minicode-ai 0.14.0 → 0.14.2
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +1 -1
- package/cli/args.ts +16 -3
- package/cli/auto-update.ts +32 -2
- package/cli/commands/exec.ts +9 -0
- package/cli/index.ts +31 -13
- package/cli/setup.ts +31 -19
- package/cli/tui.ts +63 -40
- package/docs/OUTPUT_PROTOCOL_SPEC.md +6 -0
- package/docs/OUTPUT_RENDERING_SPEC.md +28 -4
- package/docs/README.md +2 -2
- package/docs/TERMINAL_CONTRACT.md +52 -26
- package/docs/agents.md +2 -2
- package/docs/choosing-mode.md +20 -13
- package/docs/cli.md +11 -11
- package/docs/environment.md +3 -3
- package/docs/getting-started.md +14 -12
- package/docs/glossary.md +1 -1
- package/docs/mcp-lsp.md +1 -1
- package/docs/policy-sandbox.md +7 -1
- package/docs/security-model.md +2 -2
- package/docs/security.md +7 -1
- package/docs/tools.md +4 -4
- package/docs/verify-benchmark.md +16 -0
- package/package.json +1 -3
- package/src/app/mentions.ts +4 -3
- package/src/app/session.ts +19 -9
- package/src/app/tool-layer.ts +10 -3
- package/src/constants.ts +17 -0
- package/src/lib/git-hardening.ts +27 -22
- package/src/lib/safe-open.ts +73 -19
- package/src/lib/trusted-exec.ts +7 -4
- package/src/mcp/client.ts +34 -9
- package/src/mcp/transport.ts +96 -42
- package/src/memory/files.ts +15 -4
- package/src/memory/vector.ts +5 -1
- package/src/policy/context.ts +21 -13
- package/src/policy/permission.ts +75 -16
- package/src/policy/tool-contract.ts +21 -10
- package/src/policy/update-check.ts +83 -6
- package/src/policy/usage.ts +17 -7
- package/src/policy/work-mode.ts +51 -17
- package/src/presentation/adapter.ts +64 -2
- package/src/presentation/events.ts +6 -0
- package/src/presentation/model.ts +1 -0
- package/src/presentation/projection.ts +2 -0
- package/src/presentation/reducer.ts +1 -0
- package/src/providers/anthropic.ts +52 -19
- package/src/providers/guards.ts +98 -13
- package/src/providers/responses.ts +61 -23
- package/src/providers/sse-bounds.ts +170 -0
- package/src/repo/repomap.ts +10 -11
- package/src/runtime/execution-backend.ts +7 -8
- package/src/sandbox/docker.ts +113 -9
- package/src/session/checkpoint.ts +9 -2
- package/src/session/persistence.ts +5 -2
- package/src/session/verification.ts +55 -16
- package/src/skills/loader.ts +16 -3
- package/src/tools/bash.ts +6 -3
- package/src/tools/code_run.ts +6 -5
- package/src/tools/context.ts +8 -0
- package/src/tools/delete_file.ts +2 -1
- package/src/tools/edit.ts +2 -1
- package/src/tools/git.ts +128 -54
- package/src/tools/glob.ts +2 -1
- package/src/tools/grep.ts +31 -6
- package/src/tools/lsp.ts +5 -4
- package/src/tools/mcp_call.ts +3 -1
- package/src/tools/memory.ts +175 -180
- package/src/tools/move_file.ts +2 -1
- package/src/tools/patch.ts +2 -1
- package/src/tools/read_file.ts +94 -1
- package/src/tools/read_image.ts +2 -1
- package/src/tools/task.ts +2 -1
- package/src/tools/todo.ts +4 -5
- package/src/tools/web_fetch.ts +28 -12
- package/src/tools/web_search.ts +28 -9
- package/src/tools/write_file.ts +2 -1
- package/src/ui/assistant/simple.ts +72 -3
- package/src/ui/footer.ts +17 -12
- package/src/ui/i18n/en.ts +6 -3
- package/src/ui/i18n/id.ts +6 -3
- package/src/ui/render/width.ts +107 -79
- package/src/ui/runtime/screen.ts +49 -37
- package/src/ui/tui/app.ts +261 -209
- package/src/ui/tui/transcript.ts +39 -0
- package/CHANGELOG.md +0 -1167
- package/docs/PLAN_UIUX_V6.md +0 -209
- package/docs/changelog.md +0 -3
package/src/mcp/transport.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
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import { type ChildProcess, spawn } from "node:child_process"
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-
import { createInterface } from "node:readline"
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import { LIMITS } from "../constants.ts"
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import { sanitizeSpawnEnv } from "../policy/scrub.ts"
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export class McpTransport {
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private proc: ChildProcess | null = null
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private
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private stdoutFrame = Buffer.alloc(0)
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private pending = new Map<
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string | number,
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{
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@@ -37,35 +36,22 @@ export class McpTransport {
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})
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this.proc.on("error", (err) => this.failAll(err))
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this.proc.stdin?.on("error", (err) => {
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// Server dapat keluar tepat sebelum request ditulis. EPIPE pada stdin
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// tetap harus menjadi penolakan request, bukan uncaught exception proses.
