nexus-agents 8.10.1 → 8.12.0

package/dist/{chunk-OM3GLZ46.js → chunk-43CSXUDA.js}

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ import {
 import {
   DEFAULT_TASK_TTL_MS,
   clampTaskTtl
-} from "./chunk-YBLUDGIJ.js";
+} from "./chunk-TURKS6GI.js";
 import {
   executeExpert
 } from "./chunk-2D3BRT4W.js";
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ import {
   simulationDeniedResult,
   toJobSummary,
   writeJobCancelled
-} from "./chunk-2QWCNKYU.js";
+} from "./chunk-RO5PBERK.js";
 import {
   allOf
 } from "./chunk-OQB3XC5O.js";
@@ -60,14 +60,14 @@ import {
   IssueTriage,
   createDurableAuditSink,
   createDurableAuditTrail
-} from "./chunk-QBJONGQ4.js";
+} from "./chunk-YG7CNXSA.js";
 import {
   resolveEnvMode,
   sanitizeInput
-} from "./chunk-FLMLZN3P.js";
+} from "./chunk-PIMUNS74.js";
 import {
   withPrerequisite
-} from "./chunk-F3DSWFCL.js";
+} from "./chunk-IWGOQT2U.js";
 import {
   NOOP_NOTIFIER,
   RateLimiter,
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ import {
   withAuditTrail,
   withProgressHeartbeat,
   wrapToolWithTimeout
-} from "./chunk-ZWJR474P.js";
+} from "./chunk-VEWMQCWS.js";
 import {
   createAuditTrail,
   createGraphAuditBridge,
@@ -45451,7 +45451,7 @@ async function tryIssueTriage(task) {
   try {
     const issueMatch = task.match(/github\.com\/([^/]+\/[^/]+)\/issues\/(\d+)/);
     if (issueMatch === null) return null;
-    const { createIssueTriage } = await import("./issue-triage-TVCFBJEX.js");
+    const { createIssueTriage } = await import("./issue-triage-AHYTWMTZ.js");
     const triage = createIssueTriage();
     const owner = issueMatch[1] ?? "";
     const num = issueMatch[2] ?? "";
@@ -47395,7 +47395,7 @@ ${contextBlock}`;
       const strategy = config.votingStrategy ?? "higher_order";
       await postProgress(config, "Vote", `Running consensus with ${strategy} strategy...`);
       try {
-        const { executeVoting } = await import("./consensus-vote-QRTR3S4E.js");
+        const { executeVoting } = await import("./consensus-vote-QRF2VFTE.js");
         const votingResult = await executeVoting(
           {
             proposal: buildVoteProposal(plan, research),
@@ -56054,4 +56054,4 @@ export {
   shutdownFeedbackSubscriber,
   createEventBusBridge
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-OM3GLZ46.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-43CSXUDA.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-F3DSWFCL.js → chunk-IWGOQT2U.js}

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import {
   toolStructuredError,
   toolSuccessStructured,
   wrapToolWithTimeout
-} from "./chunk-ZWJR474P.js";
+} from "./chunk-VEWMQCWS.js";
 import {
   JsonlStore,
   SECURITY_KEYWORDS,
@@ -2159,4 +2159,4 @@ export {
   runImprovementReview,
   registerImprovementReviewTool
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-F3DSWFCL.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-IWGOQT2U.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-5LN24JCO.js → chunk-L5VUMXDA.js}

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import {
 import {
   assessReputation,
   sanitizeInput
-} from "./chunk-FLMLZN3P.js";
+} from "./chunk-PIMUNS74.js";
 import {
   createLogger,
   err,
@@ -305,4 +305,4 @@ export {
   createFailedReview,
   reviewPostingBlock
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-5LN24JCO.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-L5VUMXDA.js.map

package/dist/chunk-N4ZVNOYN.js

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+// src/version.ts
+var VERSION = true ? "8.12.0" : "dev";
+
+export {
+  VERSION
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-N4ZVNOYN.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-FLMLZN3P.js → chunk-PIMUNS74.js}

@@ -54,8 +54,21 @@ var SanitizedInputSchema = z.object({
   content: z.string(),
   /** Original content before sanitization (for audit). */
   originalLength: z.number().int().nonnegative(),
-  /** Assigned trust tier based on user role and content analysis. */
+  /**
+   * Assigned trust tier based on user role and content analysis.
+   *
+   * Deprecation note: required today; a future major makes it absent when
+   * unmeasured (see the next-major issue named in the changeset).
+   */
   trustTier: TrustTierSchema,
+  /**
+   * True when `trustTier` is the sanitizer's measured content tier; false when
+   * the sanitization stage was disabled and `trustTier` is only the
+   * role-derived base tier. Absent on records that predate this field; an
+   * absent value MUST be treated as measured so legacy content downgrades are
+   * preserved fail-closed.
+   */
+  contentTierMeasured: z.boolean().optional(),
   /** GitHub user role of the input source. */
   userRole: GitHubUserRoleSchema,
   /** Injection patterns detected in content. */
@@ -292,6 +305,7 @@ function sanitizeInput(content, userRole, username, config) {
       content: comments.cleaned,
       originalLength: content.length,
       trustTier,
+      contentTierMeasured: true,
       userRole,
       injectionFlags,
       strippedElements: allStripped,
@@ -308,6 +322,7 @@ function buildFailClosedResult(err, originalContent, truncated, userRole, allowl
     content: "",
     originalLength: originalContent.length,
     trustTier: allowlisted ? "1" : "4",
+    contentTierMeasured: true,
     userRole,
     injectionFlags: [],
     strippedElements: [
@@ -565,4 +580,4 @@ export {
   resolveReputationGatingMode,
   gateWithReputation
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-FLMLZN3P.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-PIMUNS74.js.map

package/dist/chunk-PIMUNS74.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/security/trust-types.ts","../src/security/input-sanitizer.ts","../src/security/reputation-model.ts","../src/security/env-mode.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * nexus-agents/security - Trust Types\n *\n * Zod schemas and TypeScript types for the untrusted input hardening\n * framework. Defines trust tiers, sanitized input, user roles, and\n * injection detection flags.\n *\n * @module security/trust-types\n * (Source: Issue #818, #819 — Phase 1: Input Sanitization)\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Trust Tiers\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Trust tier classification for input sources.\n * Lower number = higher trust.\n *\n * 1 = Authoritative (repo files, CI, CLAUDE.md, allowlisted maintainers)\n * 2 = Semi-trusted (collaborator issue body, contributor PR metadata)\n * 3 = Untrusted (unknown user comments, non-collaborator issue body)\n * 4 = Hostile (injection patterns, hidden HTML, instruction-like content)\n */\nexport const TrustTierSchema = z.enum(['1', '2', '3', '4']);\nexport type TrustTier = z.infer<typeof TrustTierSchema>;\n\n/** Numeric trust tier for comparisons. Higher number = lower trust. */\nexport const TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC: Record<TrustTier, number> = {\n  '1': 1,\n  '2': 2,\n  '3': 3,\n  '4': 4,\n};\n\n// ============================================================================\n// GitHub User Roles\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * GitHub user relationship to the repository.