nsauditor-ai-agent-skill 0.2.0 → 0.2.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +4 -0
- package/README.md +4 -4
- package/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/CHANGELOG.md
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@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ Release notes for **`nsauditor-ai-agent-skill`** — installable knowledge packa
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## 0.2.1 (2026-06-03) — Paired-release pin for EE 0.18.0 + CE 0.2.1 — GCP false-negative hardening
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Paired no-op bump (no standalone agent-skill content change beyond the SKILL.md version banner; SKILL.md body + `references/plugins.md` UNCHANGED). EE 0.18.0 closes five GCP false-negative defects at substrate depth on already-covered controls: **(1) plugin 1021 — AccessDenied evidence-gaps now route into `result.findings[]`** (16 single-owner anchors), so a denied GCP firewall / IAM / bucket enumeration FAILS its controls instead of reading CLEAN (was a compliance-layer false-CLEAN); **(2) plugin 1021 — project-IAM-public check now calls the correct client** — it had called `getIamPolicy` on `@google-cloud/compute`'s `ProjectsClient`, which has NO IAM methods, so the check ALWAYS threw live (`client.getIamPolicy is not a function`) and evidence-gapped → real project-IAM-public detection never fired (a pre-0.18.0 bug; the 1021 evidence-gap made it fail gracefully with no false-CLEAN, but the detection was dead); fixed to `@google-cloud/resource-manager`'s `ProjectsClient.getIamPolicy` (the client plugin 1025 already uses), live-validated under pure ADC; **(3) plugin 1025 — googleapis IAM-admin client now authenticates under pure ADC** — the `googleapis` REST client that powers 1025's Dim4-6 (custom-role inventory, SA-key custody, and the impersonation breadth-first-search where the K1/K2 paths below live) only set auth for the impersonation/key-file credential modes; in PURE Application-Default-Credentials it had NO auth set, and unlike the `@google-cloud` gax clients (storage / resource-manager) which auto-detect ADC, the `googleapis` library does NOT — so Dim4-6 returned AccessDenied even as project owner and never ran live (caught by the live Task 12 owner-ADC smoke). Fixed with an explicit scoped `GoogleAuth` for the pure-ADC path; pre-existing, same class as fix (2); **(4) plugin 1024 (GCP Cloud Storage) — NEW legacy-ACL public-exposure detection**, a bucket made public via a legacy ACL (`allUsers` / `allAuthenticatedUsers`) while Uniform Bucket-Level Access is disabled now scans the bucket ACL + a sampled object-ACL surface → CRITICAL / HIGH + evidence-gap (routed to SOC 2 CC6.6 / HIPAA §164.312(a)(1) / CIS Controls v8 3.3) instead of CLEAN; **(5) plugin 1025 (GCP IAM impersonation-BFS) completeness** — project-scope `roles/iam.serviceAccountKeyAdmin` (mint a long-lived key for ANY service account = offline impersonation) now fires the project-scope impersonation CRITICAL, and a service account privileged via an admin-equivalent CUSTOM role (`iam.serviceAccounts.actAs` etc.) is now marked admin in the impersonation graph so paths terminating there are detected instead of reading clean — both live-validated (K1 fired on a project-scope `serviceAccountKeyAdmin` binding; K2 fired on a custom-role-`actAs` SA reached via a `tokenCreator` edge). No skill-logic change. **Plugin count UNCHANGED at 28; all six coverage matrices UNCHANGED** (SOC 2 + HIPAA + NIST CSF 2.0 + PCI DSS v4.0.1 + ISO 27001:2022 + CIS Controls v8) — these are substrate-depth false-negative fixes on already-covered controls, NOT new controls. Live-validated under pure owner-ADC against a test-infra GCP project (1025-K1/K2 fired; 1025-adc Dim4-6 confirmed running; 1021 client read works with no false-clean under degraded auth); the 1024-C1 public-bucket + 1021 allUsers-binding findings could not be exercised live because the org enforces `publicAccessPrevention` + `allowedPolicyMemberDomains` (an environmental constraint, not a product gap) and remain unit-test + storage-enumeration-live proven.
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## 0.2.0 (2026-06-01) — `scan_cloud` `regions` teaching (paired with EE 0.17.0 + CE 0.2.0)
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SKILL.md now teaches the `scan_cloud` `regions` argument: AWS region codes (e.g. `["us-east-1","eu-west-1"]`) or `["all"]`, with the divergent default (omit = the single server-configured `AWS_REGION`; omitting does NOT fan out). **Region-scope discipline — validated via live Claude Desktop runs + a RED→GREEN→REFACTOR subagent harness on a lighter model tier:** (1) **Default = single region** for any plain "audit my AWS account" / "quick check" / no-region request — do NOT fan out or batch; (2) **Honest scope reporting** — report the regions you actually PASSED, never claim "all regions / every region / across N regions" off GuardDuty's or Inspector's INTERNAL per-region enumeration, and never escalate a single-region or "quick" request into a multi-region scan; (3) **Full all-region coverage via discover-then-batch** (ONLY on an explicit all/every/whole-account/full-coverage request) — a single `["all"]` call usually exceeds the host's MCP tool-call timeout (e.g. Claude Desktop's ~60s) and returns nothing, so discover the enabled regions via a default scan then audit the remainder in small region-group batches until complete, counting the regions covered, and never report a timed-out or partial scan as full coverage. Paired with the EE 0.17.0 `--aws-region` feature + CE 0.2.0. Plugin count UNCHANGED (28); all six matrices UNCHANGED.
