newmark-agent 0.4.4 → 0.4.6

package/dist/tools/index.js

@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ const terminalTakeover_1 = require("./terminalTakeover");
 const computerUse_1 = require("./computerUse");
 const nativeTools_1 = require("./nativeTools");
 const ssh_1 = require("../core/ssh");
+const workspace_1 = require("../core/workspace");
 const wslHostToolBridge_1 = require("../core/wslHostToolBridge");
 const utilityHostToolBridge_1 = require("../core/utilityHostToolBridge");
 const toolPolicy_1 = require("../core/toolPolicy");
@@ -61,6 +62,41 @@ const computerUseSession_1 = require("../core/computerUseSession");
 function normalizeComputerUseAction(action) {
     return String(action || '').trim().toLowerCase();
 }
+/**
+ * 统一跨环境路径归一。WSL 运行时里，Agent 可能用 Windows 盘符路径（`C:\...` /
+ * `C:/...`）引用 Windows 工作区；Linux 的 `path.isAbsolute` 不认识盘符，会把
+ * 它误当相对路径拼到 `/mnt/...` 工作区下。这里先把盘符路径转换为 `/mnt/<drive>/...`，
+ * 再做常规的绝对/相对判断。非 WSL 运行时行为与旧的 `resolve` 完全一致。
+ */
+function normalizeCrossEnvPath(value, wsPath) {
+    const raw = String(value || '').trim();
+    if (!raw)
+        return wsPath;
+    if (process.env.NEWMARK_WSL_DISTRO) {
+        const posix = (0, workspace_1.windowsDrivePathToPosix)(raw);
+        if (posix)
+            return posix;
+    }
+    if (path.isAbsolute(raw))
+        return raw;
+    return path.join(wsPath, raw);
+}
+/**
+ * WSL 运行时：把 bash 命令里出现的 Windows 盘符路径保守翻译为 `/mnt/<drive>/...`。
+ * 仅替换「以盘符开头、后跟路径字符（不含空白、引号、反引号与 shell 元字符）」的
+ * token，避免误伤 `C:` 标签、环境变量与字符串字面量。非 WSL 原样返回。
+ */
+function translateWindowsPathsForWslBash(script) {
+    if (!process.env.NEWMARK_WSL_DISTRO)
+        return script;
+    const value = String(script || '');
+    if (!/[A-Za-z]:[\\/]/.test(value))
+        return value;
+    return value.replace(/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])([A-Za-z]):[\\/]([^\s"'`;|&<>()]+)/g, (_match, drive, rest) => {
+        const posix = rest.replace(/\\/g, '/').replace(/\/+$/, '');
+        return `/mnt/${drive.toLowerCase()}/${posix}`;
+    });
+}
 function computerUseOwner(context, wsPath) {
     const conversationId = String(context.conversationId || '').trim();
     if (conversationId)
@@ -422,12 +458,15 @@ class ToolExecutor {
                 include_remote: { type: 'boolean' },
                 base_ref: { type: 'string' },
             }, []),
-            t('repo_security_audit', 'Review a local or remote-backed repository for release/privacy risk before remote actions. Reports GitHub/private/public state, dirty files, ignored local-only files, likely secret material, release-excluded paths, and recommended next checks. Read-only.', {
+            t('repo_security_audit', 'Review a local or remote-backed repository for release/privacy risk before remote actions. Reports GitHub/private/public state, dirty files, ignored local-only files, likely secret material, privacy addresses (credential URLs, private network addresses, local user paths), release-excluded paths, and recommended next checks. Read-only.', {
                 path: { type: 'string' },
                 base_ref: { type: 'string' },
             }, []),
             t('git_pull', 'Pull from remote', {}, []),
-            t('git_push', 'Stage, commit, push', { message: { type: 'string' } }, ['message']),
+            t('git_push', 'Stage, commit, and push changes. Before a remote push, an automatic repository security review runs: if it finds high-risk content (personal keys/tokens or privacy addresses such as credential URLs, private network addresses, or local user paths), the push is BLOCKED. Complete a second review of every reported finding (remove/ignore it or confirm it is safe), then call git_push again with security_review_confirmed=true to proceed.', {
+                message: { type: 'string' },
