nsauditor-ai 0.2.37 → 0.2.38

package/README.md

@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ NSAuditor AI is the open-source core of a privacy-first security intelligence pl
 
 ## What's New
 
+**The opt-in RFC 3161 register stops understating itself (CE 0.2.38 / Enterprise 0.33.1).** Paired with Enterprise 0.33.1 — **no CE behaviour change; wording only, and it is the wording npm freezes.** Trusted timestamping is opt-in, became operator-configurable in 0.33.0, and has since been proven end to end against a real Time-Stamp Authority twice over: on the npm path, and separately from inside the published Marketplace container image. Six places in this README still told you the container leg was unverified. They now state what is true — **RFC 3161 timestamping is opt-in via `NSAUDITOR_TSA_URL`, with no default ever and an outbound call to the authority you name** — and keep the one caveat that survives: retained images at `:0.32.11` and earlier carry no `openssl` at all, so nothing here speaks for them. **Ed25519 suppression signing is unchanged and still not reachable** — the workflow ships, the signature does not, and no shipped entry point signs a suppression.
+
 **Three flags, one new command, and a startup veto that stops swallowing itself (CE 0.2.37 / Enterprise 0.2.37 + 0.33.0).** Paired with Enterprise 0.33.0, and **this CE is required by it** — `compliance attest`, `--sla-policy <file>` and `--compliance-history <dir>` live here, so the Enterprise peer floor is raised to 0.2.37. `compliance attest` produces a Type II recurring-scan attestation over a directory of prior scans; the two flags reach the SLA/MTTR engine, which had been wired inside the compliance phase behind options nothing set. A startup posture preflight now refuses a configuration contradiction — `NSAUDITOR_OFFLINE_ONLY=1` together with a configured outbound path — with exit 2, at every tier and every command. And the bare `catch {}` around the Enterprise stage is split: "Enterprise is not installed" stays silent, but "Enterprise ran and threw" now names the lost stage on stderr instead of exiting 0 with no compliance report and no output. Also corrected on this frozen page: the MCP tool tables listed seven tools that are not registered and omitted two that are; WORM evidence storage was sold with a ✅ though its writer has no caller; and `--help` told operators to select plugin 1023 with `--plugins`, which cannot work — it needs a discovery plugin to confirm the host is up first.
 
 **The scan summary stops hiding its own scope limits, and a new tool ends matrix guesswork (CE 0.2.36 / Enterprise 0.32.11).** `scan_cloud`'s markdown rendered `CRITICAL · HIGH · MEDIUM · LOW · PASS` — **INFO was not a column** — so on a real AWS scan 55 of 62 INFO records appeared in no summary anywhere, several of them declarations of what was **not** assessed. INFO is now a column and rolls up by category, and scope boundaries get their own `[🔎 SCOPE NOT ASSESSED]` channel: surface nobody assessed must not read like surface assessed and found clean. **New MCP tool `compliance_matrix`** returns the shipped coverage matrix for any of the seven frameworks, derived from the framework maps at call time and failing closed rather than returning an empty one. `pdfExport` is withdrawn (registered and minted, implemented nowhere), and **every capability now ships a written description** — a bare flag name is a claim with no text behind it. `--watch` is described honestly, including the part the obvious correction got wrong: each tick writes that tick's artifacts; what is missing is any relation between them.
