nightpay 0.3.0 → 0.3.2
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- package/README.md +192 -376
- package/bin/cli.js +256 -60
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/skills/nightpay/AGENTS.md +283 -0
- package/skills/nightpay/SKILL.md +12 -9
- package/skills/nightpay/ontology/ontology.jsonld +1 -7
- package/skills/nightpay/ontology/ontology.md +178 -36
- package/scripts/bounty-board.sh +0 -325
- package/scripts/gateway.sh +0 -1365
- package/scripts/mip003-server.sh +0 -3593
- package/scripts/update-blocklist.sh +0 -194
package/scripts/gateway.sh
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# nightpay gateway — orchestrates the bounty lifecycle with fee mechanism
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#
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# SECURITY MODEL:
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# - RECEIPT_CONTRACT is required — no silent no-ops against empty address
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# - withdraw-fees requires OPERATOR_SECRET_KEY for signing (operator-only)
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# - All hashes are domain-separated to prevent cross-namespace collisions
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# - refund path cancels Masumi escrow AND emits a signed on-chain NIGHT refund intent
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# - Amount bounds enforced (min + max) before any network call
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# - commitment_hash format validated before any network call
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# - curl has --max-time 30 to prevent hung connections
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#
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# Usage: ./gateway.sh <command> [args...]
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#
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# Commands:
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# create-pool <job_description> <contribution_specks> <funding_goal_specks>
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# fund-pool <pool_commitment>
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# pool-status <pool_commitment>
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# activate-pool <pool_commitment>
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# expire-pool <pool_commitment>
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# claim-refund <pool_commitment> <funder_nullifier>
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# emergency-refund <pool_commitment> <funder_nullifier> <contribution_specks> <funded_at_tx> <nonce>
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# post-bounty <job_description> <amount_night_specks>
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# find-agent <capability_query>
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# agent-showcase [search_query]
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# hire-and-pay <agent_id> <job_description> <commitment_hash> [refund_address]
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# hire-direct <agent_id> <job_description> <amount_specks>
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# check-job <job_id>
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# complete <job_id> <commitment_hash> [--approvals sig1:ts1:nonce1,...]
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# refund <job_id> <commitment_hash> [refund_address]
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# withdraw-fees [amount_specks] # operator-only: requires OPERATOR_SECRET_KEY
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# stats # public contract stats
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# approve-multisig <job_id> <output_hash> <approver_key> # per-approver signature
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# optimistic-sweep [--dry-run] # auto-complete expired optimistic windows
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# refund-unclaimed [--dry-run] # auto-refund old jobs with zero claims
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set -euo pipefail
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# ─── Terminal colors ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Gracefully disabled when stderr is not a TTY (CI, logs, pipes)
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if [[ -t 2 ]]; then
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RED=$'\e[31m'; GREEN=$'\e[32m'; YELLOW=$'\e[33m'
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CYAN=$'\e[36m'; BOLD=$'\e[1m'; DIM=$'\e[2m'; RESET=$'\e[0m'
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else
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RED=''; GREEN=''; YELLOW=''; CYAN=''; BOLD=''; DIM=''; RESET=''
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fi
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# ─── Required env vars ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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MASUMI_PAYMENT_URL="${MASUMI_PAYMENT_URL:-http://localhost:3001/api/v1}"
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MASUMI_REGISTRY_URL="${MASUMI_REGISTRY_URL:-http://localhost:3000/api/v1}"
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MASUMI_API_KEY="${MASUMI_API_KEY:?SECURITY: Set MASUMI_API_KEY}"
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# Keep preprod default until Midnight mainnet is live.
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MIDNIGHT_NETWORK="${MIDNIGHT_NETWORK:-preprod}"
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OPERATOR_ADDRESS="${OPERATOR_ADDRESS:?SECURITY: Set OPERATOR_ADDRESS}"
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OPERATOR_FEE_BPS="${OPERATOR_FEE_BPS:-200}"
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MAX_BOUNTY_SPECKS="${MAX_BOUNTY_SPECKS:-500000000}"
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MIN_BOUNTY_SPECKS="${MIN_BOUNTY_SPECKS:-1000}" # SECURITY: reject dust bounties
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# Midnight bridge — if set, gateway calls the bridge for real on-chain transactions.
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# If not set, gateway runs in local/stub mode (computes hashes locally, no chain).
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BRIDGE_URL="${BRIDGE_URL:-}"
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# SECURITY: contract address is REQUIRED — fail loudly rather than silently
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# routing funds to a void address
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RECEIPT_CONTRACT="${RECEIPT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS:?SECURITY: Set RECEIPT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS — funds cannot be routed without it}"
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# ─── Rate limiting ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# SECURITY: prevent bounty spam that inflates activeCount and floods Masumi.
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# Uses a per-command lockfile with a minimum interval between invocations.
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# Default: max 1 post-bounty per 5 seconds. Override with RATE_LIMIT_SECONDS.
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RATE_LIMIT_DIR="${RATE_LIMIT_DIR:-${HOME}/.nightpay/ratelimit}"
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RATE_LIMIT_SECONDS="${RATE_LIMIT_SECONDS:-5}"
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COMMAND="${1:?Usage: gateway.sh <command> [args...]}"
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shift
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# ─── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# SECURITY: SSRF guard — only allow http/https to non-RFC-1918, non-loopback hosts.
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# Blocks: 127.x, 10.x, 172.16-31.x, 192.168.x, 169.254.x (cloud metadata), ::1
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validate_url() {
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local url="$1"
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python3 -c "
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import sys, urllib.parse, ipaddress, socket
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url = sys.argv[1]
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parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
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if parsed.scheme not in ('http', 'https'):
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print('ERROR: URL must use http or https scheme'); sys.exit(1)
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host = parsed.hostname
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if not host:
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print('ERROR: URL has no hostname'); sys.exit(1)
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# Resolve and check for private/loopback addresses
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try:
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addrs = socket.getaddrinfo(host, None)
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for addr in addrs:
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ip = ipaddress.ip_address(addr[4][0])
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if ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_reserved:
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# Allow localhost explicitly for dev — controlled by ALLOW_LOCAL_URLS
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import os
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if os.environ.get('ALLOW_LOCAL_URLS') == '1':
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sys.exit(0)
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print(f'ERROR: SSRF blocked — {ip} is a private/internal address'); sys.exit(1)
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except socket.gaierror:
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print(f'ERROR: Cannot resolve host {host}'); sys.exit(1)
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print('ok')
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" "$url" || exit 1
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}
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# Validate URLs at startup — fail before any command runs
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# Skip SSRF check for localhost (dev mode) if ALLOW_LOCAL_URLS=1
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if [[ "${ALLOW_LOCAL_URLS:-0}" != "1" ]]; then
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_url_check=$(python3 -c "
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import sys, urllib.parse, ipaddress
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for url in sys.argv[1:]:
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parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
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if parsed.scheme not in ('http','https'):
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print(f'ERROR: {url} — must be http/https'); sys.exit(1)
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print('ok')
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" "$MASUMI_PAYMENT_URL" "$MASUMI_REGISTRY_URL" 2>&1) || {
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echo -e "${RED}SECURITY ERROR${RESET}: Invalid Masumi URL — $_url_check" >&2; exit 1
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}
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fi
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# DARK ENERGY: DNS rebinding guard — re-resolve the hostname on every request
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# and verify it is still a non-private IP. An attacker who controls the DNS
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# server can pass the startup check (public IP) then flip the A-record to
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# 169.254.169.254 (AWS metadata) for subsequent calls. We re-resolve per call.
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_ssrf_safe_curl() {
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local url="$1"; shift
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local resolve_arg
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resolve_arg=$(python3 -c "
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import sys, urllib.parse, ipaddress, socket, os
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url = sys.argv[1]
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parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
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host = parsed.hostname or ''
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port = parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == 'https' else 80)
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try:
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if not host:
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sys.exit(0)
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addrs = socket.getaddrinfo(host, port)
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for addr in addrs:
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ip_str = addr[4][0]
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ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)
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if ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_reserved:
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if os.environ.get('ALLOW_LOCAL_URLS') == '1':
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print(f'{host}:{port}:{ip_str}')
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sys.exit(0)
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print(f'SSRF blocked: {ip}', file=sys.stderr); sys.exit(1)
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print(f'{host}:{port}:{ip_str}')
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sys.exit(0)
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except socket.gaierror as e:
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print(f'DNS error: {e}', file=sys.stderr); sys.exit(1)
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" "$url") || { echo -e "${RED}SECURITY ERROR${RESET}: SSRF guard blocked request to $url" >&2; exit 1; }
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if [[ -n "$resolve_arg" ]]; then
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curl -sf --max-time 30 --resolve "$resolve_arg" "$@" "$url"
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else
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curl -sf --max-time 30 "$@" "$url"
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fi
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}
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# ─── SSRF error (colored) — used by _ssrf_safe_curl ───────────────────────────
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masumi_get() {
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_ssrf_safe_curl "${MASUMI_REGISTRY_URL}${1}" \
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-H "Authorization: Bearer $MASUMI_API_KEY"
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}
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masumi_post() {
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_ssrf_safe_curl "${MASUMI_PAYMENT_URL}${1}" \
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-X POST \
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-H "Authorization: Bearer $MASUMI_API_KEY" \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d "$2"
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}
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# Best-effort compatibility layer for registry endpoint changes.
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find_agents() {
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local encoded="$1"
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local base_urls=("$MASUMI_REGISTRY_URL" "$MASUMI_PAYMENT_URL")
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local endpoints=(
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"/agents?capability=${encoded}&limit=5"
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"/registry/agents?capability=${encoded}&limit=5"
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"/services/agents?capability=${encoded}&limit=5"
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"/search/agents?capability=${encoded}&limit=5"
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)
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local base ep
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local auth_headers=(
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"Authorization: Bearer $MASUMI_API_KEY"
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"token: $MASUMI_API_KEY"
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)
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for base in "${base_urls[@]}"; do
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for ep in "${endpoints[@]}"; do
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local hdr
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for hdr in "${auth_headers[@]}"; do
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if out="$(_ssrf_safe_curl "${base}${ep}" -H "$hdr" 2>/dev/null)"; then
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printf '%s\n' "$out"
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return 0
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fi
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done
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done
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done
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echo "ERROR: agent discovery failed on all known endpoints and auth headers" >&2
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return 1
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}
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generate_nonce() {
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# SECURITY: cryptographically secure 32-byte random nonce.
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# `openssl rand -hex 32` always outputs exactly 64 lowercase hex chars + newline.
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# No spaces, no special chars — safe from word splitting in all contexts.
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# We strip the newline explicitly so callers can safely use $() without concern.
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openssl rand -hex 32 | tr -d '[:space:]'
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}
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# SECURITY: rate limiter — prevents bounty spam and Masumi flooding.
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# Creates a per-command lockfile; rejects calls within RATE_LIMIT_SECONDS of last call.
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rate_limit() {
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local cmd="$1"
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mkdir -p "$RATE_LIMIT_DIR"
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chmod 700 "$RATE_LIMIT_DIR"
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local lockfile="${RATE_LIMIT_DIR}/${cmd}.last"
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if [[ -f "$lockfile" ]]; then
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local last_ts; last_ts=$(cat "$lockfile" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
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local now; now=$(date +%s)
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local diff=$(( now - last_ts ))
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if (( diff < RATE_LIMIT_SECONDS )); then
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echo -e "${RED}ERROR${RESET}: Rate limit — wait ${BOLD}$(( RATE_LIMIT_SECONDS - diff ))s${RESET} before calling ${CYAN}$cmd${RESET} again" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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fi
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date +%s > "$lockfile"
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}
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die() {
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echo "ERROR: $*" >&2
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exit 1
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}
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# SECURITY: domain-separated hashes prevent cross-namespace collisions.
