mindforge-cc 11.9.1 → 11.9.2

package/.agent/mindforge/consult.md

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ $ARGUMENTS
    - Identify divergence (models disagree — flag for user)
    - Identify novel insights (unique points from one model)
 7. **Present results** with clear attribution (which model said what).
-8. Log consultation in token-ledger.jsonl (model, tokens, cost per call).
+8. Log consultation in token-usage.jsonl (model, tokens, cost per call).
 9. Report total cost of this consultation.
 10. Remind: "External opinions are advisory — user sovereignty applies."
 </process>

package/.agent/mindforge/cost-report.md

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ $ARGUMENTS
 
 <process>
 1. Parse flags: --window (time period, default: current session), --by-model, --by-task, --phase.
-2. Read `.mindforge/metrics/token-ledger.jsonl` for the specified window.
+2. Read `.mindforge/metrics/token-usage.jsonl` for the specified window.
 3. **Compute totals:**
    - Total tokens (input, output, cached)
    - Total estimated cost (USD)

package/.claude/commands/mindforge/consult.md

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ $ARGUMENTS
    - Identify divergence (models disagree — flag for user)
    - Identify novel insights (unique points from one model)
 7. **Present results** with clear attribution (which model said what).
-8. Log consultation in token-ledger.jsonl (model, tokens, cost per call).
+8. Log consultation in token-usage.jsonl (model, tokens, cost per call).
 9. Report total cost of this consultation.
 10. Remind: "External opinions are advisory — user sovereignty applies."
 </process>

package/.claude/commands/mindforge/cost-report.md

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ $ARGUMENTS
 
 <process>
 1. Parse flags: --window (time period, default: current session), --by-model, --by-task, --phase.
-2. Read `.mindforge/metrics/token-ledger.jsonl` for the specified window.
+2. Read `.mindforge/metrics/token-usage.jsonl` for the specified window.
 3. **Compute totals:**
    - Total tokens (input, output, cached)
    - Total estimated cost (USD)