\n */\nexport const GitHubUserRoleSchema = z.enum([\n  'owner',\n  'maintainer',\n  'collaborator',\n  'contributor',\n  'member',\n  'unknown',\n]);\nexport type GitHubUserRole = z.infer<typeof GitHubUserRoleSchema>;\n\n/**\n * Default trust tier mapping for each GitHub role.\n * Can be overridden by injection pattern detection (downgrade only).\n */\nexport const ROLE_DEFAULT_TRUST: Record<GitHubUserRole, TrustTier> = {\n  owner: '1',\n  maintainer: '1',\n  collaborator: '2',\n  contributor: '2',\n  member: '3',\n  unknown: '3',\n};\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Injection Detection\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Categories of injection patterns detected in content.\n */\nexport const InjectionFlagSchema = z.enum([\n  'authority_claim',\n  'instruction_pattern',\n  'system_prompt_manipulation',\n  'hidden_content',\n  'urgency_manipulation',\n  'fake_conversation',\n  'base64_encoded',\n  'external_link_instruction',\n]);\nexport type InjectionFlag = z.infer<typeof InjectionFlagSchema>;\n\n/**\n * An element stripped during sanitization, preserved for audit trail.\n */\nexport const StrippedElementSchema = z.object({\n  /** Type of element stripped. */\n  tag: z.string().min(1),\n  /** Reason for stripping. */\n  reason: z.string().min(1),\n  /** Start index in original content. */\n  startIndex: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n  /** Length of stripped content. */\n  length: z.number().int().positive(),\n});\nexport type StrippedElement = z.infer<typeof StrippedElementSchema>;\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Sanitized Input\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * The result of sanitizing untrusted input.\n * Contains cleaned content, trust classification, and audit data.\n */\nexport const SanitizedInputSchema = z.object({\n  /** Sanitized content with dangerous elements removed. */\n  content: z.string(),\n  /** Original content before sanitization (for audit). */\n  originalLength: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n  /**\n   * Assigned trust tier based on user role and content analysis.\n   *\n   * Deprecation note: required today; a future major makes it absent when\n   * unmeasured (see the next-major issue named in the changeset).\n   */\n  trustTier: TrustTierSchema,\n  /**\n   * True when `trustTier` is the sanitizer's measured content tier; false when\n   * the sanitization stage was disabled and `trustTier` is only the\n   * role-derived base tier. Absent on records that predate this field; an\n   * absent value MUST be treated as measured so legacy content downgrades are\n   * preserved fail-closed.\n   */\n  contentTierMeasured: z.boolean().optional(),\n  /** GitHub user role of the input source. */\n  userRole: GitHubUserRoleSchema,\n  /** Injection patterns detected in content. */\n  injectionFlags: z.array(InjectionFlagSchema),\n  /** Elements stripped during sanitization (audit trail). */\n  strippedElements: z.array(StrippedElementSchema),\n  /** Whether any dangerous content was detected and stripped. */\n  wasModified: z.boolean(),\n  /** Timestamp of sanitization (ISO 8601). */\n  sanitizedAt: z.iso.datetime(),\n});\nexport type SanitizedInput = z.infer<typeof SanitizedInputSchema>;\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Configuration\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Configuration for the input sanitizer.\n */\nexport const SanitizerConfigSchema = z.object({\n  /** GitHub usernames that are always Tier 1 (allowlisted maintainers). */\n  allowlistedMaintainers: z.array(z.string().min(1)).default([]),\n  /** Whether to fail open (log only) or fail closed (block). Phase 1 = open. */\n  failOpen: z.boolean().default(true),\n  /** Maximum input length before truncation. */\n  maxInputLength: z.number().int().positive().default(50_000),\n});\nexport type SanitizerConfig = z.infer<typeof SanitizerConfigSchema>;\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/security - Input Sanitizer\n *\n * Sanitizes untrusted GitHub input by stripping dangerous HTML/XML tags,\n * detecting injection patterns, and producing a SanitizedInput result\n * with full audit trail.\n *\n * Defense layer 1 of the three-layer hardening architecture.\n * See: docs/architecture/UNTRUSTED_INPUT_HARDENING.md\n *\n * @module security/input-sanitizer\n * (Source: Issue #818, #819 — Phase 1: Input Sanitization)\n */\n\nimport type {\n  InjectionFlag,\n  SanitizedInput,\n  SanitizerConfig,\n  StrippedElement,\n  TrustTier,\n  GitHubUserRole,\n} from './trust-types.js';\nimport { ROLE_DEFAULT_TRUST, SanitizerConfigSchema } from './trust-types.js';\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Dangerous HTML Patterns (Trail of Bits / GitHub Copilot vectors)\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * HTML tags to strip. These are known injection vectors:\n * - `<picture>` / `<source>`: Trail of Bits GitHub Copilot injection\n * - `<img>`: Can carry injection via alt text or onerror\n */\nconst DANGEROUS_HTML_PATTERN =\n  /<(picture|source|img)\\b[^>]*>[\\s\\S]*?<\\/\\1>|<(picture|source|img)\\b[^>]*\\/?>/gi;\n\n// ============================================================================\n// XML-like Tags (Conversation History Injection)\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * XML-like tags that mimic conversation structure or system prompts.\n */\nconst XML_INJECTION_PATTERN =\n  /<\\/?(system|human|assistant|instructions|user|prompt|context|tool_use|tool_result)\\b[^>]*>/gi;\n\n// ============================================================================\n// HTML Comments with Instructions\n// ============================================================================\n\nconst HTML_COMMENT_PATTERN = /<!--[\\s\\S]*?-->/g;\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Injection Pattern Detectors\n// ============================================================================\n\ninterface PatternMatch {\n  flag: InjectionFlag;\n  pattern: RegExp;\n}\n\nconst INJECTION_PATTERNS: readonly PatternMatch[] = [\n  {\n    flag: 'authority_claim',\n    pattern: /\\b(as (?:a|the) (?:maintainer|admin|owner|security lead|repo owner|developer))\\b/i,\n  },\n  {\n    flag: 'authority_claim',\n    pattern: /\\b(i(?:'m| am) the (?:repo |project )?