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# A bounty commitment can never equal a receipt hash even with identical inputs.
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domain_hash() {
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# DARK ENERGY: word splitting guard — pipe through tr to guarantee the output
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# is exactly 64 hex chars with no whitespace. sha256sum outputs "hash -\n";
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# awk extracts field 1, tr strips any residual whitespace. Safe to use unquoted
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# in arithmetic but we always double-quote hash variables regardless.
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local domain="$1"; local data="$2"
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printf '%s:%s' "$domain" "$data" | sha256sum | awk '{print $1}' | tr -d '[:space:]'
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}
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compute_bounty_commitment() { domain_hash "nightpay-bounty-v1" "$1"; }
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compute_receipt_hash() { domain_hash "nightpay-receipt-v1" "$1"; }
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compute_job_hash() { domain_hash "nightpay-job-v1" "$1"; }
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compute_fee() { echo $(( $1 * OPERATOR_FEE_BPS / 10000 )); }
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compute_net() { local fee; fee=$(compute_fee "$1"); echo $(( $1 - fee )); }
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# ─── Encrypted memory (OpenShart) ────────────────────────────────────────────
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# PRIVACY: funder credentials (nullifier, nonce, fundedAtTx) are the keys to
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# emergency refunds. Printing them to stdout puts them in agent conversation
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# history — plaintext, potentially logged by LLM providers, violating privacy.
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#
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# When OpenShart is available, credentials are encrypted and fragmented via
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# Shamir's Secret Sharing. The agent gets back a memory_id, not raw secrets.
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# To reclaim funds, the agent recalls the memory_id — OpenShart reconstructs
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# the credentials through its ChainLock protocol with timing validation.
|
|
271
|
-
#
|
|
272
|
-
# Fallback: if OpenShart is not installed, credentials are printed to stdout
|
|
273
|
-
# with a warning. The agent must save them somewhere safe.
|
|
274
|
-
|
|
275
|
-
OPENSHART_BIN="${OPENSHART_BIN:-}"
|
|
276
|
-
|
|
277
|
-
_shart_available() {
|
|
278
|
-
if [[ -n "$OPENSHART_BIN" ]]; then
|
|
279
|
-
command -v "$OPENSHART_BIN" &>/dev/null && return 0
|
|
280
|
-
fi
|
|
281
|
-
command -v openshart &>/dev/null && { OPENSHART_BIN="openshart"; return 0; }
|
|
282
|
-
command -v npx &>/dev/null && npx openshart --version &>/dev/null 2>&1 && { OPENSHART_BIN="npx openshart"; return 0; }
|
|
283
|
-
return 1
|
|
284
|
-
}
|
|
285
|
-
|
|
286
|
-
# Store a JSON blob in encrypted memory. Returns the memory_id.
|
|
287
|
-
_shart_store() {
|
|
288
|
-
local content="$1"
|
|
289
|
-
local tags="${2:-nightpay,funding}"
|
|
290
|
-
local classification="${3:-CONFIDENTIAL}"
|
|
291
|
-
if ! _shart_available; then
|
|
292
|
-
return 1
|
|
293
|
-
fi
|
|
294
|
-
$OPENSHART_BIN store \
|
|
295
|
-
--content "$content" \
|
|
296
|
-
--classification "$classification" \
|
|
297
|
-
--tags "$tags" \
|
|
298
|
-
--compartments "NIGHTPAY_FUNDING" \
|
|
299
|
-
2>/dev/null | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.loads(sys.stdin.read()).get('id',''))"
|
|
300
|
-
}
|
|
301
|
-
|
|
302
|
-
# Recall a stored memory by ID. Returns the decrypted JSON.
|
|
303
|
-
_shart_recall() {
|
|
304
|
-
local memory_id="$1"
|
|
305
|
-
if ! _shart_available; then
|
|
306
|
-
return 1
|
|
307
|
-
fi
|
|
308
|
-
$OPENSHART_BIN recall --id "$memory_id" 2>/dev/null
|
|
309
|
-
}
|
|
310
|
-
|
|
311
|
-
# Search encrypted memories by tag. Returns matching IDs.
|
|
312
|
-
_shart_search() {
|
|
313
|
-
local query="$1"
|
|
314
|
-
local limit="${2:-10}"
|
|
315
|
-
if ! _shart_available; then
|
|
316
|
-
return 1
|
|
317
|
-
fi
|
|
318
|
-
$OPENSHART_BIN search --query "$query" --limit "$limit" 2>/dev/null
|
|
319
|
-
}
|
|
320
|
-
|
|
321
|
-
# Call midnight bridge service if BRIDGE_URL is set
|
|
322
|
-
bridge_post() {
|
|
323
|
-
local endpoint="$1"; local payload="$2"
|
|
324
|
-
if [[ -z "$BRIDGE_URL" ]]; then
|
|
325
|
-
return 1 # no bridge — caller falls back to local computation
|
|
326
|
-
fi
|
|
327
|
-
_ssrf_safe_curl "${BRIDGE_URL}${endpoint}" \
|
|
328
|
-
-X POST \
|
|
329
|
-
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
|
|
330
|
-
-d "$payload"
|
|
331
|
-
}
|
|
332
|
-
|
|
333
|
-
bridge_get() {
|
|
334
|
-
local endpoint="$1"
|
|
335
|
-
if [[ -z "$BRIDGE_URL" ]]; then
|
|
336
|
-
return 1
|
|
337
|
-
fi
|
|
338
|
-
_ssrf_safe_curl "${BRIDGE_URL}${endpoint}" \
|
|
339
|
-
-H "Content-Type: application/json"
|
|
340
|
-
}
|
|
341
|
-
|
|
342
|
-
validate_amount() {
|
|
343
|
-
local amount="$1"
|
|
344
|
-
# SECURITY: enforce integer type, min, and max before any network call
|
|
345
|
-
if ! [[ "$amount" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
|
|
346
|
-
echo "ERROR: amount must be a positive integer (specks)"; exit 1
|
|
347
|
-
fi
|
|
348
|
-
if (( amount < MIN_BOUNTY_SPECKS )); then
|
|
349
|
-
echo "ERROR: Amount $amount below minimum $MIN_BOUNTY_SPECKS specks"; exit 1
|
|
350
|
-
fi
|
|
351
|
-
if (( amount > MAX_BOUNTY_SPECKS )); then
|
|
352
|
-
echo "ERROR: Amount $amount exceeds maximum $MAX_BOUNTY_SPECKS specks"; exit 1
|
|
353
|
-
fi
|
|
354
|
-
}
|
|
355
|
-
|
|
356
|
-
validate_commitment() {
|
|
357
|
-
# SECURITY: commitment must be a 64-char hex string — reject malformed inputs
|
|
358
|
-
if ! [[ "$1" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{64}$ ]]; then
|
|
359
|
-
echo "ERROR: commitment_hash must be a 64-character lowercase hex string"; exit 1
|
|
360
|
-
fi
|
|
361
|
-
}
|
|
362
|
-
|
|
363
|
-
validate_job_id() {
|
|
364
|
-
# SECURITY: job IDs must be alphanumeric + hyphens only.
|
|
365
|
-
# Prevents path traversal (../../), shell injection, and API endpoint manipulation.
|
|
366
|
-
if ! [[ "$1" =~ ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,128}$ ]]; then
|
|
367
|
-
echo "ERROR: job_id must be alphanumeric/hyphens/underscores, max 128 chars"; exit 1
|
|
368
|
-
fi
|
|
369
|
-
}
|
|
370
|
-
|
|
371
|
-
# SECURITY: operator must authenticate before fee withdrawal.
|
|
372
|
-
# Requires OPERATOR_SECRET_KEY env var — prevents unauthorized parties from
|
|
373
|
-
# draining accumulated fees even if they have shell access to the gateway.
|
|
374
|
-
# SECURITY: payload includes a timestamp + random nonce — prevents replay attacks.
|
|
375
|
-
# The same HMAC can never be reused because the nonce is different every call.
|
|
376
|
-
require_operator_auth() {
|
|
377
|
-
if [[ -z "${OPERATOR_SECRET_KEY:-}" ]]; then
|
|
378
|
-
echo -e "${RED}SECURITY ERROR${RESET}: withdraw-fees requires ${BOLD}OPERATOR_SECRET_KEY${RESET} env var." >&2
|
|
379
|
-
echo -e "${DIM}This prevents unauthorized parties from draining accumulated fees.${RESET}" >&2
|
|
380
|
-
exit 1
|
|
381
|
-
fi
|
|
382
|
-
local payload="$1"
|
|
383
|
-
local ts; ts=$(date +%s)
|
|
384
|
-
local nonce; nonce=$(generate_nonce)
|
|
385
|
-
# Include timestamp + nonce in signed payload — every signature is unique
|
|
386
|
-
local full_payload="${payload}:ts=${ts}:nonce=${nonce}"
|
|
387
|
-
local sig; sig=$(echo -n "$full_payload" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "$OPERATOR_SECRET_KEY" | awk '{print $2}')
|
|
388
|
-
# Return sig:ts:nonce so the Midnight contract can verify freshness
|
|
389
|
-
echo "${sig}:${ts}:${nonce}"
