nsauditor-ai-agent-skill 0.2.48 → 0.2.50
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +48 -0
- package/README.md +7 -3
- package/SKILL.md +64 -3
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/references/plugins.md +1 -1
- package/references/workflows.md +13 -1
package/CHANGELOG.md
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@@ -4,6 +4,54 @@ Release notes for **`nsauditor-ai-agent-skill`** — installable knowledge packa
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## 0.2.50 (2026-09-07) — the NTP-withdrawal release
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Paired with **Enterprise 0.45.0 / Community 0.2.52**. **NOT a floor bump: Community stays `>= 0.2.49`.**
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**The teaching change is a REFUSAL rule: the NTP clock attestation is WITHDRAWN.** `utils/ntp_probe.mjs`
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is deleted, the compliance phase's clock stage is a withdrawal record, and the three `complianceNtp*`
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options are gone. An agent must not describe it, offer it, or plan around it.
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**WITHDRAWN, and never real: there is no `NSAUDITOR_NTP_*` environment variable and there never was one.**
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**`COMPLIANCE_NTP_STRICT` is WITHDRAWN too** — it was published to auditors and read by zero code in
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either repo. **It is not on a roadmap either**, which inverts the
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previous guidance: a hedge like "planned" or "not yet wired" is now a promise about unscheduled work
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rather than a disclosure.
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**Why, because a user will ask.** The probe accepted any reply of at least 48 bytes carrying a non-null
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transmit timestamp and nothing else — no mode byte, no stratum check, no originate-timestamp echo — so
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over unauthenticated UDP a datagram of the right shape produced a false clean reading, or a false abort
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in strict mode, while the word printed beside it was *attestation*. And it measured the SCANNER's own
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host clock, while every framework control about time synchronisation (PCI DSS 10.6.1, NIST SP 800-171 3.3.7, ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.8.17 and CIS v8 8.4 — and NOT NIST CSF 2.0, which has no time-synchronisation subcategory at all) asks about the customer's estate.
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**Point users at opt-in RFC 3161 timestamping instead** — `NSAUDITOR_TSA_URL`, an outbound call to a
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third party and off by default; the `.tsr` time comes from the authority rather than from this host.
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**⚠️ The attestation's SHAPE did not change.** `scan_attestation_<fw>.json` still carries all six `ntp`
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keys, now as constants, because the envelope is a frozen schema id and every pack a customer already
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holds carries them. A null `probedAt` is not a failed probe.
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Plugin catalog UNCHANGED at 29 EE; all eight coverage matrices UNCHANGED.
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---
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## 0.2.49 (2026-09-04) — the client-report release
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Paired with **Enterprise 0.44.0 / Community 0.2.51**. **NOT a floor bump: Community stays `>= 0.2.49`.**
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- **New teaching: the Pro `report` subcommand.** `nsauditor-ai report --from <dir> --format
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executive|jira` turns a completed run into a client-facing HTML report or a Jira-importer CSV, with
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`--run`, `--brand`, `--out` and `--allow-partial`. Two limits an agent must state rather than
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discover: the Jira import mapping has not been verified against a live Jira instance, and a
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value-less flag is a fatal error rather than a silent default.
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- **New teaching: an S3 audit-trail gap now means BOTH streams are missing.** Plugin 1020
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cross-checks CloudTrail data-event coverage before reporting a missing server access log, and emits
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positive substrate naming the covering trail instead. A gap disappearing after upgrade on a covered
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bucket is the fix working. Every uncertain answer — denied read, absent optional SDK, stopped trail,
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delivery error, prefix-scoped or one-sided selector — keeps the finding unchanged.
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- Plugin catalog unchanged at 29 EE; all eight coverage matrices unchanged.
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---
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## 0.2.48 (2026-09-02) — paired with EE 0.43.0: teach what a provider badge means, and what an evidence gap must not say
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**Two teaching changes, both about how to READ a scan rather than how to run one.**
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package/README.md
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@@ -11,7 +11,11 @@ Works with **Claude Code**, **Claude Desktop**, **Cursor**, **Windsurf**, **VS C
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## Current release
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**0.2.
