nexus-agents 2.128.2 → 2.128.4

package/dist/{chunk-HFIYXKDQ.js.map → chunk-BKZ5YD66.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/mcp/middleware/validation.ts","../src/mcp/middleware/rate-limiter.ts","../src/mcp/middleware/policy-types.ts","../src/mcp/middleware/policy-helpers.ts","../src/mcp/middleware/policy-rules.ts","../src/mcp/middleware/policy.ts","../src/audit/secure-handler-audit.ts","../src/mcp/error-envelope.ts","../src/mcp/tools/tool-result.ts","../src/mcp/middleware/request-context.ts","../src/mcp/middleware/tool-input-sanitizer.ts","../src/mcp/middleware/secure-handler.ts","../src/mcp/mcp-notifier.ts","../src/mcp/middleware/tool-wrapper.ts","../src/mcp/middleware/timeout-guard.ts","../src/security/access-constraint-deriver/denylist.ts","../src/security/access-constraint-deriver/tool-risk.ts","../src/security/access-constraint-deriver/enforcer.ts","../src/security/access-constraint-deriver/mcp-guard.ts","../src/security/access-constraint-deriver/chain-adapter.ts","../src/mcp/middleware/middleware-chain.ts","../src/mcp/tools/tool-annotations.ts","../src/mcp/tool-annotations.ts","../src/consensus/types-core.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Validation Middleware\n *\n * Input validation helper using Zod schemas.\n * All tool inputs must be validated at the boundary.\n *\n * (Source: MCP Protocol 2025-11-25, Zod Documentation)\n */\n\nimport type { ZodType } from 'zod';\n\nimport { type Result, ok, err, ValidationError, formatZodError } from '../../core/index.js';\n\n// Re-export isZodError for backward compatibility\nexport { isZodError } from '../../core/index.js';\n\n/**\n * Validates tool input against a Zod schema.\n *\n * This function should be called at the start of every tool handler\n * to validate incoming arguments before processing.\n *\n * @template T - The expected type after validation\n * @param schema - The Zod schema to validate against\n * @param args - The unknown input to validate\n * @returns Result containing validated data or a ValidationError\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * const InputSchema = z.object({\n *   task: z.string().min(1),\n *   context: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()).optional(),\n * });\n *\n * server.tool('my_tool', InputSchema.shape, async (args) => {\n *   const result = validateToolInput(InputSchema, args);\n *   if (!result.ok) {\n *     return toolStructuredError({ errorCategory: 'validation', message: result.error.message });\n *   }\n *   const { task, context } = result.value;\n *   // Process validated input...\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport function validateToolInput<T>(\n  schema: ZodType<T>,\n  args: unknown\n): Result<T, ValidationError> {\n  const parsed = schema.safeParse(args);\n\n  if (parsed.success) {\n    return ok(parsed.data);\n  }\n\n  const message = formatZodError(parsed.error);\n  const validationError = new ValidationError(`Invalid tool input: ${message}`, {\n    context: {\n      issues: parsed.error.issues,\n      receivedType: typeof args,\n    },\n  });\n\n  return err(validationError);\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a validation function bound to a specific schema.\n *\n * Useful for reusing the same schema across multiple tools.\n *\n * @template T - The expected type after validation\n * @param schema - The Zod schema to bind\n * @returns A validation function for the schema\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * const validateTask = createValidator(TaskSchema);\n *\n * // Later in tool handlers:\n * const result = validateTask(args);\n * ```\n */\nexport function createValidator<T>(\n  schema: ZodType<T>\n): (args: unknown) => Result<T, ValidationError> {\n  return (args: unknown) => validateToolInput(schema, args);\n}\n\n// `validateToolOutput` and `createOutputValidator` (Issue #547 sibling of\n// `validateToolInput` / `createValidator`) removed in #3022 — no MCP tool\n// ever called the output-validation path; every tool returns its result\n// without schema-validating first. If output validation comes back as a\n// real requirement, reintroduce alongside the per-tool wiring in the same\n// PR (activate-or-delete YAGNI — #2937, #2938, #2939, #2940, #3018, #3022).\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Rate Limiter Middleware\n *\n * Token bucket implementation for rate limiting MCP tool calls.\n * Prevents abuse and ensures fair resource usage.\n *\n * (Source: Token Bucket Algorithm, RFC 6585)\n */\n\nimport { createLogger, type ILogger, getTimeProvider } from '../../core/index.js';\n\n/**\n * Configuration for the token bucket rate limiter.\n */\nexport interface RateLimiterConfig {\n  /** Maximum number of tokens in the bucket */\n  readonly capacity: number;\n  /** Number of tokens added per interval */\n  readonly refillRate: number;\n  /** Interval in milliseconds between token refills (default: 1000ms) */\n  readonly refillIntervalMs?: number;\n  /** Optional logger instance */\n  readonly logger?: ILogger;\n  /** Optional identifier for logging */\n  readonly name?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Current state of the rate limiter.\n */\nexport interface RateLimiterState {\n  /** Current number of available tokens */\n  readonly tokens: number;\n  /** Capacity of the bucket */\n  readonly capacity: number;\n  /** Time until next token is available (0 if tokens available) */\n  readonly nextTokenMs: number;\n}\n\n// Canonical source: config/timeouts.ts (Issue #1046)\nimport { CACHE_TIMEOUTS } from '../../config/timeouts.js';\n\nconst DEFAULT_REFILL_INTERVAL_MS = CACHE_TIMEOUTS.rateLimitRefillMs;\n\n/**\n * Token bucket rate limiter implementation.\n *\n * The token bucket algorithm allows for bursting up to the capacity,\n * while maintaining a steady-state rate equal to the refill rate.\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * const limiter = new RateLimiter({\n *   capacity: 100,\n *   refillRate: 10,\n *   refillIntervalMs: 1000,\n * });\n *\n * if (limiter.tryAcquire()) {\n *   // Proceed with operation\n * } else {\n *   // Rate limited, reject or queue\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport class RateLimiter {\n  private tokens: number;\n  private readonly capacity: number;\n  private readonly refillRate: number;\n  private readonly refillIntervalMs: number;\n  private lastRefillTime: number;\n  private readonly logger: ILogger;\n  private readonly name: string;\n\n  constructor(config: RateLimiterConfig) {\n    this.capacity = config.capacity;\n    this.refillRate = config.refillRate;\n    this.refillIntervalMs = config.refillIntervalMs ?? DEFAULT_REFILL_INTERVAL_MS;\n    this.tokens = this.capacity;\n    this.lastRefillTime = getTimeProvider().now();\n    this.name = config.name ?? 'rate-limiter';\n    this.logger = config.logger ?? createLogger({ component: this.name });\n\n    this.logger.debug('Rate limiter initialized', {\n      capacity: this.capacity,\n      refillRate: this.refillRate,\n      refillIntervalMs: this.refillIntervalMs,\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Refills tokens based on elapsed time.\n   * Called automatically before each acquire attempt.\n   */\n  private refill(): void {\n    const now = getTimeProvider().now();\n    const elapsed = now - this.lastRefillTime;\n    const intervals = Math.floor(elapsed / this.refillIntervalMs);\n\n    if (intervals > 0) {\n      const tokensToAdd = intervals * this.refillRate;\n      this.tokens = Math.min(this.capacity, this.tokens + tokensToAdd);\n      this.lastRefillTime = now - (elapsed % this.refillIntervalMs);\n\n      if (tokensToAdd > 0) {\n        this.logger.debug('Tokens refilled', {\n          added: tokensToAdd,\n          current: this.tokens,\n        });\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Attempts to acquire a token.\n   *\n   * @param count - Number of tokens to acquire (default: 1)\n   * @returns True if tokens were acquired, false if rate limited\n   */\n  tryAcquire(count = 1): boolean {\n    this.refill();\n\n    if (this.tokens >= count) {\n      this.tokens -= count;\n      this.logger.debug('Token acquired', {\n        requested: count,\n        remaining: this.tokens,\n      });\n      return true;\n    }\n\n    this.logger.warn('Rate limit exceeded', {\n      requested: count,\n      available: this.tokens,\n    });\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Gets the current state of the rate limiter.\n   *\n   * @returns The current rate limiter state\n   */\n  getState(): RateLimiterState {\n    this.refill();\n\n    const nextTokenMs =\n      this.tokens > 0 ? 0 : this.refillIntervalMs - (getTimeProvider().now() - this.lastRefillTime);\n\n    return {\n      tokens: this.tokens,\n      capacity: this.capacity,\n      nextTokenMs: Math.max(0, nextTokenMs),\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Resets the rate limiter to full capacity.\n   * Useful for testing or after configuration changes.\n   */\n  reset(): void {\n    this.tokens = this.capacity;\n    this.lastRefillTime = getTimeProvider().now();\n    this.logger.debug('Rate limiter reset', { tokens: this.tokens });\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a rate limiter with default settings suitable for MCP tools.\n *\n * Default configuration:\n * - Capacity: 100 tokens\n * - Refill rate: 10 tokens per second\n *\n * @param name - Optional name for the rate limiter\n * @param logger - Optional logger instance\n * @returns A configured RateLimiter instance\n */\nexport function createDefaultRateLimiter(name?: string, logger?: ILogger): RateLimiter {\n  const config: RateLimiterConfig = {\n    capacity: 100,\n    refillRate: 10,\n    refillIntervalMs: 1000,\n  };\n  if (name !== undefined) {\n    (config as { name?: string }).name = name;\n  }\n  if (logger !== undefined) {\n    (config as { logger?: ILogger }).logger = logger;\n  }\n  return new RateLimiter(config);\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Policy Firewall Types\n *\n * Type definitions for the authorization layer of MCP tool calls.\n *\n * (Source: OWASP ASVS 4.0, Authorization Controls)\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\n\nimport { SecurityError, type ILogger } from '../../core/index.js';\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Core Types\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Artifact type for policy context.\n * Artifacts are resources that can be referenced in policy decisions.\n */\nexport interface Artifact<T = unknown> {\n  readonly id: string;\n  readonly type: string;\n  readonly value: T;\n  readonly createdAt: Date;\n}\n\n/**\n * Execution mode for tool operations.\n * - 'read-only': Only read operations allowed (default)\n * - 'read-write': Both read and write operations allowed\n */\nexport type ExecutionMode = 'read-only' | 'read-write';\n\n/**\n * Policy enforcement mode.\n * - 'enforce': Block denied operations\n * - 'warn': Log denials but allow execution (for migration)\n */\nexport type PolicyMode = 'enforce' | 'warn';\n\n/**\n * Result of a policy evaluation.\n */\nexport interface PolicyDecision {\n  readonly allowed: boolean;\n  readonly reason: string;\n  readonly requiredArtifact?: string;\n  readonly ruleName?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Context provided to policy rules for evaluation.\n */\nexport interface PolicyContext {\n  readonly toolName: string;\n  readonly args: unknown;\n  readonly mode: ExecutionMode;\n  readonly artifacts?: Map<string, Artifact>;\n  readonly workflowId?: string;\n  readonly allowedPaths?: readonly string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * A single policy rule that can approve or deny operations.\n */\nexport interface PolicyRule {\n  readonly name: string;\n  readonly description: string;\n  check(ctx: PolicyContext): PolicyDecision;\n}\n\n/**\n * Interface for the policy firewall.\n */\nexport interface IPolicyFirewall {\n  evaluate(ctx: PolicyContext): PolicyDecision;\n  addRule(rule: PolicyRule): void;\n  removeRule(name: string): boolean;\n  getRules(): readonly PolicyRule[];\n  setMode(mode: PolicyMode): void;\n  getMode(): PolicyMode;\n}\n\n/**\n * Configuration for the policy firewall.\n */\nexport interface PolicyFirewallConfig {\n  /** Enforcement mode (default: 'enforce') */\n  readonly mode?: PolicyMode;\n  /** Logger instance */\n  readonly logger?: ILogger;\n  /** Initial rules to register */\n  readonly rules?: readonly PolicyRule[];\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Error Types\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Policy error for authorization failures.\n */\nexport class PolicyError extends SecurityError {\n  readonly decision: PolicyDecision;\n\n  constructor(message: string, decision: PolicyDecision) {\n    super(message, {\n      context: {\n        allowed: decision.allowed,\n        reason: decision.reason,\n        ruleName: decision.ruleName,\n        requiredArtifact: decision.requiredArtifact,\n      },\n    });\n    this.name = 'PolicyError';\n    this.decision = decision;\n  }\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Zod Schemas for Configuration\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Schema for policy configuration.\n */\nexport const PolicyConfigSchema = z.object({\n  defaultMode: z.enum(['read-only', 'read-write']).default('read-only'),\n  policyMode: z.enum(['enforce', 'warn']).default('enforce'),\n  allowedPaths: z.array(z.string()).default(['./']),\n});\n\nexport type PolicyConfig = z.infer<typeof PolicyConfigSchema>;\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Policy Firewall Helpers\n *\n * Utility functions for path validation and argument extraction.\n *\n * (Source: OWASP ASVS 4.0, Authorization Controls)\n */\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Path Utility Functions\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Validates a path against allowed roots.\n *\n * @param targetPath - The path to validate\n * @param allowedPaths - Array of allowed root paths\n * @returns True if the path is within an allowed root\n */\nexport function isPathSafe(targetPath: string, allowedPaths: readonly string[]): boolean {\n  // Normalize the target path\n  const normalizedTarget = normalizePath(targetPath);\n\n  // Check if any allowed path is a prefix of the target\n  for (const allowed of allowedPaths) {\n    const normalizedAllowed = normalizePath(allowed);\n    if (normalizedTarget.startsWith(normalizedAllowed)) {\n      return true;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return false;\n}\n\n/**\n * Normalizes a path by removing trailing slashes and handling relative paths.\n */\nexport function normalizePath(p: string): string {\n  // Remove trailing slashes\n  let normalized = p.replace(/\\/{1,100}$/, '');\n\n  // Handle relative paths\n  if (normalized === '.') {\n    normalized = '';\n  } else if (normalized.startsWith('./')) {\n    normalized = normalized.slice(2);\n  }\n\n  // Ensure absolute-like comparison\n  if (!normalized.startsWith('/')) {\n    normalized = '/' + normalized;\n  }\n\n  return normalized;\n}\n\n/**\n * Extracts path from tool arguments if present.\n */\nexport function extractPathFromArgs(args: unknown): string | undefined {\n  if (args === null || typeof args !== 'object') {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n\n  const argsObj = args as Record<string, unknown>;\n\n  // Common path field names\n  const pathFields = ['path', 'filePath', 'file_path', 'directory', 'dir', 'target'];\n\n  for (const field of pathFields) {\n    const value = argsObj[field];\n    if (typeof value === 'string') {\n      return value;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return undefined;\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Policy Firewall Rules\n *\n * Default policy rules and constants for the authorization layer.\n *\n * (Source: OWASP ASVS 4.0, Authorization Controls)\n */\n\nimport type { PolicyContext, PolicyDecision, PolicyRule } from './policy-types.js';\nimport { isPathSafe, extractPathFromArgs } from './policy-helpers.js';\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Tool Classification Constants\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Tools that are considered write/mutation operations.\n */\nexport const MUTATION_TOOLS = new Set([\n  'write_file',\n  'edit_file',\n  'delete_file',\n  'create_directory',\n  'remove_directory',\n  'execute_command',\n  'run_shell',\n  'bash',\n  'create_expert',\n  'run_workflow',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Tools that are considered read-only operations.\n */\nexport const READ_ONLY_TOOLS = new Set([\n  'read_file',\n  'list_directory',\n  'search_files',\n  'get_status',\n  'orchestrate',\n  'delegate_to_model',\n]);\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Tool Classification Functions\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Checks if a tool is a mutation operation.\n */\nexport function isMutationTool(toolName: string): boolean {\n  // Check explicit mutation tools\n  if (MUTATION_TOOLS.has(toolName)) {\n    return true;\n  }\n\n  // Check explicit read-only tools\n  if (READ_ONLY_TOOLS.has(toolName)) {\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  // Default to treating unknown tools as mutations (safe default)\n  return true;\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Default Policy Rules\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Policy rule that denies mutation operations when mode is 'read-only'.\n *\n * This ensures that write operations are only allowed when explicitly\n * enabled via the 'read-write' mode.\n */\nexport const denyMutationsWithoutModeRule: PolicyRule = {\n  name: 'deny-mutations-without-mode',\n  description: 'Blocks write operations unless mode is read-write',\n  check(ctx: PolicyContext): PolicyDecision {\n    // If mode is read-write, allow all operations\n    if (ctx.mode === 'read-write') {\n      return { allowed: true, reason: 'Read-write mode enabled' };\n    }\n\n    // Check if this is a mutation tool\n    if (isMutationTool(ctx.toolName)) {\n      return {\n        allowed: false,\n        reason: `Tool '${ctx.toolName}' is a mutation operation but mode is '${ctx.mode}'. Set mode to 'read-write' to enable.`,\n      };\n    }\n\n    // Read-only tool in read-only mode is allowed\n    return { allowed: true, reason: 'Read-only operation allowed' };\n  },\n};\n\n/**\n * Policy rule that validates paths against allowed roots.\n *\n * Prevents path traversal attacks by ensuring all file operations\n * target paths within configured allowed directories.\n */\nexport const safePathsRule: PolicyRule = {\n  name: 'safe-paths',\n  description: 'Validates paths against allowed root directories',\n  check(ctx: PolicyContext): PolicyDecision {\n    // Extract path from arguments\n    const targetPath = extractPathFromArgs(ctx.args);\n\n    // If no path in args, allow (not a file operation)\n    if (targetPath === undefined) {\n      return { allowed: true, reason: 'No path argument found' };\n    }\n\n    // Check for obvious path traversal attempts\n    if (targetPath.includes('..')) {\n      return {\n        allowed: false,\n        reason: `Path contains '..' which may indicate path traversal: ${targetPath}`,\n      };\n    }\n\n    // Get allowed paths from context or use default\n    const allowedPaths = ctx.allowedPaths ?? ['./'];\n\n    // Validate path is within allowed roots\n    if (!isPathSafe(targetPath, allowedPaths)) {\n      return {\n        allowed: false,\n        reason: `Path '${targetPath}' is outside allowed directories: ${allowedPaths.join(', ')}`,\n      };\n    }\n\n    return { allowed: true, reason: 'Path is within allowed directories' };\n  },\n};\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Policy Firewall Middleware\n *\n * Authorization layer for MCP tool calls. Evaluates policy rules\n * to determine whether operations should be allowed or denied.\n *\n * This is separate from validation - validation checks if input is well-formed,\n * policy checks if the operation is authorized.\n *\n * (Source: OWASP ASVS 4.0, Authorization Controls)\n */\n\nimport { createLogger, type ILogger, type Result, ok, err } from '../../core/index.js';\n\nimport type {\n  Artifact,\n  ExecutionMode,\n  PolicyMode,\n  PolicyDecision,\n  PolicyContext,\n  PolicyRule,\n  IPolicyFirewall,\n  PolicyFirewallConfig,\n} from './policy-types.js';\nimport { PolicyError } from './policy-types.js';\nimport { denyMutationsWithoutModeRule, safePathsRule } from './policy-rules.js';\n\n// =============================================================================\n// PolicyFirewall Implementation\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Policy firewall that evaluates rules to authorize or deny operations.\n *\n * Rules are evaluated in order. The first rule that denies the operation\n * stops evaluation and returns the denial. If all rules pass, the operation\n * is allowed.\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * const firewall = new PolicyFirewall({ mode: 'enforce' });\n *\n * // Add rules\n * firewall.addRule(denyMutationsWithoutModeRule);\n * firewall.addRule(safePathsRule);\n *\n * // Evaluate\n * const decision = firewall.evaluate({\n *   toolName: 'write_file',\n *   args: { path: '/etc/passwd' },\n *   mode: 'read-only',\n * });\n *\n * if (!decision.allowed) {\n *   console.error(`Denied: ${decision.reason}`);\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport class PolicyFirewall implements IPolicyFirewall {\n  private readonly rules: PolicyRule[] = [];\n  private mode: PolicyMode;\n  private readonly logger: ILogger;\n\n  constructor(config?: PolicyFirewallConfig) {\n    this.mode = config?.mode ?? 'enforce';\n    this.logger = config?.logger ?? createLogger({ component: 'policy-firewall' });\n\n    // Register initial rules if provided\n    if (config?.rules) {\n      for (const rule of config.rules) {\n        this.rules.push(rule);\n      }\n    }\n\n    this.logger.debug('Policy firewall initialized', {\n      mode: this.mode,\n      ruleCount: this.rules.length,\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Evaluates all policy rules against the given context.\n   *\n   * Rules are evaluated in order. The first rule that denies stops\n   * evaluation and returns the denial decision.\n   *\n   * @param ctx - The policy context to evaluate\n   * @returns The policy decision\n   */\n  evaluate(ctx: PolicyContext): PolicyDecision {\n    this.logger.debug('Evaluating policy', {\n      toolName: ctx.toolName,\n      mode: ctx.mode,\n      ruleCount: this.rules.length,\n    });\n\n    // If no rules, allow by default\n    if (this.rules.length === 0) {\n      return this.allowWithReason(ctx, 'No policy rules configured');\n    }\n\n    // Evaluate each rule in order\n    for (const rule of this.rules) {\n      const decision = rule.check(ctx);\n\n      if (!decision.allowed) {\n        return this.handleDenial(ctx, rule, decision);\n      }\n    }\n\n    // All rules passed\n    return this.allowWithReason(ctx, 'All policy rules passed');\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Creates an allow decision with the given reason and logs it.\n   */\n  private allowWithReason(ctx: PolicyContext, reason: string): PolicyDecision {\n    const decision: PolicyDecision = { allowed: true, reason };\n    this.logDecision(ctx, decision);\n    return decision;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Handles a rule denial, respecting warn mode if configured.\n   */\n  private handleDenial(\n    ctx: PolicyContext,\n    rule: PolicyRule,\n    decision: PolicyDecision\n  ): PolicyDecision {\n    const denialDecision: PolicyDecision = {\n      ...decision,\n      ruleName: rule.name,\n    };\n\n    this.logDecision(ctx, denialDecision);\n\n    // In warn mode, log but still allow\n    if (this.mode === 'warn') {\n      this.logger.warn('Policy denial overridden by warn mode', {\n        toolName: ctx.toolName,\n        ruleName: rule.name,\n        reason: decision.reason,\n      });\n      return {\n        allowed: true,\n        reason: `[WARN MODE] Would be denied: ${decision.reason}`,\n        ruleName: rule.name,\n      };\n    }\n\n    return denialDecision;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Adds a policy rule to the firewall.\n   *\n   * @param rule - The rule to add\n   */\n  addRule(rule: PolicyRule): void {\n    // Prevent duplicate rules\n    const existingIndex = this.rules.findIndex((r) => r.name === rule.name);\n    if (existingIndex >= 0) {\n      this.logger.warn('Replacing existing policy rule', { ruleName: rule.name });\n      this.rules[existingIndex] = rule;\n    } else {\n      this.rules.push(rule);\n      this.logger.debug('Policy rule added', { ruleName: rule.name });\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Removes a policy rule by name.\n   *\n   * @param name - The name of the rule to remove\n   * @returns True if the rule was found and removed\n   */\n  removeRule(name: string): boolean {\n    const index = this.rules.findIndex((r) => r.name === name);\n    if (index >= 0) {\n      this.rules.splice(index, 1);\n      this.logger.debug('Policy rule removed', { ruleName: name });\n      return true;\n    }\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Gets all registered policy rules.\n   *\n   * @returns A readonly array of policy rules\n   */\n  getRules(): readonly PolicyRule[] {\n    return [...this.rules];\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Sets the policy enforcement mode.\n   *\n   * @param mode - The new enforcement mode\n   */\n  setMode(mode: PolicyMode): void {\n    const previousMode = this.mode;\n    this.mode = mode;\n    this.logger.info('Policy mode changed', { from: previousMode, to: mode });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Gets the current policy enforcement mode.\n   *\n   * @returns The current mode\n   */\n  getMode(): PolicyMode {\n    return this.mode;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Logs a policy decision for audit purposes.\n   */\n  private logDecision(ctx: PolicyContext, decision: PolicyDecision): void {\n    const logData = {\n      toolName: ctx.toolName,\n      mode: ctx.mode,\n      workflowId: ctx.workflowId,\n      allowed: decision.allowed,\n      reason: decision.reason,\n      ruleName: decision.ruleName,\n    };\n\n    if (decision.allowed) {\n      this.logger.debug('Policy decision: ALLOWED', logData);\n    } else {\n      this.logger.warn('Policy decision: DENIED', logData);\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Factory Functions\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Creates a policy firewall with default rules.\n *\n * Default rules included:\n * - deny-mutations-without-mode\n * - safe-paths\n *\n * @param config - Optional configuration\n * @returns A configured PolicyFirewall instance\n */\nexport function createDefaultPolicyFirewall(config?: PolicyFirewallConfig): PolicyFirewall {\n  const firewall = new PolicyFirewall(config);\n\n  // Add default rules\n  firewall.addRule(denyMutationsWithoutModeRule);\n  firewall.addRule(safePathsRule);\n\n  return firewall;\n}\n\n/**\n * Evaluates a policy context and returns a Result.\n *\n * This is a convenience function that wraps the firewall evaluation\n * in a Result type for easier error handling.\n *\n * @param firewall - The policy firewall to use\n * @param ctx - The policy context to evaluate\n * @returns Result containing void on success or PolicyError on denial\n */\nexport function evaluatePolicy(\n  firewall: IPolicyFirewall,\n  ctx: PolicyContext\n): Result<void, PolicyError> {\n  const decision = firewall.evaluate(ctx);\n\n  if (decision.allowed) {\n    return ok(undefined);\n  }\n\n  return err(new PolicyError(`Policy denied: ${decision.reason}`, decision));\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a policy context from tool invocation parameters.\n *\n * @param toolName - Name of the tool being invoked\n * @param args - Tool arguments\n * @param options - Additional context options\n * @returns A PolicyContext object\n */\nexport function createPolicyContext(\n  toolName: string,\n  args: unknown,\n  options?: {\n    mode?: ExecutionMode;\n    artifacts?: Map<string, Artifact>;\n    workflowId?: string;\n    allowedPaths?: readonly string[];\n  }\n): PolicyContext {\n  // Build base context with required properties\n  const base = {\n    toolName,\n    args,\n    mode: options?.mode ?? 'read-only',\n  };\n\n  // Use Object.assign to build result, only adding optional properties\n  // when they are actually defined (to satisfy exactOptionalPropertyTypes)\n  const result: Record<string, unknown> = { ...base };\n\n  if (options?.artifacts !== undefined) {\n    result['artifacts'] = options.artifacts;\n  }\n  if (options?.workflowId !== undefined) {\n    result['workflowId'] = options.workflowId;\n  }\n  if (options?.allowedPaths !== undefined) {\n    result['allowedPaths'] = options.allowedPaths;\n  }\n\n  return result as unknown as PolicyContext;\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Re-exports for backward compatibility\n// =============================================================================\n\nexport * from './policy-types.js';\nexport * from './policy-rules.js';\nexport * from './policy-helpers.js';\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/audit - SecureHandler Audit Integration\n *\n * Integration helper to add audit logging to SecureHandler middleware.\n *\n * (Source: Issue #193 - Phase 3 structured audit logging)\n *\n * @module audit/secure-handler-audit\n */\n\nimport type { IAuditLogger, AuditActor, AuditOutcome } from './audit-types.js';\nimport type { RequestContext } from '../mcp/middleware/request-context.js';\n\n/**\n * Configuration for audit-enabled secure handler.\n */\nexport interface AuditHandlerConfig {\n  /** Audit logger instance */\n  auditLogger: IAuditLogger;\n  /** Default actor for requests without caller info */\n  defaultActor?: AuditActor | undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates an AuditActor from RequestContext.\n */\nexport function actorFromContext(ctx: RequestContext, fallback?: AuditActor): AuditActor {\n  const caller = ctx.caller;\n  const clientId = caller.clientId;\n  if (clientId !== undefined && clientId.length > 0) {\n    return {\n      type: clientId.includes('api') ? 'external' : clientId.includes('cli') ? 'agent' : 'user',\n      id: clientId,\n      name: caller.userAgent,\n    };\n  }\n  return fallback ?? { type: 'system', id: 'unknown', name: 'Unknown Caller' };\n}\n\n/**\n * Maps tool result to audit outcome.\n */\nexport function resultToOutcome(\n  isError: boolean | undefined,\n  isPolicyDenied: boolean\n): AuditOutcome {\n  if (isPolicyDenied) return 'denied';\n  if (isError === true) return 'failure';\n  return 'success';\n}\n\n/** Options for logging tool invocation audit */\nexport interface LogToolInvocationOpts {\n  auditLogger: IAuditLogger;\n  toolName: string;\n  outcome: AuditOutcome;\n  actor: AuditActor;\n  requestId: string;\n  durationMs?: number | undefined;\n  errorMessage?: string | undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Logs tool invocation to audit logger.\n */\nexport function logToolInvocationAudit(opts: LogToolInvocationOpts): void {\n  opts.auditLogger.logToolInvocation({\n    toolName: opts.toolName,\n    outcome: opts.outcome,\n    actor: opts.actor,\n    requestId: opts.requestId,\n    durationMs: opts.durationMs,\n    errorMessage: opts.errorMessage,\n  });\n}\n\n/** Options for logging policy audit */\nexport interface LogPolicyAuditOpts {\n  auditLogger: IAuditLogger;\n  policyName: string;\n  decision: 'allow' | 'deny';\n  reason: string;\n  toolName: string;\n  actor: AuditActor;\n  requestId: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Logs policy decision to audit logger.\n */\nexport function logPolicyAudit(opts: LogPolicyAuditOpts): void {\n  opts.auditLogger.logPolicyDecision({\n    policyName: opts.policyName,\n    decision: opts.decision,\n    reason: opts.reason,\n    toolName: opts.toolName,\n    actor: opts.actor,\n    requestId: opts.requestId,\n  });\n}\n\n/** Options for logging rate limit audit */\nexport interface LogRateLimitAuditOpts {\n  auditLogger: IAuditLogger;\n  toolName: string;\n  actor: AuditActor;\n  currentRate: number;\n  limitRate: number;\n  requestId: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Logs rate limit violation to audit logger.\n */\nexport function logRateLimitAudit(opts: LogRateLimitAuditOpts): void {\n  opts.auditLogger.logRateLimitViolation({\n    toolName: opts.toolName,\n    actor: opts.actor,\n    currentRate: opts.currentRate,\n    limitRate: opts.limitRate,\n    requestId: opts.requestId,\n  });\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Structured Tool Error Envelope\n *\n * Caller-facing error contract for MCP tools. Replaces the opaque\n * `{ isError: true, content: [{ text }] }` string shape with a structured\n * envelope so callers (other tools, voter panels, the Claude/Codex/Gemini/\n * OpenCode harnesses) can reason about retry-safety and recovery path\n * instead of string-matching arbitrary text.\n *\n * SCOPE — this envelope is caller-facing ONLY. The routing/circuit-breaker\n * layer classifies adapter subprocess failures through its own\n * `categorizeOutcomeError()` path (orchestration/outcomes/outcome-types.ts)\n * and never reads this envelope. `coarsenFailureCategory()` is a one-way\n * convenience for the rare tool that internally catches an\n * `OutcomeFailureCategory`-classified error and wants to surface it to its\n * caller — it is not, and must not become, a routing input. The two\n * taxonomies serve different layers; this is the single authoritative\n * projection between them.\n *\n * @module mcp/error-envelope\n * @see Issue #2649\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport type { OutcomeFailureCategory } from '../orchestration/outcomes/outcome-types.js';\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Schema\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Caller-facing error category. Deliberately coarser than the routing\n * layer's 11-value `OutcomeFailureCategory` — a tool's caller only needs\n * enough resolution to choose a recovery path:\n *\n * - `transient`  — network blip, rate limit, timeout. Retry is safe.\n * - `validation` — input shape/values wrong. Caller must fix its args.\n * - `permission` — auth / authorization / sandbox / access-policy denial.\n * - `business`   — domain-logic refusal (dedup hit, precondition not met).\n *                  An expected, non-bug outcome — not a failure to retry.\n * - `internal`   — unexpected, bug-class. Not retry-class; escalate.\n */\nexport const ErrorCategorySchema = z.enum([\n  'transient',\n  'validation',\n  'permission',\n  'business',\n  'internal',\n]);\n\nexport type ErrorCategory = z.infer<typeof ErrorCategorySchema>;\n\n/**\n * Structured error envelope returned by MCP tools. Carried in the tool\n * result's `structuredContent` under the `error` key; the human-readable\n * `message` is also mirrored into `content[].text` for display.\n */\nexport const ToolErrorEnvelopeSchema = z.object({\n  errorCategory: ErrorCategorySchema,\n  /** Whether retrying the same call could succeed without caller changes. */\n  isRetryable: z.boolean(),\n  /** Human-readable summary. Bounded to keep stack traces out of results. */\n  message: z.string().min(1).max(2000),\n  /**\n   * Optional structured context. MUST NOT carry secrets, credentials,\n   * absolute filesystem paths, or raw Error/response objects — those are\n   * an information-disclosure risk (this field is not output-sanitized).\n   */\n  detail: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()).optional(),\n});\n\nexport type ToolErrorEnvelope = z.infer<typeof ToolErrorEnvelopeSchema>;\n\n/**\n * `_meta` key the envelope is carried under on a tool result. It lives in\n * `_meta` — NOT `structuredContent` — because the MCP client validates\n * `structuredContent` against the tool's `outputSchema` even on error\n * results (SDK `client/index.js`: it only guards on presence, not on\n * `isError`), so an envelope in `structuredContent` breaks every tool\n * that has an `outputSchema`. `_meta` is the spec's out-of-band metadata\n * channel and is never schema-validated. Namespaced to avoid collisions.\n */\nexport const ERROR_ENVELOPE_META_KEY = 'nexus-agents/error';\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Helpers\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Default retry-safety for a category. Only `transient` errors are\n * retry-safe by default; callers can override per-call when a specific\n * `internal` or `business` error is known to be retryable.\n */\nexport function defaultRetryable(category: ErrorCategory): boolean {\n  return category === 'transient';\n}\n\n/**\n * The single authoritative projection from the routing layer's 11-value\n * `OutcomeFailureCategory` down to the 5-value caller-facing\n * `ErrorCategory`. A `Record` over every key — adding a 12th\n * `OutcomeFailureCategory` value without extending this map is a compile\n * error, which is the drift safeguard.\n *\n * One-way only: there is no `un-coarsen`, by design — the routing layer\n * keeps its own granular classification and never round-trips through here.\n */\nconst FAILURE_CATEGORY_COARSENING: Record<OutcomeFailureCategory, ErrorCategory> = {\n  timeout: 'transient',\n  rate_limit: 'transient',\n  connection: 'transient',\n  authentication: 'permission',\n  validation: 'validation',\n  parse: 'validation',\n  crash: 'internal',\n  adapter_unavailable: 'internal',\n  execution: 'internal',\n  generic: 'internal',\n  unknown: 'internal',\n};\n\n/**\n * Coarsen a routing-layer `OutcomeFailureCategory` to a caller-facing\n * `ErrorCategory`. Use this only when a tool has caught an error already\n * classified by the routing layer and wants to surface it in its envelope.\n */\nexport function coarsenFailureCategory(category: OutcomeFailureCategory): ErrorCategory {\n  return FAILURE_CATEGORY_COARSENING[category];\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract and validate a `ToolErrorEnvelope` from a tool result's `_meta`\n * object. Returns `null` when `_meta` is absent or does not carry a\n * parseable envelope under {@link ERROR_ENVELOPE_META_KEY}. Used by\n * envelope-aware callers.\n */\nexport function parseToolErrorEnvelope(meta: unknown): ToolErrorEnvelope | null {\n  if (meta === null || typeof meta !== 'object') {\n    return null;\n  }\n  const candidate = (meta as Record<string, unknown>)[ERROR_ENVELOPE_META_KEY];\n  const result = ToolErrorEnvelopeSchema.safeParse(candidate);\n  return result.success ? result.data : null;\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Tool Result Helpers\n *\n * Canonical type and factory functions for MCP tool results.\n * Extracted from index.ts to allow tool implementations to import\n * without circular dependencies.\n *\n * @module mcp/tools/tool-result\n */\n\nimport type { ILogger } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport type { RateLimiter } from '../middleware/rate-limiter.js';\nimport type { SecurityConfig } from '../../config/schemas.js';\nimport {\n  defaultRetryable,\n  ERROR_ENVELOPE_META_KEY,\n  type ErrorCategory,\n  type ToolErrorEnvelope,\n} from '../error-envelope.js';\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Base Dependencies\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Common dependency interface shared by all MCP tool handlers.\n *\n * Tool-specific deps interfaces should extend this base.\n * (Source: Issue #1439 — DRY extraction of 25 duplicated Deps interfaces)\n */\nexport interface BaseMcpToolDeps {\n  /** Optional logger */\n  logger?: ILogger;\n  /** Rate limiter for throttling tool calls (required) */\n  rateLimiter: RateLimiter;\n  /** Security configuration (includes timeout settings) */\n  security?: SecurityConfig | undefined;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Types\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * MCP tool content types.\n */\nexport interface TextContent {\n  type: 'text';\n  text: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * MCP tool result.\n *\n * Uses mutable properties for compatibility with secure-handler\n * sanitization (which rewrites `text` in-place).\n */\nexport interface ToolResult {\n  content: Array<TextContent>;\n  isError?: boolean;\n  /** Structured output for SDK outputSchema validation (Issue #1117) */\n  structuredContent?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /**\n   * Out-of-band metadata, never validated against `outputSchema`. The\n   * structured error envelope (#2649) is carried here under\n   * `ERROR_ENVELOPE_META_KEY`.\n   */\n  _meta?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Factory Functions\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Creates a successful tool result.\n *\n * @param text - The result text\n * @returns A ToolResult with the text content\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * return toolSuccess(JSON.stringify({ status: 'ok', data: result }));\n * ```\n */\nexport function toolSuccess(text: string): ToolResult {\n  return {\n    content: [{ type: 'text', text }],\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a successful tool result with structured content for outputSchema validation.\n *\n * When a tool is registered with outputSchema, the SDK validates structuredContent\n * against the schema. This helper returns both text (for display) and structured data.\n *\n * @param data - The structured result data (must match the tool's outputSchema)\n * @returns A ToolResult with both text content and structuredContent\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * return toolSuccessStructured({ experts: [...], count: 10 });\n * ```\n */\nexport function toolSuccessStructured(data: Record<string, unknown>): ToolResult {\n  return {\n    content: [{ type: 'text', text: JSON.stringify(data, null, 2) }],\n    structuredContent: data,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Input for {@link toolStructuredError}. `isRetryable` is optional — when\n * omitted it is derived from the category via `defaultRetryable()`.\n */\nexport interface ToolStructuredErrorInput {\n  errorCategory: ErrorCategory;\n  message: string;\n  isRetryable?: boolean;\n  detail?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a structured error tool result (#2649). The envelope is carried\n * in `_meta` (under `ERROR_ENVELOPE_META_KEY`) — NOT `structuredContent`,\n * which the MCP client validates against the tool's `outputSchema` even\n * on error results. `message` is mirrored into `content[].text` for\n * display.\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * if (!validated.success) {\n *   return toolStructuredError({\n *     errorCategory: 'validation',\n *     message: `Validation error: ${formatZodError(validated.error)}`,\n *   });\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport function toolStructuredError(input: ToolStructuredErrorInput): ToolResult {\n  const envelope: ToolErrorEnvelope = {\n    errorCategory: input.errorCategory,\n    isRetryable: input.isRetryable ?? defaultRetryable(input.errorCategory),\n    message: input.message,\n    ...(input.detail !== undefined ? { detail: input.detail } : {}),\n  };\n  return {\n    isError: true,\n    content: [{ type: 'text', text: envelope.message }],\n    _meta: { [ERROR_ENVELOPE_META_KEY]: envelope },\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates an error tool result.\n *\n * Back-compat alias for {@link toolStructuredError} — maps to the\n * conservative `internal` / non-retryable envelope. New code should call\n * `toolStructuredError` directly with the correct category; this alias\n * exists so the ~64 legacy call sites keep working during the #2649\n * migration sweep.\n *\n * @param message - The error message\n * @returns A ToolResult with isError set to true and an `internal` envelope\n */\nexport function toolError(message: string): ToolResult {\n  return toolStructuredError({ errorCategory: 'internal', message });\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Request Context Middleware\n *\n * Provides request ID generation and caller context tracking for MCP tools.\n * (Source: Issue #185 Phase 1 - Request context & PolicyFirewall integration)\n *\n * @module mcp/middleware/request-context\n */\n\nimport { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';\nimport { getTimeProvider } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport type { TrustTier } from '../../security/trust-types.js';\n\n/**\n * Authenticated user information.\n * (Source: Issue #739 - MCP authentication)\n */\nexport interface AuthenticatedUser {\n  /** Unique user/client identifier */\n  readonly id: string;\n  /** Human-readable name (optional) */\n  readonly name?: string;\n  /** Granted permissions/scopes (optional) */\n  readonly permissions?: readonly string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Caller identification for audit trails.\n */\nexport interface CallerInfo {\n  /** Client identifier (e.g., 'claude-cli', 'gemini-cli') */\n  readonly clientId?: string;\n  /** User agent string if available */\n  readonly userAgent?: string;\n  /** Session ID for request correlation */\n  readonly sessionId?: string;\n  /** IP address or transport identifier */\n  readonly transport?: string;\n  /** Whether the request is authenticated (Issue #739) */\n  readonly authenticated?: boolean;\n  /** Authenticated user information (Issue #739) */\n  readonly authenticatedUser?: AuthenticatedUser;\n}\n\n/**\n * Request context for MCP tool invocations.\n * Immutable once created.\n */\nexport interface RequestContext {\n  /** Unique request identifier (format: req_<16 hex chars>) */\n  readonly requestId: string;\n  /** Timestamp when request was received (ISO 8601, ET) */\n  readonly timestamp: string;\n  /** Tool being invoked */\n  readonly toolName: string;\n  /** Caller information for audit */\n  readonly caller: CallerInfo;\n  /**\n   * Trust tier for this request (Issue #828).\n   * Derived from caller authentication state:\n   * - '1' = Authenticated + known client, or stdio (local-only)\n   * - '2' = Authenticated via network\n   * - '3' = Unauthenticated network request\n   * - '4' = Request with detected injection patterns (set by sanitizer)\n   */\n  readonly trustTier: TrustTier;\n  /** Trace ID for distributed tracing correlation */\n  readonly traceId?: string;\n  /** Parent span ID if part of a larger trace */\n  readonly parentSpanId?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for creating a request context.\n */\nexport interface CreateContextOptions {\n  /** Tool name being invoked */\n  toolName: string;\n  /** Optional caller information */\n  caller?: CallerInfo;\n  /** Optional explicit trust tier override (defaults to derived from caller) */\n  trustTier?: TrustTier;\n  /** Optional trace ID for correlation */\n  traceId?: string;\n  /** Optional parent span ID */\n  parentSpanId?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Generates a cryptographically secure request ID.\n * Format: req_<16 hex characters>\n *\n * @returns Unique request identifier\n */\nexport function generateRequestId(): string {\n  const bytes = randomBytes(8);\n  return `req_${bytes.toString('hex')}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Generates a session ID for request correlation.\n * Format: sess_<12 hex characters>\n *\n * @returns Unique session identifier\n */\nexport function generateSessionId(): string {\n  const bytes = randomBytes(6);\n  return `sess_${bytes.toString('hex')}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Formats timestamp in ISO 8601 format with ET timezone.\n * (Source: CLAUDE.md - Time Authority section)\n */\nfunction formatTimestamp(): string {\n  const now = new Date(getTimeProvider().now());\n  const formatter = new Intl.DateTimeFormat('en-US', {\n    timeZone: 'America/New_York',\n    timeZoneName: 'shortOffset',\n  });\n  const parts = formatter.formatToParts(now);\n  const offset = parts.find((p) => p.type === 'timeZoneName')?.value ?? '-05:00';\n  const base = now.toLocaleString('sv-SE', {\n    timeZone: 'America/New_York',\n    hour12: false,\n  });\n  return base.replace(' ', 'T') + offset.replace('GMT', '');\n}\n\n/**\n * Derives trust tier from caller authentication state (Issue #828).\n *\n * - Authenticated + known CLI client (claude, gemini, codex) → Tier 1\n * - stdio transport (local-only, no network) → Tier 1\n * - Authenticated via network → Tier 2\n * - Unauthenticated → Tier 3\n */\nexport function deriveTrustTier(caller: CallerInfo): TrustTier {\n  const knownClients = ['claude-cli', 'gemini-cli', 'codex-cli'];\n\n  if (caller.transport === 'stdio') return '1';\n\n  if (caller.authenticated === true) {\n    if (caller.clientId !== undefined && knownClients.includes(caller.clientId)) {\n      return '1';\n    }\n    return '2';\n  }\n\n  return '3';\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates an immutable request context for an MCP tool invocation.\n *\n * @param options - Context creation options\n * @returns Immutable request context\n */\nexport function createRequestContext(options: CreateContextOptions): RequestContext {\n  const caller = options.caller ?? {};\n  const context: RequestContext = {\n    requestId: generateRequestId(),\n    timestamp: formatTimestamp(),\n    toolName: options.toolName,\n    caller,\n    trustTier: options.trustTier ?? deriveTrustTier(caller),\n    ...(options.traceId !== undefined && { traceId: options.traceId }),\n    ...(options.parentSpanId !== undefined && { parentSpanId: options.parentSpanId }),\n  };\n\n  // Freeze to ensure immutability\n  return Object.freeze(context);\n}\n\n/**\n * Extracts caller info from MCP transport metadata.\n * Currently supports extracting from request headers or environment.\n *\n * @param metadata - Optional transport metadata\n * @returns Caller information\n */\nexport function extractCallerInfo(metadata?: Record<string, unknown>): CallerInfo {\n  const caller: CallerInfo = {};\n\n  if (metadata !== undefined) {\n    // Extract all available fields from metadata\n    const extracted: CallerInfo = {\n      ...caller,\n      ...(typeof metadata['clientId'] === 'string' ? { clientId: metadata['clientId'] } : {}),\n      ...(typeof metadata['userAgent'] === 'string' ? { userAgent: metadata['userAgent'] } : {}),\n      ...(typeof metadata['sessionId'] === 'string' ? { sessionId: metadata['sessionId'] } : {}),\n    };\n\n    // If any metadata was extracted, return it directly\n    if (\n      typeof metadata['clientId'] === 'string' ||\n      typeof metadata['userAgent'] === 'string' ||\n      typeof metadata['sessionId'] === 'string'\n    ) {\n      return extracted;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Fallback to environment variables for known CLI tools\n  const claudeSession = process.env['CLAUDE_SESSION_ID'];\n  if (claudeSession !== undefined) {\n    return { ...caller, clientId: 'claude-cli', sessionId: claudeSession };\n  }\n\n  const geminiSession = process.env['GEMINI_SESSION_ID'];\n  if (geminiSession !== undefined) {\n    return { ...caller, clientId: 'gemini-cli', sessionId: geminiSession };\n  }\n\n  return caller;\n}\n\n/**\n * Formats request context for logging.\n * Extracts essential fields for log context.\n *\n * @param ctx - Request context\n * @returns Log-friendly context object\n */\nexport function contextForLogging(ctx: RequestContext): Record<string, unknown> {\n  return {\n    requestId: ctx.requestId,\n    toolName: ctx.toolName,\n    trustTier: ctx.trustTier,\n    ...(ctx.caller.clientId !== undefined && { clientId: ctx.caller.clientId }),\n    ...(ctx.traceId !== undefined && { traceId: ctx.traceId }),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Type guard to check if a value is a valid RequestContext.\n */\nexport function isRequestContext(value: unknown): value is RequestContext {\n  if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  const obj = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n  return (\n    typeof obj['requestId'] === 'string' &&\n    obj['requestId'].startsWith('req_') &&\n    typeof obj['timestamp'] === 'string' &&\n    typeof obj['toolName'] === 'string' &&\n    typeof obj['caller'] === 'object' &&\n    typeof obj['trustTier'] === 'string' &&\n    ['1', '2', '3', '4'].includes(obj['trustTier'])\n  );\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Tool Input Sanitizer Middleware\n *\n * Lightweight sanitization for MCP tool arguments. Strips XML-like\n * conversation injection tags and detects prompt injection patterns\n * in all string values within tool arguments.\n *\n * Defense-in-depth layer that protects against prompt injection\n * through tool arguments containing external content.\n *\n * @module mcp/middleware/tool-input-sanitizer\n * (Source: Issue #828 — Wire security modules into production pipeline)\n */\n\nimport type { ILogger } from '../../core/index.js';\n\n/**\n * Result of sanitizing tool input.\n */\nexport interface SanitizeToolInputResult {\n  /** Sanitized arguments (XML tags stripped from string values) */\n  readonly sanitized: unknown;\n  /** Whether any modification was made */\n  readonly wasModified: boolean;\n  /** Count of strings that were modified */\n  readonly modifiedCount: number;\n  /** Injection patterns detected (for logging) */\n  readonly detectedPatterns: readonly string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * XML-like tags that mimic conversation structure or system prompts.\n * Stripping these prevents prompt injection through tool arguments.\n */\nconst XML_INJECTION_PATTERN =\n  /<\\/?(system|human|assistant|instructions|user|prompt|context|tool_use|tool_result)\\b[^>]*>/gi;\n\n/**\n * Patterns that indicate attempted prompt injection.\n * These are logged but not necessarily stripped (detection only).\n */\nconst INJECTION_DETECTORS: ReadonlyArray<{ name: string; pattern: RegExp }> = [\n  { name: 'system_prompt_override', pattern: /ignore (?:all )?previous (?:instructions|rules)/i },\n  { name: 'role_impersonation', pattern: /i(?:'m| am) the (?:repo |project )?(?:owner|admin)/i },\n  { name: 'hidden_instruction', pattern: /<!--[\\s\\S]*?(?:execute|delete|merge|apply)[\\s\\S]*?-->/i },\n];\n\n/**\n * Sanitizes a single string value by stripping XML injection tags.\n * Returns the cleaned string and whether it was modified.\n */\nfunction sanitizeString(value: string): { cleaned: string; modified: boolean } {\n  XML_INJECTION_PATTERN.lastIndex = 0;\n  const cleaned = value.replace(XML_INJECTION_PATTERN, '');\n  return { cleaned, modified: cleaned !== value };\n}\n\n/**\n * Detects injection patterns in a string without modifying it.\n */\nfunction detectPatterns(value: string): string[] {\n  const detected: string[] = [];\n  for (const { name, pattern } of INJECTION_DETECTORS) {\n    pattern.lastIndex = 0;\n    if (pattern.test(value)) {\n      detected.push(name);\n    }\n  }\n  return detected;\n}\n\n/**\n * Recursively sanitizes all string values in an object/array.\n * Returns a deep copy with XML injection tags stripped from strings.\n */\nfunction sanitizeValue(value: unknown, stats: { count: number; patterns: string[] }): unknown {\n  if (typeof value === 'string') {\n    const patterns = detectPatterns(value);\n    if (patterns.length > 0) {\n      stats.patterns.push(...patterns);\n    }\n    const { cleaned, modified } = sanitizeString(value);\n    if (modified) stats.count++;\n    return cleaned;\n  }\n\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n    return value.map((item) => sanitizeValue(item, stats));\n  }\n\n  if (value !== null && typeof value === 'object') {\n    const result: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n    for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(value as Record<string, unknown>)) {\n      result[key] = sanitizeValue(val, stats);\n    }\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  return value;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitizes MCP tool arguments by stripping XML injection tags\n * from all string values and detecting injection patterns.\n *\n * @param args - Tool arguments to sanitize\n * @returns Sanitized result with modification tracking\n */\nexport function sanitizeToolInput(args: unknown): SanitizeToolInputResult {\n  if (args === undefined || args === null) {\n    return { sanitized: args, wasModified: false, modifiedCount: 0, detectedPatterns: [] };\n  }\n\n  const stats = { count: 0, patterns: [] as string[] };\n  const sanitized = sanitizeValue(args, stats);\n  const uniquePatterns = [...new Set(stats.patterns)];\n\n  return {\n    sanitized,\n    wasModified: stats.count > 0,\n    modifiedCount: stats.count,\n    detectedPatterns: uniquePatterns,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Logs sanitization results when modifications or detections occur.\n */\nexport function logSanitizationResult(\n  result: SanitizeToolInputResult,\n  logger: ILogger,\n  toolName: string\n): void {\n  if (result.wasModified) {\n    logger.warn('Tool input sanitized — XML injection tags stripped', {\n      tool: toolName,\n      modifiedFields: result.modifiedCount,\n    });\n  }\n  if (result.detectedPatterns.length > 0) {\n    logger.warn('Injection patterns detected in tool input', {\n      tool: toolName,\n      patterns: result.detectedPatterns,\n    });\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Secure Handler Middleware\n *\n * Higher-order function that wraps MCP tool handlers with security middleware:\n * - RequestContext creation and tracking\n * - PolicyFirewall evaluation\n * - Logging with request context\n *\n * (Source: Issue #185 Phase 1 - PolicyFirewall integration)\n *\n * @module mcp/middleware/secure-handler\n */\n\nimport type { ILogger } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { createLogger, getTimeProvider } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport {\n  createRequestContext,\n  contextForLogging,\n  type RequestContext,\n  type CallerInfo,\n} from './request-context.js';\nimport { type IPolicyFirewall, type ExecutionMode, createPolicyContext } from './policy.js';\nimport type { RateLimiter } from './rate-limiter.js';\nimport type { IAuditLogger } from '../../audit/audit-types.js';\nimport { actorFromContext, resultToOutcome } from '../../audit/secure-handler-audit.js';\nimport {\n  sanitizeToolInput,\n  logSanitizationResult,\n  type SanitizeToolInputResult,\n} from './tool-input-sanitizer.js';\nimport { toolStructuredError, type ToolResult } from '../tools/tool-result.js';\n\nexport type { ToolResult };\n\n/**\n * Tool handler function signature.