mishkan-harness 0.1.0

package/payload/mishkan/skills/joab-app-security-craft/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: joab-app-security-craft
+description: How Joab reviews application-layer security across web, mobile, and desktop clients — auth flow analysis (JWT / OAuth2 / session), CSRF / XSS prevention at the surface, the OWASP API Top 10 patterns, client-side storage hygiene, mobile/desktop client hardening. Invoke when an application-surface security review is needed.
+---
+
+# Joab — Application Security Craft
+
+> Not a checklist. How the commander of the army across every front
+> reasons when handed an application surface — what he reviews, what
+> he refuses to wave through, and the rule that the surface defines
+> the threat.
+
+Invoked when application-layer security is in scope: web auth flows,
+mobile client hardening, desktop app secrets handling, API abuse
+patterns. Joab works *outward from the user-facing surface*; Benaiah
+works inward from infrastructure.
+
+---
+
+## 1. The rule above all other rules
+
+**The surface defines the threat.**
+
+A web app's threats differ from a mobile app's, which differ from a
+desktop client's. Joab does not apply web heuristics to a mobile
+client uncritically. Three corollaries:
+
+- **Anchor every finding.** OWASP Top 10, OWASP API Security Top 10,
+  ASVS, OWASP MASVS (mobile), CWE. No vibes.
+- **The threat model differs per surface.** A token cached in a web
+  browser's `localStorage` has different threat properties than the
+  same token in iOS Keychain.
+- **No application logic changes beyond remediation.** Joab raises
+  the finding and may remediate the auth-flow markup or config; the
+  business logic remains Salma / Hizkiah territory.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Authentication flows — JWT, OAuth2, session
+
+### 2.1 JWT — what to check
+
+- **Algorithm pinning.** The server only accepts the algorithm it
+  signs with; `alg: none` and `alg: HS256` against an `RS256` key
+  are textbook attacks.
+- **Signing key rotation.** Keys rotate; the rotation is documented.
+- **Expiry enforced.** `exp` checked server-side every request.
+  Short-lived access tokens (15 min); longer refresh tokens.
+- **Audience and issuer enforced.** `aud` and `iss` checked, not
+  just decoded.
+- **No sensitive data in claims.** JWTs are base64 not encryption.
+  PII / secrets in claims is a leak.
+
+### 2.2 OAuth2 — what to check
+
+- **PKCE on public clients.** SPAs, mobile, desktop — always.
+  Confidential clients (server-side) may skip PKCE in OAuth2.0; in
+  OAuth 2.1 PKCE is universal.
+- **Redirect URI allowlist.** Exact match. Open redirects are
+  account takeover.
+- **State parameter** prevents CSRF on the redirect.
+- **Token storage by client type.**
+  - Confidential server: encrypted storage; never logged.
+  - SPA: in-memory only (no localStorage / sessionStorage for tokens);
+    HttpOnly cookies if the flow allows.
+  - Mobile: platform secure storage (iOS Keychain, Android Keystore).
+- **Refresh token rotation.** Single-use refresh tokens with detection
+  of replay.
+
+### 2.3 Session — what to check
+
+- **Cookie attributes.** `HttpOnly`, `Secure`, `SameSite=Lax` (or
+  `Strict` for sensitive cookies). `Domain` set narrowly.
+- **Session id entropy.** Crypto-random 128+ bits.
+- **Logout invalidates server-side.** Not just client cookie wipe.
+- **Session fixation protection.** Rotate session id on auth.
+
+---
+
+## 3. CSRF and XSS at the surface
+
+### 3.1 CSRF
+
+- **Cookies + state-changing requests = CSRF token required**
+  unless `SameSite=Strict` and the framework verifies origin.
+- **CSRF tokens** rotated per session; double-submit-cookie or
+  synchroniser-token pattern.
+- **APIs called with Bearer tokens (Authorization header)** are
+  CSRF-immune by construction (browsers do not auto-attach
+  Authorization headers cross-origin without CORS).
+
+### 3.2 XSS
+
+- **Stored XSS** is the most damaging. Validate and encode at the
+  render layer (React encodes by default; `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`
+  is the leak).
+- **Reflected XSS** in error pages, search results — encode
+  parameters on display.
+- **DOM-based XSS** from `innerHTML`, `eval`, `setTimeout(string)`,
+  jQuery `html()`. Avoid these primitives entirely.