+                security_review_confirmed: { type: 'boolean', description: 'Set true only after a second review resolved or explicitly confirmed every reported high-risk finding.' },
+            }, ['message']),
             t('git_clone', 'Clone a git repo', { url: { type: 'string' }, path: { type: 'string' } }, ['url', 'path']),
             t('git_branch', 'Inspect or manage local git branches. Actions: current, list, create, switch.', {
                 action: { type: 'string', enum: ['current', 'list', 'create', 'switch'] },
@@ -445,12 +484,13 @@ class ToolExecutor {
                 remote: { type: 'boolean' },
                 remote_name: { type: 'string' },
             }, []),
-            t('gh_pr_create', 'Create a GitHub pull request for the current branch through GitHub CLI. Requires explicit title and body.', {
+            t('gh_pr_create', 'Create a GitHub pull request for the current branch through GitHub CLI. Requires explicit title and body. Before creation, the same automatic repository security review as git_push runs: high-risk findings (personal keys/tokens or privacy addresses) BLOCK creation until a second review resolves them and you call again with security_review_confirmed=true.', {
                 title: { type: 'string' },
                 body: { type: 'string' },
                 base: { type: 'string' },
                 head: { type: 'string' },
                 draft: { type: 'boolean' },
+                security_review_confirmed: { type: 'boolean', description: 'Set true only after a second review resolved or explicitly confirmed every reported high-risk finding.' },
             }, ['title', 'body']),
         ];
         let visibleTools = tools.filter((tool) => (0, nativeTools_1.isNativeToolEnabled)(tool.function?.name || '', this.config.nativeToolEnabled()));
@@ -571,11 +611,7 @@ class ToolExecutor {
             const value = args[k];
             return value === undefined || value === null ? '' : String(value);
         };
-        const resolve = (relPath) => {
-            if (path.isAbsolute(relPath))
-                return relPath;
-            return path.join(wsPath, relPath);
-        };
+        const resolve = (relPath) => normalizeCrossEnvPath(relPath, wsPath);
         const targetForTool = () => {
             switch (tool) {
                 case 'read':
@@ -911,7 +947,7 @@ class ToolExecutor {
                 case 'file_audit': return await this.fileAudit(resolve(g('path') || '.'), wsPath, args.include_remote !== false, g('base_ref'), context.signal);
                 case 'repo_security_audit': return await this.repoSecurityAudit(resolve(g('path') || '.'), wsPath, g('base_ref'), context.signal);
                 case 'git_pull': return await this.gpull(wsPath, context.signal);
-                case 'git_push': return await this.withRemoteSecurityPreamble(wsPath, () => this.gpush(g('message'), wsPath, context.signal), context.signal);
+                case 'git_push': return await this.withRemoteSecurityPreamble(wsPath, () => this.gpush(g('message'), wsPath, context.signal), context.signal, args.security_review_confirmed === true);
                 case 'git_clone': return await this.gclone(g('url'), resolve(g('path')), context.signal);
                 case 'git_branch': return await this.gbranch(g('action'), g('name'), g('start_point'), wsPath, context.signal);
                 case 'gh_auth_status': return await this.gh(['auth', 'status'], wsPath, context.signal);
@@ -919,7 +955,7 @@ class ToolExecutor {
                 case 'gh_issue_list': return await this.ghList('issue', g('repo'), Number(args.limit || 20), wsPath, context.signal);
                 case 'gh_pr_list': return await this.ghList('pr', g('repo'), Number(args.limit || 20), wsPath, context.signal);