\n */\nexport type ToolHandler = (args: unknown) => Promise<ToolResult>;\n\n/**\n * Security tier for MCP tools. Controls input validation strictness.\n *\n * - 'standard': Default. XML injection tag stripping only (existing behavior).\n * - 'user-facing': Accepts user task descriptions. Rejects known injection patterns.\n * - 'external': Processes external URLs/content. Strictest validation.\n *\n * @see Issue #1586 — Tiered security validation\n */\nexport type SecurityTier = 'standard' | 'user-facing' | 'external';\n\n/**\n * Configuration for the secure handler wrapper.\n */\nexport interface SecureHandlerConfig {\n  /** Tool name for logging and policy evaluation */\n  toolName: string;\n  /** Security tier controlling input validation strictness (default: 'standard') */\n  securityTier?: SecurityTier;\n  /** Policy firewall instance (optional - if not provided, policy checks are skipped) */\n  policyFirewall?: IPolicyFirewall;\n  /** Execution mode for policy evaluation */\n  executionMode?: ExecutionMode;\n  /** Allowed paths for file operations */\n  allowedPaths?: readonly string[];\n  /** Rate limiter instance (optional) */\n  rateLimiter?: RateLimiter;\n  /** Logger instance (optional - creates default if not provided) */\n  logger?: ILogger;\n  /** Caller information extractor (optional) */\n  callerInfo?: CallerInfo;\n  /** Audit logger for structured audit trail (Issue #740 Phase 2) */\n  auditLogger?: IAuditLogger;\n}\n\n/**\n * Extended handler context passed to the wrapped handler.\n */\nexport interface HandlerContext {\n  /** Request context for this invocation */\n  requestContext: RequestContext;\n  /** Logger with request context attached */\n  logger: ILogger;\n}\n\n/**\n * Tool handler with context signature.\n */\nexport type ContextAwareHandler = (args: unknown, ctx: HandlerContext) => Promise<ToolResult>;\n\n/**\n * Creates a rate limit error response. Rate limits are transient — the\n * structured envelope marks it retryable (#2649).\n */\nfunction rateLimitError(nextTokenMs: number): ToolResult {\n  return toolStructuredError({\n    errorCategory: 'transient',\n    message: `Rate limit exceeded. Try again in ${String(nextTokenMs)}ms.`,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a policy denial error response — an access-control denial,\n * categorized `permission` (#2649).\n */\nfunction policyDeniedError(reason: string, requestId: string): ToolResult {\n  return toolStructuredError({\n    errorCategory: 'permission',\n    message: `Policy denied: ${reason} (request: ${requestId})`,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates an internal error response (#2649).\n */\nfunction internalError(message: string, requestId: string): ToolResult {\n  return toolStructuredError({\n    errorCategory: 'internal',\n    message: `Internal error: ${message} (request: ${requestId})`,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Maximum input size for tool arguments (10MB).\n * Prevents memory exhaustion from oversized payloads.\n * (Source: Issue #740 - MCP security hardening)\n */\nconst MAX_INPUT_SIZE_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024;\n\n/**\n * Patterns that indicate leaked secrets in tool output.\n * Each pattern is tested against tool response text.\n */\n// #3109: every pattern is GLOBAL so `replace` redacts ALL matches, not just\n// the first — two secrets of the same shape (e.g. a rotated old+new key) must\n// both be redacted before the result reaches the MCP caller.\nconst SECRET_PATTERNS: readonly RegExp[] = [\n  // API keys with common prefixes\n  /\\b(sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,})\\b/g,\n  /\\b(pk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,})\\b/g,\n  // AWS-style keys\n  /\\b(AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16})\\b/g,\n  // Bearer tokens in output\n  /Bearer\\s+[a-zA-Z0-9_\\-.~+/]+=*/g,\n  // Generic long hex secrets (40+ chars)\n  /\\b[0-9a-f]{40,}\\b/gi,\n  // password= or token= in output\n  /(?:password|token|secret|apikey|api_key)\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S{8,}/gi,\n];\n\n/** Redact detected secrets from tool output text. */\nfunction sanitizeOutput(text: string, logger: ILogger): string {\n  let sanitized = text;\n  for (const pattern of SECRET_PATTERNS) {\n    // #3109: replace unconditionally — do NOT guard with pattern.test(), which\n    // advances a global regex's lastIndex and makes replace() skip earlier\n    // matches. `String.replace` with a global regex redacts every occurrence\n    // and resets lastIndex to 0 on completion, so the shared pattern stays\n    // safe across calls. Detect a redaction via a before/after compare.\n    const before = sanitized;\n    sanitized = sanitized.replace(pattern, '[REDACTED]');\n    if (sanitized !== before) {\n      logger.warn('Potential secret detected in tool output, redacting', {\n        pattern: pattern.source.slice(0, 30),\n      });\n    }\n  }\n  return sanitized;\n}\n\n/** Sanitize all text content in a tool result (Issue #740). */\nfunction sanitizeToolResult(result: ToolResult, logger: ILogger): void {\n  for (const item of result.content) {\n    item.text = sanitizeOutput(item.text, logger);\n  }\n}\n\n/** Validates input size and returns error if too large. */\nfunction checkInputSize(args: unknown, logger: ILogger, requestId: string): ToolResult | null {\n  if (args === undefined) return null;\n  const inputSize = JSON.stringify(args).length;\n  if (inputSize > MAX_INPUT_SIZE_BYTES) {\n    logger.warn('Input size exceeds limit', { inputSize, limit: MAX_INPUT_SIZE_BYTES });\n    return internalError('Input too large', requestId);\n  }\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Checks rate limiter and returns error if exceeded.\n */\nfunction checkRateLimit(rateLimiter: RateLimiter, logger: ILogger): ToolResult | null {\n  const acquired = rateLimiter.tryAcquire();\n  if (!acquired) {\n    const state = rateLimiter.getState();\n    logger.warn('Rate limit exceeded');\n    return rateLimitError(state.nextTokenMs);\n  }\n  return null;\n}\n\n/** Options for policy check */\ninterface PolicyCheckOptions {\n  firewall: IPolicyFirewall;\n  toolName: string;\n  args: unknown;\n  mode: ExecutionMode;\n  allowedPaths?: readonly string[] | undefined;\n  logger: ILogger;\n  requestId: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Evaluates policy firewall and returns error if denied.\n */\nfunction checkPolicy(opts: PolicyCheckOptions): ToolResult | null {\n  const ctxOpts = {\n    mode: opts.mode,\n    ...(opts.allowedPaths && { allowedPaths: opts.allowedPaths }),\n  };\n  const decision = opts.firewall.evaluate(createPolicyContext(opts.toolName, opts.args, ctxOpts));\n\n  if (!decision.allowed) {\n    opts.logger.warn('Policy denied tool execution', {\n      reason: decision.reason,\n      ruleName: decision.ruleName,\n    });\n    return policyDeniedError(decision.reason, opts.requestId);\n  }\n  opts.logger.debug('Policy check passed', { reason: decision.reason });\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Executes handler and logs result.\n */\nasync function executeHandler(\n  handler: ToolHandler | ContextAwareHandler,\n  args: unknown,\n  ctx: HandlerContext,\n  logger: ILogger\n): Promise<ToolResult> {\n  const startTime = getTimeProvider().now();\n  const result =\n    handler.length >= 2 ? await handler(args, ctx) : await (handler as ToolHandler)(args);\n\n  const durationMs = getTimeProvider().now() - startTime;\n  if (result.isError === true) {\n    logger.warn('Tool execution completed with error', { durationMs });\n  } else {\n    logger.info('Tool execution completed', { durationMs });\n  }\n  return result;\n}\n\n/** Emits an audit event for a completed tool invocation. */\nfunction emitToolAudit(\n  auditLogger: IAuditLogger,\n  toolName: string,\n  ctx: RequestContext,\n  result: ToolResult,\n  durationMs: number\n): void {\n  const actor = actorFromContext(ctx);\n  const outcome = resultToOutcome(result.isError, false);\n  auditLogger.logToolInvocation({\n    toolName,\n    outcome,\n    actor,\n    requestId: ctx.requestId,\n    durationMs,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Emits an audit event when a tool handler throws (or returns a rejected\n * Promise) — closes the audit-trail gap where unexpected exceptions left\n * no auditor record (security-review fallout from #2191).\n */\nfunction emitToolAuditException(\n  auditLogger: IAuditLogger,\n  toolName: string,\n  ctx: RequestContext,\n  durationMs: number\n): void {\n  const actor = actorFromContext(ctx);\n  auditLogger.logToolInvocation({\n    toolName,\n    outcome: 'error',\n    actor,\n    requestId: ctx.requestId,\n    durationMs,\n  });\n}\n\n/** Emits an audit event for a policy denial. */\nfunction emitPolicyAudit(\n  auditLogger: IAuditLogger,\n  toolName: string,\n  ctx: RequestContext,\n  reason: string\n): void {\n  const actor = actorFromContext(ctx);\n  auditLogger.logPolicyDecision({\n    policyName: 'default',\n    decision: 'deny',\n    reason,\n    toolName,\n    actor,\n    requestId: ctx.requestId,\n  });\n}\n\n/** Emits an audit event for a rate limit violation. */\nfunction emitRateLimitAudit(\n  auditLogger: IAuditLogger,\n  toolName: string,\n  ctx: RequestContext\n): void {\n  const actor = actorFromContext(ctx);\n  auditLogger.logRateLimitViolation({\n    toolName,\n    actor,\n    currentRate: 0,\n    limitRate: 0,\n    requestId: ctx.requestId,\n  });\n}\n\n/** Reject inputs with detected injection patterns for elevated security tiers. */\nfunction checkSecurityTier(\n  config: SecureHandlerConfig,\n  sanitizeResult: SanitizeToolInputResult,\n  logger: ILogger\n): ToolResult | null {\n  const tier = config.securityTier ?? 'standard';\n  if (tier === 'standard' || sanitizeResult.detectedPatterns.length === 0) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  logger.warn('Input rejected by security tier validation', {\n    tier,\n    patterns: sanitizeResult.detectedPatterns,\n  });\n  // Security-tier rejection of suspected injection patterns — an\n  // access-control denial, categorized `permission` (#2649).\n  return toolStructuredError({\n    errorCategory: 'permission',\n    message:\n      `Input validation failed: detected patterns [${sanitizeResult.detectedPatterns.join(', ')}]. ` +\n      'Remove prompt injection patterns and retry.',\n  });\n}\n\n/** Pre-execution checks: input size, input sanitization, rate limit, policy. */\nfunction runPreChecks(\n  config: SecureHandlerConfig,\n  args: unknown,\n  mode: ExecutionMode,\n  requestContext: RequestContext,\n  logger: ILogger\n): { error: ToolResult | null; sanitizedArgs: unknown } {\n  const sizeResult = checkInputSize(args, logger, requestContext.requestId);\n  if (sizeResult) return { error: sizeResult, sanitizedArgs: args };\n\n  // Sanitize tool input: strip XML injection tags, detect injection patterns (Issue #828)\n  const sanitizeResult = sanitizeToolInput(args);\n  logSanitizationResult(sanitizeResult, logger, config.toolName);\n  const sanitizedArgs = sanitizeResult.wasModified ? sanitizeResult.sanitized : args;\n\n  // Tiered validation: reject (not strip) for user-facing/external tools (Issue #1586)\n  const tierError = checkSecurityTier(config, sanitizeResult, logger);\n  if (tierError !== null) return { error: tierError, sanitizedArgs };\n\n  if (config.rateLimiter) {\n    const rlResult = checkRateLimit(config.rateLimiter, logger);\n    if (rlResult) {\n      if (config.auditLogger)\n        emitRateLimitAudit(config.auditLogger, config.toolName, requestContext);\n      return { error: rlResult, sanitizedArgs };\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (config.policyFirewall) {\n    const pResult = checkPolicy({\n      firewall: config.policyFirewall,\n      toolName: config.toolName,\n      args: sanitizedArgs,\n      mode,\n      allowedPaths: config.allowedPaths,\n      logger,\n      requestId: requestContext.requestId,\n    });\n    if (pResult) {\n      if (config.auditLogger)\n        emitPolicyAudit(config.auditLogger, config.toolName, requestContext, 'policy denied');\n      return { error: pResult, sanitizedArgs };\n    }\n  }\n\n  return { error: null, sanitizedArgs };\n}\n\n/**\n * Wraps a tool handler with security middleware.\n *\n * @param handler - The original tool handler or context-aware handler\n * @param config - Security configuration\n * @returns Wrapped handler with security middleware\n */\nexport function createSecureHandler(\n  handler: ToolHandler | ContextAwareHandler,\n  config: SecureHandlerConfig\n): ToolHandler {\n  const logger = config.logger ?? createLogger({ tool: config.toolName });\n  const mode = config.executionMode ?? 'read-only';\n\n  return async (args: unknown): Promise<ToolResult> => {\n    const ctxOpts = {\n      toolName: config.toolName,\n      ...(config.callerInfo && { caller: config.callerInfo }),\n    };\n    const requestContext = createRequestContext(ctxOpts);\n    const requestLogger = logger.child(contextForLogging(requestContext));\n    requestLogger.info('Tool invocation started');\n\n    const { error: preCheckError, sanitizedArgs } = runPreChecks(\n      config,\n      args,\n      mode,\n      requestContext,\n      requestLogger\n    );\n    if (preCheckError) return preCheckError;\n\n    return executeAndAudit(handler, sanitizedArgs, requestContext, requestLogger, config);\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Executes the wrapped handler with audit emission on both the success and\n * exception paths. Extracted from `createSecureHandler` to keep that\n * function within the 50-line budget.\n */\nasync function executeAndAudit(\n  handler: ToolHandler | ContextAwareHandler,\n  sanitizedArgs: unknown,\n  requestContext: RequestContext,\n  requestLogger: ILogger,\n  config: SecureHandlerConfig\n): Promise<ToolResult> {\n  const execStartTime = getTimeProvider().now();\n  try {\n    const result = await executeHandler(\n      handler,\n      sanitizedArgs,\n      { requestContext, logger: requestLogger },\n      requestLogger\n    );\n    sanitizeToolResult(result, requestLogger);\n    if (config.auditLogger) {\n      emitToolAudit(\n        config.auditLogger,\n        config.toolName,\n        requestContext,\n        result,\n        getTimeProvider().now() - execStartTime\n      );\n    }\n    return result;\n  } catch (error) {\n    const rawMessage = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error';\n    requestLogger.error('Tool execution failed', error instanceof Error ? error : undefined);\n    if (config.auditLogger) {\n      emitToolAuditException(\n        config.auditLogger,\n        config.toolName,\n        requestContext,\n        getTimeProvider().now() - execStartTime\n      );\n    }\n    // Closes a secret-leak path: adapter SDKs commonly echo offending\n    // credentials in their error messages (e.g. Anthropic's\n    // AuthenticationError carries `sk-ant-api03-…` substrings; fetch\n    // wrappers can echo Authorization headers). The success branch above\n    // runs sanitizeToolResult; the exception path must too.\n    const sanitized = sanitizeOutput(rawMessage, requestLogger);\n    return internalError(sanitized, requestContext.requestId);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a secure handler factory with shared configuration.\n * Useful for registering multiple tools with the same security settings.\n *\n * @param sharedConfig - Shared security configuration\n * @returns Factory function for creating secure handlers\n */\nexport function createSecureHandlerFactory(\n  sharedConfig: Omit<SecureHandlerConfig, 'toolName'>\n): (toolName: string, handler: ToolHandler | ContextAwareHandler) => ToolHandler {\n  return (toolName: string, handler: ToolHandler | ContextAwareHandler) =>\n    createSecureHandler(handler, { ...sharedConfig, toolName });\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - MCP Notification Helper\n *\n * Sends structured logging notifications to MCP clients via\n * the `notifications/message` protocol method.\n * Clients (e.g., Claude Code) can display these for real-time\n * observability of orchestration events.\n *\n * Also provides progress notification support via AsyncLocalStorage\n * for resetting client-side request timeouts (MCP SDK resetTimeoutOnProgress).\n *\n * @module mcp/mcp-notifier\n * (Source: Issue #973, #974 — Claude Code Observability)\n * (Source: Issue #1108 — Progress heartbeat timeout reset)\n * (Source: MCP Protocol 2025-11-25, Logging Specification)\n */\n\nimport { AsyncLocalStorage } from 'node:async_hooks';\nimport type { McpServer } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js';\nimport { createLogger, getErrorMessage } from '../core/index.js';\n\n/**\n * Logging levels for MCP notifications (RFC 5424 syslog).\n */\nexport type McpLogLevel = 'debug' | 'info' | 'notice' | 'warning' | 'error';\n\n/**\n * MCP notifier for sending structured log events to clients.\n */\nexport interface IMcpNotifier {\n  /** Send info-level notification (key orchestration events) */\n  info(logger: string, data: Record<string, unknown>): void;\n  /** Send debug-level notification (detailed execution steps) */\n  debug(logger: string, data: Record<string, unknown>): void;\n  /** Send warning-level notification */\n  warn(logger: string, data: Record<string, unknown>): void;\n}\n\nconst internalLogger = createLogger({ component: 'mcp-notifier' });\n\n/**\n * Creates an MCP notifier that sends logging notifications to connected clients.\n *\n * Notifications are fire-and-forget — failures are logged but never\n * propagate to callers. This ensures observability never breaks tool execution.\n */\nexport function createMcpNotifier(server: McpServer): IMcpNotifier {\n  function send(level: McpLogLevel, logger: string, data: Record<string, unknown>): void {\n    try {\n      server.sendLoggingMessage({ level, logger, data }).catch((error: unknown) => {\n        internalLogger.debug('Failed to send MCP notification', {\n          level,\n          logger,\n          error: getErrorMessage(error),\n        });\n      });\n    } catch (error: unknown) {\n      internalLogger.debug('Failed to send MCP notification', {\n        level,\n        logger,\n        error: getErrorMessage(error),\n      });\n    }\n  }\n\n  return {\n    info: (logger, data) => {\n      send('info', logger, data);\n    },\n    debug: (logger, data) => {\n      send('debug', logger, data);\n    },\n    warn: (logger, data) => {\n      send('warning', logger, data);\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * No-op notifier for when MCP server is not available.\n */\nexport const NOOP_NOTIFIER: IMcpNotifier = {\n  info: () => undefined,\n  debug: () => undefined,\n  warn: () => undefined,\n};\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Progress Notification Support (MCP SDK resetTimeoutOnProgress)\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Callback to send a progress notification to the MCP client.\n * When the client sets resetTimeoutOnProgress=true, each notification\n * resets the client's 60s request timeout.\n */\nexport type ProgressSender = (progress: number, total?: number) => void;\n\n/**\n * Progress context stored via AsyncLocalStorage.\n * Set by toSdkCallbackWithProgress when a progressToken is available.\n */\nexport interface ProgressContext {\n  readonly progressToken: string | number;\n  readonly sendNotification: ProgressSender;\n}\n\n/**\n * AsyncLocalStorage for MCP progress context.\n * Allows withProgressHeartbeat to access the progress sender without\n * threading it through the entire middleware chain.\n */\nexport const progressContextStorage = new AsyncLocalStorage<ProgressContext>();\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Abort Signal Support (MCP SDK cancellation)\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * AsyncLocalStorage for MCP abort signal.\n * Set by toSdkCallback when the SDK provides an AbortSignal.\n * Allows middleware (e.g., TimeoutGuard) to race client cancellation\n * alongside server-side timeouts.\n */\nexport const abortSignalStorage = new AsyncLocalStorage<AbortSignal>();\n\n/**\n * Wraps an async operation with periodic heartbeat notifications.\n *\n * When a progressToken is available (via AsyncLocalStorage from the MCP\n * request handler), sends real `notifications/progress` that reset the\n * client's request timeout (MCP SDK resetTimeoutOnProgress feature).\n *\n * Always sends logging notifications for observability regardless.\n *\n * @param toolName - Name of the tool for notification context\n * @param notifier - MCP notifier instance\n * @param operation - The async operation to wrap\n * @param intervalMs - Heartbeat interval (default: 15000ms)\n * @returns The operation result\n */\nexport async function withProgressHeartbeat<T>(\n  toolName: string,\n  notifier: IMcpNotifier,\n  operation: () => Promise<T>,\n  intervalMs = 15_000\n): Promise<T> {\n  const startTime = Date.now();\n  let beatCount = 0;\n  const progressCtx = progressContextStorage.getStore();\n\n  const timer = setInterval(() => {\n    beatCount++;\n    const elapsed = Math.round((Date.now() - startTime) / 1000);\n\n    // Send real progress notification if client provided progressToken\n    if (progressCtx !== undefined) {\n      progressCtx.sendNotification(beatCount);\n    }\n\n    // Always send logging notification for observability\n    notifier.debug(toolName, {\n      event: 'heartbeat',\n      elapsedSeconds: elapsed,\n      beatCount,\n      hasProgressToken: progressCtx !== undefined,\n    });\n  }, intervalMs);\n\n  try {\n    return await operation();\n  } finally {\n    clearInterval(timer);\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Tool Wrapper Helper\n *\n * Provides a convenient wrapper for MCP tools that automatically applies\n * the middleware chain with timeout protection (CVE-2026-0621 mitigation).\n *\n * @module mcp/middleware/tool-wrapper\n * (Source: Issue #271, CVE-2026-0621 mitigation)\n */\n\nimport { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';\nimport { appendFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';\nimport { dirname, join } from 'node:path';\n\nimport type { ILogger } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport type { TimeoutConfig, SecurityConfig } from '../../config/schemas.js';\nimport type { IPolicyFirewall, ExecutionMode } from './policy.js';\nimport type { RateLimiterConfig } from './rate-limiter.js';\nimport { RateLimiter } from './rate-limiter.js';\nimport {\n  withMiddleware,\n  createMiddlewareFactory,\n  type ToolHandler,\n  type ContextAwareToolHandler,\n  type MiddlewareChainConfig,\n} from './middleware-chain.js';\nimport { MCP_TIMEOUTS, resolveToolClassGuardMs } from '../../config/timeouts.js';\nimport {\n  progressContextStorage,\n  abortSignalStorage,\n  type ProgressContext,\n} from '../mcp-notifier.js';\nimport { createLogger as createInternalLogger, getErrorMessage } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { getNexusDataDir } from '../../config/nexus-data-dir.js';\n\n/**\n * Default timeout configuration.\n * Values sourced from config/timeouts.ts (Issue #984).\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_CONFIG: TimeoutConfig = {\n  defaultTimeoutMs: MCP_TIMEOUTS.defaultMs,\n  maxTimeoutMs: MCP_TIMEOUTS.maxMs,\n  enableLogging: true,\n  uriValidation: true,\n};\n\n/**\n * Default per-tool timeout overrides.\n * Sourced from config/timeouts.ts (Issue #984).\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_TOOL_TIMEOUTS: Record<string, number> = {\n  ...MCP_TIMEOUTS.perTool,\n};\n\n/**\n * Resolves the timeout for a specific tool — the central resolution chokepoint\n * (#3734). Lookup chain:\n *   1. explicit override (caller-supplied),\n *   2. security config `perToolTimeout`,\n *   3. the operation-class runaway-guard for the tool's {@link TOOL_CLASS}\n *      classification (or {@link DEFAULT_OPERATION_CLASS} = 300s if unclassified),\n *      honoring `NEXUS_TIMEOUT_MULTIPLIER` + per-class env overrides.\n *\n * The class-guard step replaces the old `DEFAULT_TOOL_TIMEOUTS` literal lookup\n * AND the punitive 60s global default — every tool now gets a generous\n * non-punitive runaway-guard.\n * (Issue #657 — per-tool timeout; #3734 — central class authority)\n */\nexport function getToolTimeout(\n  toolName: string,\n  security?: SecurityConfig,\n  explicitMs?: number\n): number {\n  // Explicit override takes highest priority.\n  if (explicitMs !== undefined) {\n    return explicitMs;\n  }\n  // Security config per-tool overrides still win over the class default.\n  const perToolConfig = security?.timeout?.perToolTimeout;\n  const perToolMs = perToolConfig?.[toolName];\n  if (perToolMs !== undefined) {\n    return perToolMs;\n  }\n  // Class-derived runaway-guard (multiplier + per-class env overrides applied).\n  return resolveToolClassGuardMs(toolName);\n}\n\n/**\n * Configuration for creating a tool factory.\n */\nexport interface ToolFactoryConfig {\n  /** Logger instance */\n  logger?: ILogger | undefined;\n  /** Security configuration (includes timeout config) */\n  security?: SecurityConfig | undefined;\n  /** Policy firewall instance */\n  policyFirewall?: IPolicyFirewall | undefined;\n  /** Rate limiter configuration */\n  rateLimiter?: RateLimiterConfig | RateLimiter | undefined;\n  /** Allowed paths for file operations */\n  allowedPaths?: readonly string[] | undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Per-tool configuration options.\n */\nexport interface ToolWrapperOptions {\n  /** Execution mode for policy evaluation (default: 'read-only') */\n  executionMode?: ExecutionMode | undefined;\n  /** Custom timeout in ms (overrides default) */\n  timeoutMs?: number | undefined;\n  /** Skip timeout protection (use sparingly) */\n  skipTimeout?: boolean | undefined;\n  /** Skip rate limiting */\n  skipRateLimit?: boolean | undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Gets timeout configuration from security config or uses defaults.\n */\nfunction getTimeoutConfig(\n  security?: SecurityConfig,\n  overrideMs?: number\n): MiddlewareChainConfig['timeout'] {\n  const timeoutConfig = security?.timeout ?? DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_CONFIG;\n\n  return {\n    defaultTimeoutMs: overrideMs ?? timeoutConfig.defaultTimeoutMs,\n    maxTimeoutMs: timeoutConfig.maxTimeoutMs,\n    enableLogging: timeoutConfig.enableLogging,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a tool factory with shared configuration.\n *\n * This factory produces wrapped handlers that include timeout protection,\n * rate limiting, and other middleware as configured.\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * const wrapTool = createToolFactory({\n *   security: appConfig.security,\n *   rateLimiter: { capacity: 100, refillRate: 10 },\n * });\n *\n * const handler = wrapTool('my_tool', async (args) => {\n *   // Your tool logic here\n *   return { content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'Done' }] };\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport function createToolFactory(\n  config: ToolFactoryConfig\n): (\n  toolName: string,\n  handler: ContextAwareToolHandler | ToolHandler,\n  options?: ToolWrapperOptions\n) => ToolHandler {\n  const { security, policyFirewall, rateLimiter, allowedPaths, logger } = config;\n\n  return (toolName, handler, options) => {\n    const skip = {\n      timeout: options?.skipTimeout,\n      rateLimit: options?.skipRateLimit,\n    };\n\n    const chainConfig: Omit<MiddlewareChainConfig, 'toolName'> = {\n      logger,\n      policyFirewall,\n      executionMode: options?.executionMode ?? 'read-only',\n      allowedPaths,\n      rateLimiter,\n      timeout: skip.timeout === true ? undefined : getTimeoutConfig(security, options?.timeoutMs),\n      skip,\n    };\n\n    return withMiddleware(toolName, handler, chainConfig);\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Wraps a single tool handler with timeout protection.\n *\n * This is a convenience function for simple cases where you don't need\n * the full factory setup.\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * const handler = wrapToolWithTimeout('my_tool', async (args) => {\n *   return { content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'Done' }] };\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport function wrapToolWithTimeout(\n  toolName: string,\n  handler: ContextAwareToolHandler | ToolHandler,\n  options?: {\n    timeoutMs?: number;\n    logger?: ILogger;\n  }\n): ToolHandler {\n  return withMiddleware(toolName, handler, {\n    timeout: getTimeoutConfig(undefined, options?.timeoutMs),\n    logger: options?.logger,\n  });\n}\n\n/** Shape of the MCP SDK's extra._meta for progress tokens. */\ninterface SdkMeta {\n  readonly progressToken?: string | number;\n}\n\n/** Shape of the MCP SDK's extra object passed to tool handlers. */\ninterface SdkExtra {\n  readonly _meta?: SdkMeta;\n  readonly signal?: AbortSignal;\n  readonly sendNotification?: (notification: {\n    method: string;\n    params?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  }) => Promise<void>;\n}\n\nconst wrapperLogger = createInternalLogger({ component: 'tool-wrapper' });\n\n/** Extract progress context from MCP SDK extra if progressToken present. */\nfunction extractProgressContext(extra: unknown): ProgressContext | undefined {\n  const sdk = extra as SdkExtra | undefined;\n  const token = sdk?._meta?.progressToken;\n  const sendFn = sdk?.sendNotification;\n  if (token === undefined || sendFn === undefined) return undefined;\n\n  return {\n    progressToken: token,\n    sendNotification: (progress: number, total?: number) => {\n      const params: Record<string, unknown> = {\n        progressToken: token,\n        progress,\n      };\n      if (total !== undefined) params['total'] = total;\n      sendFn({ method: 'notifications/progress', params }).catch((err: unknown) => {\n        wrapperLogger.debug('Failed to send progress notification', {\n          error: getErrorMessage(err),\n        });\n      });\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Runs handler within nested AsyncLocalStorage contexts for progress + abort.\n */\n/** SDK-compatible tool result with optional structuredContent (Issue #1117). */\ntype SdkToolResult = {\n  content: Array<{ type: 'text'; text: string }>;\n  isError?: boolean;\n  structuredContent?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  // Post-#2649: the structured error envelope lives in `_meta` under\n  // `nexus-agents/error` (not in `structuredContent`, which is validated\n  // against `outputSchema` even on error results).\n  _meta?: Record<string, unknown>;\n};\n\nfunction runWithContexts(\n  handler: ToolHandler,\n  args: unknown,\n  progressCtx: ProgressContext | undefined,\n  signal: AbortSignal | undefined\n): Promise<SdkToolResult> {\n  const run = (): Promise<SdkToolResult> => handler(args);\n\n  // Nest contexts: abort signal outer, progress inner\n  if (signal !== undefined && progressCtx !== undefined) {\n    return abortSignalStorage.run(signal, () => progressContextStorage.run(progressCtx, run));\n  }\n  if (signal !== undefined) {\n    return abortSignalStorage.run(signal, run);\n  }\n  if (progressCtx !== undefined) {\n    return progressContextStorage.run(progressCtx, run);\n  }\n  return run();\n}\n\n/**\n * Adapts a ToolHandler to the MCP SDK's expected callback signature.\n *\n * Extracts progressToken and AbortSignal from extra, runs the handler\n * within AsyncLocalStorage contexts so middleware can access them.\n *\n * @param handler - Our internal ToolHandler\n * @returns SDK-compatible callback function\n */\nexport function toSdkCallback(\n  handler: ToolHandler\n): (args: unknown, extra: unknown) => Promise<SdkToolResult> {\n  return (args: unknown, extra: unknown) => {\n    const progressCtx = extractProgressContext(extra);\n    const signal = (extra as SdkExtra | undefined)?.signal;\n    return runWithContexts(handler, args, progressCtx, signal);\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * MCP SDK client default request timeout. Matches `DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MSEC`\n * in `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` (`shared/protocol.js`). If a tool's\n * configured server-side budget exceeds this and the client did not send a\n * `progressToken` (i.e. did not pass `onprogress` to its `request()` call),\n * the client kills the request at this threshold regardless of what the\n * server is doing — heartbeats fire but go nowhere.\n *\n * (Source: audit on #2619 / #2631 — root cause of \"MCP error -32001 at 60010ms\")\n */\nexport const MCP_SDK_DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 60_000;\n\n/**\n * Relative path under `$NEXUS_DATA_DIR` for the timeout-mismatch event log.\n * The #2632 WARN was log-only — useful in tail but not queryable. #2703\n * records each mismatch event as a JSONL row keyed by a correlation\n * `eventId` shared with the log entry, so \"did mismatch cause this\n * timeout?\" can be answered by joining the warning's eventId against the\n * recorded outcome — not just counted in aggregate.\n *\n * Schema lives at `docs/architecture/MCP_PROTOCOL.md` (Timeout-mismatch\n * telemetry section).\n */\nexport const TIMEOUT_MISMATCH_TELEMETRY_REL_PATH = 'mcp-telemetry/timeout-mismatch-events.jsonl';\n\n/** A single timeout-mismatch event recorded to the telemetry JSONL. */\nexport interface TimeoutMismatchEvent {\n  readonly eventId: string;\n  readonly toolName: string;\n  readonly configuredTimeoutMs: number;\n  readonly mcpSdkDefaultMs: number;\n  readonly startedAt: string;\n  readonly endedAt: string;\n  readonly durationMs: number;\n  readonly outcome: 'success' | 'error';\n  /** From the post-#2649 structured error envelope when present. */\n  readonly errorCategory?: string;\n  readonly errorMessage?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Cache the \"dir ensured\" flag so we don't re-`existsSync` on every call\n * (closes #2955 site 3, partial). Cached per `dirname(path)` so an\n * operator changing `NEXUS_DATA_DIR` between calls (test/dev only)\n * still works after a process restart. The full async-write part of\n * the perf fix is deferred — `tool-wrapper-budget-check.test.ts` reads\n * the JSONL synchronously after `await callback(...)` and expects the\n * write to be visible, so switching to `fs.promises.appendFile` broke\n * those tests. The dir-cache is the cheaper part of the perf win\n * (skipping 1 existsSync per call); the appendFileSync vs appendFile\n * win can ship later behind a test-helper that awaits pending writes.\n */\nconst ensuredDirs = new Set<string>();\n\n/** Best-effort append — telemetry recording must never fail the user's tool call. */\nfunction appendTimeoutMismatchEvent(event: TimeoutMismatchEvent): void {\n  try {\n    const path = join(getNexusDataDir(), TIMEOUT_MISMATCH_TELEMETRY_REL_PATH);\n    const dir = dirname(path);\n    if (!ensuredDirs.has(dir)) {\n      if (!existsSync(dir)) mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });\n      ensuredDirs.add(dir);\n    }\n    appendFileSync(path, JSON.stringify(event) + '\\n', 'utf-8');\n  } catch (err) {\n    wrapperLogger.debug('Best-effort timeout-mismatch event recording failed', {\n      error: getErrorMessage(err),\n    });\n  }\n}\n\n/** Pull the post-#2649 errorCategory off an error result's `_meta` envelope. */\nfunction extractErrorCategoryFromResult(result: SdkToolResult): string | undefined {\n  const envelope = result._meta?.['nexus-agents/error'];\n  if (envelope !== null && typeof envelope === 'object' && 'errorCategory' in envelope) {\n    const cat = (envelope as { errorCategory?: unknown }).errorCategory;\n    if (typeof cat === 'string') return cat;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\n/** First text-content line of an error result, truncated for logging. */\nfunction extractErrorMessageFromResult(result: SdkToolResult): string | undefined {\n  const first = result.content[0];\n  if (first?.type === 'text' && typeof first.text === 'string') {\n    return first.text.slice(0, 500);\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\ninterface MismatchCallContext {\n  readonly log: ILogger;\n  readonly handler: ToolHandler;\n  readonly args: unknown;\n  readonly progressCtx: ProgressContext | undefined;\n  readonly signal: AbortSignal | undefined;\n  readonly toolName: string;\n  readonly configuredTimeoutMs: number;\n}\n\ninterface MismatchOutcome {\n  readonly outcome: 'success' | 'error';\n  readonly errorCategory?: string;\n  readonly errorMessage?: string;\n}\n\n/** Build a complete event record from a finished mismatched call. */\nfunction buildMismatchEvent(\n  ctx: MismatchCallContext,\n  eventId: string,\n  t0: number,\n  outcome: MismatchOutcome\n): TimeoutMismatchEvent {\n  const t1 = Date.now();\n  return {\n    eventId,\n    toolName: ctx.toolName,\n    configuredTimeoutMs: ctx.configuredTimeoutMs,\n    mcpSdkDefaultMs: MCP_SDK_DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS,\n    startedAt: new Date(t0).toISOString(),\n    endedAt: new Date(t1).toISOString(),\n    durationMs: t1 - t0,\n    outcome: outcome.outcome,\n    ...(outcome.errorCategory !== undefined ? { errorCategory: outcome.errorCategory } : {}),\n    ...(outcome.errorMessage !== undefined ? { errorMessage: outcome.errorMessage } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\n/** Classify a tool result into a MismatchOutcome (success or structured error). */\nfunction classifyResult(result: SdkToolResult): MismatchOutcome {\n  if (result.isError !== true) return { outcome: 'success' };\n  const errorCategory = extractErrorCategoryFromResult(result);\n  const errorMessage = extractErrorMessageFromResult(result);\n  return {\n    outcome: 'error',\n    ...(errorCategory !== undefined ? { errorCategory } : {}),\n    ...(errorMessage !== undefined ? { errorMessage } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\n/** Run a mismatched call, recording its outcome to the JSONL. */\nasync function runMismatchedCall(ctx: MismatchCallContext): Promise<SdkToolResult> {\n  const eventId = randomUUID();\n  const t0 = Date.now();\n  ctx.log.warn(\n    'MCP tool budget exceeds client default and no progressToken received — request likely to be killed by client before server-side deadline',\n    {\n      tool: ctx.toolName,\n      eventId,\n      configuredTimeoutMs: ctx.configuredTimeoutMs,\n      mcpSdkDefaultMs: MCP_SDK_DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS,\n      remediation:\n        'Client should pass `onprogress` and `resetTimeoutOnProgress: true` when calling, or extend `options.timeout`. See docs/architecture/MCP_PROTOCOL.md.',\n    }\n  );\n  try {\n    const result = await runWithContexts(ctx.handler, ctx.args, ctx.progressCtx, ctx.signal);\n    appendTimeoutMismatchEvent(buildMismatchEvent(ctx, eventId, t0, classifyResult(result)));\n    return result;\n  } catch (err) {\n    appendTimeoutMismatchEvent(\n      buildMismatchEvent(ctx, eventId, t0, {\n        outcome: 'error',\n        errorMessage: getErrorMessage(err).slice(0, 500),\n      })\n    );\n    throw err;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Like `toSdkCallback`, but emits a one-shot WARN at invocation start when\n * the configured per-tool budget exceeds the MCP SDK client default AND the\n * client did not send a `progressToken`. The call is almost certainly going\n * to die at the client default (~60s) regardless of server-side timeout\n * config or progress heartbeats — surface that at the moment of invocation\n * so operators can spot the mismatch in logs without waiting for the\n * timeout to fire.\n *\n * Wrap a long-running tool (`orchestrate`, `consensus_vote`,\n * `execute_expert`, `run_workflow`) with this instead of plain\n * `toSdkCallback`. Tools whose budget already fits within\n * `MCP_SDK_DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS` should keep using `toSdkCallback`.\n *\n * Each mismatch is **also recorded** to\n * `$NEXUS_DATA_DIR/mcp-telemetry/timeout-mismatch-events.jsonl` with a\n * correlation `eventId` (also surfaced in the WARN log entry) and the\n * call's eventual outcome (`success` / `error` + post-#2649 errorCategory\n * if present). This lets the Epic #2631 gate be answered with data —\n * \"of N mismatches, what fraction ended in a timeout?\" — not just counted\n * in aggregate (#2703).\n *\n * (Source: audit on #2619 / #2631 — observability for client-timeout mismatch)\n */\nexport function toSdkCallbackWithBudgetCheck(\n  handler: ToolHandler,\n  toolName: string,\n  configuredTimeoutMs: number,\n  logger?: ILogger\n): (args: unknown, extra: unknown) => Promise<SdkToolResult> {\n  const log = logger ?? wrapperLogger;\n  return (args: unknown, extra: unknown) => {\n    const progressCtx = extractProgressContext(extra);\n    const signal = (extra as SdkExtra | undefined)?.signal;\n    const isMismatch =\n      configuredTimeoutMs > MCP_SDK_DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS && progressCtx === undefined;\n    if (!isMismatch) return runWithContexts(handler, args, progressCtx, signal);\n    return runMismatchedCall({\n      log,\n      handler,\n      args,\n      progressCtx,\n      signal,\n      toolName,\n      configuredTimeoutMs,\n    });\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Re-export middleware factory for advanced use cases.\n */\nexport { createMiddlewareFactory, withMiddleware };\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Timeout Guard Middleware\n *\n * Provides timeout protection for MCP operations to mitigate ReDoS and\n * other denial-of-service vectors. Implements configurable timeouts with\n * proper cleanup and error handling.\n *\n * (Source: CVE-2026-0621, GHSA-8r9q-7v3j-jr4g)\n * (Source: Issue #107)\n *\n * @module mcp/middleware/timeout-guard\n */\n\nimport {\n  getErrorMessage,\n  createLogger,\n  type ILogger,\n  type Result,\n  ok,\n  err,\n  getTimeProvider,\n} from '../../core/index.js';\n\n/**\n * Error codes for timeout-related failures.\n */\nexport type TimeoutErrorCode =\n  | 'OPERATION_TIMEOUT'\n  | 'OPERATION_CANCELLED'\n  | 'INVALID_TIMEOUT'\n  | 'GUARD_ERROR';\n\n/**\n * Timeout guard error.\n */\nexport interface TimeoutError {\n  readonly code: TimeoutErrorCode;\n  readonly message: string;\n  readonly operation?: string;\n  readonly timeoutMs?: number;\n  readonly cause?: Error;\n}\n\n/**\n * Configuration for timeout guard.\n */\nexport interface TimeoutGuardConfig {\n  /** Default timeout in milliseconds (default: 30000) */\n  readonly defaultTimeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Maximum allowed timeout in milliseconds (default: 300000) */\n  readonly maxTimeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Whether to log timeout events (default: true) */\n  readonly enableLogging?: boolean;\n  /** Logger instance */\n  readonly logger?: ILogger;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of a guarded operation.\n */\nexport interface GuardedResult<T> {\n  /** The operation result */\n  readonly value: T;\n  /** Execution duration in milliseconds */\n  readonly durationMs: number;\n  /** Whether the operation was near timeout */\n  readonly nearTimeout: boolean;\n}\n\n/** Execution options for guarded operations. */\nexport interface ExecuteOptions {\n  /** Custom timeout for this operation */\n  readonly timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Name for logging/debugging */\n  readonly operationName?: string;\n  /** Cleanup function to call on timeout */\n  readonly onTimeout?: () => void;\n  /** AbortSignal for client-initiated cancellation */\n  readonly signal?: AbortSignal;\n}\n\n// Canonical source: config/timeouts.ts (Issue #1046)\nimport { TIMEOUT_GUARD } from '../../config/timeouts.js';\n\nconst DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = TIMEOUT_GUARD.defaultMs;\nconst MAX_TIMEOUT_MS = TIMEOUT_GUARD.maxMs;\nconst NEAR_TIMEOUT_THRESHOLD = TIMEOUT_GUARD.nearTimeoutThreshold;\n\n/** Internal state for tracking timeout. */\ninterface TimeoutState {\n  timeoutId: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;\n  timedOut: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a timeout error for operation timeout.\n */\nfunction createTimeoutError(operationName: string, timeoutMs: number): TimeoutError {\n  return {\n    code: 'OPERATION_TIMEOUT',\n    message: `Operation '${operationName}' timed out after ${String(timeoutMs)}ms`,\n    operation: operationName,\n    timeoutMs,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a guard error from a caught exception.\n */\nfunction createGuardError(error: unknown, operationName: string): TimeoutError {\n  const guardError: TimeoutError = {\n    code: 'GUARD_ERROR',\n    message: getErrorMessage(error),\n    operation: operationName,\n  };\n  if (error instanceof Error) {\n    return { ...guardError, cause: error };\n  }\n  return guardError;\n}\n\n/**\n * Timeout guard for protecting async operations from hanging.\n *\n * Provides protection against:\n * - ReDoS attacks (CVE-2026-0621)\n * - Slow/hanging external services\n * - Resource exhaustion\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * const guard = new TimeoutGuard({ defaultTimeoutMs: 5000 });\n *\n * const result = await guard.execute(\n *   () => someAsyncOperation(),\n *   { operationName: 'process-uri' }\n * );\n *\n * if (result.ok) {\n *   console.log('Completed in', result.value.durationMs, 'ms');\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport class TimeoutGuard {\n  private readonly defaultTimeoutMs: number;\n  private readonly maxTimeoutMs: number;\n  private readonly enableLogging: boolean;\n  private readonly logger: ILogger;\n\n  constructor(config?: TimeoutGuardConfig) {\n    this.defaultTimeoutMs = config?.defaultTimeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS;\n    this.maxTimeoutMs = config?.maxTimeoutMs ?? MAX_TIMEOUT_MS;\n    this.enableLogging = config?.enableLogging ?? true;\n    this.logger = config?.logger ?? createLogger({ component: 'timeout-guard' });\n  }\n\n  /** Resolves effective timeout and operation name from options. */\n  private resolveOptions(options?: ExecuteOptions): {\n    timeoutMs: number;\n    operationName: string;\n  } {\n    return {\n      timeoutMs: Math.min(options?.timeoutMs ?? this.defaultTimeoutMs, this.maxTimeoutMs),\n      operationName: options?.operationName ?? 'unknown',\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Executes an async operation with timeout protection.\n   */\n  async execute<T>(\n    operation: () => Promise<T>,\n    options?: ExecuteOptions\n  ): Promise<Result<GuardedResult<T>, TimeoutError>> {\n    const { timeoutMs, operationName } = this.resolveOptions(options);\n\n    const validationError = this.validateTimeout(timeoutMs, operationName);\n    if (validationError !== null) {\n      return err(validationError);\n    }\n\n    return this.runGuarded(operation, timeoutMs, operationName, options);\n  }\n\n  /** Runs the operation with timeout and optional abort signal. */\n  private async runGuarded<T>(\n    operation: () => Promise<T>,\n    timeoutMs: number,\n    operationName: string,\n    options?: ExecuteOptions\n  ): Promise<Result<GuardedResult<T>, TimeoutError>> {\n    this.logStart(operationName, timeoutMs);\n    const startTime = getTimeProvider().now();\n    const state: TimeoutState = { timeoutId: undefined, timedOut: false };\n\n    try {\n      const result = await this.runWithTimeout(\n        operation,\n        timeoutMs,\n        state,\n        options?.onTimeout,\n        options?.signal\n      );\n      return this.handleSuccess(result, startTime, timeoutMs, operationName);\n    } catch {\n      const cancelled = options?.signal?.aborted === true && !state.timedOut;\n      return err(\n        this.handleFailure(state.timedOut, operationName, timeoutMs, startTime, cancelled)\n      );\n    } finally {\n      if (state.timeoutId !== undefined) {\n        clearTimeout(state.timeoutId);\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  private validateTimeout(timeoutMs: number, operationName: string): TimeoutError | null {\n    if (timeoutMs <= 0) {\n      return {\n        code: 'INVALID_TIMEOUT',\n        message: `Invalid timeout: ${String(timeoutMs)}ms`,\n        operation: operationName,\n      };\n    }\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  private logStart(operationName: string, timeoutMs: number): void {\n    if (this.enableLogging) {\n      this.logger.debug('Starting guarded operation', { operation: operationName, timeoutMs });\n    }\n  }\n\n  private async runWithTimeout<T>(\n    operation: () => Promise<T>,\n    timeoutMs: number,\n    state: TimeoutState,\n    onTimeout?: () => void,\n    signal?: AbortSignal\n  ): Promise<T> {\n    const timeoutPromise = new Promise<never>((_resolve, reject) => {\n      state.timeoutId = setTimeout(() => {\n        state.timedOut = true;\n        onTimeout?.();\n        reject(new Error(`Operation timed out after ${String(timeoutMs)}ms`));\n      }, timeoutMs);\n    });\n\n    const promises: Array<Promise<T>> = [operation(), timeoutPromise];\n\n    // Race against client AbortSignal if provided\n    if (signal !== undefined && !signal.aborted) {\n      const abortPromise = new Promise<never>((_resolve, reject) => {\n        signal.addEventListener(\n          'abort',\n          () => {\n            reject(new Error('Operation cancelled by client'));\n          },\n          { once: true }\n        );\n      });\n      promises.push(abortPromise);\n    }\n\n    return Promise.race(promises);\n  }\n\n  private handleSuccess<T>(\n    result: T,\n    startTime: number,\n    timeoutMs: number,\n    operationName: string\n  ): Result<GuardedResult<T>, TimeoutError> {\n    const durationMs = getTimeProvider().now() - startTime;\n    const nearTimeout = durationMs > timeoutMs * NEAR_TIMEOUT_THRESHOLD;\n\n    if (nearTimeout && this.enableLogging) {\n      this.logger.warn('Operation completed near timeout threshold', {\n        operation: operationName,\n        durationMs,\n        timeoutMs,\n        thresholdPercent: Math.round((durationMs / timeoutMs) * 100),\n      });\n    }\n\n    if (this.enableLogging) {\n      this.logger.debug('Guarded operation completed', { operation: operationName, durationMs });\n    }\n\n    return ok({ value: result, durationMs, nearTimeout });\n  }\n\n  private handleFailure(\n    timedOut: boolean,\n    operationName: string,\n    timeoutMs: number,\n    startTime: number,\n    cancelled = false\n  ): TimeoutError {\n    const durationMs = getTimeProvider().now() - startTime;\n\n    if (cancelled) {\n      this.logger.info('Operation cancelled by client', {\n        operation: operationName,\n        durationMs,\n      });\n      return {\n        code: 'OPERATION_CANCELLED',\n        message: `Operation '${operationName}' cancelled by client`,\n        operation: operationName,\n      };\n    }\n\n    if (timedOut) {\n      this.logger.error('Operation timed out', undefined, {\n        operation: operationName,\n        timeoutMs,\n        durationMs,\n      });\n      return createTimeoutError(operationName, timeoutMs);\n    }\n\n    return createGuardError(new Error('Unknown error'), operationName);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Creates a guarded version of an async function.\n   */\n  guard<TArgs extends unknown[], TResult>(\n    fn: (...args: TArgs) => Promise<TResult>,\n    options?: { readonly timeoutMs?: number; readonly operationName?: string }\n  ): (...args: TArgs) => Promise<Result<GuardedResult<TResult>, TimeoutError>> {\n    return async (...args: TArgs): Promise<Result<GuardedResult<TResult>, TimeoutError>> => {\n      return this.execute(() => fn(...args), options);\n    };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * URI validation utilities to complement timeout protection.\n */\nexport const UriValidation = {\n  MAX_URI_LENGTH: 8192,\n  MAX_TEMPLATE_DEPTH: 3,\n  SUSPICIOUS_PATTERN: /\\{[+#./;?&]?[^}]*\\*\\}.*\\{[+#./;?&]?[^}]*\\*\\}|\\{(?:[^{}]*\\{){3,}/,\n\n  validate(uri: string): Result<string, TimeoutError> {\n    if (uri.length > this.MAX_URI_LENGTH) {\n      return err({\n        code: 'GUARD_ERROR',\n        message: `URI exceeds maximum length: ${String(uri.length)} > ${String(this.MAX_URI_LENGTH)}`,\n        operation: 'uri-validation',\n      });\n    }\n\n    if (this.SUSPICIOUS_PATTERN.test(uri)) {\n      return err({\n        code: 'GUARD_ERROR',\n        message: 'URI contains suspicious patterns that may cause performance issues',\n        operation: 'uri-validation',\n      });\n    }\n\n    return ok(uri);\n  },\n\n  sanitize(uri: string): string {\n    const sanitized = uri.slice(0, this.MAX_URI_LENGTH);\n    let depth = 0;\n    let result = '';\n\n    for (const char of sanitized) {\n      if (char === '{') {\n        depth++;\n        if (depth > this.MAX_TEMPLATE_DEPTH) continue;\n      } else if (char === '}') {\n        if (depth > this.MAX_TEMPLATE_DEPTH) {\n          depth--;\n          continue;\n        }\n        depth--;\n      }\n      result += char;\n    }\n\n    return result;\n  },\n};\n\n/**\n * Creates a timeout guard with default MCP-appropriate settings.\n */\nexport function createDefaultTimeoutGuard(logger?: ILogger): TimeoutGuard {\n  const config: TimeoutGuardConfig = {\n    defaultTimeoutMs: DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS,\n    maxTimeoutMs: MAX_TIMEOUT_MS,\n    enableLogging: true,\n  };\n  if (logger !== undefined) {\n    return new TimeoutGuard({ ...config, logger });\n  }\n  return new TimeoutGuard(config);\n}\n","/**\n * Access Constraint Deriver — Unbypassable denylist (#1977 condition 3).\n *\n * Hardcoded patterns that no LLM-derived policy may override. Applied FIRST\n * in the enforcer, before checking the per-task policy. If the LLM (or a\n * malicious user objective) produces a policy that would allow access to\n * `.env`, SSH keys, cloud credentials, or similar, the denylist still wins.\n *\n * This exists because the LLM deriver is the weakest link — a user objective\n * that says \"I need to view my AWS credentials to debug\" would otherwise\n * produce a policy allowing `~/.aws/**`. The denylist refuses regardless.\n *\n * @module security/access-constraint-deriver/denylist\n */\n\n/**\n * File-path patterns that are unconditionally denied. Glob-style wildcards.\n * All matching is case-insensitive to catch `~/.SSH` and similar.\n */\nexport const UNBYPASSABLE_PATH_PATTERNS: readonly string[] = [\n  // Environment files\n  '.env',\n  '.env.*',\n  '**/.env',\n  '**/.env.*',\n\n  // SSH credentials\n  '~/.ssh/**',\n  '**/ssh/id_*',\n  '**/*_rsa',\n  '**/*_ed25519',\n  '**/*.pem',\n\n  // Cloud credentials\n  '~/.aws/**',\n  '~/.azure/**',\n  '~/.gcp/**',\n  '~/.config/gcloud/**',\n  '~/.kube/config',\n\n  // Unix secret files\n  '/etc/shadow',\n  '/etc/sudoers',\n  '/etc/sudoers.d/**',\n\n  // Common secret file patterns\n  '**/secrets.*',\n  '**/credentials.*',\n  '**/private_key.*',\n  '**/id_rsa*',\n];\n\n/**\n * Tool names that are unconditionally denied regardless of derived policy.\n * These are tools that should never be callable during automated agent\n * dispatch — they require explicit human action.\n */\nexport const UNBYPASSABLE_TOOL_NAMES: readonly string[] = [\n  // Destructive git operations\n  'git_push_force',\n  'git_reset_hard',\n  'git_branch_delete_force',\n  'git_clean_force',\n\n  // Destructive filesystem\n  'rm_recursive_force',\n  'chmod_recursive',\n\n  // Identity / auth mutations\n  'ssh_add_key',\n  'gpg_add_key',\n  'npm_publish_force',\n\n  // Remote destruction\n  'github_repo_delete',\n  'github_org_transfer',\n  'aws_account_close',\n];\n\n/**\n * Compiles a glob pattern to a regex at module-load time.\n * Supports: `**` (any path segments), `*` (any non-separator chars),\n * `~/` (home-anchor prefix). All other regex metachars escaped.\n *\n * Regexes built here come from the hardcoded `UNBYPASSABLE_PATH_PATTERNS`\n * constant — never from user input — so they are ReDoS-safe by construction.\n */\nfunction compileGlobToRegex(pattern: string): RegExp {\n  const pat = pattern.toLowerCase();\n  // Escape regex metacharacters INCLUDING backslash (per CodeQL — without\n  // backslash in the class, a `\\` in input would leak into the regex output\n  // unescaped). Do NOT escape `*` here — it's a glob wildcard that the\n  // subsequent replaces expand into regex wildcards.\n  const escaped = pat\n    .replace(/[\\\\.+^$()|[\\]{}]/g, '\\\\$&')\n    .replace(/\\*\\*/g, '__DOUBLESTAR__')\n    .replace(/\\*/g, '[^/]*')\n    .replace(/__DOUBLESTAR__/g, '.*');\n  const anchored = escaped.startsWith('~/')\n    ? `(^|/)${escaped.slice(2)}$`\n    : escaped.startsWith('/')\n      ? `^${escaped}$`\n      : `(^|/)${escaped}$`;\n  return new RegExp(anchored);\n}\n\n/**\n * Precompiled regexes for every unbypassable path pattern, computed once\n * at module load. Static inputs → no ReDoS surface.\n */\nconst COMPILED_PATH_PATTERNS: ReadonlyArray<{\n  readonly pattern: string;\n  readonly regex: RegExp;\n}> = UNBYPASSABLE_PATH_PATTERNS.map((pattern) => ({\n  pattern,\n  regex: compileGlobToRegex(pattern),\n}));\n\n/**\n * Returns true if a lowercased file path matches the given pattern.\n * Exported for tests; production code should use `isPathDenied`.\n */\nexport function matchDenyPattern(path: string, pattern: string): boolean {\n  const normalized = path.toLowerCase();\n  const compiled = COMPILED_PATH_PATTERNS.find((c) => c.pattern === pattern);\n  if (compiled !== undefined) return compiled.regex.test(normalized);\n  // Fallback for ad-hoc test patterns not in the static list.\n  return compileGlobToRegex(pattern).test(normalized);\n}\n\n/** Returns true if the path hits any unbypassable pattern. */\nexport function isPathDenied(path: string): boolean {\n  const normalized = path.toLowerCase();\n  return COMPILED_PATH_PATTERNS.some((c) => c.regex.test(normalized));\n}\n\n/** Returns true if the tool name is unconditionally denied. */\nexport function isToolDenied(toolName: string): boolean {\n  return UNBYPASSABLE_TOOL_NAMES.includes(toolName);\n}\n","/**\n * Tool risk classification for `confirm_risky` access-policy mode (#2279).\n *\n * Classifies each registered MCP tool as `read-only` (safe — log-and-allow\n * under confirm_risky) or `risky` (write/exec/network — block under\n * confirm_risky). Used by the policy enforcer to differentiate which\n * violations a human would have wanted to review.