mixdog 0.7.18 → 0.8.0

package/src/shared/config.mjs

@@ -1,372 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Unified config reader/writer.
- * Single file: mixdog-config.json with sections: channels, agent, memory, search.
- */
-import { readFileSync, mkdirSync, existsSync } from 'fs'
-import { join, dirname } from 'path'
-import { createRequire } from 'module'
-import { resolvePluginData } from './plugin-paths.mjs'
-import { renameWithRetrySync, writeJsonAtomicSync, withFileLockSync } from './atomic-file.mjs'
-import {
-  backupUserData,
-  markUserDataInitialized,
-  loadLatestMixdogConfigFromBackup,
-  hasUserDataInitMarker,
-} from './user-data-guard.mjs'
-
-const _require = createRequire(import.meta.url)
-const { getSecret: _getSecret, setSecret: _setSecret, deleteSecret: _deleteSecret } = _require('../../lib/keychain-cjs.cjs')
-
-const DATA_DIR = resolvePluginData()
-
-const CONFIG_PATH = join(DATA_DIR, 'mixdog-config.json')
-
-const GENERATED_KEY = '_generated'
-
-function isPlainObject(value) {
-  return !!value && typeof value === 'object' && !Array.isArray(value)
-}
-
-export function stripGeneratedMarker(data) {
-  if (!isPlainObject(data) || !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(data, GENERATED_KEY)) return data
-  const { [GENERATED_KEY]: _generated, ...rest } = data
-  return rest
-}
-
-function readJsonFile(path) {
-  let raw
-  try {
-    raw = readFileSync(path, 'utf8')
-  } catch (err) {
-    if (err.code === 'ENOENT') return null
-    // Fail closed on unknown read errors (EACCES, EIO, …). Returning {}
-    // here would let a subsequent writeSection() serialize an empty
-    // object back over an existing-but-temporarily-unreadable config and
-    // erase every other section. Better to surface the read error and
-    // abort the RMW than silently destroy data.
-    process.stderr.write(`[config] readJsonFile: unexpected read error for ${path}: ${err.message}\n`)
-    throw err
-  }
-  try {
-    return JSON.parse(raw)
-  } catch (err) {
-    // Quarantine a malformed mixdog-config.json so the next boot starts fresh
-    // instead of looping on a broken file.
-    if (path === CONFIG_PATH) {
-      const corrupt = `${path}.corrupt-${Date.now()}`
-      try { renameWithRetrySync(path, corrupt) } catch {}
-      process.stderr.write(`[config] mixdog-config.json is malformed (${err.message}). Renamed to ${corrupt}. Restore it or delete to start fresh.\n`)
-    }
-    return null
-  }
-}
-
-function writeJsonFile(path, data) {
-  // R4 data-at-rest: mixdog-config.json holds provider apiKeys; clamp to
-  // owner-only on POSIX via 0o600/0o700 mode bits, AND fail-closed on
-  // Windows where those bits are advisory — `secret: true` makes the
-  // atomic writer apply an owner-only NTFS ACL (icacls) to the file,
-  // temp, lock, and parent dir, throwing if the ACL cannot be enforced
-  // so the key is never left world-readable. 0o700 on the parent dir
-  // restricts directory traversal in shared-home setups on POSIX.
-  mkdirSync(dirname(path), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 })
-  // NOTE: lock:false here — callers that perform read-modify-write
-  // (writeSection/updateSection) hold the lock at the outer RMW
-  // boundary, so the inner write must not try to re-acquire the same
-  // lock file (would self-deadlock on `openSync('wx')`). Direct
-  // whole-config writers go through `writeAllLocked` below.