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this.closed = true
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this.writeQueue = []
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this.draining = false
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this.failAll(err)
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})
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this.proc.on("exit", (code) => {
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if (!this.closed) this.failAll(new Error(`MCP server exited with code ${code}`))
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})
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this.proc.stderr?.on("data", (d: Buffer) =>
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process.stderr.write(`[mcp:${command}] ${d.toString().trim()}\n`),
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)
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try {
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this.rl.close()
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} catch {}
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this.rl = createInterface({ input: this.proc.stdout! })
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this.rl.on("line", (line) => {
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if (!line.trim()) return
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try {
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const msg = JSON.parse(line)
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if (msg.id != null && this.pending.has(msg.id)) {
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const p = this.pending.get(msg.id)!
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clearTimeout(p.timer)
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p.unsubscribe?.()
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this.pending.delete(msg.id)
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if (msg.error) p.reject(new Error(msg.error.message || JSON.stringify(msg.error)))
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-
else p.resolve(msg.result)
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}
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} catch (e) {
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process.stderr.write(`[mcp] ignoring invalid JSON from server: ${(e as Error).message}\n`)
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}
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})
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this.stdoutFrame = Buffer.alloc(0)
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this.proc.stdout!.on("data", (chunk: Buffer) => this.consumeStdout(chunk))
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}
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async request(
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@@ -107,36 +93,43 @@ export class McpTransport {
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}
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async close(): Promise<void> {
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if (this.closed) return
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if (this.closed && !this.proc) return
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this.closed = true
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this.writeQueue = []
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this.draining = false
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this.failAll(new Error("transport closed"))
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if (this.rl) this.rl.close()
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try {
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this.proc?.stdin?.end()
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} catch {}
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this.killSignal.abort()
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if (this.proc) {
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const p = this.proc
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if (p.exitCode === null && p.signalCode === null) {
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await new Promise<void>((r) => {
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const t = setTimeout(() => {
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try {
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p.kill("SIGKILL")
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} catch {}
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r()
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}, 2_000)
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p.once("exit", () => {
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clearTimeout(t)
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r()
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})
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})
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-
}
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}
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}
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this.proc = null
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}
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125
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private write(msg: unknown) {
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139
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-
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126
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const proc = this.proc
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if (!proc?.stdin) throw new Error("transport not connected")
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128
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if (this.closed || proc.exitCode !== null || proc.stdin.destroyed) {
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129
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throw new Error(
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`MCP transport is closed${proc.exitCode === null ? "" : ` (exit ${proc.exitCode})`}`,
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131
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)
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132
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}
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140
133
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let line: string
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141
134
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try {
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142
135
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line = `${JSON.stringify(msg)}\n`
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@@ -147,10 +140,10 @@ export class McpTransport {
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147
140
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this.writeQueue.push(line)
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148
141
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return
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149
142
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}
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150
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-
const ok =
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const ok = proc.stdin.write(line)
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144
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if (!ok) {
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145
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this.draining = true
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-
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146
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proc.stdin.once("drain", () => {
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147
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this.draining = false
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155
148
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this.flushQueue()
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149
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})
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@@ -173,6 +166,67 @@ export class McpTransport {
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166
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}
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167
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}
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168
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/** Frame parsing stays incremental so a peer cannot make readline buffer an unlimited line. */
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private consumeStdout(chunk: Buffer): void {
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let start = 0
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for (let i = 0; i < chunk.length; i++) {
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if (chunk[i] !== 0x0a) continue
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const part = chunk.subarray(start, i)
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if (this.stdoutFrame.length + part.length > LIMITS.MCP_STDIO_FRAME_MAX_BYTES) {
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this.rejectOversizedFrame(this.stdoutFrame.length + part.length)
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+
return
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}
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179
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const frame = this.stdoutFrame.length === 0 ? part : Buffer.concat([this.stdoutFrame, part])
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+
this.stdoutFrame = Buffer.alloc(0)
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181
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this.handleFrame(frame)
|
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182
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if (this.closed) return
|
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183
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+
start = i + 1
|
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184
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+
}
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185
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+
if (start < chunk.length) {
|
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const remainder = chunk.subarray(start)
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if (this.stdoutFrame.length + remainder.length > LIMITS.MCP_STDIO_FRAME_MAX_BYTES) {
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this.rejectOversizedFrame(this.stdoutFrame.length + remainder.length)
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+
return
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}
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this.stdoutFrame =
|
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this.stdoutFrame.length === 0
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? Buffer.from(remainder)
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: Buffer.concat([this.stdoutFrame, remainder])
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}
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}
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+
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198
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+
private handleFrame(frame: Buffer): void {
|
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199
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+
if (frame.length === 0) return
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try {
|
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const msg = JSON.parse(frame.toString("utf8"))
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if (msg.id != null && this.pending.has(msg.id)) {
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const p = this.pending.get(msg.id)!
