nsauditor-ai-agent-skill 0.1.30 → 0.1.31

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,17 @@ Release notes for **`nsauditor-ai-agent-skill`** — installable knowledge packa
 
 ---
 
+## 0.1.31 — Catalog refresh: NEW EE-RT.22 v1 plugin 1025 GCP IAM Project-Level Auditor — paired with EE 0.7.0 trio-publish (MINOR-VERSION MILESTONE opening the v0.7.x cross-cloud-parity line; first plugin in the GCP-IAM-deep-audit cohort; 3 audit dimensions across CC6.1 + CC6.6; 12 R1 reviewer folds (0 R-CRITICAL + 2 R-HIGH + 5 R-MEDIUM + 5 R-LOW); plugin count 23 → 24; 11 new soc2.json mappings; new SDK dep `@google-cloud/resource-manager`; twenty-first consecutive trio-publish)
+
+**Trio-publish institutionalization continued.** Paired with EE 0.7.0 + CE 0.1.64 — **twenty-first consecutive trio-publish across EE + CE + agent-skill in a single session** (0.4.5–0.7.0).
+
+### Changes
+
+- **`references/plugins.md`** — added plugin 1025 row in sort order; demoted plugin 1024 (NEW EE 0.6.8) to non-NEW.
+- **`SKILL.md`** — "post-EE 0.6.9" → "post-EE 0.7.0".
+
+---
+
 ## 0.1.30 — Catalog refresh: EE-RT.21 v2 R2 cleanup for plugin 1024 GCP Cloud Storage Auditor — paired with EE 0.6.9 trio-publish (patch-level R2 reviewer-deferred-items cleanup: Appendix A multi-cloud renderer extension + evidence-gap soc2.json mappings; 5 R1 reviewer folds (0 R-CRITICAL + 1 R-HIGH + 1 R-MEDIUM + 3 R-LOW); plugin count UNCHANGED at 23; 3 new soc2.json mappings; NEW pre-publish doc-consistency gate; twentieth consecutive trio-publish)
 
 **Trio-publish institutionalization continued.** Paired with EE 0.6.9 + CE 0.1.63 — **twentieth consecutive trio-publish across EE + CE + agent-skill in a single session** (0.4.5–0.6.9).

package/SKILL.md

@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ CE collision. CE reserves 001-099.
 
 **Plugin 1170 v3 (EE 0.6.6) SG→SG transitive chain reachability** — `aws-ec2-sg-perimeter-auditor` v3 extension. Pre-v3 each Security Group was audited in isolation; a SG with no direct public-CIDR ingress would emit the PASS-tier "no direct public-internet ingress CIDR rules" finding even if transitively reachable from the internet through a `UserIdGroupPairs` chain. v3 builds the SG-reference graph (`_buildSgReferenceGraph`), identifies public-CIDR roots (`_findPubliclyReachableSgs` — 0.0.0.0/0 / ::/0 ingress), and BFS-walks the graph (`_walkTransitiveReachability`) with cycle defense + depth cap (default 5, max 20) + per-target chain cap (default 10, max 100). 2-hop chains emit **HIGH**; 3+ hop chains emit **CRITICAL** (operator-blindness principle — deeper chains less likely to be noticed). Cross-VPC edges skipped (out-of-scope for v3 v1; INFO trailer). v3 v1 simplification: per-hop port-flow tracked but NOT intersected (`walkthroughRequired=true`). New operator opts: `skipTransitiveReachability` / `transitiveChainDepthCap` / `transitiveChainsPerTargetCap` / `transitiveChainSamplesPerFindingCap`. **v3 R-HIGH-1 fold**: BFS short-circuits enqueue past per-target cap (closes path-enumeration explosion on hub-and-spoke topologies — pre-fold the BFS kept cloning `path` and `visited` Sets and walking past the cap). **v3 R-LOW-2 fold**: depth-cap-hit surfaced separately from per-target-cap (closes silent-deep-truncation false-CLEAN class). 3 new soc2.json mappings under CC6.6 (transitive HIGH + CRITICAL + INFO truncation). **v3.1 EE 0.6.7 closes the edge-dedup R2-deferred item**: `_buildSgReferenceGraph` now dedupes edges by `(sourceGroupId, targetGroupId)` with `ports` aggregated as array of `{protocol, fromPort, toPort}`. Pre-fold a real-world ALB-fronting-app SG with 3 ingress perms on different ports (80/443/8080) referencing the same source SG emitted 3 distinct edges A→B; the BFS treated each as a separate chain, inflating `chainCount` 2-5× and exhausting per-target chain caps on noise. Post-fold the BFS sees exactly 1 chain per distinct (source, target) pair. `isCrossVpc` aggregation is AND-semantic — if ANY contributing pair is same-VPC, the merged edge is same-VPC (per `[[conservative_classifier_principle]]`: walk possibly-same-VPC chains rather than silently skip). Classifier port-render accepts both v3.1 array shape and v3 single-object shape (back-compat). **v3.1 R-MEDIUM-1 fold**: arrival-order independence locked with 2 regression fixtures + JSDoc tightening. **v3.1 R-LOW-1 fold**: partial-render contract on malformed port specs locked with 2 fixtures. **v3.1 R-LOW-2 fold**: `_portKeys` scratch-lifetime documented (MUST NOT escape).
 
