mobbdev 1.4.25 → 1.4.27

package/dist/args/commands/upload_ai_blame.mjs

@@ -357,6 +357,7 @@ var init_client_generates = __esm({
       IssueType_Enum2["TrustBoundaryViolation"] = "TRUST_BOUNDARY_VIOLATION";
       IssueType_Enum2["TypeConfusion"] = "TYPE_CONFUSION";
       IssueType_Enum2["UncheckedLoopCondition"] = "UNCHECKED_LOOP_CONDITION";
+      IssueType_Enum2["UncheckedReturnValue"] = "UNCHECKED_RETURN_VALUE";
       IssueType_Enum2["UnencryptedAwsSqsQueue"] = "UNENCRYPTED_AWS_SQS_QUEUE";
       IssueType_Enum2["UnnecessaryImports"] = "UNNECESSARY_IMPORTS";
       IssueType_Enum2["UnsafeDeserialization"] = "UNSAFE_DESERIALIZATION";
@@ -1657,7 +1658,8 @@ var init_issue = __esm({
       category: z4.nativeEnum(Vulnerability_Report_Issue_Category_Enum),
       extraData: z4.object({
         missing_files: z4.string().array().nullish(),
-        error_files: z4.string().array().nullish()
+        error_files: z4.string().array().nullish(),
+        ai_cost_limit_exceeded: z4.string().nullish()
       }),
       vulnerabilityReportIssueTags: z4.array(
         z4.object({
@@ -1929,7 +1931,8 @@ var init_getIssueType = __esm({
       ["UNENCRYPTED_AWS_SQS_QUEUE" /* UnencryptedAwsSqsQueue */]: "AWS SQS Queue Unencrypted",
       ["INSECURE_DESERIALIZATION" /* InsecureDeserialization */]: "Insecure Deserialization",
       ["AWS_DYNAMODB_POINT_IN_TIME_RECOVERY_DISABLED" /* AwsDynamodbPointInTimeRecoveryDisabled */]: "AWS DynamoDB Point-in-Time Recovery Disabled",
-      ["JWT_DECODE_WITHOUT_VERIFY" /* JwtDecodeWithoutVerify */]: "JWT Decoded Without Signature Verification"
+      ["JWT_DECODE_WITHOUT_VERIFY" /* JwtDecodeWithoutVerify */]: "JWT Decoded Without Signature Verification",
+      ["UNCHECKED_RETURN_VALUE" /* UncheckedReturnValue */]: "Unchecked Return Value"
     };
     issueTypeZ = z5.nativeEnum(IssueType_Enum);
     getIssueTypeFriendlyString = (issueType) => {
@@ -2198,7 +2201,8 @@ var init_types = __esm({
             extraData: z7.object({
               missing_files: z7.string().array().nullish(),
               large_files: z7.string().array().nullish(),
-              error_files: z7.string().array().nullish()
+              error_files: z7.string().array().nullish(),
+              ai_cost_limit_exceeded: z7.string().nullish()
             })
           }).array()
         })
@@ -2237,7 +2241,8 @@ var init_types = __esm({
       extraData: z7.object({
         missing_files: z7.string().array().nullish(),
         large_files: z7.string().array().nullish(),
-        error_files: z7.string().array().nullish()
+        error_files: z7.string().array().nullish(),
+        ai_cost_limit_exceeded: z7.string().nullish()
       }),
       fix: ReportFixesQueryFixZ.nullable(),
       falsePositive: z7.object({
@@ -5185,7 +5190,8 @@ var fixDetailsData = {
   ["JWT_DECODE_WITHOUT_VERIFY" /* JwtDecodeWithoutVerify */]: {
     issueDescription: "Decoding a JWT with `JWT.decode()` only base64-decodes the token without checking its signature, so an attacker can forge a token with arbitrary claims (identity, roles, expiration) and have it trusted. CWE-345, OWASP A08:2021 Software and Data Integrity Failures.",
     fixInstructions: "Verify the signature before trusting any claims: build a verifier with the expected algorithm and secret/key (e.g. `JWT.require(Algorithm.HMAC256(secret)).build().verify(token)`) instead of calling `JWT.decode(token)`. After merging, confirm the verifier is configured with the same algorithm and secret/key used to sign your tokens \u2014 an incorrect or placeholder secret will make verification throw `JWTVerificationException` at runtime and reject legitimate tokens."
-  }
+  },
+  ["UNCHECKED_RETURN_VALUE" /* UncheckedReturnValue */]: void 0
 };
 
 // src/features/analysis/scm/shared/src/commitDescriptionMarkup.ts
@@ -7046,6 +7052,7 @@ import { fetch as fetch2, ProxyAgent } from "undici";
 
 // src/features/analysis/scm/gitlab/gitlab.ts
 import querystring3 from "querystring";
+import { setTimeout as delay } from "timers/promises";
 import {
   createRequesterFn
 } from "@gitbeaker/requester-utils";
@@ -7812,7 +7819,7 @@ async function sanitizeDataWithCounts(obj, options) {
 }
 