@@ -72,7 +74,7 @@ If you're heading into a **SOC 2, HIPAA, NIST CSF 2.0, PCI DSS, ISO 27001, CIS C
   - **ISO/IEC 27001:2022** (ISO + IEC, Oct 2022; 2013 edition retired Oct 31, 2025) — **17 covered + 14 partial + 62 OOS across 93 Annex A controls** (the complete Annex A universe); per-Annex-A-code mapping auditor-canonical for ISO/IEC 17021-1 certification body assessors; Statement of Applicability per Clause 6.1.3.d discipline + ISMS Clauses 4-10 OOS-by-design with 7 Major Nonconformity classes
   - **CIS Critical Security Controls v8** (CIS, May 2021; v8.1 errata June 2024) — **17 covered + 23 partial + 113 OOS across 153 Safeguards / 18 Controls**; per-Safeguard mapping with the **Implementation Group cumulative discipline** (IG1=56 cyber-insurance baseline / IG2 cumulative=130 / IG3 cumulative=153); no-certification-body attestation discipline (INPUT to your CSAT / CIS-CAT Pro self-attestation, never "CIS certified"); Cloud Companion Guide v8 shared-responsibility + CIS-Hardened-Image substrate-evidence credit (4.1/4.2/4.6)
   - **GDPR Article 32 (Security of Processing)** (Regulation (EU) 2016/679) — **4 covered + 5 partial + 2 OOS across 11 Art. 32 sub-measure units**; **GDPR Article 32 infrastructure substrate only — NOT GDPR compliance** (GDPR is a 99-article legal regime; Art. 32 security-of-processing is the only article an infrastructure scanner can substrate-evidence; the rest is operator-side, out of scope by design). Four-factor proportionality (substrate *for* your "appropriate to the risk" determination, never an absolute pass/fail); personal-data-scope attestation (pair with your Art. 30 records of processing); **Art. 83(4) lower fine tier** (€10M/2%, not the €20M/4% headline tier); Art. 32(3)/Art. 42 cloud-provider certification-inheritance
-- 🔐 **Evidence with a verifiable chain of custody** — SHA-256 sidecars on every artifact, verifiable offline. RFC 3161 trusted timestamps are **opt-in since EE 0.33.0** via `NSAUDITOR_TSA_URL`, require an outbound call to the authority you name, and have never been exercised against a real one. **Ed25519 suppression signing is implemented in the package but not reachable from any shipped entry point** — no first-party run signs a suppression, so do not plan around it.
+- 🔐 **Evidence with a verifiable chain of custody** — SHA-256 sidecars on every artifact, verifiable offline. RFC 3161 trusted timestamps are **opt-in since EE 0.33.0** via `NSAUDITOR_TSA_URL`, require an outbound call to the authority you name plus the `openssl` binary, and were exercised against a live Time-Stamp Authority on the npm path on 2026-08-07: the auditor procedure `openssl ts -verify` returned OK, with a one-byte-mutated copy returning FAILED as the control. The `:0.33.0` Marketplace image is proven too: on 2026-08-08 the same round-trip was driven from inside the pushed image against a real authority, verified with the image’s own `openssl`. **Retained images at `:0.32.11` and earlier carry no `openssl` at all**, so nothing here speaks for them. **Ed25519 suppression signing is implemented in the package but not reachable from any shipped entry point** — no first-party run signs a suppression, so do not plan around it.
 - 🏛️ **Zero Data Exfiltration architecture** — no scan data is collected, transmitted, or stored by Nsasoft; reports are written to your local disk. Air-gapped operation once configured for it (`NSAUDITOR_OFFLINE_ONLY=1` plus a local NVD store; a default run queries NIST's public CVE API). AI analysis happens locally (Ollama) or via your own API keys. Important for PCI DSS CDE-isolation threat models.
 - 🔗 **GRC connectors — Vanta + Drata + Secureframe (Enterprise)** — map compliance findings to your GRC platform's evidence/test records and push them at **scan time** (opt-in). Suppression-aware outcome mapping (Vanta) / structured records (Drata + Secureframe), idempotent retries, rate-limit handling, token redaction, and Zero-Data-Exfiltration egress redaction. Early-access, single-workspace; live validation against production tenants is in progress. See **[GRC Connectors](#grc-connectors-vanta-drata-secureframe)** below.