|
|
390
|
-
}
|
|
391
|
-
|
|
392
|
-
# ─── Content Safety ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
393
|
-
# SAFETY: classify-then-forget — checks job description in-memory, never logs it.
|
|
394
|
-
# Three layers: live rules file > hardcoded fallback > external moderation API.
|
|
395
|
-
# Rules auto-updated by update-blocklist.sh (cron). See rules/content-safety.md.
|
|
396
|
-
|
|
397
|
-
CONTENT_SAFETY_URL="${CONTENT_SAFETY_URL:-}"
|
|
398
|
-
SAFETY_RULES_FILE="${SAFETY_RULES_FILE:-${HOME}/.nightpay/safety/safety-rules.json}"
|
|
399
|
-
|
|
400
|
-
safety_check() {
|
|
401
|
-
local text="$1"
|
|
402
|
-
|
|
403
|
-
local rejected_category
|
|
404
|
-
rejected_category=$(python3 -c "
|
|
405
|
-
import sys, re, json, os
|
|
406
|
-
|
|
407
|
-
text = sys.argv[1].lower()
|
|
408
|
-
rules_file = sys.argv[2]
|
|
409
|
-
|
|
410
|
-
# ─── Layer 1: load live rules file if available (updated by update-blocklist.sh)
|
|
411
|
-
rules = []
|
|
412
|
-
if os.path.exists(rules_file):
|
|
413
|
-
try:
|
|
414
|
-
with open(rules_file) as f:
|
|
415
|
-
data = json.load(f)
|
|
416
|
-
rules = [(r['category'], r['pattern']) for r in data.get('rules', [])
|
|
417
|
-
if 'category' in r and 'pattern' in r]
|
|
418
|
-
except (json.JSONDecodeError, KeyError):
|
|
419
|
-
pass # fall through to hardcoded
|
|
420
|
-
|
|
421
|
-
# ─── Layer 2: hardcoded fallback if no rules file or it failed to load
|
|
422
|
-
if not rules:
|
|
423
|
-
rules = [
|
|
424
|
-
('csam', r'\b(child|minor|underage|kid|teen)\b.{0,100}?\b(sex|porn|nude|naked|exploit)\b'),
|
|
425
|
-
('csam', r'\b(sex|porn|nude|naked|exploit)\b.{0,100}?\b(child|minor|underage|kid|teen)\b'),
|
|
426
|
-
('violence', r'\b(kill|assassinate|murder|execute)\b.{0,100}?\b(person|people|someone|him|her|them|target)\b'),
|
|
427
|
-
('violence', r'\b(hire|find|pay).{0,100}?\b(hitman|killer|assassin)\b'),
|
|
428
|
-
('violence', r'\bhit\s*man\b'),
|
|
429
|
-
('weapons_of_mass_destruction', r'\b(synthe|build|make|create|assemble)\b.{0,100}?\b(bomb|bioweapon|chemical weapon|nerve agent|sarin|anthrax|ricin|nuclear|dirty bomb|explosive device)\b'),
|
|
430
|
-
('human_trafficking', r'\b(traffic|smuggle|exploit|enslave)\b.{0,100}?\b(person|people|human|worker|organ|women|children)\b'),
|
|
431
|
-
('terrorism', r'\b(fund|finance|recruit|plan|support)\b.{0,100}?\b(terror|jihad|extremis|insurrection|attack on)\b'),
|
|
432
|
-
('ncii', r'\b(deepfake|revenge porn|sextortion|non.?consensual)\b.{0,100}?\b(nude|naked|intimate|image|video|photo)\b'),
|
|
433
|
-
('financial_fraud', r'\b(launder|counterfeit|forge)\b.{0,100}?\b(money|currency|documents|passport|identity)\b'),
|
|
434
|
-
('financial_fraud', r'\b(evade|bypass|circumvent)\b.{0,100}?\b(sanction|embargo|aml|kyc)\b'),
|
|
435
|
-
('infrastructure_attack', r'\b(attack|hack|disrupt|destroy|sabotage)\b.{0,100}?\b(power grid|water supply|hospital|election|pipeline|dam)\b'),
|
|
436
|
-
('doxxing', r'\b(doxx|stalk|track|surveil|locate)\b.{0,100}?\b(person|address|home|family|where .{0,100}? live)\b'),
|
|
437
|
-
('drug_manufacturing', r'\b(synthe|cook|manufacture|produce)\b.{0,100}?\b(meth|fentanyl|heroin|cocaine|mdma|lsd)\b'),
|
|
438
|
-
]
|
|
439
|
-
|
|
440
|
-
for category, pattern in rules:
|
|
441
|
-
try:
|
|
442
|
-
if re.search(pattern, text):
|
|
443
|
-
print(category)
|
|
444
|
-
sys.exit(0)
|
|
445
|
-
except re.error:
|
|
446
|
-
continue # skip malformed patterns from feeds
|
|
447
|
-
|
|
448
|
-
print('safe')
|
|
449
|
-
" "$text" "$SAFETY_RULES_FILE" 2>/dev/null) || rejected_category="safe"
|
|
450
|
-
|
|
451
|
-
# ─── Layer 3: external moderation API (catches what regex misses)
|
|
452
|
-
if [[ "$rejected_category" == "safe" && -n "$CONTENT_SAFETY_URL" ]]; then
|
|
453
|
-
local api_payload
|
|
454
|
-
api_payload=$(python3 -c "
|
|
455
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
456
|
-
print(json.dumps({'text': sys.argv[1]}))
|
|
457
|
-
" "$text")
|
|
458
|
-
local response
|
|
459
|
-
response=$(curl -sf --max-time 5 -X POST \
|
|
460
|
-
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
|
|
461
|
-
-d "$api_payload" \
|
|
462
|
-
"$CONTENT_SAFETY_URL" 2>/dev/null) || response=""
|
|
463
|
-
|
|
464
|
-
if [[ -n "$response" ]]; then
|
|
465
|
-
rejected_category=$(echo "$response" | python3 -c "
|
|
466
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
467
|
-
try:
|
|
468
|
-
d = json.load(sys.stdin)
|
|
469
|
-
if not d.get('safe', True):
|
|
470
|
-
print(d.get('category', 'unsafe'))
|
|
471
|
-
else:
|
|
472
|
-
print('safe')
|
|
473
|
-
except: print('safe')
|
|
474
|
-
" 2>/dev/null) || rejected_category="safe"
|
|
475
|
-
fi
|
|
476
|
-
fi
|
|
477
|
-
|
|
478
|
-
if [[ "$rejected_category" != "safe" ]]; then
|
|
479
|
-
python3 -c "
|
|
480
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
481
|
-
print(json.dumps({
|
|
482
|
-
'status': 'REJECTED',
|
|
483
|
-
'reason': 'content_safety',
|
|
484
|
-
'category': sys.argv[1],
|
|
485
|
-
'message': 'This bounty description was rejected by the content safety gate. See rules/content-safety.md.'
|
|
486
|
-
}, indent=2))
|
|
487
|
-
" "$rejected_category"
|
|
488
|
-
exit 2
|
|
489
|
-
fi
|
|
490
|
-
}
|
|
491
|
-
|
|
492
|
-
# ─── Optimistic delivery & multisig env vars ──────────────────────────────────
|
|
493
|
-
OPTIMISTIC_WINDOW_HOURS="${OPTIMISTIC_WINDOW_HOURS:-48}"
|
|
494
|
-
MULTISIG_THRESHOLD_SPECKS="${MULTISIG_THRESHOLD_SPECKS:-1000000}"
|
|
495
|
-
MULTISIG_M="${MULTISIG_M:-2}"
|
|
496
|
-
MULTISIG_N="${MULTISIG_N:-3}"
|
|
497
|
-
OPTIMISTIC_SWEEP_PAGE_SIZE="${OPTIMISTIC_SWEEP_PAGE_SIZE:-200}" # capped to <= 500
|
|
498
|
-
UNCLAIMED_REFUND_HOURS="${UNCLAIMED_REFUND_HOURS:-24}"
|
|
499
|
-
UNCLAIMED_SWEEP_PAGE_SIZE="${UNCLAIMED_SWEEP_PAGE_SIZE:-200}" # capped to <= 500
|
|
500
|
-
# APPROVER_KEYS: comma-separated HMAC secrets, one per approver
|
|
501
|
-
# e.g. APPROVER_KEYS="key1secret,key2secret,key3secret"
|
|
502
|
-
APPROVER_KEYS="${APPROVER_KEYS:-}"
|
|
503
|
-
MIP003_PORT="${MIP003_PORT:-8090}"
|
|
504
|
-
MIP003_URL="${MIP003_URL:-http://localhost:${MIP003_PORT}}"
|
|
505
|
-
|
|
506
|
-
# ─── Commands ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
507
|
-
|
|
508
|
-
case "$COMMAND" in
|
|
509
|
-
|
|
510
|
-
post-bounty)
|
|
511
|
-
JOB_DESC="${1:?Usage: post-bounty <job_description> <amount_specks>}"
|
|
512
|
-
AMOUNT="${2:?Usage: post-bounty <job_description> <amount_specks>}"
|
|
513
|
-
|
|
514
|
-
rate_limit "post-bounty" # SECURITY: max 1 post per RATE_LIMIT_SECONDS
|
|
515
|
-
validate_amount "$AMOUNT"
|
|
516
|
-
safety_check "$JOB_DESC"
|
|
517
|
-
|
|
518
|
-
FEE=$(compute_fee "$AMOUNT")
|
|
519
|
-
NET=$(compute_net "$AMOUNT")
|
|
520
|
-
NONCE=$(generate_nonce)
|
|
521
|
-
JOB_HASH=$(compute_job_hash "$JOB_DESC")
|
|
522
|
-
|
|
523
|
-
# SECURITY: domain-separated commitment — matches what the Compact circuit produces
|
|
524
|
-
COMMITMENT=$(compute_bounty_commitment "nullifier:${AMOUNT}:${JOB_HASH}:${NONCE}")
|
|
525
|
-
|
|
526
|
-
# If bridge is running, submit real on-chain transaction
|
|
527
|
-
if [[ -n "$BRIDGE_URL" ]]; then
|
|
528
|
-
BRIDGE_PAYLOAD=$(python3 -c "
|
|
529
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
530
|
-
print(json.dumps({'jobHash': sys.argv[1], 'amount': int(sys.argv[2]), 'nonce': sys.argv[3]}))
|
|
531
|
-
" "$JOB_HASH" "$AMOUNT" "$NONCE")
|
|
532
|
-
BRIDGE_RESULT=$(bridge_post "/postBounty" "$BRIDGE_PAYLOAD" 2>/dev/null) && {
|
|
533
|
-
TX_ID=$(echo "$BRIDGE_RESULT" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('txId',''))" 2>/dev/null)
|
|
534
|
-
ON_CHAIN=$(echo "$BRIDGE_RESULT" | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print('false' if d.get('stub') else 'true')" 2>/dev/null)
|
|
535
|
-
echo -e " ${GREEN}Midnight TX${RESET}: ${DIM}$TX_ID${RESET} ${CYAN}(on-chain: $ON_CHAIN)${RESET}" >&2
|
|
536
|
-
} || echo -e " ${YELLOW}WARNING${RESET}: Bridge unavailable — commitment computed locally only" >&2
|
|
537
|
-
fi
|
|
538
|
-
|
|
539
|
-
# SECURITY: nonce printed once for the caller to store securely.
|
|
540
|
-
# NOT persisted by the gateway — loss of nonce means the caller cannot
|
|
541
|
-
# prove bounty ownership in a dispute.
|
|
542
|
-
python3 -c "
|
|
543
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
544
|
-
print(json.dumps({
|
|
545
|
-
'commitment': sys.argv[1],
|
|
546
|
-
'nonce': sys.argv[2],
|
|
547
|
-
'jobHash': sys.argv[3],
|
|
548
|
-
'amount': int(sys.argv[4]),
|
|
549
|
-
'operatorFee': int(sys.argv[5]),
|
|
550
|
-
'netToAgent': int(sys.argv[6]),
|
|
551
|
-
'feeBps': int(sys.argv[7]),
|
|
552
|
-
'receiptContract': sys.argv[8],
|
|
553
|
-
'network': sys.argv[9],
|
|
554
|
-
'status': 'posted',
|
|
555
|
-
'warning': 'Store your nonce securely — it cannot be recovered and is required for dispute resolution'
|
|
556
|
-
}, indent=2))
|
|
557
|
-
" "$COMMITMENT" "$NONCE" "$JOB_HASH" "$AMOUNT" "$FEE" "$NET" "$OPERATOR_FEE_BPS" "$RECEIPT_CONTRACT" "$MIDNIGHT_NETWORK"
|
|
558
|
-
;;
|
|
559
|
-
|
|
560
|
-
find-agent)
|
|
561
|
-
CAPABILITY="${1:?Usage: find-agent <capability_query>}"
|
|
562
|
-
ENCODED=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse,sys; print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.argv[1]))" "$CAPABILITY")
|
|
563
|
-
find_agents "$ENCODED"
|
|
564
|
-
;;
|
|
565
|
-
|
|
566
|
-
agent-showcase)
|
|
567
|
-
QUERY="${1:-}"
|
|
568
|
-
LIMIT="${AGENT_SHOWCASE_LIMIT:-8}"
|
|
569
|
-
URL="${MIP003_URL}/agents?limit=${LIMIT}&sort=credibility&showcase_only=1"
|
|
570
|
-
if [[ -n "$QUERY" ]]; then
|
|
571
|
-
ENCODED=$(python3 -c "import urllib.parse,sys; print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.argv[1]))" "$QUERY")
|
|
572
|
-
URL="${URL}&q=${ENCODED}"
|
|
573
|
-
fi
|
|
574
|
-
curl -sf --max-time 15 "$URL"
|
|
575
|
-
;;
|
|
576
|
-
|
|
577
|
-
hire-and-pay)
|
|
578
|
-
AGENT_ID="${1:?Usage: hire-and-pay <agent_id> <job_description> <commitment_hash> [refund_address]}"
|
|
579
|
-
JOB_DESC="${2:?Usage: hire-and-pay <agent_id> <job_description> <commitment_hash> [refund_address]}"
|
|
580
|
-
COMMITMENT="${3:?Usage: hire-and-pay <agent_id> <job_description> <commitment_hash> [refund_address]}"
|
|
581
|
-
REFUND_ADDRESS="${4:-}"
|
|
582
|
-
|
|
583
|
-
validate_commitment "$COMMITMENT"
|
|
584
|
-
safety_check "$JOB_DESC"