 // src/utils/with-timeout.ts
-import { setTimeout as delay } from "timers/promises";
+import { setTimeout as delay2 } from "timers/promises";
 
 // src/features/analysis/graphql/s3-raw-data-upload.ts
 import { setTimeout as sleep2 } from "timers/promises";

package/dist/index.mjs

@@ -357,6 +357,7 @@ var init_client_generates = __esm({
       IssueType_Enum2["TrustBoundaryViolation"] = "TRUST_BOUNDARY_VIOLATION";
       IssueType_Enum2["TypeConfusion"] = "TYPE_CONFUSION";
       IssueType_Enum2["UncheckedLoopCondition"] = "UNCHECKED_LOOP_CONDITION";
+      IssueType_Enum2["UncheckedReturnValue"] = "UNCHECKED_RETURN_VALUE";
       IssueType_Enum2["UnencryptedAwsSqsQueue"] = "UNENCRYPTED_AWS_SQS_QUEUE";
       IssueType_Enum2["UnnecessaryImports"] = "UNNECESSARY_IMPORTS";
       IssueType_Enum2["UnsafeDeserialization"] = "UNSAFE_DESERIALIZATION";
@@ -1595,7 +1596,8 @@ var init_getIssueType = __esm({
       ["UNENCRYPTED_AWS_SQS_QUEUE" /* UnencryptedAwsSqsQueue */]: "AWS SQS Queue Unencrypted",
       ["INSECURE_DESERIALIZATION" /* InsecureDeserialization */]: "Insecure Deserialization",
       ["AWS_DYNAMODB_POINT_IN_TIME_RECOVERY_DISABLED" /* AwsDynamodbPointInTimeRecoveryDisabled */]: "AWS DynamoDB Point-in-Time Recovery Disabled",
-      ["JWT_DECODE_WITHOUT_VERIFY" /* JwtDecodeWithoutVerify */]: "JWT Decoded Without Signature Verification"
+      ["JWT_DECODE_WITHOUT_VERIFY" /* JwtDecodeWithoutVerify */]: "JWT Decoded Without Signature Verification",
+      ["UNCHECKED_RETURN_VALUE" /* UncheckedReturnValue */]: "Unchecked Return Value"
     };
     issueTypeZ = z.nativeEnum(IssueType_Enum);
     getIssueTypeFriendlyString = (issueType) => {
@@ -1885,7 +1887,8 @@ var init_issue = __esm({
       category: z9.nativeEnum(Vulnerability_Report_Issue_Category_Enum),
       extraData: z9.object({
         missing_files: z9.string().array().nullish(),
-        error_files: z9.string().array().nullish()
+        error_files: z9.string().array().nullish(),
+        ai_cost_limit_exceeded: z9.string().nullish()
       }),
       vulnerabilityReportIssueTags: z9.array(
         z9.object({
@@ -2243,7 +2246,8 @@ var init_types = __esm({
             extraData: z11.object({
               missing_files: z11.string().array().nullish(),
               large_files: z11.string().array().nullish(),
-              error_files: z11.string().array().nullish()
+              error_files: z11.string().array().nullish(),
+              ai_cost_limit_exceeded: z11.string().nullish()
             })
           }).array()
         })
@@ -2282,7 +2286,8 @@ var init_types = __esm({
       extraData: z11.object({
         missing_files: z11.string().array().nullish(),
         large_files: z11.string().array().nullish(),
-        error_files: z11.string().array().nullish()
+        error_files: z11.string().array().nullish(),
+        ai_cost_limit_exceeded: z11.string().nullish()
       }),
       fix: ReportFixesQueryFixZ.nullable(),
       falsePositive: z11.object({
@@ -4890,7 +4895,8 @@ var fixDetailsData = {
   ["JWT_DECODE_WITHOUT_VERIFY" /* JwtDecodeWithoutVerify */]: {
     issueDescription: "Decoding a JWT with `JWT.decode()` only base64-decodes the token without checking its signature, so an attacker can forge a token with arbitrary claims (identity, roles, expiration) and have it trusted. CWE-345, OWASP A08:2021 Software and Data Integrity Failures.",
     fixInstructions: "Verify the signature before trusting any claims: build a verifier with the expected algorithm and secret/key (e.g. `JWT.require(Algorithm.HMAC256(secret)).build().verify(token)`) instead of calling `JWT.decode(token)`. After merging, confirm the verifier is configured with the same algorithm and secret/key used to sign your tokens \u2014 an incorrect or placeholder secret will make verification throw `JWTVerificationException` at runtime and reject legitimate tokens."
-  }
+  },
+  ["UNCHECKED_RETURN_VALUE" /* UncheckedReturnValue */]: void 0
 };
 
 // src/features/analysis/scm/shared/src/commitDescriptionMarkup.ts
@@ -10947,6 +10953,7 @@ var GithubSCMLib = class extends SCMLib {
 