package/.mindforge/MINDFORGE-SCHEMA.json

@@ -1,33 +1,146 @@
 {
   "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
   "title": "MindForge Project Configuration Schema",
-  "description": "JSON Schema for MINDFORGE.md key-value settings",
+  "description": "JSON Schema for MINDFORGE.md bracketed parameter assignments ([KEY] = value)",
   "type": "object",
+  "required": [
+    "VERSION",
+    "REACTIVE_MODE",
+    "PLANNER",
+    "EXECUTOR",
+    "MIN_SOUL_SCORE"
+  ],
+  "recommended": [
+    "COST_WARN_USD",
+    "COST_HARD_LIMIT_USD",
+    "BLOCK_ON_SECURITY"
+  ],
   "properties": {
+    "NAME": { "type": "string", "description": "Project display name" },
+    "VERSION": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "pattern": "^\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+$",
+      "description": "MindForge version this registry targets (must equal package.json version)"
+    },
+    "STABLE": { "type": "boolean", "description": "Registry is a released/stable configuration" },
+    "MODE": { "type": "string", "description": "Operating mode label (free-form)" },
+    "REQUIRED_CORE_VERSION": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "pattern": "^\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+$",
+      "description": "Minimum MindForge core version required by this project"
+    },
+    "SOVEREIGN_IDENTITY": {
+      "type": "boolean",
+      "nonOverridable": true,
+      "description": "NON-OVERRIDABLE: identity verification is always required"
+    },
+    "SRE_LAYER_ENABLED": { "type": "boolean", "description": "Enable the SRE persona layer" },
+    "SWARM_ORCHESTRATION": { "type": "boolean", "description": "Enable dynamic swarm orchestration" },
+    "AUTO_SWARM_THRESHOLD": {
+      "type": "number", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 10,
+      "description": "Difficulty score above which a swarm is auto-spawned"
+    },
+    "CONTEXT7_DEPTH": {
+      "type": "enum", "values": ["MINIMAL", "STANDARD", "EXTENDED"],
+      "description": "Depth of Context7 knowledge injection"
+    },
+    "DYNAMISM_LEVEL": {
+      "type": "number", "minimum": 1, "maximum": 5,
+      "description": "How aggressively the engine reshapes its own plan (1=static, 5=fully dynamic)"
+    },
+    "REACTIVE_MODE": { "type": "boolean", "description": "Enable the reactive (auto-discovery) engine" },
+    "CONTEXT_SHARDING": { "type": "boolean", "description": "Enable the sharded memory loop" },
+    "ADS_LOOP_ENFORCED": { "type": "boolean", "description": "Enforce the adversarial decision loop before architectural change" },
+    "TEMPORAL_VISION": { "type": "boolean", "description": "Enable temporal hindsight / steering" },
+    "RAG_2_AUTO_SHADOW": { "type": "boolean", "description": "Run RAG-2 retrieval in shadow mode" },
+    "ENABLE_ART_TRACING": { "type": "boolean", "description": "Enable agent reasoning trace (ART) capture" },
+    "ENABLE_ZTAI": {
+      "type": "boolean",
+      "nonOverridable": true,
+      "description": "NON-OVERRIDABLE: zero-trust agent identity cannot be bypassed"
+    },
+    "ZTAI_KEY_TYPE": { "type": "string", "description": "Declared ZTAI key algorithm label" },
+    "NEXUS_TRACE_RETENTION_DAYS": {
+      "type": "number", "minimum": 1, "maximum": 365,
+      "description": "Days of NexusTracer trace retention"
+    },
+    "CADIA_CORE": { "type": "boolean", "description": "Enable the CADIA core layer" },
+    "PQAS_ENFORCED": {
+      "type": "boolean",
+      "description": "Post-quantum attestation enforcement (SIMULATED/inactive by default — see bin/governance/quantum-crypto.js)"
+    },
+    "PROACTIVE_HOMING": { "type": "boolean", "description": "Enable proactive homing / next-task discovery" },
+    "PLANNER": { "type": "string", "description": "Model id for the planning persona (canonical: PLANNER_MODEL)" },
+    "EXECUTOR": { "type": "string", "description": "Model id for execution agents (canonical: EXECUTOR_MODEL)" },
+    "REVIEWER": { "type": "string", "description": "Model id for the code reviewer (canonical: REVIEWER_MODEL)" },
+    "VERIFIER": { "type": "string", "description": "Model id for the verification persona (canonical: VERIFIER_MODEL)" },
+    "SECURITY": { "type": "string", "description": "Model id for security review (canonical: SECURITY_MODEL)" },
+    "DEBUG": { "type": "string", "description": "Model id for the debug specialist (canonical: DEBUG_MODEL)" },
+    "RESEARCH": { "type": "string", "description": "Model id for the research agent (canonical: RESEARCH_MODEL)" },
+    "QA": { "type": "string", "description": "Model id for the QA engineer (canonical: QA_MODEL)" },
+    "QUICK": { "type": "string", "description": "Model id for tier-1 budget-bias tasks (canonical: QUICK_MODEL)" },
+    "COST_WARN_USD": {
+      "type": "number", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 10000,
+      "description": "Daily spend at which a cost warning is emitted"
+    },
+    "COST_HARD_LIMIT_USD": {
+      "type": "number", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 10000,
+      "description": "Daily hard cost limit in USD. DECLARED BUT NOT ENFORCED as of 11.9.2: bin/models/cost-tracker.js reads MODEL_COST_HARD_LIMIT_USD, which this registry does not declare, so preflight() returns early and no cap is applied. Do not treat this as a spend control. Tracked as COST-02."
+    },
+    "ADS_DEBATE_ROUNDS": {
+      "type": "number", "minimum": 1, "maximum": 10,
+      "description": "Red-team/blue-team debate rounds per architectural decision"
+    },
+    "MIN_SOUL_SCORE": {
+      "type": "number", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 10,
+      "nonOverridable": true,
+      "description": "NON-OVERRIDABLE: minimum SOUL score required for architectural changes"
+    },
+    "REQUIRE_ADR": { "type": "boolean", "description": "Require an ADR for architectural decisions" },
+    "BLOCK_ON_SECURITY": {
+      "type": "boolean",
+      "nonOverridable": true,
+      "description": "NON-OVERRIDABLE: security gate enforcement cannot be disabled"
+    },
+    "BROWSER_PORT": {
+      "type": "number", "minimum": 1024, "maximum": 65535,
+      "description": "Port for the browser/QA harness"
+    },
+    "DASHBOARD_PORT": {
+      "type": "number", "minimum": 1024, "maximum": 65535,
+      "description": "Port for the MindForge dashboard"
+    },
+    "API_URL": { "type": "string", "description": "Base URL of the project API under development" },
+    "SHARD_RETAIN_DAYS": {
+      "type": "number", "minimum": 1, "maximum": 365,
+      "description": "Days to retain context shards"
+    },
+    "FORBIDDEN": { "type": "string", "description": "Multi-line block of project prohibitions injected into every agent prompt" },
+    "INSTRUCTIONS": { "type": "string", "description": "Multi-line block of project instructions injected into every agent prompt" },
     "MINDFORGE_VERSION_REQUIRED": {
       "type": "string",
       "pattern": "^\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+$",
       "description": "Minimum MindForge version required for this config"
     },
     "PLANNER_MODEL": {
-      "type": "enum",
-      "values": ["claude-opus-4-5", "claude-sonnet-4-5", "claude-haiku-4-5", "inherit"],
-      "description": "Claude model to use for the planning agent"
+      "type": "string",
+      "deprecated": true,
+      "description": "DEPRECATED long form of [PLANNER]. Model id for the planning agent (free-form: model ids churn faster than this schema)"
     },
     "EXECUTOR_MODEL": {
-      "type": "enum",
-      "values": ["claude-opus-4-5", "claude-sonnet-4-5", "claude-haiku-4-5", "inherit"],
-      "description": "Claude model to use for execution agents"
+      "type": "string",
+      "deprecated": true,
+      "description": "DEPRECATED long form of [EXECUTOR]. Model id for execution agents"
     },
     "REVIEWER_MODEL": {
-      "type": "enum",
-      "values": ["claude-opus-4-5", "claude-sonnet-4-5", "claude-haiku-4-5", "inherit"],
-      "description": "Claude model to use for the code reviewer"
+      "type": "string",
+      "deprecated": true,
+      "description": "DEPRECATED long form of [REVIEWER]. Model id for the code reviewer"
     },
     "SECURITY_MODEL": {
-      "type": "enum",
-      "values": ["claude-opus-4-5", "claude-sonnet-4-5", "claude-haiku-4-5", "inherit"],
-      "description": "Claude model to use for security review (recommend Opus for thoroughness)"
+      "type": "string",
+      "deprecated": true,
+      "description": "DEPRECATED long form of [SECURITY]. Model id for security review"
     },
     "TIER1_AUTO_APPROVE": {
       "type": "boolean",