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**0.2.50** — paired with **Enterprise 0.45.0 / Community 0.2.52**. ⚠️ **NOT a floor bump: Community stays >= 0.2.49.** New in this release's teaching, and it is a REFUSAL rule before it is a feature note: **the NTP clock attestation is WITHDRAWN** — the probe is deleted, the three `complianceNtp*` options are gone, there is no `NSAUDITOR_NTP_*` environment variable and there never was one, and it is NOT on a roadmap, so a hedge like "planned" is now a promise rather than a disclosure. The probe validated any reply of at least 48 bytes with a non-null transmit timestamp and nothing else — no mode byte, no stratum, no originate echo — and it measured the SCANNER's clock while every framework control about time synchronisation asks about the customer's estate. Point users at **opt-in RFC 3161 timestamping** instead (`NSAUDITOR_TSA_URL`; an outbound call to a third party, off by default), whose `.tsr` time comes from the authority rather than from the host. ⚠️ **The attestation's shape did NOT change** — all six `ntp` keys remain, now constants, because the envelope is a frozen schema id; a null `probedAt` is not a failed probe.
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**Prior: 0.2.49** — paired with **Enterprise 0.44.0 / Community 0.2.51**. ⚠️ **NOT a floor bump: Community stays >= 0.2.49.** New in this release's teaching: **there is a Pro `report` subcommand** (`nsauditor-ai report --from <dir> --format executive|jira`) that turns a completed run into a client-facing HTML report or a Jira-importer CSV — with two limits an agent should state rather than let a user discover: the Jira import mapping has not been verified against a live Jira instance, and a value-less flag is a fatal error rather than a silent default; and **an S3 audit-trail gap now means BOTH streams are missing** (plugin 1020 cross-checks CloudTrail data-event coverage before reporting a missing server access log, so a gap disappearing after upgrade on a covered bucket is the fix working, while every uncertain answer — denied read, absent optional SDK, stopped trail, delivery error, prefix-scoped or one-sided selector — keeps the finding unchanged).
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**Prior: 0.2.48** — paired with **Enterprise 0.43.0 / Community 0.2.50**. ⚠️ **NOT a floor bump: Community stays >= 0.2.49**, derived rather than reflexive — the one Community behaviour the Enterprise fix depends on already shipped there. New in this release's teaching: **a provider badge is now trustworthy** (an Enterprise scan whose cloud SDK failed to load used to report that provider as *audited*, because a plugin result carrying neither an error nor a skip flag falls through to `ran` and `auditedProviders` derives from `ran`; eighteen refusals across seventeen AWS and GCP plugins now carry their cause, so such a provider reads `errored` and drops out — a provider disappearing after upgrade is the fix, not a regression), and **an evidence gap states a cause, never an instruction** (the engine quoted whole thrown messages, so the loaders' `Install: npm install <pkg>@latest` reached the gap text of 7 SOC 2 / 2 GDPR / 12 NIST SP 800-171 controls — never quote a gap line to a user as remediation, and note that under air-gapped operation it cannot be followed at all). The two causes are now distinct — `plugin skipped:` vs `scanner error:` — because the remedies differ; and a GDPR Art. 32 report now fails closed on an Azure refusal where it previously failed nothing.