-  if (path === CONFIG_PATH) {
-    try { backupUserData(DATA_DIR, 'pre-config-write') } catch {}
-  }
-  writeJsonAtomicSync(path, data, { lock: false, fsyncDir: true, mode: 0o600, secret: true })
-  if (path === CONFIG_PATH) {
-    try { markUserDataInitialized(DATA_DIR) } catch {}
-    try { backupUserData(DATA_DIR, 'post-config-write') } catch {}
-  }
-}
-
-function readAll() {
-  const parsed = readJsonFile(CONFIG_PATH)
-  if (parsed != null) return parsed
-  // Symmetric with readAllForRmW(): a missing/unreadable config on a data
-  // dir that was previously initialized means the file was LOST (deleted,
-  // failed write), not a fresh install. Self-heal from the newest
-  // structurally-complete backup instead of silently collapsing to {} —
-  // which callers (readSection/getCapabilities) merge with in-memory
-  // defaults, dropping the user's presets/roles/sections. In-memory only:
-  // readAll() runs OUTSIDE the config lock (unlike the RMW path), so we do
-  // not write here to avoid an unlocked-write race; the next writeSection
-  // re-persists the file under the lock.
-  if (hasUserDataInitMarker(DATA_DIR)) {
-    const restored = loadLatestMixdogConfigFromBackup(DATA_DIR)
-    if (restored && isPlainObject(restored)) {
-      process.stderr.write('[config] read: restored mixdog-config.json from latest user-data backup (missing after init)\n')
-      return restored
-    }
-  }
-  return {}
-}
-
-function quarantineMalformedConfig(parseErr) {
-  const corrupt = `${CONFIG_PATH}.corrupt-${Date.now()}`
-  try {
-    if (existsSync(CONFIG_PATH)) renameWithRetrySync(CONFIG_PATH, corrupt)
-  } catch {}
-  process.stderr.write(
-    `[config] mixdog-config.json is malformed (${parseErr.message}). Renamed to ${corrupt}. Restore it or delete to start fresh.\n`,
-  )
-}
-
-function restoreAllForRmWOrThrow(reason) {
-  const restored = loadLatestMixdogConfigFromBackup(DATA_DIR)
-  if (restored && isPlainObject(restored)) {
-    process.stderr.write(`[config] RMW read: restored mixdog-config.json from latest user-data backup (${reason})\n`)
-    return restored
-  }
-  throw new Error(
-    `[config] mixdog-config.json is unreadable and no valid backup was found (${reason}); refusing section write that would wipe other sections`,
-  )
-}
-
-/**
- * Read-modify-write baseline. ENOENT on a never-initialized data dir → {}.
- * Malformed on-disk config (or missing config after prior init) → restore
- * from backup or throw; never silently collapse to a one-section overwrite.
- */
-function readAllForRmW() {
-  let raw
-  try {
-    raw = readFileSync(CONFIG_PATH, 'utf8')
-  } catch (err) {
-    if (err.code === 'ENOENT') {
-      if (hasUserDataInitMarker(DATA_DIR)) {
-        return restoreAllForRmWOrThrow('config file missing after user-data was initialized')
-      }
-      return {}
-    }
-    process.stderr.write(`[config] readAllForRmW: unexpected read error for ${CONFIG_PATH}: ${err.message}\n`)
-    throw err
-  }
-  try {
-    const parsed = JSON.parse(raw)
-    if (!isPlainObject(parsed)) throw new SyntaxError('config root must be a JSON object')
-    return parsed
-  } catch (parseErr) {
-    quarantineMalformedConfig(parseErr)
-    return restoreAllForRmWOrThrow(parseErr.message)
-  }
-}
-
-function writeAll(data) {
-  writeJsonFile(CONFIG_PATH, data)
-}
-
-// Serialize a read-modify-write under the same file lock. Concurrent
-// processes used to race here: each read the old config, each computed
-// `all[section] = …`, each atomic-wrote — the later writer would
-// silently clobber the earlier section update. Holding the lock across
-// read+modify+write keeps RMW linearizable.
-function withConfigLock(fn) {
-  // secret:true clamps the lock file (which sits beside the API-key
-  // config in a possibly shared home dir) to an owner-only ACL on win32,
-  // fail-closed. POSIX is unaffected.