package/.mindforge/config.json

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 {
-  "version": "11.9.1",
+  "version": "11.9.2",
   "environment": "development",
   "governance": {
     "drift_threshold": 0.75,
     "critical_drift_threshold": 0.5,
     "res_threshold": 0.8,
-    "active_did": "did:mindforge:ea8ace55-c2f0-46f2-af28-4d5a8ee3293a"
+    "active_did": "did:mindforge:766e07ac-8f56-4840-be61-316b90bbed35"
   },
   "revops": {
     "market_registry": {
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@
       "project_weekly_warn_usd": 50,
       "project_weekly_hard_limit_usd": 200
     },
-    "ledger_path": ".mindforge/metrics/token-ledger.jsonl"
+    "ledger_path": ".mindforge/metrics/token-usage.jsonl"
   },
   "proactive_suggestions": {
     "enabled": true,

package/.mindforge/engine/cost-tracking/router.md

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ These always override the matrix:
 3. Map score to tier via decision matrix
 4. Apply override rules
 5. Check budget: if remaining budget < estimated cost, downgrade one tier with WARNING
-6. Log routing decision to token-ledger.jsonl
+6. Log routing decision to token-usage.jsonl
 7. Return selected model ID
 
 ## Budget Guard

package/.mindforge/engine/cost-tracking/token-ledger.md

@@ -5,43 +5,40 @@ Append-only ledger recording all token usage for analytics, budgeting, and optim
 
 ## Storage
 
-- Location: `.mindforge/metrics/token-ledger.jsonl`
+- Location: `.mindforge/metrics/token-usage.jsonl` (canonical shape: `bin/models/usage-record.js`)
 - Format: JSON Lines (one entry per model interaction)
 - Rotation: Archive entries older than 30 days to `.mindforge/metrics/archive/`
 - Retention: Archives kept for 90 days, then deleted
 
