nsauditor-ai-agent-skill 0.1.18 → 0.1.19

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,30 @@ Release notes for **`nsauditor-ai-agent-skill`** — installable knowledge packa
 
 ---
 
+## 0.1.19 — Catalog refresh: plugin 1190 AWS SES Email Integrity Auditor v3 extension (Part A DKIM public-key fingerprint capture/pin + Part B in-band DMARC alignment classifier; 5 same-session reviewer folds incl. 1 R-CRITICAL false-CLEAN closure on truncated DKIM keys) — EE 0.5.3; plugin count UNCHANGED at 20
+
+**Trio-publish institutionalization continued.** Paired with EE 0.5.3 + CE 0.1.52 — **ninth consecutive trio-publish across EE + CE + agent-skill in a single session** (after 0.4.5/0.4.6/0.4.7/0.4.8/0.4.9/0.5.0/0.5.1/0.5.2). The 0.1.19 refresh keeps the AI-coding-agent knowledge surface current with the latest EE plugin extension.
+
+### What changed
+
+- **`references/plugins.md`** — **plugin 1190 row** updated v2.1 → v3: 2 NEW evidence dimensions (Part A DKIM public-key fingerprint capture/pin + Part B in-band DMARC alignment classifier). NEW emission categories: `ses-dkim-fingerprint-verified` (PASS) / `ses-dkim-fingerprint-mismatch` (HIGH — operator-supplied pin store enables unauthorized rotation / key substitution attack detection) / `ses-dkim-fingerprint-unverifiable` (LOW + evidenceGap) + `ses-dmarc-alignment-strict-met` (PASS) / `ses-dmarc-alignment-relaxed` (INFO) / `ses-dmarc-alignment-dkim-strict-impossible` (HIGH — adkim=s + DKIM disabled) / `ses-dmarc-alignment-spf-strict-impossible` (HIGH — aspf=s + no custom MailFrom) / `ses-dmarc-alignment-unverifiable` (LOW). NEW kill-switches `_skipDkimFingerprintCapture` + `_skipDmarcAlignmentCheck`. R-CRITICAL closure (discovered via test): `_stripControlChars` 256-char truncation corrupted long DKIM keys → new `_stripControlCharsNoTruncate` helper.
+- **`SKILL.md`** — plugin 1190 v3 narrative added; "post-EE 0.5.2" → "post-EE 0.5.3". EE plugin count UNCHANGED at 20.
+- **`peerDependencies`** floor: unchanged at `nsauditor-ai >=0.1.40`.
+
+### Recommended upgrade path
+
+```bash
+npm install nsauditor-ai-agent-skill@0.1.19
+# (paired with EE 0.5.3 + CE 0.1.52; AI-coding-agent users only)
+```
+
+### Notes
+
+- No SKILL contract changes; pure catalog refresh.
+- Ninth consecutive trio-publish institutionalizes the discipline across 9 ship cycles.
+
+---
+
 ## 0.1.18 — Catalog refresh: plugin 1190 AWS SES Email Integrity Auditor v2.1 deferred-items sweep (7 deferred reviewer-fold items closed from 0.5.0 cycle + 6 same-session reviewer folds incl. 1 CRITICAL soc2 mapping closure + silent-loss-class closure on SES classic API quota exhaustion) — EE 0.5.2; plugin count UNCHANGED at 20
 
 **Trio-publish institutionalization continued.** Paired with EE 0.5.2 + CE 0.1.51 — **eighth consecutive trio-publish across EE + CE + agent-skill in a single session** (after 0.4.5/0.4.6/0.4.7/0.4.8/0.4.9/0.5.0/0.5.1). The 0.1.18 refresh keeps the AI-coding-agent knowledge surface current with the latest EE plugin consolidation.