                 case 'gh_fork': return await this.ghFork(g('action'), g('repo'), args.clone === true, args.remote === true, g('remote_name'), wsPath, context.signal);
-                case 'gh_pr_create': return await this.withRemoteSecurityPreamble(wsPath, () => this.ghPrCreate(g('title'), g('body'), g('base'), g('head'), args.draft === true, wsPath, context.signal), context.signal);
+                case 'gh_pr_create': return await this.withRemoteSecurityPreamble(wsPath, () => this.ghPrCreate(g('title'), g('body'), g('base'), g('head'), args.draft === true, wsPath, context.signal), context.signal, args.security_review_confirmed === true);
                 default: return `[?] Unknown tool: ${tool}`;
             }
         }
@@ -1064,7 +1100,7 @@ class ToolExecutor {
             if (!this.looksLikePath(token))
                 continue;
             const withoutWildcard = token.replace(/[\\/][*?][^\\/]*$/g, '');
-            refs.push(path.isAbsolute(withoutWildcard) ? path.resolve(withoutWildcard) : path.resolve(wsPath, withoutWildcard));
+            refs.push(path.resolve(normalizeCrossEnvPath(withoutWildcard, wsPath)));
         }
         return Array.from(new Set(refs));
     }
@@ -1100,9 +1136,13 @@ class ToolExecutor {
         if (!cmd.trim())
             return '[bash] No command.';
         const timeout = this.resolveBashTimeout(timeoutMs);
+        // WSL 运行时跨环境归一：工作目录若仍是 Windows 盘符路径则转 /mnt/<drive>/...，
+        // 命令内的 Windows 盘符路径保守翻译为 WSL 挂载路径，让 bash 能直接操作 Windows 工作区。
+        const workspaceCwd = process.env.NEWMARK_WSL_DISTRO ? ((0, workspace_1.windowsDrivePathToPosix)(ws) || ws) : ws;
+        const translatedCmd = translateWindowsPathsForWslBash(cmd);
         try {
-            const result = await (0, nativeBash_1.executeWorkspaceBash)(cmd, ws, {
-                cwd: ws,
+            const result = await (0, nativeBash_1.executeWorkspaceBash)(translatedCmd, workspaceCwd, {
+                cwd: workspaceCwd,
                 timeoutMs: timeout,
                 signal,
                 allowHostFallback: true,
@@ -1739,6 +1779,7 @@ class ToolExecutor {
         const ignoredFiles = await this.gitExecAt(repoRoot, ['ls-files', '--others', '--ignored', '--exclude-standard'], signal);
         const changedAgainstBase = chosenBase ? await this.gitExecAt(repoRoot, ['diff', '--name-status', chosenBase], signal) : '';
         const secretFindings = this.scanRepositorySecrets(repoRoot, trackedFiles, statusShort);
+        const privacyFindings = this.scanRepositoryPrivacyLeaks(repoRoot, trackedFiles, statusShort);
         const localOnlyFindings = this.releaseExcludedPathFindings(repoRoot, ignoredFiles);
         const repoInfo = ghRemote
             ? await this.ghJson(['api', `repos/${ghRemote.owner}/${ghRemote.name}`, '--jq', '{name: .full_name, private: .private, visibility: .visibility, fork: .fork, archived: .archived, default_branch: .default_branch, html_url: .html_url}'], repoRoot, signal)
@@ -1751,6 +1792,8 @@ class ToolExecutor {
             risks.push('Remote GitHub repository is public; treat all tracked content and PR metadata as publicly visible.');
         if (ghRemote && secretFindings.length)
             risks.push('Potential secret-like material appears in tracked or changed files.');
+        if (ghRemote && privacyFindings.length)
+            risks.push('Privacy-address content (credential URLs, private network addresses, or local user paths) appears in tracked or changed files.');
         if (ghRemote && localOnlyFindings.length)
             risks.push('Workspace contains release-excluded/local-only files that must stay out of remote commits and public reports.');
         if (ghRemote && String(statusShort || '').trim())
@@ -1791,12 +1834,14 @@ class ToolExecutor {
                 verdict: risks.length ? 'review-required' : 'no-obvious-risk',
