nexus-agents 8.8.2 → 8.9.1

package/dist/{ast-rule-runner-WANOR3MX.js → ast-rule-runner-BEUFFQWL.js}

@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ import {
   getBuiltInAstRulesPath,
   loadRules,
   runAstQaRules
-} from "./chunk-3XQK4MEF.js";
-import "./chunk-ERL3XHQO.js";
+} from "./chunk-FDZ3SLMV.js";
+import "./chunk-AOBIUJX5.js";
 import "./chunk-7WJGV5DN.js";
 import "./chunk-J7QCZRVK.js";
 import "./chunk-ZPWHCABL.js";
@@ -26,4 +26,4 @@ export {
   loadRules,
   runAstQaRules
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=ast-rule-runner-WANOR3MX.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=ast-rule-runner-BEUFFQWL.js.map

package/dist/{child-mcp-config-N4HLLCEH.js → child-mcp-config-QFPSL7Y2.js}

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import {
 } from "./chunk-DKHBIJO4.js";
 import {
   createLogger
-} from "./chunk-ERL3XHQO.js";
+} from "./chunk-AOBIUJX5.js";
 import "./chunk-7WJGV5DN.js";
 import "./chunk-J7QCZRVK.js";
 import "./chunk-ZPWHCABL.js";
@@ -62,4 +62,4 @@ export {
   generateMcpConfig,
   getDefaultAllowedTools
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=child-mcp-config-N4HLLCEH.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=child-mcp-config-QFPSL7Y2.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-VADACTVB.js → chunk-2RZWKIDU.js}

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import {
   getTimeProvider,
   isRateLimitText,
   ok
-} from "./chunk-ERL3XHQO.js";
+} from "./chunk-AOBIUJX5.js";
 
 // src/cli-adapters/circuit-breaker-types.ts
 var CircuitErrorCode = {
@@ -541,4 +541,4 @@ export {
   CliCircuitBreakerIntegration,
   createCliCircuitBreakerIntegration
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-VADACTVB.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-2RZWKIDU.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-QCSXKQTK.js → chunk-36BA6D6J.js}

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import {
   createGetRetryConfig,
   createGetTimeout,
   createGetToolRateLimit
-} from "./chunk-ERL3XHQO.js";
+} from "./chunk-AOBIUJX5.js";
 
 // src/config/defaults.ts
 var CUSTOM_API_DEFAULT_MODEL = "gpt-5.5";
@@ -230,4 +230,4 @@ export {
   CUSTOM_API_DEFAULT_MODEL,
   DEFAULTS
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-QCSXKQTK.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-36BA6D6J.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-BYUVLVN7.js → chunk-3W4L63ML.js}

@@ -112,4 +112,4 @@ export {
   SEVERITY_EMOJI,
   DECISION_EMOJI
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-BYUVLVN7.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-3W4L63ML.js.map

