nsauditor-ai-agent-skill 0.1.47 → 0.1.49
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +9 -1
- package/README.md +1 -1
- package/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/references/plugins.md +1 -0
package/CHANGELOG.md
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@@ -4,7 +4,15 @@ Release notes for **`nsauditor-ai-agent-skill`** — installable knowledge packa
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## 0.1.
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## 0.1.49 (PUBLISHED 2026-05-27) — Paired-release pin for EE 0.15.1 + CE 0.1.82 — plugin 1222 hotfix (Dim-3 SDK-shape + Dim-4 inherited-admin re-tune)
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Paired-release pin for the EE 0.15.1 hotfix cycle: two defects in plugin 1222 (`azure-keyvault-deep-auditor`) surfaced by the 0.15.0 published-build live smoke. **H-1** — the Dim-3 diagnostic-logging probe `for await`-ed `@azure/arm-monitor`'s `diagnosticSettings.list()`, which returns a `Promise<{value:[]}>` collection object (NOT a paged async-iterator), so the dim always threw and degraded to a non-functional evidence-gap; fixed to `await` + read `.value` (confirmed against live Azure; the unit-test mock corrected to the real `Promise<{value}>` shape — the mock-vs-real-SDK mismatch that masked the bug). **H-2** — the Dim-4 privileged-access dim flagged inherited subscription/management-group-scope Owner/Contributor as HIGH on every RBAC vault (a ubiquitous Azure control-plane reality); re-tuned so inherited Owner/User-Access-Administrator → MEDIUM, inherited Contributor → LOW, with HIGH reserved for VAULT-scoped control-plane god roles + Key Vault Administrator at any scope. **Plugin count UNCHANGED at 28 (cloud-substrate 26); all six coverage matrices UNCHANGED.** EE regression 6526/6526 GREEN. `references/plugins.md` 1222 row Dim-3/Dim-4 wording refined. No standalone agent-skill code changes.
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## 0.1.48 (PUBLISHED 2026-05-27) — Paired-release pin for EE 0.15.0 + CE 0.1.81 — NEW plugin 1222 (Azure Key Vault Deep Auditor)
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Paired-release pin for the EE 0.15.0 cycle (Move C-2.3): NEW **plugin 1222 `azure-keyvault-deep-auditor`** — the third dedicated Azure auditor (after 1220 storage + 1221 NSG), the KV analog of how 1221 deepens 1022's flat NSG dim — takes the EE plugin count **27 → 28** (cloud-substrate 25 → 26; ID range now 1020-1222). It enumerates each vault's keys, role assignments, and diagnostic settings across 4 dims: (1) key auto-rotation policy + (2) key expiry (epoch-s/ms/Date/string coerced) + (3) diagnostic logging → Log Analytics (`@azure/arm-monitor`) + (4) privileged-access depth (RBAC `roleAssignments` admin/data-plane/scope-aware + legacy `accessPolicies` export/wide-crypto breadth). Deliberately orthogonal to plugin 1022's vault-property dims (purge/soft-delete/network-ACL/RBAC-mode) — no double-emission. Secret/cert expiry is a deliberate data-plane scope boundary. Findings route across all six frameworks (SOC 2 CC6.3/C1.1/CC6.1/CC7.2 / HIPAA §164.312(a)(2)(iv)/(b)/(a)(1) / NIST CSF PR.DS-01/DE.CM-09/PR.AA-05 / PCI DSS 3.5.1/10.2.1/7.2.1 / ISO 27001 A.8.24/A.8.15/A.5.15+A.8.2 / CIS v8 3.11/8.2/5.4) — all six coverage matrices UNCHANGED. SKILL.md + README + `references/plugins.md` updated to the full 28-plugin catalog (1020-1222; 26 cloud-substrate auditors). No standalone agent-skill code changes.
