nexus-agents 2.92.3 → 2.92.5

package/dist/{factory-NNSXCD25.js → factory-NE7SNW7V.js}

@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
 import {
   createGitHubProvider,
   createScmProvider
-} from "./chunk-52ACUN6T.js";
-import "./chunk-EAT4GTMT.js";
-import "./chunk-EFHZHCF2.js";
-import "./chunk-W5I6L4UT.js";
+} from "./chunk-GKFFRRS4.js";
+import "./chunk-DQEREDUW.js";
+import "./chunk-YQAS2EGR.js";
+import "./chunk-L5BXCSMP.js";
 import "./chunk-CH7QIDHQ.js";
 import "./chunk-PR4QN5HX.js";
 export {
   createGitHubProvider,
   createScmProvider
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=factory-NNSXCD25.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=factory-NE7SNW7V.js.map

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -2576,6 +2576,8 @@ declare const TaskOutcomeSchema$2: z.ZodObject<{
     family: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
     voterRole: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
     baselineId: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    traceId: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+    requestId: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
 }, z.core.$strip>;
 /** Schema for filtering outcomes. */
 declare const OutcomeQuerySchema: z.ZodObject<{
@@ -27879,6 +27881,161 @@ declare function isMutatingAction(actionType: AgentActionType): boolean;
  */
 declare function requiresCitation(actionType: AgentActionType): boolean;
 
+/**
+ * nexus-agents/security - Audit Trail
+ *
+ * Machine-readable JSON audit events for security pipeline decisions.
+ * Every trust classification, policy gate decision, corroboration check,
+ * and reputation assessment is recorded as a structured event.
+ *
+ * Satisfies CLAUDE.md requirement: "Every action on untrusted input must
+ * log: trust tier, sources cited, policy gate decision, stripped content."
+ *
+ * @module security/audit-trail
+ * (Source: Issue #832 — Security audit trail)
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Discriminated union of audit event types.
+ * Each event captures a single security pipeline decision.
+ */
+type AuditEvent = TrustClassificationEvent | PolicyGateEvent | CorroborationEvent | ReputationEvent | SanitizationEvent | GraphExecutionAuditEvent;
+/** Base fields shared by all audit events. */
+interface AuditEventBase {
+    readonly id: string;
+    readonly timestamp: string;
+    readonly component: string;
+}
+/** Trust classification decision. */
+interface TrustClassificationEvent extends AuditEventBase {
+    readonly type: 'trust_classification';
+    readonly username: string;
+    readonly assignedTier: TrustTier;
+    readonly userRole: string;
+    readonly isAllowlisted: boolean;
+    readonly wasDowngraded: boolean;
+    readonly reason: string;
+}
+/** Policy gate evaluation result. */
+interface PolicyGateEvent extends AuditEventBase {
+    readonly type: 'policy_gate';
+    readonly actionType: AgentActionType;
+    readonly allowed: boolean;
+    readonly requiresApproval: boolean;
+    readonly inputTrustTier: TrustTier;
+    readonly violationRules: readonly string[];
+}
+/** Corroboration validation result. */
+interface CorroborationEvent extends AuditEventBase {
+    readonly type: 'corroboration';
+    readonly actionType: AgentActionType;
+    readonly satisfied: boolean;
+    readonly sourceCount: number;
+    readonly missingRequirements: readonly string[];
+}
+/** Reputation assessment result. */
+interface ReputationEvent extends AuditEventBase {
+    readonly type: 'reputation';
+    readonly username: string;
+    readonly reputationScore: number;
+    readonly isSuspicious: boolean;
+    readonly effectiveTier: TrustTier;
+    readonly signalCount: number;
+}
+/** Summary of a single element stripped during sanitization. */
+interface StrippedElementSummary {
+    /** Truncated tag text (≤30 chars + '...' from the sanitizer). */
+    readonly tag: string;
+    /** Reason the element was removed (e.g. 'Trail of Bits injection vector'). */
+    readonly reason: string;
+}
+/** Input sanitization result. */
+interface SanitizationEvent extends AuditEventBase {
+    readonly type: 'sanitization';
+    readonly source: string;
+    readonly wasModified: boolean;
+    readonly strippedCount: number;
+    readonly injectionFlagCount: number;
+    /**
+     * Per-element tag/reason details, truncated to at most
+     * MAX_STRIPPED_ELEMENTS_PER_EVENT entries. Required by CLAUDE.md's
+     * Untrusted Input Policy: "Log stripped elements for audit trail."