\n *\n * Classification policy:\n *\n * - **Read-only**: tool exclusively reads existing state — no file writes,\n *   no subprocess execution, no network requests beyond a single bounded\n *   read of project-internal data. `query_*`, `list_*`, `search_*`,\n *   `*_query`, `*_analyze` patterns by default.\n * - **Risky**: tool writes files, runs subprocesses, posts to external\n *   services, calls LLM APIs, or has any side effect that a human reviewer\n *   would want to see before approving in confirm_risky mode.\n *\n * If a tool is unknown, it is treated as risky (default-deny) — same\n * principle as the unbypassable denylist: the security layer fails closed\n * on a misclassification.\n *\n * Update path: when adding a new MCP tool, classify it explicitly here.\n * The `inject-governance.ts check` CI gate ensures the registry list is\n * still the source of truth; this file is the risk overlay.\n *\n * @module security/access-constraint-deriver/tool-risk\n */\n\n/**\n * Tools that exclusively read state. Violations on these are log-and-allow\n * under `confirm_risky` mode — same as `audit` mode.\n */\nexport const READ_ONLY_TOOLS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  // Discovery / listing\n  'list_experts',\n  'list_workflows',\n  // Research reads\n  'research_query',\n  'research_analyze',\n  'research_catalog_review',\n  'research_synthesize',\n  // Memory reads\n  'memory_query',\n  'memory_stats',\n  // Observability\n  'weather_report',\n  'query_trace',\n  'query_task_state',\n  // Async-mode result polling (#3042 / epic #2631)\n  'get_job_result',\n  // Async-mode job discovery (#3046 / epic #2631 Stage 5)\n  'list_jobs',\n  // Codebase intelligence (read-only over local files)\n  'search_codebase',\n  'extract_symbols',\n  // Repo analysis (read-only)\n  'repo_analyze',\n  'repo_security_plan',\n  // Routing recommendation (no side effects — returns recommendation)\n  'delegate_to_model',\n  // Registry import (returns a draft template — does not write)\n  'registry_import',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Returns true if the tool is risky under confirm_risky mode (default-deny\n * for unknown tools — security layer fails closed).\n */\nexport function isRiskyTool(toolName: string): boolean {\n  return !READ_ONLY_TOOLS.has(toolName);\n}\n","/**\n * Access Constraint Deriver — Policy enforcement (#1977, #2279).\n *\n * Pure function that checks a proposed tool call against a derived policy\n * and returns an AccessDecision. Enforcement depends on the policy's mode:\n * - `off` and `audit` never block\n * - `confirm_risky` (#2279) blocks violations on risky tools (write/exec/\n *   network) and log-and-allows violations on read-only tools\n * - `enforce` blocks every violation regardless of risk classification\n *\n * @module security/access-constraint-deriver/enforcer\n */\n\nimport { isPathDenied, isToolDenied } from './denylist.js';\nimport { isRiskyTool } from './tool-risk.js';\nimport type { AccessDecision, TaskAccessPolicy } from './types.js';\n\n/**\n * Checks a proposed tool call against the unbypassable denylist AND the\n * task's derived access policy.\n *\n * Order of operations (important — the denylist is FIRST and unbypassable):\n * 1. If the tool is on the hardcoded deny-tool list → deny regardless\n *    of policy. This is unbypassable even in `off` mode.\n * 2. If a file-path argument is provided and matches an unbypassable path\n *    pattern (e.g. `~/.ssh/**`, `/etc/shadow`) → deny regardless.\n * 3. Otherwise, fall back to the per-task policy (bypass in skeleton).\n *\n * The denylist check runs before the policy check so a malicious LLM-derived\n * policy cannot grant access to secrets/credentials by listing the tool in\n * `allowedTools`.\n */\nexport function checkAccess(\n  toolName: string,\n  policy: TaskAccessPolicy,\n  args?: { readonly path?: string }\n): AccessDecision {\n  // 1. Unbypassable tool denylist — applies in all modes.\n  if (isToolDenied(toolName)) {\n    return {\n      decision: 'deny',\n      reason: `tool \"${toolName}\" is on the unbypassable deny-tool list`,\n      matchedRule: 'unbypassable:tool',\n    };\n  }\n\n  // 2. Unbypassable path denylist — applies when a path argument is given.\n  if (typeof args?.path === 'string' && args.path.length > 0 && isPathDenied(args.path)) {\n    return {\n      decision: 'deny',\n      reason: `path \"${args.path}\" is on the unbypassable deny-path list`,\n      matchedRule: 'unbypassable:path',\n    };\n  }\n\n  // 3. Per-task policy check.\n  if (policy.allowedTools === '*') return { decision: 'allow' };\n\n  if (policy.allowedTools.includes(toolName)) return { decision: 'allow' };\n\n  return decideOnViolation(toolName, policy.mode);\n}\n\n/**\n * Mode-specific behavior when a tool is not in the per-task allowlist.\n * Extracted so checkAccess stays under the complexity-10 cap.\n */\nfunction decideOnViolation(toolName: string, mode: TaskAccessPolicy['mode']): AccessDecision {\n  if (mode === 'audit') {\n    return {\n      decision: 'log-and-allow',\n      warning: `tool \"${toolName}\" not in derived policy (audit mode)`,\n    };\n  }\n  // confirm_risky: split by tool risk classification (#2279). Read-only\n  // violations are log-and-allow (audit-like); risky violations are denied\n  // with a structured reason that surfaces \"would-have-required-approval\"\n  // semantics. Operators add the tool to the allowlist after review, or\n  // graduate to `enforce` once the violation rate is acceptable.\n  if (mode === 'confirm_risky') {\n    if (!isRiskyTool(toolName)) {\n      return {\n        decision: 'log-and-allow',\n        warning: `tool \"${toolName}\" not in derived policy (confirm_risky mode, read-only — would have required human approval, allowed because read-only)`,\n      };\n    }\n    return {\n      decision: 'deny',\n      reason: `tool \"${toolName}\" not in derived policy (confirm_risky mode, risky — would have required human approval; denied for now, add to allowedTools or run in audit mode to allow)`,\n      matchedRule: 'allowedTools:confirm_risky',\n    };\n  }\n  return {\n    decision: 'deny',\n    reason: `tool \"${toolName}\" not in derived policy`,\n    matchedRule: 'allowedTools',\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Access Constraint Deriver — MCP tool dispatch guard (#1977 final wiring).\n *\n * Per-call helper and middleware factory that plugs the access-constraint\n * enforcer into the MCP tool dispatch path. Runs AFTER policy derivation\n * (deriver.ts owns that) and BEFORE the tool handler executes.\n *\n * Behavior matrix:\n * - mode=off → no-op, allows every call (this is the default; runtime\n *   behavior is unchanged from pre-#1977)\n * - mode=audit → checks against the policy; on violation, logs a warning\n *   and still forwards to the handler\n * - mode=enforce → checks against the policy; on violation, returns an\n *   MCP-format isError result without invoking the handler\n *\n * The enforcer's hardcoded denylist (denylist.ts) runs FIRST regardless\n * of mode. Even `off` mode denies destructive tools and secret paths.\n *\n * @module security/access-constraint-deriver/mcp-guard\n */\n\nimport { AsyncLocalStorage } from 'node:async_hooks';\nimport { checkAccess } from './enforcer.js';\nimport type { AccessDecision, TaskAccessPolicy } from './types.js';\n\n/** AsyncLocalStorage holding the active task's access policy. */\nconst accessPolicyStorage = new AsyncLocalStorage<TaskAccessPolicy>();\n\n/**\n * Run `fn` with `policy` available to any nested MCP tool dispatch.\n *\n * Orchestrators (orchestrate, execute_expert, etc.) derive a policy at\n * task start and wrap downstream work in this helper. Tool handlers that\n * use `guardMcpToolCall` will read the policy from ALS.\n */\nexport function withAccessPolicy<T>(policy: TaskAccessPolicy, fn: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {\n  return accessPolicyStorage.run(policy, fn);\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns the active access policy, or undefined if no wrapping `withAccessPolicy`\n * is in scope. When undefined, `guardMcpToolCall` treats the request as\n * mode=off (permissive) since no task context has been established.\n */\nexport function getActivePolicy(): TaskAccessPolicy | undefined {\n  return accessPolicyStorage.getStore();\n}\n\n/**\n * Input-hints a tool handler can surface so the guard can reason about\n * file-path arguments. Tools with a `path` arg should pass it; tools\n * without can omit.\n */\nexport interface GuardArgs {\n  readonly path?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Check a proposed MCP tool call against the active access policy.\n *\n * Pure function — does not mutate the policy or the storage. Returns an\n * AccessDecision the caller interprets:\n *\n * - `allow`: invoke the handler\n * - `deny`: do not invoke; return a RefuseAction / isError result upstream\n * - `log-and-allow`: log a warning, then invoke the handler (audit mode)\n *\n * When no policy is in ALS (no wrapping `withAccessPolicy`), this returns\n * `allow` — the guard is opt-in at the orchestrator layer.\n */\nexport function guardMcpToolCall(toolName: string, args?: GuardArgs): AccessDecision {\n  const policy = getActivePolicy();\n  if (policy === undefined) return { decision: 'allow' };\n  return checkAccess(toolName, policy, args);\n}\n\n/**\n * Shape of the logger the middleware uses. Minimal to avoid coupling.\n */\ninterface MiddlewareLogger {\n  warn: (message: string, context?: Record<string, unknown>) => void;\n  info: (message: string, context?: Record<string, unknown>) => void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Formats a deny decision as an MCP-compliant isError ToolResult shape.\n * The MCP server's middleware chain recognizes `{ isError, content }` and\n * surfaces it as a tool error to the caller.\n */\nexport function denyToToolResult(\n  decision: Extract<AccessDecision, { decision: 'deny' }>,\n  requestId: string\n): { isError: true; content: Array<{ type: 'text'; text: string }> } {\n  return {\n    isError: true,\n    content: [\n      {\n        type: 'text',\n        text: `access denied: ${decision.reason} (rule: ${decision.matchedRule}, request: ${requestId})`,\n      },\n    ],\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Create an access-policy middleware that plugs into the MCP middleware\n * chain. Reads the active policy from ALS. When no policy is active OR\n * the policy is in `off` mode, this middleware is a no-op pass-through.\n */\nexport function createAccessPolicyMiddleware(config: {\n  readonly toolName: string;\n  readonly logger: MiddlewareLogger;\n}): (\n  args: unknown,\n  ctx: { readonly requestContext: { readonly requestId: string } },\n  next: (args: unknown, ctx: unknown) => Promise<unknown>\n) => Promise<unknown> {\n  return async (args, ctx, next) => {\n    const policy = getActivePolicy();\n    if (policy === undefined || policy.mode === 'off') {\n      return next(args, ctx);\n    }\n\n    const guardArgs = toGuardArgs(args);\n    const decision = checkAccess(config.toolName, policy, guardArgs);\n\n    if (decision.decision === 'allow') {\n      return next(args, ctx);\n    }\n    if (decision.decision === 'log-and-allow') {\n      config.logger.warn('access-policy: audit violation', {\n        tool: config.toolName,\n        warning: decision.warning,\n        policySource: policy.source,\n        requestId: ctx.requestContext.requestId,\n      });\n      return next(args, ctx);\n    }\n    // decision.decision === 'deny'\n    config.logger.info('access-policy: tool call denied', {\n      tool: config.toolName,\n      reason: decision.reason,\n      matchedRule: decision.matchedRule,\n      policySource: policy.source,\n      mode: policy.mode,\n      requestId: ctx.requestContext.requestId,\n    });\n    return denyToToolResult(decision, ctx.requestContext.requestId);\n  };\n}\n\n/** Extract path from a typed tool-arg record, if present and a string. */\nfunction toGuardArgs(args: unknown): GuardArgs | undefined {\n  if (typeof args !== 'object' || args === null) return undefined;\n  const path = (args as Record<string, unknown>)['path'];\n  return typeof path === 'string' && path.length > 0 ? { path } : undefined;\n}\n","/**\n * Access Constraint Deriver — MCP middleware-chain adapter (#1977 activation).\n *\n * Bridges `createAccessPolicyMiddleware` (which returns a generic\n * `Promise<unknown>`-shaped middleware) to the strongly-typed `Middleware`\n * contract used by `mcp/middleware/middleware-chain.ts`.\n *\n * Mounted into the standard middleware stack so every tool call passes\n * through the ClawGuard enforcer. When no orchestrator has wrapped the\n * call with `withAccessPolicy(...)`, this adapter is a no-op pass-through\n * — runtime behavior is unchanged for callers that don't set up a policy.\n *\n * @module security/access-constraint-deriver/chain-adapter\n */\n\nimport { checkAccess } from './enforcer.js';\nimport { denyToToolResult, getActivePolicy } from './mcp-guard.js';\nimport type { GuardArgs } from './mcp-guard.js';\n// Type-only import: no runtime cycle with mcp/middleware/middleware-chain.ts.\nimport type { Middleware } from '../../mcp/middleware/middleware-chain.js';\n\nfunction toGuardArgs(args: unknown): GuardArgs | undefined {\n  if (typeof args !== 'object' || args === null) return undefined;\n  const path = (args as Record<string, unknown>)['path'];\n  return typeof path === 'string' && path.length > 0 ? { path } : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds a middleware-chain-compatible access-policy middleware for\n * `toolName`. Reads the active `TaskAccessPolicy` from `AsyncLocalStorage`\n * (populated by `withAccessPolicy`). When no policy is active OR the\n * policy is in `off` mode, the middleware is a no-op pass-through.\n */\nexport function createAccessPolicyChainMiddleware(toolName: string): Middleware {\n  return async (args, ctx, next) => {\n    const policy = getActivePolicy();\n    if (policy === undefined || policy.mode === 'off') {\n      return next(args, ctx);\n    }\n\n    const decision = checkAccess(toolName, policy, toGuardArgs(args));\n\n    if (decision.decision === 'allow') {\n      return next(args, ctx);\n    }\n    if (decision.decision === 'log-and-allow') {\n      ctx.logger.warn('access-policy: audit violation', {\n        tool: toolName,\n        warning: decision.warning,\n        policySource: policy.source,\n        requestId: ctx.requestContext.requestId,\n      });\n      return next(args, ctx);\n    }\n    ctx.logger.info('access-policy: tool call denied', {\n      tool: toolName,\n      reason: decision.reason,\n      matchedRule: decision.matchedRule,\n      policySource: policy.source,\n      mode: policy.mode,\n      requestId: ctx.requestContext.requestId,\n    });\n    return denyToToolResult(decision, ctx.requestContext.requestId);\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Centralized Middleware Chain\n *\n * Provides a composable middleware chain for MCP tools with guaranteed\n * execution order: auth → validation → policy → rate-limit → timeout → audit\n *\n * @module mcp/middleware/middleware-chain\n * (Source: Issue #189 - Centralized MCP middleware chain)\n */\n\nimport type { z } from 'zod';\nimport type { ILogger } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { createLogger, getTimeProvider } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { validateToolInput } from './validation.js';\nimport { RateLimiter, type RateLimiterConfig } from './rate-limiter.js';\nimport { type IPolicyFirewall, type ExecutionMode, createPolicyContext } from './policy.js';\nimport { TimeoutGuard, type TimeoutGuardConfig } from './timeout-guard.js';\nimport { MCP_TIMEOUTS } from '../../config/timeouts.js';\nimport { createRequestContext, contextForLogging, type RequestContext } from './request-context.js';\nimport { createMetricsMiddleware } from './tool-metrics.js';\nimport { abortSignalStorage } from '../mcp-notifier.js';\nimport { createAccessPolicyChainMiddleware } from '../../security/access-constraint-deriver/chain-adapter.js';\nimport { toolStructuredError } from '../tools/tool-result.js';\nimport type { ErrorCategory } from '../error-envelope.js';\n\n/**\n * MCP tool result type.\n *\n * This interface is structurally compatible with the MCP SDK's CallToolResult.\n * The content array accepts text content for simplicity, while remaining\n * compatible with the SDK's broader ContentBlock type at runtime.\n */\nexport interface ToolResult {\n  /** Content blocks returned by the tool (text content) */\n  content: Array<{ type: 'text'; text: string }>;\n  /** Whether this represents an error result */\n  isError?: boolean;\n  /** Structured output for SDK outputSchema validation (Issue #1117) */\n  structuredContent?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /** Out-of-band metadata — carries the #2649 error envelope on errors. */\n  _meta?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Middleware context passed through the chain.\n */\nexport interface MiddlewareContext {\n  /** Unique request ID for tracing */\n  readonly requestContext: RequestContext;\n  /** Logger with request context */\n  readonly logger: ILogger;\n  /** Validated arguments (set after validation middleware) */\n  validatedArgs?: unknown;\n}\n\n/**\n * Middleware function signature.\n * Each middleware receives the context and a next function to call.\n */\nexport type Middleware = (\n  args: unknown,\n  ctx: MiddlewareContext,\n  next: (args: unknown, ctx: MiddlewareContext) => Promise<ToolResult>\n) => Promise<ToolResult>;\n\n/**\n * Configuration for the middleware chain.\n */\nexport interface MiddlewareChainConfig {\n  /** Tool name for logging and policy evaluation */\n  toolName: string;\n  /** Zod schema for input validation (optional) */\n  schema?: z.ZodType;\n  /** Policy firewall instance (optional) */\n  policyFirewall?: IPolicyFirewall | undefined;\n  /** Execution mode for policy evaluation */\n  executionMode?: ExecutionMode | undefined;\n  /** Allowed paths for file operations */\n  allowedPaths?: readonly string[] | undefined;\n  /** Rate limiter configuration (optional) */\n  rateLimiter?: RateLimiterConfig | RateLimiter | undefined;\n  /** Timeout configuration (optional) */\n  timeout?: TimeoutGuardConfig | undefined;\n  /** Logger instance (optional) */\n  logger?: ILogger | undefined;\n  /** Skip specific middleware steps */\n  skip?: MiddlewareSkipConfig | undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Configuration for skipping middleware steps.\n */\nexport interface MiddlewareSkipConfig {\n  validation?: boolean | undefined;\n  policy?: boolean | undefined;\n  rateLimit?: boolean | undefined;\n  timeout?: boolean | undefined;\n  audit?: boolean | undefined;\n  /** Skip the ClawGuard access-policy middleware (#1977). */\n  accessPolicy?: boolean | undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Tool handler function signature.\n */\nexport type ToolHandler = (args: unknown) => Promise<ToolResult>;\n\n/**\n * Context-aware handler that receives middleware context.\n */\nexport type ContextAwareToolHandler = (\n  args: unknown,\n  ctx: MiddlewareContext\n) => Promise<ToolResult>;\n\n/**\n * Creates an error result with the structured error envelope (#2649).\n * Each middleware passes the category that matches its failure mode.\n */\nfunction errorResult(category: ErrorCategory, message: string, requestId: string): ToolResult {\n  return toolStructuredError({\n    errorCategory: category,\n    message: `${message} (request: ${requestId})`,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates validation middleware.\n */\nfunction createValidationMiddleware(schema: z.ZodType): Middleware {\n  return async (args, ctx, next) => {\n    const result = validateToolInput(schema, args);\n    if (!result.ok) {\n      ctx.logger.warn('Validation failed', {\n        error: result.error.message,\n      });\n      return errorResult(\n        'validation',\n        `Validation error: ${result.error.message}`,\n        ctx.requestContext.requestId\n      );\n    }\n    ctx.validatedArgs = result.value;\n    return next(result.value, ctx);\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates policy middleware.\n */\nfunction createPolicyMiddleware(\n  firewall: IPolicyFirewall,\n  toolName: string,\n  mode: ExecutionMode,\n  allowedPaths?: readonly string[]\n): Middleware {\n  return async (args, ctx, next) => {\n    const policyCtx = createPolicyContext(toolName, args, {\n      mode,\n      ...(allowedPaths !== undefined && { allowedPaths }),\n    });\n    const decision = firewall.evaluate(policyCtx);\n\n    if (!decision.allowed) {\n      ctx.logger.warn('Policy denied', {\n        reason: decision.reason,\n        ruleName: decision.ruleName,\n      });\n      return errorResult(\n        'permission',\n        `Policy denied: ${decision.reason}`,\n        ctx.requestContext.requestId\n      );\n    }\n    ctx.logger.debug('Policy check passed', { reason: decision.reason });\n    return next(args, ctx);\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates rate limit middleware.\n */\nfunction createRateLimitMiddleware(limiter: RateLimiter): Middleware {\n  return async (args, ctx, next) => {\n    const acquired = limiter.tryAcquire();\n    if (!acquired) {\n      const state = limiter.getState();\n      ctx.logger.warn('Rate limit exceeded', {\n        nextTokenMs: state.nextTokenMs,\n      });\n      return errorResult(\n        'transient',\n        `Rate limit exceeded. Try again in ${String(state.nextTokenMs)}ms`,\n        ctx.requestContext.requestId\n      );\n    }\n    return next(args, ctx);\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates timeout middleware.\n * Reads AbortSignal from AsyncLocalStorage for client cancellation support.\n */\nfunction createTimeoutMiddleware(guard: TimeoutGuard, toolName: string): Middleware {\n  return async (args, ctx, next) => {\n    const signal = abortSignalStorage.getStore();\n    const result = await guard.execute(() => next(args, ctx), {\n      operationName: toolName,\n      ...(signal !== undefined ? { signal } : {}),\n    });\n\n    if (!result.ok) {\n      ctx.logger.error('Operation timed out', undefined, {\n        code: result.error.code,\n        timeoutMs: result.error.timeoutMs,\n      });\n      // #3726 discoverability: append the per-tool hint (e.g. \"retry in async\n      // job-mode\") so a sync long-running tool that hits its ceiling tells the\n      // caller how to escape it. Absent hint → message unchanged.\n      const hint = MCP_TIMEOUTS.perToolTimeoutHint[toolName];\n      const message = hint !== undefined ? `${result.error.message} ${hint}` : result.error.message;\n      // Timeout — transient, a retry with more headroom may succeed.\n      return errorResult('transient', message, ctx.requestContext.requestId);\n    }\n\n    if (result.value.nearTimeout) {\n      ctx.logger.warn('Operation completed near timeout threshold', {\n        durationMs: result.value.durationMs,\n      });\n    }\n\n    return result.value.value;\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates audit middleware that logs start/end of request.\n */\nfunction createAuditMiddleware(): Middleware {\n  return async (args, ctx, next) => {\n    const startTime = getTimeProvider().now();\n    ctx.logger.info('Tool invocation started');\n\n    try {\n      const result = await next(args, ctx);\n      const durationMs = getTimeProvider().now() - startTime;\n\n      if (result.isError === true) {\n        ctx.logger.warn('Tool execution completed with error', { durationMs });\n      } else {\n        ctx.logger.info('Tool execution completed', { durationMs });\n      }\n      return result;\n    } catch (error) {\n      const durationMs = getTimeProvider().now() - startTime;\n      const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error';\n      ctx.logger.error('Tool execution failed', error instanceof Error ? error : undefined, {\n        durationMs,\n      });\n      return errorResult('internal', `Internal error: ${message}`, ctx.requestContext.requestId);\n    }\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Composes multiple middleware functions into a single chain.\n */\nfunction composeMiddleware(middlewares: Middleware[]): Middleware {\n  return (args, ctx, finalHandler) => {\n    const dispatch = (index: number, currentArgs: unknown): Promise<ToolResult> => {\n      if (index >= middlewares.length) {\n        return finalHandler(currentArgs, ctx);\n      }\n      const middleware = middlewares[index];\n      if (middleware === undefined) {\n        return finalHandler(currentArgs, ctx);\n      }\n      return middleware(currentArgs, ctx, (nextArgs) => dispatch(index + 1, nextArgs));\n    };\n    return dispatch(0, args);\n  };\n}\n\n/** Helper: adds audit middleware if not skipped */\nfunction addAuditMiddleware(middlewares: Middleware[], skip: MiddlewareSkipConfig): void {\n  if (skip.audit !== true) {\n    middlewares.push(createAuditMiddleware());\n  }\n}\n\n/** Helper: adds rate limit middleware if configured */\nfunction addRateLimitMiddleware(\n  middlewares: Middleware[],\n  config: MiddlewareChainConfig,\n  skip: MiddlewareSkipConfig\n): void {\n  if (skip.rateLimit !== true && config.rateLimiter !== undefined) {\n    const limiter =\n      config.rateLimiter instanceof RateLimiter\n        ? config.rateLimiter\n        : new RateLimiter(config.rateLimiter);\n    middlewares.push(createRateLimitMiddleware(limiter));\n  }\n}\n\n/** Helper: adds validation middleware if schema provided */\nfunction addValidationMiddleware(\n  middlewares: Middleware[],\n  config: MiddlewareChainConfig,\n  skip: MiddlewareSkipConfig\n): void {\n  if (skip.validation !== true && config.schema !== undefined) {\n    middlewares.push(createValidationMiddleware(config.schema));\n  }\n}\n\n/** Helper: adds policy middleware if configured */\nfunction addPolicyMiddleware(\n  middlewares: Middleware[],\n  config: MiddlewareChainConfig,\n  skip: MiddlewareSkipConfig\n): void {\n  if (skip.policy !== true && config.policyFirewall !== undefined) {\n    const mode = config.executionMode ?? 'read-only';\n    middlewares.push(\n      createPolicyMiddleware(config.policyFirewall, config.toolName, mode, config.allowedPaths)\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/** Helper: adds timeout middleware if configured */\nfunction addTimeoutMiddleware(\n  middlewares: Middleware[],\n  config: MiddlewareChainConfig,\n  skip: MiddlewareSkipConfig\n): void {\n  if (skip.timeout !== true && config.timeout !== undefined) {\n    const guard = new TimeoutGuard(config.timeout);\n    middlewares.push(createTimeoutMiddleware(guard, config.toolName));\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Helper: adds the ClawGuard access-policy middleware (#1977).\n *\n * Always added unless explicitly skipped. The middleware is ALS-backed\n * and a no-op pass-through when no orchestrator has called\n * `withAccessPolicy(...)` — so runtime behavior is unchanged for callers\n * that haven't opted in.\n */\nfunction addAccessPolicyMiddleware(\n  middlewares: Middleware[],\n  config: MiddlewareChainConfig,\n  skip: MiddlewareSkipConfig\n): void {\n  if (skip.accessPolicy !== true) {\n    middlewares.push(createAccessPolicyChainMiddleware(config.toolName));\n  }\n}\n\n/** Helper: builds the middleware stack */\nfunction buildMiddlewareStack(config: MiddlewareChainConfig): Middleware[] {\n  const skip = config.skip ?? {};\n  const middlewares: Middleware[] = [];\n\n  middlewares.push(createMetricsMiddleware()); // Tool usage analytics (#1022)\n  addAuditMiddleware(middlewares, skip);\n  addRateLimitMiddleware(middlewares, config, skip);\n  addValidationMiddleware(middlewares, config, skip);\n  addPolicyMiddleware(middlewares, config, skip);\n  addAccessPolicyMiddleware(middlewares, config, skip); // #1977 ClawGuard\n  addTimeoutMiddleware(middlewares, config, skip);\n\n  return middlewares;\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a middleware chain with the standard execution order.\n *\n * Order: audit → rate-limit → validation → policy → timeout → handler\n *\n * Audit wraps everything to capture timing. Rate limit is checked early\n * to reject requests before expensive validation. Timeout wraps the\n * actual handler execution.\n *\n * @param config - Chain configuration\n * @returns A function that wraps handlers with the middleware chain\n */\nexport function createMiddlewareChain(\n  config: MiddlewareChainConfig\n): (handler: ContextAwareToolHandler) => ToolHandler {\n  const logger = config.logger ?? createLogger({ tool: config.toolName });\n  const middlewares = buildMiddlewareStack(config);\n  const composed = composeMiddleware(middlewares);\n\n  return (handler: ContextAwareToolHandler): ToolHandler => {\n    return async (args: unknown): Promise<ToolResult> => {\n      const requestContext = createRequestContext({ toolName: config.toolName });\n      const requestLogger = logger.child(contextForLogging(requestContext));\n      const ctx: MiddlewareContext = { requestContext, logger: requestLogger };\n      return composed(args, ctx, (finalArgs, finalCtx) => handler(finalArgs, finalCtx));\n    };\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Convenience function to wrap a handler with default middleware.\n *\n * @param toolName - Name of the tool\n * @param handler - The tool handler\n * @param options - Optional middleware configuration\n * @returns Wrapped handler with middleware\n */\nexport function withMiddleware(\n  toolName: string,\n  handler: ContextAwareToolHandler | ToolHandler,\n  options?: Partial<Omit<MiddlewareChainConfig, 'toolName'>>\n): ToolHandler {\n  // Note: Policy firewall is NOT added by default - must be explicitly configured\n  // This follows the principle of minimal defaults with explicit opt-in for security\n  const config: MiddlewareChainConfig = {\n    toolName,\n    ...options,\n  };\n\n  const chain = createMiddlewareChain(config);\n\n  // Wrap handler to support both signatures\n  const wrappedHandler: ContextAwareToolHandler = (args, ctx) => {\n    // Check if handler expects context (2 params)\n    if (handler.length >= 2) {\n      return handler(args, ctx);\n    }\n    return (handler as ToolHandler)(args);\n  };\n\n  return chain(wrappedHandler);\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a middleware chain factory with shared configuration.\n *\n * @param sharedConfig - Configuration shared across all tools\n * @returns Factory function for creating wrapped handlers\n */\nexport function createMiddlewareFactory(\n  sharedConfig: Omit<MiddlewareChainConfig, 'toolName' | 'schema'>\n): (\n  toolName: string,\n  handler: ContextAwareToolHandler | ToolHandler,\n  schema?: z.ZodType\n) => ToolHandler {\n  return (toolName, handler, schema) => {\n    const options = schema !== undefined ? { ...sharedConfig, schema } : sharedConfig;\n    return withMiddleware(toolName, handler, options);\n  };\n}\n","/* eslint-disable max-lines -- Cohesive central registry: per-tool annotation entries grow with REGISTERED_TOOLS (governance: 400-600 OK if cohesive). */\n/**\n * MCP Tool Annotations Registry\n *\n * Centralized side effect and behavior annotations for all MCP tools.\n * Uses MCP protocol-standard ToolAnnotations (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint,\n * idempotentHint, openWorldHint) plus custom side effect metadata.\n *\n * @module mcp/tools/tool-annotations\n * (Source: Issue #993 — Document MCP tool side effects in schema metadata)\n */\n\n/**\n * Side effect category per Issue #993 proposal.\n * - explicit: Intended, documented state changes\n * - implicit: System-level effects (rate limits, token consumption)\n * - coupling: Modifies state that another tool depends on\n */\nexport type SideEffectCategory = 'explicit' | 'implicit' | 'coupling';\n\n/**\n * A single side effect declaration.\n */\nexport interface SideEffect {\n  readonly category: SideEffectCategory;\n  readonly description: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * MCP protocol-standard tool annotations.\n * Maps to ToolAnnotationsSchema from @modelcontextprotocol/sdk.\n */\nexport interface ToolAnnotations {\n  /** Human-readable title for the tool */\n  readonly title?: string;\n  /** If true, the tool does not modify state */\n  readonly readOnlyHint?: boolean;\n  /** If true, the tool may perform destructive operations */\n  readonly destructiveHint?: boolean;\n  /** If true, calling with same args yields same result */\n  readonly idempotentHint?: boolean;\n  /** If true, the tool interacts with external systems */\n  readonly openWorldHint?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Combined tool metadata: MCP annotations + custom side effects.\n */\nexport interface ToolSideEffectsEntry {\n  readonly annotations: ToolAnnotations;\n  readonly sideEffects: readonly SideEffect[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonical registry of tool annotations and side effects.\n * One entry per registered MCP tool.\n */\nexport const TOOL_ANNOTATIONS: Readonly<Record<string, ToolSideEffectsEntry>> = {\n  run: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Run (Adaptive Entry Point)',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Records a routing decision for observability' },\n    ],\n  },\n  delegate_to_model: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Delegate to Model',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [{ category: 'implicit', description: 'Consumes rate limit quota' }],\n  },\n  orchestrate: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Orchestrate Task',\n      readOnlyHint: false,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: false,\n      openWorldHint: true,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      { category: 'explicit', description: 'Creates and executes expert agents' },\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Consumes API tokens from configured provider' },\n      { category: 'coupling', description: 'May trigger rate limiting on model adapter' },\n      { category: 'coupling', description: 'Records task outcome in OutcomeFeedbackCollector' },\n    ],\n  },\n  create_expert: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Create Expert',\n      readOnlyHint: false,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: false,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      { category: 'explicit', description: 'Creates expert agent in shared registry' },\n      { category: 'coupling', description: 'Expert ID required by execute_expert' },\n    ],\n  },\n  execute_expert: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Execute Expert',\n      readOnlyHint: false,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: false,\n      openWorldHint: true,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      { category: 'explicit', description: 'Executes expert agent task via model adapter' },\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Consumes API tokens from configured provider' },\n      { category: 'coupling', description: 'Requires expert created by create_expert' },\n      { category: 'coupling', description: 'May trigger rate limiting on model adapter' },\n    ],\n  },\n  run_workflow: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Run Workflow',\n      readOnlyHint: false,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: false,\n      openWorldHint: true,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      { category: 'explicit', description: 'Executes multi-step workflow template' },\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Consumes API tokens if workflow uses model adapter' },\n      { category: 'coupling', description: 'May trigger rate limiting on model adapter' },\n    ],\n  },\n  list_experts: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'List Experts',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [{ category: 'implicit', description: 'Consumes rate limit quota' }],\n  },\n  list_workflows: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'List Workflows',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [{ category: 'implicit', description: 'Consumes rate limit quota' }],\n  },\n  consensus_vote: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Consensus Vote',\n      readOnlyHint: false,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: false,\n      openWorldHint: true,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      { category: 'explicit', description: 'Executes multi-agent voting across CLIs' },\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Consumes API tokens from multiple providers' },\n      { category: 'coupling', description: 'Records vote outcomes for weather report' },\n    ],\n  },\n  research_query: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Research Query',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [{ category: 'implicit', description: 'Consumes rate limit quota' }],\n  },\n  research_add: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Research Add',\n      readOnlyHint: false,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: true,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      { category: 'explicit', description: 'Adds paper to research registry on disk' },\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Fetches metadata from arXiv API' },\n    ],\n  },\n  research_discover: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Research Discover',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: false,\n      openWorldHint: true,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Queries external APIs (arXiv, GitHub, etc.)' },\n      { category: 'coupling', description: 'Auto-catalogs discovered references' },\n    ],\n  },\n  survey_oss_landscape: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Survey OSS Landscape',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      // Same query may return different results day-to-day as star counts\n      // and last-commit dates evolve; idempotentHint=false matches reality.\n      idempotentHint: false,\n      openWorldHint: true,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [{ category: 'implicit', description: 'Queries the GitHub search API' }],\n  },\n  vendor_publishing_audit: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Vendor Publishing Audit',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      // Pure static lookup against the in-process seed dataset.\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [{ category: 'implicit', description: 'Consumes rate limit quota' }],\n  },\n  compare_data_feeds: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Compare Data Feeds',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      // Same input → same output; pure file diff with no external calls.\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [{ category: 'implicit', description: 'Reads two files from the workspace' }],\n  },\n  research_analyze: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Research Analyze',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [{ category: 'implicit', description: 'Consumes rate limit quota' }],\n  },\n  research_catalog_review: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Research Catalog Review',\n      readOnlyHint: false,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: false,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      { category: 'explicit', description: 'Approves or dismisses cataloged references' },\n      { category: 'coupling', description: 'Approved items added to research registry' },\n    ],\n  },\n  memory_query: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Memory Query',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: false,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Consumes rate limit quota' },\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'May trigger reflective retrieval (MemR3)' },\n    ],\n  },\n  memory_stats: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Memory Stats',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [{ category: 'implicit', description: 'Consumes rate limit quota' }],\n  },\n  memory_write: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Memory Write',\n      readOnlyHint: false,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: false,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      { category: 'explicit', description: 'Writes data to memory backend' },\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Consumes rate limit quota' },\n    ],\n  },\n  weather_report: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Weather Report',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: false,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [{ category: 'implicit', description: 'Consumes rate limit quota' }],\n  },\n  improvement_review: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Improvement Review',\n      readOnlyHint: false,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      // When fileIssues=true, creates GitHub issues — not idempotent.\n      idempotentHint: false,\n      openWorldHint: true,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Reads OutcomeStore and runs fitness audit' },\n      {\n        category: 'explicit',\n        description: 'When fileIssues=true, files candidate GitHub issues via gh CLI',\n      },\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Consumes rate limit quota' },\n    ],\n  },\n  run_quality_gate: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Run Quality Gate',\n      // Spawns build/test toolchains which can write artifacts — not read-only.\n      readOnlyHint: false,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      // Same checks against the same code yield the same verdict.\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      // build/test/security invoke local toolchains and may reach the network.\n      openWorldHint: true,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      {\n        category: 'implicit',\n        description:\n          'Spawns local toolchain processes (tsc/eslint/vitest/build) in the target project dir',\n      },\n      {\n        category: 'implicit',\n        description: 'build/test checks may write build artifacts and coverage output to disk',\n      },\n    ],\n  },\n  issue_triage: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Issue Triage',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: true,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Fetches issue data from GitHub API' },\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Consumes rate limit quota' },\n    ],\n  },\n  run_graph_workflow: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Run Graph Workflow',\n      readOnlyHint: false,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: false,\n      openWorldHint: true,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      { category: 'explicit', description: 'Executes graph-based workflow with checkpointing' },\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Writes checkpoint files to disk' },\n      { category: 'coupling', description: 'May trigger rate limiting on model adapters' },\n    ],\n  },\n  execute_spec: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Execute Spec',\n      readOnlyHint: false,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: false,\n      openWorldHint: true,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      { category: 'explicit', description: 'Parses and executes markdown specification' },\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Consumes API tokens from configured provider' },\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Writes execution trace to disk' },\n    ],\n  },\n  registry_import: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Registry Import',\n      readOnlyHint: false,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [{ category: 'explicit', description: 'Generates draft model registry entry' }],\n  },\n  query_trace: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Query Trace',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Reads execution trace JSONL files from disk' },\n    ],\n  },\n  repo_analyze: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Repo Analyze',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: true,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      {\n        category: 'implicit',\n        description: 'Fetches repository metadata from GitHub API via gh CLI',\n      },\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Consumes rate limit quota' },\n    ],\n  },\n  repo_security_plan: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Repo Security Plan',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: true,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      {\n        category: 'implicit',\n        description: 'Fetches repository metadata from GitHub API via gh CLI',\n      },\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Consumes rate limit quota' },\n    ],\n  },\n  research_add_source: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Research Add Source',\n      readOnlyHint: false,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: false,\n      openWorldHint: true,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      { category: 'explicit', description: 'Adds a non-paper source to the research registry' },\n      { category: 'coupling', description: 'New entries affect research_discover/research_query' },\n    ],\n  },\n  research_synthesize: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Research Synthesize',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [{ category: 'implicit', description: 'Reads research catalog + alignment map' }],\n  },\n  query_task_state: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Query Task State',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Reads the structured task-state log (#2278)' },\n    ],\n  },\n  get_job_result: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Get Job Result',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      {\n        category: 'implicit',\n        description: 'Reads the async-mode job-result sidecar (#3042 / epic #2631)',\n      },\n    ],\n  },\n  list_jobs: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'List Jobs',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      {\n        category: 'implicit',\n        description:\n          'Lists async-mode job summaries from the sidecar dir (#3046 / epic #2631 Stage 5)',\n      },\n    ],\n  },\n  cancel_job: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Cancel Job',\n      readOnlyHint: false,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      {\n        category: 'explicit',\n        description: 'Writes cancellation record to the async-mode sidecar (#3042 Stage 1b)',\n      },\n      {\n        category: 'coupling',\n        description:\n          'Triggers AbortSignal unwind in same-process dispatcher (cross-process workers must poll)',\n      },\n    ],\n  },\n  verify_audit_chain: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Verify Audit Chain',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      {\n        category: 'implicit',\n        description: 'Reads the immutable audit log and verifies the hash chain',\n      },\n    ],\n  },\n  ci_health_check: {\n    annotations: {\n      // #3530: NOT read-only / idempotent — every call appends a CI-health\n      // telemetry event (appendCiHealthEvent in ci-health-check-tool.ts), which\n      // both writes local state and accumulates per call. The check itself only\n      // reads upstream, but the per-call telemetry append is a real side effect.\n      title: 'CI Health Check',\n      readOnlyHint: false,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: false,\n      // Outbound network to githubstatus.com + GitHub API.\n      openWorldHint: true,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      {\n        category: 'implicit',\n        description:\n          'Fetches GitHub status-page + repo actions/runs to assess CI infrastructure health (#3076)',\n      },\n      {\n        category: 'implicit',\n        description: 'Appends a local CI-health telemetry event per call for observability (#3530)',\n      },\n    ],\n  },\n  extract_symbols: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Extract Symbols',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [{ category: 'implicit', description: 'Reads source files and walks their ASTs' }],\n  },\n  search_codebase: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Search Codebase',\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: true,\n      openWorldHint: false,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      {\n        category: 'implicit',\n        description: 'Reads source files and builds an in-memory symbol index',\n      },\n    ],\n  },\n  run_dev_pipeline: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Run Dev Pipeline',\n      readOnlyHint: false,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: false,\n      openWorldHint: true,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      {\n        category: 'explicit',\n        description: 'Executes the V2 dev pipeline (delegates to CLI adapters)',\n      },\n      {\n        category: 'implicit',\n        description: 'Consumes API tokens; persists outcomes and checkpoints',\n      },\n      {\n        category: 'coupling',\n        description: 'Writes routing/learning state consumed by future runs',\n      },\n    ],\n  },\n  run_pipeline: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Run Pipeline',\n      readOnlyHint: false,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: false,\n      openWorldHint: true,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      { category: 'explicit', description: 'Executes a generic V2 pipeline TaskContract' },\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Consumes API tokens; emits pipeline events' },\n      { category: 'coupling', description: 'Writes policy/audit state consumed by other tools' },\n    ],\n  },\n  pr_review: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'PR Review',\n      readOnlyHint: false,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: false,\n      openWorldHint: true,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      {\n        category: 'explicit',\n        description: 'Runs multi-voter PR review with verification gate (#2233)',\n      },\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Consumes API tokens across voter CLIs' },\n      { category: 'coupling', description: 'Records voter outcomes for weather report' },\n    ],\n  },\n  suggest_research_tasks: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Suggest Research Tasks',\n      // SUGGEST-ONLY: discovers/reads via research_discover and returns\n      // candidate tasks. Files nothing, executes nothing, mutates nothing.\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      // Discovery results vary run-to-run as external sources evolve.\n      idempotentHint: false,\n      // Reaches external research APIs (arXiv/GitHub/etc.) via the engine.\n      openWorldHint: true,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      {\n        category: 'implicit',\n        description: 'Queries research_discover / external research APIs; consumes tokens',\n      },\n    ],\n  },\n  list_available_models: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'List Available Models',\n      // Probes discovery transports and reports health. Reads only; mutates\n      // nothing and does not change routing.\n      readOnlyHint: true,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      // Probe results vary as catalogs/CLIs change.\n      idempotentHint: false,\n      // Reaches the OpenRouter API + spawns CLI probes.\n      openWorldHint: true,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      {\n        category: 'implicit',\n        description: 'Fetches the OpenRouter catalog + probes CLI adapters (network/subprocess)',\n      },\n    ],\n  },\n  supply_chain_tradeoff_panel: {\n    annotations: {\n      title: 'Supply-chain Tradeoff Panel',\n      readOnlyHint: false,\n      destructiveHint: false,\n      idempotentHint: false,\n      openWorldHint: true,\n    },\n    sideEffects: [\n      {\n        category: 'explicit',\n        description:\n          'Runs per-axis tradeoff vote (build_time_determinism / supply_chain_risk / update_cadence) (#2294)',\n      },\n      { category: 'implicit', description: 'Consumes API tokens across voter CLIs' },\n      { category: 'coupling', description: 'Records voter outcomes for weather report' },\n    ],\n  },\n};\n\n/**\n * Returns the annotations for a given tool, or undefined if not found.\n */\nexport function getToolAnnotations(toolName: string): ToolSideEffectsEntry | undefined {\n  return TOOL_ANNOTATIONS[toolName];\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns only the MCP protocol annotations for a tool (for registerTool config).\n */\nexport function getMcpAnnotations(toolName: string): ToolAnnotations | undefined {\n  return TOOL_ANNOTATIONS[toolName]?.annotations;\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns side effects for a tool filtered by category.\n */\nexport function getSideEffectsByCategory(\n  toolName: string,\n  category: SideEffectCategory\n): readonly SideEffect[] {\n  const entry = TOOL_ANNOTATIONS[toolName];\n  if (entry === undefined) return [];\n  return entry.sideEffects.filter((se) => se.category === category);\n}\n","/**\n * Central per-tool MCP annotations accessors (#2648, Epic A; consolidated #3358).\n *\n * The MCP 2025-11-25 spec defines four boolean hints clients use to reason\n * about each tool's safety, retry semantics, and permission UX:\n *\n *   - `readOnlyHint`     — tool does not modify persistent state\n *   - `destructiveHint`  — tool can perform destructive operations\n *   - `idempotentHint`   — calling with the same input is safe to repeat\n *   - `openWorldHint`    — tool interacts with systems outside the server's control\n *\n * Per the MCP spec these are **hints**, not enforcement primitives — clients\n * should never trust them from an untrusted server. But for nexus-agents (a\n * governance substrate) the hints are load-bearing for:\n *\n *   - Programmatic prerequisite gates (Epic B / #2652) — uses\n *     `destructiveHint` and `openWorldHint` to decide what to gate.\n *   - Retry policy decisions in pipeline runners — only retry tools where\n *     `idempotentHint === true`.\n *   - Permission-prompt UX consistency across Claude / Codex / Gemini /\n *     OpenCode harnesses.\n *\n * The audit (#2648 / docs/research/nexus-agents-multi-harness-alignment-audit.md\n * §6 T14) requires **every** registered tool declare all four hints\n * explicitly — no defaults.\n *\n * **Single source of truth (#3358):** the per-tool annotation DATA lives in\n * the side-effects superset registry at `./tools/tool-annotations.ts`, where\n * each entry pairs the MCP hints (`.annotations`) with curated side-effects\n * metadata (#993). This file is the LIVE ACCESSOR path: each tool's\n * `registerTool()` call site reads its annotations via `getToolAnnotations(name)`.\n * Data flows data-file → accessor-file only (no circular import).\n *\n * @module mcp/tool-annotations\n */\n\nimport type { ToolAnnotations } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js';\nimport { TOOL_ANNOTATIONS as TOOL_SIDE_EFFECTS } from './tools/tool-annotations.js';\n\n/**\n * Look up the MCP annotations for a registered MCP tool. Throws if the tool\n * name isn't in the central registry — this enforces \"every tool declares its\n * hints explicitly\" rather than silently falling back to MCP's defaults\n * (which assume destructive + non-idempotent + open-world).\n *\n * The data is derived from the side-effects superset registry\n * (`./tools/tool-annotations.ts`, #993); only the four MCP hint booleans are\n * returned here — side-effects metadata is reached via that module's\n * `getSideEffectsByCategory`.\n */\nexport function getToolAnnotations(name: string): ToolAnnotations {\n  const entry = TOOL_SIDE_EFFECTS[name];\n  if (entry === undefined) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `getToolAnnotations: no entry for tool \"${name}\". Add it to TOOL_ANNOTATIONS in src/mcp/tools/tool-annotations.ts (#2648/#3358).`\n    );\n  }\n  return entry.annotations;\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/consensus - Core Type Definitions\n *\n * Core type definitions and Zod schemas for the consensus engine.\n * Supports multiple voting strategies for multi-agent decisions.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\n\n/**\n * Consensus algorithm types.\n * - simple_majority: >50% of votes required\n * - supermajority: >=67% of votes required\n * - unanimous: 100% approval required\n * - proof_of_learning: weighted voting based on agent performance\n * - opinion_wise: higher-order voting with correlation awareness (Issue #333)\n * - higher_order: alias for opinion_wise (Issue #514)\n */\nexport const ConsensusAlgorithmSchema = z.enum([\n  'simple_majority',\n  'supermajority',\n  'unanimous',\n  'proof_of_learning',\n  'opinion_wise',\n  'higher_order',\n]);\nexport type ConsensusAlgorithm = z.infer<typeof ConsensusAlgorithmSchema>;\n\n/**\n * Vote decision options.\n */\nexport const VoteDecisionSchema = z.enum(['approve', 'reject', 'abstain']);\nexport type VoteDecision = z.infer<typeof VoteDecisionSchema>;\n\n/**\n * Proposal status in the lifecycle.\n */\nexport const ProposalStatusSchema = z.enum([\n  'pending',\n  'voting',\n  'approved',\n  'rejected',\n  'timeout',\n  'closed',\n]);\nexport type ProposalStatus = z.infer<typeof ProposalStatusSchema>;\n\n/**\n * Structured rejection feedback categories (Issue #1213).\n * Enables reject→refine→re-vote feedback loops by classifying rejection reasons.\n */\nexport const RejectionCategorySchema = z.enum([\n  'YAGNI',\n  'DRY_VIOLATION',\n  'OVER_ENGINEERING',\n  'SCOPE_CREEP',\n  'SECURITY_RISK',\n  'MISALIGNED',\n  'INSUFFICIENT_EVIDENCE',\n]);\nexport type RejectionCategory = z.infer<typeof RejectionCategorySchema>;\n\n/**\n * All valid rejection category values, for runtime reference.\n */\nexport const REJECTION_CATEGORIES = RejectionCategorySchema.options;\n\n/**\n * Pre-verified finding emitted by a voter (#2245 v4 follow-up).\n * Mirrors `cli/voter-response.ts:RawFindingSchema` — kept inline here to\n * avoid a circular cli→consensus import. Downstream code in mcp/tools\n * adds the derived `verified` flag based on the gate fields.