package/SKILL.md

@@ -209,9 +209,10 @@ SG Perimeter Auditor (1170 v2 — RESTRICTED_PORTS 23 ports per CIS AWS Foundati
 v3.0), AWS ElastiCache Redis Auditor (1180 v2 — extended in EE 0.4.9: kms:DescribeKey
 promotion + subnet route-table verifier; closes both v1 deferred items R-MEDIUM-3 +
 R-LOW-2; main-RT-inheritance false-NEGATIVE closure per R-MEDIUM-2 reviewer-fold),
-AWS SES Email Integrity Auditor (1190 v2.1 — extended in EE 0.5.0 + consolidated in
-EE 0.5.2: DKIM CNAME DNS resolution + DMARC TXT record parser + SES classic API parity
-+ deferred-items sweep; closes 1 CRITICAL false-CLEAN class on DMARC pct=0 per
+AWS SES Email Integrity Auditor (1190 v3 — extended in EE 0.5.0 + consolidated in
+EE 0.5.2 + v3 extension in EE 0.5.3: DKIM CNAME DNS resolution + DMARC TXT record
+parser + SES classic API parity + deferred-items sweep + DKIM public-key fingerprint
+capture/pin + in-band DMARC alignment classifier; closes 1 CRITICAL false-CLEAN class on DMARC pct=0 per
 R-CRITICAL-1 fold + 1 HIGH false-NEGATIVE class on DMARC sp subdomain-policy override
 per R-HIGH-1 fold + new MEDIUM ses-dkim-dns-partial-with-transients per v2.1 R-MEDIUM-2
 fold + silent-loss-class closure on SES classic API quota exhaustion via cause:
@@ -220,7 +221,7 @@ depend on node:dns/promises for live DNS cross-reference).
 **EE plugin IDs use the disjoint 1000+ range** (per EE 0.3.9 renumbering) to avoid
 CE collision. CE reserves 001-099.
 
-**EE SOC 2 substrate-evidence coverage (post-EE 0.5.2):** 10 covered controls (CC6.1 /
+**EE SOC 2 substrate-evidence coverage (post-EE 0.5.3):** 10 covered controls (CC6.1 /
 CC6.2 / CC6.6 / CC6.7 / CC6.8 / CC7.1 / CC7.2 / CC7.3 / C1.1 / C1.2) + 4 partial
 (CC6.3 / CC8.1 / A1.2 / PI1.5) + 33 OOS for static substrate scanning. Coverage matrix
 is institutionally honest: substrate-evidence depth grows release-over-release without

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "nsauditor-ai-agent-skill",
-  "version": "0.1.18",
+  "version": "0.1.19",
   "description": "AI Agent Skill for NSAuditor AI — gives any AI coding agent built-in knowledge of NSAuditor's MCP tools, schemas, plugins, and security audit workflows.",
   "keywords": [
     "nsauditor",

package/references/plugins.md

@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ listings, and default pages.
 | 1150 | AWS SQS/SNS Auditor (NEW EE 0.4.4 v1; **EXTENDED EE 0.5.1 v2** — 5 → 7 dimensions: CloudWatch alarm coverage on SQS ApproximateAgeOfOldestMessage + SNS NumberOfNotificationsFailed; first plugin-1150 dim to cross an SDK boundary — SQS+SNS → CloudWatch) | Enterprise | First multi-service plugin in EE codebase. **7 dimensions total** (v1: 5; v2 EE 0.5.1 added dims 6 + 7). **v1 dims preserved:** SQS encryption at rest (SqsManagedSseEnabled OR KmsMasterKeyId; four-tier classification) + SQS transit-encryption policy (aws:SecureTransport Deny statement) + SNS topic encryption at rest + SNS topic-policy permissive-Principal (full NotAction-Allow + NotPrincipal-Allow + Resource-scope filtering per plugin 1070 + 1110 precedent) + SQS dead-letter queue presence (dual-mapped A1.2 + CC7.1). **v2 EE 0.5.1 NEW dims:** **dim 6 — SQS ApproximateAgeOfOldestMessage CloudWatch alarm coverage** (CC7.2 + A1.2 dual-mapped) — per-queue classifier `_classifySqsAgeAlarmCoverage` checks for at least one `AWS/SQS:ApproximateAgeOfOldestMessage` MetricAlarm with the queue's `QueueName` dimension AND **both** `ActionsEnabled=true` AND non-empty `AlarmActions[]`. Four outcomes: PASS `sqs-age-alarm-covered` / MEDIUM `sqs-age-alarm-missing` (silent backlog growth class) / LOW `sqs-age-alarm-actions-disabled` (matching alarm with all disabled OR empty AlarmActions — informational-only) / LOW + evidenceGap `sqs-age-alarm-coverage-unverifiable` (CW SDK unavailable / DescribeAlarms AccessDenied / queue name un-extractable / pagination truncated). **dim 7 — SNS NumberOfNotificationsFailed CloudWatch alarm coverage** (CC7.2 + A1.2 dual-mapped) — per-topic analogue with `AWS/SNS:NumberOfNotificationsFailed` metric + `TopicName` dimension; same four-tier severity ladder. **v2 single-fetch budget pattern** (mirrors plugin 1040): `_enumerateMetricAlarms` paginates `cloudwatch:DescribeAlarms` ONCE per scan; `_buildAlarmIndex` builds per-resource Maps (`sqsAgeByQueueName` + `snsFailureByTopicName`) for O(1) per-resource lookup. Pagination cap default 20 pages × 100 alarms = 2000 alarm ceiling, operator-tunable via `opts.cwAlarmPageCap`. **Soft-degrade contract** — CW SDK load failure routes per-resource classifier to LOW + evidenceGap rather than blocking SQS+SNS primary substrate audit. **R-CRITICAL v2 fold (false-CLEAN closure)**: `actionable` requires BOTH `ActionsEnabled=true` AND non-empty `AlarmActions[]` array — CloudWatch fires NO operator paging when AlarmActions=[] even with ActionsEnabled=true; pre-fold an `{ActionsEnabled:true, AlarmActions:[]}` alarm passed as PASS-tier evidence on a structurally broken alarm. Discriminates "all disabled" vs "all empty actions" in remediation narrative. **R-HIGH v2 fold**: soc2.json PASS-tier titlePatterns narrowed to anchor on `AWS/SQS:ApproximateAgeOfOldestMessage` / `AWS/SNS:NumberOfNotificationsFailed` clauses. **R-MEDIUM/R-LOW v2 folds**: defensive shape guard + multi-alarm collision tests + FIFO end-to-end + corrupted-shape defensive tests. **7 same-session v2 reviewer folds** (1 CRITICAL + 1 HIGH + 2 MEDIUM + 1 LOW + 1 NIT; 6 folded same-session, 1 NIT deferred). **No new SDK dependencies** — `@aws-sdk/client-cloudwatch` already declared in optionalDependencies since EE 0.4.0 (used by plugin 1040). **23 soc2.json titlePattern entries total** (11 v1 + 12 v2: 8 CC7.2 + 4 A1.2 dual-mapped). **Synthetic-mock validation only** this cycle for v2 — real-AWS smoke deferred (no SQS/SNS paired fixtures yet in test-infra-builder; ship-without per documented gap, EE 0.5.0 SES precedent). Closes the **"messaging monitoring" SOC 2 dimension** per `tasks/things-to-check.md` §4 institutional checklist: *"Track SQS ApproximateAgeOfOldestMessage and SNS delivery failure metrics inside CloudWatch to prove operational monitoring."* | C1.1 / CC6.6 / A1.2 / CC7.1 / CC7.2 |
 | 1170 | AWS EC2 SG Perimeter Auditor (v2 — extended in EE 0.4.6) | Enterprise | Orthogonal evidence to plugin 1023 zero-trust-checker (1023 reads OBSERVED open ports; 1170 reads DECLARED SG policy via DescribeSecurityGroups). 6 dimensions: IPv4 0.0.0.0/0 ingress to **RESTRICTED_PORTS (v2: 23 ports per CIS AWS Foundations v3.0)** — SSH/RDP/MS SQL/MySQL/Postgres/Redshift/Redis/Memcached/MongoDB/Elasticsearch/CouchDB/Docker/Kubelet/K8s-API/etcd/Kibana/InfluxDB/Kafka/Consul/ZooKeeper/Vault CRITICAL + IPv6 ::/0 sibling CRITICAL + all-protocol (-1) wildcard CRITICAL + public ingress to non-restricted ports INFO + egress 0.0.0.0/0 INFO + orphan SG (no attached ENI) LOW governance. **v2: `opts.additionalRestrictedPorts` operator-config knob** + **per-SG cardinality cap with rollup trailer** (defends against finding-size DoS on 1000+ SG accounts) + **system-managed-SG name-prefix exclusion list** (ElasticMapReduce- / eks-cluster-sg- / AWSServiceRole / awseb- prefixes excluded from orphan-detection). UserIdGroupPairs rules surfaced as INFO + evidenceGap; transitive SG→SG chain analysis deferred to v3 | CC6.6 / CC6.2 |