+     */
+    readonly strippedElements: readonly StrippedElementSummary[];
+}
+/** Graph execution lifecycle event (Issue #839). */
+interface GraphExecutionAuditEvent extends AuditEventBase {
+    readonly type: 'graph_execution';
+    readonly graphEvent: string;
+    readonly nodeId?: string;
+    readonly stepNumber: number;
+    readonly detail: string;
+}
+/** Query filter for retrieving audit events. */
+interface AuditQuery {
+    readonly type?: AuditEvent['type'];
+    readonly since?: string;
+    readonly until?: string;
+    readonly trustTier?: TrustTier;
+    readonly limit?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Append-only audit trail for security pipeline decisions.
+ * Events are bounded by MAX_EVENTS to prevent unbounded growth.
+ */
+declare class AuditTrail {
+    private events;
+    private nextId;
+    /** Appends an event to the trail. Returns the assigned event ID. */
+    append(event: Omit<AuditEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp'>): string;
+    /** Queries events matching the given filter. */
+    query(filter?: AuditQuery): readonly AuditEvent[];
+    /** Returns the total number of events. */
+    get size(): number;
+    /** Clears all events. */
+    clear(): void;
+    /** Enforces MAX_EVENTS bound. */
+    private enforceLimit;
+}
+/**
+ * Records a trust classification decision.
+ */
+declare function emitTrustEvent(trail: AuditTrail, data: Omit<TrustClassificationEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>): string;
+/**
+ * Records a policy gate evaluation.
+ */
+declare function emitPolicyEvent(trail: AuditTrail, data: Omit<PolicyGateEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>): string;
+/**
+ * Records a corroboration validation.
+ */
+declare function emitCorroborationEvent(trail: AuditTrail, data: Omit<CorroborationEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>): string;
+/**
+ * Records a reputation assessment.
+ */
+declare function emitReputationEvent(trail: AuditTrail, data: Omit<ReputationEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>): string;
+/**
+ * Records an input sanitization result.
+ */
+declare function emitSanitizationEvent(trail: AuditTrail, data: Omit<SanitizationEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>): string;
+/**
+ * Records a graph execution lifecycle event.
+ */
+declare function emitGraphExecutionEvent(trail: AuditTrail, data: Omit<GraphExecutionAuditEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>): string;
+/**
+ * Creates an onEvent callback that bridges graph events to the audit trail.
+ * Pass the returned function as `onEvent` in GraphExecuteOptions.
+ *
+ * @example
+ * const trail = createAuditTrail();
+ * await executeGraph(graph, inputs, { onEvent: createGraphAuditBridge(trail) });
+ */
+declare function createGraphAuditBridge(trail: AuditTrail): (event: {
+    readonly type: string;
+    readonly [key: string]: unknown;
+}) => void;
+/** Creates a new AuditTrail instance. */
+declare function createAuditTrail(): AuditTrail;
+
 /**
  * nexus-agents/security - Policy Gate
  *
@@ -27941,7 +28098,7 @@ interface ActionContext {
  * @param context - The current execution context.
  * @returns PolicyDecision with violations and approval requirements.
  */
-declare function evaluatePolicy$1(action: AgentAction, context: ActionContext): PolicyDecision$1;
+declare function evaluatePolicy$1(action: AgentAction, context: ActionContext, auditTrail?: AuditTrail): PolicyDecision$1;
 /**
  * Quick check: can this action type proceed at all given the input trust tier?
  * Useful for early rejection before full policy evaluation.
@@ -28078,161 +28235,6 @@ declare class ReputationCache {
  */
 declare function assessReputation(metadata: GitHubUserMetadata, cache?: ReputationCache): ReputationAssessment;
 
-/**
- * nexus-agents/security - Audit Trail
- *
- * Machine-readable JSON audit events for security pipeline decisions.