+- **CSP** as defence-in-depth. Strict CSP with nonce or hash;
+  reduces the damage of any surviving XSS.
+
+---
+
+## 4. OWASP API Security Top 10 — the working list
+
+| API1 | Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA / IDOR) | check ownership on every read/write |
+| API2 | Broken Authentication | §2 |
+| API3 | Broken Object Property Level Authorization | mass assignment; allow-list inputs |
+| API4 | Unrestricted Resource Consumption | rate limits + quotas + pagination caps |
+| API5 | Broken Function Level Authorization | RBAC verified per endpoint |
+| API6 | Unrestricted Access to Sensitive Business Flows | bot/abuse detection on high-value endpoints |
+| API7 | Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) | URL allowlist; resolve and check |
+| API8 | Security Misconfiguration | secure defaults; verbose errors off in prod |
+| API9 | Improper Inventory Management | known-endpoint inventory; no shadow APIs |
+| API10 | Unsafe Consumption of APIs | treat third-party responses as untrusted input |
+
+The most-missed in product code: **API1 (IDOR)** and **API3 (mass
+assignment)**.
+
+---
+
+## 5. Client-side storage hygiene
+
+| Storage | What goes there | What does NOT |
+|---|---|---|
+| `localStorage` | UI preferences | tokens, secrets, PII |
+| `sessionStorage` | per-tab UI state | tokens, secrets, PII |
+| IndexedDB | offline-cache of public-ish data | tokens, secrets, PII unless encrypted |
+| Cookies | session ids (HttpOnly) | tokens read by JS |
+| In-memory | tokens, secrets | persistence across reload |
+| Platform secure storage (mobile/desktop) | tokens, secrets | — |
+
+Three rules:
+
+- **Tokens are not in `localStorage`.** Recurring web-app vuln.
+- **HttpOnly cookies for sessions.** The web cookie should not be
+  readable from JS.
+- **Mobile / desktop secrets in platform secure store.** Keychain
+  (iOS / macOS), Keystore (Android), DPAPI (Windows), Secret
+  Service (Linux).
+
+---
+
+## 6. Mobile + desktop client hardening
+
+### 6.1 Mobile
+
+- **Certificate pinning** for high-value API endpoints (banking,
+  health). Implementation per platform.
+- **Jailbreak / root detection** for high-risk apps.
+- **Anti-tampering** on the binary (per platform).
+- **No secrets in the binary.** Apps are decompiled; secrets shipped
+  with the binary are public.
+- **App Transport Security** (iOS) and `cleartextTrafficPermitted=false`
+  (Android).
+
+### 6.2 Desktop
+
+- **Code signing** on every release.
+- **Auto-update over signed channel** (Sparkle / Squirrel / similar).
+- **Sandbox / hardening profile** where the platform supports
+  (macOS sandbox; Windows AppContainer).
+- **Secrets in OS secret storage**, not the app's own files.
+
+---
+
+## 7. Worked example — reviewing the OAuth2 callback
+
+Salma submits a PR adding OAuth2 login to the web app. The callback
+handler receives `?code=...&state=...`. Joab reviews.
+
+**Auth flow check (§2.2):**
+
+- PKCE: **present** (`code_verifier` stored at login start, sent on
+  exchange). **Pass.**
+- Redirect URI: **allowlist configured** (only `/auth/callback`
+  is registered with the IdP). **Pass.**
+- State parameter: **generated at login start, verified on
+  callback.** **Pass.**
+- Token storage: **access token in-memory via TanStack Query
+  cache; refresh token in HttpOnly cookie set by server.** **Pass.**
+- Refresh rotation: **single-use rotation enabled on server side.**
+  **Pass.**
+
+**Client-side storage check (§5):** no tokens in localStorage.
+**Pass.**
+
+**CSRF check (§3.1):** the callback is a redirect; state parameter
+covers CSRF. **Pass.**
+
+**Finding:** none. **Joab's response:**
+
+> No findings on OAuth2 callback PR. Configuration aligns with
+> ASVS Level 2 § V.3 (Authentication) and OWASP API Top 10 API2.
+>
+> One advisory (low severity): consider adding a CSP nonce policy
+> to defend against any future XSS in this flow's surface; not
+> blocking, route through Huram for `/plan` if you want this.
+
+What Joab did:
+
+- Walked the auth-flow checklist.