package/dist/chunk-3W4L63ML.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/dogfooding/pr-review-types.ts","../src/security/sarif-types.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * nexus-agents/dogfooding - PR Review Types\n *\n * Type definitions for automated pull request review using\n * multi-agent collaboration.\n *\n * @module dogfooding/pr-review-types\n * (Source: Issue #161, Alignment Roadmap Phase 3)\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport type { FullCapableProvider } from '../scm/types.js';\nimport { FINDING_SEVERITY_LEVELS } from '../security/sarif-types.js';\n\n/**\n * Pull request file change information.\n */\nexport interface PRFileChange {\n  /** File path */\n  readonly filename: string;\n  /** Change status */\n  readonly status: 'added' | 'removed' | 'modified' | 'renamed' | 'copied';\n  /** Number of additions */\n  readonly additions: number;\n  /** Number of deletions */\n  readonly deletions: number;\n  /** File patch/diff content */\n  readonly patch?: string | undefined;\n  /** Previous filename if renamed */\n  readonly previousFilename?: string | undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Pull request metadata from GitHub API.\n */\nexport interface PRMetadata {\n  /** PR number */\n  readonly number: number;\n  /** PR title */\n  readonly title: string;\n  /** PR description/body */\n  readonly body: string;\n  /** Author username */\n  readonly author: string;\n  /** GitHub API author_association (e.g., 'OWNER', 'COLLABORATOR', 'NONE') */\n  readonly authorAssociation: string;\n  /** Base branch */\n  readonly base: string;\n  /** Head branch */\n  readonly head: string;\n  /** Repository owner */\n  readonly owner: string;\n  /** Repository name */\n  readonly repo: string;\n  /** PR URL */\n  readonly url: string;\n  /** Whether PR is draft */\n  readonly draft: boolean;\n  /** PR labels */\n  readonly labels: readonly string[];\n  /** Changed files */\n  readonly files: readonly PRFileChange[];\n  /** Total additions */\n  readonly additions: number;\n  /** Total deletions */\n  readonly deletions: number;\n  /** Commit SHA of head */\n  readonly headSha: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Review severity levels.\n */\nexport type ReviewSeverity = (typeof FINDING_SEVERITY_LEVELS)[number];\n\n/**\n * Review category for organizing findings.\n */\nexport type ReviewCategory =\n  'security' | 'performance' | 'code_quality' | 'testing' | 'documentation' | 'architecture';\n\n/**\n * Individual review finding from an expert.\n */\nexport interface ReviewFinding {\n  /** Unique finding ID */\n  readonly id: string;\n  /** Category of finding */\n  readonly category: ReviewCategory;\n  /** Severity level */\n  readonly severity: ReviewSeverity;\n  /** Finding title */\n  readonly title: string;\n  /** Detailed description */\n  readonly description: string;\n  /** Affected file (if applicable) */\n  readonly file?: string | undefined;\n  /** Line number (if applicable) */\n  readonly line?: number | undefined;\n  /** Suggested fix */\n  readonly suggestion?: string | undefined;\n  /** Expert that found this issue */\n  readonly expertId: string;\n  /** Confidence score (0-1) */\n  readonly confidence: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Review result from a single expert agent.\n */\nexport interface ExpertReviewResult {\n  /** Expert ID */\n  readonly expertId: string;\n  /** Expert role/type */\n  readonly expertType: string;\n  /** Overall approval */\n  readonly approved: boolean;\n  /** Review summary */\n  readonly summary: string;\n  /** Individual findings */\n  readonly findings: readonly ReviewFinding[];\n  /** Execution time in ms */\n  readonly durationMs: number;\n  /** Confidence in review (0-1) */\n  readonly confidence: number;\n  /**\n   * The expert never produced a verdict — its adapter failed or returned\n   * nothing (#5012).\n   *\n   * `approved` cannot express this. A failed expert used to be recorded as\n   * `approved: true` (\"don't block on failures\"), so a review in which every\n   * expert failed resolved to `approve` at 100% consensus and was posted to\n   * GitHub as a real APPROVE. Absence of a review is not approval — a consumer\n   * must be able to tell them apart, and `confidence: 0` was already present\n   * and already ignored.\n   */\n  readonly errored?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Aggregated review decision after multi-agent debate.\n */\nexport type ReviewDecision = 'approve' | 'request_changes' | 'comment';\n\n/**\n * Complete PR review result from multi-agent collaboration.\n */\n/**\n * Trust + reputation assessment of the PR author, surfaced for observability\n * (#3123, epic #3118 Phase 5). Mirrors `issue_triage`'s assessment.\n */\nexport interface PRTrustAssessment {\n  /** Classifier trust tier (1-4) from author association. */\n  readonly trustTier: string;\n  /** Author's GitHub role. */\n  readonly userRole: string;\n  /**\n   * Whether the author is on the maintainer allowlist — present only when an\n   * allowlist was consulted (#4992). Absent means \"no allowlist was consulted\",\n   * which is the state on every live path today; it was previously recorded\n   * as `false` without being measured.\n   */\n  readonly isAllowlisted?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Whether a durable `AuditLogger` was configured for this process (#4992\n   * review). `configured` — the trust event was handed to it; delivery to the\n   * hash chain is subject to the logger's own severity filter (trust events\n   * are `info`), queue and fail-loud flush, and is not confirmed per call.\n   * `none` — no audit logger (audit disabled, or the CLI path).\n   */\n  readonly auditSink: 'configured' | 'none';\n  /** Reputation score (0-100) when reputation is enabled. */\n  readonly reputationScore?: number | undefined;\n  /** Suspicious signals detected (e.g. `new_account`, `injection_patterns_detected`). */\n  readonly suspiciousSignals: readonly string[];\n  /** Whether the author is flagged as suspicious. */\n  readonly isSuspicious: boolean;\n  /** Tier the policy gate ACTUALLY enforced (== trustTier under audit/off). */\n  readonly enforcedTrustTier?: string | undefined;\n  /** Tier reputation reconciliation computed — what enforce mode WOULD gate on. */\n  readonly reputationReconciledTier?: string | undefined;\n  /** Reputation-gating rollout mode applied: `off` | `audit` | `enforce`. */\n  readonly gatingMode?: string | undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of fetching PR data plus best-effort author signals (#3133).\n */\nexport interface PRFetchData {\n  readonly metadata: PRMetadata;\n  readonly provider: FullCapableProvider;\n  /** Author's real account age in days, when the lookup succeeded (#3133). */\n  readonly accountAgeDays?: number;\n}\n\nexport interface PRReviewResult {\n  /** Pull request number */\n  readonly prNumber: number;\n  /** Repository full name (owner/repo) */\n  readonly repository: string;\n  /** Overall decision */\n  readonly decision: ReviewDecision;\n  /** Executive summary */\n  readonly summary: string;\n  /** Individual expert reviews */\n  readonly expertReviews: readonly ExpertReviewResult[];\n  /** Aggregated findings by severity */\n  readonly findingsBySeverity: Readonly<Record<ReviewSeverity, number>>;\n  /** Aggregated findings by category */\n  readonly findingsByCategory: Readonly<Record<ReviewCategory, number>>;\n  /** Total execution time in ms */\n  readonly totalDurationMs: number;\n  /** Number of experts that participated */\n  readonly expertCount: number;\n  /**\n   * Number of changed files the review covered (#4350).\n   *\n   * The demo command's progress line printed `expertReviews.length` under a\n   * \"files\" label, so a 7-file PR reported \"3 files\" — the expert count. The\n   * fetch was always correct; the result simply carried no file count to print.\n   */\n  readonly filesReviewed: number;\n  /** Consensus score (0-1) */\n  readonly consensusScore: number;\n  /** Debate rounds completed */\n  readonly debateRounds: number;\n  /** Timestamp of review */\n  readonly timestamp: string;\n  /** Author trust + reputation assessment (#3123). */\n  readonly trustAssessment: PRTrustAssessment;\n  /**\n   * What actually happened when the review was posted to GitHub (#4354).