muaddib-scanner 2.7.7 → 2.7.9

package/README.md

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
 
 npm and PyPI supply-chain attacks are exploding. Shai-Hulud compromised 25K+ repos in 2025. Existing tools detect threats but don't help you respond.
 
-MUAD'DIB combines **14 parallel scanners** (133 detection rules), a **deobfuscation engine**, **inter-module dataflow analysis**, **per-file max scoring**, Docker sandbox with **monkey-patching preload** for time-bomb detection, **behavioral anomaly detection**, and **ground truth validation** to detect threats AND guide your response — even before they appear in any IOC database.
+MUAD'DIB combines **14 parallel scanners** (134 detection rules), a **deobfuscation engine**, **inter-module dataflow analysis**, **per-file max scoring**, Docker sandbox with **monkey-patching preload** for time-bomb detection, **behavioral anomaly detection**, and **ground truth validation** to detect threats AND guide your response — even before they appear in any IOC database.
 
 ---
 
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ muaddib replay                     # Ground truth validation (46/49 TPR)
 | GitHub Actions | Shai-Hulud backdoor detection |
 | Hash Scanner | Known malicious file hashes |
 
-### 133 detection rules
+### 134 detection rules
 
 All rules are mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques. See [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md#detection-rules-v262) for the complete rules reference.
 
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ repos:
 | **FPR** (Benign) | **12.1%** (64/529) | 529 npm packages, real source via `npm pack` |
 | **ADR** (Adversarial + Holdout) | **92.2%** (71/77) | 53 adversarial + 40 holdout (77 available on disk), global threshold=20 |
 
-**2093 tests** across 49 files. **134 rules** (129 RULES + 5 PARANOID).
+**2166 tests** across 49 files. **134 rules** (129 RULES + 5 PARANOID).
 
 > **Methodology caveats:**
 > - TPR measured on 49 Node.js attack samples (3 browser-only excluded from 51 total)
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ npm test
 
 ### Testing
 
-- **2093 tests** across 49 modular test files
+- **2166 tests** across 49 modular test files
 - **56 fuzz tests** - Malformed inputs, ReDoS, unicode, binary
 - **Datadog 17K benchmark** - 17,922 real malware samples
 - **Ground truth validation** - 51 real-world attacks (93.9% TPR)

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "muaddib-scanner",
-  "version": "2.7.7",
+  "version": "2.7.9",
   "description": "Supply-chain threat detection & response for npm & PyPI/Python",
   "main": "src/index.js",
   "bin": {

package/src/index.js

@@ -555,18 +555,21 @@ async function run(targetPath, options = {}) {
     }
   }
 
-  // Read package name for benign package whitelist
+  // Read package name and dependencies for FP reduction heuristics
   let packageName = null;
+  let packageDeps = null;
   try {
     const pkgPath = path.join(targetPath, 'package.json');
     if (fs.existsSync(pkgPath)) {
-      packageName = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(pkgPath, 'utf8')).name || null;
+      const pkgData = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(pkgPath, 'utf8'));
+      packageName = pkgData.name || null;
+      packageDeps = pkgData.dependencies || null;
     }
   } catch { /* graceful fallback */ }
 
   // FP reduction: legitimate frameworks produce high volumes of certain threat types.
   // A malware package typically has 1-3 occurrences, not dozens.
-  applyFPReductions(deduped, reachableFiles, packageName);
+  applyFPReductions(deduped, reachableFiles, packageName, packageDeps);
 
   // Intent coherence analysis: detect source→sink pairs within files
   // Pass targetPath for destination-aware SDK pattern detection

package/src/scoring.js

@@ -197,7 +197,12 @@ const FRAMEWORK_PROTO_RE = new RegExp(
   '^(' + FRAMEWORK_PROTOTYPES.join('|') + ')\\.prototype\\.'
 );
 
-function applyFPReductions(threats, reachableFiles, packageName) {
+function applyFPReductions(threats, reachableFiles, packageName, packageDeps) {
+  // Initialize reductions audit trail on each threat
+  for (const t of threats) {
+    t.reductions = [];
+  }
+
   // Count occurrences of each threat type (package-level, across all files)
   const typeCounts = {};
   for (const t of threats) {
@@ -224,6 +229,7 @@ function applyFPReductions(threats, reachableFiles, packageName) {
       if ((t.type === 'dynamic_require' || t.type === 'dynamic_import') && t.severity === 'HIGH') {
         const f = t.file || '(unknown)';
         if (perFilePluginCount[f] > 4) {
+          t.reductions.push({ rule: 'plugin_loader_per_file', from: 'HIGH', to: 'LOW' });
           t.severity = 'LOW';
         }
       }
@@ -245,6 +251,7 @@ function applyFPReductions(threats, reachableFiles, packageName) {
       if (typeRatio < 0.4 ||
           (t.type === 'suspicious_dataflow' && typeCounts[t.type] > rule.maxCount) ||
           (t.type === 'vm_code_execution' && typeCounts[t.type] > rule.maxCount)) {
+        t.reductions.push({ rule: 'count_threshold', from: t.severity, to: rule.to });
         t.severity = rule.to;
       }
     }
@@ -253,6 +260,7 @@ function applyFPReductions(threats, reachableFiles, packageName) {
     // Malware poisons cache repeatedly; a single access is framework behavior
     if (t.type === 'require_cache_poison' && t.severity === 'CRITICAL' &&
         typeCounts.require_cache_poison === 1) {
+      t.reductions.push({ rule: 'cache_poison_single', from: 'CRITICAL', to: 'HIGH' });
       t.severity = 'HIGH';
     }
 