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## 0.1.47 (PUBLISHED 2026-05-27) — Paired-release pin for EE 0.14.1 + CE 0.1.80 — plugin 1221 UDP restricted-port lane
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Paired-release pin for the EE 0.14.1 cycle: plugin 1221 (the Azure NSG perimeter auditor) gains a **UDP restricted-port lane** (Dim 2u/3u) — tiering UDP management/amplification services (SNMP 161 / CLDAP 389 / NTP 123 / rpcbind 111 / IPMI 623 / IKE 500 / Memcached 11211, etc.) in parallel with the existing TCP lane, attachment-aware (attached → CRITICAL effective; orphaned → MEDIUM latent) with per-transport priority/deny-override resolution — closing the R-MEDIUM-2 false negative where a public UDP service was silently treated as benign non-restricted "web tier" INFO. Dim-4 made protocol-aware. The six framework titlePatterns for 1221 were generalized `permits TCP inbound …` → `permits (?:TCP|UDP) inbound …` so UDP findings route to the same CC6.6/perimeter controls. **Plugin count UNCHANGED at 27 (cloud-substrate 25); all six coverage matrices UNCHANGED.** `references/plugins.md` 1221 row updated to the UDP lane. No standalone agent-skill code changes.
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package/README.md
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@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ This package provides **knowledge about** NSAuditor AI. To actually **run** scan
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| **Community** | Free / MIT | 27 plugins (service probes + host/network discovery + intelligence/meta), basic AI, SARIF, CTEM, scan history |
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| **Pro** | $49/mo | + CVE matching, verification probes, risk scoring, 3 Pro plugins (040 TLS / 050 TRIBE / 060 DNS) |
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| **Enterprise** | $2k+/yr | +
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| **Enterprise** | $2k+/yr | + 26 cloud-substrate auditor plugins (1020-1222 range; AWS / GCP / Azure SOC 2 evidence-pack), Zero Trust, RFC 3161 timestamps, chain-of-custody attestations, air-gapped deployment |
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→ [Pricing](https://www.nsauditor.com/ai/pricing/)
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package/SKILL.md
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| **Community** | Free / MIT | 27 plugins (service probes + host/network discovery + intelligence/meta), basic AI, CTEM, SARIF, scan history |
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| **Pro** | $49/mo | + CVE matching, verification probes, risk scoring, Pro plugins (040 TLS / 050 TRIBE / 060 DNS) |
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| **Enterprise** | $2k+/yr | +
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| **Enterprise** | $2k+/yr | + 26 cloud-substrate auditor plugins (1020-1222 range) covering AWS / GCP / Azure against SOC 2 (10 covered + 4 partial controls); Zero Trust; SOC 2 evidence-pack generation; RFC 3161 timestamps; chain-of-custody attestations; air-gapped deployment |
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→ [Pricing](https://www.nsauditor.com/ai/pricing/)
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package/package.json
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"name": "nsauditor-ai-agent-skill",
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"version": "0.1.
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"version": "0.1.49",
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"description": "AI Agent Skill for NSAuditor AI — gives any AI coding agent built-in knowledge of NSAuditor's MCP tools, schemas, plugins, and security audit workflows.",
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"keywords": [
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"nsauditor",
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package/references/plugins.md