\n   *\n   * The review previously reported success whether or not the post landed: a\n   * `createReview` rejection was logged and discarded, and a Rule-of-Two block\n   * returned early, both leaving the CLI to print \"Review posted to GitHub.\"\n   * over a review that does not exist. Callers must consult this rather than\n   * inferring a successful post from a successful review.\n   */\n  readonly postOutcome: ReviewPostOutcome;\n}\n\n/**\n * A completed review before the posting step has run (#4354).\n *\n * Everything the reviewer aggregates is known before the post is attempted; the\n * outcome is stamped on afterwards. Keeping the two apart in the types is what\n * stops `postOutcome` from being defaulted to a hopeful value.\n */\nexport type PRReviewDraft = Omit<PRReviewResult, 'postOutcome'>;\n\n/** Terminal state of the GitHub review-posting step (#4354). */\nexport type ReviewPostOutcome =\n  /** The review was created on GitHub. */\n  | { readonly status: 'posted' }\n  /** Posting was deliberately not attempted (dry-run, or a policy gate blocked it). */\n  | { readonly status: 'skipped'; readonly reason: string }\n  /** Posting was attempted and GitHub rejected it. */\n  | { readonly status: 'failed'; readonly error: string };\n\n/**\n * Configuration for PR review.\n */\nexport interface PRReviewConfig {\n  /** Experts to include in review */\n  readonly experts: readonly ReviewCategory[];\n  /** Maximum debate rounds */\n  readonly maxDebateRounds: number;\n  /** Consensus threshold (0-1) */\n  readonly consensusThreshold: number;\n  /** Minimum severity to report */\n  readonly minSeverity: ReviewSeverity;\n  /** Whether to post inline comments */\n  readonly enableInlineComments: boolean;\n  /** Whether to run in dry-run mode (no GitHub posting) */\n  readonly dryRun: boolean;\n  /** Whether to assess author reputation and gate on it (#3123). */\n  readonly enableReputation: boolean;\n  /** GitHub token for API access */\n  readonly githubToken?: string | undefined;\n  /** Model adapter configuration */\n  readonly modelConfig?: {\n    readonly temperature?: number;\n    readonly maxTokens?: number;\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Default PR review configuration.\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_PR_REVIEW_CONFIG: PRReviewConfig = {\n  experts: ['security', 'code_quality', 'testing'],\n  maxDebateRounds: 3,\n  consensusThreshold: 0.7,\n  minSeverity: 'low',\n  enableInlineComments: true,\n  dryRun: false,\n  enableReputation: true,\n  modelConfig: {\n    temperature: 0.3,\n    maxTokens: 8192,\n  },\n};\n\n/**\n * Zod schema for PR review configuration.\n */\nexport const PRReviewConfigSchema = z.object({\n  experts: z\n    .array(\n      z.enum([\n        'security',\n        'performance',\n        'code_quality',\n        'testing',\n        'documentation',\n        'architecture',\n      ])\n    )\n    .default(['security', 'code_quality', 'testing']),\n  maxDebateRounds: z.number().int().min(1).max(10).default(3),\n  consensusThreshold: z.number().min(0).max(1).default(0.7),\n  minSeverity: z.enum(FINDING_SEVERITY_LEVELS).default('low'),\n  enableInlineComments: z.boolean().default(true),\n  dryRun: z.boolean().default(false),\n  enableReputation: z.boolean().default(true),\n  githubToken: z.string().optional(),\n  modelConfig: z\n    .object({\n      temperature: z.number().min(0).max(2).default(0.3),\n      maxTokens: z.number().int().positive().default(8192),\n    })\n    .optional(),\n});\n\n/**\n * Severity order for comparison. INVERTED vs sarif-types' SEVERITY_ORDER by\n * design (higher = more severe here, for descending sort); only the KEY SET is\n * shared. Derived from the canonical {@link FINDING_SEVERITY_LEVELS} so the keys\n * can't drift (#3570): critical→5 … info→1.\n */\nexport const SEVERITY_ORDER: Record<ReviewSeverity, number> = Object.fromEntries(\n  FINDING_SEVERITY_LEVELS.map((level, index) => [level, FINDING_SEVERITY_LEVELS.length - index])\n) as Record<ReviewSeverity, number>;\n\n/**\n * Category display names.\n */\nexport const CATEGORY_DISPLAY_NAMES: Record<ReviewCategory, string> = {\n  security: 'Security',\n  performance: 'Performance',\n  code_quality: 'Code Quality',\n  testing: 'Testing',\n  documentation: 'Documentation',\n  architecture: 'Architecture',\n};\n\n/**\n * Severity emoji for GitHub comments.\n */\nexport const SEVERITY_EMOJI: Record<ReviewSeverity, string> = {\n  critical: ':rotating_light:',\n  high: ':warning:',\n  medium: ':yellow_circle:',\n  low: ':large_blue_circle:',\n  info: ':information_source:',\n};\n\n/**\n * Decision emoji for GitHub comments.\n */\nexport const DECISION_EMOJI: Record<ReviewDecision, string> = {\n  approve: ':white_check_mark:',\n  request_changes: ':x:',\n  comment: ':speech_balloon:',\n};\n","/**\n * SARIF Types and Security Finding Schema (#1682)\n *\n * Types for parsing SARIF (Static Analysis Results Interchange Format)\n * output from security scanners (Semgrep, CodeQL, Bandit, ESLint).\n * Normalizes findings into a unified schema for MCP tool consumption.\n *\n * @module security/sarif-types\n * (Source: Issue #1681, #1682 — Proactive Defensive Security)\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Unified Security Finding Schema\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Canonical 5-value finding-severity vocabulary (CVSS-aligned), most→least\n * severe. THE single source of truth — every 5-value finding-severity zod enum\n * (severity-consensus, finding-triage, agents/output-schemas, expert-types\n * VulnerabilitySeverity) and both SEVERITY_ORDER maps derive from this (#3570).\n * Tuple order is authoritative: SEVERITY_ORDER below maps it to ascending ranks.\n */\nexport const FINDING_SEVERITY_LEVELS = ['critical', 'high', 'medium', 'low', 'info'] as const;\n\n/** Severity levels aligned with CVSS and common scanner output. */\nexport const FindingSeveritySchema = z.enum(FINDING_SEVERITY_LEVELS);\nexport type FindingSeverity = z.infer<typeof FindingSeveritySchema>;\n\n/** A normalized security finding from any SARIF-compatible scanner. */\nexport const SecurityFindingSchema = z.object({\n  /** Unique finding ID (scanner-specific rule ID). */\n  id: z.string().min(1),\n  /** Scanner that produced this finding. */\n  scanner: z.string().min(1),\n  /** Rule identifier (e.g., 'javascript.lang.security.detect-eval'). */\n  rule: z.string().min(1),\n  /** Normalized severity. */\n  severity: FindingSeveritySchema,\n  /** Human-readable description of the finding. */\n  message: z.string().min(1).max(2000),\n  /** File path where the finding was detected. */\n  file: z.string().min(1),\n  /** Start line number (1-based). */\n  startLine: z.number().int().min(1),\n  /** End line number (1-based, optional). */\n  endLine: z.number().int().min(1).optional(),\n  /** CWE identifiers (e.g., ['CWE-79', 'CWE-89']). */\n  cweIds: z.array(z.string()).default([]),\n  /** Scanner confidence (0-1). */\n  confidence: z.number().min(0).max(1).default(0.5),\n  /** Code snippet around the finding (optional). */\n  snippet: z.string().max(500).optional(),\n  /** Help URL for remediation guidance. */\n  helpUrl: z.string().optional(),\n});\n\nexport type SecurityFinding = z.infer<typeof SecurityFindingSchema>;\n\n/** Result of parsing a SARIF file. */\nexport interface SarifParseResult {\n  /** Scanner name extracted from SARIF. */\n  readonly scanner: string;\n  /** Total findings parsed. */\n  readonly totalFindings: number;\n  /** Findings sorted by severity (critical first). */\n  readonly findings: readonly SecurityFinding[];\n  /** Parsing errors (non-fatal). */\n  readonly errors: readonly string[];\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// SARIF Input Types (subset of the SARIF 2.1.0 spec we need)\n// ============================================================================\n\n/** SARIF result level → our severity mapping. */\nexport const SARIF_LEVEL_MAP: Readonly<Record<string, FindingSeverity>> = {\n  error: 'high',\n  warning: 'medium',\n  note: 'low',\n  none: 'info',\n};\n\n/**\n * Severity order for sorting (lower = more severe). 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package/dist/{chunk-3YKFLM2B.js → chunk-46YGVSBD.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   getTimeProvider
-} from "./chunk-ERL3XHQO.js";
+} from "./chunk-AOBIUJX5.js";
 