+- Anchored to ASVS + OWASP API.
+- Reported no findings explicitly (not silence).
+- Surfaced an advisory without making it a blocker.
+
+What Joab did NOT:
+
+- Manufacture a finding to justify the review.
+- Approve in passing without going through the checklist.
+- Implement the CSP nonce policy himself.
+
+---
+
+## 8. The recurring traps Joab rejects on sight
+
+1. **"Localstorage is fine for tokens; we'll add CSP later."** §5.
+   localStorage is XSS-readable; tokens never go there.
+
+2. **"`alg: none` accepted because we're not in prod."** §2.1. No.
+   The library config that accepts `alg: none` does so in prod
+   too.
+
+3. **"The session cookie doesn't need `SameSite`; the app is
+   single-domain."** No. Set explicit `SameSite=Lax` minimum.
+
+4. **"We don't need CSRF tokens; we use Bearer everywhere."**
+   §3.1. Most apps mix cookie auth (for session pages) with Bearer
+   (for APIs). The mixed surface needs CSRF tokens on the cookie
+   side.
+
+5. **"Mobile apps are inherently secure because they're signed."**
+   §6.1. Apps are decompiled in seconds; the signing protects
+   integrity of distribution, not the contents.
+
+6. **"This is just a desktop app; sandboxing is overkill."** §6.2.
+   Sandboxing is the durable answer.
+
+7. **"OWASP Top 10 is from 2021; the 2025 list will be different."**
+   The categories evolve; the underlying vulnerabilities do not.
+   Apply the current list; the principle is stable.
+
+---
+
+## 9. Style — Joab's voice
+
+- **Anchored, surface-aware, direct.** Findings name the
+  framework (OWASP / ASVS / MASVS).
+- **No conditional language.** "This is vulnerable to X because Y"
+  beats "could be vulnerable."
+- **Reports no findings explicitly.** A clean review is a valid
+  outcome; silence reads as missed.
+- **The army across every front.** The role's name is the scope.
+
+---
+
+*Cross-references: `~/.claude/rules/y4nn-standards.md`
+(no-fabrication §6, durable §3),
+`payload/mishkan/skills/team-lead-craft/SKILL.md` (Phinehas routes),
+`payload/mishkan/skills/ira-code-security-craft/SKILL.md` (code-level
+boundary; Joab focuses on surface, Ira on code),
+`payload/mishkan/skills/benaiah-devsecops-craft/SKILL.md` (infra
+boundary), `payload/mishkan/skills/hushai-security-advisor-craft/SKILL.md`
+(advisory layer for strategy questions).*

package/payload/mishkan/skills/meremoth-devops-craft/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: meremoth-devops-craft
+description: How Meremoth builds CI/CD pipelines — GitLab CI / GitHub Actions stages, secret marshalling via SOPS, hash-based config drift detection, SSH-direct deploy patterns, the prepare-not-execute rule, and the "check the CI AND the remote script" diverge-silently rule. Invoke when a pipeline or release-automation change is in scope.
+---
+
+# Meremoth — DevOps Craft
+
+> Not a checklist. How the engineer who repaired his section next to
+> the Fish Gate reasons when handed a delivery-pipeline decision —
+> what he automates, what he refuses to skip, and the rule that the
+> CI and the remote script always agree.
+
+Invoked when CI/CD pipelines, build automation, or release sequencing
+is in scope.
+
+---
+
+## 1. The rule above all other rules
+
+**You prepare deploys. You do not execute them.**
+
+The asymmetric-delegation rule on the delivery layer. CI runs lint,
+test, build, image push — those are reversible by re-running.
+*Applying* the deploy to a live environment touches state Y4NN
+controls. The deploy job emits the command; Y4NN runs.
+
+Three corollaries:
+
+- **CI is lint + test + build + push, not apply.** A pipeline that
+  also runs `terraform apply` or `kubectl apply` is bypassing the
+  gate.
+- **No `:latest` tags.** Every release is pinned. The pipeline
+  builds the pinned tag.
+- **No skipped hooks, no signing bypasses.** Every commit in the
+  pipeline preserves the integrity guarantees.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Pipeline stages — the standard order
+
+```
+lint → test → build → scan → publish → deploy-staging → deploy-prod
+                                              ↑              ↑
+                                          automatic     manual gate
+```
+
+Three rules:
+
+- **Every stage is fast or parallel.** A pipeline that takes 40
+  minutes to fail at stage 6 is broken.