\n */\nconst FindingShapeSchema = z.object({\n  summary: z.string().min(1).max(500),\n  location: z.string().min(1).max(200),\n  severity: z.enum(['critical', 'high', 'medium', 'low']).default('medium'),\n  gate: z.object({\n    reread_cited_line: z.enum(['passed', 'failed', 'skipped']).default('skipped'),\n    traced_call_path: z.enum(['passed', 'failed', 'skipped']).default('skipped'),\n    named_assertion: z.string().default(''),\n    ruled_out_language_non_issue: z.enum(['passed', 'failed', 'skipped']).default('skipped'),\n  }),\n  claim: z.string().min(1).max(2000),\n});\n\n/**\n * A vote cast by an agent.\n */\nexport const VoteSchema = z.object({\n  decision: VoteDecisionSchema,\n  reasoning: z.string().min(1).describe('Explanation for the vote'),\n  confidence: z.number().min(0).max(1).describe('Confidence level 0-1'),\n  conditions: z.array(z.string()).optional().describe('Conditions for approval'),\n  /** Structured rejection categories for reject→refine→re-vote loops (Issue #1213). */\n  rejectionCategories: z\n    .array(RejectionCategorySchema)\n    .optional()\n    .describe('Rejection reason categories when decision is reject'),\n  /** Pre-verified PR-review findings (#2245 v4 follow-up). Optional;\n   * populated only when the voter emits the structured top-level array. */\n  findings: z.array(FindingShapeSchema).optional().describe('PR-review findings (pre-verified)'),\n  timestamp: z.iso.datetime().optional(),\n});\nexport type Vote = z.infer<typeof VoteSchema>;\n\n/**\n * A proposal submitted for consensus.\n */\nexport const ProposalSchema = z.object({\n  id: z.string().optional().describe('Auto-generated if not provided'),\n  title: z.string().min(1).max(200).describe('Short proposal title'),\n  description: z.string().min(1).describe('Detailed proposal description'),\n  algorithm: ConsensusAlgorithmSchema,\n  timeout: z.number().int().positive().optional().describe('Timeout in milliseconds'),\n  requiredVoters: z.array(z.string()).optional().describe('Agent IDs that must vote'),\n  metadata: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()).optional().describe('Additional context'),\n  createdAt: z.iso.datetime().optional(),\n});\nexport type Proposal = z.infer<typeof ProposalSchema>;\n\n/**\n * Unique identifier for a proposal.\n */\nexport type ProposalId = string;\n\n/**\n * Vote counts summary.\n */\nexport interface VoteCounts {\n  approve: number;\n  reject: number;\n  abstain: number;\n  total: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Weighted vote counts for proof-of-learning.\n */\nexport interface WeightedVoteCounts {\n  approve: number;\n  reject: number;\n  abstain: number;\n  totalWeight: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of a consensus decision.\n */\nexport interface ConsensusResult {\n  proposalId: ProposalId;\n  proposal: Proposal;\n  outcome: ProposalStatus;\n  votes: Map<string, Vote>;\n  voteCounts: VoteCounts;\n  weightedCounts?: WeightedVoteCounts | undefined;\n  approvalPercentage: number;\n  quorumReached: boolean;\n  startedAt: string;\n  closedAt: string;\n  durationMs: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Consensus result schema for validation.\n */\nexport const ConsensusResultSchema = z.object({\n  proposalId: z.string(),\n  proposal: ProposalSchema,\n  outcome: ProposalStatusSchema,\n  votes: z.map(z.string(), VoteSchema),\n  voteCounts: z.object({\n    approve: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n    reject: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n    abstain: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n    total: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n  }),\n  weightedCounts: z\n    .object({\n      approve: z.number().nonnegative(),\n      reject: z.number().nonnegative(),\n      abstain: z.number().nonnegative(),\n      totalWeight: z.number().nonnegative(),\n    })\n    .optional(),\n  approvalPercentage: z.number().min(0).max(100),\n  quorumReached: z.boolean(),\n  startedAt: z.iso.datetime(),\n  closedAt: z.iso.datetime(),\n  durationMs: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n});\n\n/**\n * Agent performance record for proof-of-learning.\n */\nexport interface AgentPerformance {\n  agentId: string;\n  totalVotes: number;\n  correctVotes: number;\n  successRate: number;\n  lastUpdated: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Agent performance schema.\n */\nexport const AgentPerformanceSchema = z.object({\n  agentId: z.string(),\n  totalVotes: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n  correctVotes: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n  successRate: z.number().min(0).max(1),\n  lastUpdated: z.iso.datetime(),\n});\n\n/**\n * Proposal content caching configuration for determinism. (Issue #589)\n */\nexport interface ProposalCacheConfig {\n  /** Enable content-based caching for repeated proposals */\n  enabled: boolean;\n  /** TTL in milliseconds (default: 1 hour) */\n  ttlMs: number;\n  /** Maximum cached entries (default: 500) */\n  maxEntries: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Incremental quorum configuration (Issue #1408).\n * When enabled, ambiguous votes trigger voter pool expansion.\n */\nexport interface IncrementalQuorumConfig {\n  /** Enable incremental quorum expansion. Default: false */\n  enabled: boolean;\n  /** Maximum expansion rounds (5→7→9). Default: 2 */\n  maxExpansionRounds: number;\n  /** Voters to add per expansion round. Default: 2 */\n  votersPerExpansion: number;\n  /** Minimum average confidence to avoid expansion. Default: 0.6 */\n  confidenceThreshold: number;\n  /** Ambiguity band: if approval rate is within this of threshold, expand. Default: 0.15 */\n  ambiguityBand: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Default incremental quorum configuration.\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_INCREMENTAL_QUORUM_CONFIG: IncrementalQuorumConfig = {\n  enabled: false,\n  maxExpansionRounds: 2,\n  votersPerExpansion: 2,\n  confidenceThreshold: 0.6,\n  ambiguityBand: 0.15,\n};\n\n/**\n * Callback to request additional voters for incremental quorum.\n * Returns the IDs of newly added voters.\n */\nexport type VoterExpansionCallback = (\n  proposalId: ProposalId,\n  currentVoterCount: number,\n  requestedCount: number\n) => Promise<readonly string[]>;\n\n/**\n * Consensus engine configuration.\n */\nexport interface ConsensusEngineConfig {\n  defaultTimeout: number;\n  minVotersForQuorum: number;\n  maxActiveProposals: number;\n  enablePerformanceTracking: boolean;\n  /** Maximum number of closed proposals to retain. Oldest are evicted when exceeded. (Issue #549) */\n  maxClosedProposals: number;\n  /** Content-based proposal caching for determinism (Issue #589) */\n  proposalCache?: ProposalCacheConfig;\n  /** Incremental quorum configuration (Issue #1408) */\n  incrementalQuorum?: IncrementalQuorumConfig;\n}\n\n/**\n * Proposal cache configuration schema. (Issue #589)\n */\nexport const ProposalCacheConfigSchema = z.object({\n  enabled: z.boolean().default(false),\n  ttlMs: z.number().int().positive().default(3600000), // 1 hour\n  maxEntries: z.number().int().positive().default(500),\n});\n\n/**\n * Consensus engine configuration schema.\n */\nexport const ConsensusEngineConfigSchema = z.object({\n  defaultTimeout: z.number().int().positive().default(300000), // 5 minutes\n  minVotersForQuorum: z.number().int().positive().default(2),\n  maxActiveProposals: z.number().int().positive().default(100),\n  enablePerformanceTracking: z.boolean().default(true),\n  maxClosedProposals: z.number().int().positive().default(1000), // Issue #549\n  proposalCache: ProposalCacheConfigSchema.optional(), // Issue #589\n});\n\n/**\n * Default configuration values.\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_CONSENSUS_CONFIG: ConsensusEngineConfig = {\n  defaultTimeout: 300000, // 5 minutes\n  minVotersForQuorum: 2,\n  maxActiveProposals: 100,\n  enablePerformanceTracking: true,\n  maxClosedProposals: 1000, // Issue #549: Prevent unbounded memory growth\n};\n\n/**\n * The 2/3 supermajority agreement threshold — the governance constant for\n * \"supermajority\" / Byzantine (2-of-3) quorum. SINGLE SOURCE (#3571): every\n * consensus site that needs a supermajority references this instead of a bare\n * `0.67` literal, so the governance threshold cannot silently drift between\n * modules. (Per-algorithm values like 0.5/1.0 are intentionally NOT centralized\n * — 0.5 is semantically overloaded across several algorithms.)\n */\nexport const SUPERMAJORITY_THRESHOLD = 0.67;\n\n/**\n * Voting thresholds for each algorithm.\n */\nexport const VOTING_THRESHOLDS: Record<ConsensusAlgorithm, number> = {\n  simple_majority: 0.5,\n  supermajority: SUPERMAJORITY_THRESHOLD,\n  unanimous: 1.0,\n  proof_of_learning: 0.5, // Uses weighted voting\n  opinion_wise: 0.5, // Uses correlation-aware Bayesian aggregation (Issue #333)\n  higher_order: 0.5, // Alias for opinion_wise (Issue #514)\n};\n\n/**\n * Internal proposal state managed by the engine.\n */\nexport interface ProposalState {\n  proposal: Proposal;\n  status: ProposalStatus;\n  votes: Map<string, Vote>;\n  voteWeights: Map<string, number>;\n  startedAt: Date;\n  timeoutId?: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout>;\n  /** Number of incremental quorum expansions applied (Issue #1408). */\n  expansionRounds?: number;\n  /**\n   * True while a quorum expansion is awaiting its callback for this\n   * proposal. Concurrent `vote()` calls check this to avoid double-\n   * expanding across the `await` gap (Issue #2861). Per-proposal so\n   * independent proposals never block each other.\n   */\n  expansionInFlight?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Consensus metrics for monitoring.\n */\nexport interface ConsensusMetrics {\n  totalProposals: number;\n  approvedProposals: number;\n  rejectedProposals: number;\n  timedOutProposals: number;\n  averageDurationMs: number;\n  averageVotesPerProposal: number;\n  algorithmUsage: Record<ConsensusAlgorithm, number>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Consensus metrics schema.\n */\nexport const ConsensusMetricsSchema = z.object({\n  totalProposals: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n  approvedProposals: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n  rejectedProposals: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n  timedOutProposals: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n  averageDurationMs: z.number().nonnegative(),\n  averageVotesPerProposal: z.number().nonnegative(),\n  algorithmUsage: z.record(ConsensusAlgorithmSchema, z.number().int().nonnegative()),\n});\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA4CO,SAAS,kBACd,QACA,MAC4B;AAC5B,QAAM,SAAS,OAAO,UAAU,IAAI;AAEpC,MAAI,OAAO,SAAS;AAClB,WAAO,GAAG,OAAO,IAAI;AAAA,EACvB;AAEA,QAAM,UAAU,eAAe,OAAO,KAAK;AAC3C,QAAM,kBAAkB,IAAI,gBAAgB,uBAAuB,OAAO,IAAI;AAAA,IAC5E,SAAS;AAAA,MACP,QAAQ,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,MACrB,cAAc,OAAO;AAAA,IACvB;AAAA,EACF,CAAC;AAED,SAAO,IAAI,eAAe;AAC5B;AAmBO,SAAS,gBACd,QAC+C;AAC/C,SAAO,CAAC,SAAkB,kBAAkB,QAAQ,IAAI;AAC1D;;;AC5CA,IAAM,6BAA6B,eAAe;AAuB3C,IAAM,cAAN,MAAkB;AAAA,EACf;AAAA,EACS;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACT;AAAA,EACS;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EAEjB,YAAY,QAA2B;AACrC,SAAK,WAAW,OAAO;AACvB,SAAK,aAAa,OAAO;AACzB,SAAK,mBAAmB,OAAO,oBAAoB;AACnD,SAAK,SAAS,KAAK;AACnB,SAAK,iBAAiB,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI;AAC5C,SAAK,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ;AAC3B,SAAK,SAAS,OAAO,UAAU,aAAa,EAAE,WAAW,KAAK,KAAK,CAAC;AAEpE,SAAK,OAAO,MAAM,4BAA4B;AAAA,MAC5C,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,MACf,YAAY,KAAK;AAAA,MACjB,kBAAkB,KAAK;AAAA,IACzB,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAMQ,SAAe;AACrB,UAAM,MAAM,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI;AAClC,UAAM,UAAU,MAAM,KAAK;AAC3B,UAAM,YAAY,KAAK,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK,gBAAgB;AAE5D,QAAI,YAAY,GAAG;AACjB,YAAM,cAAc,YAAY,KAAK;AACrC,WAAK,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK,SAAS,WAAW;AAC/D,WAAK,iBAAiB,MAAO,UAAU,KAAK;AAE5C,UAAI,cAAc,GAAG;AACnB,aAAK,OAAO,MAAM,mBAAmB;AAAA,UACnC,OAAO;AAAA,UACP,SAAS,KAAK;AAAA,QAChB,CAAC;AAAA,MACH;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAQA,WAAW,QAAQ,GAAY;AAC7B,SAAK,OAAO;AAEZ,QAAI,KAAK,UAAU,OAAO;AACxB,WAAK,UAAU;AACf,WAAK,OAAO,MAAM,kBAAkB;AAAA,QAClC,WAAW;AAAA,QACX,WAAW,KAAK;AAAA,MAClB,CAAC;AACD,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAEA,SAAK,OAAO,KAAK,uBAAuB;AAAA,MACtC,WAAW;AAAA,MACX,WAAW,KAAK;AAAA,IAClB,CAAC;AACD,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAOA,WAA6B;AAC3B,SAAK,OAAO;AAEZ,UAAM,cACJ,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,oBAAoB,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK;AAEhF,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,QAAQ,KAAK;AAAA,MACb,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,MACf,aAAa,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,WAAW;AAAA,IACtC;AAAA,EACF;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAMA,QAAc;AACZ,SAAK,SAAS,KAAK;AACnB,SAAK,iBAAiB,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI;AAC5C,SAAK,OAAO,MAAM,sBAAsB,EAAE,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC;AAAA,EACjE;AACF;AAaO,SAAS,yBAAyB,MAAe,QAA+B;AACrF,QAAM,SAA4B;AAAA,IAChC,UAAU;AAAA,IACV,YAAY;AAAA,IACZ,kBAAkB;AAAA,EACpB;AACA,MAAI,SAAS,QAAW;AACtB,IAAC,OAA6B,OAAO;AAAA,EACvC;AACA,MAAI,WAAW,QAAW;AACxB,IAAC,OAAgC,SAAS;AAAA,EAC5C;AACA,SAAO,IAAI,YAAY,MAAM;AAC/B;;;ACvLA,SAAS,SAAS;AA+FX,IAAM,cAAN,cAA0B,cAAc;AAAA,EACpC;AAAA,EAET,YAAY,SAAiB,UAA0B;AACrD,UAAM,SAAS;AAAA,MACb,SAAS;AAAA,QACP,SAAS,SAAS;AAAA,QAClB,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,QACjB,UAAU,SAAS;AAAA,QACnB,kBAAkB,SAAS;AAAA,MAC7B;AAAA,IACF,CAAC;AACD,SAAK,OAAO;AACZ,SAAK,WAAW;AAAA,EAClB;AACF;AASO,IAAM,qBAAqB,EAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EACzC,aAAa,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,aAAa,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,WAAW;AAAA,EACpE,YAAY,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,WAAW,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,EACzD,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;AAClD,CAAC;;;AChHM,SAAS,WAAW,YAAoB,cAA0C;AAEvF,QAAM,mBAAmB,cAAc,UAAU;AAGjD,aAAW,WAAW,cAAc;AAClC,UAAM,oBAAoB,cAAc,OAAO;AAC/C,QAAI,iBAAiB,WAAW,iBAAiB,GAAG;AAClD,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;AAKO,SAAS,cAAc,GAAmB;AAE/C,MAAI,aAAa,EAAE,QAAQ,cAAc,EAAE;AAG3C,MAAI,eAAe,KAAK;AACtB,iBAAa;AAAA,EACf,WAAW,WAAW,WAAW,IAAI,GAAG;AACtC,iBAAa,WAAW,MAAM,CAAC;AAAA,EACjC;AAGA,MAAI,CAAC,WAAW,WAAW,GAAG,GAAG;AAC/B,iBAAa,MAAM;AAAA,EACrB;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;AAKO,SAAS,oBAAoB,MAAmC;AACrE,MAAI,SAAS,QAAQ,OAAO,SAAS,UAAU;AAC7C,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAEA,QAAM,UAAU;AAGhB,QAAM,aAAa,CAAC,QAAQ,YAAY,aAAa,aAAa,OAAO,QAAQ;AAEjF,aAAW,SAAS,YAAY;AAC9B,UAAM,QAAQ,QAAQ,KAAK;AAC3B,QAAI,OAAO,UAAU,UAAU;AAC7B,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;;;AC3DO,IAAM,iBAAiB,oBAAI,IAAI;AAAA,EACpC;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF,CAAC;AAKM,IAAM,kBAAkB,oBAAI,IAAI;AAAA,EACrC;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF,CAAC;AASM,SAAS,eAAe,UAA2B;AAExD,MAAI,eAAe,IAAI,QAAQ,GAAG;AAChC,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAGA,MAAI,gBAAgB,IAAI,QAAQ,GAAG;AACjC,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAGA,SAAO;AACT;AAYO,IAAM,+BAA2C;AAAA,EACtD,MAAM;AAAA,EACN,aAAa;AAAA,EACb,MAAM,KAAoC;AAExC,QAAI,IAAI,SAAS,cAAc;AAC7B,aAAO,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,0BAA0B;AAAA,IAC5D;AAGA,QAAI,eAAe,IAAI,QAAQ,GAAG;AAChC,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,SAAS;AAAA,QACT,QAAQ,SAAS,IAAI,QAAQ,0CAA0C,IAAI,IAAI;AAAA,MACjF;AAAA,IACF;AAGA,WAAO,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,8BAA8B;AAAA,EAChE;AACF;AAQO,IAAM,gBAA4B;AAAA,EACvC,MAAM;AAAA,EACN,aAAa;AAAA,EACb,MAAM,KAAoC;AAExC,UAAM,aAAa,oBAAoB,IAAI,IAAI;AAG/C,QAAI,eAAe,QAAW;AAC5B,aAAO,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,yBAAyB;AAAA,IAC3D;AAGA,QAAI,WAAW,SAAS,IAAI,GAAG;AAC7B,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,SAAS;AAAA,QACT,QAAQ,yDAAyD,UAAU;AAAA,MAC7E;AAAA,IACF;AAGA,UAAM,eAAe,IAAI,gBAAgB,CAAC,IAAI;AAG9C,QAAI,CAAC,WAAW,YAAY,YAAY,GAAG;AACzC,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,SAAS;AAAA,QACT,QAAQ,SAAS,UAAU,qCAAqC,aAAa,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,MACzF;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,WAAO,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,qCAAqC;AAAA,EACvE;AACF;;;AC9EO,IAAM,iBAAN,MAAgD;AAAA,EACpC,QAAsB,CAAC;AAAA,EAChC;AAAA,EACS;AAAA,EAEjB,YAAY,QAA+B;AACzC,SAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAC5B,SAAK,SAAS,QAAQ,UAAU,aAAa,EAAE,WAAW,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAG7E,QAAI,QAAQ,OAAO;AACjB,iBAAW,QAAQ,OAAO,OAAO;AAC/B,aAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,MACtB;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,SAAK,OAAO,MAAM,+BAA+B;AAAA,MAC/C,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,MACX,WAAW,KAAK,MAAM;AAAA,IACxB,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAWA,SAAS,KAAoC;AAC3C,SAAK,OAAO,MAAM,qBAAqB;AAAA,MACrC,UAAU,IAAI;AAAA,MACd,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACV,WAAW,KAAK,MAAM;AAAA,IACxB,CAAC;AAGD,QAAI,KAAK,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG;AAC3B,aAAO,KAAK,gBAAgB,KAAK,4BAA4B;AAAA,IAC/D;AAGA,eAAW,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO;AAC7B,YAAM,WAAW,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAE/B,UAAI,CAAC,SAAS,SAAS;AACrB,eAAO,KAAK,aAAa,KAAK,MAAM,QAAQ;AAAA,MAC9C;AAAA,IACF;AAGA,WAAO,KAAK,gBAAgB,KAAK,yBAAyB;AAAA,EAC5D;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKQ,gBAAgB,KAAoB,QAAgC;AAC1E,UAAM,WAA2B,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,OAAO;AACzD,SAAK,YAAY,KAAK,QAAQ;AAC9B,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKQ,aACN,KACA,MACA,UACgB;AAChB,UAAM,iBAAiC;AAAA,MACrC,GAAG;AAAA,MACH,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,IACjB;AAEA,SAAK,YAAY,KAAK,cAAc;AAGpC,QAAI,KAAK,SAAS,QAAQ;AACxB,WAAK,OAAO,KAAK,yCAAyC;AAAA,QACxD,UAAU,IAAI;AAAA,QACd,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,QACf,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,MACnB,CAAC;AACD,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,SAAS;AAAA,QACT,QAAQ,gCAAgC,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,QACvD,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,MACjB;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAOA,QAAQ,MAAwB;AAE9B,UAAM,gBAAgB,KAAK,MAAM,UAAU,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI;AACtE,QAAI,iBAAiB,GAAG;AACtB,WAAK,OAAO,KAAK,kCAAkC,EAAE,UAAU,KAAK,KAAK,CAAC;AAC1E,WAAK,MAAM,aAAa,IAAI;AAAA,IAC9B,OAAO;AACL,WAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI;AACpB,WAAK,OAAO,MAAM,qBAAqB,EAAE,UAAU,KAAK,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,IAChE;AAAA,EACF;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAQA,WAAW,MAAuB;AAChC,UAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,MAAM,UAAU,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI;AACzD,QAAI,SAAS,GAAG;AACd,WAAK,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC;AAC1B,WAAK,OAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,EAAE,UAAU,KAAK,CAAC;AAC3D,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAOA,WAAkC;AAChC,WAAO,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA,EACvB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAOA,QAAQ,MAAwB;AAC9B,UAAM,eAAe,KAAK;AAC1B,SAAK,OAAO;AACZ,SAAK,OAAO,KAAK,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,EAC1E;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAOA,UAAsB;AACpB,WAAO,KAAK;AAAA,EACd;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKQ,YAAY,KAAoB,UAAgC;AACtE,UAAM,UAAU;AAAA,MACd,UAAU,IAAI;AAAA,MACd,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACV,YAAY,IAAI;AAAA,MAChB,SAAS,SAAS;AAAA,MAClB,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,MACjB,UAAU,SAAS;AAAA,IACrB;AAEA,QAAI,SAAS,SAAS;AACpB,WAAK,OAAO,MAAM,4BAA4B,OAAO;AAAA,IACvD,OAAO;AACL,WAAK,OAAO,KAAK,2BAA2B,OAAO;AAAA,IACrD;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAgBO,SAAS,4BAA4B,QAA+C;AACzF,QAAM,WAAW,IAAI,eAAe,MAAM;AAG1C,WAAS,QAAQ,4BAA4B;AAC7C,WAAS,QAAQ,aAAa;AAE9B,SAAO;AACT;AAYO,SAAS,eACd,UACA,KAC2B;AAC3B,QAAM,WAAW,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG;AAEtC,MAAI,SAAS,SAAS;AACpB,WAAO,GAAG,MAAS;AAAA,EACrB;AAEA,SAAO,IAAI,IAAI,YAAY,kBAAkB,SAAS,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC;AAC3E;AAUO,SAAS,oBACd,UACA,MACA,SAMe;AAEf,QAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IACX;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,SAAS,QAAQ;AAAA,EACzB;AAIA,QAAM,SAAkC,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK;AAElD,MAAI,SAAS,cAAc,QAAW;AACpC,WAAO,WAAW,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,EAChC;AACA,MAAI,SAAS,eAAe,QAAW;AACrC,WAAO,YAAY,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,EACjC;AACA,MAAI,SAAS,iBAAiB,QAAW;AACvC,WAAO,cAAc,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,EACnC;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;;;AC3SO,SAAS,iBAAiB,KAAqB,UAAmC;AACvF,QAAM,SAAS,IAAI;AACnB,QAAM,WAAW,OAAO;AACxB,MAAI,aAAa,UAAa,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG;AACjD,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,MAAM,SAAS,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,aAAa,SAAS,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,UAAU;AAAA,MACnF,IAAI;AAAA,MACJ,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IACf;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,UAAU,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM,iBAAiB;AAC7E;AAKO,SAAS,gBACd,SACA,gBACc;AACd,MAAI,eAAgB,QAAO;AAC3B,MAAI,YAAY,KAAM,QAAO;AAC7B,SAAO;AACT;AAgBO,SAAS,uBAAuB,MAAmC;AACxE,OAAK,YAAY,kBAAkB;AAAA,IACjC,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,IACf,SAAS,KAAK;AAAA,IACd,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IACZ,WAAW,KAAK;AAAA,IAChB,YAAY,KAAK;AAAA,IACjB,cAAc,KAAK;AAAA,EACrB,CAAC;AACH;AAgBO,SAAS,eAAe,MAAgC;AAC7D,OAAK,YAAY,kBAAkB;AAAA,IACjC,YAAY,KAAK;AAAA,IACjB,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,IACf,QAAQ,KAAK;AAAA,IACb,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,IACf,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IACZ,WAAW,KAAK;AAAA,EAClB,CAAC;AACH;AAeO,SAAS,kBAAkB,MAAmC;AACnE,OAAK,YAAY,sBAAsB;AAAA,IACrC,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,IACf,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IACZ,aAAa,KAAK;AAAA,IAClB,WAAW,KAAK;AAAA,IAChB,WAAW,KAAK;AAAA,EAClB,CAAC;AACH;;;ACnGA,SAAS,KAAAA,UAAS;AAmBX,IAAM,sBAAsBA,GAAE,KAAK;AAAA,EACxC;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF,CAAC;AASM,IAAM,0BAA0BA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EAC9C,eAAe;AAAA;AAAA,EAEf,aAAaA,GAAE,QAAQ;AAAA;AAAA,EAEvB,SAASA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,GAAI;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAMnC,QAAQA,GAAE,OAAOA,GAAE,OAAO,GAAGA,GAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS;AACrD,CAAC;AAaM,IAAM,0BAA0B;AAWhC,SAAS,iBAAiB,UAAkC;AACjE,SAAO,aAAa;AACtB;AAYA,IAAM,8BAA6E;AAAA,EACjF,SAAS;AAAA,EACT,YAAY;AAAA,EACZ,YAAY;AAAA,EACZ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAChB,YAAY;AAAA,EACZ,OAAO;AAAA,EACP,OAAO;AAAA,EACP,qBAAqB;AAAA,EACrB,WAAW;AAAA,EACX,SAAS;AAAA,EACT,SAAS;AACX;AAOO,SAAS,uBAAuB,UAAiD;AACtF,SAAO,4BAA4B,QAAQ;AAC7C;;;AC3CO,SAAS,YAAY,MAA0B;AACpD,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,EAClC;AACF;AAgBO,SAAS,sBAAsB,MAA2C;AAC/E,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;AAAA,IAC/D,mBAAmB;AAAA,EACrB;AACF;AA8BO,SAAS,oBAAoB,OAA6C;AAC/E,QAAM,WAA8B;AAAA,IAClC,eAAe,MAAM;AAAA,IACrB,aAAa,MAAM,eAAe,iBAAiB,MAAM,aAAa;AAAA,IACtE,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,IACf,GAAI,MAAM,WAAW,SAAY,EAAE,QAAQ,MAAM,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EAC/D;AACA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,SAAS;AAAA,IACT,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,IAClD,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,uBAAuB,GAAG,SAAS;AAAA,EAC/C;AACF;AAcO,SAAS,UAAU,SAA6B;AACrD,SAAO,oBAAoB,EAAE,eAAe,YAAY,QAAQ,CAAC;AACnE;;;AC/JA,SAAS,mBAAmB;AAqFrB,SAAS,oBAA4B;AAC1C,QAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,CAAC;AAC3B,SAAO,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,CAAC;AACrC;AAiBA,SAAS,kBAA0B;AACjC,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAC5C,QAAM,YAAY,IAAI,KAAK,eAAe,SAAS;AAAA,IACjD,UAAU;AAAA,IACV,cAAc;AAAA,EAChB,CAAC;AACD,QAAM,QAAQ,UAAU,cAAc,GAAG;AACzC,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,cAAc,GAAG,SAAS;AACtE,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,eAAe,SAAS;AAAA,IACvC,UAAU;AAAA,IACV,QAAQ;AAAA,EACV,CAAC;AACD,SAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,EAAE;AAC1D;AAUO,SAAS,gBAAgB,QAA+B;AAC7D,QAAM,eAAe,CAAC,cAAc,cAAc,WAAW;AAE7D,MAAI,OAAO,cAAc,QAAS,QAAO;AAEzC,MAAI,OAAO,kBAAkB,MAAM;AACjC,QAAI,OAAO,aAAa,UAAa,aAAa,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC3E,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;AAQO,SAAS,qBAAqB,SAA+C;AAClF,QAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,UAAU,CAAC;AAClC,QAAM,UAA0B;AAAA,IAC9B,WAAW,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAC7B,WAAW,gBAAgB;AAAA,IAC3B,UAAU,QAAQ;AAAA,IAClB;AAAA,IACA,WAAW,QAAQ,aAAa,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAAA,IACtD,GAAI,QAAQ,YAAY,UAAa,EAAE,SAAS,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAAA,IAChE,GAAI,QAAQ,iBAAiB,UAAa,EAAE,cAAc,QAAQ,aAAa;AAAA,EACjF;AAGA,SAAO,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO;AAC9B;AAoDO,SAAS,kBAAkB,KAA8C;AAC9E,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,IACf,UAAU,IAAI;AAAA,IACd,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,IACf,GAAI,IAAI,OAAO,aAAa,UAAa,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS;AAAA,IACzE,GAAI,IAAI,YAAY,UAAa,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,EAC1D;AACF;;;ACtMA,IAAM,wBACJ;AAMF,IAAM,sBAAwE;AAAA,EAC5E,EAAE,MAAM,0BAA0B,SAAS,mDAAmD;AAAA,EAC9F,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,SAAS,sDAAsD;AAAA,EAC7F,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,SAAS,yDAAyD;AAClG;AAMA,SAAS,eAAe,OAAuD;AAC7E,wBAAsB,YAAY;AAClC,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,QAAQ,uBAAuB,EAAE;AACvD,SAAO,EAAE,SAAS,UAAU,YAAY,MAAM;AAChD;AAKA,SAAS,eAAe,OAAyB;AAC/C,QAAM,WAAqB,CAAC;AAC5B,aAAW,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,qBAAqB;AACnD,YAAQ,YAAY;AACpB,QAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK,GAAG;AACvB,eAAS,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,IACpB;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAMA,SAAS,cAAc,OAAgB,OAAuD;AAC5F,MAAI,OAAO,UAAU,UAAU;AAC7B,UAAM,WAAW,eAAe,KAAK;AACrC,QAAI,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG;AACvB,YAAM,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG,QAAQ;AAAA,IACjC;AACA,UAAM,EAAE,SAAS,SAAS,IAAI,eAAe,KAAK;AAClD,QAAI,SAAU,OAAM;AACpB,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAEA,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG;AACxB,WAAO,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,cAAc,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,EACvD;AAEA,MAAI,UAAU,QAAQ,OAAO,UAAU,UAAU;AAC/C,UAAM,SAAkC,CAAC;AACzC,eAAW,CAAC,KAAK,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAgC,GAAG;AACzE,aAAO,GAAG,IAAI,cAAc,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA,IACxC;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;AASO,SAAS,kBAAkB,MAAwC;AACxE,MAAI,SAAS,UAAa,SAAS,MAAM;AACvC,WAAO,EAAE,WAAW,MAAM,aAAa,OAAO,eAAe,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE;AAAA,EACvF;AAEA,QAAM,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,UAAU,CAAC,EAAc;AACnD,QAAM,YAAY,cAAc,MAAM,KAAK;AAC3C,QAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;AAElD,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA,aAAa,MAAM,QAAQ;AAAA,IAC3B,eAAe,MAAM;AAAA,IACrB,kBAAkB;AAAA,EACpB;AACF;AAKO,SAAS,sBACd,QACA,QACA,UACM;AACN,MAAI,OAAO,aAAa;AACtB,WAAO,KAAK,2DAAsD;AAAA,MAChE,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,gBAAgB,OAAO;AAAA,IACzB,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AACA,MAAI,OAAO,iBAAiB,SAAS,GAAG;AACtC,WAAO,KAAK,6CAA6C;AAAA,MACvD,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,UAAU,OAAO;AAAA,IACnB,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AACF;;;ACpDA,SAAS,eAAe,aAAiC;AACvD,SAAO,oBAAoB;AAAA,IACzB,eAAe;AAAA,IACf,SAAS,qCAAqC,OAAO,WAAW,CAAC;AAAA,EACnE,CAAC;AACH;AAMA,SAAS,kBAAkB,QAAgB,WAA+B;AACxE,SAAO,oBAAoB;AAAA,IACzB,eAAe;AAAA,IACf,SAAS,kBAAkB,MAAM,cAAc,SAAS;AAAA,EAC1D,CAAC;AACH;AAKA,SAAS,cAAc,SAAiB,WAA+B;AACrE,SAAO,oBAAoB;AAAA,IACzB,eAAe;AAAA,IACf,SAAS,mBAAmB,OAAO,cAAc,SAAS;AAAA,EAC5D,CAAC;AACH;AAOA,IAAM,uBAAuB,KAAK,OAAO;AASzC,IAAM,kBAAqC;AAAA;AAAA,EAEzC;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,eAAe,MAAc,QAAyB;AAC7D,MAAI,YAAY;AAChB,aAAW,WAAW,iBAAiB;AAMrC,UAAM,SAAS;AACf,gBAAY,UAAU,QAAQ,SAAS,YAAY;AACnD,QAAI,cAAc,QAAQ;AACxB,aAAO,KAAK,uDAAuD;AAAA,QACjE,SAAS,QAAQ,OAAO,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE;AAAA,MACrC,CAAC;AAAA,IACH;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAGA,SAAS,mBAAmB,QAAoB,QAAuB;AACrE,aAAW,QAAQ,OAAO,SAAS;AACjC,SAAK,OAAO,eAAe,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,EAC9C;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,eAAe,MAAe,QAAiB,WAAsC;AAC5F,MAAI,SAAS,OAAW,QAAO;AAC/B,QAAM,YAAY,KAAK,UAAU,IAAI,EAAE;AACvC,MAAI,YAAY,sBAAsB;AACpC,WAAO,KAAK,4BAA4B,EAAE,WAAW,OAAO,qBAAqB,CAAC;AAClF,WAAO,cAAc,mBAAmB,SAAS;AAAA,EACnD;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAKA,SAAS,eAAe,aAA0B,QAAoC;AACpF,QAAM,WAAW,YAAY,WAAW;AACxC,MAAI,CAAC,UAAU;AACb,UAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,SAAS;AACnC,WAAO,KAAK,qBAAqB;AACjC,WAAO,eAAe,MAAM,WAAW;AAAA,EACzC;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAgBA,SAAS,YAAY,MAA6C;AAChE,QAAM,UAAU;AAAA,IACd,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,IACX,GAAI,KAAK,gBAAgB,EAAE,cAAc,KAAK,aAAa;AAAA,EAC7D;AACA,QAAM,WAAW,KAAK,SAAS,SAAS,oBAAoB,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC;AAE9F,MAAI,CAAC,SAAS,SAAS;AACrB,SAAK,OAAO,KAAK,gCAAgC;AAAA,MAC/C,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,MACjB,UAAU,SAAS;AAAA,IACrB,CAAC;AACD,WAAO,kBAAkB,SAAS,QAAQ,KAAK,SAAS;AAAA,EAC1D;AACA,OAAK,OAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,EAAE,QAAQ,SAAS,OAAO,CAAC;AACpE,SAAO;AACT;AAKA,eAAe,eACb,SACA,MACA,KACA,QACqB;AACrB,QAAM,YAAY,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI;AACxC,QAAM,SACJ,QAAQ,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,MAAO,QAAwB,IAAI;AAEtF,QAAM,aAAa,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI;AAC7C,MAAI,OAAO,YAAY,MAAM;AAC3B,WAAO,KAAK,uCAAuC,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;AAAA,EACnE,OAAO;AACL,WAAO,KAAK,4BAA4B,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;AAAA,EACxD;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAGA,SAAS,cACP,aACA,UACA,KACA,QACA,YACM;AACN,QAAM,QAAQ,iBAAiB,GAAG;AAClC,QAAM,UAAU,gBAAgB,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK;AACrD,cAAY,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAC5B;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,IACf;AAAA,EACF,CAAC;AACH;AAOA,SAAS,uBACP,aACA,UACA,KACA,YACM;AACN,QAAM,QAAQ,iBAAiB,GAAG;AAClC,cAAY,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAC5B;AAAA,IACA,SAAS;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,IACA,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,IACf;AAAA,EACF,CAAC;AACH;AAGA,SAAS,gBACP,aACA,UACA,KACA,QACM;AACN,QAAM,QAAQ,iBAAiB,GAAG;AAClC,cAAY,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAC5B,YAAY;AAAA,IACZ,UAAU;AAAA,IACV;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,EACjB,CAAC;AACH;AAGA,SAAS,mBACP,aACA,UACA,KACM;AACN,QAAM,QAAQ,iBAAiB,GAAG;AAClC,cAAY,sBAAsB;AAAA,IAChC;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,IACb,WAAW;AAAA,IACX,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,EACjB,CAAC;AACH;AAGA,SAAS,kBACP,QACA,gBACA,QACmB;AACnB,QAAM,OAAO,OAAO,gBAAgB;AACpC,MAAI,SAAS,cAAc,eAAe,iBAAiB,WAAW,GAAG;AACvE,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,SAAO,KAAK,8CAA8C;AAAA,IACxD;AAAA,IACA,UAAU,eAAe;AAAA,EAC3B,CAAC;AAGD,SAAO,oBAAoB;AAAA,IACzB,eAAe;AAAA,IACf,SACE,+CAA+C,eAAe,iBAAiB,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EAE7F,CAAC;AACH;AAGA,SAAS,aACP,QACA,MACA,MACA,gBACA,QACsD;AACtD,QAAM,aAAa,eAAe,MAAM,QAAQ,eAAe,SAAS;AACxE,MAAI,WAAY,QAAO,EAAE,OAAO,YAAY,eAAe,KAAK;AAGhE,QAAM,iBAAiB,kBAAkB,IAAI;AAC7C,wBAAsB,gBAAgB,QAAQ,OAAO,QAAQ;AAC7D,QAAM,gBAAgB,eAAe,cAAc,eAAe,YAAY;AAG9E,QAAM,YAAY,kBAAkB,QAAQ,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAClE,MAAI,cAAc,KAAM,QAAO,EAAE,OAAO,WAAW,cAAc;AAEjE,MAAI,OAAO,aAAa;AACtB,UAAM,WAAW,eAAe,OAAO,aAAa,MAAM;AAC1D,QAAI,UAAU;AACZ,UAAI,OAAO;AACT,2BAAmB,OAAO,aAAa,OAAO,UAAU,cAAc;AACxE,aAAO,EAAE,OAAO,UAAU,cAAc;AAAA,IAC1C;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,MAAI,OAAO,gBAAgB;AACzB,UAAM,UAAU,YAAY;AAAA,MAC1B,UAAU,OAAO;AAAA,MACjB,UAAU,OAAO;AAAA,MACjB,MAAM;AAAA,MACN;AAAA,MACA,cAAc,OAAO;AAAA,MACrB;AAAA,MACA,WAAW,eAAe;AAAA,IAC5B,CAAC;AACD,QAAI,SAAS;AACX,UAAI,OAAO;AACT,wBAAgB,OAAO,aAAa,OAAO,UAAU,gBAAgB,eAAe;AACtF,aAAO,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,cAAc;AAAA,IACzC;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO,EAAE,OAAO,MAAM,cAAc;AACtC;AASO,SAAS,oBACd,SACA,QACa;AACb,QAAM,SAAS,OAAO,UAAU,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AACtE,QAAM,OAAO,OAAO,iBAAiB;AAErC,SAAO,OAAO,SAAuC;AACnD,UAAM,UAAU;AAAA,MACd,UAAU,OAAO;AAAA,MACjB,GAAI,OAAO,cAAc,EAAE,QAAQ,OAAO,WAAW;AAAA,IACvD;AACA,UAAM,iBAAiB,qBAAqB,OAAO;AACnD,UAAM,gBAAgB,OAAO,MAAM,kBAAkB,cAAc,CAAC;AACpE,kBAAc,KAAK,yBAAyB;AAE5C,UAAM,EAAE,OAAO,eAAe,cAAc,IAAI;AAAA,MAC9C;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,cAAe,QAAO;AAE1B,WAAO,gBAAgB,SAAS,eAAe,gBAAgB,eAAe,MAAM;AAAA,EACtF;AACF;AAOA,eAAe,gBACb,SACA,eACA,gBACA,eACA,QACqB;AACrB,QAAM,gBAAgB,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI;AAC5C,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,MACnB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,EAAE,gBAAgB,QAAQ,cAAc;AAAA,MACxC;AAAA,IACF;AACA,uBAAmB,QAAQ,aAAa;AACxC,QAAI,OAAO,aAAa;AACtB;AAAA,QACE,OAAO;AAAA,QACP,OAAO;AAAA,QACP;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI;AAAA,MAC5B;AAAA,IACF;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,SAAS,OAAO;AACd,UAAM,aAAa,iBAAiB,QAAQ,MAAM,UAAU;AAC5D,kBAAc,MAAM,yBAAyB,iBAAiB,QAAQ,QAAQ,MAAS;AACvF,QAAI,OAAO,aAAa;AACtB;AAAA,QACE,OAAO;AAAA,QACP,OAAO;AAAA,QACP;AAAA,QACA,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI;AAAA,MAC5B;AAAA,IACF;AAMA,UAAM,YAAY,eAAe,YAAY,aAAa;AAC1D,WAAO,cAAc,WAAW,eAAe,SAAS;AAAA,EAC1D;AACF;;;ACtdA,SAAS,yBAAyB;AAqBlC,IAAM,iBAAiB,aAAa,EAAE,WAAW,eAAe,CAAC;AAQ1D,SAAS,kBAAkB,QAAiC;AACjE,WAAS,KAAK,OAAoB,QAAgB,MAAqC;AACrF,QAAI;AACF,aAAO,mBAAmB,EAAE,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,UAAmB;AAC3E,uBAAe,MAAM,mCAAmC;AAAA,UACtD;AAAA,UACA;AAAA,UACA,OAAO,gBAAgB,KAAK;AAAA,QAC9B,CAAC;AAAA,MACH,CAAC;AAAA,IACH,SAAS,OAAgB;AACvB,qBAAe,MAAM,mCAAmC;AAAA,QACtD;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA,OAAO,gBAAgB,KAAK;AAAA,MAC9B,CAAC;AAAA,IACH;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,SAAS;AACtB,WAAK,QAAQ,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,IAC3B;AAAA,IACA,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,SAAS;AACvB,WAAK,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,IAC5B;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,SAAS;AACtB,WAAK,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,IAC9B;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAKO,IAAM,gBAA8B;AAAA,EACzC,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,EACZ,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,EACb,MAAM,MAAM;AACd;AA2BO,IAAM,yBAAyB,IAAI,kBAAmC;AAYtE,IAAM,qBAAqB,IAAI,kBAA+B;AAiBrE,eAAsB,sBACpB,UACA,UACA,WACA,aAAa,MACD;AACZ,QAAM,YAAY,KAAK,IAAI;AAC3B,MAAI,YAAY;AAChB,QAAM,cAAc,uBAAuB,SAAS;AAEpD,QAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,MAAM;AAC9B;AACA,UAAM,UAAU,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,aAAa,GAAI;AAG1D,QAAI,gBAAgB,QAAW;AAC7B,kBAAY,iBAAiB,SAAS;AAAA,IACxC;AAGA,aAAS,MAAM,UAAU;AAAA,MACvB,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB;AAAA,MACA,kBAAkB,gBAAgB;AAAA,IACpC,CAAC;AAAA,EACH,GAAG,UAAU;AAEb,MAAI;AACF,WAAO,MAAM,UAAU;AAAA,EACzB,UAAE;AACA,kBAAc,KAAK;AAAA,EACrB;AACF;;;ACpKA,SAAS,kBAAkB;AAC3B,SAAS,gBAAgB,YAAY,iBAAiB;AACtD,SAAS,SAAS,YAAY;;;ACwE9B,IAAM,qBAAqB,cAAc;AACzC,IAAM,iBAAiB,cAAc;AACrC,IAAM,yBAAyB,cAAc;AAW7C,SAAS,mBAAmB,eAAuB,WAAiC;AAClF,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,MAAM;AAAA,IACN,SAAS,cAAc,aAAa,qBAAqB,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,IAC1E,WAAW;AAAA,IACX;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAKA,SAAS,iBAAiB,OAAgB,eAAqC;AAC7E,QAAM,aAA2B;AAAA,IAC/B,MAAM;AAAA,IACN,SAAS,gBAAgB,KAAK;AAAA,IAC9B,WAAW;AAAA,EACb;AACA,MAAI,iBAAiB,OAAO;AAC1B,WAAO,EAAE,GAAG,YAAY,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,EACvC;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAwBO,IAAM,eAAN,MAAmB;AAAA,EACP;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EAEjB,YAAY,QAA6B;AACvC,SAAK,mBAAmB,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AACpD,SAAK,eAAe,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAC5C,SAAK,gBAAgB,QAAQ,iBAAiB;AAC9C,SAAK,SAAS,QAAQ,UAAU,aAAa,EAAE,WAAW,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAAA,EAC7E;AAAA;AAAA,EAGQ,eAAe,SAGrB;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI,SAAS,aAAa,KAAK,kBAAkB,KAAK,YAAY;AAAA,MAClF,eAAe,SAAS,iBAAiB;AAAA,IAC3C;AAAA,EACF;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKA,MAAM,QACJ,WACA,SACiD;AACjD,UAAM,EAAE,WAAW,cAAc,IAAI,KAAK,eAAe,OAAO;AAEhE,UAAM,kBAAkB,KAAK,gBAAgB,WAAW,aAAa;AACrE,QAAI,oBAAoB,MAAM;AAC5B,aAAO,IAAI,eAAe;AAAA,IAC5B;AAEA,WAAO,KAAK,WAAW,WAAW,WAAW,eAAe,OAAO;AAAA,EACrE;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA,MAAc,WACZ,WACA,WACA,eACA,SACiD;AACjD,SAAK,SAAS,eAAe,SAAS;AACtC,UAAM,YAAY,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI;AACxC,UAAM,QAAsB,EAAE,WAAW,QAAW,UAAU,MAAM;AAEpE,QAAI;AACF,YAAM,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,QACxB;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA,SAAS;AAAA,QACT,SAAS;AAAA,MACX;AACA,aAAO,KAAK,cAAc,QAAQ,WAAW,WAAW,aAAa;AAAA,IACvE,QAAQ;AACN,YAAM,YAAY,SAAS,QAAQ,YAAY,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM;AAC9D,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,KAAK,cAAc,MAAM,UAAU,eAAe,WAAW,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,MACnF;AAAA,IACF,UAAE;AACA,UAAI,MAAM,cAAc,QAAW;AACjC,qBAAa,MAAM,SAAS;AAAA,MAC9B;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEQ,gBAAgB,WAAmB,eAA4C;AACrF,QAAI,aAAa,GAAG;AAClB,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,MAAM;AAAA,QACN,SAAS,oBAAoB,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,QAC9C,WAAW;AAAA,MACb;AAAA,IACF;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA,EAEQ,SAAS,eAAuB,WAAyB;AAC/D,QAAI,KAAK,eAAe;AACtB,WAAK,OAAO,MAAM,8BAA8B,EAAE,WAAW,eAAe,UAAU,CAAC;AAAA,IACzF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEA,MAAc,eACZ,WACA,WACA,OACA,WACA,QACY;AACZ,UAAM,iBAAiB,IAAI,QAAe,CAAC,UAAU,WAAW;AAC9D,YAAM,YAAY,WAAW,MAAM;AACjC,cAAM,WAAW;AACjB,oBAAY;AACZ,eAAO,IAAI,MAAM,6BAA6B,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,MACtE,GAAG,SAAS;AAAA,IACd,CAAC;AAED,UAAM,WAA8B,CAAC,UAAU,GAAG,cAAc;AAGhE,QAAI,WAAW,UAAa,CAAC,OAAO,SAAS;AAC3C,YAAM,eAAe,IAAI,QAAe,CAAC,UAAU,WAAW;AAC5D,eAAO;AAAA,UACL;AAAA,UACA,MAAM;AACJ,mBAAO,IAAI,MAAM,+BAA+B,CAAC;AAAA,UACnD;AAAA,UACA,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,QACf;AAAA,MACF,CAAC;AACD,eAAS,KAAK,YAAY;AAAA,IAC5B;AAEA,WAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ;AAAA,EAC9B;AAAA,EAEQ,cACN,QACA,WACA,WACA,eACwC;AACxC,UAAM,aAAa,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI;AAC7C,UAAM,cAAc,aAAa,YAAY;AAE7C,QAAI,eAAe,KAAK,eAAe;AACrC,WAAK,OAAO,KAAK,8CAA8C;AAAA,QAC7D,WAAW;AAAA,QACX;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA,kBAAkB,KAAK,MAAO,aAAa,YAAa,GAAG;AAAA,MAC7D,CAAC;AAAA,IACH;AAEA,QAAI,KAAK,eAAe;AACtB,WAAK,OAAO,MAAM,+BAA+B,EAAE,WAAW,eAAe,WAAW,CAAC;AAAA,IAC3F;AAEA,WAAO,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO,QAAQ,YAAY,YAAY,CAAC;AAAA,EACtD;AAAA,EAEQ,cACN,UACA,eACA,WACA,WACA,YAAY,OACE;AACd,UAAM,aAAa,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI;AAE7C,QAAI,WAAW;AACb,WAAK,OAAO,KAAK,iCAAiC;AAAA,QAChD,WAAW;AAAA,QACX;AAAA,MACF,CAAC;AACD,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,MAAM;AAAA,QACN,SAAS,cAAc,aAAa;AAAA,QACpC,WAAW;AAAA,MACb;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,QAAI,UAAU;AACZ,WAAK,OAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,QAAW;AAAA,QAClD,WAAW;AAAA,QACX;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,MACF,CAAC;AACD,aAAO,mBAAmB,eAAe,SAAS;AAAA,IACpD;AAEA,WAAO,iBAAiB,IAAI,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG,aAAa;AAAA,EACnE;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKA,MACE,IACA,SAC2E;AAC3E,WAAO,UAAU,SAAuE;AACtF,aAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO;AAAA,IAChD;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;AC7TO,IAAM,6BAAgD;AAAA;AAAA,EAE3D;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF;AAOO,IAAM,0BAA6C;AAAA;AAAA,EAExD;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF;AAUA,SAAS,mBAAmB,SAAyB;AACnD,QAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,YAAY;AAKhC,QAAM,UAAU,IACb,QAAQ,qBAAqB,MAAM,EACnC,QAAQ,SAAS,gBAAgB,EACjC,QAAQ,OAAO,OAAO,EACtB,QAAQ,mBAAmB,IAAI;AAClC,QAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,WAAW,IAAI,IACpC,QAAQ,QAAQ,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,MACxB,QAAQ,WAAW,GAAG,IACpB,IAAI,OAAO,MACX,QAAQ,OAAO;AACrB,SAAO,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ;AAC5B;AAMA,IAAM,yBAGD,2BAA2B,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa;AAAA,EAChD;AAAA,EACA,OAAO,mBAAmB,OAAO;AACnC,EAAE;AAeK,SAAS,aAAa,MAAuB;AAClD,QAAM,aAAa,KAAK,YAAY;AACpC,SAAO,uBAAuB,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC;AACpE;AAGO,SAAS,aAAa,UAA2B;AACtD,SAAO,wBAAwB,SAAS,QAAQ;AAClD;;;AC1GO,IAAMC,mBAAuC,oBAAI,IAAI;AAAA;AAAA,EAE1D;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AACF,CAAC;AAMM,SAAS,YAAY,UAA2B;AACrD,SAAO,CAACA,iBAAgB,IAAI,QAAQ;AACtC;;;ACvCO,SAAS,YACd,UACA,QACA,MACgB;AAEhB,MAAI,aAAa,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC1B,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,UAAU;AAAA,MACV,QAAQ,SAAS,QAAQ;AAAA,MACzB,aAAa;AAAA,IACf;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,YAAY,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,aAAa,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG;AACrF,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,UAAU;AAAA,MACV,QAAQ,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,MAC1B,aAAa;AAAA,IACf;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,MAAI,OAAO,iBAAiB,IAAK,QAAO,EAAE,UAAU,QAAQ;AAE5D,MAAI,OAAO,aAAa,SAAS,QAAQ,EAAG,QAAO,EAAE,UAAU,QAAQ;AAEvE,SAAO,kBAAkB,UAAU,OAAO,IAAI;AAChD;AAMA,SAAS,kBAAkB,UAAkB,MAAgD;AAC3F,MAAI,SAAS,SAAS;AACpB,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,UAAU;AAAA,MACV,SAAS,SAAS,QAAQ;AAAA,IAC5B;AAAA,EACF;AAMA,MAAI,SAAS,iBAAiB;AAC5B,QAAI,CAAC,YAAY,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC1B,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,SAAS,SAAS,QAAQ;AAAA,MAC5B;AAAA,IACF;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,UAAU;AAAA,MACV,QAAQ,SAAS,QAAQ;AAAA,MACzB,aAAa;AAAA,IACf;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,UAAU;AAAA,IACV,QAAQ,SAAS,QAAQ;AAAA,IACzB,aAAa;AAAA,EACf;AACF;;;AC5EA,SAAS,qBAAAC,0BAAyB;AAKlC,IAAM,sBAAsB,IAAIC,mBAAoC;AAS7D,SAAS,iBAAoB,QAA0B,IAAkC;AAC9F,SAAO,oBAAoB,IAAI,QAAQ,EAAE;AAC3C;AAOO,SAAS,kBAAgD;AAC9D,SAAO,oBAAoB,SAAS;AACtC;AA2CO,SAAS,iBACd,UACA,WACmE;AACnE,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,SAAS;AAAA,IACT,SAAS;AAAA,MACP;AAAA,QACE,MAAM;AAAA,QACN,MAAM,kBAAkB,SAAS,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS,WAAW,cAAc,SAAS;AAAA,MAC/F;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;ACjFA,SAAS,YAAY,MAAsC;AACzD,MAAI,OAAO,SAAS,YAAY,SAAS,KAAM,QAAO;AACtD,QAAM,OAAQ,KAAiC,MAAM;AACrD,SAAO,OAAO,SAAS,YAAY,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI;AAClE;AAQO,SAAS,kCAAkC,UAA8B;AAC9E,SAAO,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS;AAChC,UAAM,SAAS,gBAAgB;AAC/B,QAAI,WAAW,UAAa,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO;AACjD,aAAO,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,IACvB;AAEA,UAAM,WAAW,YAAY,UAAU,QAAQ,YAAY,IAAI,CAAC;AAEhE,QAAI,SAAS,aAAa,SAAS;AACjC,aAAO,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,IACvB;AACA,QAAI,SAAS,aAAa,iBAAiB;AACzC,UAAI,OAAO,KAAK,kCAAkC;AAAA,QAChD,MAAM;AAAA,QACN,SAAS,SAAS;AAAA,QAClB,cAAc,OAAO;AAAA,QACrB,WAAW,IAAI,eAAe;AAAA,MAChC,CAAC;AACD,aAAO,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,IACvB;AACA,QAAI,OAAO,KAAK,mCAAmC;AAAA,MACjD,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,MACjB,aAAa,SAAS;AAAA,MACtB,cAAc,OAAO;AAAA,MACrB,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,MACb,WAAW,IAAI,eAAe;AAAA,IAChC,CAAC;AACD,WAAO,iBAAiB,UAAU,IAAI,eAAe,SAAS;AAAA,EAChE;AACF;;;ACuDA,SAAS,YAAY,UAAyB,SAAiB,WAA+B;AAC5F,SAAO,oBAAoB;AAAA,IACzB,eAAe;AAAA,IACf,SAAS,GAAG,OAAO,cAAc,SAAS;AAAA,EAC5C,CAAC;AACH;AAKA,SAAS,2BAA2B,QAA+B;AACjE,SAAO,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS;AAChC,UAAM,SAAS,kBAAkB,QAAQ,IAAI;AAC7C,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI;AACd,UAAI,OAAO,KAAK,qBAAqB;AAAA,QACnC,OAAO,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,MACtB,CAAC;AACD,aAAO;AAAA,QACL;AAAA,QACA,qBAAqB,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,QACzC,IAAI,eAAe;AAAA,MACrB;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,gBAAgB,OAAO;AAC3B,WAAO,KAAK,OAAO,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,EAC/B;AACF;AAKA,SAAS,uBACP,UACA,UACA,MACA,cACY;AACZ,SAAO,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS;AAChC,UAAM,YAAY,oBAAoB,UAAU,MAAM;AAAA,MACpD;AAAA,MACA,GAAI,iBAAiB,UAAa,EAAE,aAAa;AAAA,IACnD,CAAC;AACD,UAAM,WAAW,SAAS,SAAS,SAAS;AAE5C,QAAI,CAAC,SAAS,SAAS;AACrB,UAAI,OAAO,KAAK,iBAAiB;AAAA,QAC/B,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,QACjB,UAAU,SAAS;AAAA,MACrB,CAAC;AACD,aAAO;AAAA,QACL;AAAA,QACA,kBAAkB,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,QACjC,IAAI,eAAe;AAAA,MACrB;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,OAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,EAAE,QAAQ,SAAS,OAAO,CAAC;AACnE,WAAO,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,EACvB;AACF;AAKA,SAAS,0BAA0B,SAAkC;AACnE,SAAO,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS;AAChC,UAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,WAAW;AACpC,QAAI,CAAC,UAAU;AACb,YAAM,QAAQ,QAAQ,SAAS;AAC/B,UAAI,OAAO,KAAK,uBAAuB;AAAA,QACrC,aAAa,MAAM;AAAA,MACrB,CAAC;AACD,aAAO;AAAA,QACL;AAAA,QACA,qCAAqC,OAAO,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AAAA,QAC9D,IAAI,eAAe;AAAA,MACrB;AAAA,IACF;AACA,WAAO,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,EACvB;AACF;AAMA,SAAS,wBAAwB,OAAqB,UAA8B;AAClF,SAAO,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS;AAChC,UAAM,SAAS,mBAAmB,SAAS;AAC3C,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG;AAAA,MACxD,eAAe;AAAA,MACf,GAAI,WAAW,SAAY,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC3C,CAAC;AAED,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI;AACd,UAAI,OAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,QAAW;AAAA,QACjD,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,QACnB,WAAW,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,MAC1B,CAAC;AAID,YAAM,OAAO,aAAa,mBAAmB,QAAQ;AACrD,YAAM,UAAU,SAAS,SAAY,GAAG,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM;AAEtF,aAAO,YAAY,aAAa,SAAS,IAAI,eAAe,SAAS;AAAA,IACvE;AAEA,QAAI,OAAO,MAAM,aAAa;AAC5B,UAAI,OAAO,KAAK,8CAA8C;AAAA,QAC5D,YAAY,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,MAC3B,CAAC;AAAA,IACH;AAEA,WAAO,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,EACtB;AACF;AAKA,SAAS,wBAAoC;AAC3C,SAAO,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS;AAChC,UAAM,YAAY,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI;AACxC,QAAI,OAAO,KAAK,yBAAyB;AAEzC,QAAI;AACF,YAAM,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AACnC,YAAM,aAAa,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI;AAE7C,UAAI,OAAO,YAAY,MAAM;AAC3B,YAAI,OAAO,KAAK,uCAAuC,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;AAAA,MACvE,OAAO;AACL,YAAI,OAAO,KAAK,4BAA4B,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;AAAA,MAC5D;AACA,aAAO;AAAA,IACT,SAAS,OAAO;AACd,YAAM,aAAa,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI;AAC7C,YAAM,UAAU,iBAAiB,QAAQ,MAAM,UAAU;AACzD,UAAI,OAAO,MAAM,yBAAyB,iBAAiB,QAAQ,QAAQ,QAAW;AAAA,QACpF;AAAA,MACF,CAAC;AACD,aAAO,YAAY,YAAY,mBAAmB,OAAO,IAAI,IAAI,eAAe,SAAS;AAAA,IAC3F;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAKA,SAAS,kBAAkB,aAAuC;AAChE,SAAO,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,iBAAiB;AAClC,UAAM,WAAW,CAAC,OAAe,gBAA8C;AAC7E,UAAI,SAAS,YAAY,QAAQ;AAC/B,eAAO,aAAa,aAAa,GAAG;AAAA,MACtC;AACA,YAAM,aAAa,YAAY,KAAK;AACpC,UAAI,eAAe,QAAW;AAC5B,eAAO,aAAa,aAAa,GAAG;AAAA,MACtC;AACA,aAAO,WAAW,aAAa,KAAK,CAAC,aAAa,SAAS,QAAQ,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,IACjF;AACA,WAAO,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI;AAAA,EACzB;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,mBAAmB,aAA2B,MAAkC;AACvF,MAAI,KAAK,UAAU,MAAM;AACvB,gBAAY,KAAK,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAAA,EAC1C;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,uBACP,aACA,QACA,MACM;AACN,MAAI,KAAK,cAAc,QAAQ,OAAO,gBAAgB,QAAW;AAC/D,UAAM,UACJ,OAAO,uBAAuB,cAC1B,OAAO,cACP,IAAI,YAAY,OAAO,WAAW;AACxC,gBAAY,KAAK,0BAA0B,OAAO,CAAC;AAAA,EACrD;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,wBACP,aACA,QACA,MACM;AACN,MAAI,KAAK,eAAe,QAAQ,OAAO,WAAW,QAAW;AAC3D,gBAAY,KAAK,2BAA2B,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC;AAAA,EAC5D;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,oBACP,aACA,QACA,MACM;AACN,MAAI,KAAK,WAAW,QAAQ,OAAO,mBAAmB,QAAW;AAC/D,UAAM,OAAO,OAAO,iBAAiB;AACrC,gBAAY;AAAA,MACV,uBAAuB,OAAO,gBAAgB,OAAO,UAAU,MAAM,OAAO,YAAY;AAAA,IAC1F;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,qBACP,aACA,QACA,MACM;AACN,MAAI,KAAK,YAAY,QAAQ,OAAO,YAAY,QAAW;AACzD,UAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,aAAa,OAAO,OAAO;AAC7C,gBAAY,KAAK,wBAAwB,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,EAClE;AACF;AAUA,SAAS,0BACP,aACA,QACA,MACM;AACN,MAAI,KAAK,iBAAiB,MAAM;AAC9B,gBAAY,KAAK,kCAAkC,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,EACrE;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,qBAAqB,QAA6C;AACzE,QAAM,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC;AAC7B,QAAM,cAA4B,CAAC;AAEnC,cAAY,KAAK,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAC1C,qBAAmB,aAAa,IAAI;AACpC,yBAAuB,aAAa,QAAQ,IAAI;AAChD,0BAAwB,aAAa,QAAQ,IAAI;AACjD,sBAAoB,aAAa,QAAQ,IAAI;AAC7C,4BAA0B,aAAa,QAAQ,IAAI;AACnD,uBAAqB,aAAa,QAAQ,IAAI;AAE9C,SAAO;AACT;AAcO,SAAS,sBACd,QACmD;AACnD,QAAM,SAAS,OAAO,UAAU,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AACtE,QAAM,cAAc,qBAAqB,MAAM;AAC/C,QAAM,WAAW,kBAAkB,WAAW;AAE9C,SAAO,CAAC,YAAkD;AACxD,WAAO,OAAO,SAAuC;AACnD,YAAM,iBAAiB,qBAAqB,EAAE,UAAU,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AACzE,YAAM,gBAAgB,OAAO,MAAM,kBAAkB,cAAc,CAAC;AACpE,YAAM,MAAyB,EAAE,gBAAgB,QAAQ,cAAc;AACvE,aAAO,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,WAAW,aAAa,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,IAClF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAUO,SAAS,eACd,UACA,SACA,SACa;AAGb,QAAM,SAAgC;AAAA,IACpC;AAAA,IACA,GAAG;AAAA,EACL;AAEA,QAAM,QAAQ,sBAAsB,MAAM;AAG1C,QAAM,iBAA0C,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ;AAE7D,QAAI,QAAQ,UAAU,GAAG;AACvB,aAAO,QAAQ,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,IAC1B;AACA,WAAQ,QAAwB,IAAI;AAAA,EACtC;AAEA,SAAO,MAAM,cAAc;AAC7B;;;AP/YO,IAAM,yBAAwC;AAAA,EACnD,kBAAkB,aAAa;AAAA,EAC/B,cAAc,aAAa;AAAA,EAC3B,eAAe;AAAA,EACf,eAAe;AACjB;AAMO,IAAM,wBAAgD;AAAA,EAC3D,GAAG,aAAa;AAClB;AAgBO,SAAS,eACd,UACA,UACA,YACQ;AAER,MAAI,eAAe,QAAW;AAC5B,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAEA,QAAM,gBAAgB,UAAU,SAAS;AACzC,QAAM,YAAY,gBAAgB,QAAQ;AAC1C,MAAI,cAAc,QAAW;AAC3B,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAEA,SAAO,wBAAwB,QAAQ;AACzC;AAmCA,SAAS,iBACP,UACA,YACkC;AAClC,QAAM,gBAAgB,UAAU,WAAW;AAE3C,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,kBAAkB,cAAc,cAAc;AAAA,IAC9C,cAAc,cAAc;AAAA,IAC5B,eAAe,cAAc;AAAA,EAC/B;AACF;AA+DO,SAAS,oBACd,UACA,SACA,SAIa;AACb,SAAO,eAAe,UAAU,SAAS;AAAA,IACvC,SAAS,iBAAiB,QAAW,SAAS,SAAS;AAAA,IACvD,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,EACnB,CAAC;AACH;AAiBA,IAAM,gBAAgB,aAAqB,EAAE,WAAW,eAAe,CAAC;AAGxE,SAAS,uBAAuB,OAA6C;AAC3E,QAAM,MAAM;AACZ,QAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO;AAC1B,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK;AACpB,MAAI,UAAU,UAAa,WAAW,OAAW,QAAO;AAExD,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,eAAe;AAAA,IACf,kBAAkB,CAAC,UAAkB,UAAmB;AACtD,YAAM,SAAkC;AAAA,QACtC,eAAe;AAAA,QACf;AAAA,MACF;AACA,UAAI,UAAU,OAAW,QAAO,OAAO,IAAI;AAC3C,aAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,0BAA0B,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAACC,SAAiB;AAC3E,sBAAc,MAAM,wCAAwC;AAAA,UAC1D,OAAO,gBAAgBA,IAAG;AAAA,QAC5B,CAAC;AAAA,MACH,CAAC;AAAA,IACH;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAgBA,SAAS,gBACP,SACA,MACA,aACA,QACwB;AACxB,QAAM,MAAM,MAA8B,QAAQ,IAAI;AAGtD,MAAI,WAAW,UAAa,gBAAgB,QAAW;AACrD,WAAO,mBAAmB,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM,uBAAuB,IAAI,aAAa,GAAG,CAAC;AAAA,EAC1F;AACA,MAAI,WAAW,QAAW;AACxB,WAAO,mBAAmB,IAAI,QAAQ,GAAG;AAAA,EAC3C;AACA,MAAI,gBAAgB,QAAW;AAC7B,WAAO,uBAAuB,IAAI,aAAa,GAAG;AAAA,EACpD;AACA,SAAO,IAAI;AACb;AAWO,SAAS,cACd,SAC2D;AAC3D,SAAO,CAAC,MAAe,UAAmB;AACxC,UAAM,cAAc,uBAAuB,KAAK;AAChD,UAAM,SAAU,OAAgC;AAChD,WAAO,gBAAgB,SAAS,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM;AAAA,EAC3D;AACF;AAYO,IAAM,qCAAqC;AAa3C,IAAM,sCAAsC;AA6BnD,IAAM,cAAc,oBAAI,IAAY;AAGpC,SAAS,2BAA2B,OAAmC;AACrE,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,OAAO,KAAK,gBAAgB,GAAG,mCAAmC;AACxE,UAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI;AACxB,QAAI,CAAC,YAAY,IAAI,GAAG,GAAG;AACzB,UAAI,CAAC,WAAW,GAAG,EAAG,WAAU,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,KAAK,CAAC;AACxD,kBAAY,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,IACrB;AACA,mBAAe,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,EAC5D,SAASA,MAAK;AACZ,kBAAc,MAAM,uDAAuD;AAAA,MACzE,OAAO,gBAAgBA,IAAG;AAAA,IAC5B,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,+BAA+B,QAA2C;AACjF,QAAM,WAAW,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AACpD,MAAI,aAAa,QAAQ,OAAO,aAAa,YAAY,mBAAmB,UAAU;AACpF,UAAM,MAAO,SAAyC;AACtD,QAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,SAAU,QAAO;AAAA,EACtC;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAGA,SAAS,8BAA8B,QAA2C;AAChF,QAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC;AAC9B,MAAI,OAAO,SAAS,UAAU,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,UAAU;AAC5D,WAAO,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG;AAAA,EAChC;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAmBA,SAAS,mBACP,KACA,SACA,IACA,SACsB;AACtB,QAAM,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;AACpB,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA,UAAU,IAAI;AAAA,IACd,qBAAqB,IAAI;AAAA,IACzB,iBAAiB;AAAA,IACjB,WAAW,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IACpC,SAAS,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IAClC,YAAY,KAAK;AAAA,IACjB,SAAS,QAAQ;AAAA,IACjB,GAAI,QAAQ,kBAAkB,SAAY,EAAE,eAAe,QAAQ,cAAc,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACtF,GAAI,QAAQ,iBAAiB,SAAY,EAAE,cAAc,QAAQ,aAAa,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EACrF;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,eAAe,QAAwC;AAC9D,MAAI,OAAO,YAAY,KAAM,QAAO,EAAE,SAAS,UAAU;AACzD,QAAM,gBAAgB,+BAA+B,MAAM;AAC3D,QAAM,eAAe,8BAA8B,MAAM;AACzD,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,SAAS;AAAA,IACT,GAAI,kBAAkB,SAAY,EAAE,cAAc,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACvD,GAAI,iBAAiB,SAAY,EAAE,aAAa,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EACvD;AACF;AAGA,eAAe,kBAAkB,KAAkD;AACjF,QAAM,UAAU,WAAW;AAC3B,QAAM,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;AACpB,MAAI,IAAI;AAAA,IACN;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,MACE,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACV;AAAA,MACA,qBAAqB,IAAI;AAAA,MACzB,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,aACE;AAAA,IACJ;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,gBAAgB,IAAI,SAAS,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,aAAa,IAAI,MAAM;AACvF,+BAA2B,mBAAmB,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,eAAe,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AACvF,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,SAASA,MAAK;AACZ;AAAA,MACE,mBAAmB,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI;AAAA,QACnC,SAAS;AAAA,QACT,cAAc,gBAAgBA,IAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG;AAAA,MACjD,CAAC;AAAA,IACH;AACA,UAAMA;AAAA,EACR;AACF;AA0BO,SAAS,6BACd,SACA,UACA,qBACA,QAC2D;AAC3D,QAAM,MAAM,UAAU;AACtB,SAAO,CAAC,MAAe,UAAmB;AACxC,UAAM,cAAc,uBAAuB,KAAK;AAChD,UAAM,SAAU,OAAgC;AAChD,UAAM,aACJ,sBAAsB,sCAAsC,gBAAgB;AAC9E,QAAI,CAAC,WAAY,QAAO,gBAAgB,SAAS,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM;AAC1E,WAAO,kBAAkB;AAAA,MACvB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AACF;;;AQ/cO,IAAM,mBAAmE;AAAA,EAC9E,KAAK;AAAA,IACH,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,+CAA+C;AAAA,IACtF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,mBAAmB;AAAA,IACjB,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,4BAA4B,CAAC;AAAA,EAClF;AAAA,EACA,aAAa;AAAA,IACX,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,qCAAqC;AAAA,MAC1E,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,+CAA+C;AAAA,MACpF,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,6CAA6C;AAAA,MAClF,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,mDAAmD;AAAA,IAC1F;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,eAAe;AAAA,IACb,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,0CAA0C;AAAA,MAC/E,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,uCAAuC;AAAA,IAC9E;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,gBAAgB;AAAA,IACd,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,+CAA+C;AAAA,MACpF,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,+CAA+C;AAAA,MACpF,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,2CAA2C;AAAA,MAChF,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,6CAA6C;AAAA,IACpF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,cAAc;AAAA,IACZ,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,wCAAwC;AAAA,MAC7E,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,qDAAqD;AAAA,MAC1F,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,6CAA6C;AAAA,IACpF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,cAAc;AAAA,IACZ,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,4BAA4B,CAAC;AAAA,EAClF;AAAA,EACA,gBAAgB;AAAA,IACd,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,4BAA4B,CAAC;AAAA,EAClF;AAAA,EACA,gBAAgB;AAAA,IACd,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,0CAA0C;AAAA,MAC/E,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,8CAA8C;AAAA,MACnF,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,2CAA2C;AAAA,IAClF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,gBAAgB;AAAA,IACd,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,4BAA4B,CAAC;AAAA,EAClF;AAAA,EACA,cAAc;AAAA,IACZ,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,0CAA0C;AAAA,MAC/E,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,kCAAkC;AAAA,IACzE;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,mBAAmB;AAAA,IACjB,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,8CAA8C;AAAA,MACnF,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,sCAAsC;AAAA,IAC7E;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,sBAAsB;AAAA,IACpB,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,MAGjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,gCAAgC,CAAC;AAAA,EACtF;AAAA,EACA,yBAAyB;AAAA,IACvB,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA;AAAA,MAEjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,4BAA4B,CAAC;AAAA,EAClF;AAAA,EACA,oBAAoB;AAAA,IAClB,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA;AAAA,MAEjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,qCAAqC,CAAC;AAAA,EAC3F;AAAA,EACA,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAChB,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,4BAA4B,CAAC;AAAA,EAClF;AAAA,EACA,yBAAyB;AAAA,IACvB,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,6CAA6C;AAAA,MAClF,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,4CAA4C;AAAA,IACnF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,cAAc;AAAA,IACZ,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,4BAA4B;AAAA,MACjE,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,2CAA2C;AAAA,IAClF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,cAAc;AAAA,IACZ,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,4BAA4B,CAAC;AAAA,EAClF;AAAA,EACA,cAAc;AAAA,IACZ,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,gCAAgC;AAAA,MACrE,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,4BAA4B;AAAA,IACnE;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,gBAAgB;AAAA,IACd,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,4BAA4B,CAAC;AAAA,EAClF;AAAA,EACA,oBAAoB;AAAA,IAClB,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA;AAAA,MAEjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,4CAA4C;AAAA,MACjF;AAAA,QACE,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,aAAa;AAAA,MACf;AAAA,MACA,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,4BAA4B;AAAA,IACnE;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAChB,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA;AAAA,MAEP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA;AAAA,MAEjB,gBAAgB;AAAA;AAAA,MAEhB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,QACE,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,aACE;AAAA,MACJ;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,QACE,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,aAAa;AAAA,MACf;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,cAAc;AAAA,IACZ,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,qCAAqC;AAAA,MAC1E,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,4BAA4B;AAAA,IACnE;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,oBAAoB;AAAA,IAClB,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,mDAAmD;AAAA,MACxF,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,kCAAkC;AAAA,MACvE,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,8CAA8C;AAAA,IACrF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,cAAc;AAAA,IACZ,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,6CAA6C;AAAA,MAClF,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,+CAA+C;AAAA,MACpF,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,iCAAiC;AAAA,IACxE;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,iBAAiB;AAAA,IACf,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,uCAAuC,CAAC;AAAA,EAC7F;AAAA,EACA,aAAa;AAAA,IACX,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,8CAA8C;AAAA,IACrF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,cAAc;AAAA,IACZ,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,QACE,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,aAAa;AAAA,MACf;AAAA,MACA,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,4BAA4B;AAAA,IACnE;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,oBAAoB;AAAA,IAClB,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,QACE,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,aAAa;AAAA,MACf;AAAA,MACA,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,4BAA4B;AAAA,IACnE;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,qBAAqB;AAAA,IACnB,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,mDAAmD;AAAA,MACxF,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,sDAAsD;AAAA,IAC7F;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,qBAAqB;AAAA,IACnB,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,yCAAyC,CAAC;AAAA,EAC/F;AAAA,EACA,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAChB,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,8CAA8C;AAAA,IACrF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,gBAAgB;AAAA,IACd,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,QACE,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,aAAa;AAAA,MACf;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,WAAW;AAAA,IACT,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,QACE,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,aACE;AAAA,MACJ;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,YAAY;AAAA,IACV,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,QACE,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,aAAa;AAAA,MACf;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,QACE,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,aACE;AAAA,MACJ;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,oBAAoB;AAAA,IAClB,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,QACE,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,aAAa;AAAA,MACf;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,iBAAiB;AAAA,IACf,aAAa;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,MAKX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA;AAAA,MAEhB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,QACE,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,aACE;AAAA,MACJ;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,QACE,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,aAAa;AAAA,MACf;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,iBAAiB;AAAA,IACf,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,0CAA0C,CAAC;AAAA,EAChG;AAAA,EACA,iBAAiB;AAAA,IACf,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,QACE,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,aAAa;AAAA,MACf;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAChB,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,QACE,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,aAAa;AAAA,MACf;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,QACE,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,aAAa;AAAA,MACf;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,QACE,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,aAAa;AAAA,MACf;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,cAAc;AAAA,IACZ,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,8CAA8C;AAAA,MACnF,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,6CAA6C;AAAA,MAClF,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,oDAAoD;AAAA,IAC3F;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,WAAW;AAAA,IACT,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,QACE,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,aAAa;AAAA,MACf;AAAA,MACA,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,wCAAwC;AAAA,MAC7E,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,4CAA4C;AAAA,IACnF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,wBAAwB;AAAA,IACtB,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,MAGP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA;AAAA,MAEjB,gBAAgB;AAAA;AAAA,MAEhB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,QACE,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,aAAa;AAAA,MACf;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,uBAAuB;AAAA,IACrB,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,MAGP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA;AAAA,MAEjB,gBAAgB;AAAA;AAAA,MAEhB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,QACE,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,aAAa;AAAA,MACf;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EACA,6BAA6B;AAAA,IAC3B,aAAa;AAAA,MACX,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,cAAc;AAAA,MACd,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,eAAe;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,QACE,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,aACE;AAAA,MACJ;AAAA,MACA,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,wCAAwC;AAAA,MAC7E,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa,4CAA4C;AAAA,IACnF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAYO,SAAS,kBAAkB,UAA+C;AAC/E,SAAO,iBAAiB,QAAQ,GAAG;AACrC;;;AC/pBO,SAAS,mBAAmB,MAA+B;AAChE,QAAM,QAAQ,iBAAkB,IAAI;AACpC,MAAI,UAAU,QAAW;AACvB,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,0CAA0C,IAAI;AAAA,IAChD;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO,MAAM;AACf;;;ACnDA,SAAS,KAAAC,UAAS;AAWX,IAAM,2BAA2BA,GAAE,KAAK;AAAA,EAC7C;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF,CAAC;AAMM,IAAM,qBAAqBA,GAAE,KAAK,CAAC,WAAW,UAAU,SAAS,CAAC;AAMlE,IAAM,uBAAuBA,GAAE,KAAK;AAAA,EACzC;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF,CAAC;AAOM,IAAM,0BAA0BA,GAAE,KAAK;AAAA,EAC5C;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF,CAAC;AAMM,IAAM,uBAAuB,wBAAwB;AAQ5D,IAAM,qBAAqBA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EAClC,SAASA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,EAClC,UAAUA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,EACnC,UAAUA,GAAE,KAAK,CAAC,YAAY,QAAQ,UAAU,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAAA,EACxE,MAAMA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,IACb,mBAAmBA,GAAE,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU,UAAU,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,IAC5E,kBAAkBA,GAAE,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU,UAAU,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,IAC3E,iBAAiBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE;AAAA,IACtC,8BAA8BA,GAAE,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU,UAAU,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,EACzF,CAAC;AAAA,EACD,OAAOA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,GAAI;AACnC,CAAC;AAKM,IAAM,aAAaA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EACjC,UAAU;AAAA,EACV,WAAWA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,0BAA0B;AAAA,EAChE,YAAYA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,sBAAsB;AAAA,EACpE,YAAYA,GAAE,MAAMA,GAAE,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,yBAAyB;AAAA;AAAA,EAE7E,qBAAqBA,GAClB,MAAM,uBAAuB,EAC7B,SAAS,EACT,SAAS,qDAAqD;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAGjE,UAAUA,GAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,mCAAmC;AAAA,EAC7F,WAAWA,GAAE,IAAI,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS;AACvC,CAAC;AAMM,IAAM,iBAAiBA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EACrC,IAAIA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,gCAAgC;AAAA,EACnE,OAAOA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,GAAG,EAAE,SAAS,sBAAsB;AAAA,EACjE,aAAaA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,+BAA+B;AAAA,EACvE,WAAW;AAAA,EACX,SAASA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,yBAAyB;AAAA,EAClF,gBAAgBA,GAAE,MAAMA,GAAE,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,0BAA0B;AAAA,EAClF,UAAUA,GAAE,OAAOA,GAAE,OAAO,GAAGA,GAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,oBAAoB;AAAA,EACpF,WAAWA,GAAE,IAAI,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS;AACvC,CAAC;AAgDM,IAAM,wBAAwBA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EAC5C,YAAYA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EACrB,UAAU;AAAA,EACV,SAAS;AAAA,EACT,OAAOA,GAAE,IAAIA,GAAE,OAAO,GAAG,UAAU;AAAA,EACnC,YAAYA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,IACnB,SAASA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IACtC,QAAQA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IACrC,SAASA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IACtC,OAAOA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EACtC,CAAC;AAAA,EACD,gBAAgBA,GACb,OAAO;AAAA,IACN,SAASA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IAChC,QAAQA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IAC/B,SAASA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IAChC,aAAaA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EACtC,CAAC,EACA,SAAS;AAAA,EACZ,oBAAoBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,EAC7C,eAAeA,GAAE,QAAQ;AAAA,EACzB,WAAWA,GAAE,IAAI,SAAS;AAAA,EAC1B,UAAUA,GAAE,IAAI,SAAS;AAAA,EACzB,YAAYA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;AAC3C,CAAC;AAgBM,IAAM,yBAAyBA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EAC7C,SAASA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EAClB,YAAYA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EACzC,cAAcA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EAC3C,aAAaA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EACpC,aAAaA,GAAE,IAAI,SAAS;AAC9B,CAAC;AAkCM,IAAM,oCAA6D;AAAA,EACxE,SAAS;AAAA,EACT,oBAAoB;AAAA,EACpB,oBAAoB;AAAA,EACpB,qBAAqB;AAAA,EACrB,eAAe;AACjB;AA+BO,IAAM,4BAA4BA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EAChD,SAASA,GAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ,KAAK;AAAA,EAClC,OAAOA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAO;AAAA;AAAA,EAClD,YAAYA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,GAAG;AACrD,CAAC;AAKM,IAAM,8BAA8BA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EAClD,gBAAgBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,GAAM;AAAA;AAAA,EAC1D,oBAAoBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,EACzD,oBAAoBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,GAAG;AAAA,EAC3D,2BAA2BA,GAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,EACnD,oBAAoBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,GAAI;AAAA;AAAA,EAC5D,eAAe,0BAA0B,SAAS;AAAA;AACpD,CAAC;AAKM,IAAM,2BAAkD;AAAA,EAC7D,gBAAgB;AAAA;AAAA,EAChB,oBAAoB;AAAA,EACpB,oBAAoB;AAAA,EACpB,2BAA2B;AAAA,EAC3B,oBAAoB;AAAA;AACtB;AAUO,IAAM,0BAA0B;AAKhC,IAAM,oBAAwD;AAAA,EACnE,iBAAiB;AAAA,EACjB,eAAe;AAAA,EACf,WAAW;AAAA,EACX,mBAAmB;AAAA;AAAA,EACnB,cAAc;AAAA;AAAA,EACd,cAAc;AAAA;AAChB;AAuCO,IAAM,yBAAyBA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EAC7C,gBAAgBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EAC7C,mBAAmBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EAChD,mBAAmBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EAChD,mBAAmBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EAChD,mBAAmBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EAC1C,yBAAyBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EAChD,gBAAgBA,GAAE,OAAO,0BAA0BA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC;AACnF,CAAC;","names":["z","READ_ONLY_TOOLS","AsyncLocalStorage","AsyncLocalStorage","err","z"]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/mcp/middleware/validation.ts","../src/mcp/middleware/rate-limiter.ts","../src/mcp/middleware/policy-types.ts","../src/mcp/middleware/policy-helpers.ts","../src/mcp/middleware/policy-rules.ts","../src/mcp/middleware/policy.ts","../src/audit/secure-handler-audit.ts","../src/mcp/error-envelope.ts","../src/mcp/tools/tool-result.ts","../src/mcp/middleware/request-context.ts","../src/mcp/middleware/tool-input-sanitizer.ts","../src/mcp/middleware/secure-handler.ts","../src/mcp/mcp-notifier.ts","../src/mcp/middleware/tool-wrapper.ts","../src/mcp/middleware/timeout-guard.ts","../src/security/access-constraint-deriver/denylist.ts","../src/security/access-constraint-deriver/tool-risk.ts","../src/security/access-constraint-deriver/enforcer.ts","../src/security/access-constraint-deriver/mcp-guard.ts","../src/security/access-constraint-deriver/chain-adapter.ts","../src/mcp/middleware/middleware-chain.ts","../src/mcp/tools/tool-annotations.ts","../src/mcp/tool-annotations.ts","../src/consensus/types-core.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Validation Middleware\n *\n * Input validation helper using Zod schemas.\n * All tool inputs must be validated at the boundary.\n *\n * (Source: MCP Protocol 2025-11-25, Zod Documentation)\n */\n\nimport type { ZodType } from 'zod';\n\nimport { type Result, ok, err, ValidationError, formatZodError } from '../../core/index.js';\n\n// Re-export isZodError for backward compatibility\nexport { isZodError } from '../../core/index.js';\n\n/**\n * Validates tool input against a Zod schema.\n *\n * This function should be called at the start of every tool handler\n * to validate incoming arguments before processing.\n *\n * @template T - The expected type after validation\n * @param schema - The Zod schema to validate against\n * @param args - The unknown input to validate\n * @returns Result containing validated data or a ValidationError\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * const InputSchema = z.object({\n *   task: z.string().min(1),\n *   context: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()).optional(),\n * });\n *\n * server.tool('my_tool', InputSchema.shape, async (args) => {\n *   const result = validateToolInput(InputSchema, args);\n *   if (!result.ok) {\n *     return toolStructuredError({ errorCategory: 'validation', message: result.error.message });\n *   }\n *   const { task, context } = result.value;\n *   // Process validated input...\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport function validateToolInput<T>(\n  schema: ZodType<T>,\n  args: unknown\n): Result<T, ValidationError> {\n  const parsed = schema.safeParse(args);\n\n  if (parsed.success) {\n    return ok(parsed.data);\n  }\n\n  const message = formatZodError(parsed.error);\n  const validationError = new ValidationError(`Invalid tool input: ${message}`, {\n    context: {\n      issues: parsed.error.issues,\n      receivedType: typeof args,\n    },\n  });\n\n  return err(validationError);\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a validation function bound to a specific schema.\n *\n * Useful for reusing the same schema across multiple tools.\n *\n * @template T - The expected type after validation\n * @param schema - The Zod schema to bind\n * @returns A validation function for the schema\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * const validateTask = createValidator(TaskSchema);\n *\n * // Later in tool handlers:\n * const result = validateTask(args);\n * ```\n */\nexport function createValidator<T>(\n  schema: ZodType<T>\n): (args: unknown) => Result<T, ValidationError> {\n  return (args: unknown) => validateToolInput(schema, args);\n}\n\n// `validateToolOutput` and `createOutputValidator` (Issue #547 sibling of\n// `validateToolInput` / `createValidator`) removed in #3022 — no MCP tool\n// ever called the output-validation path; every tool returns its result\n// without schema-validating first. If output validation comes back as a\n// real requirement, reintroduce alongside the per-tool wiring in the same\n// PR (activate-or-delete YAGNI — #2937, #2938, #2939, #2940, #3018, #3022).\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Rate Limiter Middleware\n *\n * Token bucket implementation for rate limiting MCP tool calls.\n * Prevents abuse and ensures fair resource usage.\n *\n * (Source: Token Bucket Algorithm, RFC 6585)\n */\n\nimport { createLogger, type ILogger, getTimeProvider } from '../../core/index.js';\n\n/**\n * Configuration for the token bucket rate limiter.\n */\nexport interface RateLimiterConfig {\n  /** Maximum number of tokens in the bucket */\n  readonly capacity: number;\n  /** Number of tokens added per interval */\n  readonly refillRate: number;\n  /** Interval in milliseconds between token refills (default: 1000ms) */\n  readonly refillIntervalMs?: number;\n  /** Optional logger instance */\n  readonly logger?: ILogger;\n  /** Optional identifier for logging */\n  readonly name?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Current state of the rate limiter.\n */\nexport interface RateLimiterState {\n  /** Current number of available tokens */\n  readonly tokens: number;\n  /** Capacity of the bucket */\n  readonly capacity: number;\n  /** Time until next token is available (0 if tokens available) */\n  readonly nextTokenMs: number;\n}\n\n// Canonical source: config/timeouts.ts (Issue #1046)\nimport { CACHE_TIMEOUTS } from '../../config/timeouts.js';\n\nconst DEFAULT_REFILL_INTERVAL_MS = CACHE_TIMEOUTS.rateLimitRefillMs;\n\n/**\n * Token bucket rate limiter implementation.\n *\n * The token bucket algorithm allows for bursting up to the capacity,\n * while maintaining a steady-state rate equal to the refill rate.\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * const limiter = new RateLimiter({\n *   capacity: 100,\n *   refillRate: 10,\n *   refillIntervalMs: 1000,\n * });\n *\n * if (limiter.tryAcquire()) {\n *   // Proceed with operation\n * } else {\n *   // Rate limited, reject or queue\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport class RateLimiter {\n  private tokens: number;\n  private readonly capacity: number;\n  private readonly refillRate: number;\n  private readonly refillIntervalMs: number;\n  private lastRefillTime: number;\n  private readonly logger: ILogger;\n  private readonly name: string;\n\n  constructor(config: RateLimiterConfig) {\n    this.capacity = config.capacity;\n    this.refillRate = config.refillRate;\n    this.refillIntervalMs = config.refillIntervalMs ?? DEFAULT_REFILL_INTERVAL_MS;\n    this.tokens = this.capacity;\n    this.lastRefillTime = getTimeProvider().now();\n    this.name = config.name ?? 'rate-limiter';\n    this.logger = config.logger ?? createLogger({ component: this.name });\n\n    this.logger.debug('Rate limiter initialized', {\n      capacity: this.capacity,\n      refillRate: this.refillRate,\n      refillIntervalMs: this.refillIntervalMs,\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Refills tokens based on elapsed time.\n   * Called automatically before each acquire attempt.\n   */\n  private refill(): void {\n    const now = getTimeProvider().now();\n    const elapsed = now - this.lastRefillTime;\n    const intervals = Math.floor(elapsed / this.refillIntervalMs);\n\n    if (intervals > 0) {\n      const tokensToAdd = intervals * this.refillRate;\n      this.tokens = Math.min(this.capacity, this.tokens + tokensToAdd);\n      this.lastRefillTime = now - (elapsed % this.refillIntervalMs);\n\n      if (tokensToAdd > 0) {\n        this.logger.debug('Tokens refilled', {\n          added: tokensToAdd,\n          current: this.tokens,\n        });\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Attempts to acquire a token.\n   *\n   * @param count - Number of tokens to acquire (default: 1)\n   * @returns True if tokens were acquired, false if rate limited\n   */\n  tryAcquire(count = 1): boolean {\n    this.refill();\n\n    if (this.tokens >= count) {\n      this.tokens -= count;\n      this.logger.debug('Token acquired', {\n        requested: count,\n        remaining: this.tokens,\n      });\n      return true;\n    }\n\n    this.logger.warn('Rate limit exceeded', {\n      requested: count,\n      available: this.tokens,\n    });\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Gets the current state of the rate limiter.\n   *\n   * @returns The current rate limiter state\n   */\n  getState(): RateLimiterState {\n    this.refill();\n\n    const nextTokenMs =\n      this.tokens > 0 ? 0 : this.refillIntervalMs - (getTimeProvider().now() - this.lastRefillTime);\n\n    return {\n      tokens: this.tokens,\n      capacity: this.capacity,\n      nextTokenMs: Math.max(0, nextTokenMs),\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Resets the rate limiter to full capacity.\n   * Useful for testing or after configuration changes.\n   */\n  reset(): void {\n    this.tokens = this.capacity;\n    this.lastRefillTime = getTimeProvider().now();\n    this.logger.debug('Rate limiter reset', { tokens: this.tokens });\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a rate limiter with default settings suitable for MCP tools.\n *\n * Default configuration:\n * - Capacity: 100 tokens\n * - Refill rate: 10 tokens per second\n *\n * @param name - Optional name for the rate limiter\n * @param logger - Optional logger instance\n * @returns A configured RateLimiter instance\n */\nexport function createDefaultRateLimiter(name?: string, logger?: ILogger): RateLimiter {\n  const config: RateLimiterConfig = {\n    capacity: 100,\n    refillRate: 10,\n    refillIntervalMs: 1000,\n  };\n  if (name !== undefined) {\n    (config as { name?: string }).name = name;\n  }\n  if (logger !== undefined) {\n    (config as { logger?: ILogger }).logger = logger;\n  }\n  return new RateLimiter(config);\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Policy Firewall Types\n *\n * Type definitions for the authorization layer of MCP tool calls.\n *\n * (Source: OWASP ASVS 4.0, Authorization Controls)\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\n\nimport { SecurityError, type ILogger } from '../../core/index.js';\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Core Types\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Artifact type for policy context.\n * Artifacts are resources that can be referenced in policy decisions.\n */\nexport interface Artifact<T = unknown> {\n  readonly id: string;\n  readonly type: string;\n  readonly value: T;\n  readonly createdAt: Date;\n}\n\n/**\n * Execution mode for tool operations.\n * - 'read-only': Only read operations allowed (default)\n * - 'read-write': Both read and write operations allowed\n */\nexport type ExecutionMode = 'read-only' | 'read-write';\n\n/**\n * Policy enforcement mode.\n * - 'enforce': Block denied operations\n * - 'warn': Log denials but allow execution (for migration)\n */\nexport type PolicyMode = 'enforce' | 'warn';\n\n/**\n * Result of a policy evaluation.\n */\nexport interface PolicyDecision {\n  readonly allowed: boolean;\n  readonly reason: string;\n  readonly requiredArtifact?: string;\n  readonly ruleName?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Context provided to policy rules for evaluation.\n */\nexport interface PolicyContext {\n  readonly toolName: string;\n  readonly args: unknown;\n  readonly mode: ExecutionMode;\n  readonly artifacts?: Map<string, Artifact>;\n  readonly workflowId?: string;\n  readonly allowedPaths?: readonly string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * A single policy rule that can approve or deny operations.\n */\nexport interface PolicyRule {\n  readonly name: string;\n  readonly description: string;\n  check(ctx: PolicyContext): PolicyDecision;\n}\n\n/**\n * Interface for the policy firewall.\n */\nexport interface IPolicyFirewall {\n  evaluate(ctx: PolicyContext): PolicyDecision;\n  addRule(rule: PolicyRule): void;\n  removeRule(name: string): boolean;\n  getRules(): readonly PolicyRule[];\n  setMode(mode: PolicyMode): void;\n  getMode(): PolicyMode;\n}\n\n/**\n * Configuration for the policy firewall.\n */\nexport interface PolicyFirewallConfig {\n  /** Enforcement mode (default: 'enforce') */\n  readonly mode?: PolicyMode;\n  /** Logger instance */\n  readonly logger?: ILogger;\n  /** Initial rules to register */\n  readonly rules?: readonly PolicyRule[];\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Error Types\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Policy error for authorization failures.\n */\nexport class PolicyError extends SecurityError {\n  readonly decision: PolicyDecision;\n\n  constructor(message: string, decision: PolicyDecision) {\n    super(message, {\n      context: {\n        allowed: decision.allowed,\n        reason: decision.reason,\n        ruleName: decision.ruleName,\n        requiredArtifact: decision.requiredArtifact,\n      },\n    });\n    this.name = 'PolicyError';\n    this.decision = decision;\n  }\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Zod Schemas for Configuration\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Schema for policy configuration.\n */\nexport const PolicyConfigSchema = z.object({\n  defaultMode: z.enum(['read-only', 'read-write']).default('read-only'),\n  policyMode: z.enum(['enforce', 'warn']).default('enforce'),\n  allowedPaths: z.array(z.string()).default(['./']),\n});\n\nexport type PolicyConfig = z.infer<typeof PolicyConfigSchema>;\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Policy Firewall Helpers\n *\n * Utility functions for path validation and argument extraction.\n *\n * (Source: OWASP ASVS 4.0, Authorization Controls)\n */\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Path Utility Functions\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Validates a path against allowed roots.\n *\n * @param targetPath - The path to validate\n * @param allowedPaths - Array of allowed root paths\n * @returns True if the path is within an allowed root\n */\nexport function isPathSafe(targetPath: string, allowedPaths: readonly string[]): boolean {\n  // Normalize the target path\n  const normalizedTarget = normalizePath(targetPath);\n\n  // Check if any allowed path is a prefix of the target\n  for (const allowed of allowedPaths) {\n    const normalizedAllowed = normalizePath(allowed);\n    if (normalizedTarget.startsWith(normalizedAllowed)) {\n      return true;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return false;\n}\n\n/**\n * Normalizes a path by removing trailing slashes and handling relative paths.\n */\nexport function normalizePath(p: string): string {\n  // Remove trailing slashes\n  let normalized = p.replace(/\\/{1,100}$/, '');\n\n  // Handle relative paths\n  if (normalized === '.') {\n    normalized = '';\n  } else if (normalized.startsWith('./')) {\n    normalized = normalized.slice(2);\n  }\n\n  // Ensure absolute-like comparison\n  if (!normalized.startsWith('/')) {\n    normalized = '/' + normalized;\n  }\n\n  return normalized;\n}\n\n/**\n * Extracts path from tool arguments if present.\n */\nexport function extractPathFromArgs(args: unknown): string | undefined {\n  if (args === null || typeof args !== 'object') {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n\n  const argsObj = args as Record<string, unknown>;\n\n  // Common path field names\n  const pathFields = ['path', 'filePath', 'file_path', 'directory', 'dir', 'target'];\n\n  for (const field of pathFields) {\n    const value = argsObj[field];\n    if (typeof value === 'string') {\n      return value;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return undefined;\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Policy Firewall Rules\n *\n * Default policy rules and constants for the authorization layer.\n *\n * (Source: OWASP ASVS 4.0, Authorization Controls)\n */\n\nimport type { PolicyContext, PolicyDecision, PolicyRule } from './policy-types.js';\nimport { isPathSafe, extractPathFromArgs } from './policy-helpers.js';\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Tool Classification Constants\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Tools that are considered write/mutation operations.\n */\nexport const MUTATION_TOOLS = new Set([\n  'write_file',\n  'edit_file',\n  'delete_file',\n  'create_directory',\n  'remove_directory',\n  'execute_command',\n  'run_shell',\n  'bash',\n  'create_expert',\n  'run_workflow',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Tools that are considered read-only operations.\n */\nexport const READ_ONLY_TOOLS = new Set([\n  'read_file',\n  'list_directory',\n  'search_files',\n  'get_status',\n  'orchestrate',\n  'delegate_to_model',\n]);\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Tool Classification Functions\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Checks if a tool is a mutation operation.\n */\nexport function isMutationTool(toolName: string): boolean {\n  // Check explicit mutation tools\n  if (MUTATION_TOOLS.has(toolName)) {\n    return true;\n  }\n\n  // Check explicit read-only tools\n  if (READ_ONLY_TOOLS.has(toolName)) {\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  // Default to treating unknown tools as mutations (safe default)\n  return true;\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Default Policy Rules\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Policy rule that denies mutation operations when mode is 'read-only'.\n *\n * This ensures that write operations are only allowed when explicitly\n * enabled via the 'read-write' mode.\n */\nexport const denyMutationsWithoutModeRule: PolicyRule = {\n  name: 'deny-mutations-without-mode',\n  description: 'Blocks write operations unless mode is read-write',\n  check(ctx: PolicyContext): PolicyDecision {\n    // If mode is read-write, allow all operations\n    if (ctx.mode === 'read-write') {\n      return { allowed: true, reason: 'Read-write mode enabled' };\n    }\n\n    // Check if this is a mutation tool\n    if (isMutationTool(ctx.toolName)) {\n      return {\n        allowed: false,\n        reason: `Tool '${ctx.toolName}' is a mutation operation but mode is '${ctx.mode}'. Set mode to 'read-write' to enable.`,\n      };\n    }\n\n    // Read-only tool in read-only mode is allowed\n    return { allowed: true, reason: 'Read-only operation allowed' };\n  },\n};\n\n/**\n * Policy rule that validates paths against allowed roots.\n *\n * Prevents path traversal attacks by ensuring all file operations\n * target paths within configured allowed directories.\n */\nexport const safePathsRule: PolicyRule = {\n  name: 'safe-paths',\n  description: 'Validates paths against allowed root directories',\n  check(ctx: PolicyContext): PolicyDecision {\n    // Extract path from arguments\n    const targetPath = extractPathFromArgs(ctx.args);\n\n    // If no path in args, allow (not a file operation)\n    if (targetPath === undefined) {\n      return { allowed: true, reason: 'No path argument found' };\n    }\n\n    // Check for obvious path traversal attempts\n    if (targetPath.includes('..')) {\n      return {\n        allowed: false,\n        reason: `Path contains '..' which may indicate path traversal: ${targetPath}`,\n      };\n    }\n\n    // Get allowed paths from context or use default\n    const allowedPaths = ctx.allowedPaths ?? ['./'];\n\n    // Validate path is within allowed roots\n    if (!isPathSafe(targetPath, allowedPaths)) {\n      return {\n        allowed: false,\n        reason: `Path '${targetPath}' is outside allowed directories: ${allowedPaths.join(', ')}`,\n      };\n    }\n\n    return { allowed: true, reason: 'Path is within allowed directories' };\n  },\n};\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Policy Firewall Middleware\n *\n * Authorization layer for MCP tool calls. Evaluates policy rules\n * to determine whether operations should be allowed or denied.\n *\n * This is separate from validation - validation checks if input is well-formed,\n * policy checks if the operation is authorized.\n *\n * (Source: OWASP ASVS 4.0, Authorization Controls)\n */\n\nimport { createLogger, type ILogger, type Result, ok, err } from '../../core/index.js';\n\nimport type {\n  Artifact,\n  ExecutionMode,\n  PolicyMode,\n  PolicyDecision,\n  PolicyContext,\n  PolicyRule,\n  IPolicyFirewall,\n  PolicyFirewallConfig,\n} from './policy-types.js';\nimport { PolicyError } from './policy-types.js';\nimport { denyMutationsWithoutModeRule, safePathsRule } from './policy-rules.js';\n\n// =============================================================================\n// PolicyFirewall Implementation\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Policy firewall that evaluates rules to authorize or deny operations.\n *\n * Rules are evaluated in order. The first rule that denies the operation\n * stops evaluation and returns the denial. If all rules pass, the operation\n * is allowed.\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * const firewall = new PolicyFirewall({ mode: 'enforce' });\n *\n * // Add rules\n * firewall.addRule(denyMutationsWithoutModeRule);\n * firewall.addRule(safePathsRule);\n *\n * // Evaluate\n * const decision = firewall.evaluate({\n *   toolName: 'write_file',\n *   args: { path: '/etc/passwd' },\n *   mode: 'read-only',\n * });\n *\n * if (!decision.allowed) {\n *   console.error(`Denied: ${decision.reason}`);\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport class PolicyFirewall implements IPolicyFirewall {\n  private readonly rules: PolicyRule[] = [];\n  private mode: PolicyMode;\n  private readonly logger: ILogger;\n\n  constructor(config?: PolicyFirewallConfig) {\n    this.mode = config?.mode ?? 'enforce';\n    this.logger = config?.logger ?? createLogger({ component: 'policy-firewall' });\n\n    // Register initial rules if provided\n    if (config?.rules) {\n      for (const rule of config.rules) {\n        this.rules.push(rule);\n      }\n    }\n\n    this.logger.debug('Policy firewall initialized', {\n      mode: this.mode,\n      ruleCount: this.rules.length,\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Evaluates all policy rules against the given context.\n   *\n   * Rules are evaluated in order. The first rule that denies stops\n   * evaluation and returns the denial decision.\n   *\n   * @param ctx - The policy context to evaluate\n   * @returns The policy decision\n   */\n  evaluate(ctx: PolicyContext): PolicyDecision {\n    this.logger.debug('Evaluating policy', {\n      toolName: ctx.toolName,\n      mode: ctx.mode,\n      ruleCount: this.rules.length,\n    });\n\n    // If no rules, allow by default\n    if (this.rules.length === 0) {\n      return this.allowWithReason(ctx, 'No policy rules configured');\n    }\n\n    // Evaluate each rule in order\n    for (const rule of this.rules) {\n      const decision = rule.check(ctx);\n\n      if (!decision.allowed) {\n        return this.handleDenial(ctx, rule, decision);\n      }\n    }\n\n    // All rules passed\n    return this.allowWithReason(ctx, 'All policy rules passed');\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Creates an allow decision with the given reason and logs it.\n   */\n  private allowWithReason(ctx: PolicyContext, reason: string): PolicyDecision {\n    const decision: PolicyDecision = { allowed: true, reason };\n    this.logDecision(ctx, decision);\n    return decision;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Handles a rule denial, respecting warn mode if configured.\n   */\n  private handleDenial(\n    ctx: PolicyContext,\n    rule: PolicyRule,\n    decision: PolicyDecision\n  ): PolicyDecision {\n    const denialDecision: PolicyDecision = {\n      ...decision,\n      ruleName: rule.name,\n    };\n\n    this.logDecision(ctx, denialDecision);\n\n    // In warn mode, log but still allow\n    if (this.mode === 'warn') {\n      this.logger.warn('Policy denial overridden by warn mode', {\n        toolName: ctx.toolName,\n        ruleName: rule.name,\n        reason: decision.reason,\n      });\n      return {\n        allowed: true,\n        reason: `[WARN MODE] Would be denied: ${decision.reason}`,\n        ruleName: rule.name,\n      };\n    }\n\n    return denialDecision;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Adds a policy rule to the firewall.\n   *\n   * @param rule - The rule to add\n   */\n  addRule(rule: PolicyRule): void {\n    // Prevent duplicate rules\n    const existingIndex = this.rules.findIndex((r) => r.name === rule.name);\n    if (existingIndex >= 0) {\n      this.logger.warn('Replacing existing policy rule', { ruleName: rule.name });\n      this.rules[existingIndex] = rule;\n    } else {\n      this.rules.push(rule);\n      this.logger.debug('Policy rule added', { ruleName: rule.name });\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Removes a policy rule by name.\n   *\n   * @param name - The name of the rule to remove\n   * @returns True if the rule was found and removed\n   */\n  removeRule(name: string): boolean {\n    const index = this.rules.findIndex((r) => r.name === name);\n    if (index >= 0) {\n      this.rules.splice(index, 1);\n      this.logger.debug('Policy rule removed', { ruleName: name });\n      return true;\n    }\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Gets all registered policy rules.\n   *\n   * @returns A readonly array of policy rules\n   */\n  getRules(): readonly PolicyRule[] {\n    return [...this.rules];\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Sets the policy enforcement mode.\n   *\n   * @param mode - The new enforcement mode\n   */\n  setMode(mode: PolicyMode): void {\n    const previousMode = this.mode;\n    this.mode = mode;\n    this.logger.info('Policy mode changed', { from: previousMode, to: mode });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Gets the current policy enforcement mode.\n   *\n   * @returns The current mode\n   */\n  getMode(): PolicyMode {\n    return this.mode;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Logs a policy decision for audit purposes.\n   */\n  private logDecision(ctx: PolicyContext, decision: PolicyDecision): void {\n    const logData = {\n      toolName: ctx.toolName,\n      mode: ctx.mode,\n      workflowId: ctx.workflowId,\n      allowed: decision.allowed,\n      reason: decision.reason,\n      ruleName: decision.ruleName,\n    };\n\n    if (decision.allowed) {\n      this.logger.debug('Policy decision: ALLOWED', logData);\n    } else {\n      this.logger.warn('Policy decision: DENIED', logData);\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Factory Functions\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Creates a policy firewall with default rules.\n *\n * Default rules included:\n * - deny-mutations-without-mode\n * - safe-paths\n *\n * @param config - Optional configuration\n * @returns A configured PolicyFirewall instance\n */\nexport function createDefaultPolicyFirewall(config?: PolicyFirewallConfig): PolicyFirewall {\n  const firewall = new PolicyFirewall(config);\n\n  // Add default rules\n  firewall.addRule(denyMutationsWithoutModeRule);\n  firewall.addRule(safePathsRule);\n\n  return firewall;\n}\n\n/**\n * Evaluates a policy context and returns a Result.\n *\n * This is a convenience function that wraps the firewall evaluation\n * in a Result type for easier error handling.\n *\n * @param firewall - The policy firewall to use\n * @param ctx - The policy context to evaluate\n * @returns Result containing void on success or PolicyError on denial\n */\nexport function evaluatePolicy(\n  firewall: IPolicyFirewall,\n  ctx: PolicyContext\n): Result<void, PolicyError> {\n  const decision = firewall.evaluate(ctx);\n\n  if (decision.allowed) {\n    return ok(undefined);\n  }\n\n  return err(new PolicyError(`Policy denied: ${decision.reason}`, decision));\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a policy context from tool invocation parameters.\n *\n * @param toolName - Name of the tool being invoked\n * @param args - Tool arguments\n * @param options - Additional context options\n * @returns A PolicyContext object\n */\nexport function createPolicyContext(\n  toolName: string,\n  args: unknown,\n  options?: {\n    mode?: ExecutionMode;\n    artifacts?: Map<string, Artifact>;\n    workflowId?: string;\n    allowedPaths?: readonly string[];\n  }\n): PolicyContext {\n  // Build base context with required properties\n  const base = {\n    toolName,\n    args,\n    mode: options?.mode ?? 'read-only',\n  };\n\n  // Use Object.assign to build result, only adding optional properties\n  // when they are actually defined (to satisfy exactOptionalPropertyTypes)\n  const result: Record<string, unknown> = { ...base };\n\n  if (options?.artifacts !== undefined) {\n    result['artifacts'] = options.artifacts;\n  }\n  if (options?.workflowId !== undefined) {\n    result['workflowId'] = options.workflowId;\n  }\n  if (options?.allowedPaths !== undefined) {\n    result['allowedPaths'] = options.allowedPaths;\n  }\n\n  return result as unknown as PolicyContext;\n}\n\n// =============================================================================\n// Re-exports for backward compatibility\n// =============================================================================\n\nexport * from './policy-types.js';\nexport * from './policy-rules.js';\nexport * from './policy-helpers.js';\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/audit - SecureHandler Audit Integration\n *\n * Integration helper to add audit logging to SecureHandler middleware.\n *\n * (Source: Issue #193 - Phase 3 structured audit logging)\n *\n * @module audit/secure-handler-audit\n */\n\nimport type { IAuditLogger, AuditActor, AuditOutcome } from './audit-types.js';\nimport type { RequestContext } from '../mcp/middleware/request-context.js';\n\n/**\n * Configuration for audit-enabled secure handler.\n */\nexport interface AuditHandlerConfig {\n  /** Audit logger instance */\n  auditLogger: IAuditLogger;\n  /** Default actor for requests without caller info */\n  defaultActor?: AuditActor | undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates an AuditActor from RequestContext.\n */\nexport function actorFromContext(ctx: RequestContext, fallback?: AuditActor): AuditActor {\n  const caller = ctx.caller;\n  const clientId = caller.clientId;\n  if (clientId !== undefined && clientId.length > 0) {\n    return {\n      type: clientId.includes('api') ? 'external' : clientId.includes('cli') ? 'agent' : 'user',\n      id: clientId,\n      name: caller.userAgent,\n    };\n  }\n  return fallback ?? { type: 'system', id: 'unknown', name: 'Unknown Caller' };\n}\n\n/**\n * Maps tool result to audit outcome.\n */\nexport function resultToOutcome(\n  isError: boolean | undefined,\n  isPolicyDenied: boolean\n): AuditOutcome {\n  if (isPolicyDenied) return 'denied';\n  if (isError === true) return 'failure';\n  return 'success';\n}\n\n/** Options for logging tool invocation audit */\nexport interface LogToolInvocationOpts {\n  auditLogger: IAuditLogger;\n  toolName: string;\n  outcome: AuditOutcome;\n  actor: AuditActor;\n  requestId: string;\n  durationMs?: number | undefined;\n  errorMessage?: string | undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Logs tool invocation to audit logger.\n */\nexport function logToolInvocationAudit(opts: LogToolInvocationOpts): void {\n  opts.auditLogger.logToolInvocation({\n    toolName: opts.toolName,\n    outcome: opts.outcome,\n    actor: opts.actor,\n    requestId: opts.requestId,\n    durationMs: opts.durationMs,\n    errorMessage: opts.errorMessage,\n  });\n}\n\n/** Options for logging policy audit */\nexport interface LogPolicyAuditOpts {\n  auditLogger: IAuditLogger;\n  policyName: string;\n  decision: 'allow' | 'deny';\n  reason: string;\n  toolName: string;\n  actor: AuditActor;\n  requestId: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Logs policy decision to audit logger.\n */\nexport function logPolicyAudit(opts: LogPolicyAuditOpts): void {\n  opts.auditLogger.logPolicyDecision({\n    policyName: opts.policyName,\n    decision: opts.decision,\n    reason: opts.reason,\n    toolName: opts.toolName,\n    actor: opts.actor,\n    requestId: opts.requestId,\n  });\n}\n\n/** Options for logging rate limit audit */\nexport interface LogRateLimitAuditOpts {\n  auditLogger: IAuditLogger;\n  toolName: string;\n  actor: AuditActor;\n  currentRate: number;\n  limitRate: number;\n  requestId: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Logs rate limit violation to audit logger.\n */\nexport function logRateLimitAudit(opts: LogRateLimitAuditOpts): void {\n  opts.auditLogger.logRateLimitViolation({\n    toolName: opts.toolName,\n    actor: opts.actor,\n    currentRate: opts.currentRate,\n    limitRate: opts.limitRate,\n    requestId: opts.requestId,\n  });\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Structured Tool Error Envelope\n *\n * Caller-facing error contract for MCP tools. Replaces the opaque\n * `{ isError: true, content: [{ text }] }` string shape with a structured\n * envelope so callers (other tools, voter panels, the Claude/Codex/Gemini/\n * OpenCode harnesses) can reason about retry-safety and recovery path\n * instead of string-matching arbitrary text.\n *\n * SCOPE — this envelope is caller-facing ONLY. The routing/circuit-breaker\n * layer classifies adapter subprocess failures through its own\n * `categorizeOutcomeError()` path (orchestration/outcomes/outcome-types.ts)\n * and never reads this envelope. `coarsenFailureCategory()` is a one-way\n * convenience for the rare tool that internally catches an\n * `OutcomeFailureCategory`-classified error and wants to surface it to its\n * caller — it is not, and must not become, a routing input. The two\n * taxonomies serve different layers; this is the single authoritative\n * projection between them.\n *\n * @module mcp/error-envelope\n * @see Issue #2649\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport type { OutcomeFailureCategory } from '../orchestration/outcomes/outcome-types.js';\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Schema\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Caller-facing error category. Deliberately coarser than the routing\n * layer's 11-value `OutcomeFailureCategory` — a tool's caller only needs\n * enough resolution to choose a recovery path:\n *\n * - `transient`  — network blip, rate limit, timeout. Retry is safe.\n * - `validation` — input shape/values wrong. Caller must fix its args.\n * - `permission` — auth / authorization / sandbox / access-policy denial.\n * - `business`   — domain-logic refusal (dedup hit, precondition not met).\n *                  An expected, non-bug outcome — not a failure to retry.\n * - `internal`   — unexpected, bug-class. Not retry-class; escalate.\n */\nexport const ErrorCategorySchema = z.enum([\n  'transient',\n  'validation',\n  'permission',\n  'business',\n  'internal',\n]);\n\nexport type ErrorCategory = z.infer<typeof ErrorCategorySchema>;\n\n/**\n * Structured error envelope returned by MCP tools. Carried in the tool\n * result's `structuredContent` under the `error` key; the human-readable\n * `message` is also mirrored into `content[].text` for display.\n */\nexport const ToolErrorEnvelopeSchema = z.object({\n  errorCategory: ErrorCategorySchema,\n  /** Whether retrying the same call could succeed without caller changes. */\n  isRetryable: z.boolean(),\n  /** Human-readable summary. Bounded to keep stack traces out of results. */\n  message: z.string().min(1).max(2000),\n  /**\n   * Optional structured context. MUST NOT carry secrets, credentials,\n   * absolute filesystem paths, or raw Error/response objects — those are\n   * an information-disclosure risk (this field is not output-sanitized).\n   */\n  detail: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()).optional(),\n});\n\nexport type ToolErrorEnvelope = z.infer<typeof ToolErrorEnvelopeSchema>;\n\n/**\n * `_meta` key the envelope is carried under on a tool result. It lives in\n * `_meta` — NOT `structuredContent` — because the MCP client validates\n * `structuredContent` against the tool's `outputSchema` even on error\n * results (SDK `client/index.js`: it only guards on presence, not on\n * `isError`), so an envelope in `structuredContent` breaks every tool\n * that has an `outputSchema`. `_meta` is the spec's out-of-band metadata\n * channel and is never schema-validated. Namespaced to avoid collisions.\n */\nexport const ERROR_ENVELOPE_META_KEY = 'nexus-agents/error';\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Helpers\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Default retry-safety for a category. Only `transient` errors are\n * retry-safe by default; callers can override per-call when a specific\n * `internal` or `business` error is known to be retryable.\n */\nexport function defaultRetryable(category: ErrorCategory): boolean {\n  return category === 'transient';\n}\n\n/**\n * The single authoritative projection from the routing layer's 11-value\n * `OutcomeFailureCategory` down to the 5-value caller-facing\n * `ErrorCategory`. A `Record` over every key — adding a 12th\n * `OutcomeFailureCategory` value without extending this map is a compile\n * error, which is the drift safeguard.\n *\n * One-way only: there is no `un-coarsen`, by design — the routing layer\n * keeps its own granular classification and never round-trips through here.\n */\nconst FAILURE_CATEGORY_COARSENING: Record<OutcomeFailureCategory, ErrorCategory> = {\n  timeout: 'transient',\n  rate_limit: 'transient',\n  connection: 'transient',\n  authentication: 'permission',\n  validation: 'validation',\n  parse: 'validation',\n  crash: 'internal',\n  adapter_unavailable: 'internal',\n  execution: 'internal',\n  generic: 'internal',\n  unknown: 'internal',\n};\n\n/**\n * Coarsen a routing-layer `OutcomeFailureCategory` to a caller-facing\n * `ErrorCategory`. Use this only when a tool has caught an error already\n * classified by the routing layer and wants to surface it in its envelope.\n */\nexport function coarsenFailureCategory(category: OutcomeFailureCategory): ErrorCategory {\n  return FAILURE_CATEGORY_COARSENING[category];\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract and validate a `ToolErrorEnvelope` from a tool result's `_meta`\n * object. Returns `null` when `_meta` is absent or does not carry a\n * parseable envelope under {@link ERROR_ENVELOPE_META_KEY}. Used by\n * envelope-aware callers.\n */\nexport function parseToolErrorEnvelope(meta: unknown): ToolErrorEnvelope | null {\n  if (meta === null || typeof meta !== 'object') {\n    return null;\n  }\n  const candidate = (meta as Record<string, unknown>)[ERROR_ENVELOPE_META_KEY];\n  const result = ToolErrorEnvelopeSchema.safeParse(candidate);\n  return result.success ? result.data : null;\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Tool Result Helpers\n *\n * Canonical type and factory functions for MCP tool results.\n * Extracted from index.ts to allow tool implementations to import\n * without circular dependencies.\n *\n * @module mcp/tools/tool-result\n */\n\nimport type { ILogger } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport type { RateLimiter } from '../middleware/rate-limiter.js';\nimport type { SecurityConfig } from '../../config/schemas.js';\nimport {\n  defaultRetryable,\n  ERROR_ENVELOPE_META_KEY,\n  type ErrorCategory,\n  type ToolErrorEnvelope,\n} from '../error-envelope.js';\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Base Dependencies\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Common dependency interface shared by all MCP tool handlers.\n *\n * Tool-specific deps interfaces should extend this base.\n * (Source: Issue #1439 — DRY extraction of 25 duplicated Deps interfaces)\n */\nexport interface BaseMcpToolDeps {\n  /** Optional logger */\n  logger?: ILogger;\n  /** Rate limiter for throttling tool calls (required) */\n  rateLimiter: RateLimiter;\n  /** Security configuration (includes timeout settings) */\n  security?: SecurityConfig | undefined;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Types\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * MCP tool content types.\n */\nexport interface TextContent {\n  type: 'text';\n  text: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * MCP tool result.\n *\n * Uses mutable properties for compatibility with secure-handler\n * sanitization (which rewrites `text` in-place).\n */\nexport interface ToolResult {\n  content: Array<TextContent>;\n  isError?: boolean;\n  /** Structured output for SDK outputSchema validation (Issue #1117) */\n  structuredContent?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /**\n   * Out-of-band metadata, never validated against `outputSchema`. The\n   * structured error envelope (#2649) is carried here under\n   * `ERROR_ENVELOPE_META_KEY`.\n   */\n  _meta?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Factory Functions\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Creates a successful tool result.\n *\n * @param text - The result text\n * @returns A ToolResult with the text content\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * return toolSuccess(JSON.stringify({ status: 'ok', data: result }));\n * ```\n */\nexport function toolSuccess(text: string): ToolResult {\n  return {\n    content: [{ type: 'text', text }],\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a successful tool result with structured content for outputSchema validation.\n *\n * When a tool is registered with outputSchema, the SDK validates structuredContent\n * against the schema. This helper returns both text (for display) and structured data.\n *\n * @param data - The structured result data (must match the tool's outputSchema)\n * @returns A ToolResult with both text content and structuredContent\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * return toolSuccessStructured({ experts: [...], count: 10 });\n * ```\n */\nexport function toolSuccessStructured(data: Record<string, unknown>): ToolResult {\n  return {\n    content: [{ type: 'text', text: JSON.stringify(data, null, 2) }],\n    structuredContent: data,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Input for {@link toolStructuredError}. `isRetryable` is optional — when\n * omitted it is derived from the category via `defaultRetryable()`.\n */\nexport interface ToolStructuredErrorInput {\n  errorCategory: ErrorCategory;\n  message: string;\n  isRetryable?: boolean;\n  detail?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a structured error tool result (#2649). The envelope is carried\n * in `_meta` (under `ERROR_ENVELOPE_META_KEY`) — NOT `structuredContent`,\n * which the MCP client validates against the tool's `outputSchema` even\n * on error results. `message` is mirrored into `content[].text` for\n * display.\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * if (!validated.success) {\n *   return toolStructuredError({\n *     errorCategory: 'validation',\n *     message: `Validation error: ${formatZodError(validated.error)}`,\n *   });\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport function toolStructuredError(input: ToolStructuredErrorInput): ToolResult {\n  const envelope: ToolErrorEnvelope = {\n    errorCategory: input.errorCategory,\n    isRetryable: input.isRetryable ?? defaultRetryable(input.errorCategory),\n    message: input.message,\n    ...