nsauditor-ai 0.1.64 → 0.1.65

package/README.md

@@ -17,7 +17,9 @@ NSAuditor AI is the open-source core of a privacy-first security intelligence pl
 
 ## What's New
 
-- **CE 0.1.64** (current) — paired with **EE 0.7.0** (May 2026). **24 enterprise plugins** across AWS / Azure / GCP, mapped to 10 fully-covered + 4 partial AICPA TSC controls. **MINOR-VERSION MILESTONE** opening the v0.7.x cross-cloud-parity line with **NEW plugin 1025 GCP IAM Project-Level Auditor** — first plugin in the GCP-IAM-deep-audit cohort; mirrors plugin 1030 AWS IAM Deep Auditor's shadow-admin discipline adapted to the GCP IAM data model. 3 audit dimensions: project-scope public-member bindings (CC6.1; allUsers = CRITICAL, allAuthenticatedUsers = HIGH at the project root), admin-equivalent role inventory across 12 predefined sensitive roles (CC6.1 + CC6.6 substrate evidence), IAM Conditions classifier on sensitive-role bindings (CC6.1 narrowing substrate; restrictive CEL = PASS, absent on sensitive = MEDIUM, vacuous = LOW + evidenceGap). 11 new soc2.json mappings. Plugin count 23 → 24; coverage matrix UNCHANGED at 10/4/33.
+- **CE 0.1.65** (current) — paired with **EE 0.7.1** (May 2026). **24 enterprise plugins** across AWS / Azure / GCP, mapped to 10 fully-covered + 4 partial AICPA TSC controls. **EE-RT.22 v2 plugin 1025 R2 expansion** — extends GCP IAM Project-Level Auditor from 3 dims to **7 dims**: + custom-role permission audit (CC6.1; `*` wildcard = CRITICAL, admin-equivalent permission intersection across 16-entry allowlist = HIGH) + SA key custody (CC6.1 + C1.1; user-managed keys = HIGH; 90-day rotation narrative-uplift threshold) + SA impersonation graph BFS (CC6.1; mirrors plugin 1030 shadow-admin BFS adapted to GCP — 2-hop = HIGH, 3+ hop = CRITICAL; per-PATH visited Set + depth cap = 4; project-scope grants surface independently as CRITICAL) + Organization Policy constraint enumeration (CC6.6 + C1.1; 4 sensitive constraints incl. `iam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreation`). NEW `utils/gcp_auth.mjs` honors `GOOGLE_IMPERSONATE_SERVICE_ACCOUNT` env var. **17 same-session reviewer folds applied — NEW HIGH-WATER MARK** vs 0.7.0's 12 (1 R-CRITICAL EE-RT.20 class recurrence catch + 7 R-HIGH + 8 R-MEDIUM + 1 R-LOW(+1 grouped)). **+22 new soc2.json mappings** (plugin 1025 total 11 → 33). **Plugin count UNCHANGED at 24**; coverage matrix UNCHANGED at 10/4/33 (pure substrate-evidence depth uplift). NEW SDK deps: `googleapis` + `@google-cloud/org-policy` in optionalDependencies.
+
+- **CE 0.1.64** — paired with **EE 0.7.0** (May 2026). **MINOR-VERSION MILESTONE** opening the v0.7.x cross-cloud-parity line with **NEW plugin 1025 GCP IAM Project-Level Auditor (EE-RT.22 v1)**; 3 audit dimensions (project-scope public-member bindings + sensitive-role inventory + IAM Conditions classifier). Plugin count 23 → 24. 12 same-session reviewer folds (clean pass). 11 new soc2.json mappings.
 
 For prior releases, see [CHANGELOG.md](./CHANGELOG.md).
 
