npm - noctrace - Versions diffs - 0.4.2 → 0.5.0 - Mend

noctrace 0.4.2 → 0.5.0

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Files changed (9) hide show

package/dist/client/assets/{index-t0_dKSyq.js → index-CfD3iTQS.js} +22 -2
package/dist/client/index.html +1 -1
package/dist/server/server/routes/api.js +12 -4
package/dist/server/server/watcher.js +3 -0
package/dist/server/shared/health.js +2 -0
package/dist/server/shared/parser.js +30 -0
package/dist/server/shared/security-tips.js +315 -0
package/dist/server/shared/tips.js +25 -0
package/package.json +1 -1

package/dist/client/index.html CHANGED Viewed

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
     <link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.googleapis.com" />
     <link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.gstatic.com" crossorigin />
     <link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=JetBrains+Mono:wght@400;600;700&display=swap" rel="stylesheet" />
-    <script type="module" crossorigin src="/assets/index-t0_dKSyq.js"></script>
+    <script type="module" crossorigin src="/assets/index-CfD3iTQS.js"></script>
     <link rel="stylesheet" crossorigin href="/assets/index-nE1IMGzA.css">
   </head>
   <body>

package/dist/server/server/routes/api.js CHANGED Viewed

@@ -6,10 +6,11 @@ import { Router } from 'express';
 import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
 import path from 'node:path';
 import { WebSocket } from 'ws';
-import { parseJsonlContent, parseCompactionBoundaries, extractSessionId, extractAgentIds, parseSubAgentContent, } from '../../shared/parser.js';
+import { parseJsonlContent, parseCompactionBoundaries, extractSessionId, extractSessionTitle, extractAgentIds, parseSubAgentContent, } from '../../shared/parser.js';
 import { computeContextHealth } from '../../shared/health.js';
 import { parseAssistantTurns, computeDrift } from '../../shared/drift.js';
 import { attachEfficiencyTips } from '../../shared/tips.js';
+import { attachSecurityTips } from '../../shared/security-tips.js';
 /**
  * Read ~/.claude/sessions/*.json and return a Set of sessionIds
  * whose PID is still a running claude process.
@@ -193,9 +194,11 @@ export function buildApiRouter(claudeHome, wss) {
                 let permissionMode = null;
                 let isRemoteControlled = false;
                 let isActive = false;
+                let sessionTitle = null;
+                let fileContent = null;
                 try {
-                    const content = await fs.readFile(filePath, 'utf8');
-                    const lines = content.split('\n');
+                    fileContent = await fs.readFile(filePath, 'utf8');
+                    const lines = fileContent.split('\n');
                     // Extract metadata from lines (scan first 50 for speed)
                     const scanLimit = Math.min(lines.length, 50);
                     for (let i = 0; i < scanLimit; i++) {
@@ -226,13 +229,15 @@ export function buildApiRouter(claudeHome, wss) {
                     // Active if: live process in registry OR file modified within last 2 minutes
                     // Registry covers CLI sessions; mtime covers Desktop app sessions
                     isActive = runningSessions.has(id) || (Date.now() - stat.mtime.getTime() < 120_000);
+                    // Extract optional session title — scans all lines, best-effort
+                    sessionTitle = extractSessionTitle(fileContent);
                 }
                 catch {
                     // Unreadable file — still include with null startTime
                 }
                 let driftFactor = null;
                 try {
-                    const content = await fs.readFile(filePath, 'utf8');
+                    const content = fileContent ?? await fs.readFile(filePath, 'utf8');
                     const sessionTurns = parseAssistantTurns(content);
                     const sessionDrift = computeDrift(sessionTurns);
                     driftFactor = sessionTurns.length >= 5 ? sessionDrift.driftFactor : null;
@@ -251,6 +256,7 @@ export function buildApiRouter(claudeHome, wss) {
                     permissionMode,
                     isRemoteControlled,
                     driftFactor,
+                    title: sessionTitle,
                 });
             }
             // Sort by lastModified descending (most recent first)
@@ -349,6 +355,8 @@ export function buildApiRouter(claudeHome, wss) {
             }
             // Attach efficiency tips to wasteful rows (mutates rows in place)
             attachEfficiencyTips(rows, boundaries);
+            // Attach security tips (mutates rows in place)
+            attachSecurityTips(rows);
             // Count total tips across all rows (including children) for the client toolbar
             function countTips(r) {
                 return r.reduce((sum, row) => sum + row.tips.length + countTips(row.children), 0);