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clearTimeout(p.timer)
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p.unsubscribe?.()
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206
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this.pending.delete(msg.id)
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207
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+
if (msg.error) p.reject(new Error(msg.error.message || "MCP server returned an error"))
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208
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+
else p.resolve(msg.result)
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}
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210
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+
} catch {
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process.stderr.write("[mcp] ignoring invalid JSON from server\n")
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}
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213
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}
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+
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215
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private rejectOversizedFrame(size: number): void {
|
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216
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const error = new Error(
|
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217
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`MCP stdio frame exceeds ${LIMITS.MCP_STDIO_FRAME_MAX_BYTES} bytes (at least ${size})`,
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)
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this.closed = true
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this.stdoutFrame = Buffer.alloc(0)
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this.writeQueue = []
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this.draining = false
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this.failAll(error)
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this.killSignal.abort(error)
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try {
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226
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this.proc?.kill("SIGKILL")
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} catch {}
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}
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private failAll(err: Error) {
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177
231
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for (const p of this.pending.values()) {
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clearTimeout(p.timer)
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package/src/memory/files.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { homedir } from "node:os"
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3
3
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import { dirname, join, resolve } from "node:path"
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4
4
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import { LIMITS } from "../constants.ts"
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5
5
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import { homeDir } from "../lib/db-path.ts"
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6
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+
import { safeReadFileCapped } from "../lib/safe-open.ts"
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6
7
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import { isRealPathOutsideRoot } from "../policy/jail.ts"
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7
8
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import { scrubSecrets } from "../policy/scrub.ts"
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8
9
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@@ -36,8 +37,15 @@ export async function loadMemoryFiles(cwd = process.cwd()): Promise<string> {
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36
37
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// symlink keluar workspace. globalMem (home) sengaja dikecualikan —
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37
38
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// di luar cwd by design. Samakan rules/ di bawah ke realpath.
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38
39
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if (p !== globalMem && isRealPathOutsideRoot(p, cwd)) continue
|
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39
|
-
const
|
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40
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-
|
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40
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+
const { text, truncated } = await safeReadFileCapped(
|
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41
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p,
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42
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p === globalMem ? dirname(p) : cwd,
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43
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6000,
|
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44
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)
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45
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if (text.trim())
|
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46
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+
parts.push(
|
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47
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+
`# ${tildePath(p)}\n${scrubSecrets(text)}${truncated ? "\n… [truncated: showing first 6000 bytes]" : ""}`,
|
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48
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+
)
|
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41
49
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} catch {}
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42
50
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}
|
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43
51
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// Load .minicode/rules/*.md (Kiro steering style)
|
|
@@ -57,8 +65,11 @@ export async function loadMemoryFiles(cwd = process.cwd()): Promise<string> {
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57
65
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try {
|
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58
66
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const full = join(rulesDir, f as string)
|
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59
67
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if (isRealPathOutsideRoot(full, cwd)) continue
|
|
60
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-
const
|
|
61
|
-
if (
|
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68
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+
const { text, truncated } = await safeReadFileCapped(full, cwd, 3000)
|
|
69
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+
if (text.trim())
|
|
70
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+
parts.push(
|
|
71
|
+
`# rules/${f}\n${scrubSecrets(text)}${truncated ? "\n… [truncated: showing first 3000 bytes]" : ""}`,
|
|
72
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+
)
|
|
62
73
|
} catch {}
|
|
63
74
|
}
|
|
64
75
|
} catch {}
|
package/src/memory/vector.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1278,7 +1278,11 @@ export async function searchHybrid(
|
|
|
1278
1278
|
if (rows.length === 0) return []
|
|
1279
1279
|
|
|
1280
1280
|
let queryVec: number[] | null = null
|
|
1281
|
-
|
|
1281
|
+
// F-07: bila semua kandidat hanya memiliki teks (mis. memori manual atau
|
|
1282
|
+
// fallback provider tanpa embedding), vektor query tidak dapat mengubah
|
|
1283
|
+
// skor satu pun. Jangan melakukan DNS/HTTP embedding yang hasilnya tak dipakai.
|
|
1284
|
+
const hasVectorCandidates = rows.some((row) => row.embedding !== null)
|
|
1285
|
+
if (hasVectorCandidates && opts.baseUrl && opts.apiKey) {
|
|
1282
1286
|
const vecs = await embedTexts(opts.baseUrl, opts.apiKey, [query], opts.embeddingModel)
|
|
1283
1287
|
if (vecs?.[0]) queryVec = vecs[0]
|
|
1284
1288
|
}
|
package/src/policy/context.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { execFile } from "node:child_process"
|
|
2
|
-
import {
|
|
3
|
-
import { resolve } from "node:path"
|
|
2
|
+
import { readdir, realpath } from "node:fs/promises"
|
|
3
|
+
import { join, resolve } from "node:path"
|
|
4
4
|
import { promisify } from "node:util"
|
|
5
5
|
import type { TokenEstimator } from "#minicore"
|
|
6
6
|
import { DEFAULT_CHARS_PER_TOKEN } from "#minicore/core/tokens.ts"
|
|
7
7
|
import { LIMITS } from "../constants.ts"
|
|
8
8
|
import { GIT_SAFE_BASE } from "../lib/git-hardening.ts"
|
|
9
|
+
import { safeReadFileCapped } from "../lib/safe-open.ts"
|
|
9
10
|
import { resolveTrustedExecutable } from "../lib/trusted-exec.ts"
|
|
10
11
|
import { loadMemoryFiles } from "../memory/files.ts"
|
|
11
12
|
import { loadRepoMap } from "../repo/repomap.ts"
|
|
@@ -259,13 +260,13 @@ export async function buildSystemPrompt(
|
|
|
259
260
|
for (const p of agentFiles) {
|
|
260
261
|
if (signal.aborted) throw new Error("aborted")
|
|
261
262
|
try {
|
|
262
|
-
// Symlink escape (temuan audit #06): AGENTS.md symlink keluar workspace
|
|
263
|
-
// ikut terbaca tanpa ini. Samakan dengan guard rules/ di bawah.