 | 1180 | AWS ElastiCache Redis Auditor (v2 — extended in EE 0.4.9) | Enterprise | First plugin in 1170-1180 ID range. **6 SOC 2 substrate-evidence dimensions** (v1 unchanged in count; v2 grew dims 2 + 6 in scope). **v1 dims preserved:** transit encryption (TransitEncryptionEnabled wraps RESP in TLS; HIGH on disabled) + Redis AUTH/IAM-auth user groups (PASS on UserGroupIds; MEDIUM no-authentication) + Multi-AZ deployment (HIGH disabled / INFO standalone-not-applicable / INFO+evidenceGap on transient enabling/disabling states) + SnapshotRetentionLimit cadence (HIGH=0 / MEDIUM 1-6 / PASS ≥7; operator-tunable `opts.snapshotRetentionPassMinDays`). Dual API enumeration (DescribeReplicationGroups + DescribeCacheClusters) with inter-API dedup. **v2 GROWN dims (EE 0.4.9 EE-RT.17 v2):** **dim 2 at-rest encryption + KMS key custody** — original four-tier ladder (HIGH disabled → MEDIUM AWS-owned-default → MEDIUM `alias/aws/elasticache` → PASS customer-managed CMK + LOW+evidenceGap on `:key/UUID` per conservative-classifier-principle) **PLUS v2 kms:DescribeKey cross-reference promotion** (mirrors plugin 1140 v2): UNVERIFIABLE `:key/UUID` ARN shapes promoted via KeyMetadata.KeyManager to deterministic PASS `elasticache-at-rest-customer-managed-kms-promoted` (CUSTOMER) / MEDIUM `elasticache-at-rest-aws-managed-kms-promoted` (AWS); conservative on AccessDenied/NotFound/unknown KeyManager. **dim 6 subnet routing** — v1 INFO substrate (`elasticache-subnet-group-substrate`) plus **v2 ec2:DescribeRouteTables verifier** that walks the cache subnet group's subnets via elasticache:DescribeCacheSubnetGroups + filtered ec2:DescribeRouteTables, classifying each subnet on Internet Gateway route presence via /^igw-[a-f0-9]+$/i (correctly excludes egress-only eigw-): HIGH `elasticache-subnet-public-route-detected` (with per-subnet `igwDestinationsBySubnet` evidence per R-HIGH-1 fold) / PASS `elasticache-subnet-private-verified` (all subnets verified IGW-free) / LOW + evidenceGap `elasticache-subnet-main-rt-inheritance` per R-MEDIUM-2 false-NEGATIVE closure (default-VPC main-RT typically routes `0.0.0.0/0 → igw-*`) / LOW + evidenceGap `elasticache-subnet-verification-unverifiable` on AccessDenied. **Cross-plugin sister of plugin 1170 SG perimeter** (layer-3 subnet→IGW vs layer-4 SG ingress policy). **7 same-session v2 reviewer folds** (HIGH-1 IGW destination evidence; MEDIUM-2 main-RT-inheritance false-NEGATIVE closure; MEDIUM-3 cache-key naming; LOW-6/7/9/10/11 + NIT-12). **Per-resource caching** prevents N×M API explosion (kmsKeyManagerCache + subnetGroupCache + subnetSetRoutingCache). **No new SDK deps** — @aws-sdk/client-kms + @aws-sdk/client-ec2 reused from EE 0.4.5. **Real-AWS smoke END-TO-END against 522412052794**: R-MEDIUM-2 fold escalation demonstrably firing in production (`redis-leaky-cache` → dim 6 LOW main-RT-inheritance). | CC6.1 / CC6.2 / CC6.6 / A1.2 / C1.1 |