-  return withFileLockSync(`${CONFIG_PATH}.lock`, fn, { secret: true })
-}
-
-export function readSection(section) {
-  return stripGeneratedMarker(readAll()[section] ?? null) ?? {}
-}
-
-export function writeSection(section, data) {
-  withConfigLock(() => {
-    const all = readAllForRmW()
-    all[section] = stripGeneratedMarker(data)
-    writeAll(all)
-  })
-}
-
-export function updateSection(section, updater) {
-  withConfigLock(() => {
-    const all = readAllForRmW()
-    const current = stripGeneratedMarker(all[section] || {})
-    all[section] = stripGeneratedMarker(typeof updater === 'function' ? updater(current) : updater)
-    writeAll(all)
-  })
-}
-
-// ── Capabilities (B2 central path policy) ───────────────────────────
-// Top-level `capabilities` section in mixdog-config.json. Safe defaults
-// win on missing/malformed input — every cap is OFF unless explicitly
-// enabled. Settings round-trip through the setup UI; the in-process
-// path gate reads them via `getCapabilities()`.
-//
-// homeAccess: when true, file tools may write anywhere under $HOME. When
-// false (default), file tools are cwd-scoped — matches the setup UI's
-// out-of-the-box "OFF" toggle so a fresh install is restrictive until the
-// user explicitly opts in. This ONLY controls the main-agent path gate —
-// bridge role Edit/Write to HOME paths always go through Discord approval
-// regardless (enforced in hooks/pre-tool-subagent.cjs).
-const CAPABILITY_DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({ homeAccess: false })
-
-function readCapabilities() {
-  const raw = readAll().capabilities
-  const out = { ...CAPABILITY_DEFAULTS }
-  if (raw && typeof raw === 'object') {
-    if (raw.homeAccess === true) out.homeAccess = true
-    else if (raw.homeAccess === false) out.homeAccess = false
-  }
-  return out
-}
-
-// Convenience alias requested by B2 call-site plumbing. Returns the
-// same object shape as readCapabilities(); callers that only need a
-// boolean can read `.homeAccess` directly.
-export function getCapabilities() {
-  return readCapabilities()
-}
-
-// ── Secret account names ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-// Canonical account strings stored in the OS keychain. Must stay in sync with
-// the migration logic in seed.mjs.
-export const SECRET_ACCOUNTS = Object.freeze({
-  discordToken: 'discord.token',
-  webhookAuth:  'webhook.authtoken',
-  searchApiKey: (provider) => `search.${provider}.apiKey`,
-  agentApiKey:  (provider) => `agent.${provider}.apiKey`,
-})
-
-export function isDiscordSnowflake(value) {
-  return /^\d{17,20}$/.test(String(value || '').trim())
-}
-
-export function diagnoseDiscordTokenValue(value, config = {}) {
-  const token = String(value || '').trim()
-  if (!token) return null
-  const discord = config?.discord && typeof config.discord === 'object' ? config.discord : {}
-  const appId = String(discord.applicationId || '').trim()
-  if (appId && token === appId) return 'Bot token field contains the Application ID, not the bot token.'
-  const channels = config?.channelsConfig && typeof config.channelsConfig === 'object' ? config.channelsConfig : {}
-  for (const ch of Object.values(channels)) {
-    const channelId = String(ch?.channelId || '').trim()
-    if (channelId && token === channelId) return 'Bot token field contains a Channel ID, not the bot token.'
-  }
-  if (isDiscordSnowflake(token)) return 'Bot token field contains a numeric Discord ID, not the bot token.'
-  return null
-}
-
-// ── Secret-aware getters ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-// Read order: ENV MIXDOG_<UPPER_SNAKE> → OS keychain → null.