|
|
585
|
-
|
|
586
|
-
# Optional routing hint for no-claim timeout refunds.
|
|
587
|
-
# The on-chain release still follows contract logic and commitment proofs.
|
|
588
|
-
if [[ -n "$REFUND_ADDRESS" ]] && ! [[ "$REFUND_ADDRESS" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{64}$ ]]; then
|
|
589
|
-
echo "ERROR: refund_address must be a 64-character lowercase hex string" >&2
|
|
590
|
-
exit 1
|
|
591
|
-
fi
|
|
592
|
-
|
|
593
|
-
PAYLOAD=$(python3 -c "
|
|
594
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
595
|
-
refund = sys.argv[6]
|
|
596
|
-
input_obj = {
|
|
597
|
-
'description': sys.argv[2],
|
|
598
|
-
'commitmentHash': sys.argv[3],
|
|
599
|
-
'receiptContract': sys.argv[4],
|
|
600
|
-
'network': sys.argv[5]
|
|
601
|
-
}
|
|
602
|
-
if refund:
|
|
603
|
-
input_obj['refundAddress'] = refund
|
|
604
|
-
print(json.dumps({
|
|
605
|
-
'agentIdentifier': sys.argv[1],
|
|
606
|
-
'input': input_obj
|
|
607
|
-
}))
|
|
608
|
-
" "$AGENT_ID" "$JOB_DESC" "$COMMITMENT" "$RECEIPT_CONTRACT" "$MIDNIGHT_NETWORK" "$REFUND_ADDRESS")
|
|
609
|
-
masumi_post "/purchases" "$PAYLOAD"
|
|
610
|
-
;;
|
|
611
|
-
|
|
612
|
-
hire-direct)
|
|
613
|
-
AGENT_ID="${1:?Usage: hire-direct <agent_id> <job_description> <amount_specks>}"
|
|
614
|
-
JOB_DESC="${2:?Usage: hire-direct <agent_id> <job_description> <amount_specks>}"
|
|
615
|
-
AMOUNT="${3:?Usage: hire-direct <agent_id> <job_description> <amount_specks>}"
|
|
616
|
-
|
|
617
|
-
validate_amount "$AMOUNT"
|
|
618
|
-
safety_check "$JOB_DESC"
|
|
619
|
-
[[ "$AGENT_ID" =~ ^[A-Za-z0-9._:@-]{2,128}$ ]] || die "agent_id must match [A-Za-z0-9._:@-] and be 2-128 chars"
|
|
620
|
-
|
|
621
|
-
PAYLOAD=$(python3 -c "
|
|
622
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
623
|
-
print(json.dumps({
|
|
624
|
-
'amount_specks': int(sys.argv[3]),
|
|
625
|
-
'direct_agent_id': sys.argv[1],
|
|
626
|
-
'visibility': 'hidden',
|
|
627
|
-
'input_data': {
|
|
628
|
-
'description': sys.argv[2],
|
|
629
|
-
'amount_specks': int(sys.argv[3]),
|
|
630
|
-
'visibility': 'hidden',
|
|
631
|
-
'hiringMode': 'direct'
|
|
632
|
-
}
|
|
633
|
-
}))
|
|
634
|
-
" "$AGENT_ID" "$JOB_DESC" "$AMOUNT")
|
|
635
|
-
curl -sf --max-time 20 \
|
|
636
|
-
-X POST \
|
|
637
|
-
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
|
|
638
|
-
-d "$PAYLOAD" \
|
|
639
|
-
"${MIP003_URL}/start_job"
|
|
640
|
-
;;
|
|
641
|
-
|
|
642
|
-
check-job)
|
|
643
|
-
JOB_ID="${1:?Usage: check-job <job_id>}"
|
|
644
|
-
validate_job_id "$JOB_ID" # SECURITY: prevent path traversal / injection
|
|
645
|
-
masumi_get "/purchases/$JOB_ID/status"
|
|
646
|
-
;;
|
|
647
|
-
|
|
648
|
-
approve-multisig)
|
|
649
|
-
# Each approver runs this with their own key.
|
|
650
|
-
# Collect M blobs and pass all sigs to: gateway.sh complete <id> <commit> --approvals sig1:ts1:nonce1,...
|
|
651
|
-
JOB_ID="${1:?Usage: approve-multisig <job_id> <output_hash> <approver_key>}"
|
|
652
|
-
OUTPUT_HASH="${2:?Usage: approve-multisig <job_id> <output_hash> <approver_key>}"
|
|
653
|
-
APPROVER_KEY="${3:?Usage: approve-multisig <job_id> <output_hash> <approver_key>}"
|
|
654
|
-
|
|
655
|
-
validate_job_id "$JOB_ID"
|
|
656
|
-
validate_commitment "$OUTPUT_HASH" # reuse 64-hex validator
|
|
657
|
-
|
|
658
|
-
TS=$(date +%s)
|
|
659
|
-
NONCE=$(generate_nonce)
|
|
660
|
-
# SECURITY: timestamp + nonce in payload — each approval is unique, stale replays rejected by complete
|
|
661
|
-
SIG_PAYLOAD="${JOB_ID}:${OUTPUT_HASH}:${TS}:${NONCE}"
|
|
662
|
-
SIG=$(echo -n "$SIG_PAYLOAD" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "$APPROVER_KEY" | awk '{print $2}')
|
|
663
|
-
|
|
664
|
-
python3 -c "
|
|
665
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
666
|
-
print(json.dumps({
|
|
667
|
-
'job_id': sys.argv[1],
|
|
668
|
-
'output_hash': sys.argv[2],
|
|
669
|
-
'sig': sys.argv[3],
|
|
670
|
-
'ts': int(sys.argv[4]),
|
|
671
|
-
'nonce': sys.argv[5],
|
|
672
|
-
'approval_blob': f'{sys.argv[3]}:{sys.argv[4]}:{sys.argv[5]}',
|
|
673
|
-
'note': 'Pass all collected approval_blobs to: gateway.sh complete <job_id> <commitment> --approvals blob1,blob2'
|
|
674
|
-
}, indent=2))
|
|
675
|
-
" "$JOB_ID" "$OUTPUT_HASH" "$SIG" "$TS" "$NONCE"
|
|
676
|
-
;;
|
|
677
|
-
|
|
678
|
-
complete)
|
|
679
|
-
JOB_ID="${1:?Usage: complete <job_id> <commitment_hash> [--approvals sig1:ts1:nonce1,...]}"
|
|
680
|
-
COMMITMENT="${2:?Usage: complete <job_id> <commitment_hash>}"
|
|
681
|
-
# Optional: $3 = "--approvals", $4 = comma-separated sig:ts:nonce blobs
|
|
682
|
-
APPROVALS_FLAG="${3:-}"
|
|
683
|
-
APPROVALS_RAW="${4:-}"
|
|
684
|
-
|
|
685
|
-
validate_job_id "$JOB_ID" # SECURITY: prevent path traversal
|
|
686
|
-
validate_commitment "$COMMITMENT"
|
|
687
|
-
|
|
688
|
-
# ── Multisig verification (for high-value bounties) ────────────────────
|
|
689
|
-
# Query the MIP-003 server for job amount to decide if multisig required
|
|
690
|
-
JOB_AMOUNT=0
|
|
691
|
-
if command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
692
|
-
_JOB_INFO=$(curl -sf --max-time 5 "http://localhost:${MIP003_PORT}/status/${JOB_ID}" 2>/dev/null || echo '{}')
|
|
693
|
-
JOB_AMOUNT=$(echo "$_JOB_INFO" | python3 -c "
|
|
694
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
695
|
-
try:
|
|
696
|
-
d = json.load(sys.stdin)
|
|
697
|
-
print(d.get('amount_specks') or 0)
|
|
698
|
-
except: print(0)
|
|
699
|
-
" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
|
|
700
|
-
fi
|
|
701
|
-
|
|
702
|
-
if (( JOB_AMOUNT >= MULTISIG_THRESHOLD_SPECKS )); then
|
|
703
|
-
if [[ -z "$APPROVALS_RAW" || "$APPROVALS_FLAG" != "--approvals" ]]; then
|
|
704
|
-
echo -e "${RED}ERROR${RESET}: job amount ${BOLD}${JOB_AMOUNT} specks${RESET} >= threshold ${MULTISIG_THRESHOLD_SPECKS}" >&2
|
|
705
|
-
echo -e "${YELLOW}Multisig required.${RESET} Each approver runs:" >&2
|
|
706
|
-
echo -e " ${CYAN}gateway.sh approve-multisig${RESET} $JOB_ID <output_hash> <approver_key>" >&2
|
|
707
|
-
echo -e "Then collect M approval_blobs and run:" >&2
|
|
708
|
-
echo -e " ${CYAN}gateway.sh complete${RESET} $JOB_ID $COMMITMENT --approvals blob1,blob2" >&2
|
|
709
|
-
exit 1
|
|
710
|
-
fi
|
|
711
|
-
|
|
712
|
-
# Verify M-of-N approvals using Python stdlib only (no new deps)
|
|
713
|
-
VERIFY_OK=$(python3 -c "
|
|
714
|
-
import sys, json, hmac, hashlib, time
|
|
715
|
-
|
|
716
|
-
job_id = sys.argv[1]
|
|
717
|
-
output_hash = sys.argv[2]
|
|
718
|
-
approvals_raw = sys.argv[3]
|
|
719
|
-
approver_keys = [k for k in sys.argv[4].split(',') if k] if sys.argv[4] else []
|
|
720
|
-
required_m = int(sys.argv[5])
|
|
721
|
-
max_age_secs = 86400 # approvals expire after 24h — prevents replay attacks
|
|
722
|
-
|
|
723
|
-
# Parse: each entry is sig:ts:nonce
|
|
724
|
-
approvals = []
|
|
725
|
-
for entry in approvals_raw.split(','):
|
|
726
|
-
parts = entry.split(':')
|
|
727
|
-
if len(parts) != 3:
|
|
728
|
-
print(f'ERROR: malformed approval blob (expected sig:ts:nonce): {entry}', file=sys.stderr)
|
|
729
|
-
sys.exit(1)
|
|
730
|
-
try:
|
|
731
|
-
approvals.append({'sig': parts[0], 'ts': int(parts[1]), 'nonce': parts[2]})
|
|
732
|
-
except ValueError:
|
|
733
|
-
print(f'ERROR: non-integer timestamp in approval: {entry}', file=sys.stderr)
|
|
734
|
-
sys.exit(1)
|
|
735
|
-
|
|
736
|
-
now = int(time.time())
|
|
737
|
-
valid_count = 0
|
|
738
|
-
used_keys = set() # SECURITY: each key index counts once — no double-counting
|
|
739
|
-
|
|
740
|
-
for approval in approvals:
|
|
741
|
-
age = now - approval['ts']
|
|
742
|
-
if age > max_age_secs:
|
|
743
|
-
print(f'WARN: approval ts={approval[\"ts\"]} is too old (age={age}s > {max_age_secs}s)', file=sys.stderr)
|
|
744
|
-
continue
|
|
745
|
-
if age < -300: # 5-min future clock skew tolerance
|
|
746
|
-
print(f'WARN: approval ts={approval[\"ts\"]} is too far in future (age={age}s)', file=sys.stderr)
|
|
747
|
-
continue
|
|
748
|
-
|
|
749
|
-
payload = f'{job_id}:{output_hash}:{approval[\"ts\"]}:{approval[\"nonce\"]}'
|
|
750
|
-
for i, key in enumerate(approver_keys):
|
|
751
|
-
if i in used_keys:
|
|
752
|
-
continue
|
|
753
|
-
expected = hmac.new(key.encode(), payload.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
|
|
754
|
-
if hmac.compare_digest(expected, approval['sig']):