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**Prior: 0.2.47** — paired with **Enterprise 0.42.0 / Community 0.2.49**. ⚠️ **A real floor bump: Community >= 0.2.49.**
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├── references/
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│ ├── workflows.md # Multi-step workflow recipes (full audit, CI/CD, CTEM)
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│ ├── schemas.md # Complete data structures (scan results, CVEs, findings)
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│ └── plugins.md # Full plugin catalog (
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│ └── plugins.md # Full plugin catalog (56 scanners with ports & protocols — 27 Community + 29 Enterprise)
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├── examples/
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│ └── agent-interactions.md # Example agent reasoning chains (9 scenarios)
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├── package.json
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| **Workflow patterns** | Multi-step chains: scan → CVE lookup → remediation report |
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| **Schema knowledge** | Complete data structures for parsing and presenting results |
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| **CPE construction** | How to map detected services to NVD vulnerability lookups |
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| **Plugin awareness** |
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| **Plugin awareness** | 56 scanner plugins (27 Community + 29 Enterprise) with protocols, ports, capabilities, and multi-framework (SOC 2 · HIPAA §164.312 · NIST CSF 2.0 · PCI DSS v4.0.1 · ISO/IEC 27001:2022 · CIS Controls v8 · GDPR Art. 32 · NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2) substrate-evidence dimensions |
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| **Compliance frameworks** | **Eight frameworks, one scan** — SOC 2 (AICPA TSC 2017) · HIPAA Security Rule §164.312 Technical Safeguards (HHS Required/Addressable discipline per control) · NIST CSF 2.0 (Subcategory-level) · PCI DSS v4.0.1 (QSA RoC sub-requirement-level) · ISO/IEC 27001:2022 (per-Annex-A-code, SoA discipline) · CIS Controls v8 (per-Safeguard; Implementation Group IG1/IG2/IG3 cumulative discipline) · GDPR Article 32 (sub-measure-level; **Art. 32 infrastructure substrate only, NOT GDPR compliance**) · NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 (requirement-level for the matrix, SP 800-171A determination-statement level for evidence; **examine-method evidence substrate for CMMC Level 2 preparation — never a CMMC certification and never a MET/NOT MET verdict**). All via `--compliance all`, or any CSV subset via `--compliance soc2,hipaa,nist-csf,pci-dss,iso-27001,cis-v8,gdpr,nist-800-171`. Zero BAA required for HIPAA — ePHI never leaves customer infrastructure. |
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| **Security rules** | ZDE, SSRF protection, redaction, scan authorization requirements |
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| **Error handling** | License gates, SSRF blocks, timeout resolution, CPE format errors |
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package/SKILL.md
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# NSAuditor AI — Agent Skill
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> **Version:** 0.2.
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> **Version:** 0.2.50 (knowledge current as of **EE 0.45.0** · **requires CE ≥ 0.2.49**) — the NTP-withdrawal release.
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> **What EE 0.
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> **What EE 0.45.0 teaches, and it is a REFUSAL rule before it is a feature note.**
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> **⚠️ THE NTP CLOCK ATTESTATION IS WITHDRAWN. Do not describe it, offer it, or plan around it.**
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> `utils/ntp_probe.mjs` is deleted, the compliance phase's clock stage is a withdrawal record, and the
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> three options that gated it are gone.
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> **WITHDRAWN and never real: there is no `NSAUDITOR_NTP_*` environment variable, and there never was.**
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> **`COMPLIANCE_NTP_STRICT` is WITHDRAWN as well** — published to auditors, read by zero code in either
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> repo. If a user asks how the scanner measures clock drift, the answer is that it does not — and the
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> honest next sentence names the opt-in RFC 3161 path, which is off unless a Time-Stamp Authority is
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> configured. **It is NOT on a roadmap:** a hedge like "planned" or "not yet wired" is now a promise
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> about work nobody has scheduled, which is the opposite of the disclosure it used to be.
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> **Why it was withdrawn rather than finished, because a user will ask and the reason is teachable.**
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> The probe accepted any reply of at least 48 bytes carrying a non-null transmit timestamp and nothing
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> else — no mode byte, no stratum check, no originate-timestamp echo — so over unauthenticated UDP a
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> datagram of the right shape produced a false clean reading, or a false abort in strict mode, while
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> the word printed beside it was *attestation*. **And it answered the wrong question:** it measured the
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> SCANNER's own host clock, while every framework control that asks about time synchronisation —
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> PCI DSS 10.6.1, NIST SP 800-171 3.3.7, ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.8.17 and CIS v8 8.4 — asks about the
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> CUSTOMER's estate, which this probe never read. ⚠️ **NIST CSF 2.0 is deliberately NOT in that list:
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> it has no time-synchronisation subcategory at all.** Its `PR.PS-04` is *log-record generation*, which
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> DEPENDS on accurate clocks without asking about them — do not cite it as a clock control.