                 risks,
                 secret_findings: secretFindings,
+                privacy_findings: privacyFindings,
+                high_risk_findings: [...secretFindings, ...privacyFindings],
                 release_excluded_local_files: localOnlyFindings,
                 recommendations,
             },
         }, null, 2);
     }
-    scanRepositorySecrets(repoRoot, trackedFilesRaw, statusRaw) {
+    collectRepositoryFiles(trackedFilesRaw, statusRaw) {
         const files = new Set();
         for (const line of String(trackedFilesRaw || '').split(/\r?\n/)) {
             const rel = line.trim();
@@ -1808,6 +1853,10 @@ class ToolExecutor {
             if (rel)
                 files.add(rel.replace(/\\/g, '/'));
         }
+        return files;
+    }
+    scanRepositorySecrets(repoRoot, trackedFilesRaw, statusRaw) {
+        const files = this.collectRepositoryFiles(trackedFilesRaw, statusRaw);
         const patterns = [
             { id: 'openai_or_generic_sk_key', re: /\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9._-]{16,}\b/ },
             { id: 'github_token', re: /\b(?:ghp|gho|ghu|ghs|ghr)_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}\b/ },
@@ -1834,7 +1883,50 @@ class ToolExecutor {
             for (const [idx, line] of text.split(/\r?\n/).entries()) {
                 const matched = patterns.find(p => p.re.test(line));
                 if (matched) {
-                    findings.push({ path: rel, line: idx + 1, type: matched.id, sample: line.replace(/=.*/, '= <redacted>').replace(/\b(?:sk|gh[pousr]|sk-ant)-[A-Za-z0-9._-]{8,}\b/g, '<redacted-token>').slice(0, 160) });
+                    // 只汇报「类型 + 位置」，绝不把密钥值（含脱敏样本）暴露给 Agent，
+                    // 避免经 API 中转被拦截窃取。
+                    findings.push({ path: rel, line: idx + 1, type: matched.id });
+                    if (findings.length >= 40)
+                        break;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        return findings;
+    }
+    /**
+     * 扫描隐私地址类高危信息：带凭据的 URL（user:pass@）、私网 IP、本地用户目录
+     * 绝对路径（C:\Users\<user>、/home/<user>、/Users/<user>）。这些内容泄露个人
+     * 账号、内网拓扑或本地机器结构，进入公开 remote 即构成隐私暴露，需与密钥同级
+     * 硬性阻挡并在 Agent 二轮审查确认后放行。
+     */
+    scanRepositoryPrivacyLeaks(repoRoot, trackedFilesRaw, statusRaw) {
+        const files = this.collectRepositoryFiles(trackedFilesRaw, statusRaw);
+        const patterns = [
+            { id: 'credential_url', re: /(?:https?|git|ssh|ftp):\/\/[^\s/@:]+:[^\s/@]+@/i },
+            { id: 'private_network_address', re: /\b(?:10\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}|192\.168\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}|172\.(?:1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})\b/ },
+            { id: 'local_user_path', re: /(?:^|[\s"'`])(?:C:\\(?:Users|Documents and Settings)\\[^\\\s"']+|~\/(?:[^/\s"']+\/){1,3}|\/(?:home|Users)\/[^/\s"']+\/[^\s"']*)/ },
+        ];
+        const findings = [];
+        for (const rel of Array.from(files).sort()) {
+            if (findings.length >= 40)
+                break;
+            const full = path.join(repoRoot, rel);
+            if (!fs.existsSync(full) || !fs.statSync(full).isFile())
+                continue;
+            if (fs.statSync(full).size > 512 * 1024)
+                continue;
+            let text = '';
+            try {
+                text = fs.readFileSync(full, 'utf-8');
+            }
+            catch {
+                continue;
+            }
+            for (const [idx, line] of text.split(/\r?\n/).entries()) {
+                const matched = patterns.find(p => p.re.test(line));
+                if (matched) {
+                    // 只汇报「类型 + 位置」，绝不把隐私地址值暴露给 Agent。
+                    findings.push({ path: rel, line: idx + 1, type: matched.id });