(input.detail !== undefined ? { detail: input.detail } : {}),\n  };\n  return {\n    isError: true,\n    content: [{ type: 'text', text: envelope.message }],\n    _meta: { [ERROR_ENVELOPE_META_KEY]: envelope },\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates an error tool result.\n *\n * Back-compat alias for {@link toolStructuredError} — maps to the\n * conservative `internal` / non-retryable envelope. New code should call\n * `toolStructuredError` directly with the correct category; this alias\n * exists so the ~64 legacy call sites keep working during the #2649\n * migration sweep.\n *\n * @param message - The error message\n * @returns A ToolResult with isError set to true and an `internal` envelope\n */\nexport function toolError(message: string): ToolResult {\n  return toolStructuredError({ errorCategory: 'internal', message });\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Request Context Middleware\n *\n * Provides request ID generation and caller context tracking for MCP tools.\n * (Source: Issue #185 Phase 1 - Request context & PolicyFirewall integration)\n *\n * @module mcp/middleware/request-context\n */\n\nimport { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';\nimport { getTimeProvider } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport type { TrustTier } from '../../security/trust-types.js';\n\n/**\n * Authenticated user information.\n * (Source: Issue #739 - MCP authentication)\n */\nexport interface AuthenticatedUser {\n  /** Unique user/client identifier */\n  readonly id: string;\n  /** Human-readable name (optional) */\n  readonly name?: string;\n  /** Granted permissions/scopes (optional) */\n  readonly permissions?: readonly string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Caller identification for audit trails.\n */\nexport interface CallerInfo {\n  /** Client identifier (e.g., 'claude-cli', 'gemini-cli') */\n  readonly clientId?: string;\n  /** User agent string if available */\n  readonly userAgent?: string;\n  /** Session ID for request correlation */\n  readonly sessionId?: string;\n  /** IP address or transport identifier */\n  readonly transport?: string;\n  /** Whether the request is authenticated (Issue #739) */\n  readonly authenticated?: boolean;\n  /** Authenticated user information (Issue #739) */\n  readonly authenticatedUser?: AuthenticatedUser;\n}\n\n/**\n * Request context for MCP tool invocations.\n * Immutable once created.\n */\nexport interface RequestContext {\n  /** Unique request identifier (format: req_<16 hex chars>) */\n  readonly requestId: string;\n  /** Timestamp when request was received (ISO 8601, ET) */\n  readonly timestamp: string;\n  /** Tool being invoked */\n  readonly toolName: string;\n  /** Caller information for audit */\n  readonly caller: CallerInfo;\n  /**\n   * Trust tier for this request (Issue #828).\n   * Derived from caller authentication state:\n   * - '1' = Authenticated + known client, or stdio (local-only)\n   * - '2' = Authenticated via network\n   * - '3' = Unauthenticated network request\n   * - '4' = Request with detected injection patterns (set by sanitizer)\n   */\n  readonly trustTier: TrustTier;\n  /** Trace ID for distributed tracing correlation */\n  readonly traceId?: string;\n  /** Parent span ID if part of a larger trace */\n  readonly parentSpanId?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for creating a request context.\n */\nexport interface CreateContextOptions {\n  /** Tool name being invoked */\n  toolName: string;\n  /** Optional caller information */\n  caller?: CallerInfo;\n  /** Optional explicit trust tier override (defaults to derived from caller) */\n  trustTier?: TrustTier;\n  /** Optional trace ID for correlation */\n  traceId?: string;\n  /** Optional parent span ID */\n  parentSpanId?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Generates a cryptographically secure request ID.\n * Format: req_<16 hex characters>\n *\n * @returns Unique request identifier\n */\nexport function generateRequestId(): string {\n  const bytes = randomBytes(8);\n  return `req_${bytes.toString('hex')}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Generates a session ID for request correlation.\n * Format: sess_<12 hex characters>\n *\n * @returns Unique session identifier\n */\nexport function generateSessionId(): string {\n  const bytes = randomBytes(6);\n  return `sess_${bytes.toString('hex')}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Formats timestamp in ISO 8601 format with ET timezone.\n * (Source: CLAUDE.md - Time Authority section)\n */\nfunction formatTimestamp(): string {\n  const now = new Date(getTimeProvider().now());\n  const formatter = new Intl.DateTimeFormat('en-US', {\n    timeZone: 'America/New_York',\n    timeZoneName: 'shortOffset',\n  });\n  const parts = formatter.formatToParts(now);\n  const offset = parts.find((p) => p.type === 'timeZoneName')?.value ?? '-05:00';\n  const base = now.toLocaleString('sv-SE', {\n    timeZone: 'America/New_York',\n    hour12: false,\n  });\n  return base.replace(' ', 'T') + offset.replace('GMT', '');\n}\n\n/**\n * Derives trust tier from caller authentication state (Issue #828).\n *\n * - Authenticated + known CLI client (claude, gemini, codex) → Tier 1\n * - stdio transport (local-only, no network) → Tier 1\n * - Authenticated via network → Tier 2\n * - Unauthenticated → Tier 3\n */\nexport function deriveTrustTier(caller: CallerInfo): TrustTier {\n  const knownClients = ['claude-cli', 'gemini-cli', 'codex-cli'];\n\n  if (caller.transport === 'stdio') return '1';\n\n  if (caller.authenticated === true) {\n    if (caller.clientId !== undefined && knownClients.includes(caller.clientId)) {\n      return '1';\n    }\n    return '2';\n  }\n\n  return '3';\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates an immutable request context for an MCP tool invocation.\n *\n * @param options - Context creation options\n * @returns Immutable request context\n */\nexport function createRequestContext(options: CreateContextOptions): RequestContext {\n  const caller = options.caller ?? {};\n  const context: RequestContext = {\n    requestId: generateRequestId(),\n    timestamp: formatTimestamp(),\n    toolName: options.toolName,\n    caller,\n    trustTier: options.trustTier ?? deriveTrustTier(caller),\n    ...(options.traceId !== undefined && { traceId: options.traceId }),\n    ...(options.parentSpanId !== undefined && { parentSpanId: options.parentSpanId }),\n  };\n\n  // Freeze to ensure immutability\n  return Object.freeze(context);\n}\n\n/**\n * Extracts caller info from MCP transport metadata.\n * Currently supports extracting from request headers or environment.\n *\n * @param metadata - Optional transport metadata\n * @returns Caller information\n */\nexport function extractCallerInfo(metadata?: Record<string, unknown>): CallerInfo {\n  const caller: CallerInfo = {};\n\n  if (metadata !== undefined) {\n    // Extract all available fields from metadata\n    const extracted: CallerInfo = {\n      ...caller,\n      ...(typeof metadata['clientId'] === 'string' ? { clientId: metadata['clientId'] } : {}),\n      ...(typeof metadata['userAgent'] === 'string' ? { userAgent: metadata['userAgent'] } : {}),\n      ...(typeof metadata['sessionId'] === 'string' ? { sessionId: metadata['sessionId'] } : {}),\n    };\n\n    // If any metadata was extracted, return it directly\n    if (\n      typeof metadata['clientId'] === 'string' ||\n      typeof metadata['userAgent'] === 'string' ||\n      typeof metadata['sessionId'] === 'string'\n    ) {\n      return extracted;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Fallback to environment variables for known CLI tools\n  const claudeSession = process.env['CLAUDE_SESSION_ID'];\n  if (claudeSession !== undefined) {\n    return { ...caller, clientId: 'claude-cli', sessionId: claudeSession };\n  }\n\n  const geminiSession = process.env['GEMINI_SESSION_ID'];\n  if (geminiSession !== undefined) {\n    return { ...caller, clientId: 'gemini-cli', sessionId: geminiSession };\n  }\n\n  return caller;\n}\n\n/**\n * Formats request context for logging.\n * Extracts essential fields for log context.\n *\n * @param ctx - Request context\n * @returns Log-friendly context object\n */\nexport function contextForLogging(ctx: RequestContext): Record<string, unknown> {\n  return {\n    requestId: ctx.requestId,\n    toolName: ctx.toolName,\n    trustTier: ctx.trustTier,\n    ...(ctx.caller.clientId !== undefined && { clientId: ctx.caller.clientId }),\n    ...(ctx.traceId !== undefined && { traceId: ctx.traceId }),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Type guard to check if a value is a valid RequestContext.\n */\nexport function isRequestContext(value: unknown): value is RequestContext {\n  if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  const obj = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n  return (\n    typeof obj['requestId'] === 'string' &&\n    obj['requestId'].startsWith('req_') &&\n    typeof obj['timestamp'] === 'string' &&\n    typeof obj['toolName'] === 'string' &&\n    typeof obj['caller'] === 'object' &&\n    typeof obj['trustTier'] === 'string' &&\n    ['1', '2', '3', '4'].includes(obj['trustTier'])\n  );\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Tool Input Sanitizer Middleware\n *\n * Lightweight sanitization for MCP tool arguments. Strips XML-like\n * conversation injection tags and detects prompt injection patterns\n * in all string values within tool arguments.\n *\n * Defense-in-depth layer that protects against prompt injection\n * through tool arguments containing external content.\n *\n * @module mcp/middleware/tool-input-sanitizer\n * (Source: Issue #828 — Wire security modules into production pipeline)\n */\n\nimport type { ILogger } from '../../core/index.js';\n\n/**\n * Result of sanitizing tool input.\n */\nexport interface SanitizeToolInputResult {\n  /** Sanitized arguments (XML tags stripped from string values) */\n  readonly sanitized: unknown;\n  /** Whether any modification was made */\n  readonly wasModified: boolean;\n  /** Count of strings that were modified */\n  readonly modifiedCount: number;\n  /** Injection patterns detected (for logging) */\n  readonly detectedPatterns: readonly string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * XML-like tags that mimic conversation structure or system prompts.\n * Stripping these prevents prompt injection through tool arguments.\n */\nconst XML_INJECTION_PATTERN =\n  /<\\/?(system|human|assistant|instructions|user|prompt|context|tool_use|tool_result)\\b[^>]*>/gi;\n\n/**\n * Patterns that indicate attempted prompt injection.\n * These are logged but not necessarily stripped (detection only).\n */\nconst INJECTION_DETECTORS: ReadonlyArray<{ name: string; pattern: RegExp }> = [\n  { name: 'system_prompt_override', pattern: /ignore (?:all )?previous (?:instructions|rules)/i },\n  { name: 'role_impersonation', pattern: /i(?:'m| am) the (?:repo |project )?(?:owner|admin)/i },\n  { name: 'hidden_instruction', pattern: /<!--[\\s\\S]*?(?:execute|delete|merge|apply)[\\s\\S]*?-->/i },\n];\n\n/**\n * Sanitizes a single string value by stripping XML injection tags.\n * Returns the cleaned string and whether it was modified.\n */\nfunction sanitizeString(value: string): { cleaned: string; modified: boolean } {\n  XML_INJECTION_PATTERN.lastIndex = 0;\n  const cleaned = value.replace(XML_INJECTION_PATTERN, '');\n  return { cleaned, modified: cleaned !== value };\n}\n\n/**\n * Detects injection patterns in a string without modifying it.\n */\nfunction detectPatterns(value: string): string[] {\n  const detected: string[] = [];\n  for (const { name, pattern } of INJECTION_DETECTORS) {\n    pattern.lastIndex = 0;\n    if (pattern.test(value)) {\n      detected.push(name);\n    }\n  }\n  return detected;\n}\n\n/**\n * Recursively sanitizes all string values in an object/array.\n * Returns a deep copy with XML injection tags stripped from strings.\n */\nfunction sanitizeValue(value: unknown, stats: { count: number; patterns: string[] }): unknown {\n  if (typeof value === 'string') {\n    const patterns = detectPatterns(value);\n    if (patterns.length > 0) {\n      stats.patterns.push(...patterns);\n    }\n    const { cleaned, modified } = sanitizeString(value);\n    if (modified) stats.count++;\n    return cleaned;\n  }\n\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n    return value.map((item) => sanitizeValue(item, stats));\n  }\n\n  if (value !== null && typeof value === 'object') {\n    const result: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n    for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(value as Record<string, unknown>)) {\n      result[key] = sanitizeValue(val, stats);\n    }\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  return value;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitizes MCP tool arguments by stripping XML injection tags\n * from all string values and detecting injection patterns.\n *\n * @param args - Tool arguments to sanitize\n * @returns Sanitized result with modification tracking\n */\nexport function sanitizeToolInput(args: unknown): SanitizeToolInputResult {\n  if (args === undefined || args === null) {\n    return { sanitized: args, wasModified: false, modifiedCount: 0, detectedPatterns: [] };\n  }\n\n  const stats = { count: 0, patterns: [] as string[] };\n  const sanitized = sanitizeValue(args, stats);\n  const uniquePatterns = [...new Set(stats.patterns)];\n\n  return {\n    sanitized,\n    wasModified: stats.count > 0,\n    modifiedCount: stats.count,\n    detectedPatterns: uniquePatterns,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Logs sanitization results when modifications or detections occur.\n */\nexport function logSanitizationResult(\n  result: SanitizeToolInputResult,\n  logger: ILogger,\n  toolName: string\n): void {\n  if (result.wasModified) {\n    logger.warn('Tool input sanitized — XML injection tags stripped', {\n      tool: toolName,\n      modifiedFields: result.modifiedCount,\n    });\n  }\n  if (result.detectedPatterns.length > 0) {\n    logger.warn('Injection patterns detected in tool input', {\n      tool: toolName,\n      patterns: result.detectedPatterns,\n    });\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Secure Handler Middleware\n *\n * Higher-order function that wraps MCP tool handlers with security middleware:\n * - RequestContext creation and tracking\n * - PolicyFirewall evaluation\n * - Logging with request context\n *\n * (Source: Issue #185 Phase 1 - PolicyFirewall integration)\n *\n * @module mcp/middleware/secure-handler\n */\n\nimport type { ILogger } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { createLogger, getTimeProvider } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport {\n  createRequestContext,\n  contextForLogging,\n  type RequestContext,\n  type CallerInfo,\n} from './request-context.js';\nimport { type IPolicyFirewall, type ExecutionMode, createPolicyContext } from './policy.js';\nimport type { RateLimiter } from './rate-limiter.js';\nimport type { IAuditLogger } from '../../audit/audit-types.js';\nimport { actorFromContext, resultToOutcome } from '../../audit/secure-handler-audit.js';\nimport {\n  sanitizeToolInput,\n  logSanitizationResult,\n  type SanitizeToolInputResult,\n} from './tool-input-sanitizer.js';\nimport { toolStructuredError, type ToolResult } from '../tools/tool-result.js';\n\nexport type { ToolResult };\n\n/**\n * Tool handler function signature.\n */\nexport type ToolHandler = (args: unknown) => Promise<ToolResult>;\n\n/**\n * Security tier for MCP tools. Controls input validation strictness.\n *\n * - 'standard': Default. XML injection tag stripping only (existing behavior).\n * - 'user-facing': Accepts user task descriptions. Rejects known injection patterns.\n * - 'external': Processes external URLs/content. Strictest validation.\n *\n * @see Issue #1586 — Tiered security validation\n */\nexport type SecurityTier = 'standard' | 'user-facing' | 'external';\n\n/**\n * Configuration for the secure handler wrapper.\n */\nexport interface SecureHandlerConfig {\n  /** Tool name for logging and policy evaluation */\n  toolName: string;\n  /** Security tier controlling input validation strictness (default: 'standard') */\n  securityTier?: SecurityTier;\n  /** Policy firewall instance (optional - if not provided, policy checks are skipped) */\n  policyFirewall?: IPolicyFirewall;\n  /** Execution mode for policy evaluation */\n  executionMode?: ExecutionMode;\n  /** Allowed paths for file operations */\n  allowedPaths?: readonly string[];\n  /** Rate limiter instance (optional) */\n  rateLimiter?: RateLimiter;\n  /** Logger instance (optional - creates default if not provided) */\n  logger?: ILogger;\n  /** Caller information extractor (optional) */\n  callerInfo?: CallerInfo;\n  /** Audit logger for structured audit trail (Issue #740 Phase 2) */\n  auditLogger?: IAuditLogger;\n}\n\n/**\n * Extended handler context passed to the wrapped handler.\n */\nexport interface HandlerContext {\n  /** Request context for this invocation */\n  requestContext: RequestContext;\n  /** Logger with request context attached */\n  logger: ILogger;\n}\n\n/**\n * Tool handler with context signature.\n */\nexport type ContextAwareHandler = (args: unknown, ctx: HandlerContext) => Promise<ToolResult>;\n\n/**\n * Creates a rate limit error response. Rate limits are transient — the\n * structured envelope marks it retryable (#2649).\n */\nfunction rateLimitError(nextTokenMs: number): ToolResult {\n  return toolStructuredError({\n    errorCategory: 'transient',\n    message: `Rate limit exceeded. Try again in ${String(nextTokenMs)}ms.`,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a policy denial error response — an access-control denial,\n * categorized `permission` (#2649).\n */\nfunction policyDeniedError(reason: string, requestId: string): ToolResult {\n  return toolStructuredError({\n    errorCategory: 'permission',\n    message: `Policy denied: ${reason} (request: ${requestId})`,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates an internal error response (#2649).\n */\nfunction internalError(message: string, requestId: string): ToolResult {\n  return toolStructuredError({\n    errorCategory: 'internal',\n    message: `Internal error: ${message} (request: ${requestId})`,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Maximum input size for tool arguments (10MB).\n * Prevents memory exhaustion from oversized payloads.\n * (Source: Issue #740 - MCP security hardening)\n */\nconst MAX_INPUT_SIZE_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024;\n\n/**\n * Patterns that indicate leaked secrets in tool output.\n * Each pattern is tested against tool response text.\n */\n// #3109: every pattern is GLOBAL so `replace` redacts ALL matches, not just\n// the first — two secrets of the same shape (e.g. a rotated old+new key) must\n// both be redacted before the result reaches the MCP caller.\nconst SECRET_PATTERNS: readonly RegExp[] = [\n  // API keys with common prefixes\n  /\\b(sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,})\\b/g,\n  /\\b(pk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,})\\b/g,\n  // AWS-style keys\n  /\\b(AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16})\\b/g,\n  // Bearer tokens in output\n  /Bearer\\s+[a-zA-Z0-9_\\-.~+/]+=*/g,\n  // Generic long hex secrets (40+ chars)\n  /\\b[0-9a-f]{40,}\\b/gi,\n  // password= or token= in output\n  /(?:password|token|secret|apikey|api_key)\\s*[=:]\\s*\\S{8,}/gi,\n];\n\n/** Redact detected secrets from tool output text. */\nfunction sanitizeOutput(text: string, logger: ILogger): string {\n  let sanitized = text;\n  for (const pattern of SECRET_PATTERNS) {\n    // #3109: replace unconditionally — do NOT guard with pattern.test(), which\n    // advances a global regex's lastIndex and makes replace() skip earlier\n    // matches. `String.replace` with a global regex redacts every occurrence\n    // and resets lastIndex to 0 on completion, so the shared pattern stays\n    // safe across calls. Detect a redaction via a before/after compare.\n    const before = sanitized;\n    sanitized = sanitized.replace(pattern, '[REDACTED]');\n    if (sanitized !== before) {\n      logger.warn('Potential secret detected in tool output, redacting', {\n        pattern: pattern.source.slice(0, 30),\n      });\n    }\n  }\n  return sanitized;\n}\n\n/** Sanitize all text content in a tool result (Issue #740). */\nfunction sanitizeToolResult(result: ToolResult, logger: ILogger): void {\n  for (const item of result.content) {\n    item.text = sanitizeOutput(item.text, logger);\n  }\n}\n\n/** Validates input size and returns error if too large. */\nfunction checkInputSize(args: unknown, logger: ILogger, requestId: string): ToolResult | null {\n  if (args === undefined) return null;\n  const inputSize = JSON.stringify(args).length;\n  if (inputSize > MAX_INPUT_SIZE_BYTES) {\n    logger.warn('Input size exceeds limit', { inputSize, limit: MAX_INPUT_SIZE_BYTES });\n    return internalError('Input too large', requestId);\n  }\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Checks rate limiter and returns error if exceeded.\n */\nfunction checkRateLimit(rateLimiter: RateLimiter, logger: ILogger): ToolResult | null {\n  const acquired = rateLimiter.tryAcquire();\n  if (!acquired) {\n    const state = rateLimiter.getState();\n    logger.warn('Rate limit exceeded');\n    return rateLimitError(state.nextTokenMs);\n  }\n  return null;\n}\n\n/** Options for policy check */\ninterface PolicyCheckOptions {\n  firewall: IPolicyFirewall;\n  toolName: string;\n  args: unknown;\n  mode: ExecutionMode;\n  allowedPaths?: readonly string[] | undefined;\n  logger: ILogger;\n  requestId: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Evaluates policy firewall and returns error if denied.\n */\nfunction checkPolicy(opts: PolicyCheckOptions): ToolResult | null {\n  const ctxOpts = {\n    mode: opts.mode,\n    ...(opts.allowedPaths && { allowedPaths: opts.allowedPaths }),\n  };\n  const decision = opts.firewall.evaluate(createPolicyContext(opts.toolName, opts.args, ctxOpts));\n\n  if (!decision.allowed) {\n    opts.logger.warn('Policy denied tool execution', {\n      reason: decision.reason,\n      ruleName: decision.ruleName,\n    });\n    return policyDeniedError(decision.reason, opts.requestId);\n  }\n  opts.logger.debug('Policy check passed', { reason: decision.reason });\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Executes handler and logs result.\n */\nasync function executeHandler(\n  handler: ToolHandler | ContextAwareHandler,\n  args: unknown,\n  ctx: HandlerContext,\n  logger: ILogger\n): Promise<ToolResult> {\n  const startTime = getTimeProvider().now();\n  const result =\n    handler.length >= 2 ? await handler(args, ctx) : await (handler as ToolHandler)(args);\n\n  const durationMs = getTimeProvider().now() - startTime;\n  if (result.isError === true) {\n    logger.warn('Tool execution completed with error', { durationMs });\n  } else {\n    logger.info('Tool execution completed', { durationMs });\n  }\n  return result;\n}\n\n/** Emits an audit event for a completed tool invocation. */\nfunction emitToolAudit(\n  auditLogger: IAuditLogger,\n  toolName: string,\n  ctx: RequestContext,\n  result: ToolResult,\n  durationMs: number\n): void {\n  const actor = actorFromContext(ctx);\n  const outcome = resultToOutcome(result.isError, false);\n  auditLogger.logToolInvocation({\n    toolName,\n    outcome,\n    actor,\n    requestId: ctx.requestId,\n    durationMs,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Emits an audit event when a tool handler throws (or returns a rejected\n * Promise) — closes the audit-trail gap where unexpected exceptions left\n * no auditor record (security-review fallout from #2191).\n */\nfunction emitToolAuditException(\n  auditLogger: IAuditLogger,\n  toolName: string,\n  ctx: RequestContext,\n  durationMs: number\n): void {\n  const actor = actorFromContext(ctx);\n  auditLogger.logToolInvocation({\n    toolName,\n    outcome: 'error',\n    actor,\n    requestId: ctx.requestId,\n    durationMs,\n  });\n}\n\n/** Emits an audit event for a policy denial. */\nfunction emitPolicyAudit(\n  auditLogger: IAuditLogger,\n  toolName: string,\n  ctx: RequestContext,\n  reason: string\n): void {\n  const actor = actorFromContext(ctx);\n  auditLogger.logPolicyDecision({\n    policyName: 'default',\n    decision: 'deny',\n    reason,\n    toolName,\n    actor,\n    requestId: ctx.requestId,\n  });\n}\n\n/** Emits an audit event for a rate limit violation. */\nfunction emitRateLimitAudit(\n  auditLogger: IAuditLogger,\n  toolName: string,\n  ctx: RequestContext\n): void {\n  const actor = actorFromContext(ctx);\n  auditLogger.logRateLimitViolation({\n    toolName,\n    actor,\n    currentRate: 0,\n    limitRate: 0,\n    requestId: ctx.requestId,\n  });\n}\n\n/** Reject inputs with detected injection patterns for elevated security tiers. */\nfunction checkSecurityTier(\n  config: SecureHandlerConfig,\n  sanitizeResult: SanitizeToolInputResult,\n  logger: ILogger\n): ToolResult | null {\n  const tier = config.securityTier ?? 'standard';\n  if (tier === 'standard' || sanitizeResult.detectedPatterns.length === 0) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  logger.warn('Input rejected by security tier validation', {\n    tier,\n    patterns: sanitizeResult.detectedPatterns,\n  });\n  // Security-tier rejection of suspected injection patterns — an\n  // access-control denial, categorized `permission` (#2649).\n  return toolStructuredError({\n    errorCategory: 'permission',\n    message:\n      `Input validation failed: detected patterns [${sanitizeResult.detectedPatterns.join(', ')}]. ` +\n      'Remove prompt injection patterns and retry.',\n  });\n}\n\n/** Pre-execution checks: input size, input sanitization, rate limit, policy. */\nfunction runPreChecks(\n  config: SecureHandlerConfig,\n  args: unknown,\n  mode: ExecutionMode,\n  requestContext: RequestContext,\n  logger: ILogger\n): { error: ToolResult | null; sanitizedArgs: unknown } {\n  const sizeResult = checkInputSize(args, logger, requestContext.requestId);\n  if (sizeResult) return { error: sizeResult, sanitizedArgs: args };\n\n  // Sanitize tool input: strip XML injection tags, detect injection patterns (Issue #828)\n  const sanitizeResult = sanitizeToolInput(args);\n  logSanitizationResult(sanitizeResult, logger, config.toolName);\n  const sanitizedArgs = sanitizeResult.wasModified ? sanitizeResult.sanitized : args;\n\n  // Tiered validation: reject (not strip) for user-facing/external tools (Issue #1586)\n  const tierError = checkSecurityTier(config, sanitizeResult, logger);\n  if (tierError !== null) return { error: tierError, sanitizedArgs };\n\n  if (config.rateLimiter) {\n    const rlResult = checkRateLimit(config.rateLimiter, logger);\n    if (rlResult) {\n      if (config.auditLogger)\n        emitRateLimitAudit(config.auditLogger, config.toolName, requestContext);\n      return { error: rlResult, sanitizedArgs };\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (config.policyFirewall) {\n    const pResult = checkPolicy({\n      firewall: config.policyFirewall,\n      toolName: config.toolName,\n      args: sanitizedArgs,\n      mode,\n      allowedPaths: config.allowedPaths,\n      logger,\n      requestId: requestContext.requestId,\n    });\n    if (pResult) {\n      if (config.auditLogger)\n        emitPolicyAudit(config.auditLogger, config.toolName, requestContext, 'policy denied');\n      return { error: pResult, sanitizedArgs };\n    }\n  }\n\n  return { error: null, sanitizedArgs };\n}\n\n/**\n * Wraps a tool handler with security middleware.\n *\n * @param handler - The original tool handler or context-aware handler\n * @param config - Security configuration\n * @returns Wrapped handler with security middleware\n */\nexport function createSecureHandler(\n  handler: ToolHandler | ContextAwareHandler,\n  config: SecureHandlerConfig\n): ToolHandler {\n  const logger = config.logger ?? createLogger({ tool: config.toolName });\n  const mode = config.executionMode ?? 'read-only';\n\n  return async (args: unknown): Promise<ToolResult> => {\n    const ctxOpts = {\n      toolName: config.toolName,\n      ...(config.callerInfo && { caller: config.callerInfo }),\n    };\n    const requestContext = createRequestContext(ctxOpts);\n    const requestLogger = logger.child(contextForLogging(requestContext));\n    requestLogger.info('Tool invocation started');\n\n    const { error: preCheckError, sanitizedArgs } = runPreChecks(\n      config,\n      args,\n      mode,\n      requestContext,\n      requestLogger\n    );\n    if (preCheckError) return preCheckError;\n\n    return executeAndAudit(handler, sanitizedArgs, requestContext, requestLogger, config);\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Executes the wrapped handler with audit emission on both the success and\n * exception paths. Extracted from `createSecureHandler` to keep that\n * function within the 50-line budget.\n */\nasync function executeAndAudit(\n  handler: ToolHandler | ContextAwareHandler,\n  sanitizedArgs: unknown,\n  requestContext: RequestContext,\n  requestLogger: ILogger,\n  config: SecureHandlerConfig\n): Promise<ToolResult> {\n  const execStartTime = getTimeProvider().now();\n  try {\n    const result = await executeHandler(\n      handler,\n      sanitizedArgs,\n      { requestContext, logger: requestLogger },\n      requestLogger\n    );\n    sanitizeToolResult(result, requestLogger);\n    if (config.auditLogger) {\n      emitToolAudit(\n        config.auditLogger,\n        config.toolName,\n        requestContext,\n        result,\n        getTimeProvider().now() - execStartTime\n      );\n    }\n    return result;\n  } catch (error) {\n    const rawMessage = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error';\n    requestLogger.error('Tool execution failed', error instanceof Error ? error : undefined);\n    if (config.auditLogger) {\n      emitToolAuditException(\n        config.auditLogger,\n        config.toolName,\n        requestContext,\n        getTimeProvider().now() - execStartTime\n      );\n    }\n    // Closes a secret-leak path: adapter SDKs commonly echo offending\n    // credentials in their error messages (e.g. Anthropic's\n    // AuthenticationError carries `sk-ant-api03-…` substrings; fetch\n    // wrappers can echo Authorization headers). The success branch above\n    // runs sanitizeToolResult; the exception path must too.\n    const sanitized = sanitizeOutput(rawMessage, requestLogger);\n    return internalError(sanitized, requestContext.requestId);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a secure handler factory with shared configuration.\n * Useful for registering multiple tools with the same security settings.\n *\n * @param sharedConfig - Shared security configuration\n * @returns Factory function for creating secure handlers\n */\nexport function createSecureHandlerFactory(\n  sharedConfig: Omit<SecureHandlerConfig, 'toolName'>\n): (toolName: string, handler: ToolHandler | ContextAwareHandler) => ToolHandler {\n  return (toolName: string, handler: ToolHandler | ContextAwareHandler) =>\n    createSecureHandler(handler, { ...sharedConfig, toolName });\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - MCP Notification Helper\n *\n * Sends structured logging notifications to MCP clients via\n * the `notifications/message` protocol method.\n * Clients (e.g., Claude Code) can display these for real-time\n * observability of orchestration events.\n *\n * Also provides progress notification support via AsyncLocalStorage\n * for resetting client-side request timeouts (MCP SDK resetTimeoutOnProgress).\n *\n * @module mcp/mcp-notifier\n * (Source: Issue #973, #974 — Claude Code Observability)\n * (Source: Issue #1108 — Progress heartbeat timeout reset)\n * (Source: MCP Protocol 2025-11-25, Logging Specification)\n */\n\nimport { AsyncLocalStorage } from 'node:async_hooks';\nimport type { McpServer } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js';\nimport { createLogger, getErrorMessage } from '../core/index.js';\n\n/**\n * Logging levels for MCP notifications (RFC 5424 syslog).\n */\nexport type McpLogLevel = 'debug' | 'info' | 'notice' | 'warning' | 'error';\n\n/**\n * MCP notifier for sending structured log events to clients.\n */\nexport interface IMcpNotifier {\n  /** Send info-level notification (key orchestration events) */\n  info(logger: string, data: Record<string, unknown>): void;\n  /** Send debug-level notification (detailed execution steps) */\n  debug(logger: string, data: Record<string, unknown>): void;\n  /** Send warning-level notification */\n  warn(logger: string, data: Record<string, unknown>): void;\n}\n\nconst internalLogger = createLogger({ component: 'mcp-notifier' });\n\n/**\n * Creates an MCP notifier that sends logging notifications to connected clients.\n *\n * Notifications are fire-and-forget — failures are logged but never\n * propagate to callers. This ensures observability never breaks tool execution.\n */\nexport function createMcpNotifier(server: McpServer): IMcpNotifier {\n  function send(level: McpLogLevel, logger: string, data: Record<string, unknown>): void {\n    try {\n      server.sendLoggingMessage({ level, logger, data }).catch((error: unknown) => {\n        internalLogger.debug('Failed to send MCP notification', {\n          level,\n          logger,\n          error: getErrorMessage(error),\n        });\n      });\n    } catch (error: unknown) {\n      internalLogger.debug('Failed to send MCP notification', {\n        level,\n        logger,\n        error: getErrorMessage(error),\n      });\n    }\n  }\n\n  return {\n    info: (logger, data) => {\n      send('info', logger, data);\n    },\n    debug: (logger, data) => {\n      send('debug', logger, data);\n    },\n    warn: (logger, data) => {\n      send('warning', logger, data);\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * No-op notifier for when MCP server is not available.\n */\nexport const NOOP_NOTIFIER: IMcpNotifier = {\n  info: () => undefined,\n  debug: () => undefined,\n  warn: () => undefined,\n};\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Progress Notification Support (MCP SDK resetTimeoutOnProgress)\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Callback to send a progress notification to the MCP client.\n * When the client sets resetTimeoutOnProgress=true, each notification\n * resets the client's 60s request timeout.\n */\nexport type ProgressSender = (progress: number, total?: number) => void;\n\n/**\n * Progress context stored via AsyncLocalStorage.\n * Set by toSdkCallbackWithProgress when a progressToken is available.\n */\nexport interface ProgressContext {\n  readonly progressToken: string | number;\n  readonly sendNotification: ProgressSender;\n}\n\n/**\n * AsyncLocalStorage for MCP progress context.\n * Allows withProgressHeartbeat to access the progress sender without\n * threading it through the entire middleware chain.\n */\nexport const progressContextStorage = new AsyncLocalStorage<ProgressContext>();\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Abort Signal Support (MCP SDK cancellation)\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * AsyncLocalStorage for MCP abort signal.\n * Set by toSdkCallback when the SDK provides an AbortSignal.\n * Allows middleware (e.g., TimeoutGuard) to race client cancellation\n * alongside server-side timeouts.\n */\nexport const abortSignalStorage = new AsyncLocalStorage<AbortSignal>();\n\n/**\n * Wraps an async operation with periodic heartbeat notifications.\n *\n * When a progressToken is available (via AsyncLocalStorage from the MCP\n * request handler), sends real `notifications/progress` that reset the\n * client's request timeout (MCP SDK resetTimeoutOnProgress feature).\n *\n * Always sends logging notifications for observability regardless.\n *\n * @param toolName - Name of the tool for notification context\n * @param notifier - MCP notifier instance\n * @param operation - The async operation to wrap\n * @param intervalMs - Heartbeat interval (default: 15000ms)\n * @returns The operation result\n */\nexport async function withProgressHeartbeat<T>(\n  toolName: string,\n  notifier: IMcpNotifier,\n  operation: () => Promise<T>,\n  intervalMs = 15_000\n): Promise<T> {\n  const startTime = Date.now();\n  let beatCount = 0;\n  const progressCtx = progressContextStorage.getStore();\n\n  const timer = setInterval(() => {\n    beatCount++;\n    const elapsed = Math.round((Date.now() - startTime) / 1000);\n\n    // Send real progress notification if client provided progressToken\n    if (progressCtx !== undefined) {\n      progressCtx.sendNotification(beatCount);\n    }\n\n    // Always send logging notification for observability\n    notifier.debug(toolName, {\n      event: 'heartbeat',\n      elapsedSeconds: elapsed,\n      beatCount,\n      hasProgressToken: progressCtx !== undefined,\n    });\n  }, intervalMs);\n\n  try {\n    return await operation();\n  } finally {\n    clearInterval(timer);\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Tool Wrapper Helper\n *\n * Provides a convenient wrapper for MCP tools that automatically applies\n * the middleware chain with timeout protection (CVE-2026-0621 mitigation).\n *\n * @module mcp/middleware/tool-wrapper\n * (Source: Issue #271, CVE-2026-0621 mitigation)\n */\n\nimport { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';\nimport { appendFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';\nimport { dirname, join } from 'node:path';\n\nimport type { ILogger } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport type { TimeoutConfig, SecurityConfig } from '../../config/schemas.js';\nimport type { IPolicyFirewall, ExecutionMode } from './policy.js';\nimport type { RateLimiterConfig } from './rate-limiter.js';\nimport { RateLimiter } from './rate-limiter.js';\nimport {\n  withMiddleware,\n  createMiddlewareFactory,\n  type ToolHandler,\n  type ContextAwareToolHandler,\n  type MiddlewareChainConfig,\n} from './middleware-chain.js';\nimport { MCP_TIMEOUTS, resolveToolClassGuardMs } from '../../config/timeouts.js';\nimport {\n  progressContextStorage,\n  abortSignalStorage,\n  type ProgressContext,\n} from '../mcp-notifier.js';\nimport { createLogger as createInternalLogger, getErrorMessage } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { getNexusDataDir } from '../../config/nexus-data-dir.js';\n\n/**\n * Default timeout configuration.\n * Values sourced from config/timeouts.ts (Issue #984).\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_CONFIG: TimeoutConfig = {\n  defaultTimeoutMs: MCP_TIMEOUTS.defaultMs,\n  maxTimeoutMs: MCP_TIMEOUTS.maxMs,\n  enableLogging: true,\n  uriValidation: true,\n};\n\n/**\n * Default per-tool timeout overrides.\n * Sourced from config/timeouts.ts (Issue #984).\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_TOOL_TIMEOUTS: Record<string, number> = {\n  ...MCP_TIMEOUTS.perTool,\n};\n\n/**\n * Resolves the timeout for a specific tool — the central resolution chokepoint\n * (#3734). Lookup chain:\n *   1. explicit override (caller-supplied),\n *   2. security config `perToolTimeout`,\n *   3. the operation-class runaway-guard for the tool's {@link TOOL_CLASS}\n *      classification (or {@link DEFAULT_OPERATION_CLASS} = 300s if unclassified),\n *      honoring `NEXUS_TIMEOUT_MULTIPLIER` + per-class env overrides.\n *\n * The class-guard step replaces the old `DEFAULT_TOOL_TIMEOUTS` literal lookup\n * AND the punitive 60s global default — every tool now gets a generous\n * non-punitive runaway-guard.\n * (Issue #657 — per-tool timeout; #3734 — central class authority)\n */\nexport function getToolTimeout(\n  toolName: string,\n  security?: SecurityConfig,\n  explicitMs?: number\n): number {\n  // Explicit override takes highest priority.\n  if (explicitMs !== undefined) {\n    return explicitMs;\n  }\n  // Security config per-tool overrides still win over the class default.\n  const perToolConfig = security?.timeout?.perToolTimeout;\n  const perToolMs = perToolConfig?.[toolName];\n  if (perToolMs !== undefined) {\n    return perToolMs;\n  }\n  // Class-derived runaway-guard (multiplier + per-class env overrides applied).\n  return resolveToolClassGuardMs(toolName);\n}\n\n/**\n * Configuration for creating a tool factory.\n */\nexport interface ToolFactoryConfig {\n  /** Logger instance */\n  logger?: ILogger | undefined;\n  /** Security configuration (includes timeout config) */\n  security?: SecurityConfig | undefined;\n  /** Policy firewall instance */\n  policyFirewall?: IPolicyFirewall | undefined;\n  /** Rate limiter configuration */\n  rateLimiter?: RateLimiterConfig | RateLimiter | undefined;\n  /** Allowed paths for file operations */\n  allowedPaths?: readonly string[] | undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Per-tool configuration options.\n */\nexport interface ToolWrapperOptions {\n  /** Execution mode for policy evaluation (default: 'read-only') */\n  executionMode?: ExecutionMode | undefined;\n  /** Custom timeout in ms (overrides default) */\n  timeoutMs?: number | undefined;\n  /** Skip timeout protection (use sparingly) */\n  skipTimeout?: boolean | undefined;\n  /** Skip rate limiting */\n  skipRateLimit?: boolean | undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Gets timeout configuration from security config or uses defaults.\n */\nfunction getTimeoutConfig(\n  security?: SecurityConfig,\n  overrideMs?: number\n): MiddlewareChainConfig['timeout'] {\n  const timeoutConfig = security?.timeout ?? DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_CONFIG;\n\n  return {\n    defaultTimeoutMs: overrideMs ?? timeoutConfig.defaultTimeoutMs,\n    maxTimeoutMs: timeoutConfig.maxTimeoutMs,\n    enableLogging: timeoutConfig.enableLogging,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a tool factory with shared configuration.\n *\n * This factory produces wrapped handlers that include timeout protection,\n * rate limiting, and other middleware as configured.\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * const wrapTool = createToolFactory({\n *   security: appConfig.security,\n *   rateLimiter: { capacity: 100, refillRate: 10 },\n * });\n *\n * const handler = wrapTool('my_tool', async (args) => {\n *   // Your tool logic here\n *   return { content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'Done' }] };\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport function createToolFactory(\n  config: ToolFactoryConfig\n): (\n  toolName: string,\n  handler: ContextAwareToolHandler | ToolHandler,\n  options?: ToolWrapperOptions\n) => ToolHandler {\n  const { security, policyFirewall, rateLimiter, allowedPaths, logger } = config;\n\n  return (toolName, handler, options) => {\n    const skip = {\n      timeout: options?.skipTimeout,\n      rateLimit: options?.skipRateLimit,\n    };\n\n    const chainConfig: Omit<MiddlewareChainConfig, 'toolName'> = {\n      logger,\n      policyFirewall,\n      executionMode: options?.executionMode ?? 'read-only',\n      allowedPaths,\n      rateLimiter,\n      timeout: skip.timeout === true ? undefined : getTimeoutConfig(security, options?.timeoutMs),\n      skip,\n    };\n\n    return withMiddleware(toolName, handler, chainConfig);\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Wraps a single tool handler with timeout protection.\n *\n * This is a convenience function for simple cases where you don't need\n * the full factory setup.\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * const handler = wrapToolWithTimeout('my_tool', async (args) => {\n *   return { content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'Done' }] };\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport function wrapToolWithTimeout(\n  toolName: string,\n  handler: ContextAwareToolHandler | ToolHandler,\n  options?: {\n    timeoutMs?: number;\n    logger?: ILogger;\n  }\n): ToolHandler {\n  return withMiddleware(toolName, handler, {\n    timeout: getTimeoutConfig(undefined, options?.timeoutMs),\n    logger: options?.logger,\n  });\n}\n\n/** Shape of the MCP SDK's extra._meta for progress tokens. */\ninterface SdkMeta {\n  readonly progressToken?: string | number;\n}\n\n/** Shape of the MCP SDK's extra object passed to tool handlers. */\ninterface SdkExtra {\n  readonly _meta?: SdkMeta;\n  readonly signal?: AbortSignal;\n  readonly sendNotification?: (notification: {\n    method: string;\n    params?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  }) => Promise<void>;\n}\n\nconst wrapperLogger = createInternalLogger({ component: 'tool-wrapper' });\n\n/** Extract progress context from MCP SDK extra if progressToken present. */\nfunction extractProgressContext(extra: unknown): ProgressContext | undefined {\n  const sdk = extra as SdkExtra | undefined;\n  const token = sdk?._meta?.progressToken;\n  const sendFn = sdk?.sendNotification;\n  if (token === undefined || sendFn === undefined) return undefined;\n\n  return {\n    progressToken: token,\n    sendNotification: (progress: number, total?: number) => {\n      const params: Record<string, unknown> = {\n        progressToken: token,\n        progress,\n      };\n      if (total !== undefined) params['total'] = total;\n      sendFn({ method: 'notifications/progress', params }).catch((err: unknown) => {\n        wrapperLogger.debug('Failed to send progress notification', {\n          error: getErrorMessage(err),\n        });\n      });\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Runs handler within nested AsyncLocalStorage contexts for progress + abort.\n */\n/** SDK-compatible tool result with optional structuredContent (Issue #1117). */\ntype SdkToolResult = {\n  content: Array<{ type: 'text'; text: string }>;\n  isError?: boolean;\n  structuredContent?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  // Post-#2649: the structured error envelope lives in `_meta` under\n  // `nexus-agents/error` (not in `structuredContent`, which is validated\n  // against `outputSchema` even on error results).\n  _meta?: Record<string, unknown>;\n};\n\nfunction runWithContexts(\n  handler: ToolHandler,\n  args: unknown,\n  progressCtx: ProgressContext | undefined,\n  signal: AbortSignal | undefined\n): Promise<SdkToolResult> {\n  const run = (): Promise<SdkToolResult> => handler(args);\n\n  // Nest contexts: abort signal outer, progress inner\n  if (signal !== undefined && progressCtx !== undefined) {\n    return abortSignalStorage.run(signal, () => progressContextStorage.run(progressCtx, run));\n  }\n  if (signal !== undefined) {\n    return abortSignalStorage.run(signal, run);\n  }\n  if (progressCtx !== undefined) {\n    return progressContextStorage.run(progressCtx, run);\n  }\n  return run();\n}\n\n/**\n * Adapts a ToolHandler to the MCP SDK's expected callback signature.\n *\n * Extracts progressToken and AbortSignal from extra, runs the handler\n * within AsyncLocalStorage contexts so middleware can access them.\n *\n * @param handler - Our internal ToolHandler\n * @returns SDK-compatible callback function\n */\nexport function toSdkCallback(\n  handler: ToolHandler\n): (args: unknown, extra: unknown) => Promise<SdkToolResult> {\n  return (args: unknown, extra: unknown) => {\n    const progressCtx = extractProgressContext(extra);\n    const signal = (extra as SdkExtra | undefined)?.signal;\n    return runWithContexts(handler, args, progressCtx, signal);\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * MCP SDK client default request timeout. Matches `DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MSEC`\n * in `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` (`shared/protocol.js`). If a tool's\n * configured server-side budget exceeds this and the client did not send a\n * `progressToken` (i.e. did not pass `onprogress` to its `request()` call),\n * the client kills the request at this threshold regardless of what the\n * server is doing — heartbeats fire but go nowhere.\n *\n * (Source: audit on #2619 / #2631 — root cause of \"MCP error -32001 at 60010ms\")\n */\nexport const MCP_SDK_DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 60_000;\n\n/**\n * Relative path under `$NEXUS_DATA_DIR` for the timeout-mismatch event log.\n * The #2632 WARN was log-only — useful in tail but not queryable. #2703\n * records each mismatch event as a JSONL row keyed by a correlation\n * `eventId` shared with the log entry, so \"did mismatch cause this\n * timeout?\" can be answered by joining the warning's eventId against the\n * recorded outcome — not just counted in aggregate.\n *\n * Schema lives at `docs/architecture/MCP_PROTOCOL.md` (Timeout-mismatch\n * telemetry section).\n */\nexport const TIMEOUT_MISMATCH_TELEMETRY_REL_PATH = 'mcp-telemetry/timeout-mismatch-events.jsonl';\n\n/** A single timeout-mismatch event recorded to the telemetry JSONL. */\nexport interface TimeoutMismatchEvent {\n  readonly eventId: string;\n  readonly toolName: string;\n  readonly configuredTimeoutMs: number;\n  readonly mcpSdkDefaultMs: number;\n  readonly startedAt: string;\n  readonly endedAt: string;\n  readonly durationMs: number;\n  readonly outcome: 'success' | 'error';\n  /** From the post-#2649 structured error envelope when present. */\n  readonly errorCategory?: string;\n  readonly errorMessage?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Cache the \"dir ensured\" flag so we don't re-`existsSync` on every call\n * (closes #2955 site 3, partial). Cached per `dirname(path)` so an\n * operator changing `NEXUS_DATA_DIR` between calls (test/dev only)\n * still works after a process restart. The full async-write part of\n * the perf fix is deferred — `tool-wrapper-budget-check.test.ts` reads\n * the JSONL synchronously after `await callback(...)` and expects the\n * write to be visible, so switching to `fs.promises.appendFile` broke\n * those tests. The dir-cache is the cheaper part of the perf win\n * (skipping 1 existsSync per call); the appendFileSync vs appendFile\n * win can ship later behind a test-helper that awaits pending writes.\n */\nconst ensuredDirs = new Set<string>();\n\n/** Best-effort append — telemetry recording must never fail the user's tool call. */\nfunction appendTimeoutMismatchEvent(event: TimeoutMismatchEvent): void {\n  try {\n    const path = join(getNexusDataDir(), TIMEOUT_MISMATCH_TELEMETRY_REL_PATH);\n    const dir = dirname(path);\n    if (!ensuredDirs.has(dir)) {\n      if (!existsSync(dir)) mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });\n      ensuredDirs.add(dir);\n    }\n    appendFileSync(path, JSON.stringify(event) + '\\n', 'utf-8');\n  } catch (err) {\n    wrapperLogger.debug('Best-effort timeout-mismatch event recording failed', {\n      error: getErrorMessage(err),\n    });\n  }\n}\n\n/** Pull the post-#2649 errorCategory off an error result's `_meta` envelope. */\nfunction extractErrorCategoryFromResult(result: SdkToolResult): string | undefined {\n  const envelope = result._meta?.['nexus-agents/error'];\n  if (envelope !== null && typeof envelope === 'object' && 'errorCategory' in envelope) {\n    const cat = (envelope as { errorCategory?: unknown }).errorCategory;\n    if (typeof cat === 'string') return cat;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\n/** First text-content line of an error result, truncated for logging. */\nfunction extractErrorMessageFromResult(result: SdkToolResult): string | undefined {\n  const first = result.content[0];\n  if (first?.type === 'text' && typeof first.text === 'string') {\n    return first.text.slice(0, 500);\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\ninterface MismatchCallContext {\n  readonly log: ILogger;\n  readonly handler: ToolHandler;\n  readonly args: unknown;\n  readonly progressCtx: ProgressContext | undefined;\n  readonly signal: AbortSignal | undefined;\n  readonly toolName: string;\n  readonly configuredTimeoutMs: number;\n}\n\ninterface MismatchOutcome {\n  readonly outcome: 'success' | 'error';\n  readonly errorCategory?: string;\n  readonly errorMessage?: string;\n}\n\n/** Build a complete event record from a finished mismatched call. */\nfunction buildMismatchEvent(\n  ctx: MismatchCallContext,\n  eventId: string,\n  t0: number,\n  outcome: MismatchOutcome\n): TimeoutMismatchEvent {\n  const t1 = Date.now();\n  return {\n    eventId,\n    toolName: ctx.toolName,\n    configuredTimeoutMs: ctx.configuredTimeoutMs,\n    mcpSdkDefaultMs: MCP_SDK_DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS,\n    startedAt: new Date(t0).toISOString(),\n    endedAt: new Date(t1).toISOString(),\n    durationMs: t1 - t0,\n    outcome: outcome.outcome,\n    ...(outcome.errorCategory !== undefined ? { errorCategory: outcome.errorCategory } : {}),\n    ...(outcome.errorMessage !== undefined ? { errorMessage: outcome.errorMessage } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\n/** Classify a tool result into a MismatchOutcome (success or structured error). */\nfunction classifyResult(result: SdkToolResult): MismatchOutcome {\n  if (result.isError !== true) return { outcome: 'success' };\n  const errorCategory = extractErrorCategoryFromResult(result);\n  const errorMessage = extractErrorMessageFromResult(result);\n  return {\n    outcome: 'error',\n    ...(errorCategory !== undefined ? { errorCategory } : {}),\n    ...(errorMessage !== undefined ? { errorMessage } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\n/** Run a mismatched call, recording its outcome to the JSONL. */\nasync function runMismatchedCall(ctx: MismatchCallContext): Promise<SdkToolResult> {\n  const eventId = randomUUID();\n  const t0 = Date.now();\n  ctx.log.warn(\n    'MCP tool budget exceeds client default and no progressToken received — request likely to be killed by client before server-side deadline',\n    {\n      tool: ctx.toolName,\n      eventId,\n      configuredTimeoutMs: ctx.configuredTimeoutMs,\n      mcpSdkDefaultMs: MCP_SDK_DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS,\n      remediation:\n        'Client should pass `onprogress` and `resetTimeoutOnProgress: true` when calling, or extend `options.timeout`. See docs/architecture/MCP_PROTOCOL.md.',\n    }\n  );\n  try {\n    const result = await runWithContexts(ctx.handler, ctx.args, ctx.progressCtx, ctx.signal);\n    appendTimeoutMismatchEvent(buildMismatchEvent(ctx, eventId, t0, classifyResult(result)));\n    return result;\n  } catch (err) {\n    appendTimeoutMismatchEvent(\n      buildMismatchEvent(ctx, eventId, t0, {\n        outcome: 'error',\n        errorMessage: getErrorMessage(err).slice(0, 500),\n      })\n    );\n    throw err;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Like `toSdkCallback`, but emits a one-shot WARN at invocation start when\n * the configured per-tool budget exceeds the MCP SDK client default AND the\n * client did not send a `progressToken`. The call is almost certainly going\n * to die at the client default (~60s) regardless of server-side timeout\n * config or progress heartbeats — surface that at the moment of invocation\n * so operators can spot the mismatch in logs without waiting for the\n * timeout to fire.\n *\n * Wrap a long-running tool (`orchestrate`, `consensus_vote`,\n * `execute_expert`, `run_workflow`) with this instead of plain\n * `toSdkCallback`. Tools whose budget already fits within\n * `MCP_SDK_DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS` should keep using `toSdkCallback`.\n *\n * Each mismatch is **also recorded** to\n * `$NEXUS_DATA_DIR/mcp-telemetry/timeout-mismatch-events.jsonl` with a\n * correlation `eventId` (also surfaced in the WARN log entry) and the\n * call's eventual outcome (`success` / `error` + post-#2649 errorCategory\n * if present). This lets the Epic #2631 gate be answered with data —\n * \"of N mismatches, what fraction ended in a timeout?\" — not just counted\n * in aggregate (#2703).\n *\n * (Source: audit on #2619 / #2631 — observability for client-timeout mismatch)\n */\nexport function toSdkCallbackWithBudgetCheck(\n  handler: ToolHandler,\n  toolName: string,\n  configuredTimeoutMs: number,\n  logger?: ILogger\n): (args: unknown, extra: unknown) => Promise<SdkToolResult> {\n  const log = logger ?? wrapperLogger;\n  return (args: unknown, extra: unknown) => {\n    const progressCtx = extractProgressContext(extra);\n    const signal = (extra as SdkExtra | undefined)?.signal;\n    const isMismatch =\n      configuredTimeoutMs > MCP_SDK_DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS && progressCtx === undefined;\n    if (!isMismatch) return runWithContexts(handler, args, progressCtx, signal);\n    return runMismatchedCall({\n      log,\n      handler,\n      args,\n      progressCtx,\n      signal,\n      toolName,\n      configuredTimeoutMs,\n    });\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Re-export middleware factory for advanced use cases.\n */\nexport { createMiddlewareFactory, withMiddleware };\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Timeout Guard Middleware\n *\n * Provides timeout protection for MCP operations to mitigate ReDoS and\n * other denial-of-service vectors. Implements configurable timeouts with\n * proper cleanup and error handling.\n *\n * (Source: CVE-2026-0621, GHSA-8r9q-7v3j-jr4g)\n * (Source: Issue #107)\n *\n * @module mcp/middleware/timeout-guard\n */\n\nimport {\n  getErrorMessage,\n  createLogger,\n  type ILogger,\n  type Result,\n  ok,\n  err,\n  getTimeProvider,\n} from '../../core/index.js';\n\n/**\n * Error codes for timeout-related failures.\n */\nexport type TimeoutErrorCode =\n  | 'OPERATION_TIMEOUT'\n  | 'OPERATION_CANCELLED'\n  | 'INVALID_TIMEOUT'\n  | 'GUARD_ERROR';\n\n/**\n * Timeout guard error.\n */\nexport interface TimeoutError {\n  readonly code: TimeoutErrorCode;\n  readonly message: string;\n  readonly operation?: string;\n  readonly timeoutMs?: number;\n  readonly cause?: Error;\n}\n\n/**\n * Configuration for timeout guard.\n */\nexport interface TimeoutGuardConfig {\n  /** Default timeout in milliseconds (default: 30000) */\n  readonly defaultTimeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Maximum allowed timeout in milliseconds (default: 300000) */\n  readonly maxTimeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Whether to log timeout events (default: true) */\n  readonly enableLogging?: boolean;\n  /** Logger instance */\n  readonly logger?: ILogger;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of a guarded operation.