|
|
264
263
|
const full = resolve(cwd, p)
|
|
265
|
-
|
|
266
|
-
const txt = await readFile(full, "utf8")
|
|
264
|
+
const loaded = await safeReadFileCapped(full, cwd, 3000)
|
|
267
265
|
if (signal.aborted) throw new Error("aborted")
|
|
268
|
-
|
|
266
|
+
const body = loaded.truncated
|
|
267
|
+
? `${loaded.text}\n… [truncated: showing first 3000 bytes]`
|
|
268
|
+
: loaded.text
|
|
269
|
+
parts.push(`\n# ${p}\n${cutMarked(body, 3000)}`)
|
|
269
270
|
loadedAgent = true
|
|
270
271
|
if (p === "AGENTS.md") break // prefer AGENTS.md, else collect all
|
|
271
272
|
} catch (e) {
|
|
@@ -275,13 +276,20 @@ export async function buildSystemPrompt(
|
|
|
275
276
|
// Also load steering if not already
|
|
276
277
|
if (!loadedAgent) {
|
|
277
278
|
try {
|
|
278
|
-
const
|
|
279
|
-
|
|
280
|
-
|
|
281
|
-
|
|
279
|
+
const steeringDir = resolve(cwd, ".minicode/steering")
|
|
280
|
+
// Resolve direktori sebelum enumerasi: junction/reparse yang keluar
|
|
281
|
+
// workspace tidak boleh menjadi sumber instruksi fallback.
|
|
282
|
+
const realSteeringDir = await realpath(steeringDir)
|
|
283
|
+
if (isRealPathOutsideRoot(realSteeringDir, cwd))
|
|
284
|
+
throw new Error("steering directory outside workspace")
|
|
285
|
+
const files = (await readdir(realSteeringDir)).sort().slice(0, 3)
|
|
286
|
+
for (const f of files) {
|
|
282
287
|
try {
|
|
283
|
-
const
|
|
284
|
-
|
|
288
|
+
const loaded = await safeReadFileCapped(join(realSteeringDir, f), cwd, 2000)
|
|
289
|
+
const body = loaded.truncated
|
|
290
|
+
? `${loaded.text}\n… [truncated: showing first 2000 bytes]`
|
|
291
|
+
: loaded.text
|
|
292
|
+
parts.push(`\n# steering file\n${cutMarked(body, 2000)}`)
|
|
285
293
|
} catch {}
|
|
286
294
|
}
|
|
287
295
|
} catch {}
|
package/src/policy/permission.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -27,9 +27,40 @@ import {
|
|
|
27
27
|
} from "./jail.ts"
|
|
28
28
|
import { scrubSecrets } from "./scrub.ts"
|
|
29
29
|
// [Fase 2 / TOOL-01] Diimpor dari registry kontrak tool (satu sumber).
|
|
30
|
-
import {
|
|
30
|
+
import {
|
|
31
|
+
contractForTool,
|
|
32
|
+
GATED_TOOLS,
|
|
33
|
+
PLAN_EXTRA_TOOL_NAMES,
|
|
34
|
+
READONLY_TOOL_NAMES,
|
|
35
|
+
} from "./tool-contract.ts"
|
|
31
36
|
|
|
32
|
-
|
|
37
|
+
/**
|
|
38
|
+
* Approval policy — DUA nilai yang berhadapan dengan pengguna.
|
|
39
|
+
*
|
|
40
|
+
* `auto` (AUTO) = eksekusi otonom penuh: selama capability & scope diizinkan,
|
|
41
|
+
* aksi berjalan TANPA henti persetujuan rutin. Bukan "izinkan semuanya" —
|
|
42
|
+
* hard-deny (jail/owned-state/bash-guard) tetap berlaku di atasnya.
|
|
43
|
+
* `ask` (ASK) = pengawasan manusia: aksi yang dicakup kebijakan persetujuan
|
|
44
|
+
* meminta izin sebelum jalan. Hard-deny tetap tak bisa di-override.
|
|
45
|
+
*
|
|
46
|
+
* Ejaan lowercase dipertahankan sebagai identitas internal/kompatibilitas
|
|
47
|
+
* untuk AUTO/ASK (persistence & ToolContext memakai nilai ini).