                     if (findings.length >= 40)
                         break;
                 }
@@ -1940,7 +2032,7 @@ class ToolExecutor {
             args.push('--draft');
         return this.gh(args, ws, signal);
     }
-    async withRemoteSecurityPreamble(ws, action, signal) {
+    async withRemoteSecurityPreamble(ws, action, signal, securityReviewConfirmed = false) {
         const repoRoot = await this.findGitRoot(ws, ws, signal);
         if (!repoRoot)
             return await action();
@@ -1954,6 +2046,11 @@ class ToolExecutor {
             const remote = audit.remote || {};
             const risks = Array.isArray(review.risks) ? review.risks : [];
             const findings = Array.isArray(review.secret_findings) ? review.secret_findings : [];
+            const privacy = Array.isArray(review.privacy_findings) ? review.privacy_findings : [];
+            const highRisk = [...findings, ...privacy];
+            if (highRisk.length && !securityReviewConfirmed) {
+                return this.formatRemoteSecurityBlock(remote, findings, privacy);
+            }
             const localOnly = Array.isArray(review.release_excluded_local_files) ? review.release_excluded_local_files : [];
             summary = [
                 '[repo_security_audit]',
@@ -1961,8 +2058,10 @@ class ToolExecutor {
                 `verdict=${review.verdict || 'unknown'}`,
                 risks.length ? `risks=${risks.length}` : 'risks=0',
                 findings.length ? `secret_findings=${findings.length}` : 'secret_findings=0',
+                privacy.length ? `privacy_findings=${privacy.length}` : 'privacy_findings=0',
                 localOnly.length ? `release_excluded_local_files=${localOnly.length}` : 'release_excluded_local_files=0',
-            ].join(' ');
+                securityReviewConfirmed ? 'security_review_confirmed=true' : '',
+            ].filter(Boolean).join(' ');
         }
         catch {
             // Keep the remote action result visible even if the preflight summary cannot be parsed.
@@ -1970,6 +2069,33 @@ class ToolExecutor {
         const actionOutput = await action();
         return `${summary}\n${actionOutput}`;
     }
+    /**
+     * 硬性阻挡远程写：当密钥或隐私地址类高危信息存在且 Agent 尚未二轮审查确认时，
+     * 返回明确的阻挡结果（脱敏 findings），要求处理/确认后再以
+     * security_review_confirmed=true 重试放行。
+     */
+    formatRemoteSecurityBlock(remote, secretFindings, privacyFindings) {
+        // 只汇报「类型 + 位置」，绝不把密钥值 / 隐私地址值（含脱敏样本）暴露给 Agent。
+        const detail = (finding) => `${String(finding.path || '')}:${String(finding.line || '')} [${String(finding.type || '')}]`.trim();
+        const lines = [
+            '[repo_security_audit] BLOCKED: remote write refused pending a second review.',
+            'High-risk content was detected in tracked or changed files.',
+            `Remote: ${remote.provider || 'git'}${remote.repository ? ` ${remote.repository}` : ''}.`,
+            `Secret-like findings: ${secretFindings.length}; privacy-address findings: ${privacyFindings.length}.`,
+        ];
+        if (secretFindings.length) {
+            lines.push('Secret-like findings:');
+            for (const finding of secretFindings.slice(0, 12))
+                lines.push(`  - ${detail(finding)}`);
+        }
+        if (privacyFindings.length) {
+            lines.push('Privacy-address findings:');
+            for (const finding of privacyFindings.slice(0, 12))
+                lines.push(`  - ${detail(finding)}`);
+        }
+        lines.push('Second review required: remove, .gitignore, or explicitly confirm each finding is safe.', 'Then retry this action with security_review_confirmed=true.');
+        return lines.join('\n');
+    }
     async gstat(ws, signal) {
         try {
             const r = await this.gitExec('git status --short', ws, signal);