-| 1190 | AWS SES Email Integrity Auditor (NEW EE 0.4.7; EXTENDED EE 0.5.0 v2; **CONSOLIDATED EE 0.5.2 v2.1** — 7 deferred reviewer-fold items closed + new MEDIUM `ses-dkim-dns-partial-with-transients` category + module-load-time disjointness IIFE + silent-loss-class closure on SES classic API quota exhaustion via `cause: "classic-sdk-quota-exhausted"`) | Enterprise | **v2 EE 0.5.0 GROWN dims:** **dim 1 DKIM** — original substrate **PLUS v2 DKIM CNAME DNS resolution promotion**: each `<token>._domainkey.<domain>` CNAME resolved via node:dns/promises + matched against `<token>.dkim.amazonses.com` (case-insensitive per RFC 1035 §2.3.3); four outcomes PASS `ses-dkim-dns-verified` / MEDIUM `ses-dkim-dns-partial` / **HIGH `ses-dkim-dns-missing` (false-CLEAN closure: SES Status=SUCCESS but DNS removed)** / LOW + evidenceGap `ses-dkim-dns-unverifiable`. **dim 2 MailFrom** — original substrate **PLUS v2 DMARC TXT record parser + MailFrom promotion**: RFC 7489 §6.4 tag-list parser + `_dmarc.<identityDomain>` TXT lookup; five outcomes PASS `ses-dmarc-policy-reject` / MEDIUM `ses-dmarc-policy-quarantine` / HIGH `ses-dmarc-policy-none` / HIGH `ses-dmarc-missing` / LOW + evidenceGap `ses-dmarc-unverifiable`. **R-CRITICAL-1 fold (false-CLEAN closure)**: `pct=0` on `p=reject`/`p=quarantine` functionally equivalent to `p=none`; now routes to HIGH `ses-dmarc-policy-none`. **R-HIGH-1 fold (subdomain-takeover false-NEGATIVE closure)**: `sp` subdomain-policy override now evaluated — `p=reject; sp=none` downgrades to HIGH with `dmarcSpWeakens` (subdomain phishing wide open while apex protected). **dim 4 sending-auth policies** — original IAM-policy classifier **PLUS v2 SES classic GetIdentityPolicies parity**: `_loadSesClassicSdk` restored; cross-API discrepancy emits HIGH `ses-classic-policy-discrepancy` (classic-only — canonical false-NEGATIVE class) / MEDIUM (`_canonicalSort` JSON deep-equal ignores whitespace + key-order drift) / INFO (v2-only benign). Conservative on classic SDK unavailable / AccessDenied → LOW + evidenceGap. **v1 dims preserved unchanged:** TLS enforcement (dim 3) + dedicated IP pool (dim 5) + suppression list (dim 6 ZDE — count + reason only). **v2 promoter pattern**: sync v1 classifiers unchanged; async promoters walk collected findings post-classification. **R-HIGH-2 fold**: brittle `inTestMode = !!opts._client` coupling replaced with explicit `_skipV2Promotion` master switch + 3 orthogonal kill-switches. **First plugin in EE to depend on node:dns/promises** for live DNS cross-reference. **8 same-session v2 reviewer folds** (1 CRITICAL + 3 HIGH + 2 MEDIUM + 2 LOW); 6 queued in Pick-up Block. **Real-DNS smoke validation END-TO-END** against production resolvers (`_dmarc.nsasoft.us` parsed correctly: `p=reject, sp=reject, pct=100`; forward-compat `fo=1` tag preserved). Empty-account SESv2 enumeration baseline succeeded end-to-end against 522412052794. **v1 base (preserved):** First plugin in 1190-1199 ID range. Closes the next-highest-priority gap from `tasks/things-to-check.md` AWS SOC 2 audit-canonical compliance checklist after Redis closed in 0.4.6. **6 audit dimensions:** **DKIM enablement + signing status** (CC6.1 / Privacy — HIGH on `SigningEnabled=false`; transient PENDING/TEMPORARY_FAILURE/NOT_STARTED INFO + walkthroughRequired; FAILED MEDIUM on DNS drift; unknown enum LOW + evidenceGap per conservative-classifier-principle) + **custom MailFrom domain alignment** (Privacy substrate — INFO + walkthroughRequired on default amazonses.com / PASS on custom + Status=SUCCESS) + **configuration set TLS enforcement** (C1.1 — REQUIRE PASS / OPTIONAL HIGH SMTP-downgrade-attack window / non-string-but-truthy distinct LOW with `tlsPolicyType` evidence per R-MEDIUM-7 fold) + **identity sending authorization policy permissive principals** (CC6.6 — multi-class wildcard detector covering bare `"*"` / `{AWS:"*"}` / `{Service:"*"}` / `{Federated:"*"}` / `{CanonicalUser:"*"}` / array-form `[*]` per R-HIGH-4 fold + distinct HIGH `ses-sending-auth-notprincipal-allow` per