 // src/security/audit-trail.ts
 var MAX_EVENTS = 1e4;
@@ -205,4 +205,4 @@ export {
   createGraphAuditBridge,
   createAuditTrail
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-3YKFLM2B.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-46YGVSBD.js.map

package/dist/chunk-46YGVSBD.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/security/audit-trail.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * nexus-agents/security - Audit Trail\n *\n * Machine-readable JSON audit events for security pipeline decisions.\n * Every trust classification, policy gate decision, corroboration check,\n * and reputation assessment is recorded as a structured event.\n *\n * Satisfies CLAUDE.md requirement: \"Every action on untrusted input must\n * log: trust tier, sources cited, policy gate decision, stripped content.\"\n *\n * @module security/audit-trail\n * (Source: Issue #832 — Security audit trail)\n */\n\nimport { getTimeProvider } from '../core/index.js';\nimport type { TrustTier } from './trust-types.js';\nimport type { AgentActionType } from './action-schema.js';\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Types\n// ============================================================================\n\n/** Maximum stored events before oldest are evicted. */\nconst MAX_EVENTS = 10_000;\n\n/**\n * Discriminated union of audit event types.\n * Each event captures a single security pipeline decision.\n */\nexport type AuditEvent =\n  | TrustClassificationEvent\n  | PolicyGateEvent\n  | CorroborationEvent\n  | ReputationEvent\n  | SanitizationEvent\n  | GraphExecutionAuditEvent\n  | ClawGuardViolationEvent;\n\n/** Base fields shared by all audit events. */\ninterface AuditEventBase {\n  readonly id: string;\n  readonly timestamp: string;\n  readonly component: string;\n}\n\n/** Trust classification decision. */\nexport interface TrustClassificationEvent extends AuditEventBase {\n  readonly type: 'trust_classification';\n  readonly username: string;\n  readonly assignedTier: TrustTier;\n  readonly userRole: string;\n  /**\n   * Present only when a maintainer allowlist was consulted (#4992). A\n   * classification that consulted no list records nothing here rather than\n   * `false` — \"not measured\" and \"measured false\" must stay distinguishable in\n   * the audit record.\n   */\n  readonly isAllowlisted?: boolean;\n  readonly wasDowngraded: boolean;\n  readonly reason: string;\n}\n\n/** Policy gate evaluation result. */\nexport interface PolicyGateEvent extends AuditEventBase {\n  readonly type: 'policy_gate';\n  /**\n   * The agent action evaluated, for the security policy-gate path\n   * (security/policy-gate.ts). Optional because the PIPELINE policy path\n   * (pipeline/policy-evaluator.ts → #3710) records stage-boundary policy\n   * decisions that have no `AgentAction` — they carry {@link stageType} +\n   * {@link mode} + {@link ruleIds} instead. Security emitters always set it.\n   */\n  readonly actionType?: AgentActionType;\n  readonly allowed: boolean;\n  readonly requiresApproval: boolean;\n  readonly inputTrustTier: TrustTier;\n  readonly violationRules: readonly string[];\n  /**\n   * Pipeline-policy fields (#3710). Carried for the dev-pipeline\n   * consensus→execute seam so the DURABLE record can distinguish soak (`warn`)\n   * from enforce (`block`) and which rules/stage fired — without these the\n   * persisted event is useless to the tune/readiness loop. Absent for the\n   * security policy-gate path.\n   */\n  /** Enforcement mode the decision was made under: `warn` (soak) or `block` (enforce). */\n  readonly mode?: 'off' | 'warn' | 'block';\n  /** IDs of the policy rules that fired (mirrors `violationRules` for the pipeline path). */\n  readonly ruleIds?: readonly string[];\n  /** Type of the stage the gate guarded (e.g. `execute`). */\n  readonly stageType?: string;\n  /**\n   * #3727: discriminates a per-EVALUATION SUMMARY record (`'summary'` — emitted\n   * once per pipeline policy evaluation INCLUDING clean ones, the DENOMINATOR for\n   * the would-block rate) from a per-VIOLATION record (`'violation'` — the\n   * existing #3710 per-violation records). Absent for the security policy-gate\n   * path. Denominator = count(recordKind==='summary'); numerator = summaries with\n   * `violationCount > 0`. Scope the #3710 count-parity assertion to `'violation'`.\n   */\n  readonly recordKind?: 'summary' | 'violation';\n  /** #3727: number of violations in THIS evaluation (set on the summary record). */\n  readonly violationCount?: number;\n}\n\n/** Corroboration validation result. */\nexport interface CorroborationEvent extends AuditEventBase {\n  readonly type: 'corroboration';\n  readonly actionType: AgentActionType;\n  readonly satisfied: boolean;\n  readonly sourceCount: number;\n  readonly missingRequirements: readonly string[];\n}\n\n/** Reputation assessment result. */\nexport interface ReputationEvent extends AuditEventBase {\n  readonly type: 'reputation';\n  readonly username: string;\n  readonly reputationScore: number;\n  readonly isSuspicious: boolean;\n  readonly effectiveTier: TrustTier;\n  readonly signalCount: number;\n}\n\n/** Summary of a single element stripped during sanitization. */\nexport interface StrippedElementSummary {\n  /** Truncated tag text (≤30 chars + '...' from the sanitizer). */\n  readonly tag: string;\n  /** Reason the element was removed (e.g. 'Trail of Bits injection vector'). */\n  readonly reason: string;\n}\n\n/** Max stripped-element details retained per sanitization event. */\nexport const MAX_STRIPPED_ELEMENTS_PER_EVENT = 20;\n\n/** Input sanitization result. */\nexport interface SanitizationEvent extends AuditEventBase {\n  readonly type: 'sanitization';\n  readonly source: string;\n  readonly wasModified: boolean;\n  readonly strippedCount: number;\n  readonly injectionFlagCount: number;\n  /**\n   * Per-element tag/reason details, truncated to at most\n   * MAX_STRIPPED_ELEMENTS_PER_EVENT entries. Required by CLAUDE.md's\n   * Untrusted Input Policy: \"Log stripped elements for audit trail.\"\n   */\n  readonly strippedElements: readonly StrippedElementSummary[];\n}\n\n/**\n * ClawGuard AUDIT-mode violation (#4097). Records a tool call that VIOLATED the\n * derived access policy but was ALLOWED to proceed because the policy is in\n * `audit` mode (log-and-allow). Persisting these is what lets the audit→enforce\n * graduation loop size the real violation rate from durable telemetry rather\n * than ephemeral logs.\n */\nexport interface ClawGuardViolationEvent extends AuditEventBase {\n  readonly type: 'clawguard_violation';\n  /** The tool whose call violated the policy. */\n  readonly toolName: string;\n  /** Human-readable warning from the access decision (may be truncated). */\n  readonly warning: string;\n  /** Source of the derived policy (`llm` / `fallback-keyword` / `bypass`). */\n  readonly policySource: string;\n  /** Policy mode under which the violation was allowed (e.g. `audit`). */\n  readonly mode: string;\n  /** Request ID of the offending tool call, for correlation. */\n  readonly requestId: string;\n  /**\n   * Which rule produced the verdict (#5106) — `unbypassable:tool`,\n   * `unbypassable:path`, `allowedTools`, `allowedTools:confirm_risky`.