-
-function _envKey(account) {
-  // 'discord.token' → 'MIXDOG_DISCORD_TOKEN'
-  return 'MIXDOG_' + account.replace(/[.\s]+/g, '_').toUpperCase()
-}
-
-function _readSecret(account) {
-  const envVal = process.env[_envKey(account)]
-  if (envVal) return envVal
-  try { return _getSecret(account) } catch { return null }
-}
-
-/**
- * Returns the Discord bot token.
- * Priority: MIXDOG_DISCORD_TOKEN → keychain('discord.token') → null
- */
-export function getDiscordToken() {
-  return _readSecret(SECRET_ACCOUNTS.discordToken)
-}
-
-/**
- * Returns the ngrok/webhook authtoken.
- * Priority: MIXDOG_WEBHOOK_AUTHTOKEN → keychain('webhook.authtoken') → null
- */
-export function getWebhookAuthtoken() {
-  return _readSecret(SECRET_ACCOUNTS.webhookAuth)
-}
-
-const SEARCH_PROVIDERS = ['firecrawl', 'tavily', 'exa']
-
-/**
- * Returns the API key for a search provider.
- * Priority: MIXDOG_SEARCH_<PROVIDER>_APIKEY → keychain('search.<provider>.apiKey') → null
- */
-export function getSearchApiKey(provider) {
-  if (!SEARCH_PROVIDERS.includes(provider)) return null
-  return _readSecret(SECRET_ACCOUNTS.searchApiKey(provider))
-}
-
-// Standard provider env names take precedence so existing OPENAI_API_KEY-style
-// exports keep working, then MIXDOG_AGENT_<P>_APIKEY, then the OS keychain.
-// SSOT for agent API-key providers: setup-server.mjs and config-merge.mjs import
-// this so UI key-presence detection uses the exact same predicate the runtime
-// loads from. Add a provider here and every path picks it up.
-export const AGENT_PROVIDER_ENV = Object.freeze({
-  openai: 'OPENAI_API_KEY', anthropic: 'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY', gemini: 'GEMINI_API_KEY',
-  deepseek: 'DEEPSEEK_API_KEY', xai: 'XAI_API_KEY', 'opencode-go': 'OPENCODE_API_KEY',
-})
-
-// Last-resort env aliases honored AFTER the standard env / MIXDOG_AGENT_* /
-// keychain sources. GROK_API_KEY is the established xAI alias elsewhere in the
-// repo (search discovery, xai-api/grok-oauth backends), so honoring it here
-// keeps provider discovery and dispatch resolving the same credential.
-export const AGENT_PROVIDER_ENV_ALIASES = Object.freeze({
-  xai: ['GROK_API_KEY'],
-})
-
-/**
- * Returns the API key for an agent provider.
- * Priority: <PROVIDER>_API_KEY env -> MIXDOG_AGENT_<PROVIDER>_APIKEY -> keychain('agent.<provider>.apiKey') -> alias env (e.g. GROK_API_KEY for xai) -> null.
- * Never reads mixdog-config.json — provider keys are keychain-only.
- */
-export function getAgentApiKey(provider) {
-  const std = AGENT_PROVIDER_ENV[provider]
-  if (std && process.env[std]) return process.env[std]
-  const fromStore = _readSecret(SECRET_ACCOUNTS.agentApiKey(provider))
-  if (fromStore) return fromStore
-  for (const alias of AGENT_PROVIDER_ENV_ALIASES[provider] || []) {
-    if (process.env[alias]) return process.env[alias]
-  }
-  return null
-}
-
-/**
- * Persist a secret to the OS keychain. Throws on failure.
- * Never writes to mixdog-config.json.
- */
-export function saveSecret(account, value) {
-  try {
-    _setSecret(account, value)
-  } catch (err) {
-    // On WSL/headless Linux (and any host missing a usable keychain backend,
-    // e.g. keytar/libsecret not installed or no running Secret Service) the OS
-    // write throws a cryptic backend error. Surface an actionable message that
-    // points at the env-var read path the getters already honor, instead of
-    // silently writing the plaintext secret to mixdog-config.json.