|
|
755
|
-
used_keys.add(i)
|
|
756
|
-
valid_count += 1
|
|
757
|
-
break
|
|
758
|
-
|
|
759
|
-
if valid_count >= required_m:
|
|
760
|
-
print(f'ok:{valid_count}')
|
|
761
|
-
else:
|
|
762
|
-
print(f'ERROR: only {valid_count} valid approvals, need {required_m}', file=sys.stderr)
|
|
763
|
-
sys.exit(1)
|
|
764
|
-
" "$JOB_ID" "$COMMITMENT" "$APPROVALS_RAW" "$APPROVER_KEYS" "$MULTISIG_M" 2>&1) || {
|
|
765
|
-
echo -e "${RED}SECURITY ERROR${RESET}: multisig verification failed — $VERIFY_OK" >&2
|
|
766
|
-
exit 1
|
|
767
|
-
}
|
|
768
|
-
echo -e " ${GREEN}Multisig${RESET}: $VERIFY_OK approvals verified" >&2
|
|
769
|
-
fi
|
|
770
|
-
|
|
771
|
-
RESULT_DATA=$(masumi_get "/purchases/$JOB_ID/result")
|
|
772
|
-
|
|
773
|
-
# SECURITY: canonical JSON (sorted keys, no whitespace) prevents hash
|
|
774
|
-
# manipulation via key reordering or whitespace changes in the API response
|
|
775
|
-
OUTPUT_HASH=$(echo "$RESULT_DATA" | python3 -c "
|
|
776
|
-
import sys, json, hashlib
|
|
777
|
-
d = json.load(sys.stdin)
|
|
778
|
-
canonical = json.dumps(d, sort_keys=True, separators=(',',':'))
|
|
779
|
-
print(hashlib.sha256(canonical.encode()).hexdigest())
|
|
780
|
-
") || { echo "ERROR: Failed to parse job result as JSON — refusing to mint receipt"; exit 1; }
|
|
781
|
-
|
|
782
|
-
COMPLETION_NONCE=$(generate_nonce)
|
|
783
|
-
|
|
784
|
-
# SECURITY: domain-separated receipt hash — cannot be forged from bounty inputs
|
|
785
|
-
RECEIPT_HASH=$(compute_receipt_hash "${COMMITMENT}:${OUTPUT_HASH}:${COMPLETION_NONCE}")
|
|
786
|
-
|
|
787
|
-
# If bridge is running, submit real completeAndReceipt circuit call
|
|
788
|
-
BRIDGE_TX_ID=""
|
|
789
|
-
BRIDGE_ON_CHAIN="false"
|
|
790
|
-
if [[ -n "$BRIDGE_URL" ]]; then
|
|
791
|
-
BRIDGE_PAYLOAD=$(python3 -c "
|
|
792
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
793
|
-
print(json.dumps({'bountyCommitment': sys.argv[1], 'outputHash': sys.argv[2]}))
|
|
794
|
-
" "$COMMITMENT" "$OUTPUT_HASH")
|
|
795
|
-
BRIDGE_RESULT=$(bridge_post "/completeAndReceipt" "$BRIDGE_PAYLOAD" 2>/dev/null) && {
|
|
796
|
-
BRIDGE_TX_ID=$(echo "$BRIDGE_RESULT" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('txId',''))" 2>/dev/null)
|
|
797
|
-
BRIDGE_ON_CHAIN=$(echo "$BRIDGE_RESULT" | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print('false' if d.get('stub') else 'true')" 2>/dev/null)
|
|
798
|
-
echo -e " ${GREEN}Midnight TX${RESET}: ${DIM}$BRIDGE_TX_ID${RESET} ${CYAN}(on-chain: $BRIDGE_ON_CHAIN)${RESET}" >&2
|
|
799
|
-
} || echo -e " ${YELLOW}WARNING${RESET}: Bridge unavailable — receipt computed locally only" >&2
|
|
800
|
-
fi
|
|
801
|
-
|
|
802
|
-
# Fetch economics from MIP-003 for the cost footer (ClawWork pattern)
|
|
803
|
-
_ECON_AMOUNT=0
|
|
804
|
-
_ECON_FEE=0
|
|
805
|
-
_ECON_NET=0
|
|
806
|
-
if command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
807
|
-
_ECON_INFO=$(curl -sf --max-time 3 "http://localhost:${MIP003_PORT}/status/${JOB_ID}" 2>/dev/null || echo '{}')
|
|
808
|
-
read -r _ECON_AMOUNT _ECON_FEE _ECON_NET <<< "$(python3 -c "
|
|
809
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
810
|
-
try:
|
|
811
|
-
d = json.load(sys.stdin)
|
|
812
|
-
amount = int(d.get('amount_specks') or 0)
|
|
813
|
-
fee_bps = int('${OPERATOR_FEE_BPS}')
|
|
814
|
-
fee = amount * fee_bps // 10000
|
|
815
|
-
net = amount - fee
|
|
816
|
-
print(amount, fee, net)
|
|
817
|
-
except: print(0, 0, 0)
|
|
818
|
-
" <<< "$_ECON_INFO" 2>/dev/null || echo "0 0 0")"
|
|
819
|
-
fi
|
|
820
|
-
|
|
821
|
-
python3 -c "
|
|
822
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
823
|
-
print(json.dumps({
|
|
824
|
-
'receiptHash': sys.argv[1],
|
|
825
|
-
'outputHash': sys.argv[2],
|
|
826
|
-
'commitment': sys.argv[3],
|
|
827
|
-
'completionNonce': sys.argv[4],
|
|
828
|
-
'status': 'completed',
|
|
829
|
-
'midnightNetwork': sys.argv[5],
|
|
830
|
-
'receiptContract': sys.argv[6],
|
|
831
|
-
'midnightTxId': sys.argv[7] or None,
|
|
832
|
-
'onChain': sys.argv[8] == 'true',
|
|
833
|
-
# Economics footer — ClawWork-compatible cost accounting shape
|
|
834
|
-
'economics': {
|
|
835
|
-
'amountSpecks': int(sys.argv[9]),
|
|
836
|
-
'fee': int(sys.argv[10]),
|
|
837
|
-
'netToAgent': int(sys.argv[11]),
|
|
838
|
-
'feeBps': int(sys.argv[12]),
|
|
839
|
-
},
|
|
840
|
-
}, indent=2))
|
|
841
|
-
" "$RECEIPT_HASH" "$OUTPUT_HASH" "$COMMITMENT" "$COMPLETION_NONCE" "$MIDNIGHT_NETWORK" "$RECEIPT_CONTRACT" "$BRIDGE_TX_ID" "$BRIDGE_ON_CHAIN" "$_ECON_AMOUNT" "$_ECON_FEE" "$_ECON_NET" "$OPERATOR_FEE_BPS"
|
|
842
|
-
;;
|
|
843
|
-
|
|
844
|
-
refund)
|
|
845
|
-
JOB_ID="${1:?Usage: refund <job_id> <commitment_hash> [refund_address]}"
|
|
846
|
-
COMMITMENT="${2:?Usage: refund <job_id> <commitment_hash> [refund_address]}"
|
|
847
|
-
REFUND_ADDRESS="${3:-}"
|
|
848
|
-
|
|
849
|
-
validate_job_id "$JOB_ID" # SECURITY: prevent path traversal
|
|
850
|
-
validate_commitment "$COMMITMENT"
|
|
851
|
-
if [[ -n "$REFUND_ADDRESS" ]] && ! [[ "$REFUND_ADDRESS" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{64}$ ]]; then
|
|
852
|
-
echo "ERROR: refund_address must be a 64-character lowercase hex string" >&2
|
|
853
|
-
exit 1
|
|
854
|
-
fi
|
|
855
|
-
|
|
856
|
-
# Step 1: Cancel Masumi escrow on Cardano
|
|
857
|
-
echo -e "${CYAN}Cancelling Masumi escrow${RESET} for job ${BOLD}$JOB_ID${RESET}..." >&2
|
|
858
|
-
masumi_post "/purchases/$JOB_ID/cancel" "{}"
|
|
859
|
-
|
|
860
|
-
# Step 2: Emit on-chain NIGHT refund intent for the Midnight contract.
|
|
861
|
-
# SECURITY: the contract's nullifier set ensures the bounty cannot be
|
|
862
|
-
# re-claimed after a refund is submitted. The refundHash is the payload
|
|
863
|
-
# the operator submits to the Midnight node to release NIGHT to the funder.
|
|
864
|
-
REFUND_NONCE=$(generate_nonce)
|
|
865
|
-
REFUND_HASH=$(compute_bounty_commitment "refund:${COMMITMENT}:${REFUND_NONCE}")
|
|
866
|
-
|
|
867
|
-
python3 -c "
|
|
868
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
869
|
-
print(json.dumps({
|
|
870
|
-
'commitment': sys.argv[1],
|
|
871
|
-
'refundHash': sys.argv[2],
|
|
872
|
-
'jobId': sys.argv[3],
|
|
873
|
-
'receiptContract': sys.argv[4],
|
|
874
|
-
'network': sys.argv[5],
|
|
875
|
-
'refundAddressHint': sys.argv[6] or None,
|
|
876
|
-
'status': 'refunded',
|
|
877
|
-
'note': 'Submit refundHash to the Midnight contract to release NIGHT back to funder'
|
|
878
|
-
}, indent=2))
|
|
879
|
-
" "$COMMITMENT" "$REFUND_HASH" "$JOB_ID" "$RECEIPT_CONTRACT" "$MIDNIGHT_NETWORK" "$REFUND_ADDRESS"
|
|
880
|
-
;;
|
|
881
|
-
|
|
882
|
-
withdraw-fees)
|
|
883
|
-
AMOUNT="${1:-all}"
|
|
884
|
-
|
|
885
|
-
# SECURITY: operator must sign the withdrawal — prevents anyone else
|
|
886
|
-
# who has shell access from draining the accumulated fee balance
|
|
887
|
-
SIG=$(require_operator_auth "${OPERATOR_ADDRESS}:${AMOUNT}")
|
|
888
|
-
|
|
889
|
-
python3 -c "
|
|
890
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
891
|
-
print(json.dumps({
|
|
892
|
-
'operatorAddress': sys.argv[1],
|
|
893
|
-
'withdrawAmount': sys.argv[2],
|
|
894
|
-
'operatorSignature': sys.argv[3],
|
|
895
|
-
'receiptContract': sys.argv[4],
|
|
896
|
-
'network': sys.argv[5],
|
|
897
|
-
'status': 'submitted',
|
|
898
|
-
'note': 'Submit this payload to the Midnight contract withdrawFees() circuit'
|
|
899
|
-
}, indent=2))
|
|
900
|
-
" "$OPERATOR_ADDRESS" "$AMOUNT" "$SIG" "$RECEIPT_CONTRACT" "$MIDNIGHT_NETWORK"
|
|
901
|
-
;;
|
|
902
|
-
|
|
903
|
-
stats)
|
|
904
|
-
echo -e "${CYAN}Querying nightpay stats${RESET} from ${DIM}$RECEIPT_CONTRACT${RESET} on ${BOLD}$MIDNIGHT_NETWORK${RESET}..." >&2
|
|
905
|
-
if [[ -n "$BRIDGE_URL" ]]; then
|
|
906
|
-
bridge_get "/stats" && exit 0
|
|
907
|
-
echo -e " ${YELLOW}WARNING${RESET}: Bridge unavailable — showing placeholder" >&2
|
|
908
|
-
fi
|
|
909
|
-
python3 -c "
|
|
910
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
911
|
-
print(json.dumps({
|
|
912
|
-
'receiptContract': sys.argv[1],
|
|
913
|
-
'network': sys.argv[2],
|
|
914
|
-
'query': 'getStats()',
|
|
915
|
-
'note': 'Set BRIDGE_URL to get live on-chain stats'
|
|
916
|
-
}, indent=2))
|
|
917
|
-
" "$RECEIPT_CONTRACT" "$MIDNIGHT_NETWORK"
|
|
918
|
-
;;
|
|
919
|
-
|
|
920
|
-
optimistic-sweep)