R-CRITICAL-1 fold catching NotPrincipal+Allow wildcard-EQUIVALENT class + LOW + evidenceGap `ses-sending-auth-malformed-statement` per R-HIGH-2 fold) + **dedicated IP pool sending posture** (CC7.1 substrate, account-level — INFO + walkthroughRequired on configured pools / INFO on shared-pool default) + **suppression list state** (CC7.1 deliverability substrate — **ZDE invariant: NEVER reads suppressed-destination email addresses**; count + reason only; verified at run() envelope boundary via sentinel-string assertion per R-LOW-8 fold). Dual API surface discipline: v1 uses SESv2 only (canonical modern API); `@aws-sdk/client-ses` declared in optionalDependencies for v2+ cross-API parity. **11 same-session reviewer folds** — ties single-cycle reviewer-fold record. **CRITICAL-1 closure**: NotPrincipal+Allow false-CLEAN class (matches plugins 1070 + 1150 discipline). **HIGH-4 closure**: `_isWildcardPrincipal` walks every Principal class value (pre-fold only `principal.AWS` inspected, leaking `{Service:"*"}` + `{Federated:"*"}` as silent CLEAN). **No real-AWS smoke against violation-tier fixtures** — test-infra-builder has NO SES paired fixtures yet (full-stack fixtures deferred to v2 alongside DKIM CNAME DNS resolution + DMARC TXT record parsing); empty-account smoke baseline against 522412052794 DID succeed end-to-end. | CC6.1 / CC6.6 / C1.1 / CC7.1 (substrate) / Privacy (substrate) |
+| 1190 | AWS SES Email Integrity Auditor (NEW EE 0.4.7; EXTENDED EE 0.5.0 v2; CONSOLIDATED EE 0.5.2 v2.1; **EXTENDED EE 0.5.3 v3** — Part A DKIM public-key fingerprint capture/pin + Part B in-band DMARC alignment classifier; 5 same-session reviewer folds incl. 1 R-CRITICAL false-CLEAN closure on truncated DKIM keys via new `_stripControlCharsNoTruncate` helper; v2.1 closed — 7 deferred reviewer-fold items closed + new MEDIUM `ses-dkim-dns-partial-with-transients` category + module-load-time disjointness IIFE + silent-loss-class closure on SES classic API quota exhaustion via `cause: "classic-sdk-quota-exhausted"`) | Enterprise | **v2 EE 0.5.0 GROWN dims:** **dim 1 DKIM** — original substrate **PLUS v2 DKIM CNAME DNS resolution promotion**: each `<token>._domainkey.<domain>` CNAME resolved via node:dns/promises + matched against `<token>.dkim.amazonses.com` (case-insensitive per RFC 1035 §2.3.3); four outcomes PASS `ses-dkim-dns-verified` / MEDIUM `ses-dkim-dns-partial` / **HIGH `ses-dkim-dns-missing` (false-CLEAN closure: SES Status=SUCCESS but DNS removed)** / LOW + evidenceGap `ses-dkim-dns-unverifiable`. **dim 2 MailFrom** — original substrate **PLUS v2 DMARC TXT record parser + MailFrom promotion**: RFC 7489 §6.4 tag-list parser + `_dmarc.<identityDomain>` TXT lookup; five outcomes PASS `ses-dmarc-policy-reject` / MEDIUM `ses-dmarc-policy-quarantine` / HIGH `ses-dmarc-policy-none` / HIGH `ses-dmarc-missing` / LOW + evidenceGap `ses-dmarc-unverifiable`. **R-CRITICAL-1 fold (false-CLEAN closure)**: `pct=0` on `p=reject`/`p=quarantine` functionally equivalent to `p=none`; now routes to HIGH `ses-dmarc-policy-none`. **R-HIGH-1 fold (subdomain-takeover false-NEGATIVE closure)**: `sp` subdomain-policy override now evaluated — `p=reject; sp=none` downgrades to HIGH with `dmarcSpWeakens` (subdomain phishing wide open while apex protected). **dim 4 sending-auth policies** — original IAM-policy classifier **PLUS v2 SES classic GetIdentityPolicies parity**: `_loadSesClassicSdk` restored; cross-API discrepancy emits HIGH `ses-classic-policy-discrepancy` (classic-only — canonical false-NEGATIVE class) / MEDIUM (`_canonicalSort` JSON