neoagent 2.4.4-beta.0 → 2.4.4-beta.4

package/README.md

@@ -77,12 +77,14 @@ please report failures with enough detail to reproduce them. Contributions to
 the backend, Flutter clients, integrations, skills, tests, and documentation
 are welcome.
 
-Read [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) before opening a pull request. Security
-issues should be reported privately according to [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md).
+Read [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) before opening a pull request. Review
+the documented [security boundaries](docs/security-boundaries.md) before
+installing on a machine with sensitive data. Security issues should be reported
+privately according to [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md).
 
 ## Documentation
 
-[Docs](https://neolabs-systems.github.io/NeoAgent/) | [Getting Started](docs/getting-started.md) | [Configuration](docs/configuration.md) | [Capabilities](docs/capabilities.md) | [Skills and MCP](docs/skills.md) | [Operations](docs/operations.md) | [Discussions](https://github.com/NeoLabs-Systems/NeoAgent/discussions) | [Issues](https://github.com/NeoLabs-Systems/NeoAgent/issues)
+[Docs](https://neolabs-systems.github.io/NeoAgent/) | [Getting Started](docs/getting-started.md) | [Configuration](docs/configuration.md) | [Capabilities](docs/capabilities.md) | [Security Boundaries](docs/security-boundaries.md) | [Skills and MCP](docs/skills.md) | [Operations](docs/operations.md) | [Discussions](https://github.com/NeoLabs-Systems/NeoAgent/discussions) | [Issues](https://github.com/NeoLabs-Systems/NeoAgent/issues)
 
 ---
 

package/docs/capabilities.md

@@ -73,14 +73,23 @@ Transcription uses Deepgram (`nova-3` model, multi-language by default). Enable
 
 ## Runtime Modes
 
-| Profile | What runs where |
+| Setting | What runs where |
 |---|---|
-| `trusted-host` | CLI and Android run on the host; browser runs in the VM or paired extension |
-| `secure-vm` | CLI, browser, and Android all run inside the isolated VM |
-
-Production deployments can require `secure-vm` and a strong `NEOAGENT_VM_GUEST_TOKEN` (32+ characters).
-
-The browser always runs in isolation — either the local VM or a paired Chrome extension on a remote machine. To pair an extension: download `/api/browser-extension/download` from NeoAgent, unzip it, enable Developer Mode in `chrome://extensions`, load the folder, then pair after signing in.
+| Default | Browser and CLI run in a per-user isolated runtime; Android runs on the host over ADB |
+| Paired browser extension | Browser actions run in the paired Chrome profile |
+| Desktop CLI backend | Shell commands run on the paired desktop with the companion process's permissions |
+
+The stored runtime profile is normalized to `secure-vm`, but that name does not
+mean every NeoAgent capability runs in a VM. In particular, Android, workspace
+file tools, memory, integrations, messaging, and MCP orchestration remain
+server-side. See [Security Boundaries](security-boundaries.md) for the enforced
+boundaries and current limitations.
+
+The default browser runs in the isolated runtime. A paired Chrome extension is
+an alternative backend, not an isolation boundary: it grants NeoAgent control
+of that browser profile on the paired machine. To pair an extension: download
+`/api/browser-extension/download` from NeoAgent, unzip it, enable Developer
+Mode in `chrome://extensions`, load the folder, then pair after signing in.
 
 ## Integrations and Messaging
 

package/docs/index.md

@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ Opens at `http://localhost:3333` when complete. See [Getting Started](getting-st
 | [Getting Started](getting-started.md) | Install, first run, service commands |
 | [Capabilities](capabilities.md) | Full tool and feature inventory |
 | [Configuration](configuration.md) | Environment variables, provider keys, OAuth setup |
+| [Security Boundaries](security-boundaries.md) | Enforced isolation, prompt-injection limits, deployment guidance |
 | [Automation](automation.md) | Tasks, cron scheduling, integration triggers |
 | [Integrations](integrations.md) | OAuth accounts and messaging platforms |
 | [Skills](skills.md) | Built-in skills catalog, custom skills, MCP |

