mtech-ai-local-runner 0.1.25 → 0.1.27
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package/README.md
CHANGED
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@@ -10,6 +10,24 @@ The package stores safe runner configuration locally and keeps OAuth refresh cre
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Public npm installation requires no npm account or publishing OTP. Setup requires Gateway OAuth login, and local Claude Code must already be authenticated (`claude auth status`).
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## 0.1.27: explicit job MCP exposure
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The job-local MCP omits deferred and Code Mode surfaces so the inspected ordinary
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MCP path keeps its tools directly available. Server authentication, enabled tools
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and scoped read-only/private-path checks remain unchanged. Exact-binary no-model
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inspection accepted the configuration and registered four synthetic tools;
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actual model selection and document reads still require separate acceptance.
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Foreground installation does not run Codex or update the daemon.
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## 0.1.26: compiled private-file denial compatibility
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The compiled `.env.*` blocked-path rule now denies that private-file family
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without rejecting unrelated scoped reads. Private files at all depths,
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read-only access and unsupported-pattern rejection remain enforced. Shared
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Claude/Codex policy and actual MCP fake-data regressions use the full compiled
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path combination. Foreground installation does not rerun Codex or update the
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daemon; actual document acceptance still requires a separately approved run.
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## 0.1.25: scoped reads and blocked diagnostics
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Codex receives explicit file-scoped ai_local read/search guidance; launch and
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@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@
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export const CODEX_ISOLATION_EXEC_FLAGS = Object.freeze([
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"--ignore-user-config", "--ignore-rules", "--ephemeral", "--strict-config", "--json",
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]);
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// Job MCP tools must be in the initial model catalog, not discoverable only via
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// tool_search or nested Code Mode. This changes exposure, not tool authority.
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export const CODEX_JOB_MCP_OMIT_SURFACES = Object.freeze(['code_mode', 'deferred']);
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export const CODEX_ISOLATION_CONFIG_OVERRIDES = Object.freeze([
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"analytics.enabled=false",
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"project_doc_max_bytes=0",
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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import { isAbsolute } from "node:path";
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import { CODEX_ISOLATION_EXEC_FLAGS, CODEX_ISOLATION_CONFIG_OVERRIDES } from "./compatibility.js";
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import { CODEX_ISOLATION_EXEC_FLAGS, CODEX_ISOLATION_CONFIG_OVERRIDES, CODEX_JOB_MCP_OMIT_SURFACES } from "./compatibility.js";
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import { codexControlDenials } from './scratch.js';
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/** Candidate invocation; execution still requires independent compatibility admission. */
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export function buildCodexInvocation(input) {
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@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ export function buildCodexInvocation(input) {
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`permissions.local_job.filesystem={":minimal"="read",${deniedFiles}}`,
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"permissions.local_job.network.enabled=false",
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// Only this job server is preauthorized: every operation is checked by Runner policy.
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`mcp_servers={ai_local={url=${JSON.stringify(endpoint.toString())},bearer_token_env_var="AI_GATEWAY_JOB_MCP_TOKEN",required=true,default_tools_approval_mode="approve",enabled_tools=["local_read","local_search","local_edit","local_test"]}}`,
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`mcp_servers={ai_local={url=${JSON.stringify(endpoint.toString())},bearer_token_env_var="AI_GATEWAY_JOB_MCP_TOKEN",required=true,default_tools_approval_mode="approve",enabled_tools=["local_read","local_search","local_edit","local_test"],omit_tools_from=${JSON.stringify(CODEX_JOB_MCP_OMIT_SURFACES)}}}`,
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];
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const env = { HOME: input.env.HOME, AI_GATEWAY_JOB_MCP_TOKEN: input.endpoint.token };
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for (const key of ["PATH", "USER", "LOGNAME", "LANG", "LC_ALL", "TMPDIR", "CODEX_HOME"]) {
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
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import { record } from './stdio-rpc.js';
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import { CODEX_ISOLATION_CONFIG_OVERRIDES } from './compatibility.js';
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import { CODEX_ISOLATION_CONFIG_OVERRIDES, CODEX_JOB_MCP_OMIT_SURFACES } from './compatibility.js';
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import { localToolInventory } from '../../safety/local-tool-server.js';
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import { codexControlDenials } from './scratch.js';
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export const canonical = (value) => JSON.stringify(normalize(value));
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@@ -102,10 +102,11 @@ export function validateNativeConfig(value, requirements, pin) {
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const server = record(servers.ai_local);
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if (server.url !== pin.endpoint || server.bearer_token_env_var !== 'AI_GATEWAY_JOB_MCP_TOKEN'
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|| server.required !== true || server.enabled !== true || server.default_tools_approval_mode !== 'approve'
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|| canonical(server.omit_tools_from) !== canonical(CODEX_JOB_MCP_OMIT_SURFACES)
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|| canonical([...(server.enabled_tools ?? [])].sort()) !== canonical(localToolInventory().map(t => t.name).sort()))
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reject();
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for (const k of Object.keys(server))
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if (!['url', 'bearer_token_env_var', 'environment_id', 'enabled', 'required', 'tool_timeout_sec', 'default_tools_approval_mode', 'enabled_tools'].includes(k))
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if (!['url', 'bearer_token_env_var', 'environment_id', 'enabled', 'required', 'tool_timeout_sec', 'default_tools_approval_mode', 'enabled_tools', 'omit_tools_from'].includes(k))
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reject();
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return fingerprint({ config: c, requirements: req, ...(pin.accountSources ? { accountSources: pin.accountSources.fingerprint } : {}) });
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}
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@@ -15,6 +15,13 @@ function scopePath(root, scope) {
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throw new Error('DENIED_UNSUPPORTED_SCOPE');
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return path.resolve(root, directory);
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}
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function blockedScopeContains(root, scope, file) {
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// The compiled repository policy includes this private-file family. Handle
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// it only as a denial, never as a wildcard grant or an ignored block.
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if (scope === '.env.*')
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return file.startsWith(path.join(root, '.env.'));
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return contains(scopePath(root, scope), file);
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}
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export class LocalToolPolicy {
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options;
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abort = new AbortController();
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@@ -51,7 +58,7 @@ export class LocalToolPolicy {
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if (typeof value !== 'string' || !value || value.includes('\0') || path.isAbsolute(value) || value.split(/[\\/]/).some(p => p === '..' || sensitive(p)))
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throw new Error('DENIED_PATH');
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const root = path.resolve(this.options.worktreeRoot), file = path.resolve(root, value);
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if (!contains(root, file) || !this.options.allowedPaths.some(scope => contains(scopePath(root, scope), file)) || this.options.blockedPaths.some(scope =>
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if (!contains(root, file) || !this.options.allowedPaths.some(scope => contains(scopePath(root, scope), file)) || this.options.blockedPaths.some(scope => blockedScopeContains(root, scope, file)))
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throw new Error('DENIED_SCOPE');
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if (await realpath(root) !== root)
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throw new Error('DENIED_ROOT');
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