\n   *\n   * A first-class field rather than prose inside `warning`, because `warning`\n   * is truncated at 500 chars and a long attacker-selectable `path` argument\n   * pushes the rule off the end. A chain reader must be able to tell an\n   * unbypassable denylist hit from an allowlist miss without parsing a string\n   * that may have been cut mid-word.\n   *\n   * Absent for verdicts that carry no rule (an audit-mode allowlist\n   * observation), which is why it is optional rather than defaulted — there is\n   * no rule to name, and inventing one would misreport.\n   */\n  readonly matchedRule?: string;\n}\n\n/** Graph execution lifecycle event (Issue #839). */\nexport interface GraphExecutionAuditEvent extends AuditEventBase {\n  readonly type: 'graph_execution';\n  readonly graphEvent: string;\n  readonly nodeId?: string;\n  readonly stepNumber: number;\n  readonly detail: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Query filter for retrieving audit events.\n *\n * The post-mortem dimensions (#3197) — `actionType`, `actor`, `violationRule`\n * — NARROW to events that actually carry the field (events lacking it are\n * excluded), unlike `trustTier`'s legacy keep-non-applicable behavior. Only\n * dimensions backed by a real event field are offered: `resource` and\n * `policyName` from the original ask were dropped because no AuditEvent\n * records them (a filter with no backing field would be dead config); the\n * policy-rule intent is served by `violationRule` (PolicyGateEvent's\n * `violationRules`).\n */\nexport interface AuditQuery {\n  readonly type?: AuditEvent['type'];\n  readonly since?: string;\n  readonly until?: string;\n  readonly trustTier?: TrustTier;\n  /** Match PolicyGate/Corroboration events by their `actionType`. */\n  readonly actionType?: AgentActionType;\n  /** Match Trust/Reputation events by `username` (the acting/assessed user). */\n  readonly actor?: string;\n  /** Match PolicyGate events whose `violationRules` include this rule name. */\n  readonly violationRule?: string;\n  readonly limit?: number;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// AuditTrail\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Append-only audit trail for security pipeline decisions.\n * Events are bounded by MAX_EVENTS to prevent unbounded growth.\n */\n/**\n * Optional durable sink: receives every fully-formed event appended to the\n * trail, so security decisions can be mirrored to a persistent, hash-chained\n * store (see security/audit-bridge.ts). Default-off — when absent, the trail\n * behaves exactly as before (#3291).\n */\nexport type DurableAuditSink = (event: AuditEvent) => void;\n\nexport class AuditTrail {\n  private events: AuditEvent[] = [];\n  private nextId = 1;\n\n  constructor(private readonly durableSink?: DurableAuditSink) {}\n\n  /** Appends an event to the trail. Returns the assigned event ID. */\n  append(event: Omit<AuditEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp'>): string {\n    const id = `audit-${String(this.nextId++)}`;\n    const fullEvent = {\n      ...event,\n      id,\n      timestamp: getTimeProvider().nowIso(),\n    } as AuditEvent;\n\n    this.events.push(fullEvent);\n    this.enforceLimit();\n\n    // Mirror to the durable store when wired (#3291). Best-effort: a sink\n    // failure must never break the in-memory security pipeline.\n    if (this.durableSink !== undefined) {\n      try {\n        this.durableSink(fullEvent);\n      } catch {\n        // Sink implementations already swallow+log; this is belt-and-suspenders.\n      }\n    }\n\n    return id;\n  }\n\n  /** Queries events matching the given filter. */\n  query(filter: AuditQuery = {}): readonly AuditEvent[] {\n    let results = this.events as readonly AuditEvent[];\n\n    if (filter.type !== undefined) {\n      results = results.filter((e) => e.type === filter.type);\n    }\n\n    if (filter.since !== undefined) {\n      results = filterSince(results, filter.since);\n    }\n\n    if (filter.until !== undefined) {\n      results = filterUntil(results, filter.until);\n    }\n\n    if (filter.trustTier !== undefined) {\n      results = filterByTrustTier(results, filter.trustTier);\n    }\n\n    if (filter.actionType !== undefined) {\n      results = filterByActionType(results, filter.actionType);\n    }\n\n    if (filter.actor !== undefined) {\n      results = filterByActor(results, filter.actor);\n    }\n\n    if (filter.violationRule !== undefined) {\n      results = filterByViolationRule(results, filter.violationRule);\n    }\n\n    const limit = filter.limit ?? results.length;\n    return results.slice(-limit);\n  }\n\n  /** Returns the total number of events. */\n  get size(): number {\n    return this.events.length;\n  }\n\n  /** Clears all events. */\n  clear(): void {\n    this.events = [];\n  }\n\n  /** Enforces MAX_EVENTS bound. */\n  private enforceLimit(): void {\n    if (this.events.length > MAX_EVENTS) {\n      this.events = this.events.slice(-MAX_EVENTS);\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Filter Helpers\n// ============================================================================\n\nfunction filterSince(events: readonly AuditEvent[], since: string): readonly AuditEvent[] {\n  const sinceTime = new Date(since).getTime();\n  return events.filter((e) => new Date(e.timestamp).getTime() >= sinceTime);\n}\n\nfunction filterUntil(events: readonly AuditEvent[], until: string): readonly AuditEvent[] {\n  const untilTime = new Date(until).getTime();\n  return events.filter((e) => new Date(e.timestamp).getTime() <= untilTime);\n}\n\nfunction filterByTrustTier(events: readonly AuditEvent[], tier: TrustTier): readonly AuditEvent[] {\n  return events.filter((e) => {\n    if (e.type === 'trust_classification') return e.assignedTier === tier;\n    if (e.type === 'policy_gate') return e.inputTrustTier === tier;\n    if (e.type === 'reputation') return e.effectiveTier === tier;\n    return true;\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Narrow to events carrying the given `actionType` (#3197). Only PolicyGate and\n * Corroboration events have one; all others are excluded.\n */\nfunction filterByActionType(\n  events: readonly AuditEvent[],\n  actionType: AgentActionType\n): readonly AuditEvent[] {\n  return events.filter(\n    (e) => (e.type === 'policy_gate' || e.type === 'corroboration') && e.actionType === actionType\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Narrow to events for the given actor (#3197), matched on `username`. Only\n * Trust-classification and Reputation events carry a username; others are\n * excluded so an actor filter never returns unrelated rows.\n */\nfunction filterByActor(events: readonly AuditEvent[], actor: string): readonly AuditEvent[] {\n  return events.filter(\n    (e) => (e.type === 'trust_classification' || e.type === 'reputation') && e.username === actor\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Narrow to PolicyGate events whose `violationRules` include the given rule\n * name (#3197) — the security post-mortem \"who tripped rule X\" query.