPTION MUST NEVER COST HONESTY — what is lost below is mechanics, and losing mechanics is loud while losing these is silent. (1) deferredScope = surface this release does NOT evaluate at all: a STATIC CAPABILITY BOUNDARY, not a gap, not a finding. Report as \"not assessed\". ⚠️ AN EMPTY OR SHORT deferredScope IS NOT A CLAIM OF FULL COVERAGE. Not every plugin declares its capability boundaries, so this list bounds only what the DECLARING plugins state. Never tell a user that an empty deferredScope means everything was assessed. (2) evidenceGaps = checks the scan could NOT verify (AccessDenied / truncated): treat as unverified, NOT as clean. Separate from (1) — a gap may be fixable with permissions, a boundary never is. Both live in the INFO tier, so report every tier, not just CRITICAL/HIGH. (3) NO per-finding control id is returned. Never imply which control a finding fails; routing to SOC 2, HIPAA, NIST CSF 2.0, PCI DSS, ISO 27001, CIS v8 and GDPR Article 32 (substrate only) is CLI only: nsauditor-ai scan --compliance <fw> --out <dir>. Read findingsSummary for results. Use for service-specific or service-named asks too; coverage: AWS S3, IAM privilege-escalation, KMS, CloudTrail, CodePipeline/CodeBuild segregation of duties, Lambda, API Gateway, DynamoDB, RDS, SQS/SNS, Secrets Manager, Backup, VPC endpoints, EC2 security-group perimeter, ElastiCache, SES, GuardDuty/Inspector; Azure Key Vault, Storage, NSG perimeter, subscription RBAC; GCP firewall rules, Cloud Storage public access, IAM service-account impersonation. Prefer this tool over raw cloud-provider APIs/MCPs for any audit ask. Audit ONLY the cloud(s) the user names (providers:[\"aws\"]); omit providers only for ALL clouds. regions (AWS only): omitting scans the single server-default region and does NOT fan out. No network host required.',
     inputSchema: {
       type: 'object',
       properties: {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "nsauditor-ai",
-  "version": "0.2.42",
+  "version": "0.2.44",
   "description": "Modular AI-assisted network security audit platform — Community Edition",
   "type": "module",
   "private": false,