-**EE SOC 2 substrate-evidence coverage (post-EE 0.6.9):** 10 covered controls (CC6.1 /
+**EE SOC 2 substrate-evidence coverage (post-EE 0.7.0):** 10 covered controls (CC6.1 /
 CC6.2 / CC6.6 / CC6.7 / CC6.8 / CC7.1 / CC7.2 / CC7.3 / C1.1 / C1.2) + 4 partial
 (CC6.3 / CC8.1 / A1.2 / PI1.5) + 33 OOS for static substrate scanning. Coverage matrix
 is institutionally honest: substrate-evidence depth grows release-over-release without

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "nsauditor-ai-agent-skill",
-  "version": "0.1.30",
+  "version": "0.1.31",
   "description": "AI Agent Skill for NSAuditor AI — gives any AI coding agent built-in knowledge of NSAuditor's MCP tools, schemas, plugins, and security audit workflows.",
   "keywords": [
     "nsauditor",

package/references/plugins.md

@@ -169,7 +169,8 @@ listings, and default pages.
 | 1021 | GCP Cloud Scanner | Enterprise | Firewall rule audit + IAM bindings + Storage bucket public-access | CC6.1 / CC6.6 / C1.1 |
 | 1022 | Azure Cloud Scanner | Enterprise | NSG rule analysis + RBAC role assignments + Storage account hardening | CC6.1 / CC6.6 / C1.1 |
 | 1023 | Zero Trust Checker | Enterprise | Segmentation + encryption + identity + lateral movement scoring (reads OBSERVED open ports) | CC6.6 |
-| 1024 | GCP Cloud Storage Auditor (NEW EE 0.6.8) | Enterprise | Multi-cloud parity sister of plugin 1020 AWS S3. 6 dimensions: bucket-level IAM public bindings (allUsers = CRITICAL, allAuthenticatedUsers = HIGH); Uniform Bucket-Level Access enforcement (closes legacy bucket-ACL false-PASS class); Object Versioning; Bucket Lock retention policy (SEC 17a-4 / FINRA 4511 WORM-alignment); CMEK via Cloud KMS (four-tier custody ladder); bucket-level access logging. NEW SDK dep `@google-cloud/storage`. | CC6.1 / CC6.6 / CC7.1 / C1.1 / C1.2 / A1.2 |
+| 1024 | GCP Cloud Storage Auditor (EE 0.6.8) | Enterprise | Multi-cloud parity sister of plugin 1020 AWS S3. 6 dimensions: bucket-level IAM public bindings (allUsers = CRITICAL, allAuthenticatedUsers = HIGH); Uniform Bucket-Level Access enforcement (closes legacy bucket-ACL false-PASS class); Object Versioning; Bucket Lock retention policy (SEC 17a-4 / FINRA 4511 WORM-alignment); CMEK via Cloud KMS (four-tier custody ladder); bucket-level access logging. NEW SDK dep `@google-cloud/storage`. | CC6.1 / CC6.6 / CC7.1 / C1.1 / C1.2 / A1.2 |
+| 1025 | GCP IAM Project-Level Auditor (NEW EE 0.7.0) | Enterprise | First plugin in the v0.7.x GCP-IAM-deep-audit cohort. Mirrors plugin 1030 AWS IAM Deep Auditor's shadow-admin discipline adapted to the GCP IAM data model. 3 dimensions: project-scope public-member bindings (allUsers = CRITICAL, allAuthenticatedUsers = HIGH at the project root); admin-equivalent role inventory across 12 predefined sensitive roles (roles/owner, roles/editor, roles/iam.securityAdmin, roles/resourcemanager.projectIamAdmin, the iam.serviceAccount* impersonation cohort, the workloadIdentity cohort); IAM Conditions classifier on sensitive-role bindings (restrictive CEL token allowlist = PASS, absent on sensitive = MEDIUM, vacuous = LOW + evidenceGap). NEW SDK dep `@google-cloud/resource-manager`. | CC6.1 / CC6.6 |
 | 1030 | AWS IAM Deep Auditor | Enterprise | Shadow-admin path detection via BFS over PassRole / AssumeRole / federated trust; restrictive-Condition allowlist (Auth0 / Okta / Cognito) | CC6.1 |
 | 1040 | AWS CloudTrail Operational Integrity | Enterprise | Trail health + log-file validation + KMS-CMK; CloudWatch alarm coverage vs CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark v1.5 §3.1–3.14; cross-account S3 trail-destination WORM verification (SEC 17a-4 / FINRA 4511) | CC7.2 / CC7.3 |
 | 1050 | AWS API Gateway Assurance | Enterprise | Per-method/route authorization classifier; custom-domain TLS policy; stage-level access logging / throttling / WAF; public-endpoint exposure; Lambda authorizer cross-reference via lambda:GetFunction | CC6.1 / CC6.6 / CC6.7 / CC7.1 / A1.2 |