 ## Entry Format
 
-Each line in the ledger is a complete JSON object:
+Each line in the ledger is a complete JSON object. The authoritative shape is
+`bin/models/usage-record.js`; this is what `bin/models/cost-tracker.js`
+actually appends today (all five providers in `bin/models/*-provider.js` emit it):
 
 ```json
 {
-  "id": "txn-[uuid]",
-  "timestamp": "2026-05-25T10:30:00Z",
-  "session_id": "session-abc123",
-  "task_id": "task-def456",
-  "phase": "execute",
   "model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
-  "tier": "standard",
-  "routing_reason": "difficulty_score_5_multi_file",
-  "tokens": {
-    "input": 12500,
-    "output": 3200,
-    "cached_input": 8000,
-    "total": 15700
-  },
+  "input_tokens": 12500,
+  "output_tokens": 3200,
+  "cache_read_input_tokens": 8000,
+  "cache_creation_input_tokens": 0,
   "cost_usd": 0.085,
-  "budget_remaining": {
-    "session": 4.915,
-    "project_weekly": 49.915
-  },
-  "task_type": "implementation",
-  "files_touched": 3,
-  "skills_loaded": ["code-quality", "testing-standards"],
-  "outcome": "success"
+  "task_name": "Plan 3-04",
+  "session_id": "session-abc123",
+  "phase": 3,
+  "date": "2026-05-25",
+  "timestamp": "2026-05-25T10:30:00.000Z"
 }
 ```
 
+`cost_usd` is the ONLY cost field. `total_cost_usd` belongs to cross-review
+reports (`bin/review/cross-review-engine.js`) and must never appear here.
+
+Not yet emitted (aspirational — do not read these): `id`, `task_id`, `tier`,
+`routing_reason`, `budget_remaining`, `task_type`, `files_touched`,
+`skills_loaded`, `outcome`.
+
 ## Reporting Queries
 
 The `/mindforge:cost-report` command reads this ledger to produce:
@@ -71,7 +68,7 @@ debugging       | $0.85    | 32,000     | 8
 
 ## Integration
 
-- Written to by the budget-enforcer after every model interaction
+- Written to by `bin/models/cost-tracker.js` `record()` after every model interaction (called from `bin/models/model-client.js:77`)
 - Read by `/mindforge:cost-report` command
 - Summarized weekly into `.mindforge/metrics/weekly-cost-summary.json`
 - Referenced by AgRevOps dashboard for ROI tracking

package/.mindforge/memory/sync-manifest.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "pattern-library.jsonl": {
-    "lastSync": "2026-07-29T10:18:46.944Z",
+    "lastSync": "2026-08-16T19:50:41.118Z",
     "localCount": 1
   }
 }

package/.mindforge/metrics/METRICS-SCHEMA.md

@@ -1,13 +1,22 @@
 # MindForge Metrics — Schema Reference
 
 ## Files
-- `session-quality.jsonl`
-- `phase-metrics.jsonl`
-- `skill-usage.jsonl`
-- `compaction-quality.jsonl`
+- `session-quality.jsonl` — **no producer in this repo**; every reference to it
+  (`bin/dashboard/metrics-aggregator.js`, `sdk/src/client.ts`,
+  `mcp-server/src/vendor/client.ts`) is a READ. Expected to be supplied by the
+  agent/host; MindForge only consumes it.
+- `phase-metrics.jsonl` — no producer in this repo
+- `skill-usage.jsonl` — no producer in this repo
+- `compaction-quality.jsonl` — no producer in this repo
+- `token-usage.jsonl` — **code-written** by `bin/models/cost-tracker.js`; canonical
+  shape is `bin/models/usage-record.js`. Cost lives in `cost_usd` and nowhere else.
+  Gitignored and excluded from the npm tarball.
 
 All files are append-only JSONL.
 
+Per-session cost is NOT a `session-quality.jsonl` field: the dashboard joins it
+from `token-usage.jsonl` on `session_id`.
+
 ## session-quality.jsonl fields
 - session_id, date, phase, developer_id
 - tasks_attempted, tasks_completed, tasks_failed

package/.mindforge/personas/cost-optimizer.md

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Map score to model tier via the routing decision matrix.
 </step>
 
 <step name="check_budget">
-Read token-ledger.jsonl for current session/project spend.
+Read token-usage.jsonl for current session/project spend.
 Compare against budget limits in config.json.
 If approaching warn threshold: flag to user.
 </step>
@@ -66,6 +66,6 @@ Recommend routing adjustments for next session.
 - NEVER skip security overrides to save money (auth/payment always >= standard tier)
 - NEVER exceed hard budget limit without explicit user approval
 - NEVER silently downgrade model quality — always inform
-- Track every model interaction in token-ledger.jsonl
+- Track every model interaction in token-usage.jsonl
 - Report cost transparency in every session summary
 </critical_rules>

package/.mindforge/personas/multi-model-bridge.md

@@ -82,5 +82,5 @@ Report to user with:
 - ALWAYS attribute responses to their source model
 - Maximum 2000 tokens per external prompt (cost control)
 - Maximum 3 consultations per session (rate limiting)
-- Log every external call in token-ledger.jsonl
+- Log every external call in token-usage.jsonl
 </critical_rules>

package/.mindforge/skills/cost-aware-routing/SKILL.md

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ for cost-performance tradeoffs, or when budget limits are approaching.
 ### Budget Monitoring
 