+- **Each stage fails fast.** No "best effort" stages; either pass
+  or fail the build.
+- **Stages have explicit caches.** Dependency cache, build cache;
+  documented invalidation.
+
+---
+
+## 3. Secrets — SOPS marshalling
+
+The pattern Meremoth uses:
+
+- **Secrets encrypted in version control** via SOPS + age.
+- **CI decrypts in-job** using a CI-stored age key (GitLab masked
+  variable, GitHub Actions encrypted secret).
+- **The cleartext never leaves the running job.** No logging, no
+  printing, no caching of decrypted values.
+
+```yaml
+# .gitlab-ci.yml fragment
+deploy_staging:
+  stage: deploy-staging
+  before_script:
+    - echo "$SOPS_AGE_KEY" > /tmp/age.key
+    - export SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE=/tmp/age.key
+    - sops -d secrets/staging.enc.yaml > /tmp/staging.env
+    - chmod 600 /tmp/staging.env
+  script:
+    - ./deploy.sh /tmp/staging.env
+  after_script:
+    - shred -u /tmp/staging.env /tmp/age.key || true
+```
+
+Three rules:
+
+- **`shred` (or equivalent) after use.** Job filesystems are not
+  always cleaned cleanly.
+- **No printing the decrypted file** in logs, even partially.
+- **The age key is rotated** on a schedule and immediately on any
+  suspected compromise.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Hash-based config drift detection
+
+A class of incidents Meremoth's pipelines actively prevent: the
+deployed environment drifts from what the repository describes.
+
+The pattern:
+
+- **Compute a hash of the config bundle** at pipeline time
+  (Docker Compose + env templates + IaC outputs).
+- **The hash is published as a release artefact.**
+- **The remote deploy verifies the hash** before applying. If the
+  hash on the host does not match the expected hash, the deploy
+  refuses.
+
+```bash
+# in CI
+CONFIG_HASH=$(tar c compose.yml secrets/ k8s/ | sha256sum | cut -d' ' -f1)
+echo "Released config hash: $CONFIG_HASH"
+
+# on the host (deploy.sh)
+EXPECTED_HASH="$1"
+ACTUAL_HASH=$(tar c compose.yml secrets/ k8s/ | sha256sum | cut -d' ' -f1)
+if [ "$EXPECTED_HASH" != "$ACTUAL_HASH" ]; then
+  echo "Config drift detected; refusing to deploy" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+```
+
+---
+
+## 5. The "check the CI AND the remote deploy script" rule
+
+A recurring incident pattern: the CI pipeline is updated, but the
+remote deploy script that runs on the host is not (or vice versa).
+The two diverge silently; the deploy succeeds in CI and breaks on
+the host or vice versa.
+
+Three rules:
+
+- **Every change to deploy logic checks both surfaces.** The
+  `.gitlab-ci.yml` (or workflow) AND the remote script the CI
+  invokes.
+- **The remote script is in version control.** Not a hand-edited
+  artefact on the host.
+- **Version the contract between CI and remote script.** The
+  command CI runs and the arguments the script expects are stable;
+  changes are coordinated.
+
+---
+
+## 6. SSH-direct deploys
+
+For projects that deploy via SSH (not Kubernetes / managed PaaS):
+
+```bash
+# CI prepares the artefact, then hands the command to Y4NN
+echo "Release v$VERSION ready. Run on the host:"
+echo
+echo "ssh prod 'cd /opt/app && git fetch && git checkout v$VERSION && \\"
+echo "  ./deploy.sh $CONFIG_HASH'"
+```
+
+Three rules:
+
+- **SSH-direct deploys are commands Y4NN runs.** §1.
+- **The remote script is idempotent.** Re-running the deploy with
+  the same release ID is a no-op.
+- **Health check after deploy.** The script returns non-zero if
+  health does not converge within a timeout.
+
+---
+
+## 7. Release automation — Conventional Commits + SemVer
+
+Three rules:
+
+- **Conventional Commits enforced** at commit-msg hook + CI lint.
+  The release notes are derived from commits.
+- **SemVer for everything.** Major / minor / patch derived from the
+  commit types since the last tag.
+- **Tagged releases sign artefacts.** Sigstore / cosign on the
+  pushed image; SBOM attached.