package/docs/security-boundaries.md

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+# Security Boundaries
+
+NeoAgent processes untrusted content from web pages, email, messaging
+platforms, integrations, MCP servers, files, and other external systems. That
+content may attempt prompt injection.
+
+Prompt instructions, warning text added to tool results, and injection
+detection heuristics are defense-in-depth signals for the model. They are not
+authorization boundaries. The boundaries below are enforced in server-side
+code and cannot be bypassed by any model-generated content.
+
+## What Is Enforced
+
+### Infrastructure isolation
+
+| Capability | Enforced boundary |
+|---|---|
+| Browser, default backend | Runs in a per-user Docker container with resource limits (`no-new-privileges`, no host filesystem mount). |
+| Browser, paired extension | Commands are sent to the explicitly paired Chrome extension. Controls that browser profile; outside the container boundary. |
+| Shell, VM backend | `execute_command` runs in the same per-user container as the default browser backend. |
+| Shell, desktop companion | Commands route through `ShellWorkerPool` — a `child_process.fork()` pool of isolated worker processes (`server/services/cli/shell_worker.js`). Workers carry **no server imports**: no database handle, no JWT secret, no app state. A compromised command result cannot read main-process memory. |
+| Workspace file tools | `read_file`, `write_file`, `edit_file`, directory listing, and file search are restricted by server-side path checks to the user's workspace directory. |
+| Android | `android_shell` and related tools run from the NeoAgent host via ADB against the selected device or emulator. |
+| Official integrations | OAuth credentials remain server-side. Accounts configured as read-only have write tools blocked by server-side access checks. |
+| Runtime API | The container endpoint is published on loopback. A guest token authenticates requests between the server and the runtime. |
+
+### Tool policy system
+
+The `before_tool_call` hook fires before every tool execution in both the
+sequential and parallel engine paths. Two handlers are registered at startup
+and cannot be removed by agent code:
+
+**Priority 5 — per-category policy check** (`server/services/security/tool_security_hook.js`)
+
+Every tool is mapped to one of seven sensitive categories:
+
+| Category | Tools |
+|---|---|
+| `shell` | `execute_command` |
+| `file_write` | `write_file`, `edit_file` |
+| `android_privileged` | `android_shell`, `android_install_apk`, `android_open_intent`, `android_open_app` |
+| `desktop_control` | `desktop_click`, `desktop_type`, `desktop_press_key`, `desktop_drag`, `desktop_launch_app`, `desktop_observe` |
+| `browser_privileged` | `browser_evaluate` |
+| `network_write` | `http_request` (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE only) |
+| `skill_mutation` | `create_skill`, `update_skill`, `delete_skill`, `create_ai_widget`, `update_ai_widget`, `delete_ai_widget` |
+
+Read-only tools (`think`, `web_search`, `browser_navigate`, `read_file`, etc.)
+are in a static `SAFE_TOOLS` set and bypass all policy checks with a single
+`Set.has()` call.
+
+Per-category policy (stored in `tool_policies` table, one row per user per
+category):
+
+| Policy | Effect |
+|---|---|
+| `deny` | Tool call is blocked immediately. The model receives a structured error and can explain the restriction to the user. |
+| `require_approval` | Execution suspends; the user receives a real-time prompt (bottom sheet + optional push notification). Decision options: Deny / Allow once / Allow session / Always allow. |
+| `allow` | Tool runs without interruption. Grants expire at session end. |
+| `allow_always` | Tool runs without interruption. Persisted to DB; never expires. |
+
+Default policy for all categories is `require_approval`, except `skill_mutation` which defaults to `deny`.
+
+**Priority 10 — approval gate** (`server/services/security/approval_gate_service.js`)
+
+When a category policy is `require_approval`, execution is suspended and a
+`tool:approval_required` event is emitted to the user's Socket.IO room. The
+agent loop awaits the decision with a 30-second timeout. If no decision is
+received, the tool is denied and the model is informed of the timeout.
+
+### Global security mode
+
+Users can override all per-category settings with a global mode (stored in
+`user_settings` under key `tool_security_mode`):
+
+| Mode | Behaviour |
+|---|---|
+| `default` | Per-category policies apply (recommended). |
+| `allow_all` | All tool policy and approval checks are bypassed. The agent runs without interruption. |
+| `always_ask` | Every sensitive tool requires approval regardless of per-category settings. |
+
+### Agent-loop feedback
+
+When a tool is blocked, the model receives a structured result:
+
+```json
+{ "tool": "execute_command", "status": "blocked", "blocked_by": "policy|user_denied|approval_timeout", "reason": "..." }
+```
+
+The `reason` field contains an actionable message the model can surface to the
+user (e.g., pointing to Settings → Tool Permissions, or acknowledging that the
+user denied the call and it should not retry).
+
+## What Is Not Enforced
+
+- **No per-tool allowlist at the schema/selection level.** A tool blocked by
+  policy is still listed in the tool catalog. The block fires at execution
+  time, not at selection time.
+- **No mandatory approval for safe tools.** Tools in `SAFE_TOOLS` always
+  execute without a policy check.
+- **No network egress filtering.** The `http_request` tool (non-write methods)
+  can reach any URL reachable from the server.
+- **Prompt-injection detection is heuristic.** The detection layer may warn the
+  model but cannot prevent every injection attempt.
+
+## Deployment Guidance
+
+- Run NeoAgent under a dedicated, unprivileged OS account.
+- Prefer the container-backed browser and CLI defaults (VM backend).
+- Do not select the desktop shell backend on a machine containing data the
+  agent should not access.
+- Use `require_approval` or `deny` for `shell` and `android_privileged` on
+  machines where you run personal or work data alongside NeoAgent.
+- Treat a paired browser extension as giving the agent control of that browser
+  profile. Use a dedicated profile.
+- Treat an ADB-connected Android device as accessible to the agent, including
+  capabilities exposed by `adb shell`.
+- Keep integration accounts read-only unless write access is required.
+- The `allow_all` global mode is suitable only for trusted automated
+  environments where the operator controls all input. Do not use it for
+  open-ended agentic sessions that browse the web or read email.
+
+For vulnerability reporting, see [Security Policy](https://github.com/NeoLabs-Systems/NeoAgent/blob/main/SECURITY.md).