muaddib-scanner 2.11.113 → 2.11.114

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "muaddib-scanner",
-  "version": "2.11.113",
+  "version": "2.11.114",
   "description": "Supply-chain threat detection & response for npm & PyPI/Python",
   "main": "src/index.js",
   "bin": {

package/{self-scan-v2.11.113.json → self-scan-v2.11.114.json}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "target": "node_modules",
-  "timestamp": "2026-06-14T08:06:18.378Z",
+  "timestamp": "2026-06-14T12:30:49.542Z",
   "threats": [
     {
       "type": "string_mutation_obfuscation",
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@
     },
     {
       "type": "credential_regex_harvest",
-      "severity": "HIGH",
+      "severity": "LOW",
       "message": "Credential regex patterns (token/password/secret/Bearer) + network call in same file — stream data credential harvesting.",
       "file": "web-tree-sitter/web-tree-sitter.cjs",
       "count": 1,
@@ -252,6 +252,11 @@
         {
           "rule": "count_threshold_floor",
           "note": "retained one instance at original severity"
+        },
+        {
+          "rule": "sink_coupling",
+          "from": "HIGH",
+          "to": "LOW"
         }
       ],
       "originalSeverity": "HIGH",
@@ -266,7 +271,7 @@
       ],
       "mitre": "T1552",
       "playbook": "Code contient des regex de detection de credentials (Bearer, password, token, API key) combine avec un appel reseau. Technique de harvesting: scanne les donnees en transit (streams HTTP, fichiers) pour extraire des secrets et les exfiltrer. Supprimer le package. Auditer le trafic reseau sortant.",
-      "points": 10
+      "points": 1
     },
     {
       "type": "proxy_data_intercept",
@@ -1823,18 +1828,18 @@
   "summary": {
     "total": 80,
     "critical": 7,
-    "high": 11,
+    "high": 10,
     "medium": 32,
-    "low": 30,
+    "low": 31,
     "riskScore": 35,
     "riskLevel": "MEDIUM",
     "globalRiskScore": 100,
-    "maxFileScore": 51,
+    "maxFileScore": 42,
     "packageScore": 1,
     "mostSuspiciousFile": "web-tree-sitter/web-tree-sitter.cjs",
     "fileScores": {
       "esquery/parser.js": 5,
-      "web-tree-sitter/web-tree-sitter.cjs": 51,
+      "web-tree-sitter/web-tree-sitter.cjs": 42,
       "web-tree-sitter/web-tree-sitter.js": 42,
       "ajv/lib/ajv.js": 25,
       "ajv/scripts/bundle.js": 10,
@@ -1927,12 +1932,6 @@
         "points": 10,
         "reason": "Binary file reference (.png/.jpg/.wasm/etc.) + eval() in same file — possible steganographic payload execution."
       },
-      {
-        "rule": "MUADDIB-AST-041",
-        "type": "credential_regex_harvest",
-        "points": 10,
-        "reason": "Credential regex patterns (token/password/secret/Bearer) + network call in same file — stream data credential harvesting."
-      },
       {
         "rule": "MUADDIB-AST-020",
         "type": "staged_binary_payload",
@@ -2185,6 +2184,12 @@
         "points": 1,
         "reason": "Dangerous call \"eval\" with dynamic expression detected."
       },
+      {
+        "rule": "MUADDIB-AST-041",
+        "type": "credential_regex_harvest",
+        "points": 1,
+        "reason": "Credential regex patterns (token/password/secret/Bearer) + network call in same file — stream data credential harvesting."
+      },
       {
         "rule": "MUADDIB-AST-043",
         "type": "proxy_data_intercept",

package/src/scoring.js

@@ -1029,6 +1029,28 @@ const FRAMEWORK_PROTO_RE = new RegExp(
   '^(' + FRAMEWORK_PROTOTYPES.join('|') + ')\\.prototype\\.'
 );
 
+// FPR sink-coupling (chantier 2026-06): independent exfil / remote-exec sink signals pointing at
+// an ANOMALOUS destination. A credential_regex_harvest signal is only a true positive when one of
+// these co-occurs in the package. Deliberately EXCLUDES benign network capability — a bare
+// fetch/http.get, remote_code_load to a first-party CDN/model host, a local server, or a native
+// build are NOT sinks. Dataflow-PROVEN harvest signals (intent_credential_exfil, cross_file_dataflow)
+// are included so a genuine read→exfil taint keeps the signal HIGH regardless of host reputation
+// (anti-FN floor). See _hasExfilSink + the credential_regex_harvest gate in applyFPReductions.
+const EXFIL_SINK_TYPES = new Set([
+  'suspicious_domain', 'direct_ip_exfil', 'ioc_string_match', 'ioc_match',
+  'known_malicious_package', 'pypi_malicious_package', 'shai_hulud_marker',
+  'detached_credential_exfil', 'silent_stealth_process',
+  'curl_pipe_shell', 'curl_env_exfil', 'reverse_shell', 'dns_exfil', 'oast_callback',
+  'function_constructor_require', 'staged_remote_loader', 'staged_eval_decode',
+  'fetch_decrypt_exec', 'download_exec_binary', 'self_destruct_eval',
+  'newsletter_auto_follow', 'cross_file_dataflow', 'intent_credential_exfil',
+  'intent_command_exfil', 'sandbox_known_exfil_domain', 'sandbox_network_after_sensitive_read'
+]);
+function _hasExfilSink(threats) {
+  if (!Array.isArray(threats)) return false;
+  return threats.some(t => EXFIL_SINK_TYPES.has(t.type) && t.severity !== 'LOW');
+}
+
 function applyFPReductions(threats, reachableFiles, packageName, packageDeps, reachableFunctions) {
   // Initialize reductions audit trail on each threat
   // Store original severity before any FP reductions, so compound
@@ -1174,6 +1196,25 @@ function applyFPReductions(threats, reachableFiles, packageName, packageDeps, re
     }
   }
 
+  // FPR sink-coupling gate (chantier 2026-06 — FPR-baseline-2026-06-14.md). credential_regex_harvest
+  // is a weak signal alone: a credential-shaped regex co-located with a network call, with NO proof
+  // the matched secret flows out and NO host-reputation check (ast.js:hasCredentialInsideRegex +
+  // hasNetworkCallInFile). The blind FPR baseline measured 94.4% FP on it — it fires on nodemailer
+  // SMTP code, redaction utilities in framework bundles, and SDKs that parse Authorization headers.
+  // It is a real harvester ONLY when an independent exfil sink to an anomalous destination co-occurs
+  // (suspicious_domain / direct_ip / ioc / detached-exfil / staged loader / curl exfil / dataflow-proven
+  // taint ...). When no such sink is present, downgrade HIGH/CRITICAL → LOW. Runs after the dilution
+  // floor so the floor's restored instance is also gated (the floor protects real exfil; with no sink
+  // there is nothing to protect). No GT sample relies on credential_regex_harvest (verified).
+  if (!_hasExfilSink(threats)) {
+    for (const t of threats) {
+      if (t.type === 'credential_regex_harvest' && (t.severity === 'HIGH' || t.severity === 'CRITICAL')) {
+        t.reductions.push({ rule: 'sink_coupling', from: t.severity, to: 'LOW' });
+        t.severity = 'LOW';
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
   for (const t of threats) {
 
     // Audit v3 B3: typosquat with LOW confidence → MEDIUM