(?:owner|maintainer|admin))\\b/i,\n  },\n  {\n    flag: 'instruction_pattern',\n    pattern: /\\b(please (?:close|merge|label|mark|apply|delete|remove|approve|reject))\\b/i,\n  },\n  {\n    flag: 'instruction_pattern',\n    pattern: /\\b(you (?:should|must|need to) (?:close|merge|label|apply|delete))\\b/i,\n  },\n  {\n    flag: 'system_prompt_manipulation',\n    pattern: /\\b(ignore (?:all )?previous (?:instructions|rules|prompts))\\b/i,\n  },\n  {\n    flag: 'system_prompt_manipulation',\n    pattern: /\\b(forget (?:your |all )?(?:instructions|rules|safety))\\b/i,\n  },\n  {\n    flag: 'system_prompt_manipulation',\n    pattern: /\\b(new (?:instructions|rules|system prompt|directives))\\b/i,\n  },\n  {\n    flag: 'urgency_manipulation',\n    pattern: /\\b(critical|emergency|urgent|must act now|immediately|time[- ]?sensitive)\\b/i,\n  },\n  {\n    flag: 'fake_conversation',\n    pattern: /<(?:assistant|human|user|system)>/i,\n  },\n  // base64_encoded is detected separately by `looksLikeBase64Payload` below.\n  // The lookahead-based regex it replaced exhibited catastrophic backtracking\n  // on long hex-only inputs (#2191) — see `looksLikeBase64Payload` for the\n  // two-phase rewrite that preserves the #1811 SHA-hash false-positive guard.\n  {\n    flag: 'external_link_instruction',\n    pattern: /(?:apply|run|execute|install)\\s+(?:this\\s+)?(?:from\\s+)?https?:\\/\\//i,\n  },\n];\n\n/**\n * Two-phase base64-payload detection (#2191).\n *\n * The original `(?=[A-Za-z0-9+/]*[g-zG-Z+/=])[A-Za-z0-9+/]{40,}={0,2}` regex\n * was vulnerable to catastrophic backtracking — V8 took ~1.8s on a 50K\n * hex-only adversarial input. Splitting the check into two non-overlapping\n * phases removes the lookahead and makes the worst case linear.\n *\n *   Phase 1: find a 40+ run of base64-alphabet chars (no lookahead).\n *   Phase 2: confirm the matched substring contains a base64-discriminating\n *            char (g-z, G-Z, +, /, =) so SHA-1 / SHA-256 hex hashes don't\n *            false-positive (preserves #1811 behavior).\n *\n * Same detection coverage as the original; same false-positive resistance.\n */\nconst BASE64_RUN_GLOBAL = /[A-Za-z0-9+/]{40,}={0,2}/g;\nconst BASE64_DISCRIMINATOR = /[g-zG-Z+/=]/;\n\nfunction looksLikeBase64Payload(content: string): boolean {\n  // Iterate every 40+ base64-alphabet run rather than just the first one,\n  // so a long hex-only prefix doesn't mask a real base64 payload that\n  // appears later in the content.\n  for (const match of content.matchAll(BASE64_RUN_GLOBAL)) {\n    if (BASE64_DISCRIMINATOR.test(match[0])) return true;\n  }\n  return false;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// HTML Entity Decoding (evasion defense)\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Dangerous-tag names we will still match after entity decoding.\n * Kept in sync with DANGEROUS_HTML_PATTERN and XML_INJECTION_PATTERN above.\n */\nconst DANGEROUS_TAG_NAMES =\n  'picture|source|img|system|human|assistant|instructions|user|prompt|context|tool_use|tool_result';\n\n/**\n * Detects whether the input contains entity-encoded forms of any dangerous\n * tag (&lt;picture, &#60;system, &#x3c;img …). Used as a cheap pre-check so\n * that benign content with legitimate entities (e.g. \"AT&amp;T\") is passed\n * through untouched and wasModified stays false.\n */\nconst ENCODED_DANGEROUS_TAG_PATTERN = new RegExp(\n  `&(?:lt|#0*60|#x0*3c);\\\\s*\\\\/?\\\\s*(?:${DANGEROUS_TAG_NAMES})\\\\b`,\n  'i'\n);\n\n/** Decodes the subset of HTML entities that can reconstruct tag syntax. */\nfunction decodeEntities(content: string): string {\n  return (\n    content\n      // Numeric (decimal) references\n      .replace(/&#(\\d+);/g, (_match, dec: string) => {\n        const code = Number.parseInt(dec, 10);\n        return Number.isFinite(code) ? String.fromCodePoint(code) : _match;\n      })\n      // Numeric (hex) references\n      .replace(/&#x([0-9a-f]+);/gi, (_match, hex: string) => {\n        const code = Number.parseInt(hex, 16);\n        return Number.isFinite(code) ? String.fromCodePoint(code) : _match;\n      })\n      // Named entities most relevant to tag reconstruction\n      .replace(/&lt;/gi, '<')\n      .replace(/&gt;/gi, '>')\n      .replace(/&quot;/gi, '\"')\n      .replace(/&apos;/gi, \"'\")\n      // &amp; must be decoded last so that &amp;lt; does not resurface as <\n      .replace(/&amp;/gi, '&')\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Runs decodeEntities only if the input contains an entity-encoded dangerous\n * tag. This keeps benign content with legitimate entities untouched.\n */\nfunction applyEntityEvasionDefense(content: string): {\n  cleaned: string;\n  stripped: StrippedElement[];\n} {\n  if (!ENCODED_DANGEROUS_TAG_PATTERN.test(content)) {\n    return { cleaned: content, stripped: [] };\n  }\n  const decoded = decodeEntities(content);\n  return {\n    cleaned: decoded,\n    stripped: [\n      {\n        tag: '&…;',\n        reason: 'HTML entity-encoded dangerous tag decoded for stripping (CWE-79)',\n        startIndex: 0,\n        length: content.length,\n      },\n    ],\n  };\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Core Sanitization Functions\n// ============================================================================\n\n/** Strips dangerous HTML tags and records what was removed.\n * Loops until stable to prevent reconstructed patterns after removal (#1496). */\nfunction stripDangerousHtml(content: string): {\n  cleaned: string;\n  stripped: StrippedElement[];\n} {\n  const stripped: StrippedElement[] = [];\n  let cleaned = content;\n  const MAX_PASSES = 5;\n  for (let pass = 0; pass < MAX_PASSES; pass++) {\n    DANGEROUS_HTML_PATTERN.lastIndex = 0;\n    if (!DANGEROUS_HTML_PATTERN.test(cleaned)) break;\n    cleaned = cleaned.replace(DANGEROUS_HTML_PATTERN, (match, _g1, _g2, offset: number) => {\n      stripped.push({\n        tag: match.slice(0, 30) + (match.length > 30 ? '...' : ''),\n        reason: 'Dangerous HTML tag (Trail of Bits injection vector)',\n        startIndex: offset,\n        length: match.length,\n      });\n      return '';\n    });\n  }\n  return { cleaned, stripped };\n}\n\n/** Strips XML-like tags that mimic conversation structure.\n * Loops until stable to prevent reconstructed patterns after removal (#1496). */\nfunction stripXmlTags(content: string): {\n  cleaned: string;\n  stripped: StrippedElement[];\n} {\n  const stripped: StrippedElement[] = [];\n  let cleaned = content;\n  const MAX_PASSES = 5;\n  for (let pass = 0; pass < MAX_PASSES; pass++) {\n    XML_INJECTION_PATTERN.lastIndex = 0;\n    if (!XML_INJECTION_PATTERN.test(cleaned)) break;\n    cleaned = cleaned.replace(XML_INJECTION_PATTERN, (match, _g1, offset: number) => {\n      stripped.push({\n        tag: match,\n        reason: 'XML-like conversation injection tag',\n        startIndex: offset,\n        length: match.length,\n      });\n      return '';\n    });\n  }\n  return { cleaned, stripped };\n}\n\n/** Strips HTML comments that may contain hidden instructions.