@@ -203,7 +205,7 @@ Results land in `./out/<host>_<timestamp>/`:
 | 1022 | Azure Cloud Scanner | Enterprise | NSG rules + RBAC role assignments + Storage account hardening. **CC6.1 / CC6.6 / C1.1** |
 | 1023 | Zero Trust Checker | Enterprise | Segmentation, encryption, identity, lateral-movement scoring across the network surface. **CC6.1 / CC6.6** |
 | 1024 | GCP Cloud Storage Auditor | Enterprise | Multi-cloud parity sister of plugin 1020 AWS S3. 6 dimensions: bucket-level IAM public bindings (allUsers = CRITICAL, allAuthenticatedUsers = HIGH), Uniform Bucket-Level Access (closes legacy bucket-ACL false-PASS class), Object Versioning, Bucket Lock retention policy (SEC 17a-4 / FINRA 4511 WORM-alignment), CMEK via Cloud KMS (four-tier custody ladder), bucket-level access logging. **CC6.1 / CC6.6 / CC7.1 / C1.1 / C1.2 / A1.2** |
-| 1025 | GCP IAM Project-Level Auditor | Enterprise | First plugin in the v0.7.x GCP-IAM-deep-audit cohort. Mirrors plugin 1030 AWS IAM Deep Auditor's shadow-admin discipline adapted to the GCP IAM data model. 3 dimensions: project-scope public-member bindings (allUsers = CRITICAL, allAuthenticatedUsers = HIGH at the project root), admin-equivalent role inventory across 12 predefined sensitive roles, IAM Conditions classifier on sensitive-role bindings (restrictive CEL = PASS, absent on sensitive = MEDIUM, vacuous = LOW + evidenceGap). **CC6.1 / CC6.6** |
+| 1025 | GCP IAM Project-Level Auditor (v2 — EE 0.7.1) | Enterprise | First plugin in the v0.7.x GCP-IAM-deep-audit cohort. Mirrors plugin 1030 AWS IAM Deep Auditor's shadow-admin discipline adapted to the GCP IAM data model. **7 dimensions (EE 0.7.1 v2 expansion):** project-scope public-member bindings (allUsers = CRITICAL, allAuthenticatedUsers = HIGH at the project root), admin-equivalent role inventory across 12 predefined sensitive roles, IAM Conditions classifier on sensitive-role bindings (restrictive CEL = PASS, absent on sensitive = MEDIUM, vacuous = LOW + evidenceGap), **custom-role permission audit** (`*` wildcard = CRITICAL; admin-equivalent permission intersection across 16-entry allowlist = HIGH), **SA key custody** (user-managed long-lived keys = HIGH; 90-day rotation threshold uplift), **SA impersonation graph BFS** (transitive `serviceAccountTokenCreator`/`User`/`OpenIdTokenCreator` chains — 2-hop = HIGH, 3+ hop = CRITICAL; project-scope grants surface independently as CRITICAL), **Organization Policy constraint enumeration** (4 sensitive constraints incl. `iam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreation`). Honors `GOOGLE_IMPERSONATE_SERVICE_ACCOUNT` via `utils/gcp_auth.mjs`. **CC6.1 / CC6.6 / C1.1** |
 | 1030 | AWS IAM Deep Auditor | Enterprise | Shadow-admin path detection via BFS over PassRole / AssumeRole / federated trust. Restrictive-Condition allowlist for Auth0 / Okta / Cognito OIDC patterns. **CC6.1** |
 | 1040 | AWS CloudTrail Operational Integrity | Enterprise | Trail health + CloudWatch alarm coverage against CIS AWS Benchmark §3.1–3.14 + AWS Config + cross-account S3 trail-destination WORM verification (SEC 17a-4 / FINRA 4511). **CC7.2 / CC7.3** |
 | 1050 | AWS API Gateway Assurance | Enterprise | Per-route authz classifier (`NONE`=CRITICAL), custom-domain TLS policy, stage-level access logging + WAF, public-endpoint exposure. Entry-point evidence for serverless deployments. **CC6.1 / CC6.6 / CC6.7 / CC7.1 / A1.2** |

package/mcp_server.mjs

@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ export function _setValidateHost(fn) {
 //
 // Why this exists: even after CE 0.1.34 embedded the resolved tier and CE 0.1.35
 // added a CLI provenance footer, Claude Desktop was empirically observed
-// (2026-05-09, kankanyan@gmail.com) fabricating list_plugins responses
+// (operator session, 2026-05-09) fabricating list_plugins responses
 // WITHOUT routing to this server (per-server log: 0 tools/call entries
 // while other configured MCP servers received 50+ in the same session).
 // A fabricated response can copy any text it has seen — including version

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "nsauditor-ai",
-  "version": "0.1.64",
+  "version": "0.1.65",
   "description": "Modular AI-assisted network security audit platform — Community Edition",
   "type": "module",
   "private": false,