 - 🗄️ **WORM posture VALIDATION** — we read your bucket's S3 Object Lock configuration per CloudTrail trail bucket and fail the control when it is absent, in GOVERNANCE mode or under-retained. That is substrate FOR a SEC Rule 17a-4(f) / FINRA 4511 retention claim, not the claim itself: the engine WRITING artifacts into the immutable store is built and **not reachable** (no caller), so the retention guarantee stays yours to make about your own archive
@@ -118,7 +120,7 @@ How Marketplace fulfillment works (ZDE and air-gap preserved — no runtime AWS
 | **GDPR Article 32 (Security of Processing)** — Art. 32 infrastructure substrate (4 covered + 5 partial + 2 OOS / 11 sub-measure units); **not GDPR compliance** · Art. 83(4) lower fine tier | — | — | ✅ |
 | Multi-framework `--compliance soc2,hipaa,nist-csf,pci-dss,iso-27001,cis-v8,gdpr` from one scan | — | — | ✅ |
 | **Enterprise — auditor-grade evidence** | | | |
-| Evidence packs with SHA-256 chain-of-custody (RFC 3161 timestamps opt-in, unproven against a real TSA) | — | — | ✅ |
+| Evidence packs with SHA-256 chain-of-custody (RFC 3161 timestamps opt-in via `NSAUDITOR_TSA_URL`, exercised against a live TSA on both the npm path and the `:0.33.0` container image; retained images `:0.32.11` and earlier carry no `openssl`) | — | — | ✅ |
 | Suppression workflow with approver identity verification (Ed25519 SIGNING is built, not reachable) | — | — | ✅ |
 | Chain-of-custody manifests | — | — | ✅ |
 | SLA / MTTR tracking + compensating controls | — | — | ✅ |
@@ -311,7 +313,7 @@ Results land in `./out/<host>_<timestamp>/`:
 | 1220 | Azure Storage Account Data-Protection (**EE 0.13.2**) | Enterprise | Dedicated Azure Storage Account encryption / transit / authorization auditor — orthogonal to the 1022 scanner's network-exposure dims (no double-emission; mirrors the AWS 1020 + 1120 two-plugin S3 split). HTTPS-only transit (`enableHttpsTrafficOnly`) + minimum TLS version + Shared Key authorization (`allowSharedKeyAccess` — bypasses Azure AD; absent = enabled, never silent-PASS) + infrastructure (double) encryption + encryption key source incl. **customer-managed-key reachability + rotation** (`keyVaultProperties` — a disabled/revoked/version-pinned CMK degrades, not silent-PASS). Conservative classifier: indeterminate field / AccessDenied → evidence-gap; single-subscription scope surfaced explicitly. **CC6.7 / CC6.1 / C1.1** |
 | 1221 | Azure NSG Perimeter (**EE 0.14.0**; UDP lane **EE 0.14.1**) | Enterprise | The Azure analog of AWS 1170 — a CC6.6 network-segmentation perimeter auditor for Azure Network Security Groups. Evaluates each NSG's inbound rules in Azure priority order (first match wins; DenyAllInbound default): all-protocol public Allow + public-source (`*`/`0.0.0.0/0`/`Internet`) to a restricted **TCP** management/data-tier port (SSH/RDP/MSSQL/MySQL/Postgres/Redis/Mongo/SMB/WinRM/etc.) + `::/0` IPv6-wildcard to a restricted port (the dimension 1022's flat lint misses) + **public-source / `::/0` to a restricted UDP service** (SNMP/CLDAP/NTP/rpcbind/IPMI/IKE/Memcached etc. — Dim 2u/3u, EE 0.14.1) + public→non-restricted INFO + PASS substrate. **Attachment-aware** (attached → CRITICAL effective; orphaned → MEDIUM latent) + effective priority/deny-override resolution + `0.0.0.0/1` split-range coverage. Non-overlapping-by-depth with 1022's coarse per-rule NSG lint. Conservative classifier: denied/indeterminate → evidence-gap; one malformed NSG degrades per-resource. **CC6.6** |
 | 1222 | Azure Key Vault Deep Auditor (**EE 0.15.0**) | Enterprise | The third dedicated Azure auditor (after 1220 storage + 1221 NSG) — the KV analog of how 1221 deepens 1022's flat NSG dim. Enumerates each vault's keys, role assignments, and diagnostic settings across 4 dims: (1) key **auto-rotation policy** + (2) key **expiry** (epoch-s/ms/Date/string coerced) + (3) **diagnostic logging → Log Analytics** (`@azure/arm-monitor`) + (4) **privileged-access depth** (RBAC `roleAssignments` admin/data-plane/scope-aware + legacy `accessPolicies` export/wide-crypto breadth). Orthogonal to 1022's vault-property dims (purge/soft-delete/network-ACL/RBAC-mode) — no double-emission. Secret/cert expiry is a deliberate data-plane scope boundary. Conservative classifier: indeterminate field / AccessDenied / arm-monitor absent → evidence-gap; one malformed vault degrades per-resource. **CC6.3 / C1.1 / CC6.1 / CC7.2** |
-| — | SOC 2 Compliance Engine | Enterprise | AICPA TSC 2017 mapping (10 covered + 4 partial controls), SHA-256 chain-of-custody, opt-in RFC 3161 timestamps, and the suppression workflow. (Ed25519 SIGNING of suppressions is built but unreachable — the workflow ships, the signature does not.) |