 Check budget status regularly:
-- Session budget remaining: from token-ledger.jsonl
+- Session budget remaining: from token-usage.jsonl
 - Warning threshold: `[COST_WARN_USD]` from config
 - Hard limit: `[COST_HARD_LIMIT_USD]` from config
 
@@ -72,12 +72,12 @@ Check budget status regularly:
 - Never exceed hard limit without explicit user approval
 
 ### After any task
-- Log actual model used + tokens consumed to token-ledger.jsonl
+- Log actual model used + tokens consumed to token-usage.jsonl
 - Compare actual vs optimal tier (for future routing accuracy)
 - Report cost in session summary
 
 ## Self-check before task completion
 - [ ] Did I log the model routing decision with rationale?
-- [ ] Did I record actual token usage in token-ledger.jsonl?
+- [ ] Did I record actual token usage in token-usage.jsonl?
 - [ ] Did I check remaining budget against session/project limits?
 - [ ] Did I flag any tasks where a cheaper model could have been used?

package/.mindforge/skills/multi-llm-consult/SKILL.md

@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ multiple AI providers, or when the user explicitly requests cross-model consulta
    ```
 
 ### During consultation
-- Log every external call in token-ledger.jsonl (model, tokens, cost)
+- Log every external call in token-usage.jsonl (model, tokens, cost)
 - Never send more than 2000 tokens to external models per consultation
 - If a model is unavailable: skip it, note in output, continue with available models
 - Respect rate limits — max 3 consultations per session
@@ -70,6 +70,6 @@ multiple AI providers, or when the user explicitly requests cross-model consulta
 
 ## Self-check before task completion
 - [ ] Did I sanitize the prompt before sending to external models?
-- [ ] Did I log every external call in token-ledger.jsonl?
+- [ ] Did I log every external call in token-usage.jsonl?
 - [ ] Did I attribute responses to their source model (no unattributed blending)?
 - [ ] Did I remind the user that external opinions are advisory?

