nsauditor-ai-agent-skill 0.2.29 → 0.2.31

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,20 @@ Release notes for **`nsauditor-ai-agent-skill`** — installable knowledge packa
 
 ---
 
+## 0.2.31 (2026-07-28) — paired content bump for EE 0.32.8 (capability-claim honesty pass, part 2: the air-gapped-delivery class)
+
+- **Two corrections in this package's own tier tables — both were overclaims this skill would otherwise teach an agent to repeat.** `SKILL.md` line 524 listed **"RFC 3161 timestamps"** unhedged among shipping Enterprise capabilities; RFC 3161 timestamping is *implemented but not yet wired to a flag*, so the row now says so explicitly and directs readers not to quote it as shipping. **SHA-256 chain-of-custody is the layer that ships.** Both `SKILL.md` and `README.md` also said **"air-gapped deployment"**, which implied a delivery mechanism that does not exist; both now say **"air-gapped operation (offline licensing + offline CVE matching under `NSAUDITOR_OFFLINE_ONLY=1`)"**.
+- Version line updated to post-EE-0.32.8. Enterprise 0.32.8 is a documentation-and-prose release: **27 withdrawn-claim sites** (distinct lines) across the three published packages, each verified against the code — an arm64 image (the build forces `--platform linux/amd64`), offline-installable tarballs (an `npm pack` tarball still resolves its dependencies from a registry), monthly NVD feed bundles (nothing produces one), an air-gapped installation script (none exists in the tree), a `feed import` CLI command (`importFeed()` has zero non-test callers), and CE's absolute "every feature works without internet access". **Five of the sites were rendered runtime strings, not documentation** — coverage-gap rationales that render verbatim into the assessor-facing evidence pack and named a command that does not exist.
+- No MCP tool, plugin, schema or workflow change. `references/plugins.md` UNCHANGED. Plugin count UNCHANGED at 28; all seven coverage matrices UNCHANGED.
+
+---
+
+## 0.2.30 (2026-07-21) — paired content bump for EE 0.32.7 (cross-framework routing + capability-claim honesty pass)
+
+- Version line updated to post-EE-0.32.7. Enterprise 0.32.7 routes the network-scan analysis agents' findings across **all seven compliance frameworks** (previously SOC 2 only off the same scan) and runs a **capability-claim honesty pass** — several Pro/Enterprise capabilities advertised without a shipping implementation (verification engine, branded reports, usage metering, Docker isolation, and the ZDE "policy engine" / Enterprise-CTEM datastore framings) are withdrawn; the real cores (the code-enforced ZDE read-only guarantee, Pro-tier CTEM retention) ship and are described honestly. Plugin count UNCHANGED at 28; all seven coverage matrices UNCHANGED.
+- **`references/plugins.md` correction:** plugin 040 (TLS Certificate & Cipher Auditor) was credited with HSTS-header verification it does not perform — the missing-HSTS check is the network-scan `crypto_agent`'s. 040's real cert/cipher/chain audit is unchanged.
+- **`SKILL.md` — new cross-framework routing note (closes a Gate-3 MCP-desktop finding).** The shipped skill did not encode the §4B HSTS disposition, so an agent asked about routing semantics would freehand-map Missing HSTS to HIPAA / ISO A.8.9 / CIS 3.10 — the exact overclaim §4B deleted from the engine. Added an authoritative "cite the engine, do not freehand-map" note recording the narrow dispositions (Missing HSTS → **SOC 2 CC6.7 only**; aggregate open-port count + opportunistic/port-inferred cleartext → SOC 2 only; confirmed cleartext → all seven), each firsthand-verified against the real engine. The engine was already correct; this aligns the conversational surface with it.
+
 ## 0.2.29 (2026-07-19) — paired content bump for EE 0.32.6 (network-scan false-negative closures)
 