|
|
921
|
-
# Scan for jobs whose optimistic window has expired and auto-complete them.
|
|
922
|
-
# Run on a cron: */30 * * * * bash gateway.sh optimistic-sweep
|
|
923
|
-
# Dry-run: gateway.sh optimistic-sweep --dry-run
|
|
924
|
-
DRY_RUN=0
|
|
925
|
-
[[ "${1:-}" == "--dry-run" ]] && DRY_RUN=1
|
|
926
|
-
|
|
927
|
-
MIP003_URL="http://localhost:${MIP003_PORT}"
|
|
928
|
-
echo -e "${CYAN}Scanning for auto-approvable jobs${RESET} ${DIM}(window=${OPTIMISTIC_WINDOW_HOURS}h, url=${MIP003_URL}, pageSize=${OPTIMISTIC_SWEEP_PAGE_SIZE})${RESET}..." >&2
|
|
929
|
-
|
|
930
|
-
# Fetch one paginated slice of jobs ready for optimistic completion.
|
|
931
|
-
NOW_ISO=$(python3 -c "
|
|
932
|
-
from datetime import datetime, timezone
|
|
933
|
-
print(datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat())
|
|
934
|
-
")
|
|
935
|
-
JOBS_JSON=$(curl -sf --max-time 10 "${MIP003_URL}/jobs?status=awaiting_approval&approved_before=${NOW_ISO}&limit=${OPTIMISTIC_SWEEP_PAGE_SIZE}&offset=0" 2>/dev/null || echo '{"jobs":[]}')
|
|
936
|
-
|
|
937
|
-
# Filter for expired windows and auto-complete each
|
|
938
|
-
python3 -c "
|
|
939
|
-
import sys, json, subprocess, os
|
|
940
|
-
from datetime import datetime, timezone
|
|
941
|
-
|
|
942
|
-
jobs_json = sys.argv[1]
|
|
943
|
-
gateway = sys.argv[2]
|
|
944
|
-
dry_run = sys.argv[3] == '1'
|
|
945
|
-
env = os.environ.copy()
|
|
946
|
-
|
|
947
|
-
try:
|
|
948
|
-
data = json.loads(jobs_json)
|
|
949
|
-
except Exception as e:
|
|
950
|
-
print(f'ERROR: could not parse /jobs response: {e}', file=sys.stderr)
|
|
951
|
-
sys.exit(1)
|
|
952
|
-
|
|
953
|
-
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
|
|
954
|
-
jobs = data.get('jobs', [])
|
|
955
|
-
done = 0
|
|
956
|
-
errors = 0
|
|
957
|
-
|
|
958
|
-
for job in jobs:
|
|
959
|
-
jid = job.get('job_id', '')
|
|
960
|
-
approved_at = job.get('approved_at')
|
|
961
|
-
input_data = job.get('input_data') or {}
|
|
962
|
-
|
|
963
|
-
if not approved_at or approved_at > now:
|
|
964
|
-
continue # window not yet expired
|
|
965
|
-
|
|
966
|
-
# Extract commitmentHash from input_data (set by hire-and-pay)
|
|
967
|
-
if isinstance(input_data, str):
|
|
968
|
-
try: input_data = json.loads(input_data)
|
|
969
|
-
except: input_data = {}
|
|
970
|
-
commit = input_data.get('commitmentHash', '')
|
|
971
|
-
|
|
972
|
-
if not commit:
|
|
973
|
-
print(f'SKIP {jid}: no commitmentHash in input_data')
|
|
974
|
-
errors += 1
|
|
975
|
-
continue
|
|
976
|
-
|
|
977
|
-
if dry_run:
|
|
978
|
-
print(f'DRY-RUN: would complete job_id={jid} commitment={commit[:16]}...')
|
|
979
|
-
done += 1
|
|
980
|
-
else:
|
|
981
|
-
result = subprocess.run(
|
|
982
|
-
['/usr/bin/env', 'bash', gateway, 'complete', jid, commit],
|
|
983
|
-
env=env, capture_output=True, text=True
|
|
984
|
-
)
|
|
985
|
-
if result.returncode == 0:
|
|
986
|
-
print(f'AUTO-COMPLETE OK: {jid}')
|
|
987
|
-
done += 1
|
|
988
|
-
else:
|
|
989
|
-
print(f'AUTO-COMPLETE FAILED: {jid} — {result.stderr.strip()}')
|
|
990
|
-
errors += 1
|
|
991
|
-
|
|
992
|
-
print(f'Sweep complete: {done} completed, {errors} errors.', file=sys.stderr)
|
|
993
|
-
" "$JOBS_JSON" "$0" "$DRY_RUN"
|
|
994
|
-
;;
|
|
995
|
-
|
|
996
|
-
# ─── Pool Lifecycle Commands ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
997
|
-
|
|
998
|
-
create-pool)
|
|
999
|
-
JOB_DESCRIPTION="${1:?Usage: create-pool <job_description> <contribution_specks> <funding_goal_specks>}"
|
|
1000
|
-
CONTRIBUTION_SPECKS="${2:?Usage: create-pool <job_description> <contribution_specks> <funding_goal_specks>}"
|
|
1001
|
-
FUNDING_GOAL_SPECKS="${3:?Usage: create-pool <job_description> <contribution_specks> <funding_goal_specks>}"
|
|
1002
|
-
|
|
1003
|
-
# SECURITY: validate amounts
|
|
1004
|
-
[[ "$CONTRIBUTION_SPECKS" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || die "contribution_specks must be a positive integer"
|
|
1005
|
-
[[ "$FUNDING_GOAL_SPECKS" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || die "funding_goal_specks must be a positive integer"
|
|
1006
|
-
(( CONTRIBUTION_SPECKS > 0 )) || die "contribution_specks must be > 0"
|
|
1007
|
-
(( FUNDING_GOAL_SPECKS > 0 )) || die "funding_goal_specks must be > 0"
|
|
1008
|
-
(( FUNDING_GOAL_SPECKS >= CONTRIBUTION_SPECKS )) || die "funding_goal must be >= contribution_amount"
|
|
1009
|
-
|
|
1010
|
-
# SECURITY: exact division — no rounding dust
|
|
1011
|
-
(( FUNDING_GOAL_SPECKS % CONTRIBUTION_SPECKS == 0 )) || die "funding_goal must be exactly divisible by contribution_amount"
|
|
1012
|
-
MAX_FUNDERS=$(( FUNDING_GOAL_SPECKS / CONTRIBUTION_SPECKS ))
|
|
1013
|
-
(( MAX_FUNDERS <= 1000 )) || die "max funders exceeds 1000 cap"
|
|
1014
|
-
|
|
1015
|
-
# Generate deterministic pool commitment
|
|
1016
|
-
POOL_NONCE=$(generate_nonce)
|
|
1017
|
-
JOB_HASH=$(domain_hash "nightpay-pool-job-v1" "$JOB_DESCRIPTION")
|
|
1018
|
-
POOL_COMMITMENT=$(domain_hash "nightpay-pool-v1" "$JOB_HASH:$FUNDING_GOAL_SPECKS:$CONTRIBUTION_SPECKS:$MAX_FUNDERS:$POOL_NONCE")
|
|
1019
|
-
|
|
1020
|
-
validate_commitment "$POOL_COMMITMENT"
|
|
1021
|
-
|
|
1022
|
-
# Calculate deadline
|
|
1023
|
-
DEFAULT_POOL_DEADLINE_HOURS="${DEFAULT_POOL_DEADLINE_HOURS:-72}"
|
|
1024
|
-
DEADLINE_ISO=$(python3 -c "
|
|
1025
|
-
from datetime import datetime, timezone, timedelta
|
|
1026
|
-
print((datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=int('$DEFAULT_POOL_DEADLINE_HOURS'))).isoformat())
|
|
1027
|
-
")
|
|
1028
|
-
|
|
1029
|
-
# Register pool on the board
|
|
1030
|
-
bash "$(dirname "$0")/bounty-board.sh" add "$POOL_COMMITMENT" "pool:funding"
|
|
1031
|
-
|
|
1032
|
-
# If bridge is available, submit createPool circuit call
|
|
1033
|
-
if [[ -n "$BRIDGE_URL" ]]; then
|
|
1034
|
-
bridge_post "/createPool" "{\"jobHash\":\"$JOB_HASH\",\"fundingGoal\":$FUNDING_GOAL_SPECKS,\"contributionAmount\":$CONTRIBUTION_SPECKS,\"maxFunders\":$MAX_FUNDERS,\"nonce\":\"$POOL_NONCE\"}" 2>/dev/null || true
|
|
1035
|
-
fi
|
|
1036
|
-
|
|
1037
|
-
python3 -c "
|
|
1038
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
1039
|
-
print(json.dumps({
|
|
1040
|
-
'poolCommitment': sys.argv[1],
|
|
1041
|
-
'fundingGoal': int(sys.argv[2]),
|
|
1042
|
-
'contributionAmount': int(sys.argv[3]),
|
|
1043
|
-
'maxFunders': int(sys.argv[4]),
|
|
1044
|
-
'deadline': sys.argv[5],
|
|
1045
|
-
'status': 'funding',
|
|
1046
|
-
'network': sys.argv[6],
|
|
1047
|
-
'contract': sys.argv[7],
|
|
1048
|
-
}, indent=2))
|
|
1049
|
-
" "$POOL_COMMITMENT" "$FUNDING_GOAL_SPECKS" "$CONTRIBUTION_SPECKS" "$MAX_FUNDERS" "$DEADLINE_ISO" "$MIDNIGHT_NETWORK" "$RECEIPT_CONTRACT"
|
|
1050
|
-
;;
|
|
1051
|
-
|
|
1052
|
-
fund-pool)
|
|
1053
|
-
POOL_COMMITMENT="${1:?Usage: fund-pool <pool_commitment>}"
|
|
1054
|
-
validate_commitment "$POOL_COMMITMENT"
|
|
1055
|
-
|
|
1056
|
-
FUNDER_NONCE=$(generate_nonce)
|
|
1057
|
-
FUNDER_NULLIFIER=$(domain_hash "nightpay-funder-v1" "$FUNDER_NONCE")
|
|
1058
|
-
FUNDING_RECORD=$(domain_hash "nightpay-funding-v1" "$FUNDER_NULLIFIER:$POOL_COMMITMENT:$FUNDER_NONCE")
|
|
1059
|
-
|
|
1060
|
-
# If bridge is available, submit fundPool circuit call
|
|
1061
|
-
if [[ -n "$BRIDGE_URL" ]]; then
|
|
1062
|
-
bridge_post "/fundPool" "{\"funderNullifier\":\"$FUNDER_NULLIFIER\",\"poolCommitment\":\"$POOL_COMMITMENT\",\"nonce\":\"$FUNDER_NONCE\"}" 2>/dev/null || true
