nodemailer 10.1.0 → 10.1.1

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,12 @@
 # CHANGELOG
 
+## [10.1.1](https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/compare/v10.1.0...v10.1.1) (2026-10-14)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **fetch:** strip credentials on any cross-origin redirect ([a15360c](https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/a15360cd2cd12e4670e96ab0b7290e8c862391cf))
+
 ## [10.1.0](https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/compare/v10.0.16...v10.1.0) (2026-10-10)
 
 

package/SECURITY.md

@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
 # Security Policy
 
-Nodemailer is a widely deployed, zero-dependency e-mail library. We take security
-reports seriously and aim to respond quickly.
+Nodemailer is a widely deployed, zero-dependency email library. We welcome
+responsible reports of vulnerabilities that present a credible security risk to
+users. Please distinguish security vulnerabilities from ordinary bugs, unusual
+edge cases, and hardening suggestions.
 
 ## Supported Versions
 
@@ -17,45 +19,119 @@ the supported way to receive security updates.
 If you are on an older major, please upgrade. See the migration notes at
 <https://nodemailer.com/> before updating.
 
-## Reporting a Vulnerability
+## What Qualifies as a Security Vulnerability
 
-**Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues,
-pull requests, or discussions.**
+A security report should identify a realistic way for an attacker to cross a
+security boundary in a supported version of Nodemailer. Unexpected behavior,
+a failing test, or a technically correct proof of concept is not sufficient on
+its own to establish security impact.
 
-Report privately through one of the following channels:
+In particular, explain:
 
-1. **GitHub Security Advisories (preferred).** Open a private report at
-   <https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/new>. This keeps
-   the discussion private until a fix is published and lets us credit you.
-2. **Email.** Send details to **andris@reinman.eu** (the contact listed in
-   [`SECURITY.txt`](SECURITY.txt)). Encrypt sensitive details if possible.
+- **Attacker capabilities:** Who is the attacker, and what inputs, systems, or
+  responses can they control _without_ already having the privileges or secrets
+  they are trying to gain?
+- **Attack path:** How does attacker-controlled input reach the affected code
+  through a supported Nodemailer API or a realistic application integration?
+- **Prerequisites:** What configuration and user actions are required? If the
+  attack depends on unusual options or deliberately malformed input, explain
+  why those conditions could arise in a real application.
+- **Impact:** What confidentiality, integrity, or availability boundary is
+  crossed, and what can the attacker achieve as a result?
 
-When reporting, please include as much of the following as you can:
+A vulnerability involving an optional or less common feature can still qualify
+if these conditions are met. Conversely, the existence of a defensive check in
+the code does not, by itself, establish that every bypass of that check has a
+realistic security impact.
 
-- The affected version(s) and environment (Node.js version, OS).
-- The component involved (e.g. SMTP connection, address parsing, MIME/header
-  generation, DKIM).
-- A clear description of the issue and its impact (e.g. header/SMTP command
-  injection, information disclosure, DoS).
-- A minimal proof of concept or reproduction steps.
-- Any suggested remediation, if you have one.
+## Reporting a Vulnerability
 
-Nodemailer is maintained by a single person, so there is no guaranteed response
-time: sometimes reports are handled within hours, sometimes they take longer.
-Accepted issues are fixed in a new release and coordinated through a GitHub
-Security Advisory, and reporters who wish to be named are credited.
+**Do not disclose suspected exploitable vulnerabilities through public GitHub
+issues, pull requests, or discussions before coordinating with the maintainer.**
 
-## CVEs
+Report privately through one of the following channels:
 