 - Version line updated to post-EE-0.32.6. Matrix-neutral cycle on the EE analysis-agent (network-scan) path: **cleartext transport** now flagged (a conditional inversion in the crypto agent — a should-be-encrypted service offering no TLS at all used to read clean → **SOC 2 CC6.7**), **SMB-alone** exposure now its own **HIGH** finding (a severity-inverted conjunction in the exposure agent — SMB without RDP is the higher-risk case → **CC6.6**), and **WinRM 5985/5986 · Elasticsearch 9300 · MSRPC 135 · a new aggregate open-port-count rule** as new exposure signals (→ **CC6.6**). Routed SOC 2-first with drift-detector coverage; **SOC 2 routing only this cycle — cross-framework mappings (HIPAA §164.312(e)(1) · CIS 4.x · NIST PR.*) deferred.** Plugin count UNCHANGED at 28; all seven coverage matrices UNCHANGED.

package/README.md

@@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ This package provides **knowledge about** NSAuditor AI. To actually **run** scan
 | Edition | Price | Highlights |
 |---------|-------|-----------|
 | **Community** | Free / MIT | 27 plugins (service probes + host/network discovery + intelligence/meta), basic AI, SARIF, CTEM, scan history |
-| **Pro** | $49/mo | + CVE matching, verification probes, risk scoring, 3 Pro plugins (040 TLS / 050 TRIBE / 060 DNS) |
-| **Enterprise** | $2k+/yr | + 28 cloud-substrate auditor plugins (1020-1222 range; AWS / Azure / GCP seven-framework evidence-pack — SOC 2 / HIPAA / NIST CSF 2.0 / PCI DSS v4.0.1 / ISO 27001:2022 / CIS Controls v8 / GDPR Art. 32), Zero Trust, RFC 3161 timestamps, chain-of-custody attestations, air-gapped deployment |
+| **Pro** | $49/mo | + CVE matching, risk scoring, 3 Pro plugins (040 TLS / 050 TRIBE / 060 DNS) |
+| **Enterprise** | $2k+/yr | + 28 cloud-substrate auditor plugins (1020-1222 range; AWS / Azure / GCP seven-framework evidence-pack — SOC 2 / HIPAA / NIST CSF 2.0 / PCI DSS v4.0.1 / ISO 27001:2022 / CIS Controls v8 / GDPR Art. 32), Zero Trust, SHA-256 chain-of-custody attestations, air-gapped operation (offline licensing + offline CVE matching) |
 
 → [Pricing](https://www.nsauditor.com/ai/pricing/)
 

package/SKILL.md

@@ -16,7 +16,9 @@ description: >
 
 # NSAuditor AI — Agent Skill
 
-> **Version:** 0.2.29 (post-EE-0.32.6 — a **matrix-neutral** false-negative-hardening release on the EE analysis-agent (network-scan) path: **cleartext transport** now flagged where before only weak-TLS-where-TLS-exists was — a conditional inversion in the crypto agent, a should-be-encrypted service offering no TLS at all used to read clean (→ SOC 2 CC6.7); **SMB-alone** exposure now its own **HIGH** finding rather than being silenced by an `SMB && RDP` conjunction — SMB without RDP is the higher-risk case (→ CC6.6); and **WinRM 5985/5986 · Elasticsearch 9300 · MSRPC 135 · a new aggregate open-port-count rule** as new exposure signals (→ CC6.6). Routed SOC 2-first with drift-detector coverage; SOC 2 routing only this cycle — cross-framework mappings (HIPAA §164.312(e)(1) · CIS 4.x · NIST PR.*) deferred. Plugin count UNCHANGED at 28; all seven coverage matrices UNCHANGED.)
+> **Version:** 0.2.31 (post-EE-0.32.8 — a **documentation-and-prose** release, no behaviour change. Capability-claim honesty pass, part 2: the air-gapped-delivery class. **27 withdrawn-claim sites** (distinct lines) across the three published packages, each verified against the code — an arm64 image (the build forces `--platform linux/amd64`), offline-installable tarballs (an `npm pack` tarball still resolves deps from a registry), monthly NVD feed bundles (nothing produces one), an air-gapped install script (none exists), a `feed import` CLI command (`importFeed()` has zero non-test callers), and CE's absolute "every feature works without internet access". **Five of the sites were rendered runtime strings**, not documentation: coverage-gap rationales in `utils/intelligence_engine.mjs` that render verbatim into the assessor-facing evidence pack and named a command that does not exist. **In this skill:** the Enterprise tier row's unhedged "RFC 3161 timestamps" is corrected — RFC 3161 timestamping is implemented but not yet wired to a flag, so **do not describe it as shipping**; SHA-256 chain-of-custody is the layer that ships. "Air-gapped deployment" is now stated as "air-gapped operation (offline licensing + offline CVE matching under `NSAUDITOR_OFFLINE_ONLY=1`)". Plugin count UNCHANGED at 28; all seven coverage matrices UNCHANGED. No MCP tool or plugin schema change.)
+
+> **Prior:** 0.2.30 (post-EE-0.32.7 — a **matrix-neutral** release that does two things. (1) **Cross-framework routing:** the network-scan analysis agents' findings now route in **all seven compliance frameworks**, not just SOC 2 — a host serving cleartext or exposing SMB previously failed the SOC 2 report and read clean in HIPAA / NIST CSF / ISO 27001 / CIS v8 / PCI / GDPR off the same scan; that gap is closed (mutation-proven guard; all seven `coverageSummary` blocks byte-identical). (2) **Capability-claim honesty pass:** several Pro/Enterprise capabilities advertised without a shipping implementation — verification engine, branded reports, usage metering, Docker per-scan isolation, and the ZDE "policy engine" / Enterprise-CTEM datastore framings — are **withdrawn**; the real cores (the code-enforced ZDE read-only guarantee, Pro-tier CTEM retention) ship and are described honestly, and the `verifiers/` stub files no longer ship. Plugin count UNCHANGED at 28; all seven coverage matrices UNCHANGED.)
 