\n * Loops until stable to prevent reconstructed comment patterns (#1496). */\nfunction stripHtmlComments(content: string): {\n  cleaned: string;\n  stripped: StrippedElement[];\n} {\n  const stripped: StrippedElement[] = [];\n  let cleaned = content;\n  // Loop until stable: stripping may reveal new instruction-bearing comments\n  const MAX_PASSES = 5;\n  for (let pass = 0; pass < MAX_PASSES; pass++) {\n    HTML_COMMENT_PATTERN.lastIndex = 0;\n    const prevLength = cleaned.length;\n    cleaned = cleaned.replace(HTML_COMMENT_PATTERN, (match, offset: number) => {\n      const hasInstruction = /\\b(ignore|execute|close|merge|delete|apply)\\b/i.test(match);\n      if (!hasInstruction) return match;\n\n      stripped.push({\n        tag: '<!-- ... -->',\n        reason: 'HTML comment with instruction-like content',\n        startIndex: offset,\n        length: match.length,\n      });\n      return '';\n    });\n    if (cleaned.length === prevLength) break;\n  }\n  // Second pass: strip unclosed <!-- tags (incomplete comment injection)\n  let searchFrom = 0;\n  while (searchFrom < cleaned.length) {\n    const openIdx = cleaned.indexOf('<!--', searchFrom);\n    if (openIdx === -1) break;\n    const closeIdx = cleaned.indexOf('-->', openIdx + 4);\n    if (closeIdx === -1) {\n      stripped.push({\n        tag: '<!--',\n        reason: 'Unclosed HTML comment (potential injection vector)',\n        startIndex: openIdx,\n        length: cleaned.length - openIdx,\n      });\n      cleaned = cleaned.slice(0, openIdx);\n      break;\n    }\n    searchFrom = closeIdx + 3;\n  }\n  return { cleaned, stripped };\n}\n\n/** Detects injection patterns in content without modifying it. */\nfunction detectInjectionPatterns(content: string): InjectionFlag[] {\n  const flags = new Set<InjectionFlag>();\n  for (const { flag, pattern } of INJECTION_PATTERNS) {\n    // Reset lastIndex for global patterns\n    pattern.lastIndex = 0;\n    if (pattern.test(content)) {\n      flags.add(flag);\n    }\n  }\n  if (looksLikeBase64Payload(content)) {\n    flags.add('base64_encoded');\n  }\n  return Array.from(flags);\n}\n\n/** Lower-cases an arbitrary role literal and maps it to a known role. */\nfunction normalizeRole(userRole: string): GitHubUserRole {\n  const lower = userRole.toLowerCase();\n  if (lower in ROLE_DEFAULT_TRUST) return lower as GitHubUserRole;\n  return 'unknown';\n}\n\n/**\n * Assigns trust tier based on user role and injection analysis.\n * Injection patterns can only DOWNGRADE trust, never upgrade.\n */\nfunction assignTrustTier(\n  userRole: GitHubUserRole,\n  injectionFlags: readonly InjectionFlag[],\n  allowlisted: boolean\n): TrustTier {\n  if (allowlisted) return '1';\n\n  // Defensive lowercase — the type says GitHubUserRole, but callers\n  // sometimes cast an unnormalized GitHub author_association literal\n  // (e.g. 'OWNER', 'MEMBER') directly. Normalize here so the maintainer\n  // exemption below matches regardless of case (CWE-178).\n  const normalizedRole = normalizeRole(userRole);\n  const baseTier = ROLE_DEFAULT_TRUST[normalizedRole];\n\n  // Content with injection patterns is downgraded to Tier 4 (hostile)\n  const hostileFlags: InjectionFlag[] = ['system_prompt_manipulation', 'fake_conversation'];\n  if (injectionFlags.some((f) => hostileFlags.includes(f))) return '4';\n\n  // Content with authority claims from non-maintainers is suspicious\n  if (\n    injectionFlags.includes('authority_claim') &&\n    normalizedRole !== 'owner' &&\n    normalizedRole !== 'maintainer'\n  ) {\n    return '4';\n  }\n\n  return baseTier;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Public API\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Sanitizes untrusted GitHub input through the full Layer 1 pipeline:\n * 1. HTML stripping (picture/source/img tags)\n * 2. XML tag stripping (system/human/assistant)\n * 3. HTML comment stripping (instruction-bearing comments only)\n * 4. Injection pattern detection\n * 5. Trust tier assignment\n *\n * ⚠ **Use HostileInputFirewall.process() in agent code paths.** Calling\n * sanitizeInput() directly only runs Layer 1 — it does not evaluate the\n * Rule of Two and does not emit audit-trail events. An agent that processes\n * untrusted input while holding both write access and secrets violates the\n * Rule of Two; `evaluatePolicy` in policy-gate.ts enforces that per action,\n * and the firewall evaluates it per input as a signal (refusing only under\n * `NEXUS_FIREWALL_POLICY=enforce`). The live paths route their trust\n * decision through the firewall as of #4992 and keep direct sanitizeInput()\n * calls only for content cleaning of text they embed. Direct use of this\n * function is appropriate for unit tests and pure content analysis, not\n * for agent decision paths.\n *\n * @see packages/nexus-agents/src/security/firewall/firewall-pipeline.ts\n * @see packages/nexus-agents/src/security/policy-gate.ts\n * @param content - Raw untrusted content from GitHub\n * @param userRole - GitHub user's relationship to the repository\n * @param username - GitHub username (for allowlist check)\n * @param config - Optional sanitizer configuration\n * @returns SanitizedInput with cleaned content and audit data\n */\nexport function sanitizeInput(\n  content: string,\n  userRole: GitHubUserRole,\n  username: string,\n  config?: Partial<SanitizerConfig>\n): SanitizedInput {\n  const cfg = SanitizerConfigSchema.parse(config ?? {});\n  const truncated = content.slice(0, cfg.maxInputLength);\n  const allowlisted = cfg.allowlistedMaintainers.includes(username);\n\n  try {\n    // Pipeline: decode entity-encoded dangerous tags, then strip dangerous content\n    const entityDecoded = applyEntityEvasionDefense(truncated);\n    const html = stripDangerousHtml(entityDecoded.cleaned);\n    const xml = stripXmlTags(html.cleaned);\n    const comments = stripHtmlComments(xml.cleaned);\n    const allStripped = [\n      ...entityDecoded.stripped,\n      ...html.stripped,\n      ...xml.stripped,\n      ...comments.stripped,\n    ];\n\n    // Detect injection patterns on ORIGINAL content (before stripping)\n    const injectionFlags = detectInjectionPatterns(truncated);\n\n    // Assign trust tier\n    const trustTier = assignTrustTier(userRole, injectionFlags, allowlisted);\n\n    return {\n      content: comments.cleaned,\n      originalLength: content.length,\n      trustTier,\n      contentTierMeasured: true,\n      userRole,\n      injectionFlags,\n      strippedElements: allStripped,\n      wasModified: allStripped.length > 0,\n      sanitizedAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n    };\n  } catch (err: unknown) {\n    return buildFailClosedResult(err, content, truncated, userRole, allowlisted);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Fail-closed result returned when the sanitizer pipeline throws.