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,213 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## [11.9.2] — 2026-08-16 — Correctness: audit-chain integrity, dashboard crash policy, secret scanning
+
+Patch release. No new features. Correctness work closing defects found by a
+multi-agent audit of v11.9.1, plus the regression suites that keep them closed.
+Contains a breaking change to the dashboard HTTP surface — see BREAKING below.
+
+### BREAKING
+
+Shipped under a PATCH bump. The break is confined to the dashboard's own HTTP
+surface, which binds to 127.0.0.1 only — but if you script against it, read this.
+
+- **Dashboard error responses changed shape.** `detail` is removed from 5 endpoints and
+  raw errno strings from 10 more; `correlation_id` is added to 15; a malformed request
+  body now returns `application/json` instead of express's `text/html` error page.
+  Anything parsing `detail` must correlate on the logged `correlation_id` instead. This
+  was deliberate — those fields leaked absolute filesystem paths, and therefore the
+  operator's username and home directory, into an unauthenticated response body
+  (`requireAuth` exempts GET).
+- **The dashboard now EXITS on an unhandled rejection or uncaught exception** where
+  11.9.1 logged and continued. If you supervise the process, expect restarts where you
+  previously saw a logged error. Rationale in the Fixed section below: log-and-continue
+  held client sockets open until the client timed out, and had made `shutdown()` swallow
+  a throwing token unlink and keep serving the authenticated mutation API after SIGTERM.
+- **`node bin/validate-config.js` and `mindforge security-scan` can now fail.** They
+  previously reported `MINDFORGE.md valid — 0 settings configured` and exited 0 on every
+  input. If you run either in CI, a genuinely invalid registry will now red-line where it
+  used to pass. Note this reaches **fresh installs and `--force` reinstalls only** — the
+  installer does not overwrite an existing `.mindforge/MINDFORGE-SCHEMA.json`, so a plain
+  upgrade keeps the old permissive schema.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **`security-scan` could not fail.** `bin/validate-config.js` and
+  `bin/models/model-router.js` each parsed `MINDFORGE.md` with a plain `KEY=value` regex, but
+  the registry declares its 43 parameters as bracketed `[KEY] = value`. Every schema property
+  resolved to `undefined` and short-circuited, so the command reported
+  `MINDFORGE.md valid — 0 settings configured` and exited 0 on any input. The schema also had
+  no `required` key at all. Both parsers now share `bin/utils/mindforge-params.js`, which also
+  accepts the legacy plain form (`examples/starter-project/MINDFORGE.md` ships 28 such lines),
+  and the schema declares real `required`/`recommended` sets.
+  **Behaviour change for consumers:** three CI gates go from unfailable to failable —
+  `.github/workflows/mindforge-ci.yml:38`, `.gitlab-ci-mindforge.yml:12`, and
+  `.github/workflows/control-plane.yml:100`. If one red-lines on a valid value, the schema
+  bound is wrong; do not "fix" it by editing `MINDFORGE.md`. Model routing is unchanged —
+  30 persona x tier combinations resolve identically.
+- **Trace retrieval returned nothing usable.** Queries were wrapped as a single FTS phrase, so
+  any query containing one absent term scored zero; and `traces_search` was keyed on `trace_id`
+  rather than the primary key, so each span's DELETE evicted the previous span and only the last
+  span per trace stayed searchable — 2,270 of 5,117 content-bearing traces, 44.4%, unsearchable.
+  Queries are now tokenised, OR-joined and ranked by tf-idf (`matchinfo('pcnx')`); the index is
+  re-keyed and rebuilt losslessly from the base table. `bin/eval/eval-harness.js` and its golden
+  set had zero callers and are now reachable as `npm run eval:retrieval`, with the baseline
+  committed: mean recall@10 0.6417, nDCG 0.5698 over 519 documents.
+- **The cost ledger reported two totals for one concept.** `sum(cost_usd)` was $13.73 while
+  `sum(total_cost_usd)` was $0.00, and `tests/dashboard.test.js` wrote the reader's field name,
+  so the mismatch tested green. `bin/models/usage-record.js` is now the single definition of the
+  ledger path, record shape, per-entry cost and day bucket. The configured `ledger_path` pointed
+  at `token-ledger.jsonl`, a file that has never existed; that ghost filename had spread to 17
+  places across 13 files and is now absent. The dashboard cost tile no longer renders `$0.00`
+  on a 500 — it had no `res.ok` check, and because errors return well-formed JSON the catch
+  never fired, making an outage indistinguishable from zero spend.
+  A maintainer tool, `scripts/purge-synthetic-usage.js`, removes fixture rows: dry-run by
+  default, backs up first, idempotent, and aborts leaving the ledger untouched if the rewrite
+  fails. It is run from a repository checkout — `scripts/` is not in the published tarball, so
+  installed consumers do not have it.
+- **Audit hash chain could fork under concurrent writers.** `bin/autonomous/audit-writer.js`