- * Every trust classification, policy gate decision, corroboration check,
- * and reputation assessment is recorded as a structured event.
- *
- * Satisfies CLAUDE.md requirement: "Every action on untrusted input must
- * log: trust tier, sources cited, policy gate decision, stripped content."
- *
- * @module security/audit-trail
- * (Source: Issue #832 — Security audit trail)
- */
-
-/**
- * Discriminated union of audit event types.
- * Each event captures a single security pipeline decision.
- */
-type AuditEvent = TrustClassificationEvent | PolicyGateEvent | CorroborationEvent | ReputationEvent | SanitizationEvent | GraphExecutionAuditEvent;
-/** Base fields shared by all audit events. */
-interface AuditEventBase {
-    readonly id: string;
-    readonly timestamp: string;
-    readonly component: string;
-}
-/** Trust classification decision. */
-interface TrustClassificationEvent extends AuditEventBase {
-    readonly type: 'trust_classification';
-    readonly username: string;
-    readonly assignedTier: TrustTier;
-    readonly userRole: string;
-    readonly isAllowlisted: boolean;
-    readonly wasDowngraded: boolean;
-    readonly reason: string;
-}
-/** Policy gate evaluation result. */
-interface PolicyGateEvent extends AuditEventBase {
-    readonly type: 'policy_gate';
-    readonly actionType: AgentActionType;
-    readonly allowed: boolean;
-    readonly requiresApproval: boolean;
-    readonly inputTrustTier: TrustTier;
-    readonly violationRules: readonly string[];
-}
-/** Corroboration validation result. */
-interface CorroborationEvent extends AuditEventBase {
-    readonly type: 'corroboration';
-    readonly actionType: AgentActionType;
-    readonly satisfied: boolean;
-    readonly sourceCount: number;
-    readonly missingRequirements: readonly string[];
-}
-/** Reputation assessment result. */
-interface ReputationEvent extends AuditEventBase {
-    readonly type: 'reputation';
-    readonly username: string;
-    readonly reputationScore: number;
-    readonly isSuspicious: boolean;
-    readonly effectiveTier: TrustTier;
-    readonly signalCount: number;
-}
-/** Summary of a single element stripped during sanitization. */
-interface StrippedElementSummary {
-    /** Truncated tag text (≤30 chars + '...' from the sanitizer). */
-    readonly tag: string;
-    /** Reason the element was removed (e.g. 'Trail of Bits injection vector'). */
-    readonly reason: string;
-}
-/** Input sanitization result. */
-interface SanitizationEvent extends AuditEventBase {
-    readonly type: 'sanitization';
-    readonly source: string;
-    readonly wasModified: boolean;
-    readonly strippedCount: number;
-    readonly injectionFlagCount: number;
-    /**
-     * Per-element tag/reason details, truncated to at most
-     * MAX_STRIPPED_ELEMENTS_PER_EVENT entries. Required by CLAUDE.md's
-     * Untrusted Input Policy: "Log stripped elements for audit trail."
-     */
-    readonly strippedElements: readonly StrippedElementSummary[];
-}
-/** Graph execution lifecycle event (Issue #839). */
-interface GraphExecutionAuditEvent extends AuditEventBase {
-    readonly type: 'graph_execution';
-    readonly graphEvent: string;
-    readonly nodeId?: string;
-    readonly stepNumber: number;
-    readonly detail: string;
-}
-/** Query filter for retrieving audit events. */
-interface AuditQuery {
-    readonly type?: AuditEvent['type'];
-    readonly since?: string;
-    readonly until?: string;
-    readonly trustTier?: TrustTier;
-    readonly limit?: number;
-}
-/**
- * Append-only audit trail for security pipeline decisions.
- * Events are bounded by MAX_EVENTS to prevent unbounded growth.