\n */\nexport interface GuardedResult<T> {\n  /** The operation result */\n  readonly value: T;\n  /** Execution duration in milliseconds */\n  readonly durationMs: number;\n  /** Whether the operation was near timeout */\n  readonly nearTimeout: boolean;\n}\n\n/** Execution options for guarded operations. */\nexport interface ExecuteOptions {\n  /** Custom timeout for this operation */\n  readonly timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Name for logging/debugging */\n  readonly operationName?: string;\n  /** Cleanup function to call on timeout */\n  readonly onTimeout?: () => void;\n  /** AbortSignal for client-initiated cancellation */\n  readonly signal?: AbortSignal;\n}\n\n// Canonical source: config/timeouts.ts (Issue #1046)\nimport { TIMEOUT_GUARD } from '../../config/timeouts.js';\n\nconst DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = TIMEOUT_GUARD.defaultMs;\nconst MAX_TIMEOUT_MS = TIMEOUT_GUARD.maxMs;\nconst NEAR_TIMEOUT_THRESHOLD = TIMEOUT_GUARD.nearTimeoutThreshold;\n\n/** Internal state for tracking timeout. */\ninterface TimeoutState {\n  timeoutId: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;\n  timedOut: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a timeout error for operation timeout.\n */\nfunction createTimeoutError(operationName: string, timeoutMs: number): TimeoutError {\n  return {\n    code: 'OPERATION_TIMEOUT',\n    message: `Operation '${operationName}' timed out after ${String(timeoutMs)}ms`,\n    operation: operationName,\n    timeoutMs,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a guard error from a caught exception.\n */\nfunction createGuardError(error: unknown, operationName: string): TimeoutError {\n  const guardError: TimeoutError = {\n    code: 'GUARD_ERROR',\n    message: getErrorMessage(error),\n    operation: operationName,\n  };\n  if (error instanceof Error) {\n    return { ...guardError, cause: error };\n  }\n  return guardError;\n}\n\n/**\n * Timeout guard for protecting async operations from hanging.\n *\n * Provides protection against:\n * - ReDoS attacks (CVE-2026-0621)\n * - Slow/hanging external services\n * - Resource exhaustion\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * const guard = new TimeoutGuard({ defaultTimeoutMs: 5000 });\n *\n * const result = await guard.execute(\n *   () => someAsyncOperation(),\n *   { operationName: 'process-uri' }\n * );\n *\n * if (result.ok) {\n *   console.log('Completed in', result.value.durationMs, 'ms');\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport class TimeoutGuard {\n  private readonly defaultTimeoutMs: number;\n  private readonly maxTimeoutMs: number;\n  private readonly enableLogging: boolean;\n  private readonly logger: ILogger;\n\n  constructor(config?: TimeoutGuardConfig) {\n    this.defaultTimeoutMs = config?.defaultTimeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS;\n    this.maxTimeoutMs = config?.maxTimeoutMs ?? MAX_TIMEOUT_MS;\n    this.enableLogging = config?.enableLogging ?? true;\n    this.logger = config?.logger ?? createLogger({ component: 'timeout-guard' });\n  }\n\n  /** Resolves effective timeout and operation name from options. */\n  private resolveOptions(options?: ExecuteOptions): {\n    timeoutMs: number;\n    operationName: string;\n  } {\n    return {\n      timeoutMs: Math.min(options?.timeoutMs ?? this.defaultTimeoutMs, this.maxTimeoutMs),\n      operationName: options?.operationName ?? 'unknown',\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Executes an async operation with timeout protection.\n   */\n  async execute<T>(\n    operation: () => Promise<T>,\n    options?: ExecuteOptions\n  ): Promise<Result<GuardedResult<T>, TimeoutError>> {\n    const { timeoutMs, operationName } = this.resolveOptions(options);\n\n    const validationError = this.validateTimeout(timeoutMs, operationName);\n    if (validationError !== null) {\n      return err(validationError);\n    }\n\n    return this.runGuarded(operation, timeoutMs, operationName, options);\n  }\n\n  /** Runs the operation with timeout and optional abort signal. */\n  private async runGuarded<T>(\n    operation: () => Promise<T>,\n    timeoutMs: number,\n    operationName: string,\n    options?: ExecuteOptions\n  ): Promise<Result<GuardedResult<T>, TimeoutError>> {\n    this.logStart(operationName, timeoutMs);\n    const startTime = getTimeProvider().now();\n    const state: TimeoutState = { timeoutId: undefined, timedOut: false };\n\n    try {\n      const result = await this.runWithTimeout(\n        operation,\n        timeoutMs,\n        state,\n        options?.onTimeout,\n        options?.signal\n      );\n      return this.handleSuccess(result, startTime, timeoutMs, operationName);\n    } catch {\n      const cancelled = options?.signal?.aborted === true && !state.timedOut;\n      return err(\n        this.handleFailure(state.timedOut, operationName, timeoutMs, startTime, cancelled)\n      );\n    } finally {\n      if (state.timeoutId !== undefined) {\n        clearTimeout(state.timeoutId);\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  private validateTimeout(timeoutMs: number, operationName: string): TimeoutError | null {\n    if (timeoutMs <= 0) {\n      return {\n        code: 'INVALID_TIMEOUT',\n        message: `Invalid timeout: ${String(timeoutMs)}ms`,\n        operation: operationName,\n      };\n    }\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  private logStart(operationName: string, timeoutMs: number): void {\n    if (this.enableLogging) {\n      this.logger.debug('Starting guarded operation', { operation: operationName, timeoutMs });\n    }\n  }\n\n  private async runWithTimeout<T>(\n    operation: () => Promise<T>,\n    timeoutMs: number,\n    state: TimeoutState,\n    onTimeout?: () => void,\n    signal?: AbortSignal\n  ): Promise<T> {\n    const timeoutPromise = new Promise<never>((_resolve, reject) => {\n      state.timeoutId = setTimeout(() => {\n        state.timedOut = true;\n        onTimeout?.();\n        reject(new Error(`Operation timed out after ${String(timeoutMs)}ms`));\n      }, timeoutMs);\n    });\n\n    const promises: Array<Promise<T>> = [operation(), timeoutPromise];\n\n    // Race against client AbortSignal if provided\n    if (signal !== undefined && !signal.aborted) {\n      const abortPromise = new Promise<never>((_resolve, reject) => {\n        signal.addEventListener(\n          'abort',\n          () => {\n            reject(new Error('Operation cancelled by client'));\n          },\n          { once: true }\n        );\n      });\n      promises.push(abortPromise);\n    }\n\n    return Promise.race(promises);\n  }\n\n  private handleSuccess<T>(\n    result: T,\n    startTime: number,\n    timeoutMs: number,\n    operationName: string\n  ): Result<GuardedResult<T>, TimeoutError> {\n    const durationMs = getTimeProvider().now() - startTime;\n    const nearTimeout = durationMs > timeoutMs * NEAR_TIMEOUT_THRESHOLD;\n\n    if (nearTimeout && this.enableLogging) {\n      this.logger.warn('Operation completed near timeout threshold', {\n        operation: operationName,\n        durationMs,\n        timeoutMs,\n        thresholdPercent: Math.round((durationMs / timeoutMs) * 100),\n      });\n    }\n\n    if (this.enableLogging) {\n      this.logger.debug('Guarded operation completed', { operation: operationName, durationMs });\n    }\n\n    return ok({ value: result, durationMs, nearTimeout });\n  }\n\n  private handleFailure(\n    timedOut: boolean,\n    operationName: string,\n    timeoutMs: number,\n    startTime: number,\n    cancelled = false\n  ): TimeoutError {\n    const durationMs = getTimeProvider().now() - startTime;\n\n    if (cancelled) {\n      this.logger.info('Operation cancelled by client', {\n        operation: operationName,\n        durationMs,\n      });\n      return {\n        code: 'OPERATION_CANCELLED',\n        message: `Operation '${operationName}' cancelled by client`,\n        operation: operationName,\n      };\n    }\n\n    if (timedOut) {\n      this.logger.error('Operation timed out', undefined, {\n        operation: operationName,\n        timeoutMs,\n        durationMs,\n      });\n      return createTimeoutError(operationName, timeoutMs);\n    }\n\n    return createGuardError(new Error('Unknown error'), operationName);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Creates a guarded version of an async function.\n   */\n  guard<TArgs extends unknown[], TResult>(\n    fn: (...args: TArgs) => Promise<TResult>,\n    options?: { readonly timeoutMs?: number; readonly operationName?: string }\n  ): (...args: TArgs) => Promise<Result<GuardedResult<TResult>, TimeoutError>> {\n    return async (...args: TArgs): Promise<Result<GuardedResult<TResult>, TimeoutError>> => {\n      return this.execute(() => fn(...args), options);\n    };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * URI validation utilities to complement timeout protection.\n */\nexport const UriValidation = {\n  MAX_URI_LENGTH: 8192,\n  MAX_TEMPLATE_DEPTH: 3,\n  SUSPICIOUS_PATTERN: /\\{[+#./;?&]?[^}]*\\*\\}.*\\{[+#./;?&]?[^}]*\\*\\}|\\{(?:[^{}]*\\{){3,}/,\n\n  validate(uri: string): Result<string, TimeoutError> {\n    if (uri.length > this.MAX_URI_LENGTH) {\n      return err({\n        code: 'GUARD_ERROR',\n        message: `URI exceeds maximum length: ${String(uri.length)} > ${String(this.MAX_URI_LENGTH)}`,\n        operation: 'uri-validation',\n      });\n    }\n\n    if (this.SUSPICIOUS_PATTERN.test(uri)) {\n      return err({\n        code: 'GUARD_ERROR',\n        message: 'URI contains suspicious patterns that may cause performance issues',\n        operation: 'uri-validation',\n      });\n    }\n\n    return ok(uri);\n  },\n\n  sanitize(uri: string): string {\n    const sanitized = uri.slice(0, this.MAX_URI_LENGTH);\n    let depth = 0;\n    let result = '';\n\n    for (const char of sanitized) {\n      if (char === '{') {\n        depth++;\n        if (depth > this.MAX_TEMPLATE_DEPTH) continue;\n      } else if (char === '}') {\n        if (depth > this.MAX_TEMPLATE_DEPTH) {\n          depth--;\n          continue;\n        }\n        depth--;\n      }\n      result += char;\n    }\n\n    return result;\n  },\n};\n\n/**\n * Creates a timeout guard with default MCP-appropriate settings.\n */\nexport function createDefaultTimeoutGuard(logger?: ILogger): TimeoutGuard {\n  const config: TimeoutGuardConfig = {\n    defaultTimeoutMs: DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS,\n    maxTimeoutMs: MAX_TIMEOUT_MS,\n    enableLogging: true,\n  };\n  if (logger !== undefined) {\n    return new TimeoutGuard({ ...config, logger });\n  }\n  return new TimeoutGuard(config);\n}\n","/**\n * Access Constraint Deriver — Unbypassable denylist (#1977 condition 3).\n *\n * Hardcoded patterns that no LLM-derived policy may override. Applied FIRST\n * in the enforcer, before checking the per-task policy. If the LLM (or a\n * malicious user objective) produces a policy that would allow access to\n * `.env`, SSH keys, cloud credentials, or similar, the denylist still wins.\n *\n * This exists because the LLM deriver is the weakest link — a user objective\n * that says \"I need to view my AWS credentials to debug\" would otherwise\n * produce a policy allowing `~/.aws/**`. The denylist refuses regardless.\n *\n * @module security/access-constraint-deriver/denylist\n */\n\n/**\n * File-path patterns that are unconditionally denied. Glob-style wildcards.\n * All matching is case-insensitive to catch `~/.SSH` and similar.\n */\nexport const UNBYPASSABLE_PATH_PATTERNS: readonly string[] = [\n  // Environment files\n  '.env',\n  '.env.*',\n  '**/.env',\n  '**/.env.*',\n\n  // SSH credentials\n  '~/.ssh/**',\n  '**/ssh/id_*',\n  '**/*_rsa',\n  '**/*_ed25519',\n  '**/*.pem',\n\n  // Cloud credentials\n  '~/.aws/**',\n  '~/.azure/**',\n  '~/.gcp/**',\n  '~/.config/gcloud/**',\n  '~/.kube/config',\n\n  // Unix secret files\n  '/etc/shadow',\n  '/etc/sudoers',\n  '/etc/sudoers.d/**',\n\n  // Common secret file patterns\n  '**/secrets.*',\n  '**/credentials.*',\n  '**/private_key.*',\n  '**/id_rsa*',\n];\n\n/**\n * Tool names that are unconditionally denied regardless of derived policy.\n * These are tools that should never be callable during automated agent\n * dispatch — they require explicit human action.\n */\nexport const UNBYPASSABLE_TOOL_NAMES: readonly string[] = [\n  // Destructive git operations\n  'git_push_force',\n  'git_reset_hard',\n  'git_branch_delete_force',\n  'git_clean_force',\n\n  // Destructive filesystem\n  'rm_recursive_force',\n  'chmod_recursive',\n\n  // Identity / auth mutations\n  'ssh_add_key',\n  'gpg_add_key',\n  'npm_publish_force',\n\n  // Remote destruction\n  'github_repo_delete',\n  'github_org_transfer',\n  'aws_account_close',\n];\n\n/**\n * Compiles a glob pattern to a regex at module-load time.\n * Supports: `**` (any path segments), `*` (any non-separator chars),\n * `~/` (home-anchor prefix). All other regex metachars escaped.\n *\n * Regexes built here come from the hardcoded `UNBYPASSABLE_PATH_PATTERNS`\n * constant — never from user input — so they are ReDoS-safe by construction.\n */\nfunction compileGlobToRegex(pattern: string): RegExp {\n  const pat = pattern.toLowerCase();\n  // Escape regex metacharacters INCLUDING backslash (per CodeQL — without\n  // backslash in the class, a `\\` in input would leak into the regex output\n  // unescaped). Do NOT escape `*` here — it's a glob wildcard that the\n  // subsequent replaces expand into regex wildcards.\n  const escaped = pat\n    .replace(/[\\\\.+^$()|[\\]{}]/g, '\\\\$&')\n    .replace(/\\*\\*/g, '__DOUBLESTAR__')\n    .replace(/\\*/g, '[^/]*')\n    .replace(/__DOUBLESTAR__/g, '.*');\n  const anchored = escaped.startsWith('~/')\n    ? `(^|/)${escaped.slice(2)}$`\n    : escaped.startsWith('/')\n      ? `^${escaped}$`\n      : `(^|/)${escaped}$`;\n  return new RegExp(anchored);\n}\n\n/**\n * Precompiled regexes for every unbypassable path pattern, computed once\n * at module load. Static inputs → no ReDoS surface.\n */\nconst COMPILED_PATH_PATTERNS: ReadonlyArray<{\n  readonly pattern: string;\n  readonly regex: RegExp;\n}> = UNBYPASSABLE_PATH_PATTERNS.map((pattern) => ({\n  pattern,\n  regex: compileGlobToRegex(pattern),\n}));\n\n/**\n * Returns true if a lowercased file path matches the given pattern.\n * Exported for tests; production code should use `isPathDenied`.\n */\nexport function matchDenyPattern(path: string, pattern: string): boolean {\n  const normalized = path.toLowerCase();\n  const compiled = COMPILED_PATH_PATTERNS.find((c) => c.pattern === pattern);\n  if (compiled !== undefined) return compiled.regex.test(normalized);\n  // Fallback for ad-hoc test patterns not in the static list.\n  return compileGlobToRegex(pattern).test(normalized);\n}\n\n/** Returns true if the path hits any unbypassable pattern. */\nexport function isPathDenied(path: string): boolean {\n  const normalized = path.toLowerCase();\n  return COMPILED_PATH_PATTERNS.some((c) => c.regex.test(normalized));\n}\n\n/** Returns true if the tool name is unconditionally denied. */\nexport function isToolDenied(toolName: string): boolean {\n  return UNBYPASSABLE_TOOL_NAMES.includes(toolName);\n}\n","/**\n * Tool risk classification for `confirm_risky` access-policy mode (#2279).\n *\n * Classifies each registered MCP tool as `read-only` (safe — log-and-allow\n * under confirm_risky) or `risky` (write/exec/network — block under\n * confirm_risky). Used by the policy enforcer to differentiate which\n * violations a human would have wanted to review.\n *\n * Classification policy:\n *\n * - **Read-only**: tool exclusively reads existing state — no file writes,\n *   no subprocess execution, no network requests beyond a single bounded\n *   read of project-internal data. `query_*`, `list_*`, `search_*`,\n *   `*_query`, `*_analyze` patterns by default.\n * - **Risky**: tool writes files, runs subprocesses, posts to external\n *   services, calls LLM APIs, or has any side effect that a human reviewer\n *   would want to see before approving in confirm_risky mode.\n *\n * If a tool is unknown, it is treated as risky (default-deny) — same\n * principle as the unbypassable denylist: the security layer fails closed\n * on a misclassification.\n *\n * Update path: when adding a new MCP tool, classify it explicitly here.\n * The `inject-governance.ts check` CI gate ensures the registry list is\n * still the source of truth; this file is the risk overlay.\n *\n * @module security/access-constraint-deriver/tool-risk\n */\n\n/**\n * Tools that exclusively read state. Violations on these are log-and-allow\n * under `confirm_risky` mode — same as `audit` mode.\n */\nexport const READ_ONLY_TOOLS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  // Discovery / listing\n  'list_experts',\n  'list_workflows',\n  // Research reads\n  'research_query',\n  'research_analyze',\n  'research_catalog_review',\n  'research_synthesize',\n  // Memory reads\n  'memory_query',\n  'memory_stats',\n  // Observability\n  'weather_report',\n  'query_trace',\n  'query_task_state',\n  // Async-mode result polling (#3042 / epic #2631)\n  'get_job_result',\n  // Async-mode job discovery (#3046 / epic #2631 Stage 5)\n  'list_jobs',\n  // Codebase intelligence (read-only over local files)\n  'search_codebase',\n  'extract_symbols',\n  // Repo analysis (read-only)\n  'repo_analyze',\n  'repo_security_plan',\n  // Routing recommendation (no side effects — returns recommendation)\n  'delegate_to_model',\n  // Registry import (returns a draft template — does not write)\n  'registry_import',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Returns true if the tool is risky under confirm_risky mode (default-deny\n * for unknown tools — security layer fails closed).\n */\nexport function isRiskyTool(toolName: string): boolean {\n  return !READ_ONLY_TOOLS.has(toolName);\n}\n","/**\n * Access Constraint Deriver — Policy enforcement (#1977, #2279).\n *\n * Pure function that checks a proposed tool call against a derived policy\n * and returns an AccessDecision. Enforcement depends on the policy's mode:\n * - `off` and `audit` never block\n * - `confirm_risky` (#2279) blocks violations on risky tools (write/exec/\n *   network) and log-and-allows violations on read-only tools\n * - `enforce` blocks every violation regardless of risk classification\n *\n * @module security/access-constraint-deriver/enforcer\n */\n\nimport { isPathDenied, isToolDenied } from './denylist.js';\nimport { isRiskyTool } from './tool-risk.js';\nimport type { AccessDecision, TaskAccessPolicy } from './types.js';\n\n/**\n * Checks a proposed tool call against the unbypassable denylist AND the\n * task's derived access policy.\n *\n * Order of operations (important — the denylist is FIRST and unbypassable):\n * 1. If the tool is on the hardcoded deny-tool list → deny regardless\n *    of policy. This is unbypassable even in `off` mode.\n * 2. If a file-path argument is provided and matches an unbypassable path\n *    pattern (e.g. `~/.ssh/**`, `/etc/shadow`) → deny regardless.\n * 3. Otherwise, fall back to the per-task policy (bypass in skeleton).\n *\n * The denylist check runs before the policy check so a malicious LLM-derived\n * policy cannot grant access to secrets/credentials by listing the tool in\n * `allowedTools`.\n */\nexport function checkAccess(\n  toolName: string,\n  policy: TaskAccessPolicy,\n  args?: { readonly path?: string }\n): AccessDecision {\n  // 1. Unbypassable tool denylist — applies in all modes.\n  if (isToolDenied(toolName)) {\n    return {\n      decision: 'deny',\n      reason: `tool \"${toolName}\" is on the unbypassable deny-tool list`,\n      matchedRule: 'unbypassable:tool',\n    };\n  }\n\n  // 2. Unbypassable path denylist — applies when a path argument is given.\n  if (typeof args?.path === 'string' && args.path.length > 0 && isPathDenied(args.path)) {\n    return {\n      decision: 'deny',\n      reason: `path \"${args.path}\" is on the unbypassable deny-path list`,\n      matchedRule: 'unbypassable:path',\n    };\n  }\n\n  // 3. Per-task policy check.\n  if (policy.allowedTools === '*') return { decision: 'allow' };\n\n  if (policy.allowedTools.includes(toolName)) return { decision: 'allow' };\n\n  return decideOnViolation(toolName, policy.mode);\n}\n\n/**\n * Mode-specific behavior when a tool is not in the per-task allowlist.\n * Extracted so checkAccess stays under the complexity-10 cap.\n */\nfunction decideOnViolation(toolName: string, mode: TaskAccessPolicy['mode']): AccessDecision {\n  if (mode === 'audit') {\n    return {\n      decision: 'log-and-allow',\n      warning: `tool \"${toolName}\" not in derived policy (audit mode)`,\n    };\n  }\n  // confirm_risky: split by tool risk classification (#2279). Read-only\n  // violations are log-and-allow (audit-like); risky violations are denied\n  // with a structured reason that surfaces \"would-have-required-approval\"\n  // semantics. Operators add the tool to the allowlist after review, or\n  // graduate to `enforce` once the violation rate is acceptable.\n  if (mode === 'confirm_risky') {\n    if (!isRiskyTool(toolName)) {\n      return {\n        decision: 'log-and-allow',\n        warning: `tool \"${toolName}\" not in derived policy (confirm_risky mode, read-only — would have required human approval, allowed because read-only)`,\n      };\n    }\n    return {\n      decision: 'deny',\n      reason: `tool \"${toolName}\" not in derived policy (confirm_risky mode, risky — would have required human approval; denied for now, add to allowedTools or run in audit mode to allow)`,\n      matchedRule: 'allowedTools:confirm_risky',\n    };\n  }\n  return {\n    decision: 'deny',\n    reason: `tool \"${toolName}\" not in derived policy`,\n    matchedRule: 'allowedTools',\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Access Constraint Deriver — MCP tool dispatch guard (#1977 final wiring).\n *\n * Per-call helper and middleware factory that plugs the access-constraint\n * enforcer into the MCP tool dispatch path. Runs AFTER policy derivation\n * (deriver.ts owns that) and BEFORE the tool handler executes.\n *\n * Behavior matrix:\n * - mode=off → no-op, allows every call (this is the default; runtime\n *   behavior is unchanged from pre-#1977)\n * - mode=audit → checks against the policy; on violation, logs a warning\n *   and still forwards to the handler\n * - mode=enforce → checks against the policy; on violation, returns an\n *   MCP-format isError result without invoking the handler\n *\n * The enforcer's hardcoded denylist (denylist.ts) runs FIRST regardless\n * of mode. Even `off` mode denies destructive tools and secret paths.\n *\n * @module security/access-constraint-deriver/mcp-guard\n */\n\nimport { AsyncLocalStorage } from 'node:async_hooks';\nimport { checkAccess } from './enforcer.js';\nimport type { AccessDecision, TaskAccessPolicy } from './types.js';\n\n/** AsyncLocalStorage holding the active task's access policy. */\nconst accessPolicyStorage = new AsyncLocalStorage<TaskAccessPolicy>();\n\n/**\n * Run `fn` with `policy` available to any nested MCP tool dispatch.\n *\n * Orchestrators (orchestrate, execute_expert, etc.) derive a policy at\n * task start and wrap downstream work in this helper. Tool handlers that\n * use `guardMcpToolCall` will read the policy from ALS.\n */\nexport function withAccessPolicy<T>(policy: TaskAccessPolicy, fn: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {\n  return accessPolicyStorage.run(policy, fn);\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns the active access policy, or undefined if no wrapping `withAccessPolicy`\n * is in scope. When undefined, `guardMcpToolCall` treats the request as\n * mode=off (permissive) since no task context has been established.\n */\nexport function getActivePolicy(): TaskAccessPolicy | undefined {\n  return accessPolicyStorage.getStore();\n}\n\n/**\n * Input-hints a tool handler can surface so the guard can reason about\n * file-path arguments. Tools with a `path` arg should pass it; tools\n * without can omit.\n */\nexport interface GuardArgs {\n  readonly path?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Check a proposed MCP tool call against the active access policy.\n *\n * Pure function — does not mutate the policy or the storage. Returns an\n * AccessDecision the caller interprets:\n *\n * - `allow`: invoke the handler\n * - `deny`: do not invoke; return a RefuseAction / isError result upstream\n * - `log-and-allow`: log a warning, then invoke the handler (audit mode)\n *\n * When no policy is in ALS (no wrapping `withAccessPolicy`), this returns\n * `allow` — the guard is opt-in at the orchestrator layer.\n */\nexport function guardMcpToolCall(toolName: string, args?: GuardArgs): AccessDecision {\n  const policy = getActivePolicy();\n  if (policy === undefined) return { decision: 'allow' };\n  return checkAccess(toolName, policy, args);\n}\n\n/**\n * Shape of the logger the middleware uses. Minimal to avoid coupling.\n */\ninterface MiddlewareLogger {\n  warn: (message: string, context?: Record<string, unknown>) => void;\n  info: (message: string, context?: Record<string, unknown>) => void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Formats a deny decision as an MCP-compliant isError ToolResult shape.\n * The MCP server's middleware chain recognizes `{ isError, content }` and\n * surfaces it as a tool error to the caller.\n */\nexport function denyToToolResult(\n  decision: Extract<AccessDecision, { decision: 'deny' }>,\n  requestId: string\n): { isError: true; content: Array<{ type: 'text'; text: string }> } {\n  return {\n    isError: true,\n    content: [\n      {\n        type: 'text',\n        text: `access denied: ${decision.reason} (rule: ${decision.matchedRule}, request: ${requestId})`,\n      },\n    ],\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Create an access-policy middleware that plugs into the MCP middleware\n * chain. Reads the active policy from ALS. When no policy is active OR\n * the policy is in `off` mode, this middleware is a no-op pass-through.\n */\nexport function createAccessPolicyMiddleware(config: {\n  readonly toolName: string;\n  readonly logger: MiddlewareLogger;\n}): (\n  args: unknown,\n  ctx: { readonly requestContext: { readonly requestId: string } },\n  next: (args: unknown, ctx: unknown) => Promise<unknown>\n) => Promise<unknown> {\n  return async (args, ctx, next) => {\n    const policy = getActivePolicy();\n    if (policy === undefined || policy.mode === 'off') {\n      return next(args, ctx);\n    }\n\n    const guardArgs = toGuardArgs(args);\n    const decision = checkAccess(config.toolName, policy, guardArgs);\n\n    if (decision.decision === 'allow') {\n      return next(args, ctx);\n    }\n    if (decision.decision === 'log-and-allow') {\n      config.logger.warn('access-policy: audit violation', {\n        tool: config.toolName,\n        warning: decision.warning,\n        policySource: policy.source,\n        requestId: ctx.requestContext.requestId,\n      });\n      return next(args, ctx);\n    }\n    // decision.decision === 'deny'\n    config.logger.info('access-policy: tool call denied', {\n      tool: config.toolName,\n      reason: decision.reason,\n      matchedRule: decision.matchedRule,\n      policySource: policy.source,\n      mode: policy.mode,\n      requestId: ctx.requestContext.requestId,\n    });\n    return denyToToolResult(decision, ctx.requestContext.requestId);\n  };\n}\n\n/** Extract path from a typed tool-arg record, if present and a string. */\nfunction toGuardArgs(args: unknown): GuardArgs | undefined {\n  if (typeof args !== 'object' || args === null) return undefined;\n  const path = (args as Record<string, unknown>)['path'];\n  return typeof path === 'string' && path.length > 0 ? { path } : undefined;\n}\n","/**\n * Access Constraint Deriver — MCP middleware-chain adapter (#1977 activation).\n *\n * Bridges `createAccessPolicyMiddleware` (which returns a generic\n * `Promise<unknown>`-shaped middleware) to the strongly-typed `Middleware`\n * contract used by `mcp/middleware/middleware-chain.ts`.\n *\n * Mounted into the standard middleware stack so every tool call passes\n * through the ClawGuard enforcer. When no orchestrator has wrapped the\n * call with `withAccessPolicy(...)`, this adapter is a no-op pass-through\n * — runtime behavior is unchanged for callers that don't set up a policy.\n *\n * @module security/access-constraint-deriver/chain-adapter\n */\n\nimport { checkAccess } from './enforcer.js';\nimport { denyToToolResult, getActivePolicy } from './mcp-guard.js';\nimport type { GuardArgs } from './mcp-guard.js';\n// Type-only import: no runtime cycle with mcp/middleware/middleware-chain.ts.\nimport type { Middleware } from '../../mcp/middleware/middleware-chain.js';\n\nfunction toGuardArgs(args: unknown): GuardArgs | undefined {\n  if (typeof args !== 'object' || args === null) return undefined;\n  const path = (args as Record<string, unknown>)['path'];\n  return typeof path === 'string' && path.length > 0 ? { path } : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds a middleware-chain-compatible access-policy middleware for\n * `toolName`. Reads the active `TaskAccessPolicy` from `AsyncLocalStorage`\n * (populated by `withAccessPolicy`). When no policy is active OR the\n * policy is in `off` mode, the middleware is a no-op pass-through.\n */\nexport function createAccessPolicyChainMiddleware(toolName: string): Middleware {\n  return async (args, ctx, next) => {\n    const policy = getActivePolicy();\n    if (policy === undefined || policy.mode === 'off') {\n      return next(args, ctx);\n    }\n\n    const decision = checkAccess(toolName, policy, toGuardArgs(args));\n\n    if (decision.decision === 'allow') {\n      return next(args, ctx);\n    }\n    if (decision.decision === 'log-and-allow') {\n      ctx.logger.warn('access-policy: audit violation', {\n        tool: toolName,\n        warning: decision.warning,\n        policySource: policy.source,\n        requestId: ctx.requestContext.requestId,\n      });\n      return next(args, ctx);\n    }\n    ctx.logger.info('access-policy: tool call denied', {\n      tool: toolName,\n      reason: decision.reason,\n      matchedRule: decision.matchedRule,\n      policySource: policy.source,\n      mode: policy.mode,\n      requestId: ctx.requestContext.requestId,\n    });\n    return denyToToolResult(decision, ctx.requestContext.requestId);\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/mcp - Centralized Middleware Chain\n *\n * Provides a composable middleware chain for MCP tools with guaranteed\n * execution order: auth → validation → policy → rate-limit → timeout → audit\n *\n * @module mcp/middleware/middleware-chain\n * (Source: Issue #189 - Centralized MCP middleware chain)\n */\n\nimport type { z } from 'zod';\nimport type { ILogger } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { createLogger, getTimeProvider } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { validateToolInput } from './validation.js';\nimport { RateLimiter, type RateLimiterConfig } from './rate-limiter.js';\nimport { type IPolicyFirewall, type ExecutionMode, createPolicyContext } from './policy.js';\nimport { TimeoutGuard, type TimeoutGuardConfig } from './timeout-guard.js';\nimport { MCP_TIMEOUTS } from '../../config/timeouts.js';\nimport { createRequestContext, contextForLogging, type RequestContext } from './request-context.js';\nimport { createMetricsMiddleware } from './tool-metrics.js';\nimport { abortSignalStorage } from '../mcp-notifier.js';\nimport { createAccessPolicyChainMiddleware } from '../../security/access-constraint-deriver/chain-adapter.js';\nimport { toolStructuredError } from '../tools/tool-result.js';\nimport type { ErrorCategory } from '../error-envelope.js';\n\n/**\n * MCP tool result type.\n *\n * This interface is structurally compatible with the MCP SDK's CallToolResult.\n * The content array accepts text content for simplicity, while remaining\n * compatible with the SDK's broader ContentBlock type at runtime.\n */\nexport interface ToolResult {\n  /** Content blocks returned by the tool (text content) */\n  content: Array<{ type: 'text'; text: string }>;\n  /** Whether this represents an error result */\n  isError?: boolean;\n  /** Structured output for SDK outputSchema validation (Issue #1117) */\n  structuredContent?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /** Out-of-band metadata — carries the #2649 error envelope on errors. */\n  _meta?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Middleware context passed through the chain.\n */\nexport interface MiddlewareContext {\n  /** Unique request ID for tracing */\n  readonly requestContext: RequestContext;\n  /** Logger with request context */\n  readonly logger: ILogger;\n  /** Validated arguments (set after validation middleware) */\n  validatedArgs?: unknown;\n}\n\n/**\n * Middleware function signature.\n * Each middleware receives the context and a next function to call.\n */\nexport type Middleware = (\n  args: unknown,\n  ctx: MiddlewareContext,\n  next: (args: unknown, ctx: MiddlewareContext) => Promise<ToolResult>\n) => Promise<ToolResult>;\n\n/**\n * Configuration for the middleware chain.\n */\nexport interface MiddlewareChainConfig {\n  /** Tool name for logging and policy evaluation */\n  toolName: string;\n  /** Zod schema for input validation (optional) */\n  schema?: z.ZodType;\n  /** Policy firewall instance (optional) */\n  policyFirewall?: IPolicyFirewall | undefined;\n  /** Execution mode for policy evaluation */\n  executionMode?: ExecutionMode | undefined;\n  /** Allowed paths for file operations */\n  allowedPaths?: readonly string[] | undefined;\n  /** Rate limiter configuration (optional) */\n  rateLimiter?: RateLimiterConfig | RateLimiter | undefined;\n  /** Timeout configuration (optional) */\n  timeout?: TimeoutGuardConfig | undefined;\n  /** Logger instance (optional) */\n  logger?: ILogger | undefined;\n  /** Skip specific middleware steps */\n  skip?: MiddlewareSkipConfig | undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Configuration for skipping middleware steps.\n */\nexport interface MiddlewareSkipConfig {\n  validation?: boolean | undefined;\n  policy?: boolean | undefined;\n  rateLimit?: boolean | undefined;\n  timeout?: boolean | undefined;\n  audit?: boolean | undefined;\n  /** Skip the ClawGuard access-policy middleware (#1977). */\n  accessPolicy?: boolean | undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Tool handler function signature.\n */\nexport type ToolHandler = (args: unknown) => Promise<ToolResult>;\n\n/**\n * Context-aware handler that receives middleware context.\n */\nexport type ContextAwareToolHandler = (\n  args: unknown,\n  ctx: MiddlewareContext\n) => Promise<ToolResult>;\n\n/**\n * Creates an error result with the structured error envelope (#2649).\n * Each middleware passes the category that matches its failure mode.\n */\nfunction errorResult(category: ErrorCategory, message: string, requestId: string): ToolResult {\n  return toolStructuredError({\n    errorCategory: category,\n    message: `${message} (request: ${requestId})`,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates validation middleware.\n */\nfunction createValidationMiddleware(schema: z.ZodType): Middleware {\n  return async (args, ctx, next) => {\n    const result = validateToolInput(schema, args);\n    if (!result.ok) {\n      ctx.logger.warn('Validation failed', {\n        error: result.error.message,\n      });\n      return errorResult(\n        'validation',\n        `Validation error: ${result.error.message}`,\n        ctx.requestContext.requestId\n      );\n    }\n    ctx.validatedArgs = result.value;\n    return next(result.value, ctx);\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates policy middleware.\n */\nfunction createPolicyMiddleware(\n  firewall: IPolicyFirewall,\n  toolName: string,\n  mode: ExecutionMode,\n  allowedPaths?: readonly string[]\n): Middleware {\n  return async (args, ctx, next) => {\n    const policyCtx = createPolicyContext(toolName, args, {\n      mode,\n      ...(allowedPaths !== undefined && { allowedPaths }),\n    });\n    const decision = firewall.evaluate(policyCtx);\n\n    if (!decision.allowed) {\n      ctx.logger.warn('Policy denied', {\n        reason: decision.reason,\n        ruleName: decision.ruleName,\n      });\n      return errorResult(\n        'permission',\n        `Policy denied: ${decision.reason}`,\n        ctx.requestContext.requestId\n      );\n    }\n    ctx.logger.debug('Policy check passed', { reason: decision.reason });\n    return next(args, ctx);\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates rate limit middleware.\n */\nfunction createRateLimitMiddleware(limiter: RateLimiter): Middleware {\n  return async (args, ctx, next) => {\n    const acquired = limiter.tryAcquire();\n    if (!acquired) {\n      const state = limiter.getState();\n      ctx.logger.warn('Rate limit exceeded', {\n        nextTokenMs: state.nextTokenMs,\n      });\n      return errorResult(\n        'transient',\n        `Rate limit exceeded. Try again in ${String(state.nextTokenMs)}ms`,\n        ctx.requestContext.requestId\n      );\n    }\n    return next(args, ctx);\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates timeout middleware.\n * Reads AbortSignal from AsyncLocalStorage for client cancellation support.\n */\nfunction createTimeoutMiddleware(guard: TimeoutGuard, toolName: string): Middleware {\n  return async (args, ctx, next) => {\n    const signal = abortSignalStorage.getStore();\n    const result = await guard.execute(() => next(args, ctx), {\n      operationName: toolName,\n      ...(signal !== undefined ? { signal } : {}),\n    });\n\n    if (!result.ok) {\n      ctx.logger.error('Operation timed out', undefined, {\n        code: result.error.code,\n        timeoutMs: result.error.timeoutMs,\n      });\n      // #3726 discoverability: append the per-tool hint (e.g. \"retry in async\n      // job-mode\") so a sync long-running tool that hits its ceiling tells the\n      // caller how to escape it. Absent hint → message unchanged.\n      const hint = MCP_TIMEOUTS.perToolTimeoutHint[toolName];\n      const message = hint !== undefined ? `${result.error.message} ${hint}` : result.error.message;\n      // Timeout — transient, a retry with more headroom may succeed.\n      return errorResult('transient', message, ctx.requestContext.requestId);\n    }\n\n    if (result.value.nearTimeout) {\n      ctx.logger.warn('Operation completed near timeout threshold', {\n        durationMs: result.value.durationMs,\n      });\n    }\n\n    return result.value.value;\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates audit middleware that logs start/end of request.\n */\nfunction createAuditMiddleware(): Middleware {\n  return async (args, ctx, next) => {\n    const startTime = getTimeProvider().now();\n    ctx.logger.info('Tool invocation started');\n\n    try {\n      const result = await next(args, ctx);\n      const durationMs = getTimeProvider().now() - startTime;\n\n      if (result.isError === true) {\n        ctx.logger.warn('Tool execution completed with error', { durationMs });\n      } else {\n        ctx.logger.info('Tool execution completed', { durationMs });\n      }\n      return result;\n    } catch (error) {\n      const durationMs = getTimeProvider().now() - startTime;\n      const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error';\n      ctx.logger.error('Tool execution failed', error instanceof Error ? error : undefined, {\n        durationMs,\n      });\n      return errorResult('internal', `Internal error: ${message}`, ctx.requestContext.requestId);\n    }\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Composes multiple middleware functions into a single chain.\n */\nfunction composeMiddleware(middlewares: Middleware[]): Middleware {\n  return (args, ctx, finalHandler) => {\n    const dispatch = (index: number, currentArgs: unknown): Promise<ToolResult> => {\n      if (index >= middlewares.length) {\n        return finalHandler(currentArgs, ctx);\n      }\n      const middleware = middlewares[index];\n      if (middleware === undefined) {\n        return finalHandler(currentArgs, ctx);\n      }\n      return middleware(currentArgs, ctx, (nextArgs) => dispatch(index + 1, nextArgs));\n    };\n    return dispatch(0, args);\n  };\n}\n\n/** Helper: adds audit middleware if not skipped */\nfunction addAuditMiddleware(middlewares: Middleware[], skip: MiddlewareSkipConfig): void {\n  if (skip.audit !== true) {\n    middlewares.push(createAuditMiddleware());\n  }\n}\n\n/** Helper: adds rate limit middleware if configured */\nfunction addRateLimitMiddleware(\n  middlewares: Middleware[],\n  config: MiddlewareChainConfig,\n  skip: MiddlewareSkipConfig\n): void {\n  if (skip.rateLimit !== true && config.rateLimiter !== undefined) {\n    const limiter =\n      config.rateLimiter instanceof RateLimiter\n        ? config.rateLimiter\n        : new RateLimiter(config.rateLimiter);\n    middlewares.push(createRateLimitMiddleware(limiter));\n  }\n}\n\n/** Helper: adds validation middleware if schema provided */\nfunction addValidationMiddleware(\n  middlewares: Middleware[],\n  config: MiddlewareChainConfig,\n  skip: MiddlewareSkipConfig\n): void {\n  if (skip.validation !== true && config.schema !== undefined) {\n    middlewares.push(createValidationMiddleware(config.schema));\n  }\n}\n\n/** Helper: adds policy middleware if configured */\nfunction addPolicyMiddleware(\n  middlewares: Middleware[],\n  config: MiddlewareChainConfig,\n  skip: MiddlewareSkipConfig\n): void {\n  if (skip.policy !== true && config.policyFirewall !== undefined) {\n    const mode = config.executionMode ?? 'read-only';\n    middlewares.push(\n      createPolicyMiddleware(config.policyFirewall, config.toolName, mode, config.allowedPaths)\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/** Helper: adds timeout middleware if configured */\nfunction addTimeoutMiddleware(\n  middlewares: Middleware[],\n  config: MiddlewareChainConfig,\n  skip: MiddlewareSkipConfig\n): void {\n  if (skip.timeout !== true && config.timeout !== undefined) {\n    const guard = new TimeoutGuard(config.timeout);\n    middlewares.push(createTimeoutMiddleware(guard, config.toolName));\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Helper: adds the ClawGuard access-policy middleware (#1977).\n *\n * Always added unless explicitly skipped. The middleware is ALS-backed\n * and a no-op pass-through when no orchestrator has called\n * `withAccessPolicy(...)` — so runtime behavior is unchanged for callers\n * that haven't opted in.\n */\nfunction addAccessPolicyMiddleware(\n  middlewares: Middleware[],\n  config: MiddlewareChainConfig,\n  skip: MiddlewareSkipConfig\n): void {\n  if (skip.accessPolicy !== true) {\n    middlewares.push(createAccessPolicyChainMiddleware(config.toolName));\n  }\n}\n\n/** Helper: builds the middleware stack */\nfunction buildMiddlewareStack(config: MiddlewareChainConfig): Middleware[] {\n  const skip = config.skip ?? {};\n  const middlewares: Middleware[] = [];\n\n  middlewares.push(createMetricsMiddleware()); // Tool usage analytics (#1022)\n  addAuditMiddleware(middlewares, skip);\n  addRateLimitMiddleware(middlewares, config, skip);\n  addValidationMiddleware(middlewares, config, skip);\n  addPolicyMiddleware(middlewares, config, skip);\n  addAccessPolicyMiddleware(middlewares, config, skip); // #1977 ClawGuard\n  addTimeoutMiddleware(middlewares, config, skip);\n\n  return middlewares;\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a middleware chain with the standard execution order.\n *\n * Order: audit → rate-limit → validation → policy → timeout → handler\n *\n * Audit wraps everything to capture timing. Rate limit is checked early\n * to reject requests before expensive validation. Timeout wraps the\n * actual handler execution.\n *\n * @param config - Chain configuration\n * @returns A function that wraps handlers with the middleware chain\n */\nexport function createMiddlewareChain(\n  config: MiddlewareChainConfig\n): (handler: ContextAwareToolHandler) => ToolHandler {\n  const logger = config.logger ?? createLogger({ tool: config.toolName });\n  const middlewares = buildMiddlewareStack(config);\n  const composed = composeMiddleware(middlewares);\n\n  return (handler: ContextAwareToolHandler): ToolHandler => {\n    return async (args: unknown): Promise<ToolResult> => {\n      const requestContext = createRequestContext({ toolName: config.toolName });\n      const requestLogger = logger.child(contextForLogging(requestContext));\n      const ctx: MiddlewareContext = { requestContext, logger: requestLogger };\n      return composed(args, ctx, (finalArgs, finalCtx) => handler(finalArgs, finalCtx));\n    };\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Convenience function to wrap a handler with default middleware.\n *\n * @param toolName - Name of the tool\n * @param handler - The tool handler\n * @param options - Optional middleware configuration\n * @returns Wrapped handler with middleware\n */\nexport function withMiddleware(\n  toolName: string,\n  handler: ContextAwareToolHandler | ToolHandler,\n  options?: Partial<Omit<MiddlewareChainConfig, 'toolName'>>\n): ToolHandler {\n  // Note: Policy firewall is NOT added by default - must be explicitly configured\n  // This follows the principle of minimal defaults with explicit opt-in for security\n  const config: MiddlewareChainConfig = {\n    toolName,\n    ...options,\n  };\n\n  const chain = createMiddlewareChain(config);\n\n  // Wrap handler to support both signatures\n  const wrappedHandler: ContextAwareToolHandler = (args, ctx) => {\n    // Check if handler expects context (2 params)\n    if (handler.length >= 2) {\n      return handler(args, ctx);\n    }\n    return (handler as ToolHandler)(args);\n  };\n\n  return chain(wrappedHandler);\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a middleware chain factory with shared configuration.\n *\n * @param sharedConfig - Configuration shared across all tools\n * @returns Factory function for creating wrapped handlers\n */\nexport function createMiddlewareFactory(\n  sharedConfig: Omit<MiddlewareChainConfig, 'toolName' | 'schema'>\n): (\n  toolName: string,\n  handler: ContextAwareToolHandler | ToolHandler,\n  schema?: z.ZodType\n) => ToolHandler {\n  return (toolName, handler, schema) => {\n    const options = schema !== undefined ? { ...sharedConfig, schema } : sharedConfig;\n    return withMiddleware(toolName, handler, options);\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * MCP Tool Annotations Registry — DERIVED VIEW (#993; folded into the manifest #3597).\n *\n * The per-tool annotation + side-effect DATA now lives in the canonical\n * {@link TOOL_MANIFEST} (one `{ name, annotations, sideEffects }` entry per tool,\n * #3597 increment 2 of #3563). This module is the keyed-record + accessor view\n * over that data: `TOOL_ANNOTATIONS` is derived from the manifest (each entry's\n * `.annotations`/`.sideEffects` are the SAME objects the manifest holds — no\n * clone, so reference identity is preserved for the live accessor in\n * `mcp/tool-annotations.ts`). The annotation TYPES are defined in the manifest\n * (the import-free leaf) and re-exported here for the existing consumers.\n *\n * @module mcp/tools/tool-annotations\n * (Source: Issue #993 — Document MCP tool side effects in schema metadata)\n */\n\nimport {\n  TOOL_MANIFEST,\n  type SideEffectCategory,\n  type SideEffect,\n  type ToolAnnotations,\n  type ToolSideEffectsEntry,\n} from './tool-manifest.js';\n\n// Re-export the annotation types from their canonical home (the manifest leaf)\n// so existing consumers can keep importing them from this module.\nexport type { SideEffectCategory, SideEffect, ToolAnnotations, ToolSideEffectsEntry };\n\n/**\n * Canonical registry of tool annotations and side effects, keyed by tool name.\n * Derived from {@link TOOL_MANIFEST}; each value's `annotations`/`sideEffects`\n * reference the manifest entry's own objects (preserving identity).\n */\nexport const TOOL_ANNOTATIONS: Readonly<Record<string, ToolSideEffectsEntry>> = Object.freeze(\n  Object.fromEntries(\n    TOOL_MANIFEST.map((entry) => [\n      entry.name,\n      { annotations: entry.annotations, sideEffects: entry.sideEffects },\n    ])\n  )\n);\n\n/**\n * Returns the annotations for a given tool, or undefined if not found.\n */\nexport function getToolAnnotations(toolName: string): ToolSideEffectsEntry | undefined {\n  return TOOL_ANNOTATIONS[toolName];\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns only the MCP protocol annotations for a tool (for registerTool config).\n */\nexport function getMcpAnnotations(toolName: string): ToolAnnotations | undefined {\n  return TOOL_ANNOTATIONS[toolName]?.annotations;\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns side effects for a tool filtered by category.\n */\nexport function getSideEffectsByCategory(\n  toolName: string,\n  category: SideEffectCategory\n): readonly SideEffect[] {\n  const entry = TOOL_ANNOTATIONS[toolName];\n  if (entry === undefined) return [];\n  return entry.sideEffects.filter((se) => se.category === category);\n}\n","/**\n * Central per-tool MCP annotations accessors (#2648, Epic A; consolidated #3358).\n *\n * The MCP 2025-11-25 spec defines four boolean hints clients use to reason\n * about each tool's safety, retry semantics, and permission UX:\n *\n *   - `readOnlyHint`     — tool does not modify persistent state\n *   - `destructiveHint`  — tool can perform destructive operations\n *   - `idempotentHint`   — calling with the same input is safe to repeat\n *   - `openWorldHint`    — tool interacts with systems outside the server's control\n *\n * Per the MCP spec these are **hints**, not enforcement primitives — clients\n * should never trust them from an untrusted server. But for nexus-agents (a\n * governance substrate) the hints are load-bearing for:\n *\n *   - Programmatic prerequisite gates (Epic B / #2652) — uses\n *     `destructiveHint` and `openWorldHint` to decide what to gate.\n *   - Retry policy decisions in pipeline runners — only retry tools where\n *     `idempotentHint === true`.\n *   - Permission-prompt UX consistency across Claude / Codex / Gemini /\n *     OpenCode harnesses.\n *\n * The audit (#2648 / docs/research/nexus-agents-multi-harness-alignment-audit.md\n * §6 T14) requires **every** registered tool declare all four hints\n * explicitly — no defaults.\n *\n * **Single source of truth (#3358):** the per-tool annotation DATA lives in\n * the side-effects superset registry at `./tools/tool-annotations.ts`, where\n * each entry pairs the MCP hints (`.annotations`) with curated side-effects\n * metadata (#993). This file is the LIVE ACCESSOR path: each tool's\n * `registerTool()` call site reads its annotations via `getToolAnnotations(name)`.\n * Data flows data-file → accessor-file only (no circular import).\n *\n * @module mcp/tool-annotations\n */\n\nimport type { ToolAnnotations } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js';\nimport { TOOL_ANNOTATIONS as TOOL_SIDE_EFFECTS } from './tools/tool-annotations.js';\n\n/**\n * Look up the MCP annotations for a registered MCP tool. Throws if the tool\n * name isn't in the central registry — this enforces \"every tool declares its\n * hints explicitly\" rather than silently falling back to MCP's defaults\n * (which assume destructive + non-idempotent + open-world).\n *\n * The data is derived from the side-effects superset registry\n * (`./tools/tool-annotations.ts`, #993); only the four MCP hint booleans are\n * returned here — side-effects metadata is reached via that module's\n * `getSideEffectsByCategory`.\n */\nexport function getToolAnnotations(name: string): ToolAnnotations {\n  const entry = TOOL_SIDE_EFFECTS[name];\n  if (entry === undefined) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `getToolAnnotations: no entry for tool \"${name}\". Add it to TOOL_ANNOTATIONS in src/mcp/tools/tool-annotations.ts (#2648/#3358).`\n    );\n  }\n  return entry.annotations;\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/consensus - Core Type Definitions\n *\n * Core type definitions and Zod schemas for the consensus engine.\n * Supports multiple voting strategies for multi-agent decisions.\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\n\n/**\n * Consensus algorithm types.\n * - simple_majority: >50% of votes required\n * - supermajority: >=67% of votes required\n * - unanimous: 100% approval required\n * - proof_of_learning: weighted voting based on agent performance\n * - opinion_wise: higher-order voting with correlation awareness (Issue #333)\n * - higher_order: alias for opinion_wise (Issue #514)\n */\nexport const ConsensusAlgorithmSchema = z.enum([\n  'simple_majority',\n  'supermajority',\n  'unanimous',\n  'proof_of_learning',\n  'opinion_wise',\n  'higher_order',\n]);\nexport type ConsensusAlgorithm = z.infer<typeof ConsensusAlgorithmSchema>;\n\n/**\n * Vote decision options.\n */\nexport const VoteDecisionSchema = z.enum(['approve', 'reject', 'abstain']);\nexport type VoteDecision = z.infer<typeof VoteDecisionSchema>;\n\n/**\n * Proposal status in the lifecycle.\n */\nexport const ProposalStatusSchema = z.enum([\n  'pending',\n  'voting',\n  'approved',\n  'rejected',\n  'timeout',\n  'closed',\n]);\nexport type ProposalStatus = z.infer<typeof ProposalStatusSchema>;\n\n/**\n * Structured rejection feedback categories (Issue #1213).\n * Enables reject→refine→re-vote feedback loops by classifying rejection reasons.\n */\nexport const RejectionCategorySchema = z.enum([\n  'YAGNI',\n  'DRY_VIOLATION',\n  'OVER_ENGINEERING',\n  'SCOPE_CREEP',\n  'SECURITY_RISK',\n  'MISALIGNED',\n  'INSUFFICIENT_EVIDENCE',\n]);\nexport type RejectionCategory = z.infer<typeof RejectionCategorySchema>;\n\n/**\n * All valid rejection category values, for runtime reference.\n */\nexport const REJECTION_CATEGORIES = RejectionCategorySchema.options;\n\n/**\n * Pre-verified finding emitted by a voter (#2245 v4 follow-up).\n * Mirrors `cli/voter-response.ts:RawFindingSchema` — kept inline here to\n * avoid a circular cli→consensus import. Downstream code in mcp/tools\n * adds the derived `verified` flag based on the gate fields.\n */\nconst FindingShapeSchema = z.object({\n  summary: z.string().min(1).max(500),\n  location: z.string().min(1).max(200),\n  severity: z.enum(['critical', 'high', 'medium', 'low']).default('medium'),\n  gate: z.object({\n    reread_cited_line: z.enum(['passed', 'failed', 'skipped']).default('skipped'),\n    traced_call_path: z.enum(['passed', 'failed', 'skipped']).default('skipped'),\n    named_assertion: z.string().default(''),\n    ruled_out_language_non_issue: z.enum(['passed', 'failed', 'skipped']).default('skipped'),\n  }),\n  claim: z.string().min(1).max(2000),\n});\n\n/**\n * A vote cast by an agent.\n */\nexport const VoteSchema = z.object({\n  decision: VoteDecisionSchema,\n  reasoning: z.string().min(1).describe('Explanation for the vote'),\n  confidence: z.number().min(0).max(1).describe('Confidence level 0-1'),\n  conditions: z.array(z.string()).optional().describe('Conditions for approval'),\n  /** Structured rejection categories for reject→refine→re-vote loops (Issue #1213). */\n  rejectionCategories: z\n    .array(RejectionCategorySchema)\n    .optional()\n    .describe('Rejection reason categories when decision is reject'),\n  /** Pre-verified PR-review findings (#2245 v4 follow-up). Optional;\n   * populated only when the voter emits the structured top-level array. */\n  findings: z.array(FindingShapeSchema).optional().describe('PR-review findings (pre-verified)'),\n  timestamp: z.iso.datetime().optional(),\n});\nexport type Vote = z.infer<typeof VoteSchema>;\n\n/**\n * A proposal submitted for consensus.\n */\nexport const ProposalSchema = z.object({\n  id: z.string().optional().describe('Auto-generated if not provided'),\n  title: z.string().min(1).max(200).describe('Short proposal title'),\n  description: z.string().min(1).describe('Detailed proposal description'),\n  algorithm: ConsensusAlgorithmSchema,\n  timeout: z.number().int().positive().optional().describe('Timeout in milliseconds'),\n  requiredVoters: z.array(z.string()).optional().describe('Agent IDs that must vote'),\n  metadata: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()).optional().describe('Additional context'),\n  createdAt: z.iso.datetime().optional(),\n});\nexport type Proposal = z.infer<typeof ProposalSchema>;\n\n/**\n * Unique identifier for a proposal.\n */\nexport type ProposalId = string;\n\n/**\n * Vote counts summary.\n */\nexport interface VoteCounts {\n  approve: number;\n  reject: number;\n  abstain: number;\n  total: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Weighted vote counts for proof-of-learning.\n */\nexport interface WeightedVoteCounts {\n  approve: number;\n  reject: number;\n  abstain: number;\n  totalWeight: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of a consensus decision.\n */\nexport interface ConsensusResult {\n  proposalId: ProposalId;\n  proposal: Proposal;\n  outcome: ProposalStatus;\n  votes: Map<string, Vote>;\n  voteCounts: VoteCounts;\n  weightedCounts?: WeightedVoteCounts | undefined;\n  approvalPercentage: number;\n  quorumReached: boolean;\n  startedAt: string;\n  closedAt: string;\n  durationMs: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Consensus result schema for validation.\n */\nexport const ConsensusResultSchema = z.object({\n  proposalId: z.string(),\n  proposal: ProposalSchema,\n  outcome: ProposalStatusSchema,\n  votes: z.map(z.string(), VoteSchema),\n  voteCounts: z.object({\n    approve: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n    reject: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n    abstain: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n    total: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n  }),\n  weightedCounts: z\n    .object({\n      approve: z.number().nonnegative(),\n      reject: z.number().nonnegative(),\n      abstain: z.number().nonnegative(),\n      totalWeight: z.number().nonnegative(),\n    })\n    .optional(),\n  approvalPercentage: z.number().min(0).max(100),\n  quorumReached: z.boolean(),\n  startedAt: z.iso.datetime(),\n  closedAt: z.iso.datetime(),\n  durationMs: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n});\n\n/**\n * Agent performance record for proof-of-learning.\n */\nexport interface AgentPerformance {\n  agentId: string;\n  totalVotes: number;\n  correctVotes: number;\n  successRate: number;\n  lastUpdated: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Agent performance schema.