 NSAuditor AI is a modular, AI-assisted network security audit platform with 27+ scanner
 plugins, CVE matching, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, and Zero Data Exfiltration by design. This
@@ -151,6 +153,32 @@ These tools return a license upgrade prompt on CE installations:
 | `compliance_check` | Enterprise | SOC 2 (AICPA TSC 2017) + HIPAA (§164.312 Technical Safeguards) + NIST CSF 2.0 Core + PCI DSS v4.0.1 (sub-requirement-level for QSA RoC; PCI SSC June 2024 errata) + ISO/IEC 27001:2022 (per-Annex-A-code-level for ISO/IEC 17021-1 certification body assessors; ISO + IEC October 2022; 2013 edition retired October 31, 2025) + **CIS Critical Security Controls v8** (per-Safeguard-level; Center for Internet Security May 2021, v8.1 errata June 2024) + **GDPR Article 32 (Security of Processing)** (sub-measure-level; Regulation (EU) 2016/679; **Art. 32 infrastructure substrate only, NOT GDPR compliance**) gap analysis — all seven shipped (SOC 2 EE 0.3.x; HIPAA EE 0.9.0; NIST CSF 2.0 EE 0.10.0; PCI DSS v4.0.1 EE 0.11.0; ISO/IEC 27001:2022 EE 0.12.0; CIS Controls v8 EE 0.13.0; **GDPR Article 32 EE 0.20.0**). Multi-framework via `--compliance all` (shorthand for all seven frameworks; EE 0.31.4) or `--compliance soc2,hipaa,nist-csf,pci-dss,iso-27001,cis-v8,gdpr` (any CSV subset; aliases `nist`/`pci`/`iso`/`cis`); an unknown token **fails fast** (no "Framework load failed" stub). The hepta-framework one-scan produces seven complete auditor-ready evidence packs. **CIS Controls v8**: 17 covered + 23 partial + 113 OOS across 153 Safeguards / 18 Controls. **Implementation Group cumulative discipline** — IG1=56 (cyber-insurance baseline; ~50-70% of mid-market policies require IG1 attestation), IG2 cumulative=130, IG3 cumulative=153; smallest-IG-membership tagging (NEVER report IG2 as 74-of-74 in isolation). **No-certification-body attestation discipline** — engine output is INPUT to CSAT / CIS-CAT Pro self-attestation OR a SOC 2 auditor cross-validating CIS scope, never "CIS certified." Cloud Companion Guide v8 shared-responsibility + CIS-Hardened-Image substrate-evidence credit (Safeguards 4.1/4.2/4.6) + 5 Security Functions (NOT 6 — no Govern) + 6 Asset Types + MS-ISAC/EI-ISAC/H-ISAC sector baselines + v7.1-to-v8 cross-reference. CIS Safeguard examples: `3.3` Data Access Control Lists, `5.4` Restrict Administrator Privileges, `6.3` MFA for Externally-Exposed Applications, `8.2` Collect Audit Logs, `11.4` Isolated Recovery Data Instance. ISO 27001 Annex A code examples: `A.5.15` Access control, `A.5.23` NEW 2022 Cloud services, `A.8.5` Secure authentication, `A.8.9` NEW 2022 Configuration management, `A.8.16` NEW 2022 Monitoring activities, `A.8.24` Use of cryptography. Statement of Applicability per Clause 6.1.3.d discipline + ISMS Clauses 4-10 OOS-by-design framing (7 Major Nonconformity classes — absence of internal audit per Clause 9.2 or management review per Clause 9.3 = auto-fail Stage 2) + 5-attribute taxonomy NEW in 2022 (controlType / informationSecurityProperties / cybersecurityConcepts [5 categories, NOT 6 like NIST CSF 2.0] / operationalCapabilities / securityDomains) + 2013-to-2022 transition discipline. Pair with ISO-aware GRC (Drata ISO 27001 / Vanta ISO 27001 / AuditBoard / OneTrust ISMS / Secureframe ISO 27001) for SoA workflow + internal audit + management review. PCI DSS sub-requirement examples: `Req 1.2.1` NSC config standards, `Req 8.4.1` MFA on non-console admin, `Req 10.2.1` audit logs enabled, `Req 11.3.1` quarterly internal vuln scans. Defined-vs-Customized Approach discipline per Appendix E (15 Defined-only sub-requirements enforced at schema layer; CHD Scope operator-attested via CDE DFD per Req 1.2.4; card-brand AOC enforcement view — Visa CISP / Mastercard SDP / Amex DSOP / Discover DISC). **GRC push (Enterprise, opt-in):** set `COMPLIANCE_GRC_PROVIDER=vanta` (or `drata` / `secureframe`) + `COMPLIANCE_GRC_TOKEN` to map the findings to the platform's evidence/test records and push them at scan time (ZDE-redacted egress; token never serialized; the Vanta·Drata·Secureframe connector trio is complete — Secureframe records model, live tenant validation in progress). |
 | `export_report` | Enterprise | Formatted compliance/risk report (PDF, HTML) |
 