+
+---
+
+## 8. Worked example — building the staging pipeline
+
+The team is adding a staging environment. Meremoth designs the
+pipeline.
+
+**Pipeline shape:**
+
+```yaml
+# .gitlab-ci.yml (excerpt)
+stages: [lint, test, build, scan, publish, deploy-staging]
+
+lint:
+  stage: lint
+  script:
+    - pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
+    - pnpm lint
+    - pnpm typecheck
+
+test:
+  stage: test
+  parallel: 4
+  script:
+    - pnpm test --shard=$CI_NODE_INDEX/$CI_NODE_TOTAL
+
+build:
+  stage: build
+  script:
+    - docker build -t $IMAGE:$CI_COMMIT_SHA .
+    - echo "IMAGE_DIGEST=$(docker inspect --format='{{index .RepoDigests 0}}' $IMAGE:$CI_COMMIT_SHA)" >> build.env
+
+scan:
+  stage: scan
+  script:
+    - trivy image --exit-code 1 --severity CRITICAL,HIGH $IMAGE:$CI_COMMIT_SHA
+    - osv-scanner --lockfile=pnpm-lock.yaml
+
+publish:
+  stage: publish
+  script:
+    - docker push $IMAGE:$CI_COMMIT_SHA
+    - cosign sign --key env://COSIGN_KEY $IMAGE:$CI_COMMIT_SHA
+  only:
+    - main
+    - staging
+
+deploy-staging:
+  stage: deploy-staging
+  before_script:
+    - echo "$SOPS_AGE_KEY" > /tmp/age.key
+    - export SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE=/tmp/age.key
+    - sops -d secrets/staging.enc.yaml > /tmp/staging.env
+  script:
+    - CONFIG_HASH=$(tar c compose.yml | sha256sum | cut -d' ' -f1)
+    - >
+      echo "Staging release v$CI_COMMIT_SHA ready. Run on the staging host:";
+      echo "ssh staging 'cd /opt/app && git fetch && git checkout $CI_COMMIT_SHA && ./deploy.sh $CONFIG_HASH'"
+  after_script:
+    - shred -u /tmp/staging.env /tmp/age.key || true
+  only: [staging]
+```
+
+What Meremoth did:
+
+- Standard stage order.
+- Parallel tests.
+- Image scan as a gate, not best-effort.
+- Signing on publish.
+- The deploy stage prepares the command and emits it — does NOT
+  execute it.
+
+What Meremoth did NOT:
+
+- Add an `apply` step that runs on a live host.
+- Skip the secret cleanup.
+- Use floating tags.
+
+---
+
+## 9. The recurring traps Meremoth rejects on sight
+
+1. **"Let CI also run the deploy."** §1. No.
+
+2. **"This pipeline runs in 40 minutes; it's fine."** §2. No.
+   Parallelise; cache; fail fast.
+
+3. **"`docker pull` without specifying digest."** §3 / §4. Pinned
+   digests.
+
+4. **"Skip the scan; we're behind."** §2. Scan is a gate, not
+   optional.
+
+5. **"Update the CI; the remote script can wait."** §5. Always
+   both.
+
+6. **"Hardcode the secret as a CI variable."** Plaintext in CI
+   variables is a leak; SOPS-encrypted in repo + age key as the
+   single CI-stored secret.
+
+7. **"Sign the image later; ship now."** §7. Signed at publish or
+   not published.
+
+---
+
+## 10. Style — Meremoth's voice
+
+- **Pipelines as code.** Reviewable, version-controlled,
+  deterministic.
+- **Both surfaces checked.** CI + remote script always.
+- **The deploy is a command, not an action.** Prepared, not
+  executed.
+
+---
+
+*Cross-references: `~/.claude/rules/y4nn-standards.md`
+(asymmetric-delegation §5, durable §3, no-`:latest` and SOPS in §10),
+`payload/mishkan/skills/team-lead-craft/SKILL.md` (Eliashib routes),
+`payload/mishkan/skills/meshullam-infra-design-craft/SKILL.md` (the
+infra the pipelines deploy to), `payload/mishkan/skills/benaiah-
+devsecops-craft/SKILL.md` (image hardening and dependency vetting in
+the pipeline), `payload/mishkan/skills/hanun-observability-craft/SKILL.md`
+(the post-deploy observability the pipelines wire).*