|
|
1063
|
-
fi
|
|
1064
|
-
|
|
1065
|
-
# PRIVACY: store credentials encrypted via OpenShart if available.
|
|
1066
|
-
# These are the keys to emergency refunds — they should NEVER sit in
|
|
1067
|
-
# plaintext conversation history or agent logs.
|
|
1068
|
-
CREDENTIAL_JSON="{\"poolCommitment\":\"$POOL_COMMITMENT\",\"fundingRecord\":\"$FUNDING_RECORD\",\"funderNullifier\":\"$FUNDER_NULLIFIER\",\"nonce\":\"$FUNDER_NONCE\",\"fundedAt\":\"$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)\"}"
|
|
1069
|
-
MEMORY_ID=""
|
|
1070
|
-
if MEMORY_ID=$(_shart_store "$CREDENTIAL_JSON" "nightpay,funding,$POOL_COMMITMENT" "CONFIDENTIAL"); then
|
|
1071
|
-
# Encrypted storage succeeded — return memory_id instead of raw secrets
|
|
1072
|
-
python3 -c "
|
|
1073
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
1074
|
-
print(json.dumps({
|
|
1075
|
-
'poolCommitment': sys.argv[1],
|
|
1076
|
-
'fundingRecord': sys.argv[2],
|
|
1077
|
-
'status': 'funded',
|
|
1078
|
-
'credentialStorage': 'encrypted',
|
|
1079
|
-
'memoryId': sys.argv[3],
|
|
1080
|
-
'note': 'Credentials stored encrypted via OpenShart. Use memoryId to recall them for refunds.'
|
|
1081
|
-
}, indent=2))
|
|
1082
|
-
" "$POOL_COMMITMENT" "$FUNDING_RECORD" "$MEMORY_ID"
|
|
1083
|
-
else
|
|
1084
|
-
# Fallback: no OpenShart — print raw credentials with warning
|
|
1085
|
-
python3 -c "
|
|
1086
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
1087
|
-
print(json.dumps({
|
|
1088
|
-
'poolCommitment': sys.argv[1],
|
|
1089
|
-
'fundingRecord': sys.argv[2],
|
|
1090
|
-
'funderNullifier': sys.argv[3],
|
|
1091
|
-
'nonce': sys.argv[4],
|
|
1092
|
-
'status': 'funded',
|
|
1093
|
-
'credentialStorage': 'plaintext',
|
|
1094
|
-
'WARNING': 'OpenShart not available — credentials are in PLAINTEXT. Install openshart for encrypted storage.',
|
|
1095
|
-
'note': 'SAVE these values securely — you need funderNullifier + nonce to claim a refund if the pool expires'
|
|
1096
|
-
}, indent=2))
|
|
1097
|
-
" "$POOL_COMMITMENT" "$FUNDING_RECORD" "$FUNDER_NULLIFIER" "$FUNDER_NONCE"
|
|
1098
|
-
fi
|
|
1099
|
-
;;
|
|
1100
|
-
|
|
1101
|
-
pool-status)
|
|
1102
|
-
POOL_COMMITMENT="${1:?Usage: pool-status <pool_commitment>}"
|
|
1103
|
-
validate_commitment "$POOL_COMMITMENT"
|
|
1104
|
-
|
|
1105
|
-
if [[ -n "$BRIDGE_URL" ]]; then
|
|
1106
|
-
bridge_get "/poolStatus/$POOL_COMMITMENT" && exit 0
|
|
1107
|
-
echo " WARNING: Bridge unavailable — showing placeholder" >&2
|
|
1108
|
-
fi
|
|
1109
|
-
|
|
1110
|
-
python3 -c "
|
|
1111
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
1112
|
-
print(json.dumps({
|
|
1113
|
-
'poolCommitment': sys.argv[1],
|
|
1114
|
-
'query': 'poolStatus',
|
|
1115
|
-
'note': 'Set BRIDGE_URL to get live on-chain pool status'
|
|
1116
|
-
}, indent=2))
|
|
1117
|
-
" "$POOL_COMMITMENT"
|
|
1118
|
-
;;
|
|
1119
|
-
|
|
1120
|
-
activate-pool)
|
|
1121
|
-
POOL_COMMITMENT="${1:?Usage: activate-pool <pool_commitment>}"
|
|
1122
|
-
validate_commitment "$POOL_COMMITMENT"
|
|
1123
|
-
|
|
1124
|
-
if [[ -n "$BRIDGE_URL" ]]; then
|
|
1125
|
-
bridge_post "/activatePool" "{\"poolCommitment\":\"$POOL_COMMITMENT\"}" 2>/dev/null || true
|
|
1126
|
-
fi
|
|
1127
|
-
|
|
1128
|
-
# Update board status
|
|
1129
|
-
bash "$(dirname "$0")/bounty-board.sh" remove "$POOL_COMMITMENT" "completed" 2>/dev/null || true
|
|
1130
|
-
|
|
1131
|
-
python3 -c "
|
|
1132
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
1133
|
-
print(json.dumps({
|
|
1134
|
-
'poolCommitment': sys.argv[1],
|
|
1135
|
-
'status': 'activated',
|
|
1136
|
-
'note': 'Pool goal met — funds released to gateway for Masumi escrow. Find an agent next.'
|
|
1137
|
-
}, indent=2))
|
|
1138
|
-
" "$POOL_COMMITMENT"
|
|
1139
|
-
;;
|
|
1140
|
-
|
|
1141
|
-
expire-pool)
|
|
1142
|
-
POOL_COMMITMENT="${1:?Usage: expire-pool <pool_commitment>}"
|
|
1143
|
-
validate_commitment "$POOL_COMMITMENT"
|
|
1144
|
-
|
|
1145
|
-
if [[ -n "$BRIDGE_URL" ]]; then
|
|
1146
|
-
bridge_post "/expirePool" "{\"poolCommitment\":\"$POOL_COMMITMENT\"}" 2>/dev/null || true
|
|
1147
|
-
fi
|
|
1148
|
-
|
|
1149
|
-
# Update board status
|
|
1150
|
-
bash "$(dirname "$0")/bounty-board.sh" remove "$POOL_COMMITMENT" "expired" 2>/dev/null || true
|
|
1151
|
-
|
|
1152
|
-
python3 -c "
|
|
1153
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
1154
|
-
print(json.dumps({
|
|
1155
|
-
'poolCommitment': sys.argv[1],
|
|
1156
|
-
'status': 'expired',
|
|
1157
|
-
'note': 'Pool expired — funders can now call claim-refund to reclaim their NIGHT'
|
|
1158
|
-
}, indent=2))
|
|
1159
|
-
" "$POOL_COMMITMENT"
|
|
1160
|
-
;;
|
|
1161
|
-
|
|
1162
|
-
claim-refund)
|
|
1163
|
-
# Accepts either:
|
|
1164
|
-
# claim-refund <pool_commitment> <funder_nullifier> (manual)
|
|
1165
|
-
# claim-refund --memory-id <openshart_memory_id> (auto-recall from encrypted storage)
|
|
1166
|
-
if [[ "${1:-}" == "--memory-id" ]]; then
|
|
1167
|
-
MEMORY_ID="${2:?Usage: claim-refund --memory-id <openshart_memory_id>}"
|
|
1168
|
-
RECALLED=$(_shart_recall "$MEMORY_ID") || { echo "ERROR: Could not recall credentials from OpenShart memory $MEMORY_ID" >&2; exit 1; }
|
|
1169
|
-
POOL_COMMITMENT=$(echo "$RECALLED" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.loads(sys.stdin.read())['poolCommitment'])")
|
|
1170
|
-
FUNDER_NULLIFIER=$(echo "$RECALLED" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.loads(sys.stdin.read())['funderNullifier'])")
|
|
1171
|
-
else
|
|
1172
|
-
POOL_COMMITMENT="${1:?Usage: claim-refund <pool_commitment> <funder_nullifier> OR claim-refund --memory-id <id>}"
|
|
1173
|
-
FUNDER_NULLIFIER="${2:?Usage: claim-refund <pool_commitment> <funder_nullifier>}"
|
|
1174
|
-
fi
|
|
1175
|
-
validate_commitment "$POOL_COMMITMENT"
|
|
1176
|
-
|
|
1177
|
-
if [[ -n "$BRIDGE_URL" ]]; then
|
|
1178
|
-
bridge_post "/claimRefund" "{\"poolCommitment\":\"$POOL_COMMITMENT\",\"funderNullifier\":\"$FUNDER_NULLIFIER\"}" 2>/dev/null || true
|
|
1179
|
-
fi
|
|
1180
|
-
|
|
1181
|
-
python3 -c "
|
|
1182
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
1183
|
-
print(json.dumps({
|
|
1184
|
-
'poolCommitment': sys.argv[1],
|
|
1185
|
-
'funderNullifier': sys.argv[2],
|
|
1186
|
-
'status': 'refunded',
|
|
1187
|
-
'note': 'Full contribution returned — no fee charged on expired pools'
|
|
1188
|
-
}, indent=2))
|
|
1189
|
-
" "$POOL_COMMITMENT" "$FUNDER_NULLIFIER"
|
|
1190
|
-
;;
|
|
1191
|
-
|
|
1192
|
-
emergency-refund)