-We track and disclose vulnerabilities through GitHub Security Advisories. We do
-not request or manage CVE identifiers ourselves. If you need a CVE assigned for a
-reported issue, please request one yourself, for example through GitHub's own
-CVE request flow on the published advisory, or another CNA.
+1. **GitHub Security Advisories (preferred):**
+   <https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/new>.
+2. **Email:** **andris@reinman.eu**, as listed in
+   [`SECURITY.txt`](SECURITY.txt). Encrypt sensitive details if possible.
+
+### Required Information
+
+Please provide enough information to evaluate both the defect and its security
+impact. Reports should include:
+
+1. The affected Nodemailer version or commit, Node.js version, and relevant
+   configuration.
+2. A concise description of the issue and the affected public API or code path.
+3. A minimal, tested reproduction, including steps to run it, expected behavior,
+   and observed behavior.
+4. A concrete threat model: attacker control, prerequisites, trust boundary, and
+   resulting impact. Clearly distinguish what your reproduction proves from what
+   you believe might be possible.
+5. An explanation of why the issue affects applications beyond a deliberately
+   constructed test setup, where this is not obvious.
+
+A suggested fix is welcome but does not replace an explanation of exploitability.
+A complete real-world exploit is not always necessary, but the report must make
+a credible security impact clear.
+
+### Reports That May Be Treated as Ordinary Bugs
+
+The following generally do **not** qualify for private security handling unless
+you can demonstrate an additional, meaningful security boundary crossing:
+
+- Issues that require the attacker to control trusted application code,
+  administrator-only configuration, or the secret they supposedly extract.
+- Problems caused solely by application-level misuse, exposed credentials, or
+  insecure deployment choices outside Nodemailer's control.
+- Contrived proof-of-concept setups where the tester controls both sides of a
+  request, without explaining how a separate attacker could trigger the issue.
+- Parser quirks, unexpected behavior, and bypasses of internal checks with no
+  demonstrated security impact.
+- Speculative findings based only on static analysis or an automated tool's
+  assessment, without a verified reproduction and credible attack scenario.
+
+These may still be valid bugs and may be considered through the normal issue
+tracker. Please coordinate before making any potentially exploitable details
+public. Classification as a bug does not guarantee a fix or a particular
+priority.
+
+### Automated and AI-Assisted Reports
+
+Automated analysis and AI tools are welcome as research aids, but the person
+submitting a report is responsible for verifying its claims. **Do not submit
+bulk, unverified, or speculative AI-generated findings.** Test each finding
+against a supported release and establish the actual security impact. Reports
+that do not meet the requirements above may be closed without further
+investigation or individual feedback; they can be resubmitted with stronger
+evidence.
+
+## Triage and Disclosure
+
+Nodemailer is maintained by a single person, and there is **no guaranteed
+response or resolution time**. Reports are prioritized based on demonstrated
+impact, exploitability, affected usage, and available maintenance resources.
+
+A private report does not automatically become a security advisory. Confirmed
+vulnerabilities may be fixed and disclosed through GitHub Security Advisories;
+other findings may be closed, deferred, or handled as ordinary bugs. Please do
+not disclose details of an unresolved, potentially exploitable issue publicly
+without coordinating with the maintainer.
+
+## CVEs and Credit
+
+We do not request or manage CVE identifiers. A report being acknowledged, a bug
+being fixed, or a pull request being merged does **not** mean that Nodemailer
+has confirmed a security vulnerability or endorsed a CVE assignment. We do not
+guarantee advisories, CVE identifiers, or public credit for reports. For
+confirmed vulnerabilities disclosed through an advisory, substantive reporters
+may be credited if they wish.
 
 ## Scope
 
 In scope: the `nodemailer` package source in this repository: message and MIME
-generation, SMTP/LMTP client behaviour, address parsing, header handling, DKIM
+generation, SMTP/LMTP client behavior, address parsing, header handling, DKIM
 signing, and the bundled transports.
 
 Out of scope: vulnerabilities in your own application code, misconfiguration of

package/dist/cjs/fetch/index.js

@@ -116,6 +116,10 @@ function parseFetchUrl(url) {
     }
     return parsed;
 }
+// the port a request to the URL goes to, explicit or the default of its scheme
+function fetchPort(parsed) {
+    return parsed.port ? Number(parsed.port) : parsed.protocol === 'https:' ? 443 : 80;
+}
 function nmfetch(url, options) {
     options = options || {};
     options.fetchRes = options.fetchRes || new node_stream_1.PassThrough();
@@ -232,7 +236,7 @@ function nmfetch(url, options) {
         method,
         host: parsed.hostname,
         path: parsed.path,
-        port: parsed.port ? parsed.port : parsed.protocol === 'https:' ? 443 : 80,
+        port: fetchPort(parsed),
         headers,
         // Validate TLS certificates by default. Callers that genuinely need to
         // reach a self-signed/internal host opt out explicitly with
@@ -334,17 +338,19 @@ function nmfetch(url, options) {
                 // the shared fetchRes once it times out. Callers listen with req.once().
                 return fail(new Error('Unsupported protocol for URL ' + redirectUrl), redirectUrl);
             }
-            // Do not forward credentials when the redirect leaves the original
-            // security context: a different host, or a downgrade from https to
-            // http (which would otherwise put them on the wire in cleartext).
-            // Strip sensitive request headers so an attacker who controls the
-            // redirect target cannot harvest them.
-            const crossHost = redirectParsed.hostname !== parsed.hostname;
-            const downgrade = parsed.protocol === 'https:' && redirectParsed.protocol === 'http:';
-            if (options.headers && (crossHost || downgrade)) {
+            // Do not forward credentials when the redirect leaves the origin: a different
+            // scheme, host or port is a different security context (an https to http
+            // downgrade would also put them on the wire in cleartext). Strip sensitive
+            // request headers so an attacker who controls the redirect target cannot
+            // harvest them.
+            const crossOrigin = redirectParsed.protocol !== parsed.protocol ||
+                redirectParsed.hostname !== parsed.hostname ||
+                fetchPort(redirectParsed) !== fetchPort(parsed);
+            if (options.headers && crossOrigin) {
                 const sensitive = ['authorization', 'cookie', 'proxy-authorization'];
                 Object.keys(options.headers).forEach(key => {
-                    if (sensitive.includes(key.toLowerCase())) {
+                    // normalized the way the request headers are built above, a padded name is sent too
+                    if (sensitive.includes(key.toLowerCase().trim())) {
                         delete options.headers[key];
                     }
                 });