\n */\nexport const AgentPerformanceSchema = z.object({\n  agentId: z.string(),\n  totalVotes: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n  correctVotes: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n  successRate: z.number().min(0).max(1),\n  lastUpdated: z.iso.datetime(),\n});\n\n/**\n * Proposal content caching configuration for determinism. (Issue #589)\n */\nexport interface ProposalCacheConfig {\n  /** Enable content-based caching for repeated proposals */\n  enabled: boolean;\n  /** TTL in milliseconds (default: 1 hour) */\n  ttlMs: number;\n  /** Maximum cached entries (default: 500) */\n  maxEntries: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Incremental quorum configuration (Issue #1408).\n * When enabled, ambiguous votes trigger voter pool expansion.\n */\nexport interface IncrementalQuorumConfig {\n  /** Enable incremental quorum expansion. Default: false */\n  enabled: boolean;\n  /** Maximum expansion rounds (5→7→9). Default: 2 */\n  maxExpansionRounds: number;\n  /** Voters to add per expansion round. Default: 2 */\n  votersPerExpansion: number;\n  /** Minimum average confidence to avoid expansion. Default: 0.6 */\n  confidenceThreshold: number;\n  /** Ambiguity band: if approval rate is within this of threshold, expand. Default: 0.15 */\n  ambiguityBand: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Default incremental quorum configuration.\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_INCREMENTAL_QUORUM_CONFIG: IncrementalQuorumConfig = {\n  enabled: false,\n  maxExpansionRounds: 2,\n  votersPerExpansion: 2,\n  confidenceThreshold: 0.6,\n  ambiguityBand: 0.15,\n};\n\n/**\n * Callback to request additional voters for incremental quorum.\n * Returns the IDs of newly added voters.\n */\nexport type VoterExpansionCallback = (\n  proposalId: ProposalId,\n  currentVoterCount: number,\n  requestedCount: number\n) => Promise<readonly string[]>;\n\n/**\n * Consensus engine configuration.\n */\nexport interface ConsensusEngineConfig {\n  defaultTimeout: number;\n  minVotersForQuorum: number;\n  maxActiveProposals: number;\n  enablePerformanceTracking: boolean;\n  /** Maximum number of closed proposals to retain. Oldest are evicted when exceeded. (Issue #549) */\n  maxClosedProposals: number;\n  /** Content-based proposal caching for determinism (Issue #589) */\n  proposalCache?: ProposalCacheConfig;\n  /** Incremental quorum configuration (Issue #1408) */\n  incrementalQuorum?: IncrementalQuorumConfig;\n}\n\n/**\n * Proposal cache configuration schema. (Issue #589)\n */\nexport const ProposalCacheConfigSchema = z.object({\n  enabled: z.boolean().default(false),\n  ttlMs: z.number().int().positive().default(3600000), // 1 hour\n  maxEntries: z.number().int().positive().default(500),\n});\n\n/**\n * Consensus engine configuration schema.\n */\nexport const ConsensusEngineConfigSchema = z.object({\n  defaultTimeout: z.number().int().positive().default(300000), // 5 minutes\n  minVotersForQuorum: z.number().int().positive().default(2),\n  maxActiveProposals: z.number().int().positive().default(100),\n  enablePerformanceTracking: z.boolean().default(true),\n  maxClosedProposals: z.number().int().positive().default(1000), // Issue #549\n  proposalCache: ProposalCacheConfigSchema.optional(), // Issue #589\n});\n\n/**\n * Default configuration values.\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_CONSENSUS_CONFIG: ConsensusEngineConfig = {\n  defaultTimeout: 300000, // 5 minutes\n  minVotersForQuorum: 2,\n  maxActiveProposals: 100,\n  enablePerformanceTracking: true,\n  maxClosedProposals: 1000, // Issue #549: Prevent unbounded memory growth\n};\n\n/**\n * The 2/3 supermajority agreement threshold — the governance constant for\n * \"supermajority\" / Byzantine (2-of-3) quorum. SINGLE SOURCE (#3571): every\n * consensus site that needs a supermajority references this instead of a bare\n * `0.67` literal, so the governance threshold cannot silently drift between\n * modules. (Per-algorithm values like 0.5/1.0 are intentionally NOT centralized\n * — 0.5 is semantically overloaded across several algorithms.)\n */\nexport const SUPERMAJORITY_THRESHOLD = 0.67;\n\n/**\n * Voting thresholds for each algorithm.\n */\nexport const VOTING_THRESHOLDS: Record<ConsensusAlgorithm, number> = {\n  simple_majority: 0.5,\n  supermajority: SUPERMAJORITY_THRESHOLD,\n  unanimous: 1.0,\n  proof_of_learning: 0.5, // Uses weighted voting\n  opinion_wise: 0.5, // Uses correlation-aware Bayesian aggregation (Issue #333)\n  higher_order: 0.5, // Alias for opinion_wise (Issue #514)\n};\n\n/**\n * Internal proposal state managed by the engine.\n */\nexport interface ProposalState {\n  proposal: Proposal;\n  status: ProposalStatus;\n  votes: Map<string, Vote>;\n  voteWeights: Map<string, number>;\n  startedAt: Date;\n  timeoutId?: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout>;\n  /** Number of incremental quorum expansions applied (Issue #1408). */\n  expansionRounds?: number;\n  /**\n   * True while a quorum expansion is awaiting its callback for this\n   * proposal. Concurrent `vote()` calls check this to avoid double-\n   * expanding across the `await` gap (Issue #2861). Per-proposal so\n   * independent proposals never block each other.\n   */\n  expansionInFlight?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Consensus metrics for monitoring.\n */\nexport interface ConsensusMetrics {\n  totalProposals: number;\n  approvedProposals: number;\n  rejectedProposals: number;\n  timedOutProposals: number;\n  averageDurationMs: number;\n  averageVotesPerProposal: number;\n  algorithmUsage: Record<ConsensusAlgorithm, number>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Consensus metrics schema.\n */\nexport const ConsensusMetricsSchema = z.object({\n  totalProposals: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n  approvedProposals: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n  rejectedProposals: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n  timedOutProposals: z.number().int().nonnegative(),\n  averageDurationMs: z.number().nonnegative(),\n  averageVotesPerProposal: z.number().nonnegative(),\n  algorithmUsage: z.record(ConsensusAlgorithmSchema, z.number().int().nonnegative()),\n});\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA4CO,SAAS,kBACd,QACA,MAC4B;AAC5B,QAAM,SAAS,OAAO,UAAU,IAAI;AAEpC,MAAI,OAAO,SAAS;AAClB,WAAO,GAAG,OAAO,IAAI;AAAA,EACvB;AAEA,QAAM,UAAU,eAAe,OAAO,KAAK;AAC3C,QAAM,kBAAkB,IAAI,gBAAgB,uBAAuB,OAAO,IAAI;AAAA,IAC5E,SAAS;AAAA,MACP,QAAQ,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,MACrB,cAAc,OAAO;AAAA,IACvB;AAAA,EACF,CAAC;AAED,SAAO,IAAI,eAAe;AAC5B;AAmBO,SAAS,gBACd,QAC+C;AAC/C,SAAO,CAAC,SAAkB,kBAAkB,QAAQ,IAAI;AAC1D;;;AC5CA,IAAM,6BAA6B,eAAe;AAuB3C,IAAM,cAAN,MAAkB;AAAA,EACf;AAAA,EACS;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACT;AAAA,EACS;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EAEjB,YAAY,QAA2B;AACrC,SAAK,WAAW,OAAO;AACvB,SAAK,aAAa,OAAO;AACzB,SAAK,mBAAmB,OAAO,oBAAoB;AACnD,SAAK,SAAS,KAAK;AACnB,SAAK,iBAAiB,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI;AAC5C,SAAK,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ;AAC3B,SAAK,SAAS,OAAO,UAAU,aAAa,EAAE,WAAW,KAAK,KAAK,CAAC;AAEpE,SAAK,OAAO,MAAM,4BAA4B;AAAA,MAC5C,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,MACf,YAAY,KAAK;AAAA,MACjB,kBAAkB,KAAK;AAAA,IACzB,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAMQ,SAAe;AACrB,UAAM,MAAM,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI;AAClC,UAAM,UAAU,MAAM,KAAK;AAC3B,UAAM,YAAY,KAAK,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK,gBAAgB;AAE5D,QAAI,YAAY,GAAG;AACjB,YAAM,cAAc,YAAY,KAAK;AACrC,WAAK,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK,SAAS,WAAW;AAC/D,WAAK,iBAAiB,MAAO,UAAU,KAAK;AAE5C,UAAI,cAAc,GAAG;AACnB,aAAK,OAAO,MAAM,mBAAmB;AAAA,UACnC,OAAO;AAAA,UACP,SAAS,KAAK;AAAA,QAChB,CAAC;AAAA,MACH;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAQA,WAAW,QAAQ,GAAY;AAC7B,SAAK,OAAO;AAEZ,QAAI,KAAK,UAAU,OAAO;AACxB,WAAK,UAAU;AACf,WAAK,OAAO,MAAM,kBAAkB;AAAA,QAClC,WAAW;AAAA,QACX,WAAW,KAAK;AAAA,MAClB,CAAC;AACD,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAEA,SAAK,OAAO,KAAK,uBAAuB;AAAA,MACtC,WAAW;AAAA,MACX,WAAW,KAAK;AAAA,IAClB,CAAC;AACD,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAOA,WAA6B;AAC3B,SAAK,OAAO;AAEZ,UAAM,cACJ,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,oBAAoB,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK;AAEhF,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,QAAQ,KAAK;AAAA,MACb,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,MACf,aAAa,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,WAAW;AAAA,IACtC;AAAA,EACF;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAMA,QAAc;AACZ,SAAK,SAAS,KAAK;AACnB,SAAK,iBAAiB,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI;AAC5C,SAAK,OAAO,MAAM,sBAAsB,EAAE,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC;AAAA,EACjE;AACF;AAaO,SAAS,yBAAyB,MAAe,QAA+B;AACrF,QAAM,SAA4B;AAAA,IAChC,UAAU;AAAA,IACV,YAAY;AAAA,IACZ,kBAAkB;AAAA,EACpB;AACA,MAAI,SAAS,QAAW;AACtB,IAAC,OAA6B,OAAO;AAAA,EACvC;AACA,MAAI,WAAW,QAAW;AACxB,IAAC,OAAgC,SAAS;AAAA,EAC5C;AACA,SAAO,IAAI,YAAY,MAAM;AAC/B;;;ACvLA,SAAS,SAAS;AA+FX,IAAM,cAAN,cAA0B,cAAc;AAAA,EACpC;AAAA,EAET,YAAY,SAAiB,UAA0B;AACrD,UAAM,SAAS;AAAA,MACb,SAAS;AAAA,QACP,SAAS,SAAS;AAAA,QAClB,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,QACjB,UAAU,SAAS;AAAA,QACnB,kBAAkB,SAAS;AAAA,MAC7B;AAAA,IACF,CAAC;AACD,SAAK,OAAO;AACZ,SAAK,WAAW;AAAA,EAClB;AACF;AASO,IAAM,qBAAqB,EAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EACzC,aAAa,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,aAAa,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,WAAW;AAAA,EACpE,YAAY,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,WAAW,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,EACzD,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;AAClD,CAAC;;;AChHM,SAAS,WAAW,YAAoB,cAA0C;AAEvF,QAAM,mBAAmB,cAAc,UAAU;AAGjD,aAAW,WAAW,cAAc;AAClC,UAAM,oBAAoB,cAAc,OAAO;AAC/C,QAAI,iBAAiB,WAAW,iBAAiB,GAAG;AAClD,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;AAKO,SAAS,cAAc,GAAmB;AAE/C,MAAI,aAAa,EAAE,QAAQ,cAAc,EAAE;AAG3C,MAAI,eAAe,KAAK;AACtB,iBAAa;AAAA,EACf,WAAW,WAAW,WAAW,IAAI,GAAG;AACtC,iBAAa,WAAW,MAAM,CAAC;AAAA,EACjC;AAGA,MAAI,CAAC,WAAW,WAAW,GAAG,GAAG;AAC/B,iBAAa,MAAM;AAAA,EACrB;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;AAKO,SAAS,oBAAoB,MAAmC;AACrE,MAAI,SAAS,QAAQ,OAAO,SAAS,UAAU;AAC7C,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAEA,QAAM,UAAU;AAGhB,QAAM,aAAa,CAAC,QAAQ,YAAY,aAAa,aAAa,OAAO,QAAQ;AAEjF,aAAW,SAAS,YAAY;AAC9B,UAAM,QAAQ,QAAQ,KAAK;AAC3B,QAAI,OAAO,UAAU,UAAU;AAC7B,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;;;AC3DO,IAAM,iBAAiB,oBAAI,IAAI;AAAA,EACpC;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF,CAAC;AAKM,IAAM,kBAAkB,oBAAI,IAAI;AAAA,EACrC;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF,CAAC;AASM,SAAS,eAAe,UAA2B;AAExD,MAAI,eAAe,IAAI,QAAQ,GAAG;AAChC,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAGA,MAAI,gBAAgB,IAAI,QAAQ,GAAG;AACjC,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAGA,SAAO;AACT;AAYO,IAAM,+BAA2C;AAAA,EACtD,MAAM;AAAA,EACN,aAAa;AAAA,EACb,MAAM,KAAoC;AAExC,QAAI,IAAI,SAAS,cAAc;AAC7B,aAAO,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,0BAA0B;AAAA,IAC5D;AAGA,QAAI,eAAe,IAAI,QAAQ,GAAG;AAChC,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,SAAS;AAAA,QACT,QAAQ,SAAS,IAAI,QAAQ,0CAA0C,IAAI,IAAI;AAAA,MACjF;AAAA,IACF;AAGA,WAAO,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,8BAA8B;AAAA,EAChE;AACF;AAQO,IAAM,gBAA4B;AAAA,EACvC,MAAM;AAAA,EACN,aAAa;AAAA,EACb,MAAM,KAAoC;AAExC,UAAM,aAAa,oBAAoB,IAAI,IAAI;AAG/C,QAAI,eAAe,QAAW;AAC5B,aAAO,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,yBAAyB;AAAA,IAC3D;AAGA,QAAI,WAAW,SAAS,IAAI,GAAG;AAC7B,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,SAAS;AAAA,QACT,QAAQ,yDAAyD,UAAU;AAAA,MAC7E;AAAA,IACF;AAGA,UAAM,eAAe,IAAI,gBAAgB,CAAC,IAAI;AAG9C,QAAI,CAAC,WAAW,YAAY,YAAY,GAAG;AACzC,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,SAAS;AAAA,QACT,QAAQ,SAAS,UAAU,qCAAqC,aAAa,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,MACzF;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,WAAO,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,qCAAqC;AAAA,EACvE;AACF;;;AC9EO,IAAM,iBAAN,MAAgD;AAAA,EACpC,QAAsB,CAAC;AAAA,EAChC;AAAA,EACS;AAAA,EAEjB,YAAY,QAA+B;AACzC,SAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAC5B,SAAK,SAAS,QAAQ,UAAU,aAAa,EAAE,WAAW,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAG7E,QAAI,QAAQ,OAAO;AACjB,iBAAW,QAAQ,OAAO,OAAO;AAC/B,aAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,MACtB;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,SAAK,OAAO,MAAM,+BAA+B;AAAA,MAC/C,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,MACX,WAAW,KAAK,MAAM;AAAA,IACxB,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAWA,SAAS,KAAoC;AAC3C,SAAK,OAAO,MAAM,qBAAqB;AAAA,MACrC,UAAU,IAAI;AAAA,MACd,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACV,WAAW,KAAK,MAAM;AAAA,IACxB,CAAC;AAGD,QAAI,KAAK,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG;AAC3B,aAAO,KAAK,gBAAgB,KAAK,4BAA4B;AAAA,IAC/D;AAGA,eAAW,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO;AAC7B,YAAM,WAAW,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAE/B,UAAI,CAAC,SAAS,SAAS;AACrB,eAAO,KAAK,aAAa,KAAK,MAAM,QAAQ;AAAA,MAC9C;AAAA,IACF;AAGA,WAAO,KAAK,gBAAgB,KAAK,yBAAyB;AAAA,EAC5D;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKQ,gBAAgB,KAAoB,QAAgC;AAC1E,UAAM,WAA2B,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,OAAO;AACzD,SAAK,YAAY,KAAK,QAAQ;AAC9B,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKQ,aACN,KACA,MACA,UACgB;AAChB,UAAM,iBAAiC;AAAA,MACrC,GAAG;AAAA,MACH,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,IACjB;AAEA,SAAK,YAAY,KAAK,cAAc;AAGpC,QAAI,KAAK,SAAS,QAAQ;AACxB,WAAK,OAAO,KAAK,yCAAyC;AAAA,QACxD,UAAU,IAAI;AAAA,QACd,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,QACf,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,MACnB,CAAC;AACD,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,SAAS;AAAA,QACT,QAAQ,gCAAgC,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,QACvD,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,MACjB;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAOA,QAAQ,MAAwB;AAE9B,UAAM,gBAAgB,KAAK,MAAM,UAAU,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI;AACtE,QAAI,iBAAiB,GAAG;AACtB,WAAK,OAAO,KAAK,kCAAkC,EAAE,UAAU,KAAK,KAAK,CAAC;AAC1E,WAAK,MAAM,aAAa,IAAI;AAAA,IAC9B,OAAO;AACL,WAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI;AACpB,WAAK,OAAO,MAAM,qBAAqB,EAAE,UAAU,KAAK,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,IAChE;AAAA,EACF;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAQA,WAAW,MAAuB;AAChC,UAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,MAAM,UAAU,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI;AACzD,QAAI,SAAS,GAAG;AACd,WAAK,MAAM,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC;AAC1B,WAAK,OAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,EAAE,UAAU,KAAK,CAAC;AAC3D,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAOA,WAAkC;AAChC,WAAO,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA,EACvB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAOA,QAAQ,MAAwB;AAC9B,UAAM,eAAe,KAAK;AAC1B,SAAK,OAAO;AACZ,SAAK,OAAO,KAAK,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,EAC1E;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAOA,UAAsB;AACpB,WAAO,KAAK;AAAA,EACd;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKQ,YAAY,KAAoB,UAAgC;AACtE,UAAM,UAAU;AAAA,MACd,UAAU,IAAI;AAAA,MACd,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACV,YAAY,IAAI;AAAA,MAChB,SAAS,SAAS;AAAA,MAClB,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,MACjB,UAAU,SAAS;AAAA,IACrB;AAEA,QAAI,SAAS,SAAS;AACpB,WAAK,OAAO,MAAM,4BAA4B,OAAO;AAAA,IACvD,OAAO;AACL,WAAK,OAAO,KAAK,2BAA2B,OAAO;AAAA,IACrD;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAgBO,SAAS,4BAA4B,QAA+C;AACzF,QAAM,WAAW,IAAI,eAAe,MAAM;AAG1C,WAAS,QAAQ,4BAA4B;AAC7C,WAAS,QAAQ,aAAa;AAE9B,SAAO;AACT;AAYO,SAAS,eACd,UACA,KAC2B;AAC3B,QAAM,WAAW,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG;AAEtC,MAAI,SAAS,SAAS;AACpB,WAAO,GAAG,MAAS;AAAA,EACrB;AAEA,SAAO,IAAI,IAAI,YAAY,kBAAkB,SAAS,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC;AAC3E;AAUO,SAAS,oBACd,UACA,MACA,SAMe;AAEf,QAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IACX;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,SAAS,QAAQ;AAAA,EACzB;AAIA,QAAM,SAAkC,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK;AAElD,MAAI,SAAS,cAAc,QAAW;AACpC,WAAO,WAAW,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,EAChC;AACA,MAAI,SAAS,eAAe,QAAW;AACrC,WAAO,YAAY,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,EACjC;AACA,MAAI,SAAS,iBAAiB,QAAW;AACvC,WAAO,cAAc,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,EACnC;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;;;AC3SO,SAAS,iBAAiB,KAAqB,UAAmC;AACvF,QAAM,SAAS,IAAI;AACnB,QAAM,WAAW,OAAO;AACxB,MAAI,aAAa,UAAa,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG;AACjD,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,MAAM,SAAS,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,aAAa,SAAS,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,UAAU;AAAA,MACnF,IAAI;AAAA,MACJ,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IACf;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,UAAU,IAAI,WAAW,MAAM,iBAAiB;AAC7E;AAKO,SAAS,gBACd,SACA,gBACc;AACd,MAAI,eAAgB,QAAO;AAC3B,MAAI,YAAY,KAAM,QAAO;AAC7B,SAAO;AACT;AAgBO,SAAS,uBAAuB,MAAmC;AACxE,OAAK,YAAY,kBAAkB;AAAA,IACjC,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,IACf,SAAS,KAAK;AAAA,IACd,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IACZ,WAAW,KAAK;AAAA,IAChB,YAAY,KAAK;AAAA,IACjB,cAAc,KAAK;AAAA,EACrB,CAAC;AACH;AAgBO,SAAS,eAAe,MAAgC;AAC7D,OAAK,YAAY,kBAAkB;AAAA,IACjC,YAAY,KAAK;AAAA,IACjB,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,IACf,QAAQ,KAAK;AAAA,IACb,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,IACf,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IACZ,WAAW,KAAK;AAAA,EAClB,CAAC;AACH;AAeO,SAAS,kBAAkB,MAAmC;AACnE,OAAK,YAAY,sBAAsB;AAAA,IACrC,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,IACf,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IACZ,aAAa,KAAK;AAAA,IAClB,WAAW,KAAK;AAAA,IAChB,WAAW,KAAK;AAAA,EAClB,CAAC;AACH;;;ACnGA,SAAS,KAAAA,UAAS;AAmBX,IAAM,sBAAsBA,GAAE,KAAK;AAAA,EACxC;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF,CAAC;AASM,IAAM,0BAA0BA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EAC9C,eAAe;AAAA;AAAA,EAEf,aAAaA,GAAE,QAAQ;AAAA;AAAA,EAEvB,SAASA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,GAAI;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAMnC,QAAQA,GAAE,OAAOA,GAAE,OAAO,GAAGA,GAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS;AACrD,CAAC;AAaM,IAAM,0BAA0B;AAWhC,SAAS,iBAAiB,UAAkC;AACjE,SAAO,aAAa;AACtB;AAYA,IAAM,8BAA6E;AAAA,EACjF,SAAS;AAAA,EACT,YAAY;AAAA,EACZ,YAAY;AAAA,EACZ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAChB,YAAY;AAAA,EACZ,OAAO;AAAA,EACP,OAAO;AAAA,EACP,qBAAqB;AAAA,EACrB,WAAW;AAAA,EACX,SAAS;AAAA,EACT,SAAS;AACX;AAOO,SAAS,uBAAuB,UAAiD;AACtF,SAAO,4BAA4B,QAAQ;AAC7C;;;AC3CO,SAAS,YAAY,MAA0B;AACpD,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,EAClC;AACF;AAgBO,SAAS,sBAAsB,MAA2C;AAC/E,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;AAAA,IAC/D,mBAAmB;AAAA,EACrB;AACF;AA8BO,SAAS,oBAAoB,OAA6C;AAC/E,QAAM,WAA8B;AAAA,IAClC,eAAe,MAAM;AAAA,IACrB,aAAa,MAAM,eAAe,iBAAiB,MAAM,aAAa;AAAA,IACtE,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,IACf,GAAI,MAAM,WAAW,SAAY,EAAE,QAAQ,MAAM,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EAC/D;AACA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,SAAS;AAAA,IACT,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,IAClD,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,uBAAuB,GAAG,SAAS;AAAA,EAC/C;AACF;AAcO,SAAS,UAAU,SAA6B;AACrD,SAAO,oBAAoB,EAAE,eAAe,YAAY,QAAQ,CAAC;AACnE;;;AC/JA,SAAS,mBAAmB;AAqFrB,SAAS,oBAA4B;AAC1C,QAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,CAAC;AAC3B,SAAO,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,CAAC;AACrC;AAiBA,SAAS,kBAA0B;AACjC,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAC5C,QAAM,YAAY,IAAI,KAAK,eAAe,SAAS;AAAA,IACjD,UAAU;AAAA,IACV,cAAc;AAAA,EAChB,CAAC;AACD,QAAM,QAAQ,UAAU,cAAc,GAAG;AACzC,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,cAAc,GAAG,SAAS;AACtE,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,eAAe,SAAS;AAAA,IACvC,UAAU;AAAA,IACV,QAAQ;AAAA,EACV,CAAC;AACD,SAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,EAAE;AAC1D;AAUO,SAAS,gBAAgB,QAA+B;AAC7D,QAAM,eAAe,CAAC,cAAc,cAAc,WAAW;AAE7D,MAAI,OAAO,cAAc,QAAS,QAAO;AAEzC,MAAI,OAAO,kBAAkB,MAAM;AACjC,QAAI,OAAO,aAAa,UAAa,aAAa,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC3E,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;AAQO,SAAS,qBAAqB,SAA+C;AAClF,QAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,UAAU,CAAC;AAClC,QAAM,UAA0B;AAAA,IAC9B,WAAW,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAC7B,WAAW,gBAAgB;AAAA,IAC3B,UAAU,QAAQ;AAAA,IAClB;AAAA,IACA,WAAW,QAAQ,aAAa,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAAA,IACtD,GAAI,QAAQ,YAAY,UAAa,EAAE,SAAS,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAAA,IAChE,GAAI,QAAQ,iBAAiB,UAAa,EAAE,cAAc,QAAQ,aAAa;AAAA,EACjF;AAGA,SAAO,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO;AAC9B;AAoDO,SAAS,kBAAkB,KAA8C;AAC9E,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,IACf,UAAU,IAAI;AAAA,IACd,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,IACf,GAAI,IAAI,OAAO,aAAa,UAAa,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS;AAAA,IACzE,GAAI,IAAI,YAAY,UAAa,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,EAC1D;AACF;;;ACtMA,IAAM,wBACJ;AAMF,IAAM,sBAAwE;AAAA,EAC5E,EAAE,MAAM,0BAA0B,SAAS,mDAAmD;AAAA,EAC9F,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,SAAS,sDAAsD;AAAA,EAC7F,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,SAAS,yDAAyD;AAClG;AAMA,SAAS,eAAe,OAAuD;AAC7E,wBAAsB,YAAY;AAClC,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,QAAQ,uBAAuB,EAAE;AACvD,SAAO,EAAE,SAAS,UAAU,YAAY,MAAM;AAChD;AAKA,SAAS,eAAe,OAAyB;AAC/C,QAAM,WAAqB,CAAC;AAC5B,aAAW,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,qBAAqB;AACnD,YAAQ,YAAY;AACpB,QAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK,GAAG;AACvB,eAAS,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,IACpB;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAMA,SAAS,cAAc,OAAgB,OAAuD;AAC5F,MAAI,OAAO,UAAU,UAAU;AAC7B,UAAM,WAAW,eAAe,KAAK;AACrC,QAAI,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG;AACvB,YAAM,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG,QAAQ;AAAA,IACjC;AACA,UAAM,EAAE,SAAS,SAAS,IAAI,eAAe,KAAK;AAClD,QAAI,SAAU,OAAM;AACpB,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAEA,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG;AACxB,WAAO,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,cAAc,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,EACvD;AAEA,MAAI,UAAU,QAAQ,OAAO,UAAU,UAAU;AAC/C,UAAM,SAAkC,CAAC;AACzC,eAAW,CAAC,KAAK,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAgC,GAAG;AACzE,aAAO,GAAG,IAAI,cAAc,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA,IACxC;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;AASO,SAAS,kBAAkB,MAAwC;AACxE,MAAI,SAAS,UAAa,SAAS,MAAM;AACvC,WAAO,EAAE,WAAW,MAAM,aAAa,OAAO,eAAe,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE;AAAA,EACvF;AAEA,QAAM,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,UAAU,CAAC,EAAc;AACnD,QAAM,YAAY,cAAc,MAAM,KAAK;AAC3C,QAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;AAElD,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA,aAAa,MAAM,QAAQ;AAAA,IAC3B,eAAe,MAAM;AAAA,IACrB,kBAAkB;AAAA,EACpB;AACF;AAKO,SAAS,sBACd,QACA,QACA,UACM;AACN,MAAI,OAAO,aAAa;AACtB,WAAO,KAAK,2DAAsD;AAAA,MAChE,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,gBAAgB,OAAO;AAAA,IACzB,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AACA,MAAI,OAAO,iBAAiB,SAAS,GAAG;AACtC,WAAO,KAAK,6CAA6C;AAAA,MACvD,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,UAAU,OAAO;AAAA,IACnB,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AACF;;;ACpDA,SAAS,eAAe,aAAiC;AACvD,SAAO,oBAAoB;AAAA,IACzB,eAAe;AAAA,IACf,SAAS,qCAAqC,OAAO,WAAW,CAAC;AAAA,EACnE,CAAC;AACH;AAMA,SAAS,kBAAkB,QAAgB,WAA+B;AACxE,SAAO,oBAAoB;AAAA,IACzB,eAAe;AAAA,IACf,SAAS,kBAAkB,MAAM,cAAc,SAAS;AAAA,EAC1D,CAAC;AACH;AAKA,SAAS,cAAc,SAAiB,WAA+B;AACrE,SAAO,oBAAoB;AAAA,IACzB,eAAe;AAAA,IACf,SAAS,mBAAmB,OAAO,cAAc,SAAS;AAAA,EAC5D,CAAC;AACH;AAOA,IAAM,uBAAuB,KAAK,OAAO;AASzC,IAAM,kBAAqC;AAAA;AAAA,EAEzC;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,eAAe,MAAc,QAAyB;AAC7D,MAAI,YAAY;AAChB,aAAW,WAAW,iBAAiB;AAMrC,UAAM,SAAS;AACf,gBAAY,UAAU,QAAQ,SAAS,YAAY;AACnD,QAAI,cAAc,QAAQ;AACxB,aAAO,KAAK,uDAAuD;AAAA,QACjE,SAAS,QAAQ,OAAO,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE;AAAA,MACrC,CAAC;AAAA,IACH;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAGA,SAAS,mBAAmB,QAAoB,QAAuB;AACrE,aAAW,QAAQ,OAAO,SAAS;AACjC,SAAK,OAAO,eAAe,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,EAC9C;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,eAAe,MAAe,QAAiB,WAAsC;AAC5F,MAAI,SAAS,OAAW,QAAO;AAC/B,QAAM,YAAY,KAAK,UAAU,IAAI,EAAE;AACvC,MAAI,YAAY,sBAAsB;AACpC,WAAO,KAAK,4BAA4B,EAAE,WAAW,OAAO,qBAAqB,CAAC;AAClF,WAAO,cAAc,mBAAmB,SAAS;AAAA,EACnD;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAKA,SAAS,eAAe,aAA0B,QAAoC;AACpF,QAAM,WAAW,YAAY,WAAW;AACxC,MAAI,CAAC,UAAU;AACb,UAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,SAAS;AACnC,WAAO,KAAK,qBAAqB;AACjC,WAAO,eAAe,MAAM,WAAW;AAAA,EACzC;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAgBA,SAAS,YAAY,MAA6C;AAChE,QAAM,UAAU;AAAA,IACd,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,IACX,GAAI,KAAK,gBAAgB,EAAE,cAAc,KAAK,aAAa;AAAA,EAC7D;AACA,QAAM,WAAW,KAAK,SAAS,SAAS,oBAAoB,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC;AAE9F,MAAI,CAAC,SAAS,SAAS;AACrB,SAAK,OAAO,KAAK,gCAAgC;AAAA,MAC/C,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,MACjB,UAAU,SAAS;AAAA,IACrB,CAAC;AACD,WAAO,kBAAkB,SAAS,QAAQ,KAAK,SAAS;AAAA,EAC1D;AACA,OAAK,OAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,EAAE,QAAQ,SAAS,OAAO,CAAC;AACpE,SAAO;AACT;AAKA,eAAe,eACb,SACA,MACA,KACA,QACqB;AACrB,QAAM,YAAY,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI;AACxC,QAAM,SACJ,QAAQ,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,MAAO,QAAwB,IAAI;AAEtF,QAAM,aAAa,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI;AAC7C,MAAI,OAAO,YAAY,MAAM;AAC3B,WAAO,KAAK,uCAAuC,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;AAAA,EACnE,OAAO;AACL,WAAO,KAAK,4BAA4B,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;AAAA,EACxD;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAGA,SAAS,cACP,aACA,UACA,KACA,QACA,YACM;AACN,QAAM,QAAQ,iBAAiB,GAAG;AAClC,QAAM,UAAU,gBAAgB,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK;AACrD,cAAY,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAC5B;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,IACf;AAAA,EACF,CAAC;AACH;AAOA,SAAS,uBACP,aACA,UACA,KACA,YACM;AACN,QAAM,QAAQ,iBAAiB,GAAG;AAClC,cAAY,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAC5B;AAAA,IACA,SAAS;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,IACA,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,IACf;AAAA,EACF,CAAC;AACH;AAGA,SAAS,gBACP,aACA,UACA,KACA,QACM;AACN,QAAM,QAAQ,iBAAiB,GAAG;AAClC,cAAY,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAC5B,YAAY;AAAA,IACZ,UAAU;AAAA,IACV;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,EACjB,CAAC;AACH;AAGA,SAAS,mBACP,aACA,UACA,KACM;AACN,QAAM,QAAQ,iBAAiB,GAAG;AAClC,cAAY,sBAAsB;AAAA,IAChC;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,IACb,WAAW;AAAA,IACX,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,EACjB,CAAC;AACH;AAGA,SAAS,kBACP,QACA,gBACA,QACmB;AACnB,QAAM,OAAO,OAAO,gBAAgB;AACpC,MAAI,SAAS,cAAc,eAAe,iBAAiB,WAAW,GAAG;AACvE,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,SAAO,KAAK,8CAA8C;AAAA,IACxD;AAAA,IACA,UAAU,eAAe;AAAA,EAC3B,CAAC;AAGD,SAAO,oBAAoB;AAAA,IACzB,eAAe;AAAA,IACf,SACE,+CAA+C,eAAe,iBAAiB,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EAE7F,CAAC;AACH;AAGA,SAAS,aACP,QACA,MACA,MACA,gBACA,QACsD;AACtD,QAAM,aAAa,eAAe,MAAM,QAAQ,eAAe,SAAS;AACxE,MAAI,WAAY,QAAO,EAAE,OAAO,YAAY,eAAe,KAAK;AAGhE,QAAM,iBAAiB,kBAAkB,IAAI;AAC7C,wBAAsB,gBAAgB,QAAQ,OAAO,QAAQ;AAC7D,QAAM,gBAAgB,eAAe,cAAc,eAAe,YAAY;AAG9E,QAAM,YAAY,kBAAkB,QAAQ,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAClE,MAAI,cAAc,KAAM,QAAO,EAAE,OAAO,WAAW,cAAc;AAEjE,MAAI,OAAO,aAAa;AACtB,UAAM,WAAW,eAAe,OAAO,aAAa,MAAM;AAC1D,QAAI,UAAU;AACZ,UAAI,OAAO;AACT,2BAAmB,OAAO,aAAa,OAAO,UAAU,cAAc;AACxE,aAAO,EAAE,OAAO,UAAU,cAAc;AAAA,IAC1C;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,MAAI,OAAO,gBAAgB;AACzB,UAAM,UAAU,YAAY;AAAA,MAC1B,UAAU,OAAO;AAAA,MACjB,UAAU,OAAO;AAAA,MACjB,MAAM;AAAA,MACN;AAAA,MACA,cAAc,OAAO;AAAA,MACrB;AAAA,MACA,WAAW,eAAe;AAAA,IAC5B,CAAC;AACD,QAAI,SAAS;AACX,UAAI,OAAO;AACT,wBAAgB,OAAO,aAAa,OAAO,UAAU,gBAAgB,eAAe;AACtF,aAAO,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,cAAc;AAAA,IACzC;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO,EAAE,OAAO,MAAM,cAAc;AACtC;AASO,SAAS,oBACd,SACA,QACa;AACb,QAAM,SAAS,OAAO,UAAU,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AACtE,QAAM,OAAO,OAAO,iBAAiB;AAErC,SAAO,OAAO,SAAuC;AACnD,UAAM,UAAU;AAAA,MACd,UAAU,OAAO;AAAA,MACjB,GAAI,OAAO,cAAc,EAAE,QAAQ,OAAO,WAAW;AAAA,IACvD;AACA,UAAM,iBAAiB,qBAAqB,OAAO;AACnD,UAAM,gBAAgB,OAAO,MAAM,kBAAkB,cAAc,CAAC;AACpE,kBAAc,KAAK,yBAAyB;AAE5C,UAAM,EAAE,OAAO,eAAe,cAAc,IAAI;AAAA,MAC9C;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,cAAe,QAAO;AAE1B,WAAO,gBAAgB,SAAS,eAAe,gBAAgB,eAAe,MAAM;AAAA,EACtF;AACF;AAOA,eAAe,gBACb,SACA,eACA,gBACA,eACA,QACqB;AACrB,QAAM,gBAAgB,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI;AAC5C,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,MACnB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,EAAE,gBAAgB,QAAQ,cAAc;AAAA,MACxC;AAAA,IACF;AACA,uBAAmB,QAAQ,aAAa;AACxC,QAAI,OAAO,aAAa;AACtB;AAAA,QACE,OAAO;AAAA,QACP,OAAO;AAAA,QACP;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI;AAAA,MAC5B;AAAA,IACF;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,SAAS,OAAO;AACd,UAAM,aAAa,iBAAiB,QAAQ,MAAM,UAAU;AAC5D,kBAAc,MAAM,yBAAyB,iBAAiB,QAAQ,QAAQ,MAAS;AACvF,QAAI,OAAO,aAAa;AACtB;AAAA,QACE,OAAO;AAAA,QACP,OAAO;AAAA,QACP;AAAA,QACA,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI;AAAA,MAC5B;AAAA,IACF;AAMA,UAAM,YAAY,eAAe,YAAY,aAAa;AAC1D,WAAO,cAAc,WAAW,eAAe,SAAS;AAAA,EAC1D;AACF;;;ACtdA,SAAS,yBAAyB;AAqBlC,IAAM,iBAAiB,aAAa,EAAE,WAAW,eAAe,CAAC;AAQ1D,SAAS,kBAAkB,QAAiC;AACjE,WAAS,KAAK,OAAoB,QAAgB,MAAqC;AACrF,QAAI;AACF,aAAO,mBAAmB,EAAE,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,UAAmB;AAC3E,uBAAe,MAAM,mCAAmC;AAAA,UACtD;AAAA,UACA;AAAA,UACA,OAAO,gBAAgB,KAAK;AAAA,QAC9B,CAAC;AAAA,MACH,CAAC;AAAA,IACH,SAAS,OAAgB;AACvB,qBAAe,MAAM,mCAAmC;AAAA,QACtD;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA,OAAO,gBAAgB,KAAK;AAAA,MAC9B,CAAC;AAAA,IACH;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,SAAS;AACtB,WAAK,QAAQ,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,IAC3B;AAAA,IACA,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,SAAS;AACvB,WAAK,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,IAC5B;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,SAAS;AACtB,WAAK,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,IAC9B;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAKO,IAAM,gBAA8B;AAAA,EACzC,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,EACZ,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,EACb,MAAM,MAAM;AACd;AA2BO,IAAM,yBAAyB,IAAI,kBAAmC;AAYtE,IAAM,qBAAqB,IAAI,kBAA+B;AAiBrE,eAAsB,sBACpB,UACA,UACA,WACA,aAAa,MACD;AACZ,QAAM,YAAY,KAAK,IAAI;AAC3B,MAAI,YAAY;AAChB,QAAM,cAAc,uBAAuB,SAAS;AAEpD,QAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,MAAM;AAC9B;AACA,UAAM,UAAU,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,aAAa,GAAI;AAG1D,QAAI,gBAAgB,QAAW;AAC7B,kBAAY,iBAAiB,SAAS;AAAA,IACxC;AAGA,aAAS,MAAM,UAAU;AAAA,MACvB,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB;AAAA,MACA,kBAAkB,gBAAgB;AAAA,IACpC,CAAC;AAAA,EACH,GAAG,UAAU;AAEb,MAAI;AACF,WAAO,MAAM,UAAU;AAAA,EACzB,UAAE;AACA,kBAAc,KAAK;AAAA,EACrB;AACF;;;ACpKA,SAAS,kBAAkB;AAC3B,SAAS,gBAAgB,YAAY,iBAAiB;AACtD,SAAS,SAAS,YAAY;;;ACwE9B,IAAM,qBAAqB,cAAc;AACzC,IAAM,iBAAiB,cAAc;AACrC,IAAM,yBAAyB,cAAc;AAW7C,SAAS,mBAAmB,eAAuB,WAAiC;AAClF,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,MAAM;AAAA,IACN,SAAS,cAAc,aAAa,qBAAqB,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,IAC1E,WAAW;AAAA,IACX;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAKA,SAAS,iBAAiB,OAAgB,eAAqC;AAC7E,QAAM,aAA2B;AAAA,IAC/B,MAAM;AAAA,IACN,SAAS,gBAAgB,KAAK;AAAA,IAC9B,WAAW;AAAA,EACb;AACA,MAAI,iBAAiB,OAAO;AAC1B,WAAO,EAAE,GAAG,YAAY,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,EACvC;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAwBO,IAAM,eAAN,MAAmB;AAAA,EACP;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EAEjB,YAAY,QAA6B;AACvC,SAAK,mBAAmB,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AACpD,SAAK,eAAe,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAC5C,SAAK,gBAAgB,QAAQ,iBAAiB;AAC9C,SAAK,SAAS,QAAQ,UAAU,aAAa,EAAE,WAAW,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAAA,EAC7E;AAAA;AAAA,EAGQ,eAAe,SAGrB;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI,SAAS,aAAa,KAAK,kBAAkB,KAAK,YAAY;AAAA,MAClF,eAAe,SAAS,iBAAiB;AAAA,IAC3C;AAAA,EACF;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKA,MAAM,QACJ,WACA,SACiD;AACjD,UAAM,EAAE,WAAW,cAAc,IAAI,KAAK,eAAe,OAAO;AAEhE,UAAM,kBAAkB,KAAK,gBAAgB,WAAW,aAAa;AACrE,QAAI,oBAAoB,MAAM;AAC5B,aAAO,IAAI,eAAe;AAAA,IAC5B;AAEA,WAAO,KAAK,WAAW,WAAW,WAAW,eAAe,OAAO;AAAA,EACrE;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA,MAAc,WACZ,WACA,WACA,eACA,SACiD;AACjD,SAAK,SAAS,eAAe,SAAS;AACtC,UAAM,YAAY,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI;AACxC,UAAM,QAAsB,EAAE,WAAW,QAAW,UAAU,MAAM;AAEpE,QAAI;AACF,YAAM,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,QACxB;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA,SAAS;AAAA,QACT,SAAS;AAAA,MACX;AACA,aAAO,KAAK,cAAc,QAAQ,WAAW,WAAW,aAAa;AAAA,IACvE,QAAQ;AACN,YAAM,YAAY,SAAS,QAAQ,YAAY,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM;AAC9D,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,KAAK,cAAc,MAAM,UAAU,eAAe,WAAW,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,MACnF;AAAA,IACF,UAAE;AACA,UAAI,MAAM,cAAc,QAAW;AACjC,qBAAa,MAAM,SAAS;AAAA,MAC9B;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEQ,gBAAgB,WAAmB,eAA4C;AACrF,QAAI,aAAa,GAAG;AAClB,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,MAAM;AAAA,QACN,SAAS,oBAAoB,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,QAC9C,WAAW;AAAA,MACb;AAAA,IACF;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA,EAEQ,SAAS,eAAuB,WAAyB;AAC/D,QAAI,KAAK,eAAe;AACtB,WAAK,OAAO,MAAM,8BAA8B,EAAE,WAAW,eAAe,UAAU,CAAC;AAAA,IACzF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEA,MAAc,eACZ,WACA,WACA,OACA,WACA,QACY;AACZ,UAAM,iBAAiB,IAAI,QAAe,CAAC,UAAU,WAAW;AAC9D,YAAM,YAAY,WAAW,MAAM;AACjC,cAAM,WAAW;AACjB,oBAAY;AACZ,eAAO,IAAI,MAAM,6BAA6B,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,MACtE,GAAG,SAAS;AAAA,IACd,CAAC;AAED,UAAM,WAA8B,CAAC,UAAU,GAAG,cAAc;AAGhE,QAAI,WAAW,UAAa,CAAC,OAAO,SAAS;AAC3C,YAAM,eAAe,IAAI,QAAe,CAAC,UAAU,WAAW;AAC5D,eAAO;AAAA,UACL;AAAA,UACA,MAAM;AACJ,mBAAO,IAAI,MAAM,+BAA+B,CAAC;AAAA,UACnD;AAAA,UACA,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,QACf;AAAA,MACF,CAAC;AACD,eAAS,KAAK,YAAY;AAAA,IAC5B;AAEA,WAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ;AAAA,EAC9B;AAAA,EAEQ,cACN,QACA,WACA,WACA,eACwC;AACxC,UAAM,aAAa,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI;AAC7C,UAAM,cAAc,aAAa,YAAY;AAE7C,QAAI,eAAe,KAAK,eAAe;AACrC,WAAK,OAAO,KAAK,8CAA8C;AAAA,QAC7D,WAAW;AAAA,QACX;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA,kBAAkB,KAAK,MAAO,aAAa,YAAa,GAAG;AAAA,MAC7D,CAAC;AAAA,IACH;AAEA,QAAI,KAAK,eAAe;AACtB,WAAK,OAAO,MAAM,+BAA+B,EAAE,WAAW,eAAe,WAAW,CAAC;AAAA,IAC3F;AAEA,WAAO,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO,QAAQ,YAAY,YAAY,CAAC;AAAA,EACtD;AAAA,EAEQ,cACN,UACA,eACA,WACA,WACA,YAAY,OACE;AACd,UAAM,aAAa,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI;AAE7C,QAAI,WAAW;AACb,WAAK,OAAO,KAAK,iCAAiC;AAAA,QAChD,WAAW;AAAA,QACX;AAAA,MACF,CAAC;AACD,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,MAAM;AAAA,QACN,SAAS,cAAc,aAAa;AAAA,QACpC,WAAW;AAAA,MACb;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,QAAI,UAAU;AACZ,WAAK,OAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,QAAW;AAAA,QAClD,WAAW;AAAA,QACX;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,MACF,CAAC;AACD,aAAO,mBAAmB,eAAe,SAAS;AAAA,IACpD;AAEA,WAAO,iBAAiB,IAAI,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG,aAAa;AAAA,EACnE;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKA,MACE,IACA,SAC2E;AAC3E,WAAO,UAAU,SAAuE;AACtF,aAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO;AAAA,IAChD;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;AC7TO,IAAM,6BAAgD;AAAA;AAAA,EAE3D;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF;AAOO,IAAM,0BAA6C;AAAA;AAAA,EAExD;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF;AAUA,SAAS,mBAAmB,SAAyB;AACnD,QAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,YAAY;AAKhC,QAAM,UAAU,IACb,QAAQ,qBAAqB,MAAM,EACnC,QAAQ,SAAS,gBAAgB,EACjC,QAAQ,OAAO,OAAO,EACtB,QAAQ,mBAAmB,IAAI;AAClC,QAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,WAAW,IAAI,IACpC,QAAQ,QAAQ,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,MACxB,QAAQ,WAAW,GAAG,IACpB,IAAI,OAAO,MACX,QAAQ,OAAO;AACrB,SAAO,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ;AAC5B;AAMA,IAAM,yBAGD,2BAA2B,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa;AAAA,EAChD;AAAA,EACA,OAAO,mBAAmB,OAAO;AACnC,EAAE;AAeK,SAAS,aAAa,MAAuB;AAClD,QAAM,aAAa,KAAK,YAAY;AACpC,SAAO,uBAAuB,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,CAAC;AACpE;AAGO,SAAS,aAAa,UAA2B;AACtD,SAAO,wBAAwB,SAAS,QAAQ;AAClD;;;AC1GO,IAAMC,mBAAuC,oBAAI,IAAI;AAAA;AAAA,EAE1D;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AACF,CAAC;AAMM,SAAS,YAAY,UAA2B;AACrD,SAAO,CAACA,iBAAgB,IAAI,QAAQ;AACtC;;;ACvCO,SAAS,YACd,UACA,QACA,MACgB;AAEhB,MAAI,aAAa,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC1B,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,UAAU;AAAA,MACV,QAAQ,SAAS,QAAQ;AAAA,MACzB,aAAa;AAAA,IACf;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,YAAY,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,aAAa,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG;AACrF,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,UAAU;AAAA,MACV,QAAQ,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,MAC1B,aAAa;AAAA,IACf;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,MAAI,OAAO,iBAAiB,IAAK,QAAO,EAAE,UAAU,QAAQ;AAE5D,MAAI,OAAO,aAAa,SAAS,QAAQ,EAAG,QAAO,EAAE,UAAU,QAAQ;AAEvE,SAAO,kBAAkB,UAAU,OAAO,IAAI;AAChD;AAMA,SAAS,kBAAkB,UAAkB,MAAgD;AAC3F,MAAI,SAAS,SAAS;AACpB,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,UAAU;AAAA,MACV,SAAS,SAAS,QAAQ;AAAA,IAC5B;AAAA,EACF;AAMA,MAAI,SAAS,iBAAiB;AAC5B,QAAI,CAAC,YAAY,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC1B,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,UAAU;AAAA,QACV,SAAS,SAAS,QAAQ;AAAA,MAC5B;AAAA,IACF;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,UAAU;AAAA,MACV,QAAQ,SAAS,QAAQ;AAAA,MACzB,aAAa;AAAA,IACf;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,UAAU;AAAA,IACV,QAAQ,SAAS,QAAQ;AAAA,IACzB,aAAa;AAAA,EACf;AACF;;;AC5EA,SAAS,qBAAAC,0BAAyB;AAKlC,IAAM,sBAAsB,IAAIC,mBAAoC;AAS7D,SAAS,iBAAoB,QAA0B,IAAkC;AAC9F,SAAO,oBAAoB,IAAI,QAAQ,EAAE;AAC3C;AAOO,SAAS,kBAAgD;AAC9D,SAAO,oBAAoB,SAAS;AACtC;AA2CO,SAAS,iBACd,UACA,WACmE;AACnE,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,SAAS;AAAA,IACT,SAAS;AAAA,MACP;AAAA,QACE,MAAM;AAAA,QACN,MAAM,kBAAkB,SAAS,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS,WAAW,cAAc,SAAS;AAAA,MAC/F;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;ACjFA,SAAS,YAAY,MAAsC;AACzD,MAAI,OAAO,SAAS,YAAY,SAAS,KAAM,QAAO;AACtD,QAAM,OAAQ,KAAiC,MAAM;AACrD,SAAO,OAAO,SAAS,YAAY,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI;AAClE;AAQO,SAAS,kCAAkC,UAA8B;AAC9E,SAAO,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS;AAChC,UAAM,SAAS,gBAAgB;AAC/B,QAAI,WAAW,UAAa,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO;AACjD,aAAO,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,IACvB;AAEA,UAAM,WAAW,YAAY,UAAU,QAAQ,YAAY,IAAI,CAAC;AAEhE,QAAI,SAAS,aAAa,SAAS;AACjC,aAAO,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,IACvB;AACA,QAAI,SAAS,aAAa,iBAAiB;AACzC,UAAI,OAAO,KAAK,kCAAkC;AAAA,QAChD,MAAM;AAAA,QACN,SAAS,SAAS;AAAA,QAClB,cAAc,OAAO;AAAA,QACrB,WAAW,IAAI,eAAe;AAAA,MAChC,CAAC;AACD,aAAO,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,IACvB;AACA,QAAI,OAAO,KAAK,mCAAmC;AAAA,MACjD,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,MACjB,aAAa,SAAS;AAAA,MACtB,cAAc,OAAO;AAAA,MACrB,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,MACb,WAAW,IAAI,eAAe;AAAA,IAChC,CAAC;AACD,WAAO,iBAAiB,UAAU,IAAI,eAAe,SAAS;AAAA,EAChE;AACF;;;ACuDA,SAAS,YAAY,UAAyB,SAAiB,WAA+B;AAC5F,SAAO,oBAAoB;AAAA,IACzB,eAAe;AAAA,IACf,SAAS,GAAG,OAAO,cAAc,SAAS;AAAA,EAC5C,CAAC;AACH;AAKA,SAAS,2BAA2B,QAA+B;AACjE,SAAO,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS;AAChC,UAAM,SAAS,kBAAkB,QAAQ,IAAI;AAC7C,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI;AACd,UAAI,OAAO,KAAK,qBAAqB;AAAA,QACnC,OAAO,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,MACtB,CAAC;AACD,aAAO;AAAA,QACL;AAAA,QACA,qBAAqB,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,QACzC,IAAI,eAAe;AAAA,MACrB;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,gBAAgB,OAAO;AAC3B,WAAO,KAAK,OAAO,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,EAC/B;AACF;AAKA,SAAS,uBACP,UACA,UACA,MACA,cACY;AACZ,SAAO,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS;AAChC,UAAM,YAAY,oBAAoB,UAAU,MAAM;AAAA,MACpD;AAAA,MACA,GAAI,iBAAiB,UAAa,EAAE,aAAa;AAAA,IACnD,CAAC;AACD,UAAM,WAAW,SAAS,SAAS,SAAS;AAE5C,QAAI,CAAC,SAAS,SAAS;AACrB,UAAI,OAAO,KAAK,iBAAiB;AAAA,QAC/B,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,QACjB,UAAU,SAAS;AAAA,MACrB,CAAC;AACD,aAAO;AAAA,QACL;AAAA,QACA,kBAAkB,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,QACjC,IAAI,eAAe;AAAA,MACrB;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,OAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,EAAE,QAAQ,SAAS,OAAO,CAAC;AACnE,WAAO,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,EACvB;AACF;AAKA,SAAS,0BAA0B,SAAkC;AACnE,SAAO,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS;AAChC,UAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,WAAW;AACpC,QAAI,CAAC,UAAU;AACb,YAAM,QAAQ,QAAQ,SAAS;AAC/B,UAAI,OAAO,KAAK,uBAAuB;AAAA,QACrC,aAAa,MAAM;AAAA,MACrB,CAAC;AACD,aAAO;AAAA,QACL;AAAA,QACA,qCAAqC,OAAO,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AAAA,QAC9D,IAAI,eAAe;AAAA,MACrB;AAAA,IACF;AACA,WAAO,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,EACvB;AACF;AAMA,SAAS,wBAAwB,OAAqB,UAA8B;AAClF,SAAO,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS;AAChC,UAAM,SAAS,mBAAmB,SAAS;AAC3C,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG;AAAA,MACxD,eAAe;AAAA,MACf,GAAI,WAAW,SAAY,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC3C,CAAC;AAED,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI;AACd,UAAI,OAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,QAAW;AAAA,QACjD,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,QACnB,WAAW,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,MAC1B,CAAC;AAID,YAAM,OAAO,aAAa,mBAAmB,QAAQ;AACrD,YAAM,UAAU,SAAS,SAAY,GAAG,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM;AAEtF,aAAO,YAAY,aAAa,SAAS,IAAI,eAAe,SAAS;AAAA,IACvE;AAEA,QAAI,OAAO,MAAM,aAAa;AAC5B,UAAI,OAAO,KAAK,8CAA8C;AAAA,QAC5D,YAAY,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,MAC3B,CAAC;AAAA,IACH;AAEA,WAAO,OAAO,MAAM;AAAA,EACtB;AACF;AAKA,SAAS,wBAAoC;AAC3C,SAAO,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS;AAChC,UAAM,YAAY,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI;AACxC,QAAI,OAAO,KAAK,yBAAyB;AAEzC,QAAI;AACF,YAAM,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AACnC,YAAM,aAAa,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI;AAE7C,UAAI,OAAO,YAAY,MAAM;AAC3B,YAAI,OAAO,KAAK,uCAAuC,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;AAAA,MACvE,OAAO;AACL,YAAI,OAAO,KAAK,4BAA4B,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;AAAA,MAC5D;AACA,aAAO;AAAA,IACT,SAAS,OAAO;AACd,YAAM,aAAa,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI;AAC7C,YAAM,UAAU,iBAAiB,QAAQ,MAAM,UAAU;AACzD,UAAI,OAAO,MAAM,yBAAyB,iBAAiB,QAAQ,QAAQ,QAAW;AAAA,QACpF;AAAA,MACF,CAAC;AACD,aAAO,YAAY,YAAY,mBAAmB,OAAO,IAAI,IAAI,eAAe,SAAS;AAAA,IAC3F;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAKA,SAAS,kBAAkB,aAAuC;AAChE,SAAO,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,iBAAiB;AAClC,UAAM,WAAW,CAAC,OAAe,gBAA8C;AAC7E,UAAI,SAAS,YAAY,QAAQ;AAC/B,eAAO,aAAa,aAAa,GAAG;AAAA,MACtC;AACA,YAAM,aAAa,YAAY,KAAK;AACpC,UAAI,eAAe,QAAW;AAC5B,eAAO,aAAa,aAAa,GAAG;AAAA,MACtC;AACA,aAAO,WAAW,aAAa,KAAK,CAAC,aAAa,SAAS,QAAQ,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,IACjF;AACA,WAAO,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI;AAAA,EACzB;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,mBAAmB,aAA2B,MAAkC;AACvF,MAAI,KAAK,UAAU,MAAM;AACvB,gBAAY,KAAK,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAAA,EAC1C;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,uBACP,aACA,QACA,MACM;AACN,MAAI,KAAK,cAAc,QAAQ,OAAO,gBAAgB,QAAW;AAC/D,UAAM,UACJ,OAAO,uBAAuB,cAC1B,OAAO,cACP,IAAI,YAAY,OAAO,WAAW;AACxC,gBAAY,KAAK,0BAA0B,OAAO,CAAC;AAAA,EACrD;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,wBACP,aACA,QACA,MACM;AACN,MAAI,KAAK,eAAe,QAAQ,OAAO,WAAW,QAAW;AAC3D,gBAAY,KAAK,2BAA2B,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC;AAAA,EAC5D;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,oBACP,aACA,QACA,MACM;AACN,MAAI,KAAK,WAAW,QAAQ,OAAO,mBAAmB,QAAW;AAC/D,UAAM,OAAO,OAAO,iBAAiB;AACrC,gBAAY;AAAA,MACV,uBAAuB,OAAO,gBAAgB,OAAO,UAAU,MAAM,OAAO,YAAY;AAAA,IAC1F;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,qBACP,aACA,QACA,MACM;AACN,MAAI,KAAK,YAAY,QAAQ,OAAO,YAAY,QAAW;AACzD,UAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,aAAa,OAAO,OAAO;AAC7C,gBAAY,KAAK,wBAAwB,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,EAClE;AACF;AAUA,SAAS,0BACP,aACA,QACA,MACM;AACN,MAAI,KAAK,iBAAiB,MAAM;AAC9B,gBAAY,KAAK,kCAAkC,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,EACrE;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,qBAAqB,QAA6C;AACzE,QAAM,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC;AAC7B,QAAM,cAA4B,CAAC;AAEnC,cAAY,KAAK,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAC1C,qBAAmB,aAAa,IAAI;AACpC,yBAAuB,aAAa,QAAQ,IAAI;AAChD,0BAAwB,aAAa,QAAQ,IAAI;AACjD,sBAAoB,aAAa,QAAQ,IAAI;AAC7C,4BAA0B,aAAa,QAAQ,IAAI;AACnD,uBAAqB,aAAa,QAAQ,IAAI;AAE9C,SAAO;AACT;AAcO,SAAS,sBACd,QACmD;AACnD,QAAM,SAAS,OAAO,UAAU,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AACtE,QAAM,cAAc,qBAAqB,MAAM;AAC/C,QAAM,WAAW,kBAAkB,WAAW;AAE9C,SAAO,CAAC,YAAkD;AACxD,WAAO,OAAO,SAAuC;AACnD,YAAM,iBAAiB,qBAAqB,EAAE,UAAU,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AACzE,YAAM,gBAAgB,OAAO,MAAM,kBAAkB,cAAc,CAAC;AACpE,YAAM,MAAyB,EAAE,gBAAgB,QAAQ,cAAc;AACvE,aAAO,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,WAAW,aAAa,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,IAClF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAUO,SAAS,eACd,UACA,SACA,SACa;AAGb,QAAM,SAAgC;AAAA,IACpC;AAAA,IACA,GAAG;AAAA,EACL;AAEA,QAAM,QAAQ,sBAAsB,MAAM;AAG1C,QAAM,iBAA0C,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ;AAE7D,QAAI,QAAQ,UAAU,GAAG;AACvB,aAAO,QAAQ,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,IAC1B;AACA,WAAQ,QAAwB,IAAI;AAAA,EACtC;AAEA,SAAO,MAAM,cAAc;AAC7B;;;AP/YO,IAAM,yBAAwC;AAAA,EACnD,kBAAkB,aAAa;AAAA,EAC/B,cAAc,aAAa;AAAA,EAC3B,eAAe;AAAA,EACf,eAAe;AACjB;AAMO,IAAM,wBAAgD;AAAA,EAC3D,GAAG,aAAa;AAClB;AAgBO,SAAS,eACd,UACA,UACA,YACQ;AAER,MAAI,eAAe,QAAW;AAC5B,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAEA,QAAM,gBAAgB,UAAU,SAAS;AACzC,QAAM,YAAY,gBAAgB,QAAQ;AAC1C,MAAI,cAAc,QAAW;AAC3B,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAEA,SAAO,wBAAwB,QAAQ;AACzC;AAmCA,SAAS,iBACP,UACA,YACkC;AAClC,QAAM,gBAAgB,UAAU,WAAW;AAE3C,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,kBAAkB,cAAc,cAAc;AAAA,IAC9C,cAAc,cAAc;AAAA,IAC5B,eAAe,cAAc;AAAA,EAC/B;AACF;AA+DO,SAAS,oBACd,UACA,SACA,SAIa;AACb,SAAO,eAAe,UAAU,SAAS;AAAA,IACvC,SAAS,iBAAiB,QAAW,SAAS,SAAS;AAAA,IACvD,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,EACnB,CAAC;AACH;AAiBA,IAAM,gBAAgB,aAAqB,EAAE,WAAW,eAAe,CAAC;AAGxE,SAAS,uBAAuB,OAA6C;AAC3E,QAAM,MAAM;AACZ,QAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO;AAC1B,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK;AACpB,MAAI,UAAU,UAAa,WAAW,OAAW,QAAO;AAExD,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,eAAe;AAAA,IACf,kBAAkB,CAAC,UAAkB,UAAmB;AACtD,YAAM,SAAkC;AAAA,QACtC,eAAe;AAAA,QACf;AAAA,MACF;AACA,UAAI,UAAU,OAAW,QAAO,OAAO,IAAI;AAC3C,aAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,0BAA0B,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAACC,SAAiB;AAC3E,sBAAc,MAAM,wCAAwC;AAAA,UAC1D,OAAO,gBAAgBA,IAAG;AAAA,QAC5B,CAAC;AAAA,MACH,CAAC;AAAA,IACH;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAgBA,SAAS,gBACP,SACA,MACA,aACA,QACwB;AACxB,QAAM,MAAM,MAA8B,QAAQ,IAAI;AAGtD,MAAI,WAAW,UAAa,gBAAgB,QAAW;AACrD,WAAO,mBAAmB,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM,uBAAuB,IAAI,aAAa,GAAG,CAAC;AAAA,EAC1F;AACA,MAAI,WAAW,QAAW;AACxB,WAAO,mBAAmB,IAAI,QAAQ,GAAG;AAAA,EAC3C;AACA,MAAI,gBAAgB,QAAW;AAC7B,WAAO,uBAAuB,IAAI,aAAa,GAAG;AAAA,EACpD;AACA,SAAO,IAAI;AACb;AAWO,SAAS,cACd,SAC2D;AAC3D,SAAO,CAAC,MAAe,UAAmB;AACxC,UAAM,cAAc,uBAAuB,KAAK;AAChD,UAAM,SAAU,OAAgC;AAChD,WAAO,gBAAgB,SAAS,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM;AAAA,EAC3D;AACF;AAYO,IAAM,qCAAqC;AAa3C,IAAM,sCAAsC;AA6BnD,IAAM,cAAc,oBAAI,IAAY;AAGpC,SAAS,2BAA2B,OAAmC;AACrE,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,OAAO,KAAK,gBAAgB,GAAG,mCAAmC;AACxE,UAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI;AACxB,QAAI,CAAC,YAAY,IAAI,GAAG,GAAG;AACzB,UAAI,CAAC,WAAW,GAAG,EAAG,WAAU,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,KAAK,CAAC;AACxD,kBAAY,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,IACrB;AACA,mBAAe,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,EAC5D,SAASA,MAAK;AACZ,kBAAc,MAAM,uDAAuD;AAAA,MACzE,OAAO,gBAAgBA,IAAG;AAAA,IAC5B,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,+BAA+B,QAA2C;AACjF,QAAM,WAAW,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AACpD,MAAI,aAAa,QAAQ,OAAO,aAAa,YAAY,mBAAmB,UAAU;AACpF,UAAM,MAAO,SAAyC;AACtD,QAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,SAAU,QAAO;AAAA,EACtC;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAGA,SAAS,8BAA8B,QAA2C;AAChF,QAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC;AAC9B,MAAI,OAAO,SAAS,UAAU,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,UAAU;AAC5D,WAAO,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG;AAAA,EAChC;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAmBA,SAAS,mBACP,KACA,SACA,IACA,SACsB;AACtB,QAAM,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;AACpB,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA,UAAU,IAAI;AAAA,IACd,qBAAqB,IAAI;AAAA,IACzB,iBAAiB;AAAA,IACjB,WAAW,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IACpC,SAAS,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IAClC,YAAY,KAAK;AAAA,IACjB,SAAS,QAAQ;AAAA,IACjB,GAAI,QAAQ,kBAAkB,SAAY,EAAE,eAAe,QAAQ,cAAc,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACtF,GAAI,QAAQ,iBAAiB,SAAY,EAAE,cAAc,QAAQ,aAAa,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EACrF;AACF;AAGA,SAAS,eAAe,QAAwC;AAC9D,MAAI,OAAO,YAAY,KAAM,QAAO,EAAE,SAAS,UAAU;AACzD,QAAM,gBAAgB,+BAA+B,MAAM;AAC3D,QAAM,eAAe,8BAA8B,MAAM;AACzD,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,SAAS;AAAA,IACT,GAAI,kBAAkB,SAAY,EAAE,cAAc,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACvD,GAAI,iBAAiB,SAAY,EAAE,aAAa,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EACvD;AACF;AAGA,eAAe,kBAAkB,KAAkD;AACjF,QAAM,UAAU,WAAW;AAC3B,QAAM,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;AACpB,MAAI,IAAI;AAAA,IACN;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,MACE,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACV;AAAA,MACA,qBAAqB,IAAI;AAAA,MACzB,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACjB,aACE;AAAA,IACJ;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,gBAAgB,IAAI,SAAS,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,aAAa,IAAI,MAAM;AACvF,+BAA2B,mBAAmB,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,eAAe,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AACvF,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,SAASA,MAAK;AACZ;AAAA,MACE,mBAAmB,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI;AAAA,QACnC,SAAS;AAAA,QACT,cAAc,gBAAgBA,IAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG;AAAA,MACjD,CAAC;AAAA,IACH;AACA,UAAMA;AAAA,EACR;AACF;AA0BO,SAAS,6BACd,SACA,UACA,qBACA,QAC2D;AAC3D,QAAM,MAAM,UAAU;AACtB,SAAO,CAAC,MAAe,UAAmB;AACxC,UAAM,cAAc,uBAAuB,KAAK;AAChD,UAAM,SAAU,OAAgC;AAChD,UAAM,aACJ,sBAAsB,sCAAsC,gBAAgB;AAC9E,QAAI,CAAC,WAAY,QAAO,gBAAgB,SAAS,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM;AAC1E,WAAO,kBAAkB;AAAA,MACvB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AACF;;;AQveO,IAAM,mBAAmE,OAAO;AAAA,EACrF,OAAO;AAAA,IACL,cAAc,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU;AAAA,MAC3B,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,EAAE,aAAa,MAAM,aAAa,aAAa,MAAM,YAAY;AAAA,IACnE,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AACF;AAYO,SAAS,kBAAkB,UAA+C;AAC/E,SAAO,iBAAiB,QAAQ,GAAG;AACrC;;;ACJO,SAAS,mBAAmB,MAA+B;AAChE,QAAM,QAAQ,iBAAkB,IAAI;AACpC,MAAI,UAAU,QAAW;AACvB,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,0CAA0C,IAAI;AAAA,IAChD;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO,MAAM;AACf;;;ACnDA,SAAS,KAAAC,UAAS;AAWX,IAAM,2BAA2BA,GAAE,KAAK;AAAA,EAC7C;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF,CAAC;AAMM,IAAM,qBAAqBA,GAAE,KAAK,CAAC,WAAW,UAAU,SAAS,CAAC;AAMlE,IAAM,uBAAuBA,GAAE,KAAK;AAAA,EACzC;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF,CAAC;AAOM,IAAM,0BAA0BA,GAAE,KAAK;AAAA,EAC5C;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF,CAAC;AAMM,IAAM,uBAAuB,wBAAwB;AAQ5D,IAAM,qBAAqBA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EAClC,SAASA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,EAClC,UAAUA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,EACnC,UAAUA,GAAE,KAAK,CAAC,YAAY,QAAQ,UAAU,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAAA,EACxE,MAAMA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,IACb,mBAAmBA,GAAE,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU,UAAU,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,IAC5E,kBAAkBA,GAAE,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU,UAAU,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,IAC3E,iBAAiBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE;AAAA,IACtC,8BAA8BA,GAAE,KAAK,CAAC,UAAU,UAAU,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,EACzF,CAAC;AAAA,EACD,OAAOA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,GAAI;AACnC,CAAC;AAKM,IAAM,aAAaA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EACjC,UAAU;AAAA,EACV,WAAWA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,0BAA0B;AAAA,EAChE,YAAYA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,sBAAsB;AAAA,EACpE,YAAYA,GAAE,MAAMA,GAAE,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,yBAAyB;AAAA;AAAA,EAE7E,qBAAqBA,GAClB,MAAM,uBAAuB,EAC7B,SAAS,EACT,SAAS,qDAAqD;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAGjE,UAAUA,GAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,mCAAmC;AAAA,EAC7F,WAAWA,GAAE,IAAI,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS;AACvC,CAAC;AAMM,IAAM,iBAAiBA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EACrC,IAAIA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,gCAAgC;AAAA,EACnE,OAAOA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,GAAG,EAAE,SAAS,sBAAsB;AAAA,EACjE,aAAaA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,+BAA+B;AAAA,EACvE,WAAW;AAAA,EACX,SAASA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,yBAAyB;AAAA,EAClF,gBAAgBA,GAAE,MAAMA,GAAE,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,0BAA0B;AAAA,EAClF,UAAUA,GAAE,OAAOA,GAAE,OAAO,GAAGA,GAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,oBAAoB;AAAA,EACpF,WAAWA,GAAE,IAAI,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS;AACvC,CAAC;AAgDM,IAAM,wBAAwBA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EAC5C,YAAYA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EACrB,UAAU;AAAA,EACV,SAAS;AAAA,EACT,OAAOA,GAAE,IAAIA,GAAE,OAAO,GAAG,UAAU;AAAA,EACnC,YAAYA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,IACnB,SAASA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IACtC,QAAQA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IACrC,SAASA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IACtC,OAAOA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EACtC,CAAC;AAAA,EACD,gBAAgBA,GACb,OAAO;AAAA,IACN,SAASA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IAChC,QAAQA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IAC/B,SAASA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IAChC,aAAaA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EACtC,CAAC,EACA,SAAS;AAAA,EACZ,oBAAoBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,EAC7C,eAAeA,GAAE,QAAQ;AAAA,EACzB,WAAWA,GAAE,IAAI,SAAS;AAAA,EAC1B,UAAUA,GAAE,IAAI,SAAS;AAAA,EACzB,YAAYA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;AAC3C,CAAC;AAgBM,IAAM,yBAAyBA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EAC7C,SAASA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EAClB,YAAYA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EACzC,cAAcA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EAC3C,aAAaA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EACpC,aAAaA,GAAE,IAAI,SAAS;AAC9B,CAAC;AAkCM,IAAM,oCAA6D;AAAA,EACxE,SAAS;AAAA,EACT,oBAAoB;AAAA,EACpB,oBAAoB;AAAA,EACpB,qBAAqB;AAAA,EACrB,eAAe;AACjB;AA+BO,IAAM,4BAA4BA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EAChD,SAASA,GAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ,KAAK;AAAA,EAClC,OAAOA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAO;AAAA;AAAA,EAClD,YAAYA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,GAAG;AACrD,CAAC;AAKM,IAAM,8BAA8BA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EAClD,gBAAgBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,GAAM;AAAA;AAAA,EAC1D,oBAAoBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,EACzD,oBAAoBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,GAAG;AAAA,EAC3D,2BAA2BA,GAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,EACnD,oBAAoBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,GAAI;AAAA;AAAA,EAC5D,eAAe,0BAA0B,SAAS;AAAA;AACpD,CAAC;AAKM,IAAM,2BAAkD;AAAA,EAC7D,gBAAgB;AAAA;AAAA,EAChB,oBAAoB;AAAA,EACpB,oBAAoB;AAAA,EACpB,2BAA2B;AAAA,EAC3B,oBAAoB;AAAA;AACtB;AAUO,IAAM,0BAA0B;AAKhC,IAAM,oBAAwD;AAAA,EACnE,iBAAiB;AAAA,EACjB,eAAe;AAAA,EACf,WAAW;AAAA,EACX,mBAAmB;AAAA;AAAA,EACnB,cAAc;AAAA;AAAA,EACd,cAAc;AAAA;AAChB;AAuCO,IAAM,yBAAyBA,GAAE,OAAO;AAAA,EAC7C,gBAAgBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EAC7C,mBAAmBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EAChD,mBAAmBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EAChD,mBAAmBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EAChD,mBAAmBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EAC1C,yBAAyBA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EAChD,gBAAgBA,GAAE,OAAO,0BAA0BA,GAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC;AACnF,CAAC;","names":["z","READ_ONLY_TOOLS","AsyncLocalStorage","AsyncLocalStorage","err","z"]}