- */
-declare class AuditTrail {
-    private events;
-    private nextId;
-    /** Appends an event to the trail. Returns the assigned event ID. */
-    append(event: Omit<AuditEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp'>): string;
-    /** Queries events matching the given filter. */
-    query(filter?: AuditQuery): readonly AuditEvent[];
-    /** Returns the total number of events. */
-    get size(): number;
-    /** Clears all events. */
-    clear(): void;
-    /** Enforces MAX_EVENTS bound. */
-    private enforceLimit;
-}
-/**
- * Records a trust classification decision.
- */
-declare function emitTrustEvent(trail: AuditTrail, data: Omit<TrustClassificationEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>): string;
-/**
- * Records a policy gate evaluation.
- */
-declare function emitPolicyEvent(trail: AuditTrail, data: Omit<PolicyGateEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>): string;
-/**
- * Records a corroboration validation.
- */
-declare function emitCorroborationEvent(trail: AuditTrail, data: Omit<CorroborationEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>): string;
-/**
- * Records a reputation assessment.
- */
-declare function emitReputationEvent(trail: AuditTrail, data: Omit<ReputationEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>): string;
-/**
- * Records an input sanitization result.
- */
-declare function emitSanitizationEvent(trail: AuditTrail, data: Omit<SanitizationEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>): string;
-/**
- * Records a graph execution lifecycle event.
- */
-declare function emitGraphExecutionEvent(trail: AuditTrail, data: Omit<GraphExecutionAuditEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>): string;
-/**
- * Creates an onEvent callback that bridges graph events to the audit trail.
- * Pass the returned function as `onEvent` in GraphExecuteOptions.
- *
- * @example
- * const trail = createAuditTrail();
- * await executeGraph(graph, inputs, { onEvent: createGraphAuditBridge(trail) });
- */
-declare function createGraphAuditBridge(trail: AuditTrail): (event: {
-    readonly type: string;
-    readonly [key: string]: unknown;
-}) => void;
-/** Creates a new AuditTrail instance. */
-declare function createAuditTrail(): AuditTrail;
-
 /**
  * nexus-agents/security/firewall - Types
  *
@@ -28345,6 +28347,14 @@ interface FirewallResult {
      */
     readonly effectiveTrustTier: TrustTier;
     readonly atl: string;
+    /**
+     * Rule-of-Two assessment surfaced by the `policyEnforcement` stage (#3198):
+     * present (with `severity: 'block'`) when the effective tier is untrusted AND
+     * the configured context has both write and secret access. The firewall is a
+     * signal provider — it SURFACES this for the consumer to enforce; it does not
+     * hard-block. `undefined` when the stage is disabled or the rule holds.
+     */
+    readonly ruleOfTwoViolation?: Violation;
     readonly auditEvents: readonly {
         readonly id: string;
         readonly type: string;
@@ -28362,6 +28372,7 @@ declare class HostileInputFirewall {
     private readonly adapter;
     private readonly reputationCache;
     private readonly auditTrail;
+    private readonly context;
     constructor(config: FirewallConfig);
     /**
      * Processes untrusted input through the firewall pipeline.
@@ -29828,6 +29839,12 @@ declare function createCorrelationTracker(config?: Partial<HigherOrderVotingConf
 /** Options for creating OWVoting instance. */
 interface OWVotingOptions {
     readonly config?: Partial<HigherOrderVotingConfig>;
+    /**
+     * Algorithm label this instance reports (#3168). Defaults to `simple_majority`
+     * for backward compatibility; `HigherOrderVotingStrategy` sets `opinion_wise`.
+     * Keeps the label consistent whether constructed directly or via a factory.
+     */
+    readonly algorithm?: ConsensusAlgorithm;
 }
 /**
  * Opinion-Wise higher-order voting implementation.
@@ -29854,7 +29871,6 @@ declare function createOWVoting(options?: OWVotingOptions): IHigherOrderVoting;
  * Wraps OWVoting to provide IVotingStrategy interface.
  */
 declare class HigherOrderVotingStrategy extends OWVoting implements IVotingStrategy {
-    readonly algorithm: ConsensusAlgorithm;
     constructor(options?: OWVotingOptions);
 }
 /** Creates a higher-order voting strategy for use with ConsensusEngine. */