|
|
48
|
+
*/
|
|
49
|
+
export type ApprovalMode = "auto" | "ask"
|
|
50
|
+
|
|
51
|
+
/**
|
|
52
|
+
* Union kompatibilitas selama migrasi arsitektur mode.
|
|
53
|
+
*
|
|
54
|
+
* HANYA `"auto"`/`"ask"` adalah kebijakan persetujuan. Sisanya adalah profil
|
|
55
|
+
* capability WARISAN yang kini menjadi tanggung jawab Tool Access Policy:
|
|
56
|
+
* - `"readonly"` → capability read-only internal (bukan permukaan; batas
|
|
57
|
+
* scheduler adalah injected AutonomousPermissionHandler,
|
|
58
|
+
* BUKAN nilai ini).
|
|
59
|
+
* - `"plan"` → ceiling WorkMode PLAN (perencanaan user-facing = PLAN).
|
|
60
|
+
* - `"allowlist"` → kebijakan akses bash/tool (flag warisan --allowlist).
|
|
61
|
+
* - `"allow-all"` → profil akses privileged (flag warisan --allow-all).
|
|
62
|
+
*/
|
|
63
|
+
export type PermissionMode = ApprovalMode | "readonly" | "plan" | "allow-all" | "allowlist"
|
|
33
64
|
|
|
34
65
|
/**
|
|
35
66
|
* View persetujuan yang di-inject dari composition root (cli/setup.ts memakai
|
|
@@ -303,6 +334,14 @@ export function createPermissionHandler(
|
|
|
303
334
|
* Tanpa store = perilaku lama persis (tanpa verifikasi tambahan).
|
|
304
335
|
*/
|
|
305
336
|
approvalBindings?: ApprovalBindingStore
|
|
337
|
+
/**
|
|
338
|
+
* Tool Access Policy — set nama tool yang DIOTORISASI sesi ini (tool yang
|
|
339
|
+
* terlihat/terdaftar, termasuk MCP runtime `server.tool` yang servernya
|
|
340
|
+
* terkonfigurasi). Dipakai `auto` untuk membedakan MCP terotorisasi dari
|
|
341
|
+
* MCP tak-dikenal/tak-terkonfigurasi: hanya nama bertitik yang ADA di set
|
|
342
|
+
* ini yang boleh auto-allow. Absen = fail-closed (semua MCP bertitik deny).
|
|
343
|
+
*/
|
|
344
|
+
authorizedTools?: ReadonlySet<string> | null
|
|
306
345
|
} = {},
|
|
307
346
|
): PermissionHandler {
|
|
308
347
|
const state = { mode: (opts.mode ?? "auto") as PermissionMode }
|
|
@@ -310,6 +349,7 @@ export function createPermissionHandler(
|
|
|
310
349
|
const approvalBindings = opts.approvalBindings
|
|
311
350
|
const askUser = opts.ask
|
|
312
351
|
const allowLocal = opts.allowLocalConfig === true
|
|
352
|
+
const authorizedTools = opts.authorizedTools
|
|
313
353
|
let allowlistCache: string[] | null = null
|
|
314
354
|
// Persetujuan "always" sesi ini — in-memory, bukan dari disk. Tanpa ini,
|
|
315
355
|
// jawaban always yang baru disimpan ke berkas lokal tak terlihat saat local
|
|
@@ -418,17 +458,13 @@ export function createPermissionHandler(
|
|
|
418
458
|
"allow-all": async () => "allow",
|
|
419
459
|
readonly: async (call) =>
|
|
420
460
|
READONLY_TOOLS.has(call.name) ? "allow" : deny(call, "read-only mode"),
|
|
421
|
-
// Plan = readonly + tiga perkecualian aman
|
|
422
|
-
// .minicode/plans, bukan file workspace),
|
|
423
|
-
// rencana, bukan eksekusi — dipaksa explore/
|
|
424
|
-
// parent plan/readonly, permission hanya membuka
|
|
425
|
-
// submit_result (singleton memori-proses untuk exec --json
|
|
426
|
-
// file/state sesi; terlihat di PLAN_EXTRA tool-layer jadi harus boleh).
|
|
461
|
+
// Plan = readonly + tiga perkecualian aman (PLAN_EXTRA_TOOL_NAMES):
|
|
462
|
+
// todo_write (artefak rencana .minicode/plans, bukan file workspace),
|
|
463
|
+
// delegate_task (penelahan rencana, bukan eksekusi — dipaksa explore/
|
|
464
|
+
// read-only di task.ts bila parent plan/readonly, permission hanya membuka
|
|
465
|
+
// gerbangnya), dan submit_result (singleton memori-proses untuk exec --json).