\n */\nfunction filterByViolationRule(events: readonly AuditEvent[], rule: string): readonly AuditEvent[] {\n  return events.filter((e) => e.type === 'policy_gate' && e.violationRules.includes(rule));\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Convenience Emitters\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Records a trust classification decision.\n */\nexport function emitTrustEvent(\n  trail: AuditTrail,\n  data: Omit<TrustClassificationEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>\n): string {\n  return trail.append({\n    type: 'trust_classification',\n    component: 'trust-classifier',\n    ...data,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Records a policy gate evaluation.\n */\nexport function emitPolicyEvent(\n  trail: AuditTrail,\n  data: Omit<PolicyGateEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>\n): string {\n  return trail.append({\n    type: 'policy_gate',\n    component: 'policy-gate',\n    ...data,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Records a PIPELINE-policy gate decision (#3710) — the dev-pipeline\n * consensus→execute seam. Distinct from {@link emitPolicyEvent} (the security\n * policy-gate path with an `AgentAction`): this carries `mode`/`ruleIds`/\n * `stageType` so the durable record distinguishes soak(warn) from enforce(block)\n * and is usable by the tune/readiness loop. ONE append per call.\n */\nexport function emitPipelinePolicyEvent(\n  trail: AuditTrail,\n  data: Omit<PolicyGateEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component' | 'actionType'>\n): string {\n  return trail.append({\n    type: 'policy_gate',\n    component: 'pipeline-policy-evaluator',\n    ...data,\n  });\n}\n\n/** The pipeline-policy would-block rate over a window (#3727). */\nexport interface PolicyWouldBlockRate {\n  /** Total pipeline-policy evaluations (the denominator — summary records). */\n  readonly evaluations: number;\n  /** Evaluations that had ≥1 violation (what enforce mode WOULD block). */\n  readonly wouldBlock: number;\n  /** `wouldBlock / evaluations`; 0 when there are no evaluations. */\n  readonly rate: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Compute the pipeline-policy would-block RATE from durable audit events (#3727)\n * — the read-side of the per-evaluation summary records, and the signal the\n * #3769-enforce soak-readiness gate needs. Denominator = per-evaluation SUMMARY\n * records (`recordKind === 'summary'`); numerator = summaries with\n * `violationCount > 0` (the would-block fraction, independent of warn/block mode).\n * Per-violation records (`recordKind === 'violation'`) are intentionally NOT\n * counted — counting them would double-count and break the denominator.\n */\nexport function computePolicyWouldBlockRate(events: readonly AuditEvent[]): PolicyWouldBlockRate {\n  let evaluations = 0;\n  let wouldBlock = 0;\n  for (const e of events) {\n    if (e.type !== 'policy_gate' || e.recordKind !== 'summary') continue;\n    evaluations += 1;\n    if ((e.violationCount ?? 0) > 0) wouldBlock += 1;\n  }\n  return { evaluations, wouldBlock, rate: evaluations > 0 ? wouldBlock / evaluations : 0 };\n}\n\n/**\n * Records a corroboration validation.\n */\nexport function emitCorroborationEvent(\n  trail: AuditTrail,\n  data: Omit<CorroborationEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>\n): string {\n  return trail.append({\n    type: 'corroboration',\n    component: 'corroboration-validator',\n    ...data,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Records a reputation assessment.\n */\nexport function emitReputationEvent(\n  trail: AuditTrail,\n  data: Omit<ReputationEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>\n): string {\n  return trail.append({\n    type: 'reputation',\n    component: 'reputation-model',\n    ...data,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Records an input sanitization result.\n */\nexport function emitSanitizationEvent(\n  trail: AuditTrail,\n  data: Omit<SanitizationEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>\n): string {\n  return trail.append({\n    type: 'sanitization',\n    component: 'input-sanitizer',\n    ...data,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Records a graph execution lifecycle event.\n */\nexport function emitGraphExecutionEvent(\n  trail: AuditTrail,\n  data: Omit<GraphExecutionAuditEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>\n): string {\n  return trail.append({\n    type: 'graph_execution',\n    component: 'graph-executor',\n    ...data,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Records a ClawGuard AUDIT-mode violation (#4097) — a policy-violating tool\n * call that was log-and-allowed because the policy is in `audit` mode. ONE\n * append per call; mirrors to the durable sink when the trail is wired.\n */\nexport function emitClawGuardViolation(\n  trail: AuditTrail,\n  data: Omit<ClawGuardViolationEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>\n): string {\n  return trail.append({\n    type: 'clawguard_violation',\n    component: 'clawguard-audit',\n    ...data,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates an onEvent callback that bridges graph events to the audit trail.\n * Pass the returned function as `onEvent` in GraphExecuteOptions.\n *\n * @example\n * const trail = createAuditTrail();\n * await executeGraph(graph, inputs, { onEvent: createGraphAuditBridge(trail) });\n */\nexport function createGraphAuditBridge(\n  trail: AuditTrail\n): (event: { readonly type: string; readonly [key: string]: unknown }) => void {\n  return (event) => {\n    const nodeId = typeof event['nodeId'] === 'string' ? event['nodeId'] : undefined;\n    const stepNumber = typeof event['stepNumber'] === 'number' ? event['stepNumber'] : 0;\n    emitGraphExecutionEvent(trail, {\n      graphEvent: event.type,\n      ...(nodeId !== undefined ? { nodeId } : {}),\n      stepNumber,\n      detail: formatGraphEventDetail(event),\n    });\n  };\n}\n\n/** Formats a brief detail string from a graph event. */\nfunction formatGraphEventDetail(event: {\n  readonly type: string;\n  readonly [key: string]: unknown;\n}): string {\n  switch (event.type) {\n    case 'node_started':\n      return `Node ${String(event['nodeId'])} starting`;\n    case 'node_completed':\n      return `Node ${String(event['nodeId'])} completed in ${String(event['durationMs'])}ms`;\n    case 'node_error':\n      return `Node ${String(event['nodeId'])} failed: ${String(event['error'])}`;\n    case 'state_updated':\n      return `State updated: ${String(event['updatedKeys'])}`;\n    case 'step_completed':\n      return `Step ${String(event['stepNumber'])}: ${String(event['nodesExecuted'])} nodes`;\n    case 'execution_complete':\n      return `Complete: ${String(event['totalSteps'])} steps, ${String(event['durationMs'])}ms`;\n    default:\n      return event.type;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a new AuditTrail instance. Pass a {@link DurableAuditSink} (e.g. from\n * `createDurableAuditSink(auditLogger)`) to mirror appended security decisions\n * to a durable, hash-chained store (#3291). 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package/dist/{chunk-7J7UYJXC.js → chunk-4GSFZS6M.js}