-    const envKey = _envKey(account)
-    const agentMatch = String(account || '').match(/^agent\.([^.]+)\.apiKey$/)
-    const stdEnv = agentMatch ? AGENT_PROVIDER_ENV[agentMatch[1]] : null
-    const envHint = stdEnv ? `${stdEnv} (or ${envKey})` : envKey
-    const e = new Error(
-      `[config] could not save secret to the OS keychain: ${err && err.message ? err.message : err}\n` +
-      `  No usable keychain backend on this host (common on WSL / headless Linux without libsecret).\n` +
-      `  Set the ${envHint} environment variable instead — the runtime reads it directly.`
-    )
-    e.cause = err
-    throw e
-  }
-}
-
-export function deleteSecret(account) {
-  _deleteSecret(account)
-}
-
-/**
- * Whether a secret is stored in the OS keychain for `account` (ignores env).
- * Lets the setup UI show "Set" WITHOUT ever sending the secret value to the
- * browser.
- */
-export function hasStoredSecret(account) {
-  try { return !!_getSecret(account) } catch { return false }
-}
-
-export { CONFIG_PATH }

package/src/shared/daemon-recycle.mjs

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-// Daemon recycle barrier — closes the dev-sync full-restart "stale-serving"
-// race.
-//
-// When dev-sync runs in-band (invoked from inside the live daemon's bash
-// tool) it cannot kill the shared daemon synchronously — that would sever
-// its own process before the response flushes. It instead SCHEDULES a
-// detached kill a couple seconds out and returns immediately. During that
-// kill-delay plus the supervisor's respawn time the OLD daemon stays alive
-// and keeps accepting work, so a bridge worker spawned in that window binds
-// to about-to-die, stale-code/schema daemon (observed: a worker received a
-// pre-edit tool schema right after a forced restart).
-//
-// Fix: at kill-schedule time dev-sync writes a sentinel naming the EXACT
-// daemon being recycled by its (server_pid, server_started_at) identity.
-// The bridge spawn-admission path refuses to start a worker while the live
-// advert still names that same daemon, so the dispatch is deferred to the
-// fresh daemon instead of served stale. This is identity-based, not a timer:
-// the gate compares the sentinel against the current advert, and the moment
-// the fresh daemon rewrites the advert with a new server_pid the match
-// breaks and spawns resume — no clock, no heuristic window. server_started_at
-// guards the rare case of an OS PID reuse aliasing the fresh daemon onto the
-// doomed identity.
-//
-// Neutral location (src/shared) so both the agent orchestrator (spawn gate)
-// and the dev-sync script (sentinel writer) import the SAME path + schema —
-// the agent layer never imports the channels layer where the rest of the
-// runtime-state lives.
-
-import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
-import { join, resolve } from 'node:path';
-import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, renameSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
-
-// Mirror runtime-paths.mjs RUNTIME_ROOT resolution so the sentinel lands
-// alongside active-instance.json regardless of MIXDOG_RUNTIME_ROOT override.
-const RUNTIME_ROOT = process.env.MIXDOG_RUNTIME_ROOT
-  ? resolve(process.env.MIXDOG_RUNTIME_ROOT)
-  : join(tmpdir(), 'mixdog');
-const RECYCLE_FILE = join(RUNTIME_ROOT, 'daemon-recycle.json');
-const ACTIVE_INSTANCE_FILE = join(RUNTIME_ROOT, 'active-instance.json');
-
-function _readJson(path) {
-  try { return JSON.parse(readFileSync(path, 'utf8')); }
-  catch { return null; }
-}
-
-function _pid(value) {
-  const n = Number(value);
-  return Number.isFinite(n) && n > 0 ? n : null;
-}
-
-function readDaemonRecycleSentinel() {
-  return _readJson(RECYCLE_FILE);
-}
-
-// Called by dev-sync when it schedules a forced daemon (server_pid) kill.