|
|
427
466
|
plan: async (call) =>
|
|
428
|
-
READONLY_TOOLS.has(call.name) ||
|
|
429
|
-
call.name === "todo_write" ||
|
|
430
|
-
call.name === "delegate_task" ||
|
|
431
|
-
call.name === "submit_result"
|
|
467
|
+
READONLY_TOOLS.has(call.name) || PLAN_EXTRA_TOOL_NAMES.has(call.name)
|
|
432
468
|
? "allow"
|
|
433
469
|
: deny(call, "plan mode"),
|
|
434
470
|
allowlist: async (call, args) => {
|
|
@@ -480,10 +516,33 @@ export function createPermissionHandler(
|
|
|
480
516
|
}
|
|
481
517
|
return ans === "allow" ? "allow" : "deny"
|
|
482
518
|
},
|
|
483
|
-
|
|
519
|
+
// AUTO = otonomi penuh. Selama tool diotorisasi oleh Tool Access Policy dan
|
|
520
|
+
// scope mengizinkan, jalankan TANPA prompt persetujuan rutin. Ini berbeda
|
|
521
|
+
// dari `ask` (di bawah) yang menahan tulis/eksekusi untuk izin manusia.
|
|
522
|
+
//
|
|
523
|
+
// Keputusan desain (mode-architecture recon): `gatedByDefault` TIDAK lagi
|
|
524
|
+
// berarti "auto wajib prompt". Tool gated (git_commit, delegate_task,
|
|
525
|
+
// mcp_call/read/prompt) adalah capability yang WAJIB Otorisasi — di ASK
|
|
526
|
+
// mereka butuh izin manusia, tetapi di AUTO mereka jalan bila authorized.
|
|
527
|
+
// Hard-deny (jail/owned-state/bash-guard) tetap berlaku di semua jalur.
|
|
528
|
+
auto: async (call, args, _signal) => {
|
|
484
529
|
if (READONLY_TOOLS.has(call.name)) return "allow"
|
|
485
|
-
|
|
486
|
-
|
|
530
|
+
// ask_user = interaksi-user, bukan eksekusi. Di AUTO dilarang deterministik
|
|
531
|
+
// (BLOCKED) supaya model memakai asumsi default sendiri — jangan biarkan
|
|
532
|
+
// pergantian tanya-jawab rutin mengubah AUTO jadi ASK.
|
|
533
|
+
if (call.name === "ask_user")
|
|
534
|
+
return deny(call, "ask_user unavailable in AUTO (autonomous mode)")
|
|
535
|
+
// Tool MCP bertitik: hanya diotorisasi bila terdaftar di sesi (server
|
|
536
|
+
// terkonfigurasi). Tak dikenal/tak terkonfigurasi = deny, bukan prompt
|
|
537
|
+
// (AUTO tak boleh bertanya sebagai jalan pintas hard-restriction).
|
|
538
|
+
if (isMcpToolName(call.name)) {
|
|
539
|
+
if (authorizedTools?.has(call.name)) return "allow"
|
|
540
|
+
return deny(call, "MCP tool not configured/authorized")
|
|
541
|
+
}
|
|
542
|
+
// Capability gated (git_commit, delegate_task, mcp_call/read/prompt):
|
|
543
|
+
// otonom di AUTO bila authorized. Scope dijaga tool-nya sendiri + jail
|
|
544
|
+
// (git_commit: path/staged dijail; delegate: anak ter-ceiling WorkMode).
|
|
545
|
+
if (GATED_TOOLS.has(call.name)) return "allow"
|
|
487
546
|
if (FILE_WRITE_TOOLS.has(call.name)) return "allow"
|
|
488
547
|
if (INTERNAL_WRITE_TOOLS.has(call.name)) return "allow"
|
|
489
548
|
if (call.name === "code_run") {
|
|
@@ -498,7 +557,7 @@ export function createPermissionHandler(
|
|
|
498
557
|
if (br) return deny(call, `bash-guard: ${br}`)
|
|
499
558
|
return "allow"
|
|
500
559
|
}
|
|
501
|
-
return
|
|
560
|
+
return deny(call, "not authorized in AUTO mode")
|
|
502
561
|
},
|
|
503
562
|
}
|
|
504
563
|
|
|
@@ -22,13 +22,8 @@
|
|
|
22
22
|
// keduanya akan mengubah perilaku recovery yang sudah teruji. Karena itu
|
|
23
23
|
// `journalMutation` dieksplisitkan, bukan disimpulkan.
|
|
24
24
|
//
|
|
25
|
-
//
|
|
26
|
-
//
|
|
27
|
-
// Executor hari ini memperlakukan `code_run` sebagai non-write (bukan anggota
|
|
28
|
-
// WRITE_TOOLS/EXCLUSIVE_TOOLS), sehingga batch membacanya paralel. Mengubahnya
|
|
29
|
-
// menjadi `exclusive` di sini akan mengubah penjadwalan yang sudah teruji, yang
|
|
30
|
-
// bukan tujuan Fase 2. Klasifikasi disamakan dengan perilaku nyata; perbaikan
|
|
31
|
-
// penjadwalan (bila diinginkan) harus menjadi perubahan terpisah dengan bukti.
|
|
25
|
+
// `code_run` mutasi workspace melalui sandbox RW. Karena itu ia harus menjadi
|
|
26
|
+
// exclusive di batch yang juga dapat membaca atau menulis file yang sama.