\n * Returns empty content at Tier-4 (or Tier-1 for allowlisted maintainers,\n * since their bypass is not regex-dependent) so downstream consumers\n * cannot act on untrusted content we could not validate.\n * CLAUDE.md: \"Fail closed on ambiguity.\"\n */\nfunction buildFailClosedResult(\n  err: unknown,\n  originalContent: string,\n  truncated: string,\n  userRole: GitHubUserRole,\n  allowlisted: boolean\n): SanitizedInput {\n  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n  return {\n    content: '',\n    originalLength: originalContent.length,\n    trustTier: allowlisted ? '1' : '4',\n    contentTierMeasured: true,\n    userRole,\n    injectionFlags: [],\n    strippedElements: [\n      {\n        tag: '(pipeline-failure)',\n        reason: `Sanitizer pipeline threw; input discarded as fail-closed: ${message}`,\n        startIndex: 0,\n        length: truncated.length,\n      },\n    ],\n    wasModified: true,\n    sanitizedAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/security - Reputation Model\n *\n * Lightweight trust model for GitHub users that assesses reputation\n * based on account age, contribution history, and behavioral signals.\n * Integrates with the trust classifier for comprehensive trust assessment.\n *\n * @module security/reputation-model\n * (Source: Issue #818, #824 — Phase 3: Reputation Model)\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\n\nimport { getTimeProvider } from '../core/index.js';\nimport { resolveEnvMode } from './env-mode.js';\nimport type { TrustTier, GitHubUserRole, InjectionFlag } from './trust-types.js';\nimport { TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC, ROLE_DEFAULT_TRUST } from './trust-types.js';\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Types\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Signals that indicate a suspicious actor.\n */\nexport const SuspiciousSignalSchema = z.enum([\n  'new_account',\n  'no_prior_contributions',\n  'injection_patterns_detected',\n  'rapid_comments',\n  'mismatched_authority_claim',\n]);\nexport type SuspiciousSignal = z.infer<typeof SuspiciousSignalSchema>;\n\n/**\n * GitHub user metadata for reputation assessment.\n */\nexport interface GitHubUserMetadata {\n  readonly username: string;\n  /**\n   * Account/activity fields are OPTIONAL (#3106). When a field is absent (the\n   * caller couldn't fetch it — e.g. the firewall before Phase 3 wiring), its\n   * signal is SKIPPED rather than fabricated: an unknown value must never be\n   * treated as benign (the old hardcoded `365`/`0`) nor as hostile. Only the\n   * `authorAssociation` + `injectionFlags` signals fire on absent activity data.\n   */\n  readonly accountAgeDays?: number;\n  readonly priorContributions?: number;\n  readonly recentCommentCount?: number;\n  readonly recentCommentWindowMinutes?: number;\n  readonly authorAssociation: string;\n  readonly injectionFlags: readonly InjectionFlag[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of a reputation assessment.\n */\nexport interface ReputationAssessment {\n  readonly username: string;\n  readonly userRole: GitHubUserRole;\n  readonly suspiciousSignals: readonly SuspiciousSignal[];\n  readonly isSuspicious: boolean;\n  readonly effectiveTrustTier: TrustTier;\n  readonly reputationScore: number;\n  readonly reason: string;\n  readonly assessedAt: string;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Configuration\n// ============================================================================\n\n/** Thresholds for suspicious behavior detection. */\n/** Approximate days per year, used to normalize account age to a 0–10 scale. */\nconst DAYS_PER_YEAR_APPROX = 36.5;\n\nconst SUSPICIOUS_THRESHOLDS = {\n  /** Account younger than this (days) is flagged. */\n  newAccountDays: 30,\n  /** Fewer contributions than this is flagged. */\n  minContributions: 1,\n  /** More comments than this in the window triggers rapid-comment flag. */\n  rapidCommentThreshold: 5,\n  /** Time window (minutes) for rapid comment detection. */\n  rapidCommentWindowMinutes: 10,\n} as const;\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Reputation Cache\n// ============================================================================\n\ninterface CacheEntry {\n  assessment: ReputationAssessment;\n  expiresAt: number;\n}\n\n// Canonical source: config/timeouts.ts (Issue #1046)\nimport { CACHE_TIMEOUTS } from '../config/timeouts.js';\n\nconst DEFAULT_TTL_MS: number = CACHE_TIMEOUTS.reputationTtlMs;\nconst DEFAULT_MAX_SIZE = 1000;\n\n/**\n * In-memory reputation cache with TTL and max size.\n * Reduces redundant assessments for the same user within a short window.\n * Evicts oldest entries when max size is exceeded.\n */\nexport class ReputationCache {\n  private readonly cache = new Map<string, CacheEntry>();\n  private readonly ttlMs: number;\n  private readonly maxSize: number;\n\n  constructor(ttlMs = DEFAULT_TTL_MS, maxSize = DEFAULT_MAX_SIZE) {\n    this.ttlMs = ttlMs;\n    this.maxSize = maxSize;\n  }\n\n  get(username: string): ReputationAssessment | undefined {\n    const entry = this.cache.get(username);\n    if (entry === undefined) return undefined;\n    if (getTimeProvider().now() > entry.expiresAt) {\n      this.cache.delete(username);\n      return undefined;\n    }\n    return entry.assessment;\n  }\n\n  set(username: string, assessment: ReputationAssessment): void {\n    if (this.cache.size >= this.maxSize && !this.cache.has(username)) {\n      this.evictOldest();\n    }\n    this.cache.set(username, {\n      assessment,\n      expiresAt: getTimeProvider().now() + this.ttlMs,\n    });\n  }\n\n  /** Evict a batch of oldest entries (10% of maxSize, minimum 1). */\n  private evictOldest(): void {\n    const batchSize = Math.max(1, Math.floor(this.maxSize * 0.1));\n    const keys = this.cache.keys();\n    for (let i = 0; i < batchSize; i++) {\n      const next = keys.next();\n      if (next.done === true) break;\n      this.cache.delete(next.value);\n    }\n  }\n\n  clear(): void {\n    this.cache.clear();\n  }\n\n  get size(): number {\n    return this.cache.size;\n  }\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Suspicious Signal Detection\n// ============================================================================\n\n/** Only hostile-tier injection flags count — benign flags like\n * instruction_pattern (\"please remove\") must not trip the injection signal. */\nconst HOSTILE_INJECTION_FLAGS: readonly InjectionFlag[] = [\n  'system_prompt_manipulation',\n  'fake_conversation',\n  'authority_claim',\n  'hidden_content',\n];\n\nfunction hasHostileInjection(flags: readonly InjectionFlag[]): boolean {\n  return flags.some((f) => HOSTILE_INJECTION_FLAGS.includes(f));\n}\n\n/** Rapid-comment burst — only when both count and window are known (#3106). */\nfunction isRapidCommenting(m: GitHubUserMetadata): boolean {\n  return (\n    m.recentCommentCount !