-// The full (server_pid, server_started_at) identity is REQUIRED: a sentinel
-// without a verifiable start time could falsely block a PID-reused fresh
-// daemon, so we decline to arm the barrier rather than arm it partially
-// (degrades to prior behavior — no heuristic PID-only match).
-function writeDaemonRecycleSentinel({ doomedServerPid, doomedServerStartedAt } = {}) {
-  const pid = _pid(doomedServerPid);
-  const startedAt = Number(doomedServerStartedAt);
-  if (pid === null || !Number.isFinite(startedAt)) return false;
-  try {
-    if (!existsSync(RUNTIME_ROOT)) mkdirSync(RUNTIME_ROOT, { recursive: true });
-    // Atomic publish: write a temp file then rename, so a concurrent
-    // isCurrentDaemonDoomed() never observes a partial/empty sentinel and
-    // falsely allows a spawn on the doomed daemon. Mirrors active-instance.json.
-    const tmp = `${RECYCLE_FILE}.${process.pid}.tmp`;
-    writeFileSync(tmp, JSON.stringify({ doomedServerPid: pid, doomedServerStartedAt: startedAt }));
-    renameSync(tmp, RECYCLE_FILE);
-    return true;
-  } catch { return false; }
-}
-
-function clearDaemonRecycleSentinel() {
-  try { if (existsSync(RECYCLE_FILE)) rmSync(RECYCLE_FILE, { force: true }); }
-  catch { /* best-effort */ }
-}
-
-// True when the live advert (this daemon's own active-instance.json) names
-// the daemon dev-sync flagged for recycle. PID identity is primary; when the
-// sentinel recorded server_started_at it must also match the advert so a
-// reused PID cannot alias a freshly-booted daemon onto the doomed identity.
-// Reads nothing when no sentinel exists (the common case) — one stat/read.
-function isCurrentDaemonDoomed() {
-  const recycle = readDaemonRecycleSentinel();
-  if (!recycle) return false;
-  const advert = _readJson(ACTIVE_INSTANCE_FILE);
-  if (!advert) return false;
-  const doomedPid = _pid(recycle.doomedServerPid);
-  const curPid = _pid(advert.server_pid);
-  if (doomedPid === null || curPid === null || doomedPid !== curPid) return false;
-  // Strict (server_pid, server_started_at) identity — no PID-only fallback,
-  // so a reused PID on a fresh daemon (different start time) never matches.
-  const doomedStart = Number(recycle.doomedServerStartedAt);
-  const curStart = Number(advert.server_started_at);
-  return Number.isFinite(doomedStart) && Number.isFinite(curStart) && doomedStart === curStart;
-}
-
-export {
-  RECYCLE_FILE,
-  ACTIVE_INSTANCE_FILE,
-  readDaemonRecycleSentinel,
-  writeDaemonRecycleSentinel,
-  clearDaemonRecycleSentinel,
-  isCurrentDaemonDoomed,
-};

package/src/shared/disable-claude-builtins.mjs

@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
-import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync } from 'fs';
-import { dirname, join } from 'path';
-import { homedir } from 'os';
-import { writeFileAtomicSync } from './atomic-file.mjs';
-import { getBackupRoot } from './user-data-guard.mjs';
-
-// On FIRST install only (gated by the caller via the fresh creation of
-// mixdog-config.json), disable Claude Code's built-in auto-memory and away
-// summary so mixdog's own memory/recap is authoritative. The user's prior
-// values are captured to an install-restore snapshot first so the original
-// behaviour can be restored. The createOnly gate in seed.mjs guarantees this
-// runs exactly once, so we never reapply on later boots.
-
-function claudeConfigBaseDir() {
-  return process.env.CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR || join(homedir(), '.claude');
-}
-
-// Settings path is a parameter (defaulting to <CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR or ~/.claude>/settings.json)
-// so it can be redirected via MIXDOG_CLAUDE_SETTINGS_PATH for testing without a real homedir.
