nsauditor-ai-agent-skill 0.2.1 → 0.2.3

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Files changed (3) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +12 -0
  2. package/SKILL.md +1 -1
  3. package/package.json +1 -1
package/CHANGELOG.md CHANGED
@@ -4,6 +4,18 @@ Release notes for **`nsauditor-ai-agent-skill`** — installable knowledge packa
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+ ## 0.2.3 (2026-06-05) — Paired-release pin for EE 0.18.2 + CE 0.2.3 — scan_cloud evidence-gap visibility (end-to-end)
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+ Paired no-op bump (no agent-skill content change beyond the SKILL.md version banner; SKILL.md body + `references/plugins.md` UNCHANGED). EE 0.18.2 + CE 0.2.3 make the no-false-clean evidence-gaps the cloud plugins emit **visible through the MCP `scan_cloud` transport, end-to-end**: the CE collector renders a dedicated "Evidence gaps (unverified)" section, and a new EE CI producer-contract guarantees every cloud plugin (AWS / Azure / GCP) marks its scan-coverage gaps so they reach it (retrofitted AWS S3 1020 + Azure 1220/1221/1222 + AWS IAM 1030). EE 0.18.2 also hardens the hand-rolled source scanners against a regex-literal desync (including the ZDE read-only security meta-test, where it could have masked a mutating cloud call) and adds the proprietary `LICENSE` / EULA (now shipped in the package) + per-file copyright headers. Plugin count UNCHANGED at 28; all six coverage matrices UNCHANGED.
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+ ---
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+ ## 0.2.2 (2026-06-05) — Paired-release pin for EE 0.18.1 + CE 0.2.2 — GCP false-negative hardening II + read-only enforcement
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+ Paired no-op bump (no agent-skill content change beyond the SKILL.md version banner; SKILL.md body + `references/plugins.md` UNCHANGED). EE 0.18.1 closes three more GCP false-negative defects at substrate depth on already-covered controls — **(1) plugin 1021** split-range firewall rules that cover the whole IPv4 internet without literally writing `0.0.0.0/0` now flag as the `0.0.0.0/0` CRITICAL (conservative full-coverage helper); **(2) plugin 1025** the SA-impersonation BFS fail-closes with a LOW evidence-gap instead of a falsely-clean `GRAPH_CLEAN` when any graph input is degraded (per-SA policy denied / custom-roles unavailable / list pagination-truncated); **(3) plugin 1024** a bucket whose DEFAULT object ACL is public (every future object born public) is now detected — and adds a structural read-only guarantee (a CI meta-test that fails the build on any mutating cloud call across all 28 plugins) plus the matching customer-facing read-only-credential requirement (EULA §5.5). No skill-logic change. **Plugin count UNCHANGED at 28; all six coverage matrices UNCHANGED** (SOC 2 + HIPAA + NIST CSF 2.0 + PCI DSS v4.0.1 + ISO 27001:2022 + CIS Controls v8).