== undefined &&\n    m.recentCommentWindowMinutes !== undefined &&\n    m.recentCommentCount > SUSPICIOUS_THRESHOLDS.rapidCommentThreshold &&\n    m.recentCommentWindowMinutes <= SUSPICIOUS_THRESHOLDS.rapidCommentWindowMinutes\n  );\n}\n\n/** Authority claim from a non-maintainer role. */\nfunction isMismatchedAuthority(m: GitHubUserMetadata): boolean {\n  if (!m.injectionFlags.includes('authority_claim')) return false;\n  const association = m.authorAssociation.toUpperCase();\n  return association !== 'OWNER' && association !== 'MEMBER';\n}\n\n/** Detect all suspicious signals from user metadata. #3106: account/activity\n * signals are skipped when their data is absent — never fabricated. */\nfunction detectSuspiciousSignals(metadata: GitHubUserMetadata): SuspiciousSignal[] {\n  const signals: SuspiciousSignal[] = [];\n  const { accountAgeDays, priorContributions } = metadata;\n\n  if (accountAgeDays !== undefined && accountAgeDays < SUSPICIOUS_THRESHOLDS.newAccountDays) {\n    signals.push('new_account');\n  }\n  if (\n    priorContributions !== undefined &&\n    priorContributions < SUSPICIOUS_THRESHOLDS.minContributions\n  ) {\n    signals.push('no_prior_contributions');\n  }\n  if (hasHostileInjection(metadata.injectionFlags)) signals.push('injection_patterns_detected');\n  if (isRapidCommenting(metadata)) signals.push('rapid_comments');\n  if (isMismatchedAuthority(metadata)) signals.push('mismatched_authority_claim');\n\n  return signals;\n}\n\n/** Calculate a 0-100 reputation score. */\nfunction calculateReputationScore(\n  metadata: GitHubUserMetadata,\n  signals: readonly SuspiciousSignal[],\n  userRole: GitHubUserRole\n): number {\n  let score = 50; // baseline\n\n  // Role bonus\n  const roleBonus: Record<GitHubUserRole, number> = {\n    owner: 40,\n    maintainer: 35,\n    collaborator: 25,\n    contributor: 15,\n    member: 5,\n    unknown: 0,\n  };\n  score += roleBonus[userRole];\n\n  // Account age bonus (max +10). #3106: absent → no bonus (avoid NaN; an\n  // unknown account neither earns nor loses the age bonus).\n  if (metadata.accountAgeDays !== undefined) {\n    score += Math.min(metadata.accountAgeDays / DAYS_PER_YEAR_APPROX, 10);\n  }\n\n  // Contribution bonus (max +10). #3106: absent → no bonus.\n  if (metadata.priorContributions !== undefined) {\n    score += Math.min(metadata.priorContributions, 10);\n  }\n\n  // Suspicious signal penalties\n  const signalPenalty: Record<SuspiciousSignal, number> = {\n    new_account: -15,\n    no_prior_contributions: -10,\n    injection_patterns_detected: -25,\n    rapid_comments: -20,\n    mismatched_authority_claim: -30,\n  };\n  for (const signal of signals) {\n    score += signalPenalty[signal];\n  }\n\n  return Math.max(0, Math.min(100, Math.round(score)));\n}\n\n/** Map role string to GitHubUserRole. */\nfunction mapRole(association: string): GitHubUserRole {\n  switch (association.toUpperCase()) {\n    case 'OWNER':\n      return 'owner';\n    case 'MEMBER':\n      return 'member';\n    case 'COLLABORATOR':\n      return 'collaborator';\n    case 'CONTRIBUTOR':\n      return 'contributor';\n    default:\n      return 'unknown';\n  }\n}\n\n/** Determine effective trust tier from signals and role. */\nfunction determineEffectiveTier(\n  userRole: GitHubUserRole,\n  signals: readonly SuspiciousSignal[]\n): TrustTier {\n  const baseTier = ROLE_DEFAULT_TRUST[userRole];\n\n  // Hostile signals → Tier 4\n  const hostileSignals: SuspiciousSignal[] = [\n    'injection_patterns_detected',\n    'mismatched_authority_claim',\n  ];\n  if (signals.some((s) => hostileSignals.includes(s))) return '4';\n\n  // Multiple suspicious signals → downgrade by 1, CLAMPED AT TIER 3 (#4681).\n  //\n  // Tier 4 is the HOSTILE tier — `.rules/untrusted-input.md` defines it as\n  // \"injection patterns, hidden HTML, instruction-like content\". It is reached\n  // ONLY via `hostileSignals` above. The generic downgrade must not manufacture\n  // it, because the two most common signals (`new_account` and\n  // `no_prior_contributions`) BOTH fire automatically for any genuine\n  // first-time reporter — they are two readings of one fact, not independent\n  // evidence of hostility. Clamping at 4 meant an `unknown` author (base 3)\n  // filing an ordinary bug report was classified hostile; once enforce mode\n  // became the default (#4675) that refused every new account's first issue\n  // and escalated it to security.\n  //\n  // Tier 3 is the correct destination: \"untrusted\" — still processed, but\n  // never treated as instructions.\n  if (signals.length >= 2) {\n    const baseNumeric = TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC[baseTier];\n    const downgraded = Math.min(baseNumeric + 1, 3);\n    return String(downgraded) as TrustTier;\n  }\n\n  return baseTier;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Public API\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Assess a GitHub user's reputation for trust classification.\n *\n * @param metadata - User metadata from GitHub API or local context.\n * @param cache - Optional cache instance for TTL-based deduplication.\n * @returns ReputationAssessment with trust tier and suspicious signals.\n */\nexport function assessReputation(\n  metadata: GitHubUserMetadata,\n  cache?: ReputationCache\n): ReputationAssessment {\n  // Check cache first\n  const cached = cache?.get(metadata.username);\n  if (cached !== undefined) return cached;\n\n  const userRole = mapRole(metadata.authorAssociation);\n  const signals = detectSuspiciousSignals(metadata);\n  const score = calculateReputationScore(metadata, signals, userRole);\n  const effectiveTier = determineEffectiveTier(userRole, signals);\n\n  const assessment: ReputationAssessment = {\n    username: metadata.username,\n    userRole,\n    suspiciousSignals: signals,\n    isSuspicious: signals.length > 0,\n    effectiveTrustTier: effectiveTier,\n    reputationScore: score,\n    reason: buildReason(userRole, signals, effectiveTier),\n    assessedAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n  };\n\n  cache?.set(metadata.username, assessment);\n  return assessment;\n}\n\n/**\n * Reconcile a trust-classifier tier with a reputation assessment into the\n * effective tier to enforce (#3119 / epic #3118). Demotion-only — reputation\n * can only RAISE the tier number (more restrictive), never lower it.\n *\n * Invariants:\n * - **Allowlist/Tier-1 wins**: a classifier Tier 1 (owner/allowlisted maintainer)\n *   is authoritative — reputation never demotes it.