@@ -261,6 +269,7 @@ function applyFPReductions(threats, reachableFiles, packageName) {
     // Browser/native APIs (globalThis.fetch, XMLHttpRequest) stay HIGH
     if (t.type === 'prototype_hook' && t.severity === 'HIGH' &&
         FRAMEWORK_PROTO_RE.test(t.message)) {
+      t.reductions.push({ rule: 'framework_prototype', from: 'HIGH', to: 'MEDIUM' });
       t.severity = 'MEDIUM';
     }
 
@@ -271,6 +280,7 @@ function applyFPReductions(threats, reachableFiles, packageName) {
         typeCounts.prototype_hook > 20) {
       const HTTP_PROTO_RE = /\b(Request|Response|IncomingMessage|ClientRequest|ServerResponse|fetch)\b/i;
       if (HTTP_PROTO_RE.test(t.message)) {
+        t.reductions.push({ rule: 'http_client_whitelist', from: t.severity, to: 'MEDIUM' });
         t.severity = 'MEDIUM';
       }
     }
@@ -283,14 +293,18 @@ function applyFPReductions(threats, reachableFiles, packageName) {
     if (t.file && !DIST_EXEMPT_TYPES.has(t.type) && DIST_FILE_RE.test(t.file)) {
       if (DIST_BUNDLER_ARTIFACT_TYPES.has(t.type)) {
         // Two-notch downgrade for bundler artifacts
+        const fromSev = t.severity;
         if (t.severity === 'CRITICAL') t.severity = 'MEDIUM';
         else if (t.severity === 'HIGH') t.severity = 'LOW';
         else if (t.severity === 'MEDIUM') t.severity = 'LOW';
+        if (t.severity !== fromSev) t.reductions.push({ rule: 'dist_file', from: fromSev, to: t.severity });
       } else {
         // One-notch downgrade for other non-exempt types
+        const fromSev = t.severity;
         if (t.severity === 'CRITICAL') t.severity = 'HIGH';
         else if (t.severity === 'HIGH') t.severity = 'MEDIUM';
         else if (t.severity === 'MEDIUM') t.severity = 'LOW';
+        if (t.severity !== fromSev) t.reductions.push({ rule: 'dist_file', from: fromSev, to: t.severity });
       }
     }
 
@@ -300,10 +314,23 @@ function applyFPReductions(threats, reachableFiles, packageName) {
         !isPackageLevelThreat(t)) {
       const normalizedFile = t.file.replace(/\\/g, '/');
       if (!reachableFiles.has(normalizedFile)) {
+        t.reductions.push({ rule: 'unreachable', from: t.severity, to: 'LOW' });
         t.severity = 'LOW';
         t.unreachable = true;
       }
     }
+
+    // C2: MCP server awareness — legitimate MCP servers write to MCP config files.
+    // Downgrade mcp_config_injection to MEDIUM when @modelcontextprotocol/sdk is in dependencies.
+    // Only dependencies (not devDependencies) — a real MCP server must ship the SDK.
+    // High-confidence compound types stay untouched (lifecycle_shell_pipe, fetch_decrypt_exec, etc.)
+    if (t.type === 'mcp_config_injection' && t.severity === 'CRITICAL' &&
+        packageDeps && typeof packageDeps === 'object' &&
+        packageDeps['@modelcontextprotocol/sdk']) {
+      t.reductions.push({ rule: 'mcp_sdk', from: 'CRITICAL', to: 'MEDIUM' });
+      t.severity = 'MEDIUM';
+      t.mcpSdkDowngrade = true;
+    }
   }
 }
 

package/src/shared/download.js

@@ -23,7 +23,11 @@ const PRIVATE_IP_PATTERNS = [
   /^::1$/,
   /^::ffff:127\./,
   /^fc00:/,
-  /^fe80:/
+  /^fe80:/,
+  /^ff/i,                      // IPv6 multicast (RFC 4291 ff00::/8)
+  /^2001:0?db8:/i,             // IPv6 documentation (RFC 3849 2001:db8::/32)
+  /^100:/,                     // IPv6 discard (RFC 6666 100::/64)
+  /^64:ff9b:/i                 // IPv6 NAT64 well-known (RFC 6052 64:ff9b::/96)
 ];
 
 /**