+  read the chain head and appended with no mutual exclusion, and cached the head in-process
+  indefinitely — so once a second process appended, the first kept chaining from a superseded
+  hash. Added `bin/utils/file-lock.js` (a fail-closed advisory lock promoted from
+  `bin/learning/instinct-cli.js`, deliberately NOT from `.agent/bin/lib/state.cjs`, which
+  writes anyway when the lock cannot be taken) held across read-head-through-fsync, and made
+  the cached head carry the file size that witnesses it is still the tail. 8 concurrent
+  appenders went from 199 broken links + 4 forks per 200 entries to 0. A lock alone was
+  measured insufficient — it still left 2 breaks and 1 fork, because the stale cache is a
+  second, independent defect.
+- **Knowledge-graph edge updates were lost under concurrency.** `deprecateEdge`,
+  `reinforceEdge` and `applyDecay` in `bin/memory/knowledge-graph.js` each did
+  `readAllEdges()` -> mutate -> append with no lock, and `addEdge` appended unserialised
+  against them. Measured at HEAD over 4 runs of 8 processes x 20 `reinforceEdge` calls:
+  93-129 of 160 increments lost, final `traversal_count` 31-67 instead of 160. All four
+  write paths now hold the `graph-edges.jsonl` lock across read-through-append; the same
+  probe then loses 0 of 160 in every run, with no lock-acquisition failures.
+- `bin/governance/policy-engine.js`: `logAudit`'s un-awaited audit write now has a
+  `.catch()` — a lock-contention failure is reported at the decision site instead of
+  escaping as an unhandled rejection.
+- `bin/hooks/instinct-capture-hook.js` appended to the instinct store without the lock that
+  `instinct-cli`'s prune/import rewrite holds, so a hook append landing in that window was
+  clobbered by the rename. It now takes the same lock.
+- `tests/v7-sovereign-security.test.js`: `new PolicyEngine()` no longer defaults
+  `planningDir` to `process.cwd()`, which appended test verdicts to the operator's real
+  `.planning/RISK-AUDIT.jsonl`.
+- Packaging: `package.json` files[] now excludes `**/*.lock` so a lockfile orphaned by a
+  hard kill cannot leak into the npm tarball (verified: without the negation, a
+  `.mindforge/memory/graph-edges.jsonl.lock` does ship).
+
+- **Audit-chain forgery via un-awaited rollback.** `HindsightInjector.inject` called
+  the async `TemporalHub.rollbackTo` without `await`, so its rejection escaped the
+  surrounding `try/catch` while execution continued: a failed rollback still fsync'd a
+  hash-chained `hindsight_injected` entry and flipped `auto-state.json` to
+  `awaiting_regeneration` for something that never happened. The log gained a
+  cryptographically valid record of a non-event, and `verify-audit` reported the chain
+  valid — valid and wrong.
+- **CLI `defaultArgs` were replaced by user arguments, not prepended.** `mindforge
+  health <anything>` lost `--check` and fell through to `installer-core`'s real
+  `install()` with `force: true`. Now prepended.
+- **`_verifyMetadata` compared UTF-16 code units, not bytes**, so a 64-unit / 65-byte
+  `integrity` still threw `RangeError` — and the caller degraded that throw into
+  "proceeding without integrity check" and restored the snapshot anyway. Read and
+  verify are now separate stages; only a genuinely absent `SNAPSHOT-META.json` reaches
+  the tolerant path.
+- **Dashboard `RevOpsAPI` was required but never mounted**, so `/api/revops/overview`
+  404'd while the AgRevOps panels and docs described it as live. Even mounted it threw:
+  `getAuditEntries()` returns `{entries,total,limit,offset}` and three engines call
+  `.filter()` on it.
+- **Dashboard leaked error internals to clients.** `err.message` reached response
+  bodies from 14 sites (`api-router.js` ×10, `temporal-api.js` ×3, `revops-api.js` ×1);
+  for fs-sourced errors that string carries absolute paths, disclosing the operator's
+  username and home directory. All sites now log server-side and return a generic
+  message plus a `correlation_id`, behind a 4-arg terminal handler that stops express
+  rendering `err.stack` when `NODE_ENV !== 'production'`.
+- **Test runner discovery was a flat `readdirSync`**, so any suite in a subdirectory was
+  invisible. Now a recursive walk that prunes `tmp-*` / `node_modules` / dot
+  directories — directories only, never files.
+- Three orphan files removed: one truncated `.planning/AUDIT.jsonl` to zero, one
+  overwrote `.planning/STATE.md`, one called a function absent from `bin/`. Recursion
+  made the `STATE.md` clobberer reachable by a single in-place rename; the other two
+  were unreachable by the runner at any depth. **The claim in `5177225`'s message that
+  all three were newly armed by recursion is correct for one of the three and
+  over-attributed for the other two.**
+- Three relocated demos kept one-level-up requires after moving a directory deeper, so
+  all three exited 1; corrected to `../../bin/`.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **`mindforge audit-skill`, `register-skill`, `install-skill` and `record-learning` no
+  longer carry `defaultArgs`.** Prepending turned them from inert into live state