\n * - **Absent reputation → classifier tier**: no assessment (stage off / not\n *   fetched) keeps the classifier/role-default tier — never fabricate a benign\n *   tier, never escalate on mere absence (fetch-failure ≠ hostile signal).\n * - **Score is advisory**: only `effectiveTrustTier` participates; the 0–100\n *   `reputationScore` never moves the gate.\n */\nexport function reconcileTrustTier(\n  classifierTier: TrustTier,\n  reputation: ReputationAssessment | undefined\n): TrustTier {\n  if (classifierTier === '1') return '1';\n  const repTier = reputation?.effectiveTrustTier;\n  if (repTier === undefined) return classifierTier;\n  return TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC[repTier] > TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC[classifierTier]\n    ? repTier\n    : classifierTier;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Reputation gating rollout (#3122 / epic #3118 Phase 4)\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Rollout mode for reputation-based tier gating, mirroring\n * `NEXUS_ACCESS_POLICY_MODE` (#1977): `off` (no reputation effect), `audit`\n * (compute + report the would-be demotion but enforce the classifier tier), or\n * `enforce` (apply the demotion). Default `enforce` since #4667 — see\n * {@link DEFAULT_REPUTATION_GATING_MODE} for the measurement that justified the\n * flip. (This block previously still described the pre-flip `audit` default.)\n */\nexport const ReputationGatingModeSchema = z.enum(['off', 'audit', 'enforce']);\nexport type ReputationGatingMode = z.infer<typeof ReputationGatingModeSchema>;\n\n/**\n * Default gating mode.\n *\n * Flipped `audit` → `enforce` in #4667. `audit` computed the demotion, logged\n * \"would block under enforce\", and let the actions through — so a detected\n * prompt injection changed nothing in the shipped configuration.\n *\n * Measured before flipping, over the real triage path with only the SCM\n * provider mocked: 5/5 hostile inputs blocked, 0 false positives across five\n * real repository issues (as OWNER and as an unaffiliated author), and 0 across\n * ordinary maintainer language (\"please close this\", \"URGENT\", \"you should\n * merge #88 first\"). The one synthetic false-positive class is a body quoting\n * an injection payload verbatim, which is arguably correct fail-closed\n * behaviour for a security report — and is now visible, because a tier-4\n * outcome emits a `RefuseAction` rather than silently approving less.\n *\n * `NEXUS_REPUTATION_GATING=audit` remains available to roll back.\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_REPUTATION_GATING_MODE: ReputationGatingMode = 'enforce';\n\n/**\n * Resolve the gating mode from the environment (invalid → default + warn, never\n * throws — #3130). Delegates to the shared `resolveEnvMode` so this flag and\n * `NEXUS_ACCESS_POLICY_MODE` coerce identically.\n */\nexport function resolveReputationGatingMode(\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env\n): ReputationGatingMode {\n  return resolveEnvMode(\n    env['NEXUS_REPUTATION_GATING'],\n    ReputationGatingModeSchema,\n    DEFAULT_REPUTATION_GATING_MODE,\n    'NEXUS_REPUTATION_GATING'\n  );\n}\n\n/** Outcome of applying the gating mode to a reputation assessment. */\nexport interface ReputationGateDecision {\n  /** Tier to actually enforce at the policy gate. */\n  readonly enforcedTier: TrustTier;\n  /** Tier reputation reconciliation computed (what `enforce` mode WOULD use). */\n  readonly reconciledTier: TrustTier;\n  /** True when reputation would demote but the mode (off/audit) did not enforce it. */\n  readonly demotionSuppressed: boolean;\n  readonly mode: ReputationGatingMode;\n}\n\n/**\n * Apply the rollout mode to a reputation assessment (#3122). `enforce` gates on\n * the reconciled (possibly demoted) tier; `audit`/`off` gate on the classifier\n * tier but report whether a demotion was suppressed (for telemetry). The\n * Tier-1/allowlist-wins and demotion-only invariants live in `reconcileTrustTier`,\n * so the allowlist remains the escape hatch in every mode.\n */\nexport function gateWithReputation(\n  classifierTier: TrustTier,\n  reputation: ReputationAssessment | undefined,\n  mode: ReputationGatingMode\n): ReputationGateDecision {\n  const reconciledTier =\n    mode === 'off' ? classifierTier : reconcileTrustTier(classifierTier, reputation);\n  const enforcedTier = mode === 'enforce' ? reconciledTier : classifierTier;\n  return {\n    enforcedTier,\n    reconciledTier,\n    demotionSuppressed: mode !== 'enforce' && reconciledTier !== classifierTier,\n    mode,\n  };\n}\n\n/** Build a human-readable reason string. */\nfunction buildReason(\n  role: GitHubUserRole,\n  signals: readonly SuspiciousSignal[],\n  tier: TrustTier\n): string {\n  if (signals.length === 0) {\n    return `Role ${role} → Tier ${tier} (no suspicious signals)`;\n  }\n  const signalList = signals.join(', ');\n  return `Role ${role} → Tier ${tier} (signals: ${signalList})`;\n}\n","/**\n * Shared resolver for `off`/`audit`/`enforce`-style security-mode env vars\n * (#3130). Both `resolveAccessPolicyMode` (ClawGuard, #1977) and\n * `resolveReputationGatingMode` (reputation gating, #3122) parse an enum env\n * var, coerce an invalid value to a safe default, and must NEVER throw — a\n * security layer must not fail-closed on a misconfiguration at startup.\n *\n * Previously the coercion was silent: a typo'd `enforce` (`enfroce`) degraded\n * to the default with no signal. This helper keeps the never-throw coercion but\n * emits a one-line `warn` so the misconfiguration is observable, and guarantees\n * both flags behave identically.\n *\n * @module security/env-mode\n */\n\nimport type { ZodType } from 'zod';\nimport { createLogger } from '../core/index.js';\nimport type { ILogger } from '../core/index.js';\n\nconst defaultLogger = createLogger({ component: 'env-mode' });\n\n/**\n * Resolve an enum-valued env var to one of its allowed values, coercing an\n * invalid/typo'd value rather than throwing. Unset or empty → `fallback`\n * silently (absence is normal, not a misconfiguration). A non-empty value that\n * fails to parse → `invalidFallback` (default: `fallback`) plus a `warn`, since\n * an explicit-but-invalid value is an operator error worth surfacing. Never\n * throws.\n *\n * @param raw      The raw env value (e.g. `process.env['NEXUS_X']`).\n * @param schema   Zod enum schema for the allowed values.\n * @param fallback Returned when `raw` is absent or empty.\n * @param varName  Env var name, for the warning message.\n * @param options  `logger` (injectable for tests) and `invalidFallback` (the\n *                 mode an explicit-but-invalid value lands on; defaults to\n *                 `fallback`). See the inline docs on the parameter.