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> **What to point at instead: RFC 3161 trusted timestamping, untouched and opt-in.** Set
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> `NSAUDITOR_TSA_URL` to a Time-Stamp Authority and each artifact ships a `.tsr` sidecar whose time
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> comes from the AUTHORITY, not from this host, so a wrong host clock cannot corrupt it. An assessor
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> comparing the pack's `generatedAt` against the token's signing time reads host skew more reliably
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> than the withdrawn probe ever could, with a signature behind it. ⚠️ It is an OUTBOUND call to a third
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> party and off by default — say both when you recommend it.
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> **⚠️ THE ATTESTATION'S SHAPE DID NOT CHANGE, and that matters when you help someone diff two packs.**
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> `scan_attestation_<fw>.json` still carries all six `ntp` keys — `driftSeconds`, `source`, `note`,
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> `probedAt`, `error`, `staleness` — now as constants, because `nsauditor.scope-attestation/v1` is a
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> frozen schema id and every pack a customer already holds carries them. `staleness.status` is
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> `unknown` and its `reason` names the withdrawal. **A null `probedAt` is not a failed probe.**
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> Plugin catalog UNCHANGED at 29 EE; all eight coverage matrices UNCHANGED; **peer floor UNCHANGED at
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> CE ≥ 0.2.49** — derived, not a bump. CE 0.2.52 changes no scanner behaviour.
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>
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> **Prior: 0.2.49** — what EE 0.44.0 / CE 0.2.51 taught, and both items were about what a REPORT may claim.
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> **(1) There is a `report` subcommand now, and it is Pro-gated.**
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> `nsauditor-ai report --from <dir> --format executive|jira` turns a completed scan run under
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> `--from` into a client-facing deliverable — an HTML report a consultant sends to their
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> customer, or a Jira-importer CSV. `--run <id>` reports a specific run instead of the newest,
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> `--brand <brand.json>` adds cover-page branding to the executive format, `--out <path>`
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> overrides the destination, `--allow-partial` renders an incomplete run with the caveat stated
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> on the cover. Exit **0** rendered · **1** fix the RUN · **2** fix the REQUEST. ⚠️ Two things to
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> teach a user rather than discover for them: **the Jira import mapping is done in Jira and has
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> not been verified against a live Jira instance** (say so when you hand over the CSV), and a
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> value-less `--from`/`--brand`/`--run`/`--out` is a **fatal error, not a silent default**.
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> **(2) An S3 audit-trail gap now means BOTH streams are missing.** Plugin 1020 used to report
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> *"Access logging not enabled – audit trail gap"* from the bucket's own server access log alone,
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> so a bucket whose object reads and writes a CloudTrail data-event trail already recorded was
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> reported as a gap. It now cross-checks CloudTrail and, where a trail positively covers the
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> bucket, emits positive substrate naming that trail instead. ⚠️ **A gap that DISAPPEARS after
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> upgrade on a bucket covered by a trail is the fix working, not a regression** — the same shape
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> as the provider badge below. Every uncertain answer keeps the finding unchanged: a denied
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> CloudTrail read, an absent optional SDK, a stopped trail, a trail with a delivery error, a
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> prefix-scoped or one-sided selector, a region not reached. The cross-check's own status is
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> reported once in the scan summary with its declared limits, so *"the gap persisted"* and *"the
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> cross-check could not run"* are distinguishable. SOC 2 CC7.1, HIPAA §164.312(b) and NIST SP
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> 800-171 3.12.3 rationales were reworded accordingly — they no longer call server access logs
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> the sole record of object-level access.
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> Plugin catalog UNCHANGED at 29 EE; all eight coverage matrices UNCHANGED; **peer floor
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> UNCHANGED at CE ≥ 0.2.49** — derived, not a bump.
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> **Prior: 0.2.48** — what EE 0.43.0 taught, and both items are about READING a scan rather than running one.