+  writers: `audit-skill <name> <ver> <tier>` appended a hash-chained
+  `{event:'skill_installed', validation_passed:true}` entry for a skill that does not
+  exist, and `register-skill` wrote a malformed row above the table header of
+  `.mindforge/org/skills/MANIFEST.md`, which ships in the tarball. Bare invocations now
+  print usage and exit 0 without reaching those writers, as at v11.9.1.
+- **`subagent` is a first-class command.** Prepending `spawn` shadowed `spawn-agent`'s
+  `subagent` mode, whose documented route was `mindforge spawn subagent <name>`.
+- **The dashboard now exits on an unhandled rejection instead of logging and
+  continuing.** An escaped rejection is the only reliable signal that an async call was
+  left un-awaited, and express 4.22.1 does not route async handler rejections to error
+  middleware — log-and-continue held the client socket open until the client gave up
+  (2.5s, 4s and 8s clients all timed out) versus a ~15ms reset on exit. Symmetric with
+  `uncaughtException`, whose log-and-continue form had made `shutdown()` swallow a
+  throwing token unlink and keep serving the token-authenticated mutation API **after
+  SIGTERM**, with the bearer token still on disk and valid in memory.
+- **Dashboard error responses changed shape.** `detail` is removed from 5 endpoints,
+  raw errno strings from 10 more, `correlation_id` is added to 15, and a malformed
+  request body now returns `application/json` rather than express's `text/html` error
+  page. Anything parsing `detail` must correlate on the logged id instead.
+
+### Added
+
+- **Secret scanning enforced at three layers**: `.gitleaks.toml`, a `.husky/pre-commit`
+  gate that fails loudly when gitleaks is absent rather than skipping, and
+  `.github/workflows/secret-scan.yml` scanning full history. `scripts/ci/verify-secret-scan.sh`
+  self-tests the scanner — it distinguishes "scanned clean" from "scanned and found"
+  from "did not scan", because gitleaks exits 1 for both a finding and a failed config
+  load, and writes no report in the latter case.
+
+### Tests
+
+- Suite totals for this release: **105 files, 103 pass, 2 environment-dependent skips**
+  (`browser`, `sre-integration`). Eight new suites across the release:
+  `temporal-integrity`, `dashboard-error-leak`, `dashboard-crash-guards`,
+  `dashboard-wiring`, `cli-router`, `mindforge-params`, `file-lock`, `retrieval-fts`.
+- **Four suites could not report failure and now can.** `v8-persistence`,
+  `v8-skill-evolution` and `v8-orbital-governance` ended `finally { process.exit(0) }`, and
+  `v7-pillar-integration` had zero assertions with a premium-model gate that named two models
+  absent from the registry for several releases. `npm test` is the only quality step before
+  `npm publish`, and the runner gates on child exit codes, so a blind suite blinded the publish
+  gate. Verified by injected failure rather than inspection.
+  `dashboard-wiring` derives the expected router set
+  from `server.js`'s own requires, so adding a router without mounting it fails.
+  `cli-router` runs against a mirror-root sandbox under `os.tmpdir()` — required, not
+  tidiness: the case that proves audit forgery is prevented would otherwise forge an
+  entry into the real chain on every run. `revops-roi.test.js` had 0 assertions and
+  could not fail; it now has 6.
+
+### Not fixed — deferred to v12
+
+- **No hook is registered in any consumer install.** The installer copies 9 hook
+  scripts into `<runtime>/hooks/`, but nothing writes `.claude/settings.json` and it is
+  absent from `package.json` `files[]`. Verified by installing the tarball into a
+  scratch project. Every gate this release hardens is inert until that lands.
+- **`requireAuth` exempts GET and OPTIONS**, so every read route — including
+  `/api/audit`, which serves the hash-chained audit log — is credential-free to any
+  local process. Mutations are protected. This is a threat-model decision, not a patch.
+- **`audit-skill audit <name> <ver> <tier>`** — the explicit form — still reaches a
+  writer that performs no existence check and hardcodes `validation_passed: true`. Only
+  the bare invocation is closed.
+- **Snapshot integrity is not an authenticity control.** `HMAC_KEY` is a literal in
+  shipped source, the HMAC covers only the metadata object so file **contents** are
+  unsigned (editing a file inside a signed snapshot leaves the signature valid), and
+  deleting `SNAPSHOT-META.json` bypasses verification entirely.
+- `cwd: ROOT` in the CLI, which resolves consumer state inside `node_modules`.
+- `security-scan` cannot fail: its parser expects `KEY=value` while `MINDFORGE.md` uses
+  `[KEY] = value`, so it always reports 0 settings and exits 0.
+- Version drift in six publishable manifests (`Formula/mindforge.rb`, `Dockerfile`,
+  `mcp-server/server.json`, `mcp-server/src/index.ts`, the plugin manifest and the
+  marketplace entry) is untouched here — none is gated, and the Formula pins a tarball
+  sha256 that cannot exist before publish.
+
 ## [11.9.1] — 2026-07-29 — Packaging Fix: Restore Missing Workflow Commands
 
 ### Fixed