package/dist/server/server/watcher.js CHANGED Viewed

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import { parseJsonlContent, parseCompactionBoundaries } from '../shared/parser.j
 import { computeContextHealth } from '../shared/health.js';
 import { parseAssistantTurns, computeDrift } from '../shared/drift.js';
 import { attachEfficiencyTips } from '../shared/tips.js';
+import { attachSecurityTips } from '../shared/security-tips.js';
 /**
  * Watch a single JSONL session file for appended content.
  * On each file change, reads only the newly appended bytes, parses them into
@@ -67,6 +68,8 @@ export function watchSession(filePath, callbacks) {
             const drift = computeDrift(turns);
             // Attach efficiency tips to wasteful rows (mutates allRows in place)
             attachEfficiencyTips(allRows, boundaries);
+            // Attach security tips (mutates allRows in place)
+            attachSecurityTips(allRows);
             callbacks.onNewRows(allRows, health, boundaries, drift);
         }
         catch (err) {

package/dist/server/shared/health.js CHANGED Viewed

@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ export function computeContextHealth(rows, compactionCount) {
             score: 100,
             fillPercent: 0,
             compactionCount: 0,
+            compactionThrash: false,
             rereadRatio: 0,
             errorAcceleration: 1,
             toolEfficiency: 1,
@@ -230,6 +231,7 @@ export function computeContextHealth(rows, compactionCount) {
         score: Math.round(composite),
         fillPercent,
         compactionCount,
+        compactionThrash: compactionCount >= 3,
         rereadRatio,
         errorAcceleration,
         toolEfficiency,

package/dist/server/shared/parser.js CHANGED Viewed

@@ -432,6 +432,36 @@ export function extractSessionId(content) {
     }
     return null;
 }
+/**
+ * Extract a human-readable session title from JSONL content.
+ * Checks top-level fields `sessionTitle`, `title`, and `displayName` on any record,
+ * and also inspects system records for a `title` field.
+ * Returns null if no title is found.
+ */
+export function extractSessionTitle(content) {
+    const lines = content.split('\n');
+    for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
+        const line = lines[i].trim();
+        if (!line)
+            continue;
+        let parsed;
+        try {
+            parsed = JSON.parse(line);
+        }
+        catch {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (!isObj(parsed))
+            continue;
+        // Check top-level title fields in priority order
+        for (const field of ['sessionTitle', 'title', 'displayName']) {
+            const val = parsed[field];
+            if (typeof val === 'string' && val.trim())
+                return val.trim();
+        }
+    }
+    return null;
+}
 /**
  * Parse a sub-agent JSONL file into flat WaterfallRow objects.
  * Does not attempt agent nesting — all tool calls are returned as a flat array.