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> **(1) A provider badge is now trustworthy, and it was not before.** An Enterprise scan whose
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> cloud SDK failed to load reported that provider as **audited**: eighteen refusals across
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> failed nothing. Plugin catalog UNCHANGED at 29 EE; all eight coverage matrices UNCHANGED;
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> **What EE 0.42.0 taught:** **Non-commercial AWS partitions and Azure sovereign clouds are now first-class, and both REFUSE rather than silently reporting on the wrong estate.** When you drive a scan against GovCloud, China, an ISO partition or the European Sovereign Cloud, findings that previously read CLEAN now fire: a public S3 access point riding a bucket delegation, IAM privilege-escalation at CRITICAL (it demoted to HIGH before), shadow-admin graph edges that were missing entirely, and the full effective-decrypt severity ladder (it collapsed to `info`). **THE ID→DEFECT MAPPING, HERE ON THE ALWAYS-LOADED SURFACE because a reader asked for it BY ID got "no source confirming there was a partition-side fix" while it sat in an on-demand reference (measured 2026-08-28):** `1020` S3 access point riding a bucket delegation · `1030` IAM privesc severity + shadow-admin edges · `1110` KMS effective-decrypt ladder · `1050` API Gateway policy classification + SSRF parsers · `1200` alerting-destination liveness · `1040` region denominator. ⚠️ Do NOT attribute the S3 case to `1110` or the decrypt ladder to `1050` — those are the pre-fix misattributions. Pre-0.42.0 non-commercial reports are unproven on THOSE FAMILIES; findings outside them stand. For Azure, `AZURE_ENVIRONMENT` / `ARM_ENVIRONMENT` / `AZURE_ARM_ENDPOINT` / `AZURE_AUTHORITY_HOST` now select the cloud — and an unrecognised or self-contradicting selection **refuses the scan and emits an evidence gap naming the variable that fixes it**, because falling back to commercial is how an operator holding both commercial and sovereign credentials gets a real, clean-looking report about an estate they did not mean. **Every Azure scan stamps the estate it addressed — but WHERE it lands is channel-specific and the Desktop channel does NOT carry it.** On the CLI/report path the stamp rides the evidence stream and the concluder summary. Through MCP it does NOT: `get_findings` iterates `result.findings` with no `result.data` fallback, and the cloud summariser short-circuits on a non-nullish `findings[]` (an EMPTY array is non-nullish, so a genuinely clean Azure scan — the exact case you would want it for — still never reaches `data[]`). **So on Desktop you CANNOT name the estate on a clean Azure result: say that you cannot confirm which estate was addressed and that the operator must check the CLI or the selector variables — never guess one.** On the REFUSAL path the estate IS visible, because it is written into the gap finding's own text. Also new: the SBOM gate (`npm run gate:sbom`) emits CycloneDX/SPDX over *the installed package* rather than the source tree — ⚠️ **but it is a MAINTAINER-side repository script: `scripts/` ships ZERO files in the customer tarball, so an installed package CANNOT run that command** (the npm script entry ships; the script it points at does not). **Never hand `npm run gate:sbom` to an end user as something to run against their install** — that is a published instruction that cannot succeed; the SBOM is generated from a repository checkout and provided on request. And `docs/fips-posture.md` states approved *algorithms*, explicitly not a validated *module* — do not let a user infer FIPS 140 validation from it; whether the RUNTIME beneath the product is a validated module is a property of the operator's platform, not of this product. **Plugin count UNCHANGED at 29; all eight coverage matrices UNCHANGED.**
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> **Prior:** 0.2.47 (post-EE-0.42.0 · **requires CE ≥ 0.2.49**) — the sovereign-cloud release.