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+ ---
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  ## 0.2.1 (2026-06-03) — Paired-release pin for EE 0.18.0 + CE 0.2.1 — GCP false-negative hardening
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  Paired no-op bump (no standalone agent-skill content change beyond the SKILL.md version banner; SKILL.md body + `references/plugins.md` UNCHANGED). EE 0.18.0 closes five GCP false-negative defects at substrate depth on already-covered controls: **(1) plugin 1021 — AccessDenied evidence-gaps now route into `result.findings[]`** (16 single-owner anchors), so a denied GCP firewall / IAM / bucket enumeration FAILS its controls instead of reading CLEAN (was a compliance-layer false-CLEAN); **(2) plugin 1021 — project-IAM-public check now calls the correct client** — it had called `getIamPolicy` on `@google-cloud/compute`'s `ProjectsClient`, which has NO IAM methods, so the check ALWAYS threw live (`client.getIamPolicy is not a function`) and evidence-gapped → real project-IAM-public detection never fired (a pre-0.18.0 bug; the 1021 evidence-gap made it fail gracefully with no false-CLEAN, but the detection was dead); fixed to `@google-cloud/resource-manager`'s `ProjectsClient.getIamPolicy` (the client plugin 1025 already uses), live-validated under pure ADC; **(3) plugin 1025 — googleapis IAM-admin client now authenticates under pure ADC** — the `googleapis` REST client that powers 1025's Dim4-6 (custom-role inventory, SA-key custody, and the impersonation breadth-first-search where the K1/K2 paths below live) only set auth for the impersonation/key-file credential modes; in PURE Application-Default-Credentials it had NO auth set, and unlike the `@google-cloud` gax clients (storage / resource-manager) which auto-detect ADC, the `googleapis` library does NOT — so Dim4-6 returned AccessDenied even as project owner and never ran live (caught by the live Task 12 owner-ADC smoke). Fixed with an explicit scoped `GoogleAuth` for the pure-ADC path; pre-existing, same class as fix (2); **(4) plugin 1024 (GCP Cloud Storage) — NEW legacy-ACL public-exposure detection**, a bucket made public via a legacy ACL (`allUsers` / `allAuthenticatedUsers`) while Uniform Bucket-Level Access is disabled now scans the bucket ACL + a sampled object-ACL surface → CRITICAL / HIGH + evidence-gap (routed to SOC 2 CC6.6 / HIPAA §164.312(a)(1) / CIS Controls v8 3.3) instead of CLEAN; **(5) plugin 1025 (GCP IAM impersonation-BFS) completeness** — project-scope `roles/iam.serviceAccountKeyAdmin` (mint a long-lived key for ANY service account = offline impersonation) now fires the project-scope impersonation CRITICAL, and a service account privileged via an admin-equivalent CUSTOM role (`iam.serviceAccounts.actAs` etc.) is now marked admin in the impersonation graph so paths terminating there are detected instead of reading clean — both live-validated (K1 fired on a project-scope `serviceAccountKeyAdmin` binding; K2 fired on a custom-role-`actAs` SA reached via a `tokenCreator` edge). No skill-logic change. **Plugin count UNCHANGED at 28; all six coverage matrices UNCHANGED** (SOC 2 + HIPAA + NIST CSF 2.0 + PCI DSS v4.0.1 + ISO 27001:2022 + CIS Controls v8) — these are substrate-depth false-negative fixes on already-covered controls, NOT new controls. Live-validated under pure owner-ADC against a test-infra GCP project (1025-K1/K2 fired; 1025-adc Dim4-6 confirmed running; 1021 client read works with no false-clean under degraded auth); the 1024-C1 public-bucket + 1021 allUsers-binding findings could not be exercised live because the org enforces `publicAccessPrevention` + `allowedPolicyMemberDomains` (an environmental constraint, not a product gap) and remain unit-test + storage-enumeration-live proven.
package/SKILL.md CHANGED
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ description: >
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  # NSAuditor AI — Agent Skill
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- > **Version:** 0.2.1 (post-EE 0.18.0GCP false-negative hardening) · **Source:** [github.com/nsasoft/nsauditor-ai](https://github.com/nsasoft/nsauditor-ai) · **npm:** `nsauditor-ai` · **License:** MIT (CE)
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+ > **Version:** 0.2.3 (post-EE 0.18.2scan_cloud evidence-gap visibility end-to-end) · **Source:** [github.com/nsasoft/nsauditor-ai](https://github.com/nsasoft/nsauditor-ai) · **npm:** `nsauditor-ai` · **License:** MIT (CE)
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  NSAuditor AI is a modular, AI-assisted network security audit platform with 27+ scanner
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  plugins, CVE matching, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, and Zero Data Exfiltration by design. This
package/package.json CHANGED
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  {
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  "name": "nsauditor-ai-agent-skill",
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- "version": "0.2.1",
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+ "version": "0.2.3",
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  "description": "AI Agent Skill for NSAuditor AI — gives any AI coding agent built-in knowledge of NSAuditor's MCP tools, schemas, plugins, and security audit workflows.",
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  "keywords": [
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  "nsauditor",