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 import {
   resolveCliSlot
-} from "./chunk-TZWJ7QLW.js";
+} from "./chunk-HQ2A4DGU.js";
 import {
   createLogger,
   getTimeProvider,
   isRateLimitText
-} from "./chunk-ERL3XHQO.js";
+} from "./chunk-AOBIUJX5.js";
 
 // src/pipeline/expert-bridge.ts
 function resolveCliFromModelString(model) {
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ async function getMcpConfigPath() {
   if (cachedMcpConfigPath !== null) return cachedMcpConfigPath;
   mcpConfigInitPromise ??= (async () => {
     try {
-      const { generateMcpConfig } = await import("./child-mcp-config-N4HLLCEH.js");
+      const { generateMcpConfig } = await import("./child-mcp-config-QFPSL7Y2.js");
       const config = await generateMcpConfig();
       cachedMcpConfigPath = config.configPath;
       cachedMcpConfigCleanup = config.cleanup;
@@ -93,8 +93,8 @@ var routerInitPromise = null;
 async function getRouter() {
   if (cachedRouter !== null) return cachedRouter;
   routerInitPromise ??= (async () => {
-    const { createAllAdapters } = await import("./factory-ROTP63IZ.js");
-    const { createCompositeRouter } = await import("./composite-router-VAVDLJGT.js");
+    const { createAllAdapters } = await import("./factory-73WKMDVR.js");
+    const { createCompositeRouter } = await import("./composite-router-NG7BLVVR.js");
     const adapters = createAllAdapters();
     if (adapters.size === 0) {
       routerInitPromise = null;
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ async function getRouter() {
     }
     cachedRouter = adaptCompositeRouter(createCompositeRouter(adapters));
     try {
-      const { createCliCircuitBreakerIntegration } = await import("./cli-circuit-breaker-AAHYLFXZ.js");
+      const { createCliCircuitBreakerIntegration } = await import("./cli-circuit-breaker-BOZNYIZE.js");
       cachedCircuitBreaker = createCliCircuitBreakerIntegration([...adapters.values()]);
     } catch (error) {
       const msg = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
@@ -213,4 +213,4 @@ export {
   tokenSplitFromUsage,
   executeExpert
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-7J7UYJXC.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-4GSFZS6M.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-ERL3XHQO.js → chunk-AOBIUJX5.js}