|
|
32
27
|
|
|
33
28
|
/** Kelas efek samping yang dideklarasikan sebuah tool. */
|
|
34
29
|
export type SideEffectTier =
|
|
@@ -348,11 +343,10 @@ export const TOOL_CONTRACTS: readonly ToolContractMetadata[] = [
|
|
|
348
343
|
idempotent: false,
|
|
349
344
|
journalMutation: false,
|
|
350
345
|
}),
|
|
351
|
-
// Lihat catatan modul: perilaku paralel `code_run` dipertahankan apa adanya.
|
|
352
346
|
C({
|
|
353
347
|
name: "code_run",
|
|
354
348
|
sideEffectTier: "LOCAL_ENV_MUTATION",
|
|
355
|
-
concurrencyClass: "
|
|
349
|
+
concurrencyClass: "exclusive",
|
|
356
350
|
gatedByDefault: false,
|
|
357
351
|
allowedInExplore: false,
|
|
358
352
|
allowedInAutonomous: false,
|
|
@@ -420,7 +414,7 @@ export const TOOL_CONTRACTS: readonly ToolContractMetadata[] = [
|
|
|
420
414
|
C({
|
|
421
415
|
name: "git_commit",
|
|
422
416
|
sideEffectTier: "EXTERNAL_IRREVERSIBLE",
|
|
423
|
-
concurrencyClass: "
|
|
417
|
+
concurrencyClass: "exclusive",
|
|
424
418
|
gatedByDefault: true,
|
|
425
419
|
allowedInExplore: false,
|
|
426
420
|
allowedInAutonomous: false,
|
|
@@ -575,6 +569,23 @@ export const NETWORK_READ_TOOL_NAMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(
|
|
|
575
569
|
),
|
|
576
570
|
)
|
|
577
571
|
|
|
572
|
+
/**
|
|
573
|
+
* Derivasi Tool Access Policy: tool ekstra yang diizinkan pada ceiling PLAN
|
|
574
|
+
* (di atas 18 `READONLY_TOOL_NAMES`). Tiga artefak perencanaan yang aman:
|
|
575
|
+
* - `todo_write` → artefak rencana `.minicode/plans` (bukan file workspace)
|
|
576
|
+
* - `delegate_task` → penelahan rencana (dipaksa explore/read-only di task.ts
|
|
577
|
+
* bila parent PLAN — permission hanya membuka gerbangnya)
|
|
578
|
+
* - `submit_result` → singleton memori-proses (exec --json) tanpa tulis file
|
|
579
|
+
*
|
|
580
|
+
* Satu sumber untuk ceiling WorkMode PLAN (`work-mode.ts`), visibilitas tool
|
|
581
|
+
* (`tool-layer.ts`), dan handler PermissionMode `plan` warisan (`permission.ts`).
|
|
582
|
+
*/
|
|
583
|
+
export const PLAN_EXTRA_TOOL_NAMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
|
|
584
|
+
"todo_write",
|
|
585
|
+
"delegate_task",
|
|
586
|
+
"submit_result",
|
|
587
|
+
])
|
|
588
|
+
|
|
578
589
|
/**
|
|
579
590
|
* Derivasi klasifikasi jurnal. Tool tak dikenal = "unknown", dan pemanggil
|
|
580
591
|
* (`isMutationTool`) memperlakukannya sebagai mutasi (fail-closed).
|
|
@@ -3,7 +3,8 @@
|
|
|
3
3
|
// Hormat offline: gagal fetch = diam. Hormat NO_UPDATE_CHECK=1 / CI=1.
|
|
4
4
|
|
|
5
5
|
import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"
|
|
6
|
-
import {
|
|
6
|
+
import { existsSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"
|
|
7
|
+
import { homedir, tmpdir } from "node:os"
|
|
7
8
|
import { join } from "node:path"
|
|
8
9
|
|
|
9
10
|
const PKG_NAME = "minicode-ai"
|
|
@@ -175,14 +176,38 @@ export async function checkForUpdateFresh(
|
|
|
175
176
|
return isNewer(currentVersion, eff) ? eff : null
|
|
176
177
|
}
|
|
177
178
|
|
|
178
|
-
export type InstallRunner = (
|
|
179
|
+
export type InstallRunner = (
|
|
180
|
+
cmd: string,
|
|
181
|
+
args: string[],
|
|
182
|
+
opts?: { cwd?: string },
|
|
183
|
+
) => { status: number | null }
|
|
179
184
|
|
|
180
|
-
|
|
181
|
-
|
|
185
|
+
const NPM_REGISTRY = "https://registry.npmjs.org/"
|
|
186
|
+
|
|
187
|
+
export function verifyInstalledVersion(expected: string, readVersion: () => string): boolean {
|
|
188
|
+
try {
|
|
189
|
+
return readVersion() === expected
|
|
190
|
+
} catch {
|
|
191
|
+
return false
|
|
192
|
+
}
|
|
193
|
+
}
|
|
194
|
+
|
|
195
|
+
const SEMVER_VERSION_RE =
|
|
196
|
+
/^(0|[1-9]\d*)\.(0|[1-9]\d*)\.(0|[1-9]\d*)(?:-((?:0|[1-9]\d*|\d*[A-Za-z-][0-9A-Za-z-]*)(?:\.(?:0|[1-9]\d*|\d*[A-Za-z-][0-9A-Za-z-]*))*))?(?:\+([0-9A-Za-z-]+(?:\.[0-9A-Za-z-]+)*))?$/
|
|
197
|
+
|
|
198
|
+
/**
|
|
199
|
+
* Verifikasi versi dari registry (signature + provenance) di prefix sementara,
|
|
200
|
+
* lalu pasang versi persis dari registry yang sama secara global. Skrip paket
|
|
201
|
+
* tidak dijalankan. Npm lama atau paket tanpa bukti registry tepercaya = gagal
|
|
202
|
+
* tertutup; pemanggil tetap melanjutkan versi yang sedang berjalan.