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| 1210 | AWS EC2 Instance Auditor (**NEW EE 0.13.1** — first new plugin since 1200; plugin count 24 → 25; the AWS producer for CIS-Hardened-Image detection + EC2 instance-level + EBS-encryption coverage) | Enterprise | Audits EC2 instances (orthogonal to plugin 1170 which audits the SG perimeter policy). **Multi-region** via ec2:DescribeRegions (single-region fallback emits an evidence-gap). Dimensions: **IMDSv1 enabled** (CC6.1 — MEDIUM when an IAM instance profile is attached / LOW without; **IMDSv2 hop-limit > 1** re-opens container credential theft) + **EBS volume unencrypted** (C1.1 + CIS 3.11 — HIGH; resolves every attached BlockDeviceMappings volume via DescribeVolumes) + **account default-EBS-encryption disabled** (C1.1 preventive — GetEbsEncryptionByDefault) + **public-IP exposure** incl. secondary-ENI/EIP + IPv6 GUA (CC6.6 substrate, INFO) + **instance-store (ephemeral) volume** evidence-gap. **DIM 4 — AMI inventory** → result.cisImageInventory (the producer feed that makes CIS-Hardened-Image detection LIVE on Safeguards 4.1/4.2/4.6; Azure 1022 + GCP 1021 feed the same contract). Conservative classifier: LOW + evidenceGap on indeterminate metadata; AccessDenied → INFO + evidenceGap (never silent-PASS); terminated/shutting-down instances skipped. Survived 3 review rounds / 5 adversarial skill lenses (network-security-audit + CIS + IAM-effective-permissions + soc2-evidence + cloud-plugin-false-negatives). `@aws-sdk/client-ec2` reused. | CC6.1 / C1.1 / CC6.6 |
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| 1220 | Azure Storage Account Data-Protection Auditor (**NEW EE 0.13.2** — Move C-2; **+2 dims EE 0.13.3** — Move C-2.1; plugin count 25 → 26; first dedicated Azure auditor beyond the multi-purpose 1022 scanner) | Enterprise | Audits the Azure Storage Account data-protection surface across **7 dims** — **orthogonal to plugin 1022** which owns the network-exposure dims (no double-emission; mirrors the AWS 1020 S3-scanner + 1120 S3-lifecycle two-plugin split). (1) **HTTPS-only transit** (`enableHttpsTrafficOnly` — HIGH on plaintext HTTP; CC6.7) + (2) **minimum TLS version** (< TLS1_2 → MEDIUM; CC6.7) + (3) **Shared Key authorization** (`allowSharedKeyAccess` — bypasses Azure AD identity; CC6.1; Azure field-default discipline: absent = ENABLED, never silent-PASS) + (4) **infrastructure (double) encryption** (`requireInfrastructureEncryption`; C1.1) + (5) **encryption key source incl. CMK reachability + rotation** (`encryption.keyVaultProperties` — keySource=Microsoft.Keyvault PASS only when the key is currently resolvable + auto-rotating; a disabled/revoked/version-pinned CMK degrades, not silent-PASS; C1.1) + (6) **blob recoverability** (soft-delete + versioning via the secondary `blobServices.getServiceProperties` path — A1.2; EE 0.13.3) + (7) **per-container anonymous public access** (account-toggle-aware via `blobContainers.list` — `publicAccess=Blob/Container` + allowBlobPublicAccess=true → HIGH effective exposure; C1.1; EE 0.13.3). Conservative classifier: indeterminate field / AccessDenied / secondary-path failure → evidence-gap (never silent-PASS); `for await` pagination. Single-subscription scope surfaced explicitly. Built + reviewed through the cloud-plugin-false-negatives lens. `@azure/arm-storage` + `@azure/identity`. | CC6.7 / CC6.1 / C1.1 / A1.2 |
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| 1221 | Azure NSG Perimeter Auditor (**NEW EE 0.14.0** — Move C-2.2; **UDP lane EE 0.14.1**; plugin count 26 → 27; the Azure analog of AWS plugin 1170) | Enterprise | A CC6.6 network-segmentation perimeter auditor for Azure Network Security Groups — **non-overlapping-by-depth with plugin 1022's flat per-rule NSG lint** (no double-emission of a verdict; mirrors the AWS 1023-observed / 1170-declared two-plugin precedent). Evaluates each NSG's inbound rules in **Azure priority order** (first match wins; DenyAllInbound default): (1) **all-protocol (`*`) public Allow** — every port reachable from the public internet + (2) **public-source (`*`/`0.0.0.0/0`/`Internet`) to a restricted TCP port** (SSH/RDP/MSSQL/MySQL/Postgres/Redis/Memcached/MongoDB/Elasticsearch/CouchDB/SMB/WinRM/Oracle/Docker/Kubelet) + (3) **`::/0` IPv6-wildcard to a restricted port** (the dimension 1022's flat lint misses) + **(2u/3u) public-source / `::/0` to a restricted UDP service** (DNS/TFTP/rpcbind/NTP/NetBIOS/SNMP/CLDAP/IKE/Syslog/IPMI/OpenVPN/MSSQL-Monitor/SSDP/IPsec-NAT-T/Memcached — closes the public-UDP false negative, **EE 0.14.1**) + (4) **public→non-restricted port** INFO substrate + (5) **PASS substrate** when no public restricted exposure. **Attachment-aware severity** via the read-only `nsg.subnets[]`/`networkInterfaces[]` back-references — attached → CRITICAL (effective exposure); orphaned → MEDIUM (latent). Per-transport effective priority/deny-override resolution + port-range expansion + `0.0.0.0/1` split-range coverage + service-tag/ASG-source normalization (VirtualNetwork/AzureLoadBalancer/ASG = not public). Conservative classifier: denied/indeterminate listAll → evidence-gap; one malformed NSG degrades per-resource (never aborts the scan); `for await` pagination; single-subscription scope explicit. Built + reviewed through the cloud-plugin-false-negatives lens (EE 0.14.0 SHIP-WITH-FOLDS 2 LOW; EE 0.14.1 UDP lane SHIP-WITH-FOLDS 2 MED + 1 LOW, all folded). `@azure/arm-network` + `@azure/identity`. | CC6.6 |
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| 1222 | Azure Key Vault Deep Auditor (**NEW EE 0.15.0** — Move C-2.3; plugin count 27 → 28; the third dedicated Azure auditor after 1220 storage + 1221 NSG; **hotfixed EE 0.15.1** — Dim-3 SDK-shape + Dim-4 inherited-admin severity re-tune) | Enterprise | The deep Key Vault auditor — the KV analog of how 1221 deepens 1022's flat NSG dim; **orthogonal to plugin 1022's vault-property dims** (purge/soft-delete/network-ACL/RBAC-mode) — no double-emission of a verdict. Enumerates each vault's **keys, role assignments, and diagnostic settings** across 4 dims: (1) key **auto-rotation policy** — keys with no `rotationPolicy` / no rotate-action → finding + (2) key **expiry** — keys with no `expires` (or already-expired), with epoch-s/ms/Date/string coercion (closes the ms-overflow false-clean) + (3) **diagnostic logging → Log Analytics** — vaults with no `AuditEvent`→workspace diagnostic setting; reads `@azure/arm-monitor`'s `diagnosticSettings.list()` correctly as an `await`-ed `{value:[]}` collection object (NOT a paged async-iterator — the EE 0.15.1 H-1 fix; pre-fix the dim always threw and degraded to a non-functional evidence-gap), soft-degrades to an evidence-gap if the SDK is absent + (4) **privileged-access depth** — RBAC `roleAssignments` (admin/data-plane/**scope-aware severity**: vault-scoped control-plane god roles + Key Vault Administrator at any scope → HIGH; inherited subscription/management-group-scope Owner/User-Access-Administrator → MEDIUM, inherited Contributor → LOW — the EE 0.15.1 H-2 re-tune that stops flagging the ubiquitous inherited-admin reality as HIGH on every RBAC vault) + legacy `accessPolicies` breadth (export + wide-crypto permissions). **Secret/cert expiry is a deliberate data-plane scope boundary** (explicit caveat — the control-plane mgmt API does not expose data-plane object expiry). Conservative classifier: indeterminate field / AccessDenied / arm-monitor absent → evidence-gap; one malformed vault degrades per-resource (never aborts the scan); single-subscription scope explicit. Findings route across all six frameworks (SOC 2 CC6.3/C1.1/CC6.1/CC7.2 · HIPAA §164.312(a)(2)(iv)/(b)/(a)(1) · NIST CSF PR.DS-01/DE.CM-09/PR.AA-05 · PCI DSS 3.5.1/10.2.1/7.2.1 · ISO 27001 A.8.24/A.8.15/A.5.15+A.8.2 · CIS v8 3.11/8.2/5.4) — all six coverage matrices UNCHANGED. Built + reviewed through the cloud-plugin-false-negatives lens (SHIP-WITH-FOLDS 0C/3H/2M/4L; 4 folded). `@azure/arm-keyvault` + `@azure/arm-monitor` + `@azure/arm-authorization` + `@azure/identity`. | CC6.3 / C1.1 / CC6.1 / CC7.2 |
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