@@ -2653,7 +2653,7 @@ function setDefaultRegistry(registry) {
 }
 async function reloadDefaultRegistry() {
   globalRegistry = buildDefaultRegistry();
-  const { resetGlobalRegistry } = await import("./unified-registry-NJS4ZWC3.js");
+  const { resetGlobalRegistry } = await import("./unified-registry-5YUSIEML.js");
   resetGlobalRegistry();
   return globalRegistry;
 }
@@ -15373,7 +15373,7 @@ var CompositeRouter = class _CompositeRouter {
    */
   async consultUnifiedContext(task) {
     try {
-      const { getContextForTask, inferTaskCategory } = await import("./context-retriever-MYKBBDAN.js");
+      const { getContextForTask, inferTaskCategory } = await import("./context-retriever-QKMSSV6W.js");
       const ctx = await getContextForTask({
         task: task.content,
         category: inferTaskCategory(task.content),
@@ -17024,4 +17024,4 @@ export {
   AgentCapability,
   OrchestratorError
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ERL3XHQO.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-AOBIUJX5.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-276GRITW.js → chunk-BTPPGHG3.js}

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 import {
   createAutoAdapter
-} from "./chunk-7QQ5F7T5.js";
+} from "./chunk-OJSG734P.js";
 import {
   getDefaultCliCircuitBreakerRegistry,
   mapModelErrorToCategory
-} from "./chunk-VADACTVB.js";
+} from "./chunk-2RZWKIDU.js";
 import {
   CLI_NAMES,
   CircularBuffer,
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ import {
   recordRateLimitEvent,
   resolveModelIdentitySync,
   toRateLimitError
-} from "./chunk-ERL3XHQO.js";
+} from "./chunk-AOBIUJX5.js";
 
 // src/config/model-equivalence.ts
 function canonicalModelKey(modelId) {
@@ -904,4 +904,4 @@ export {
   getGlobalRegistry,
   resetGlobalRegistry
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-276GRITW.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-BTPPGHG3.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-II5NJRKH.js → chunk-CMQO6WEQ.js}

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import {
   createLogger,
   err,
   ok
-} from "./chunk-ERL3XHQO.js";
+} from "./chunk-AOBIUJX5.js";
 
 // src/scm/token-resolver.ts
 import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
@@ -87,4 +87,4 @@ export {
   hasToken,
   getTokenEnvVars
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-II5NJRKH.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-CMQO6WEQ.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-WXU4Y5T3.js → chunk-D3TZZO6L.js}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   getRandomProvider,
   getTimeProvider
-} from "./chunk-ERL3XHQO.js";
+} from "./chunk-AOBIUJX5.js";
 
 // src/utils/id-utils.ts
 import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
@@ -24,4 +24,4 @@ export {
   generateHyphenId,
   generateUUID
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-WXU4Y5T3.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-D3TZZO6L.js.map

package/dist/chunk-DJFYMDMD.js

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+// src/version.ts
+var VERSION = true ? "8.9.1" : "dev";
+
+export {
+  VERSION
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-DJFYMDMD.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-K2PVLCHR.js → chunk-DLVIES6W.js}

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import {
   getErrorMessage,
   getTimeProvider,
   ok
-} from "./chunk-ERL3XHQO.js";
+} from "./chunk-AOBIUJX5.js";
 
 // src/context/session-memory.ts
 import * as fs from "node:fs";
@@ -366,4 +366,4 @@ export {
   SessionMemory,
   createSessionMemory
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-K2PVLCHR.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-DLVIES6W.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-3XQK4MEF.js → chunk-FDZ3SLMV.js}

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import {
   ValidationError,
   createLogger,
   formatZodError
-} from "./chunk-ERL3XHQO.js";
+} from "./chunk-AOBIUJX5.js";
 
 // src/security/ast-rule-runner.ts
 import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
@@ -241,4 +241,4 @@ export {
   collectAstQaFindings,
   runAstQaRules
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-3XQK4MEF.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-FDZ3SLMV.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-W6SM3MU5.js → chunk-FMKEGR6N.js}

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import {
   toolStructuredError,
   toolSuccessStructured,
   wrapToolWithTimeout
-} from "./chunk-YQUM3UWK.js";
+} from "./chunk-P2DV7PDG.js";
 import {
   JsonlStore,
   SECURITY_KEYWORDS,
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ import {
   getTimeProvider,
   isDeclaredNeverDeprecate,
   isRegisteredToolName
-} from "./chunk-ERL3XHQO.js";
+} from "./chunk-AOBIUJX5.js";
 import {
   getNexusDataDir,
   nexusDataPath
@@ -2159,4 +2159,4 @@ export {
   runImprovementReview,
   registerImprovementReviewTool
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-W6SM3MU5.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-FMKEGR6N.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-F2GERNMF.js → chunk-FOYSPWOA.js}

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import {
   createLogger,
   err,
   ok
-} from "./chunk-ERL3XHQO.js";
+} from "./chunk-AOBIUJX5.js";
 
 // src/adapters/sdk/types.ts
 var PROVIDER_ENV_KEYS = {
@@ -260,4 +260,4 @@ export {
   validateCustomApiBaseUrl,
   assertCustomApiHostResolvesPublic
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-F2GERNMF.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-FOYSPWOA.js.map