package/dist/server/shared/security-tips.js ADDED Viewed

@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Pre-compiled regex constants
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/** Matches common API key / secret token patterns. */
+const SECRET_PATTERNS = [
+    /AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}/,
+    /sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}/,
+    /sk-ant-[a-zA-Z0-9-]{20,}/,
+    /ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}/,
+    /npm_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}/,
+    /xoxb-[0-9]{10,}/,
+    /-----BEGIN .{0,30}PRIVATE KEY-----/,
+];
+/** curl/wget piped directly to a shell interpreter. */
+const CURL_PIPE_BASH = /curl[^|]*\|[^|]*(bash|sh|zsh|python|node)\b|wget[^|]*\|[^|]*(bash|sh)\b|eval\s*\$\(curl/;
+/** Outbound data transfer via curl/wget/nc. */
+const DATA_EXFIL = /curl[^&\n]*(-d\s|--data|--data-raw|-F\s)|cat[^|]*\|[^|]*(curl|wget|nc)\b|base64[^|]*\|[^|]*(curl|wget)\b/;
+/** localhost / loopback exclusion for data exfiltration. */
+const LOCALHOST_PATTERN = /localhost|127\.0\.0\.1/;
+/** Write/Edit to shell profile files. */
+const SHELL_PROFILE = /\.(bashrc|zshrc|bash_profile|zprofile|profile)$/;
+/** Zero-width and bidirectional Unicode control characters. */
+const HIDDEN_UNICODE = /[\u200B\u200C\u200D\u2060\uFEFF\u202A-\u202E]/;
+/** Individual prompt-injection keyword patterns. */
+const INJECTION_KEYWORDS = [
+    /ignore.*previous.*instructions/i,
+    /disregard.*above/i,
+    /you are now/i,
+    /new instructions:/i,
+    /system prompt/i,
+];
+/** Destructive shell / SQL commands. */
+const DESTRUCTIVE_CMD = /rm\s+.*-.*r.*-.*f|rm\s+-rf|DROP\s+(TABLE|DATABASE)|TRUNCATE\s+TABLE|DELETE\s+FROM\s+\w+\s*;/i;
+/** git push --force (but NOT --force-with-lease). */
+const FORCE_PUSH = /git\s+push\s+.*--force(?!-with-lease)|git\s+push\s+.*-f\b/;
+/** Sensitive credential / config file paths. */
+const SENSITIVE_FILE = /\.env($|\.)|\.pem$|\.key$|id_rsa|id_ed25519|\.ssh\/|credentials\.json|\.aws\/|\.npmrc|\.docker\/config|kubeconfig/;
+/** Overly permissive chmod. */
+const PERMISSION_WEAKENING = /chmod\s+(777|666)|chmod\s+-R\s+7/;
+/** sudo invocation at the start of a command. */
+const SUDO_CMD = /^sudo\s/;
+/** Binary file downloaded from the internet. */
+const BINARY_DOWNLOAD = /curl[^&\n]*-o[^&\n]*\.(sh|bin|exe)|wget[^&\n]*\.(sh|bin|exe|deb|rpm)/;
+/** Tool names that operate on files (Write / Edit / MultiEdit). */
+const FILE_WRITE_TOOLS = new Set(['Write', 'Edit', 'MultiEdit']);
+/** Maximum number of output characters to scan (performance guard). */
+const OUTPUT_SCAN_LIMIT = 3000;
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Internal helpers
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * Append a tip to a row, skipping duplicates by tip id.
+ */
+function addTip(row, tip) {
+    if (!row.tips.some((t) => t.id === tip.id)) {
+        row.tips.push(tip);
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Return the first OUTPUT_SCAN_LIMIT characters of a string, or '' if null.
+ */
+function truncatedOutput(output) {
+    if (output === null)
+        return '';
+    return output.length > OUTPUT_SCAN_LIMIT ? output.slice(0, OUTPUT_SCAN_LIMIT) : output;
+}
+/**
+ * Return true if any SECRET_PATTERNS regex matches the given text.
+ */
+function containsSecret(text) {
+    return SECRET_PATTERNS.some((re) => re.test(text));
+}
+/**
+ * Return true if the output text appears to contain prompt-injection patterns.
+ * Requires 2+ distinct keyword matches within 200 characters of each other.
+ * Skips Markdown documentation files (too many false positives).
+ */
+function hasPossibleInjection(output, filePath) {
+    if (filePath !== null && filePath.endsWith('.md'))
+        return false;
+    const matches = [];
+    for (const re of INJECTION_KEYWORDS) {
+        const m = re.exec(output);
+        if (m !== null)
+            matches.push(m.index);
+    }
+    if (matches.length < 2)
+        return false;
+    // Check whether any two match positions are within 200 chars of each other.
+    const sorted = matches.slice().sort((a, b) => a - b);
+    for (let i = 0; i < sorted.length - 1; i++) {
+        if (sorted[i + 1] - sorted[i] <= 200)
+            return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+/**
+ * Flatten rows and all their children into a single ordered array.
+ */
+function flattenRows(rows) {
+    const result = [];
+    for (const row of rows) {
+        result.push(row);
+        if (row.children.length > 0) {
+            result.push(...flattenRows(row.children));
+        }
+    }
+    return result;
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Public API
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * Scan rows for security-relevant patterns and attach tips. Mutates rows in place.
+ *
+ * Detection rules (CRITICAL):
+ * 1. secrets-in-output      — credential patterns in tool output
+ * 2. secrets-in-command     — credential patterns in Bash input.command
+ * 3. curl-pipe-bash         — remote code execution via pipe
+ * 4. data-exfiltration      — outbound data transfer (excluding localhost)
+ * 5. shell-profile-mod      — Write/Edit to .bashrc / .zshrc etc.
+ * 6. hidden-unicode         — zero-width / bidirectional chars in output
+ * 7. prompt-injection       — instruction-like text in tool output
+ *
+ * Detection rules (WARNING):
+ * 8.  destructive-command   — rm -rf, DROP TABLE, DELETE without WHERE
+ * 9.  force-push            — git push --force (not --force-with-lease)
+ * 10. sensitive-file        — .env, .pem, .key, .ssh/, AWS/npm credentials
+ * 11. permission-weakening  — chmod 777/666
+ * 12. sudo-usage            — sudo at the start of a command
+ *
+ * Detection rules (INFO):
+ * 13. binary-download       — curl/wget downloading .sh / .bin / .exe
+ *
+ * @param rows Top-level WaterfallRow[] (may include agent rows with children).
+ */
+export function attachSecurityTips(rows) {
+    const flat = flattenRows(rows);
+    for (const row of flat) {
+        if (row.type !== 'tool')
+            continue;
+        const output = truncatedOutput(row.output);
+        const command = row.toolName === 'Bash' && typeof row.input['command'] === 'string'
+            ? row.input['command']
+            : null;
+        const filePath = FILE_WRITE_TOOLS.has(row.toolName) && typeof row.input['file_path'] === 'string'
+            ? row.input['file_path']
+            : null;
+        const readFilePath = row.toolName === 'Read' && typeof row.input['file_path'] === 'string'
+            ? row.input['file_path']
+            : null;
+        const anyFilePath = filePath ?? readFilePath;
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // 1. secrets-in-output (CRITICAL)
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        if (output && containsSecret(output)) {
+            addTip(row, {
+                id: 'secrets-in-output',
+                title: 'Secret detected in output',
+                message: 'An API key or secret token appeared in this tool output. It is now in your session log on disk. ' +
+                    'Rotate the credential and add the source file to .gitignore.',