-export function resolveClaudeSettingsPath() {
-  return process.env.MIXDOG_CLAUDE_SETTINGS_PATH
-    || join(claudeConfigBaseDir(), 'settings.json');
-}
-
-function readJsonOrNull(filePath) {
-  try {
-    return JSON.parse(readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8'));
-  } catch {
-    return null;
-  }
-}
-
-function isPlainObject(value) {
-  return !!value && typeof value === 'object' && !Array.isArray(value);
-}
-
-/**
- * Disable Claude Code's built-in memory/recap on first install. Best-effort:
- * any failure is warned to stderr and swallowed so seeding is never broken.
- *
- * @param {string} settingsPath  path to settings.json (default ~/.claude/settings.json)
- * @returns {{ snapshot: boolean, merged: boolean }}
- */
-export function disableClaudeBuiltinsOnFirstInstall(settingsPath = resolveClaudeSettingsPath()) {
-  const result = { snapshot: false, merged: false };
-  try {
-    let settings = {};
-    if (existsSync(settingsPath)) {
-      // File exists: parse it. An unparseable existing file may hold raw,
-      // hand-fixable user content — never overwrite it. Warn and skip the
-      // whole merge (no reliable priors → no snapshot either). Only a truly
-      // missing file is treated as `{}` and gets the disable flags written.
-      const parsed = readJsonOrNull(settingsPath);
-      if (parsed === null) {
-        process.stderr.write(`[seed] claude settings.json at ${settingsPath} is unparseable; leaving untouched\n`);
-        return result;
-      }
-      // Valid JSON with a non-object top level (array/string/number) also
-      // holds user content we cannot merge into — skip, same as unparseable.
-      if (!isPlainObject(parsed)) {
-        process.stderr.write(`[seed] claude settings.json at ${settingsPath} is not a JSON object; leaving untouched\n`);
-        return result;
-      }
-      settings = parsed;
-    }
-
-    // 1. Restore snapshot FIRST, capturing prior values (null when absent).
-    const snapshotPath = join(getBackupRoot(), 'install-restore', 'claude-settings-original.json');
-    if (!existsSync(snapshotPath)) {
-      const snapshot = {
-        autoMemoryEnabled: Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(settings, 'autoMemoryEnabled')
-          ? settings.autoMemoryEnabled : null,
-        awaySummaryEnabled: Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(settings, 'awaySummaryEnabled')
-          ? settings.awaySummaryEnabled : null,
-        capturedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
-      };
-      mkdirSync(dirname(snapshotPath), { recursive: true });
-      writeFileAtomicSync(snapshotPath, JSON.stringify(snapshot, null, 2) + '\n', { fsyncDir: true });
-      result.snapshot = true;
-    }
-
-    // 2. Merge the disables, preserving all other keys, atomic write.
-    const merged = { ...settings, autoMemoryEnabled: false, awaySummaryEnabled: false };
-    mkdirSync(dirname(settingsPath), { recursive: true });
-    writeFileAtomicSync(settingsPath, JSON.stringify(merged, null, 2) + '\n', { fsyncDir: true });
-    result.merged = true;
-  } catch (e) {
-    process.stderr.write(`[seed] disable claude built-ins failed: ${e.message}\n`);
-  }
-  return result;
-}

package/src/shared/err-text.mjs

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-export function errText(e) {
-  if (e == null) return String(e);
-  if (typeof e === 'string') return e;
-  if (e instanceof Error) return e.message || e.name || String(e);
-  // ErrorEvent / event-like / plain object (NOT instanceof Error)
-  if (typeof e.message === 'string' && e.message) return e.message;
-  if (e.error != null && e.error !== e) return errText(e.error);
-  if (e.reason != null && e.reason !== e) return errText(e.reason);
-  if (typeof e.type === 'string' && e.type) return `${e.type} event`;
-  try { const j = JSON.stringify(e); if (j && j !== '{}' && j !== 'null') return j; } catch {}
-  return String(e);
-}