|
|
203
|
+
*/
|
|
204
|
+
export function installUpdate(version: string, runner?: InstallRunner): boolean {
|
|
205
|
+
if (version.length > 128 || !SEMVER_VERSION_RE.test(version)) return false
|
|
206
|
+
let verifyRoot: string | undefined
|
|
182
207
|
try {
|
|
183
208
|
const run: InstallRunner =
|
|
184
209
|
runner ??
|
|
185
|
-
((cmd, args) => {
|
|
210
|
+
((cmd, args, opts) => {
|
|
186
211
|
// Windows: npm adalah .cmd → butuh shell; stdio inherit agar user
|
|
187
212
|
// melihat progres install (interaktif, bukan CI).
|
|
188
213
|
// Timeout 120 dtk: tanpa ini spawnSync memblokir event-loop selamanya
|
|
@@ -192,12 +217,64 @@ export function installUpdate(runner?: InstallRunner): boolean {
|
|
|
192
217
|
const r = spawnSync(cmd, args, {
|
|
193
218
|
stdio: "inherit",
|
|
194
219
|
shell: process.platform === "win32",
|
|
220
|
+
...(opts?.cwd ? { cwd: opts.cwd } : {}),
|
|
195
221
|
timeout: 120_000,
|
|
196
222
|
})
|
|
197
223
|
return { status: typeof r.status === "number" ? r.status : null }
|
|
198
224
|
})
|
|
199
|
-
|
|
225
|
+
verifyRoot = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "minicode-update-verify-"))
|
|
226
|
+
writeFileSync(
|
|
227
|
+
join(verifyRoot, "package.json"),
|
|
228
|
+
JSON.stringify({ name: "minicode-update-verification", version: "1.0.0", private: true }),
|
|
229
|
+
"utf8",
|
|
230
|
+
)
|
|
231
|
+
const verifiedInstall = run(
|
|
232
|
+
"npm",
|
|
233
|
+
[
|
|
234
|
+
"install",
|
|
235
|
+
"--ignore-scripts",
|
|
236
|
+
"--no-audit",
|
|
237
|
+
"--save-exact",
|
|
238
|
+
"--package-lock=true",
|
|
239
|
+
"--registry",
|
|
240
|
+
NPM_REGISTRY,
|
|
241
|
+
`${PKG_NAME}@${version}`,
|
|
242
|
+
],
|
|
243
|
+
{ cwd: verifyRoot },
|
|
244
|
+
)
|
|
245
|
+
if (verifiedInstall.status !== 0) return false
|
|
246
|
+
const lock = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(verifyRoot, "package-lock.json"), "utf8")) as {
|
|
247
|
+
packages?: Record<string, unknown>
|
|
248
|
+
}
|
|
249
|
+
const installedPackages = Object.keys(lock.packages ?? {}).filter((path) =>
|
|
250
|
+
path.startsWith("node_modules/"),
|
|
251
|
+
)
|
|
252
|
+
// Global npm install does not consume this local lockfile. Today this CLI
|
|
253
|
+
// has no runtime dependencies; refuse silent graph drift until updater can
|
|
254
|
+
// install and verify every locked dependency identically.
|
|
255
|
+
if (installedPackages.length !== 1 || installedPackages[0] !== `node_modules/${PKG_NAME}`)
|
|
256
|
+
return false
|
|
257
|
+
const signatures = run("npm", ["audit", "signatures", "--registry", NPM_REGISTRY], {
|
|
258
|
+
cwd: verifyRoot,
|
|
259
|
+
})
|
|
260
|
+
if (signatures.status !== 0) return false
|
|
261
|
+
return (
|
|
262
|
+
run("npm", [
|
|
263
|
+
"install",
|
|
264
|
+
"-g",
|
|
265
|
+
"--ignore-scripts",
|
|
266
|
+
"--registry",
|
|
267
|
+
NPM_REGISTRY,
|
|
268
|
+
`${PKG_NAME}@${version}`,
|
|
269
|
+
]).status === 0
|
|
270
|
+
)
|
|
200
271
|
} catch {
|
|
201
272
|
return false
|
|
273
|
+
} finally {
|
|
274
|
+
if (verifyRoot && existsSync(verifyRoot)) {
|
|
275
|
+
try {
|
|
276
|
+
rmSync(verifyRoot, { recursive: true, force: true })
|
|
277
|
+
} catch {}
|
|
278
|
+
}
|
|
202
279
|
}
|
|
203
280
|
}
|