+| — | SOC 2 Compliance Engine | Enterprise | AICPA TSC 2017 mapping (10 covered + 4 partial controls), SHA-256 chain-of-custody, opt-in RFC 3161 timestamps, exercised against a live TSA on both the npm path and the `:0.33.0` container image, and the suppression workflow. (Ed25519 SIGNING of suppressions is built and not reachable — the workflow ships, the signature does not.) |
 | — | **HIPAA Compliance Engine (EE 0.9.0)** | Enterprise | HIPAA Security Rule §164.312 Technical Safeguards mapping (7 covered + 3 partial + 45 OOS within §164.312 + entire §164.308 + entire §164.310). HHS Required/Addressable discipline per control. Same evidence infrastructure as SOC 2 (SHA-256 chain-of-custody; opt-in RFC 3161 timestamps; suppression signing built but not reachable). Use `--compliance hipaa` or `--compliance soc2,hipaa` for dual-framework reports from a single scan. **Zero BAA required** — Zero Data Exfiltration architecture means ePHI never leaves customer infrastructure. |
 | — | **NIST CSF 2.0 Compliance Engine (EE 0.10.0)** | Enterprise | NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Core mapping at the auditor-canonical Subcategory level — 13 covered + 10 partial + 83 OOS across 106 of CSF 2.0's 107 Subcategories. Govern function OOS-by-design (GV.SC-04 partial as substrate exception); Respond function OOS-entirely; Implementation Tiers 1-4 OOS as organizational-maturity claims. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 + CIS Critical Security Controls v8 cross-references baked into `informativeReferences`. Use `--compliance nist-csf` or `--compliance soc2,hipaa,nist-csf` for triple-framework reports from a single scan. |
 | — | **PCI DSS v4.0.1 Compliance Engine (EE 0.11.0)** | Enterprise | PCI DSS v4.0.1 (PCI SSC, June 2024 errata; supersedes v4.0 March 2022; v3.2.1 retired March 31, 2024) mapping at the auditor-canonical sub-requirement level for QSA Report on Compliance workflow — **19 covered + 9 partial + 39 OOS across 67 of ~250 sub-requirements (MVP-67 density)** (Req 7.2.2 down-rated covered→partial in EE 0.19.4 — access-by-job-classification is process/HR-gated). Req 12 Information Security Program OOS-by-design entirely. Req 5 anti-malware + Req 9 physical OOS-entirely. **Defined-vs-Customized Approach discipline per Appendix E** — 15 Defined-only sub-requirements enforced at schema layer. **Cardholder Data Environment (CDE) scope operator-attested** via CDE Data Flow Diagram per Req 1.2.4 + Req 12.5.1. **Card-brand AOC enforcement priority view** (Visa CISP / Mastercard SDP / Amex DSOP / Discover DISC). **4 load-bearing schema enrichments** per control: `controlType` + `approachEligibility` + `cloudProviderAttestation` (AWS / Azure / GCP currently-named AOCs) + `cdeScope`. CAO MVP-deferred to EE 0.11.1. Use `--compliance pci-dss` or `--compliance soc2,hipaa,nist-csf,pci-dss` for quad-framework reports from a single scan. |
@@ -361,7 +363,7 @@ nsauditor-ai scan --host aws --plugins all --compliance soc2 --aws-region all
 - **Global services** (IAM, account-level S3 enumeration) are audited once regardless of `--aws-region`; the S3 auditors resolve **each bucket's own region** and skip + disclose buckets outside the scoped set (closing latent cross-region false-cleans).
 - **MCP `scan_cloud` (Claude Desktop / Claude Code):** the same scoping is a `regions` argument — *omit* it to scan the server-configured `AWS_REGION`, or pass `["all"]` (or a region-code list like `["us-east-1","eu-west-1"]`) to fan out. Omitting does **not** fan out, so a single tool-call stays within Desktop's timeout.
 
-The auditor evidence pack is emitted under `out/` — cover-page Scope Attestation, SHA-256 chain-of-custody sidecars, the suppression workflow and approver identity verification, plus opt-in RFC 3161 trusted-timestamps (`NSAUDITOR_TSA_URL`; never run against a real authority). Ed25519 suppression SIGNING is built and not reachable. EE is available at [`www.nsauditor.com/ai/pricing`](https://www.nsauditor.com/ai/pricing).
+The auditor evidence pack is emitted under `out/` — cover-page Scope Attestation, SHA-256 chain-of-custody sidecars, the suppression workflow and approver identity verification, plus opt-in RFC 3161 trusted-timestamps (`NSAUDITOR_TSA_URL`), exercised against a live TSA on both the npm path and the `:0.33.0` container image. Ed25519 suppression SIGNING is built and not reachable. EE is available at [`www.nsauditor.com/ai/pricing`](https://www.nsauditor.com/ai/pricing).