+### Cross-framework routing — cite the engine, do NOT freehand-map (post EE 0.32.7)
+
+When a user asks which controls a finding maps to, **read it from the engine's compliance
+pack (`compliance_check` / the `scan_compliance_<framework>.json` artifact) — do not infer
+a mapping from general security knowledge.** The engine deliberately routes some findings
+*narrowly*, and a plausible-looking freehand mapping will overclaim. The non-obvious
+dispositions to know:
+
+- **Missing HSTS header → SOC 2 CC6.7 ONLY.** It is deliberately **not** mapped to HIPAA
+  §164.312(e)(1), ISO A.8.9, CIS 3.10, NIST CSF, PCI DSS, or GDPR. The finding fires only
+  on an endpoint whose transport **is** encrypted (the header governs a *future* client's
+  downgrade, not the observed session), so failing a transmission-security or
+  secure-configuration control in the other six on one absent response header would
+  overclaim — a Required HIPAA standard or an IG1 CIS Safeguard flipped on a single-header
+  inference. (EE 0.32.7 §4B; routes to CC6.7 only, mutation-proven.)
+- **Aggregate open-port count** and the **opportunistic-STARTTLS / port-inferred cleartext**
+  variants also route to **SOC 2 only** — each is a breadth heuristic or a self-declared
+  *unverifiable* observation, not a per-transmission determination.
+- Otherwise, network-scan analysis-agent findings (`crypto_agent` / `exposure_agent`) now
+  route across **all seven** frameworks where the control subject matches (EE 0.32.7): a
+  **confirmed** cleartext channel fails HIPAA §164.312(e)(1), ISO A.8.24, NIST PR.DS-02,
+  CIS 3.10, PCI 4.2.1 and GDPR Art. 32(1)(a) as well as SOC 2 CC6.7.
+
+If unsure, run `compliance_check` and report what the pack says — never assert a control
+mapping the engine did not emit.
+
 ---
 