|
|
1193
|
-
# FAILSAFE: bypass the gateway entirely. Submits emergencyRefund circuit call
|
|
1194
|
-
# directly to the Midnight contract. No bridge needed.
|
|
1195
|
-
# Accepts either:
|
|
1196
|
-
# emergency-refund <pool_commitment> <funder_nullifier> <contribution_specks> <funded_at_tx> <nonce>
|
|
1197
|
-
# emergency-refund --memory-id <openshart_memory_id> <contribution_specks> <funded_at_tx>
|
|
1198
|
-
if [[ "${1:-}" == "--memory-id" ]]; then
|
|
1199
|
-
MEMORY_ID="${2:?Usage: emergency-refund --memory-id <id> <contribution_specks> <funded_at_tx>}"
|
|
1200
|
-
CONTRIBUTION_SPECKS="${3:?Usage: emergency-refund --memory-id <id> <contribution_specks> <funded_at_tx>}"
|
|
1201
|
-
FUNDED_AT_TX="${4:?Usage: emergency-refund --memory-id <id> <contribution_specks> <funded_at_tx>}"
|
|
1202
|
-
RECALLED=$(_shart_recall "$MEMORY_ID") || { echo "ERROR: Could not recall credentials from OpenShart memory $MEMORY_ID" >&2; exit 1; }
|
|
1203
|
-
POOL_COMMITMENT=$(echo "$RECALLED" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.loads(sys.stdin.read())['poolCommitment'])")
|
|
1204
|
-
FUNDER_NULLIFIER=$(echo "$RECALLED" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.loads(sys.stdin.read())['funderNullifier'])")
|
|
1205
|
-
NONCE=$(echo "$RECALLED" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.loads(sys.stdin.read())['nonce'])")
|
|
1206
|
-
else
|
|
1207
|
-
POOL_COMMITMENT="${1:?Usage: emergency-refund <pool_commitment> <funder_nullifier> <contribution_specks> <funded_at_tx> <nonce>}"
|
|
1208
|
-
FUNDER_NULLIFIER="${2:?Usage: emergency-refund <pool_commitment> <funder_nullifier> <contribution_specks> <funded_at_tx> <nonce>}"
|
|
1209
|
-
CONTRIBUTION_SPECKS="${3:?Usage: emergency-refund <pool_commitment> <funder_nullifier> <contribution_specks> <funded_at_tx> <nonce>}"
|
|
1210
|
-
FUNDED_AT_TX="${4:?Usage: emergency-refund <pool_commitment> <funder_nullifier> <contribution_specks> <funded_at_tx> <nonce>}"
|
|
1211
|
-
NONCE="${5:?Usage: emergency-refund <pool_commitment> <funder_nullifier> <contribution_specks> <funded_at_tx> <nonce>}"
|
|
1212
|
-
fi
|
|
1213
|
-
validate_commitment "$POOL_COMMITMENT"
|
|
1214
|
-
|
|
1215
|
-
[[ "$CONTRIBUTION_SPECKS" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || die "contribution_specks must be a positive integer"
|
|
1216
|
-
[[ "$FUNDED_AT_TX" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || die "funded_at_tx must be a non-negative integer"
|
|
1217
|
-
|
|
1218
|
-
python3 -c "
|
|
1219
|
-
import sys, json
|
|
1220
|
-
print(json.dumps({
|
|
1221
|
-
'poolCommitment': sys.argv[1],
|
|
1222
|
-
'funderNullifier': sys.argv[2],
|
|
1223
|
-
'contributionSpecks': int(sys.argv[3]),
|
|
1224
|
-
'fundedAtTx': int(sys.argv[4]),
|
|
1225
|
-
'nonce': sys.argv[5],
|
|
1226
|
-
'status': 'emergency_refund',
|
|
1227
|
-
'emergencyPath': True,
|
|
1228
|
-
'note': 'Submit this payload directly to the Midnight contract emergencyRefund() circuit — no bridge/gateway needed'
|
|
1229
|
-
}, indent=2))
|
|
1230
|
-
" "$POOL_COMMITMENT" "$FUNDER_NULLIFIER" "$CONTRIBUTION_SPECKS" "$FUNDED_AT_TX" "$NONCE"
|
|
1231
|
-
;;
|
|
1232
|
-
|
|
1233
|
-
refund-unclaimed)
|
|
1234
|
-
# Refund jobs that were never claimed and exceeded UNCLAIMED_REFUND_HOURS.
|
|
1235
|
-
# Safety conditions:
|
|
1236
|
-
# - status == running
|
|
1237
|
-
# - claims_count == 0 and assigned_agent_id empty
|
|
1238
|
-
# - started_at older than threshold
|
|
1239
|
-
# - commitmentHash present in input_data
|
|
1240
|
-
DRY_RUN=0
|
|
1241
|
-
[[ "${1:-}" == "--dry-run" ]] && DRY_RUN=1
|
|
1242
|
-
MIP003_URL="http://localhost:${MIP003_PORT}"
|
|
1243
|
-
echo -e "${CYAN}Scanning for unclaimed refunds${RESET} ${DIM}(age=${UNCLAIMED_REFUND_HOURS}h, url=${MIP003_URL}, pageSize=${UNCLAIMED_SWEEP_PAGE_SIZE})${RESET}..." >&2
|
|
1244
|
-
|
|
1245
|
-
python3 -c "
|
|
1246
|
-
import json, subprocess, sys, urllib.request, urllib.error
|
|
1247
|
-
from datetime import datetime, timezone, timedelta
|
|
1248
|
-
|
|
1249
|
-
mip_url = sys.argv[1]
|
|
1250
|
-
gateway = sys.argv[2]
|
|
1251
|
-
dry_run = sys.argv[3] == '1'
|
|
1252
|
-
hours = float(sys.argv[4])
|
|
1253
|
-
page_size = int(sys.argv[5])
|
|
1254
|
-
|
|
1255
|
-
if page_size < 1:
|
|
1256
|
-
page_size = 1
|
|
1257
|
-
if page_size > 500:
|
|
1258
|
-
page_size = 500
|
|
1259
|
-
|
|
1260
|
-
threshold = datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=hours)
|
|
1261
|
-
offset = 0
|
|
1262
|
-
scanned = 0
|
|
1263
|
-
candidates = 0
|
|
1264
|
-
done = 0
|
|
1265
|
-
errors = 0
|
|
1266
|
-
|
|
1267
|
-
def parse_iso(v):
|
|
1268
|
-
if not v:
|
|
1269
|
-
return None
|
|
1270
|
-
try:
|
|
1271
|
-
return datetime.fromisoformat(str(v).replace('Z', '+00:00'))
|
|
1272
|
-
except Exception:
|
|
1273
|
-
return None
|
|
1274
|
-
|
|
1275
|
-
while True:
|
|
1276
|
-
url = f'{mip_url}/jobs?status=running&limit={page_size}&offset={offset}'
|
|
1277
|
-
try:
|
|
1278
|
-
with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=10) as r:
|
|
1279
|
-
data = json.loads(r.read().decode())
|
|
1280
|
-
except Exception as e:
|
|
1281
|
-
print(f'ERROR: failed to query jobs page offset={offset}: {e}', file=sys.stderr)
|
|
1282
|
-
sys.exit(1)
|
|
1283
|
-
|
|
1284
|
-
jobs = data.get('jobs', [])
|
|
1285
|
-
if not isinstance(jobs, list):
|
|
1286
|
-
print('ERROR: unexpected /jobs response format', file=sys.stderr)
|
|
1287
|
-
sys.exit(1)
|
|
1288
|
-
|
|
1289
|
-
for job in jobs:
|
|
1290
|
-
scanned += 1
|
|
1291
|
-
jid = job.get('job_id', '')
|
|
1292
|
-
claims = int(job.get('claims_count') or 0)
|
|
1293
|
-
assigned = job.get('assigned_agent_id')
|
|
1294
|
-
started_at = parse_iso(job.get('started_at'))
|
|
1295
|
-
input_data = job.get('input_data') or {}
|
|
1296
|
-
|
|
1297
|
-
if claims > 0 or assigned:
|
|
1298
|
-
continue
|
|
1299
|
-
if not started_at or started_at > threshold:
|
|
1300
|
-
continue
|
|
1301
|
-
if isinstance(input_data, str):
|
|
1302
|
-
try:
|
|
1303
|
-
input_data = json.loads(input_data)
|
|
1304
|
-
except Exception:
|
|
1305
|
-
input_data = {}
|
|
1306
|
-
if not isinstance(input_data, dict):
|
|
1307
|
-
input_data = {}
|
|
1308
|
-
|
|
1309
|
-
commit = str(input_data.get('commitmentHash') or '')
|
|
1310
|
-
refund_addr = str(input_data.get('refundAddress') or input_data.get('funderAddress') or '')
|
|
1311
|
-
if len(commit) != 64 or any(c not in '0123456789abcdef' for c in commit):
|
|
1312
|
-
print(f'SKIP {jid}: missing/invalid commitmentHash for refund', file=sys.stderr)
|
|
1313
|
-
errors += 1
|
|
1314
|
-
continue
|
|
1315
|
-
|
|
1316
|
-
candidates += 1
|
|
1317
|
-
if dry_run:
|
|
1318
|
-
addr_hint = refund_addr[:12] + '...' if refund_addr else 'unknown'
|
|
1319
|
-
print(f'DRY-RUN: would refund job_id={jid} commitment={commit[:16]}... refundAddress={addr_hint}')
|
|
1320
|
-
done += 1
|
|
1321
|
-
continue
|
|
1322
|
-
|
|
1323
|
-
cmd = ['/usr/bin/env', 'bash', gateway, 'refund', jid, commit]
|
|
1324
|
-
if len(refund_addr) == 64 and all(c in '0123456789abcdef' for c in refund_addr):
|
|
1325
|
-
cmd.append(refund_addr)
|
|
1326
|
-
result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)
|
|
1327
|
-
if result.returncode == 0:
|
|
1328
|
-
print(f'AUTO-REFUND OK: {jid}')
|
|
1329
|
-
done += 1
|
|
1330
|
-
else:
|
|
1331
|
-
print(f'AUTO-REFUND FAILED: {jid} — {result.stderr.strip()}', file=sys.stderr)
|
|
1332
|
-
errors += 1
|
|
1333
|
-
|
|
1334
|
-
has_more = bool(data.get('has_more'))
|
|
1335
|
-
count = int(data.get('count') or 0)
|
|
1336
|
-
if not has_more or count == 0:
|
|
1337
|
-
break
|
|
1338
|
-
offset += page_size
|
|
1339
|
-
|
|
1340
|
-
print(f'Unclaimed refund sweep: scanned={scanned}, candidates={candidates}, refunded={done}, errors={errors}.', file=sys.stderr)
|
|
1341
|
-
" "$MIP003_URL" "$0" "$DRY_RUN" "$UNCLAIMED_REFUND_HOURS" "$UNCLAIMED_SWEEP_PAGE_SIZE"
|
|
1342
|
-
;;
|
|
1343
|
-
|
|
1344
|
-
*)
|
|
1345
|
-
echo -e "${BOLD}nightpay gateway${RESET} — anonymous bounty lifecycle CLI" >&2
|
|
1346
|
-
echo "" >&2
|
|
1347
|
-
echo -e "${BOLD}Commands:${RESET}" >&2
|
|
1348
|
-
echo -e " ${CYAN}post-bounty${RESET} <desc> <amount> Fund a bounty anonymously" >&2
|
|
1349
|
-
echo -e " ${CYAN}find-agent${RESET} <query> Search Masumi for agents" >&2
|
|
1350
|
-
echo -e " ${CYAN}agent-showcase${RESET} [query] List profile showcase agents by credibility" >&2
|
|
1351
|
-
echo -e " ${CYAN}hire-and-pay${RESET} <agent> <desc> <hash> Create escrow, start job" >&2
|
|
1352
|
-
echo -e " ${CYAN}hire-direct${RESET} <agent> <desc> <amount> Create hidden direct-hire job" >&2
|
|
1353
|
-
echo -e " ${CYAN}check-job${RESET} <job_id> Poll job status" >&2
|
|
1354
|
-
echo -e " ${CYAN}complete${RESET} <job_id> <hash> Mint receipt, release payment" >&2
|
|
1355
|
-
echo -e " ${CYAN}refund${RESET} <job_id> <hash> [addr] Cancel escrow, refund NIGHT" >&2
|
|
1356
|
-
echo -e " ${CYAN}refund-unclaimed${RESET} [--dry-run] Auto-refund old unclaimed jobs" >&2
|
|
1357
|
-
echo -e " ${CYAN}approve-multisig${RESET} <id> <hash> <key> Sign high-value approval" >&2
|
|
1358
|
-
echo -e " ${CYAN}optimistic-sweep${RESET} [--dry-run] Auto-complete expired windows" >&2
|
|
1359
|
-
echo -e " ${CYAN}withdraw-fees${RESET} [amount] Operator fee withdrawal" >&2
|
|
1360
|
-
echo -e " ${CYAN}stats${RESET} On-chain contract stats" >&2
|
|
1361
|
-
echo "" >&2
|
|
1362
|
-
echo -e "${DIM}Required: MASUMI_API_KEY MIDNIGHT_NETWORK OPERATOR_ADDRESS RECEIPT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS${RESET}" >&2
|
|
1363
|
-
exit 1
|
|
1364
|
-
;;
|
|
1365
|
-
esac
|