package/dist/tui/src/adapters/core-runtime-adapter.js

@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ function createCoreRuntimeAdapter(options = {}) {
   const { AutomationManager } = require(path.join(desktopDist, "core", "automation.js"));
   const { FlowEngine } = require(path.join(desktopDist, "core", "flow.js"));
   const installUpdate = require(path.join(desktopDist, "core", "installUpdate.js"));
+  const mobilePairing = require(path.join(desktopDist, "core", "mobilePairing.js"));
   const root = path.resolve(options.root || path.join(os.homedir(), ".Newmark"));
   const workspacePath = safeWorkspacePath(root, options.workspacePath || process.cwd());
   ensureRuntimeRoot(root, configModule);
@@ -211,7 +212,8 @@ function createCoreRuntimeAdapter(options = {}) {
     defaultTerminalShell: agent.config.getStr("terminal", "default_shell") || (process.platform === "win32" ? "powershell" : "bash"),
     status: agent.status,
     connected: true,
-    runtimeRoot: root
+    runtimeRoot: root,
+    remoteTouchEnabled: agent.config.getBool('remote', 'touch_enabled')
   });
 
   const snapshotFor = (requested = currentTarget()) => {
@@ -473,6 +475,20 @@ function createCoreRuntimeAdapter(options = {}) {
     updateVersion() {
       return { version: installUpdate.currentAppVersion(), root };
     },
+    async pairingQr() {
+      const qr = await mobilePairing.pairingQrAscii(root);
+      return {
+        ascii: qr.ascii,
+        url: qr.session.url,
+        pairingId: qr.session.pairingId,
+        expiresAt: qr.session.expiresAt,
+        tokenFile: mobilePairing.pairingTokenPath(root),
+        tailscaleIpv4: mobilePairing.tailscaleIpv4(),
+      };
+    },
+    pairingStatus() {
+      return mobilePairing.pairingStatus(root);
+    },
     updateCheckGithub(input = {}) {
       return installUpdate.checkGitHubUpdate(input.repo, input.tag, input.asset, input.token);
     },

package/dist/tui/src/app.js

@@ -93,6 +93,46 @@ function executeAction(state, action) {
     const appearance = applyThemeAppearance(state, state.theme === "dark" ? "Light" : "Dark");
     state.adapter.saveConfig(appearance);
     state.notice = `${state.theme === "dark" ? "Dark" : "Light"} terminal theme`;
+  } else if (action === "pair-mobile") {
+    state.overlay = "pair";
+    state.pairingQrLines = ["Loading pairing QR…"];
+    state.pairingUrl = "";
+    state.pairingTokenFile = "";
+    if (typeof state.requestPaint === "function") state.requestPaint();
+    if (typeof state.adapter.pairingQr !== "function") {
+      state.pairingQrLines = ["Pairing QR is unavailable in this adapter."];
+      if (typeof state.requestPaint === "function") state.requestPaint();
+      return;
+    }
+    Promise.resolve(state.adapter.pairingQr())
+      .then((pairing) => {
+        state.pairingQrLines = String(pairing?.ascii || "").split(/\r?\n/);
+        state.pairingUrl = String(pairing?.url || "");
+        state.pairingTokenFile = String(pairing?.tokenFile || "");
+        if (typeof state.requestPaint === "function") state.requestPaint();
+        if (typeof state.adapter.pairingStatus === "function") {
+          if (state._pairingPoll) clearInterval(state._pairingPoll);
+          state._pairingPoll = setInterval(() => {
+            const status = state.adapter.pairingStatus();
+            if (!status) return;
+            if (status.confirmed) {
+              clearInterval(state._pairingPoll);
+              state.overlay = null;
+              state.notice = "Mobile device connected";
+              if (typeof state.requestPaint === "function") state.requestPaint();
+            } else if (status.expired || !status.active) {
+              clearInterval(state._pairingPoll);
+              state.overlay = null;
+              state.notice = "Pairing window expired";
+              if (typeof state.requestPaint === "function") state.requestPaint();
+            }
+          }, 1000);
+        }
+      })
+      .catch((error) => {
+        state.pairingQrLines = [`Pairing failed: ${error?.message || error}`];
+        if (typeof state.requestPaint === "function") state.requestPaint();
+      });
   } else if (action === "help") {
     state.overlay = "help";
   }
@@ -166,6 +206,7 @@ function start(options = {}) {
     return;
   }
   const state = createState({ adapter });
+  state.requestPaint = () => paint();
   let timer = null;
   let animationTimer = null;
   let closing = false;

package/dist/tui/src/data.js

@@ -315,6 +315,7 @@ const commands = [
   { label: "Open Automations", hint: "", action: "view:automation" },
   { label: "Open WorkFlow", hint: "", action: "view:workflow" },
   { label: "Open Settings", hint: "", action: "view:settings" },
+  { label: "Show mobile pairing QR", hint: "", action: "pair-mobile" },
   { label: "New conversation", hint: "N", action: "new-chat" },
   { label: "Toggle theme", hint: "T", action: "theme" },
   { label: "Keyboard shortcuts", hint: "?", action: "help" }