+                severity: 'critical',
+                category: 'security',
+            });
+        }
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // 2. secrets-in-command (CRITICAL)
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        if (command !== null && containsSecret(command)) {
+            addTip(row, {
+                id: 'secrets-in-command',
+                title: 'Secret in command',
+                message: 'A credential appears to be hardcoded in this shell command. Use environment variables instead.',
+                severity: 'critical',
+                category: 'security',
+            });
+        }
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // 3. curl-pipe-bash (CRITICAL)
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        if (command !== null && CURL_PIPE_BASH.test(command)) {
+            addTip(row, {
+                id: 'curl-pipe-bash',
+                title: 'Remote code execution',
+                message: 'Downloading and piping directly to a shell interpreter. This bypasses security checks. ' +
+                    'Review the URL and consider using a package manager.',
+                severity: 'critical',
+                category: 'security',
+            });
+        }
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // 4. data-exfiltration (CRITICAL)
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        if (command !== null && DATA_EXFIL.test(command) && !LOCALHOST_PATTERN.test(command)) {
+            addTip(row, {
+                id: 'data-exfiltration',
+                title: 'Outbound data transfer',
+                message: 'Data is being sent to an external URL. Verify the destination and confirm no sensitive data is being transmitted.',
+                severity: 'critical',
+                category: 'security',
+            });
+        }
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // 5. shell-profile-mod (CRITICAL)
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        if (filePath !== null && SHELL_PROFILE.test(filePath)) {
+            addTip(row, {
+                id: 'shell-profile-mod',
+                title: 'Shell profile modified',
+                message: 'Changes to shell profiles persist across all future terminal sessions. Review what was added.',
+                severity: 'critical',
+                category: 'security',
+            });
+        }
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // 6. hidden-unicode (CRITICAL)
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        if (output && HIDDEN_UNICODE.test(output)) {
+            addTip(row, {
+                id: 'hidden-unicode',
+                title: 'Hidden Unicode characters',
+                message: 'Invisible control characters detected in tool output. These can conceal instructions that ' +
+                    'Claude processes but humans cannot see.',
+                severity: 'critical',
+                category: 'security',
+            });
+        }
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // 7. prompt-injection (CRITICAL)
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        if (output && hasPossibleInjection(output, anyFilePath)) {
+            addTip(row, {
+                id: 'prompt-injection',
+                title: 'Possible prompt injection',
+                message: 'Tool output contains instruction-like text that could manipulate Claude. This may indicate ' +
+                    'adversarial content in project files or dependencies.',
+                severity: 'critical',
+                category: 'security',
+            });
+        }
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // 8. destructive-command (WARNING)
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        if (command !== null && DESTRUCTIVE_CMD.test(command)) {
+            addTip(row, {
+                id: 'destructive-command',
+                title: 'Destructive command',
+                message: 'This command can cause irreversible data loss. Verify the target is correct.',
+                severity: 'warning',
+                category: 'security',
+            });
+        }
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // 9. force-push (WARNING)
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        if (command !== null && FORCE_PUSH.test(command)) {
+            addTip(row, {
+                id: 'force-push',
+                title: 'Force push',
+                message: 'Force push rewrites remote history. Use --force-with-lease for safer pushes, or verify this is intentional.',
+                severity: 'warning',
+                category: 'security',
+            });
+        }
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // 10. sensitive-file (WARNING) — Read, Write, Edit, MultiEdit
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        const sensitiveFilePath = typeof row.input['file_path'] === 'string' ? row.input['file_path'] : null;
+        if (sensitiveFilePath !== null && SENSITIVE_FILE.test(sensitiveFilePath)) {
+            addTip(row, {
+                id: 'sensitive-file',
+                title: 'Sensitive file accessed',
+                message: 'Credential file contents are now in the session log (~/.claude/projects/). Consider whether this access was necessary.',
+                severity: 'warning',
+                category: 'security',
+            });
+        }
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // 11. permission-weakening (WARNING)
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        if (command !== null && PERMISSION_WEAKENING.test(command)) {
+            addTip(row, {
+                id: 'permission-weakening',
+                title: 'Overly permissive permissions',
+                message: 'World-writable permissions (777/666). Use 755 for directories, 644 for files.',
+                severity: 'warning',
+                category: 'security',
+            });
+        }
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // 12. sudo-usage (WARNING)
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        if (command !== null && SUDO_CMD.test(command)) {
+            addTip(row, {
+                id: 'sudo-usage',
+                title: 'Root privilege escalation',
+                message: 'Claude should not need sudo for development tasks. Consider a non-root approach.',
+                severity: 'warning',
+                category: 'security',
+            });
+        }
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        // 13. binary-download (INFO)
+        // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+        if (command !== null && BINARY_DOWNLOAD.test(command)) {
+            addTip(row, {
+                id: 'binary-download',
+                title: 'Binary download',
+                message: 'Binary downloaded from the internet. Verify the source URL and consider using a package manager with signature verification.',
+                severity: 'info',
+                category: 'security',
+            });
+        }
+    }
+}