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package/README.md
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├── references/
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│ ├── workflows.md # Multi-step workflow recipes (full audit, CI/CD, CTEM)
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│ ├── schemas.md # Complete data structures (scan results, CVEs, findings)
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│ └── plugins.md # Full plugin catalog (
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│ └── plugins.md # Full plugin catalog (55 scanners with ports & protocols — 27 Community incl. 3 Pro + 28 Enterprise)
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├── examples/
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│ └── agent-interactions.md # Example agent reasoning chains (9 scenarios)
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├── package.json
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| **Workflow patterns** | Multi-step chains: scan → CVE lookup → remediation report |
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| **Schema knowledge** | Complete data structures for parsing and presenting results |
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| **CPE construction** | How to map detected services to NVD vulnerability lookups |
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| **Plugin awareness** |
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| **Compliance frameworks** | SOC 2 (AICPA TSC 2017
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| **Plugin awareness** | 55 scanner plugins (27 Community incl. 3 Pro + 28 Enterprise) with protocols, ports, capabilities, and six-framework (SOC 2 · HIPAA §164.312 · NIST CSF 2.0 · PCI DSS v4.0.1 · ISO/IEC 27001:2022 · CIS Controls v8) substrate-evidence dimensions |
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| **Compliance frameworks** | **Six frameworks, one scan** — SOC 2 (AICPA TSC 2017) · HIPAA Security Rule §164.312 Technical Safeguards (HHS Required/Addressable discipline per control) · NIST CSF 2.0 (Subcategory-level) · PCI DSS v4.0.1 (QSA RoC sub-requirement-level) · ISO/IEC 27001:2022 (per-Annex-A-code, SoA discipline) · CIS Controls v8 (per-Safeguard; Implementation Group IG1/IG2/IG3 cumulative discipline). Any CSV subset via `--compliance soc2,hipaa,nist-csf,pci-dss,iso-27001,cis-v8`. Zero BAA required for HIPAA — ePHI never leaves customer infrastructure. |
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| **Security rules** | ZDE, SSRF protection, redaction, scan authorization requirements |
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| **Error handling** | License gates, SSRF blocks, timeout resolution, CPE format errors |
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| **Decision routing** | When to use scan_host vs probe_service vs CLI vs get_vulnerabilities |
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| **Community** | Free / MIT | 27 plugins (service probes + host/network discovery + intelligence/meta), basic AI, SARIF, CTEM, scan history |
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| **Pro** | $49/mo | + CVE matching, verification probes, risk scoring, 3 Pro plugins (040 TLS / 050 TRIBE / 060 DNS) |
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| **Enterprise** | $2k+/yr | +
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| **Enterprise** | $2k+/yr | + 28 cloud-substrate auditor plugins (1020-1222 range; AWS / Azure / GCP six-framework evidence-pack — SOC 2 / HIPAA / NIST CSF 2.0 / PCI DSS v4.0.1 / ISO 27001:2022 / CIS Controls v8), Zero Trust, RFC 3161 timestamps, chain-of-custody attestations, air-gapped deployment |
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→ [Pricing](https://www.nsauditor.com/ai/pricing/)
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package/SKILL.md
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# NSAuditor AI — Agent Skill
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> **Version:** 0.2.0 · **Source:** [github.com/nsasoft/nsauditor-ai](https://github.com/nsasoft/nsauditor-ai) · **npm:** `nsauditor-ai` · **License:** MIT (CE)
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> **Version:** 0.2.1 (post-EE 0.18.0 — GCP false-negative hardening) · **Source:** [github.com/nsasoft/nsauditor-ai](https://github.com/nsasoft/nsauditor-ai) · **npm:** `nsauditor-ai` · **License:** MIT (CE)
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NSAuditor AI is a modular, AI-assisted network security audit platform with 27+ scanner
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plugins, CVE matching, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, and Zero Data Exfiltration by design. This
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package/package.json
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{
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"name": "nsauditor-ai-agent-skill",
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"version": "0.2.
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"version": "0.2.1",
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"description": "AI Agent Skill for NSAuditor AI — gives any AI coding agent built-in knowledge of NSAuditor's MCP tools, schemas, plugins, and security audit workflows.",
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"keywords": [
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"nsauditor",
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