package/dist/tui/src/render.js

@@ -1154,6 +1154,17 @@ function overlayLines(state, width, p) {
       `${p.cyan}Press Esc or ? to close${p.reset}`
     ], Math.min(78, width - 4), p, "Keyboard shortcuts");
   }
+  if (state.overlay === "pair") {
+    const qrLines = Array.isArray(state.pairingQrLines) ? state.pairingQrLines : [];
+    const rows = [
+      ...qrLines,
+      "",
+      ...(state.pairingUrl ? [`${p.muted}${state.pairingUrl}${p.reset}`] : []),
+      ...(state.pairingTokenFile ? [`${p.muted}Token: ${state.pairingTokenFile}${p.reset}`] : []),
+      `${p.cyan}Scan with the Newmark mobile app · Esc close${p.reset}`
+    ];
+    return card(rows, Math.min(88, width - 4), p, "Pair mobile device");
+  }
   if (state.overlay === "palette") {
     const commands = filteredCommands(state);
     const paletteViewport = Math.min(7, Math.max(1, commands.length));

package/dist/tui/src/settings-schema.js

@@ -23,7 +23,9 @@ function settingsRows(state, tab = state.settingsTab) {
     { key: "dialogStyle", label: "Conversation style", value: s.general.dialogStyle, choices: ["Formal", "Friendly"], save: ["config", "dialogStyle"] },
     { key: "feedbackLevel", label: "Option feedback", value: s.general.feedbackLevel, choices: ["Default", "Ask more", "Ask less", "Autonomous"], save: ["config", "feedbackLevel"] },
     { key: "closeBehavior", label: "Close behavior", value: s.general.closeBehavior, choices: ["Close app", "Minimize to tray"], save: ["setting", "general", "close_behavior"] },
-    { key: "expandTools", label: "Expand tool usage", value: s.general.expandTools, choices: [true, false], save: ["setting", "general", "expand_tools"] }
+    { key: "expandTools", label: "Expand tool usage", value: s.general.expandTools, choices: [true, false], save: ["setting", "general", "expand_tools"] },
+    { key: "remoteTouch", label: "Remote behavior · Mobile remote-touch", value: s.general.remoteTouch, choices: [true, false], save: ["setting", "remote", "touch_enabled"] },
+    { key: "remotePair", label: "Remote behavior · Start connection", value: "Open QR", choices: [], action: "pair-mobile" }
   ];
   if (tab === "personalization") return [
     { key: "theme", label: "Theme", value: s.personalization.theme, choices: ["Dark", "Light", "System"], save: ["config", "theme"] },

package/dist/tui/src/state.js

@@ -253,7 +253,8 @@ function createState(options = {}) {
         dialogStyle: snapshot.dialogStyle === "friendly" ? "Friendly" : "Formal",
         feedbackLevel: { ask_more: "Ask more", ask_less: "Ask less", fully_autonomous: "Autonomous" }[snapshot.feedback] || "Default",
         closeBehavior: snapshot.closeBehavior === "minimize" ? "Minimize to tray" : "Close app",
-        expandTools: snapshot.expandToolsDefault !== false
+        expandTools: snapshot.expandToolsDefault !== false,
+        remoteTouch: snapshot.remoteTouchEnabled !== false
       },
       personalization: {
         theme: { light: "Light", system: "System", dark: "Dark" }[String(snapshot.darkMode || "dark").toLowerCase()] || "Dark",
@@ -1071,6 +1072,25 @@ function toggleSelected(state) {
     }
     const row = settingsRows(state)[state.selected];
     if (!row) return;
+    if (row.action === "pair-mobile") {
+      state.overlay = "pair";
+      state.pairingQrLines = ["Loading pairing QR…"];
+      state.pairingUrl = "";
+      state.pairingTokenFile = "";
+      if (typeof state.adapter.pairingQr !== "function") {
+        state.pairingQrLines = ["Pairing QR is unavailable in this adapter."];
+        return false;
+      }
+      return Promise.resolve(state.adapter.pairingQr()).then((pairing) => {
+        state.pairingQrLines = String(pairing?.ascii || "").split(/\r?\n/);
+        state.pairingUrl = String(pairing?.url || "");
+        state.pairingTokenFile = String(pairing?.tokenFile || "");
+        return true;
+      }).catch((error) => {
+        state.pairingQrLines = [`Pairing failed: ${error?.message || error}`];
+        return false;
+      });
+    }
     if (state.settingsTab === "general" && row.key === "inputBehavior") {
       const current = row.choices.findIndex((value) => value === row.value);
       state.settingChoiceTab = state.settingsTab;