package/dist/cjs/package-info.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 export declare const name = "nodemailer";
-export declare const version = "10.1.0";
+export declare const version = "10.1.1";
 export declare const homepage = "https://nodemailer.com/";

package/dist/cjs/package-info.js

@@ -3,5 +3,5 @@
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
 exports.homepage = exports.version = exports.name = void 0;
 exports.name = 'nodemailer';
-exports.version = '10.1.0';
+exports.version = '10.1.1';
 exports.homepage = 'https://nodemailer.com/';

package/dist/esm/fetch/index.js

@@ -78,6 +78,10 @@ function parseFetchUrl(url) {
     }
     return parsed;
 }
+// the port a request to the URL goes to, explicit or the default of its scheme
+function fetchPort(parsed) {
+    return parsed.port ? Number(parsed.port) : parsed.protocol === 'https:' ? 443 : 80;
+}
 function nmfetch(url, options) {
     options = options || {};
     options.fetchRes = options.fetchRes || new PassThrough();
@@ -194,7 +198,7 @@ function nmfetch(url, options) {
         method,
         host: parsed.hostname,
         path: parsed.path,
-        port: parsed.port ? parsed.port : parsed.protocol === 'https:' ? 443 : 80,
+        port: fetchPort(parsed),
         headers,
         // Validate TLS certificates by default. Callers that genuinely need to
         // reach a self-signed/internal host opt out explicitly with
@@ -296,17 +300,19 @@ function nmfetch(url, options) {
                 // the shared fetchRes once it times out. Callers listen with req.once().
                 return fail(new Error('Unsupported protocol for URL ' + redirectUrl), redirectUrl);
             }
-            // Do not forward credentials when the redirect leaves the original
-            // security context: a different host, or a downgrade from https to
-            // http (which would otherwise put them on the wire in cleartext).
-            // Strip sensitive request headers so an attacker who controls the
-            // redirect target cannot harvest them.
-            const crossHost = redirectParsed.hostname !== parsed.hostname;
-            const downgrade = parsed.protocol === 'https:' && redirectParsed.protocol === 'http:';
-            if (options.headers && (crossHost || downgrade)) {
+            // Do not forward credentials when the redirect leaves the origin: a different
+            // scheme, host or port is a different security context (an https to http
+            // downgrade would also put them on the wire in cleartext). Strip sensitive
+            // request headers so an attacker who controls the redirect target cannot
+            // harvest them.
+            const crossOrigin = redirectParsed.protocol !== parsed.protocol ||
+                redirectParsed.hostname !== parsed.hostname ||
+                fetchPort(redirectParsed) !== fetchPort(parsed);
+            if (options.headers && crossOrigin) {
                 const sensitive = ['authorization', 'cookie', 'proxy-authorization'];
                 Object.keys(options.headers).forEach(key => {
-                    if (sensitive.includes(key.toLowerCase())) {
+                    // normalized the way the request headers are built above, a padded name is sent too
+                    if (sensitive.includes(key.toLowerCase().trim())) {
                         delete options.headers[key];
                     }
                 });

package/dist/esm/package-info.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 export declare const name = "nodemailer";
-export declare const version = "10.1.0";
+export declare const version = "10.1.1";
 export declare const homepage = "https://nodemailer.com/";

package/dist/esm/package-info.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 // Generated by scripts/build.js from package.json. Do not edit by hand.
 export const name = 'nodemailer';
-export const version = '10.1.0';
+export const version = '10.1.1';
 export const homepage = 'https://nodemailer.com/';

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
     "name": "nodemailer",
-    "version": "10.1.0",
+    "version": "10.1.1",
     "description": "Easy as cake e-mail sending from your Node.js applications",
     "type": "module",
     "main": "./dist/cjs/nodemailer.js",
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@
     },
     "homepage": "https://nodemailer.com/",
     "devDependencies": {
-        "@aws-sdk/client-sesv2": "3.1146.0",
+        "@aws-sdk/client-sesv2": "3.1151.0",
         "@types/node": "20.19.43",
         "bunyan": "1.8.15",
         "c8": "12.0.0",
@@ -161,14 +161,14 @@
         "libbase64": "1.3.2",
         "libmime": "5.4.7",
         "libqp": "2.1.2",
-        "mailauth": "7.1.1",
-        "prettier": "3.9.9",
+        "mailauth": "7.3.0",
+        "prettier": "3.9.10",
         "proxy": "1.0.2",
         "proxy-test-server": "1.0.0",
-        "smtp-server": "3.19.17",
+        "smtp-server": "3.19.21",
         "tsx": "4.23.15",
         "typescript": "6.0.3",
-        "typescript-eslint": "8.71.1"
+        "typescript-eslint": "8.71.2"
     },
     "engines": {
         "node": ">=20.0.0"