package/dist/server/shared/tips.js CHANGED Viewed

@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ function flattenRows(rows) {
  * 6. High context fill — first row where contextFillPercent >= 80
  * 7. No delegation     — 50+ total tool rows with zero agent rows
  * 8. Post-compaction re-read — isReread after a compaction boundary
+ * 9. Compaction thrash    — 3+ compaction boundaries (thrash loop)
  *
  * A row may accumulate multiple tips. Duplicate tip ids on the same row are silently skipped.
  *
@@ -206,4 +207,28 @@ export function attachEfficiencyTips(rows, compactionBoundaries) {
             severity: 'info',
         });
     }
+    // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    // Rule 9: Compaction thrash (post-scan)
+    // Triggered when the session has been compacted 3+ times.
+    // Attach the tip to the row nearest (at or after) the 3rd compaction boundary.
+    // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    if (sortedBoundaries.length >= 3) {
+        const thirdBoundary = sortedBoundaries[2];
+        // Find the first tool row whose startTime is at or after the 3rd boundary.
+        let targetRow = flat.find((r) => r.type === 'tool' && r.startTime >= thirdBoundary);
+        // If no row comes after (session ended right at compaction), use the last tool row.
+        if (targetRow === undefined && toolRows.length > 0) {
+            targetRow = toolRows[toolRows.length - 1];
+        }
+        if (targetRow !== undefined) {
+            addTip(targetRow, {
+                id: 'compaction-thrash',
+                title: 'Compaction thrash loop',
+                message: 'This session has been compacted 3+ times, meaning context fills up immediately after each ' +
+                    'compaction. Start a new session with /clear, or break your work into smaller tasks. ' +
+                    'Add persistent context to CLAUDE.md so it survives compaction.',
+                severity: 'critical',
+            });
+        }
+    }
 }

package/package.json CHANGED Viewed

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "noctrace",
-  "version": "0.4.2",
+  "version": "0.5.0",
   "description": "Chrome DevTools Network-tab-style waterfall visualizer for Claude Code agent workflows",
   "type": "module",
   "license": "MIT",