 ## Five-Phase Pipeline Architecture
@@ -495,7 +523,7 @@ Add to your MCP configuration with the same command/args pattern.
 |---------|-------|-------------|
 | **Community** | Free / MIT | 27 plugins (service probes + host/network discovery + intelligence/meta), basic AI, CTEM, SARIF, scan history |
 | **Pro** | $49/mo | + CVE matching, verification probes, risk scoring, Pro plugins (040 TLS / 050 TRIBE / 060 DNS) |
-| **Enterprise** | $2k+/yr | + 28 cloud-substrate auditor plugins (1020-1222 range) covering AWS / GCP / Azure against seven frameworks (SOC 2 10 covered + 4 partial; HIPAA; NIST CSF 2.0; PCI DSS v4.0.1; ISO/IEC 27001:2022; CIS Controls v8; GDPR Art. 32 infrastructure substrate); Zero Trust; SOC 2 evidence-pack generation; RFC 3161 timestamps; chain-of-custody attestations; air-gapped deployment |
+| **Enterprise** | $2k+/yr | + 28 cloud-substrate auditor plugins (1020-1222 range) covering AWS / GCP / Azure against seven frameworks (SOC 2 10 covered + 4 partial; HIPAA; NIST CSF 2.0; PCI DSS v4.0.1; ISO/IEC 27001:2022; CIS Controls v8; GDPR Art. 32 infrastructure substrate); Zero Trust; SOC 2 evidence-pack generation; SHA-256 chain-of-custody attestations (RFC 3161 timestamping is implemented but not yet wired to a flag — do not quote it as shipping); air-gapped operation (offline licensing + offline CVE matching under `NSAUDITOR_OFFLINE_ONLY=1`) |
 
 → [Pricing](https://www.nsauditor.com/ai/pricing/)
 

package/package.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "nsauditor-ai-agent-skill",
-  "version": "0.2.29",
-  "description": "AI Agent Skill for NSAuditor AI \u2014 gives any AI coding agent built-in knowledge of NSAuditor's MCP tools, schemas, plugins, and security audit workflows.",
+  "version": "0.2.31",
+  "description": "AI Agent Skill for NSAuditor AI — gives any AI coding agent built-in knowledge of NSAuditor's MCP tools, schemas, plugins, and security audit workflows.",
   "keywords": [
     "nsauditor",
     "ai-agent",

package/references/plugins.md

@@ -130,17 +130,17 @@ LLMNR poisoning risk).
 
 | ID | Name | Ports | Purpose |
 |----|------|-------|---------|
-| 040 | TLS Certificate & Cipher Auditor | 443, 465, 993, 995, 8443 | Deep TLS audit: cert chain, expiry, weak ciphers, HSTS |
+| 040 | TLS Certificate & Cipher Auditor | 443, 465, 993, 995, 8443 | Deep TLS audit: cert chain, expiry, self-signed, weak ciphers |
 | 050 | TRIBE v2 Probe | 80, 443 | Detect debug info leaks, stack traces, verbose errors, CORS misconfig |
 | 060 | DNS Security Auditor | 53 | SPF/DKIM/DMARC validation, DNSSEC, zone transfer, MX security, CAA |
 
 ### Pro Plugin Details
 
 **040 — TLS Certificate & Cipher Auditor:** Goes beyond the basic TLS Scanner (011)
-with full certificate chain validation, expiration warnings, certificate transparency
-log checks, HSTS header verification, and a comprehensive weak cipher inventory.
-Generates findings for: expired certs, self-signed certs, missing HSTS, weak key
-sizes (<2048-bit RSA), and deprecated cipher suites.
+with full certificate chain validation, expiration warnings, and a comprehensive weak
+cipher inventory. Generates findings for: expired certs, self-signed certs, weak key
+sizes (<2048-bit RSA), and deprecated cipher suites. *(Missing-HSTS detection is the
+network-scan `crypto_agent`'s, not this plugin's.)*
 
 **050 — TRIBE v2 Probe:** Targeted Reconnaissance for Information and Bug Enumeration.
 Sends crafted requests to detect: stack traces in error responses, debug mode