 
 ---
 
@@ -858,8 +860,10 @@ NSAUDITOR_OFFLINE_ONLY=1          # Exact match on '1'. Forbids outbound: CVE ma
                                   # clean. Also VETOES the two settings below — configuring an offline
                                   # posture and an outbound destination together is a startup error,
                                   # never a quiet downgrade to weaker evidence.
-NSAUDITOR_TSA_URL=                # RFC 3161 Time-Stamp Authority endpoint. NO DEFAULT, EVER — unset
-                                  # means the feature is absent, not "use a vendor default".
+NSAUDITOR_TSA_URL=                # RFC 3161 Time-Stamp Authority endpoint, opt-in. Proven against a
+                                  # live TSA on the npm path AND from inside the :0.33.0 container
+                                  # image; :0.32.11 and earlier carry no openssl. NO DEFAULT, EVER —
+                                  # unset means the feature is absent, not "use a vendor default".
 NSAUDITOR_TSA_CERT_CHAIN=         # Path to the TSA certificate chain (PEM), for offline verification
 NSAUDITOR_TSA_POLICY_OID=         # Optional policy OID to request from the TSA
 NSAUDITOR_IDENTITY_REGISTRY=      # Path to the approver identity registry JSON. Binds the humans named
@@ -869,17 +873,35 @@ NSAUDITOR_SIGNING_KEY=            # A REFERENCE, never key material: keychain:LA
                                   # (mode 0600) | awskms:alias/… — see the honesty note below.
 ```
 
-Two of these are deliberately **not** capabilities yet, and saying so here is the point:
+One of these is deliberately **not** a capability yet and the other is proven on one path only —
+saying which is which is the point:
 
 - **`NSAUDITOR_SIGNING_KEY` is groundwork, and less wired than this note used to say.** EE 0.33.0 stopped parsing it at option-resolution time — a malformed value used to abort the EE stage for a setting nothing reads — so it is now carried through unparsed; `parseSigningRef` / `resolveSigner` hold the parse and the offline veto at the point a key would be used, and no
   shipped entry point signs a suppression, so setting it changes nothing today. It exists
   now because the signature record's `algorithm` and `backend` fields had to be frozen
   *before* the first signature reaches a customer archive — retrofitting that later breaks
   every auditor holding one.
-- **`NSAUDITOR_TSA_URL` is wired but unproven.** The request is built and sent; it has
-  **never been exercised against a real Time-Stamp Authority** — every test to date injects
-  a fake, which proves the plumbing and not the capability. Treat trusted timestamping as
-  roadmap until that live check is published.
+- **`NSAUDITOR_TSA_URL` is wired, and since 2026-08-07 it is proven — on the npm path only.**
+  The live check this note used to say was outstanding has been run: through the installed
+  binary, against a real Time-Stamp Authority, the auditor procedure `openssl ts -verify`
+  returns OK on the compliance report, the scope attestation and the chain of custody; the
+  same response file checked against a one-byte-mutated copy of the artifact returns FAILED,
+  so the OK is a statement about those exact bytes and not about the command having run.
+  ⚠️ The Marketplace container is a second delivery vehicle and was a separate question,
+  because the implementation shells out to the `openssl` binary and a distroless runtime
+  does not carry one unless it was deliberately put there. **It was deliberately put there
+  for `:0.33.0`**: the image now carries the openssl CLI and libs, and a build-blocking gate
+  proves it by building a real `openssl ts -query` request through the shipped module INSIDE
+  the image before the leg is allowed to push. That check is made by RUNNING the image, never
+  by reading the Dockerfile — a negative from a broken probe reads exactly like a negative
+  from a missing binary, so the gate exits 2 rather than 1 when its own positive control
+  fails. **And the live round-trip has now been run too** (2026-08-08): the shipped signing
+  function was driven from inside the pushed `:0.33.0` image against a real authority,
+  returning a genuine `.tsr` that the image's own `openssl` verified — with a one-byte-appended
+  copy returning FAILED, so the OK is a statement about those bytes rather than about the
+  command running. Both delivery vehicles are therefore proven end to end. **The one container
+  caveat that survives is version scope:** retained images at `:0.32.11` and earlier do not
+  carry the binary at all, so nothing here speaks for them.
 
 **Security overrides:**
 

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "nsauditor-ai",
-  "version": "0.2.37",
+  "version": "0.2.38",
   "description": "Modular AI-assisted network security audit platform — Community Edition",
   "type": "module",
   "private": false,