\n */\nexport function resolveEnvMode<T extends string>(\n  raw: string | undefined,\n  schema: ZodType<T>,\n  fallback: T,\n  varName: string,\n  options: {\n    /** Injectable for testing; defaults to the module logger. */\n    readonly logger?: ILogger;\n    /**\n     * The mode an explicit-but-UNPARSEABLE value lands on. Defaults to\n     * `fallback`, so a caller that does not pass it is byte-identical to the\n     * previous behaviour.\n     *\n     * It exists because `fallback` answers two different questions with one\n     * value: what absence means, and what a typo means. For a flag whose unset\n     * default is the permissive end those answers should differ —\n     * `NEXUS_FIREWALL_POLICY=enfroce` used to resolve to `off`, so an operator\n     * who explicitly asked for enforcement got a gate that refuses nothing\n     * (refines #3130; ratified by a 7-voter panel at the supermajority bar,\n     * 5 of 6 approvers — rationale in the changeset).\n     *\n     * Constrained deliberately: typed as the same `T` as `fallback`, so it can\n     * only select among the flag's own modes and can never introduce a fourth\n     * behaviour. It must never be MORE permissive than `fallback` — a typo may\n     * tighten the gate, never loosen it. A caller whose unset default is\n     * already the strictest mode (e.g. `NEXUS_REPUTATION_GATING`, which\n     * defaults to `enforce`) has nothing to correct and should not pass it.\n     *\n     * Declared inline rather than as an exported interface: no caller needs the\n     * name (they pass object literals), and exporting it would add a symbol\n     * with no cross-file consumer, which the #3024 gate correctly rejects.\n     */\n    readonly invalidFallback?: T;\n  } = {}\n): T {\n  const { logger = defaultLogger, invalidFallback } = options;\n  if (typeof raw !== 'string' || raw.length === 0) return fallback;\n  const parsed = schema.safeParse(raw.toLowerCase());\n  if (parsed.success) return parsed.data;\n  const applied = invalidFallback ?? fallback;\n  // Name the mode actually applied, not just \"the default\": when `applied`\n  // differs from `fallback` a log line saying \"coercing to default\" would\n  // describe a value the process did not use.\n  logger.warn(`Invalid ${varName} value — coercing to ${applied}`, {\n    raw,\n    default: fallback,\n    applied,\n  });\n  return 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package/dist/{chunk-2QWCNKYU.js → chunk-RO5PBERK.js}

@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@ import {
   toolSuccessStructured,
   withProgressHeartbeat,
   wrapToolWithTimeout
-} from "./chunk-ZWJR474P.js";
+} from "./chunk-VEWMQCWS.js";
 import {
   VERSION
-} from "./chunk-2BNOT4KX.js";
+} from "./chunk-N4ZVNOYN.js";
 import {
   assessPanelIndependence,
   countDistinctModels,
@@ -6972,4 +6972,4 @@ export {
   CONSENSUS_VOTE_TOOL_SCHEMA,
   registerConsensusVoteTool
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-2QWCNKYU.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-RO5PBERK.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-YBLUDGIJ.js → chunk-TURKS6GI.js}

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import {
 } from "./chunk-OQB3XC5O.js";
 import {
   VERSION
-} from "./chunk-2BNOT4KX.js";
+} from "./chunk-N4ZVNOYN.js";
 import {
   capitalize
 } from "./chunk-6T3EPABN.js";
@@ -1201,7 +1201,7 @@ async function runDoctorFix(result) {
   writeLine2("\u2500".repeat(40));
   let fixCount = 0;
   if (!result.dataDirectory.rootExists || result.dataDirectory.subdirectories.some((d) => !d.exists || !d.writable)) {
-    const { initDataDirectories: initDataDirectories2, describeDataDirFix: describeDataDirFix2 } = await import("./setup-data-dir-XSRJTXDQ.js");
+    const { initDataDirectories: initDataDirectories2, describeDataDirFix: describeDataDirFix2 } = await import("./setup-data-dir-ATYDEUSH.js");
     const outcome = describeDataDirFix2(initDataDirectories2());
     writeLine2(outcome.line);
     if (outcome.counted) fixCount++;
@@ -1303,4 +1303,4 @@ export {
   startStdioServer,
   closeServer
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-YBLUDGIJ.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-TURKS6GI.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-ZWJR474P.js → chunk-VEWMQCWS.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   VERSION
-} from "./chunk-2BNOT4KX.js";
+} from "./chunk-N4ZVNOYN.js";
 import {
   emitClawGuardViolation
 } from "./chunk-BGW474Z7.js";
@@ -2246,4 +2246,4 @@ export {
   VOTING_THRESHOLDS,
   ConsensusMetricsSchema
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ZWJR474P.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-VEWMQCWS.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-QBJONGQ4.js → chunk-YG7CNXSA.js}

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import {
   resolveEnvMode,
   resolveReputationGatingMode,
   sanitizeInput
-} from "./chunk-FLMLZN3P.js";
+} from "./chunk-PIMUNS74.js";
 import {
   MAX_STRIPPED_ELEMENTS_PER_EVENT,
   createAuditTrail,
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ function classifyTrust(input) {
     };
   }
   const baseTier = ROLE_DEFAULT_TRUST[userRole];
-  if (input.sanitizedInput !== void 0) {
+  if (input.sanitizedInput !== void 0 && input.sanitizedInput.contentTierMeasured !== false) {
     const contentTier = input.sanitizedInput.trustTier;
     const downgraded = TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC[contentTier] > TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC[baseTier];
     return {
@@ -410,11 +410,13 @@ function decodeATLValue(value) {
 
 // src/security/firewall/firewall-passthrough.ts
 function createPassthroughSanitized(meta) {
+  const userRole = mapAuthorAssociation(meta.authorAssociation);
   return {
     content: meta.content,
     originalLength: meta.content.length,
-    trustTier: "3",
-    userRole: mapAuthorAssociation(meta.authorAssociation),
+    trustTier: ROLE_DEFAULT_TRUST[userRole],
+    contentTierMeasured: false,
+    userRole,
     injectionFlags: [],
     strippedElements: [],
     wasModified: false,
@@ -1160,7 +1162,7 @@ var HostileInputFirewall = class {
       authorAssociation: meta.authorAssociation,
       // #4992: `contentDowngrade: false` withholds the sanitizer's content tier
       // from the classifier; the flags themselves were still measured above.
-      ...this.contentDowngrade ? { sanitizedInput: sanitized } : {},
+      ...this.contentDowngrade && sanitized.contentTierMeasured !== false ? { sanitizedInput: sanitized } : {},
       config: {
         allowlistedMaintainers: [...allowlist ?? []]
       }
@@ -2091,4 +2093,4 @@ export {
   IssueTriage,
   createIssueTriage
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-QBJONGQ4.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-YG7CNXSA.js.map