nsauditor-ai-agent-skill 0.2.38 → 0.2.39

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,19 @@ Release notes for **`nsauditor-ai-agent-skill`** — installable knowledge packa
 
 ---
 
+## 0.2.39 (2026-08-13) — post-EE 0.36.0: the report verifies the signatures it renders
+
+**Requires CE >= 0.2.40** (unchanged — nothing this cycle needs new CE code).
+
+Enterprise 0.36.0 makes every compliance report cryptographically verify each suppression signature — the Ed25519 suppression-signing capability this exercises stays **not yet proven**, its verification gate not having run against published bytes — writing `report.signatureVerification` beside `identityVerification` in the machine-JSON report. What an agent reading these artifacts must know:
+
+- A **missing** verdict for a suppression means NOT CHECKED, never FAILED. Only `verified: false` is a failure. Do not report an unchecked approval as tampered.
+- `verified` and `cryptoValid` are different questions — should this suppression stand, versus did these bytes come from the named key. They diverge on a revoked key, which is the case that matters.
+- `cryptoValid` is ABSENT when unanswerable and never `false`.
+- `identityVerification.configured` means A REGISTRY IS PRESENT; `signatureVerification.configured` means KEY MATERIAL IS PRESENT. The join of the two is the partial-migration state.
+
+**Ed25519 suppression signing remains reachable and NOT YET PROVEN** — its verification gate has not run against published bytes, so do not describe a produced signature as verified evidence.
+
 ## 0.2.38 (2026-08-12) — post-EE-0.35.0: the suppression-approval commands are reachable
 
 Paired with EE 0.35.0 / CE 0.2.40. Four Enterprise commands reach the CLI — `compliance suppress | review | renew | keygen` — so the suppression-approval workflow has an operator entry point for the first time. ⚠️ The skill's own prose is corrected with them: Ed25519 suppression signing was taught as NOT REACHABLE, which this release makes false. It is now **reachable and not yet proven** — the verification gate has not run against published bytes, so a produced signature must never be presented as verified evidence. Plugin catalog UNCHANGED at 28 EE / 55 overall; all seven matrices UNCHANGED.

package/SKILL.md

@@ -16,7 +16,9 @@ description: >
 
 # NSAuditor AI — Agent Skill
 
-> **Version:** 0.2.38 (post-EE-0.35.0 · **requires CE ≥ 0.2.40**) — the approval-surface release. Four Enterprise commands are now reachable from the CLI: `compliance suppress | review | renew | keygen`. `keygen` creates an Ed25519 approval keypair for a capability that is not yet proven, writes the private half `0600` and prints an identity-registry member to paste; it refuses to overwrite an existing signing key. `suppress` signs the approval it writes when `NSAUDITOR_SIGNING_KEY` names a local Ed25519 key, and a malformed key fails at the command with nothing written. `renew` warns that renewing a signed approval invalidates its signature — the expiry and the renewal record live inside the signed payload, so the record afterwards reads `signature does not match payload`, which an auditor cannot distinguish from real tampering. ⚠️ **Teach this precisely: Ed25519 suppression signing is now REACHABLE and NOT YET PROVEN.** The verification gate has not run against published bytes, so never present a produced signature as verified evidence and never use the bare word "signed" without that qualifier. These commands are CLI-only — they are not MCP-reachable. Plugin catalog UNCHANGED at 28 EE / 55 overall; all seven matrices UNCHANGED.
+> **Version:** 0.2.39 (post-EE-0.36.0 · **requires CE ≥ 0.2.40**) — the verification release. Every compliance report now cryptographically checks each suppression signature — the Ed25519 suppression-signing capability this exercises stays **not yet proven**, its verification gate not having run against published bytes, and writes `report.signatureVerification`. A MISSING verdict means NOT CHECKED, never failed; `cryptoValid` is absent when unanswerable, never `false`. Ed25519 suppression signing stays **not yet proven** — its gate has not run against published bytes.
+>
+> **Prior:** 0.2.38 (post-EE-0.35.0 · **requires CE ≥ 0.2.40**) — the approval-surface release. Four Enterprise commands are now reachable from the CLI: `compliance suppress | review | renew | keygen`. `keygen` creates an Ed25519 approval keypair for a capability that is not yet proven, writes the private half `0600` and prints an identity-registry member to paste; it refuses to overwrite an existing signing key. `suppress` signs the approval it writes when `NSAUDITOR_SIGNING_KEY` names a local Ed25519 key, and a malformed key fails at the command with nothing written. `renew` warns that renewing a signed approval invalidates its signature — the expiry and the renewal record live inside the signed payload, so the record afterwards reads `signature does not match payload`, which an auditor cannot distinguish from real tampering. ⚠️ **Teach this precisely: Ed25519 suppression signing is now REACHABLE and NOT YET PROVEN.** The verification gate has not run against published bytes, so never present a produced signature as verified evidence and never use the bare word "signed" without that qualifier. These commands are CLI-only — they are not MCP-reachable. Plugin catalog UNCHANGED at 28 EE / 55 overall; all seven matrices UNCHANGED.
 >
 > **Prior:** 0.2.37 (post-EE-0.34.0 · **requires CE ≥ 0.2.39**) — the exploit-intelligence release. Enterprise findings that carry CVEs are joined by CVE-ID against a local **CISA KEV** catalog and a local **FIRST EPSS** scores file, banded `KNOWN_EXPLOITED` / `ELEVATED` / `BASELINE`, and the finding queue is ordered exploit-first — a KEV-listed MEDIUM outranks an unexploited CRITICAL. ⚠️ Teach this accurately: **no feed data ships with the product.** Both stores are operator-populated via `NSAUDITOR_EXPLOIT_KEV_STORE` / `NSAUDITOR_EXPLOIT_EPSS_STORE`, the same rule as the offline NVD store, and both **fail closed when stale** (KEV 14-day / EPSS 10-day windows) so an out-of-date catalog never reports "not exploited". `riskScore` is UNCHANGED — `exploitPriority` is a new axis beside it, not a re-weighting. ⚠️ One correction to this package's own prose: the risk score is **CVSS weighted by verification status with an initial-access uplift**, not "severity × exploitability × impact × exposure" — that phrasing named an exploitability input that did not exist until this release. Plugin catalog UNCHANGED at 28 EE / 55 overall; all seven matrices UNCHANGED.
 

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "nsauditor-ai-agent-skill",
-  "version": "0.2.38",
+  "version": "0.2.39",
   "description": "AI Agent Skill for NSAuditor AI — gives any AI coding agent built-in knowledge of NSAuditor's MCP tools, schemas, plugins, and security audit workflows.",
   "keywords": [
     "nsauditor",