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>
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package/package.json
CHANGED
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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1
1
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{
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2
2
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"name": "nsauditor-ai-agent-skill",
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3
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-
"version": "0.2.
|
|
3
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+
"version": "0.2.50",
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|
4
4
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"description": "AI Agent Skill for NSAuditor AI \u2014 gives any AI coding agent built-in knowledge of NSAuditor's MCP tools, schemas, plugins, and security audit workflows.",
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5
5
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"keywords": [
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|
6
6
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"nsauditor",
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package/references/plugins.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ listings, and default pages.
|
|
|
215
215
|
|
|
216
216
|
| ID | Name | Tier | Purpose | SOC 2 Controls |
|
|
217
217
|
|----|------|------|---------|----------------|
|
|
218
|
-
| 1020 | AWS Cloud Scanner | Enterprise | S3 bucket hardening (PAB, encryption, versioning, Object Lock, MFA Delete
|
|
218
|
+
| 1020 | AWS Cloud Scanner | Enterprise | S3 bucket hardening (PAB, encryption, versioning, Object Lock, MFA Delete) + object-access audit trail as a JOIN of server access logging AND CloudTrail S3 data-event coverage — a bucket a trail records is not a gap; any uncertain answer keeps the finding | C1.1 / C1.2 / CC7.1 |
|
|
219
219
|
| 1021 | GCP Cloud Scanner | Enterprise | Firewall rule audit + IAM bindings + Storage bucket public-access | CC6.1 / CC6.6 / C1.1 |
|
|
220
220
|
| 1022 | Azure Cloud Scanner | Enterprise | NSG rule analysis + RBAC role assignments + Storage account hardening | CC6.1 / CC6.6 / C1.1 |
|
|
221
221
|
| 1023 | Zero Trust Checker | Enterprise | Segmentation + encryption + identity + lateral movement scoring (reads OBSERVED open ports) | CC6.6 |
|
package/references/workflows.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ AI_ENABLED=true AI_PROVIDER=openai OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-... OPENAI_REDACT=true \
|
|
|
219
219
|
| `scan_response_ai_payload.json` | Redacted payload sent to AI |
|
|
220
220
|
| `scan_response_ai.html` | Styled HTML report with CVE links, severity badges |
|
|
221
221
|
| `scan_response_ai.txt` | AI vulnerability assessment in markdown |
|
|
222
|
+
| `scan_run_<runId>.json` | **Per-run scan record** — written at the ROOT of `--out` (one level above the per-host folders) at run start, appended per host, finalized at the end. It is what `report` is built from, and what lets a report cover STATE its coverage (hosts requested / written / reachable) instead of implying it. On the free tier these are pruned after a retention window. |
|
|
222
223
|
|
|
223
224
|
### AI Prompt Modes
|
|
224
225
|
|
|
@@ -273,7 +274,18 @@ User wants to...
|
|
|
273
274
|
├── Compare two scans → CLI: diff the per-run out-dirs (no compare tool)
|
|
274
275
|
├── State framework COVERAGE → compliance_matrix (any tier)
|
|
275
276
|
├── Produce a compliance EVIDENCE PACK → CLI: --compliance <fw> --out <dir> (not MCP)
|
|
276
|
-
|
|
277
|
+
├── Generate a formatted report → CLI: --output-format sarif|csv|md (not MCP)
|
|
278
|
+
└── Produce a CLIENT-FACING report → CLI (Pro): nsauditor-ai report --from <dir>
|
|
279
|
+
--format executive → self-contained print-ready HTML
|
|
280
|
+
(+ --brand <brand.json> for a branded cover)
|
|
281
|
+
--format jira → Jira-importer CSV
|
|
282
|
+
--run <id> | --out <path> | --allow-partial
|
|
283
|
+
exit 0 rendered · 1 fix the RUN · 2 fix the REQUEST
|
|
284
|
+
⚠️ TELL THE USER: the Jira import mapping is done in
|
|
285
|
+
Jira and has NOT been verified against a live Jira
|
|
286
|
+
instance, and the emitted CSV does not carry that
|
|
287
|
+
caveat — you must hand it over with the file.
|
|
288
|
+
⚠️ --brand with --format jira is REFUSED, not ignored.
|
|
277
289
|
```
|
|
278
290
|
|
|
279
291
|
---
|