 // src/features/analysis/scm/gitlab/gitlab.ts
 import querystring3 from "querystring";
+import { setTimeout as delay } from "timers/promises";
 import {
   createRequesterFn
 } from "@gitbeaker/requester-utils";
@@ -11608,6 +11615,9 @@ async function processBody(response) {
   }
   return await response.text();
 }
+var GITLAB_RETRYABLE_STATUSES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([429, 502, 503, 504]);
+var GITLAB_REQUEST_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 4;
+var GITLAB_REQUEST_BASE_BACKOFF_MS = 1e3;
 async function brokerRequestHandler(endpoint, options) {
   const { prefixUrl, searchParams } = options || {};
   let baseUrl;
@@ -11620,24 +11630,42 @@ async function brokerRequestHandler(endpoint, options) {
       rejectUnauthorized: false
     }
   }) : void 0;
-  const response = await undiciFetch(url, {
-    headers: options?.headers,
-    method: options?.method,
-    body: options?.body ? String(options?.body) : void 0,
-    dispatcher
-  }).catch((e) => {
-    if (e.name === "TimeoutError" || e.name === "AbortError") {
-      throw new Error("Query timeout was reached");
+  let lastError;
+  for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= GITLAB_REQUEST_MAX_ATTEMPTS; attempt++) {
+    let response;
+    try {
+      response = await undiciFetch(url, {
+        headers: options?.headers,
+        method: options?.method,
+        body: options?.body ? String(options?.body) : void 0,
+        dispatcher
+      });
+    } catch (e) {
+      if (e.name === "TimeoutError" || e.name === "AbortError") {
+        lastError = new Error("Query timeout was reached");
+      } else {
+        throw e;
+      }
     }
-    throw e;
-  });
-  if (response.ok)
-    return {
-      body: await processBody(response),
-      headers: Object.fromEntries(response.headers.entries()),
-      status: response.status
-    };
-  throw new Error(`gitbeaker: ${response.statusText}`);
+    if (response) {
+      if (response.ok) {
+        return {
+          body: await processBody(response),
+          headers: Object.fromEntries(response.headers.entries()),
+          status: response.status
+        };
+      }
+      if (!GITLAB_RETRYABLE_STATUSES.has(response.status)) {
+        throw new Error(`gitbeaker: ${response.statusText}`);
+      }
+      lastError = new Error(`gitbeaker: ${response.statusText}`);
+    }
+    if (attempt === GITLAB_REQUEST_MAX_ATTEMPTS) break;
+    const retryAfter = Number(response?.headers.get("retry-after"));
+    const waitMs = Number.isFinite(retryAfter) && retryAfter > 0 ? retryAfter * 1e3 : GITLAB_REQUEST_BASE_BACKOFF_MS * 2 ** (attempt - 1);
+    await delay(waitMs);
+  }
+  throw lastError ?? new Error("gitbeaker: request failed");
 }
 async function listGitlabProjectMembers({
   repoUrl,
@@ -14916,12 +14944,12 @@ async function uploadAiBlameCommandHandler(args) {
 }
 
 // src/utils/with-timeout.ts
-import { setTimeout as delay } from "timers/promises";
+import { setTimeout as delay2 } from "timers/promises";
 function withTimeout(promise, ms, label) {
   const ac = new AbortController();
   return Promise.race([
     promise.finally(() => ac.abort()),
-    delay(ms, void 0, { signal: ac.signal }).then(() => {
+    delay2(ms, void 0, { signal: ac.signal }).then(() => {
       throw new Error(`${label} timed out after ${ms}ms`);
     })
   ]);
@@ -19782,7 +19810,7 @@ function createLogger(config2) {
 
 // src/features/claude_code/hook_logger.ts
 var DD_RUM_TOKEN = true ? "pubf59c0182545bfb4c299175119f1abf9b" : "";
-var CLI_VERSION = true ? "1.4.25" : "unknown";
+var CLI_VERSION = true ? "1.4.27" : "unknown";
 var NAMESPACE = "mobbdev-claude-code-hook-logs";
 var claudeCodeVersion;
 function buildDdTags() {
@@ -28745,7 +28773,7 @@ var _FetchAvailableFixesService = class _FetchAvailableFixesService {
         interactiveFixes: fixReport.interactiveFixes ?? [],
         repositoryPath
       });
-      this.currentOffset = effectiveOffset + (fixReport.fixes?.length || 0);
+      this.currentOffset = effectiveOffset + (fixReport.fixes?.length || 0) + (fixReport.interactiveFixes?.length || 0);
       return prompt;
     } catch (error) {
       logError("Failed to check for available fixes", {
@@ -29103,7 +29131,7 @@ var _ScanAndFixVulnerabilitiesService = class _ScanAndFixVulnerabilitiesService
         interactiveFixes: fixes.interactiveFixes,
         repositoryPath
       });
-      this.currentOffset = effectiveOffset + (fixes.fixes?.length || 0);
+      this.currentOffset = effectiveOffset + (fixes.fixes?.length || 0) + (fixes.interactiveFixes?.length || 0);
       return prompt;
     } catch (error) {
       const message = error.message;

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "mobbdev",
-  "version": "1.4.25",
+  "version": "1.4.27",
   "description": "Automated secure code remediation tool",
   "repository": "git+https://github.com/mobb-dev/bugsy.git",
   "main": "dist/index.mjs",