deep-equal ignores whitespace + key-order drift) / INFO (v2-only benign). Conservative on classic SDK unavailable / AccessDenied → LOW + evidenceGap. **v1 dims preserved unchanged:** TLS enforcement (dim 3) + dedicated IP pool (dim 5) + suppression list (dim 6 ZDE — count + reason only). **v2 promoter pattern**: sync v1 classifiers unchanged; async promoters walk collected findings post-classification. **R-HIGH-2 fold**: brittle `inTestMode = !!opts._client` coupling replaced with explicit `_skipV2Promotion` master switch + 3 orthogonal kill-switches. **First plugin in EE to depend on node:dns/promises** for live DNS cross-reference. **8 same-session v2 reviewer folds** (1 CRITICAL + 3 HIGH + 2 MEDIUM + 2 LOW); 6 queued in Pick-up Block. **Real-DNS smoke validation END-TO-END** against production resolvers (`_dmarc.nsasoft.us` parsed correctly: `p=reject, sp=reject, pct=100`; forward-compat `fo=1` tag preserved). Empty-account SESv2 enumeration baseline succeeded end-to-end against 522412052794. **v1 base (preserved):** First plugin in 1190-1199 ID range. Closes the next-highest-priority gap from `tasks/things-to-check.md` AWS SOC 2 audit-canonical compliance checklist after Redis closed in 0.4.6. **6 audit dimensions:** **DKIM enablement + signing status** (CC6.1 / Privacy — HIGH on `SigningEnabled=false`; transient PENDING/TEMPORARY_FAILURE/NOT_STARTED INFO + walkthroughRequired; FAILED MEDIUM on DNS drift; unknown enum LOW + evidenceGap per conservative-classifier-principle) + **custom MailFrom domain alignment** (Privacy substrate — INFO + walkthroughRequired on default amazonses.com / PASS on custom + Status=SUCCESS) + **configuration set TLS enforcement** (C1.1 — REQUIRE PASS / OPTIONAL HIGH SMTP-downgrade-attack window / non-string-but-truthy distinct LOW with `tlsPolicyType` evidence per R-MEDIUM-7 fold) + **identity sending authorization policy permissive principals** (CC6.6 — multi-class wildcard detector covering bare `"*"` / `{AWS:"*"}` / `{Service:"*"}` / `{Federated:"*"}` / `{CanonicalUser:"*"}` / array-form `[*]` per R-HIGH-4 fold + distinct HIGH `ses-sending-auth-notprincipal-allow` per R-CRITICAL-1 fold catching NotPrincipal+Allow wildcard-EQUIVALENT class + LOW + evidenceGap `ses-sending-auth-malformed-statement` per R-HIGH-2 fold) + **dedicated IP pool sending posture** (CC7.1 substrate, account-level — INFO + walkthroughRequired on configured pools / INFO on shared-pool default) + **suppression list state** (CC7.1 deliverability substrate — **ZDE invariant: NEVER reads suppressed-destination email addresses**; count + reason only; verified at run() envelope boundary via sentinel-string assertion per R-LOW-8 fold). Dual API surface discipline: v1 uses SESv2 only (canonical modern API); `@aws-sdk/client-ses` declared in optionalDependencies for v2+ cross-API parity. **11 same-session reviewer folds** — ties single-cycle reviewer-fold record. **CRITICAL-1 closure**: NotPrincipal+Allow false-CLEAN class (matches plugins 1070 + 1150 discipline). **HIGH-4 closure**: `_isWildcardPrincipal` walks every Principal class value (pre-fold only `principal.AWS` inspected, leaking `{Service:"*"}` + `{Federated:"*"}` as silent CLEAN). **No real-AWS smoke against violation-tier fixtures** — test-infra-builder has NO SES paired fixtures yet (full-stack fixtures deferred to v2 alongside DKIM CNAME DNS resolution + DMARC TXT record parsing); empty-account smoke baseline against 522412052794 DID succeed end-to-end. | CC6.1 / CC6.6 / C1.1 / CC7.1 (substrate) / Privacy (substrate) |
 
 ---