micro509 0.1.0

package/dist/revocation/chain.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"chain.js","names":[],"sources":["../../src/revocation/chain.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Chain-level revocation orchestration.\n *\n * Evaluates CRL and OCSP evidence for an entire validated certificate chain,\n * implementing the revocation checking portion of RFC 5280 §6.3.\n *\n * @see {@link https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5280#section-6.3 | RFC 5280 §6.3 CRL Validation}\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { ParsedCertificate } from '#micro509/x509/parse.ts';\nimport { parseCertificateFromSource } from '#micro509/x509/parse.ts';\nimport {\n\tcheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrl,\n\tparseCertificateRevocationListDer,\n\tparseCertificateRevocationListPem,\n\ttype ParsedCertificateRevocationList,\n\ttype RevocationReason,\n} from './crl.ts';\nimport type { CrlSource } from './crl.ts';\n\nexport type { CrlSource };\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Input Types\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Certificate in any supported format.\n *\n * Accepts PEM string, DER bytes, or an already-parsed {@linkcode ParsedCertificate}.\n * Used for {@linkcode CheckChainRevocationInput.extraCertificates}.\n */\nexport type CertificateSource = string | Uint8Array | ParsedCertificate;\n\n/**\n * OCSP response in any supported format.\n *\n * Accepts PEM string or DER bytes. Reserved for future OCSP support in\n * {@linkcode CheckChainRevocationInput.ocspResponses}.\n */\nexport type OcspResponseSource = string | Uint8Array;\n\n/**\n * Revocation checking policy for {@linkcode checkChainRevocation}.\n *\n * Controls how indeterminate results (missing evidence, expired CRLs) affect\n * the final {@linkcode CheckChainRevocationValue.decision | decision}.\n */\nexport interface RevocationPolicy {\n\t/**\n\t * How to handle indeterminate status.\n\t *\n\t * - `'soft-fail'`: indeterminate certificates are allowed (default)\n\t * - `'hard-fail'`: indeterminate certificates cause denial\n\t */\n\treadonly mode?: 'soft-fail' | 'hard-fail';\n\t/**\n\t * Evidence preference when multiple sources are available.\n\t *\n\t * - `'best-available'`: use whichever evidence is freshest (default)\n\t * - `'ocsp'`: prefer OCSP over CRL\n\t * - `'crl'`: prefer CRL over OCSP\n\t */\n\treadonly prefer?: 'ocsp' | 'crl' | 'best-available';\n}\n\n/** Input for {@linkcode checkChainRevocation}. */\nexport interface CheckChainRevocationInput {\n\t/** Validated certificate chain (leaf first, root last). */\n\treadonly chain: readonly ParsedCertificate[];\n\t/** CRLs to evaluate. */\n\treadonly crls?: readonly CrlSource[];\n\t/** OCSP responses to evaluate. */\n\treadonly ocspResponses?: readonly OcspResponseSource[];\n\t/** Extra certs for indirect CRL issuers / delegated OCSP responders. */\n\treadonly extraCertificates?: readonly CertificateSource[];\n\t/** Evaluation time. Defaults to `new Date()`. */\n\treadonly at?: Date;\n\t/** Revocation policy. */\n\treadonly policy?: RevocationPolicy;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Output Types\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Granular reasons why revocation status could not be determined.\n *\n * Returned in {@linkcode CertificateRevocationStatus.indeterminateReasons} when\n * `status` is `'indeterminate'`. Grouped by category:\n *\n * - **Evidence not found**: `no_applicable_crl`, `no_applicable_ocsp`\n * - **Scope mismatch**: `distribution_point_mismatch`, `issuer_name_mismatch`,\n *   `reason_scope_mismatch`, `indirect_crl_scope_mismatch`, `reason_coverage_incomplete`\n * - **Signer trust**: `crl_signer_not_found`, `crl_signer_not_authorized`,\n *   `crl_signer_revoked`, `crl_signer_indeterminate`, and OCSP equivalents\n * - **Freshness**: `crl_expired`, `ocsp_response_expired`\n */\nexport type RevocationIndeterminateReason =\n\t// Evidence not found\n\t| 'no_applicable_crl'\n\t| 'no_applicable_ocsp'\n\t// Scope issues\n\t| 'distribution_point_mismatch'\n\t| 'issuer_name_mismatch'\n\t| 'reason_scope_mismatch'\n\t| 'indirect_crl_scope_mismatch'\n\t| 'reason_coverage_incomplete'\n\t// Signer trust issues\n\t| 'crl_signer_not_found'\n\t| 'crl_signer_not_authorized'\n\t| 'crl_signer_revoked'\n\t| 'crl_signer_indeterminate'\n\t| 'ocsp_responder_not_found'\n\t| 'ocsp_responder_not_authorized'\n\t| 'ocsp_responder_revoked'\n\t| 'ocsp_responder_indeterminate'\n\t// Freshness\n\t| 'crl_expired'\n\t| 'ocsp_response_expired'\n\t// OCSP specific\n\t| 'ocsp_status_unknown';\n\n/**\n * Identifies the source of revocation evidence.\n *\n * Included in {@linkcode CertificateRevocationStatus.source} when status is\n * `'good'` or `'revoked'` to indicate which CRL or OCSP response provided the answer.\n */\nexport interface RevocationSource {\n\t/** Whether evidence came from a CRL or OCSP response. */\n\treadonly type: 'crl' | 'ocsp';\n\t/** Certificate that signed the evidence (CRL issuer or OCSP responder). */\n\treadonly signerCertificate?: ParsedCertificate;\n\t/** Identifier for debugging (e.g., CRL issuer DN or OCSP responder URL). */\n\treadonly evidenceIdentifier?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Revocation evaluation result for a single certificate.\n *\n * One entry per certificate in {@linkcode CheckChainRevocationValue.certificates}.\n * The trust anchor is excluded (never checked for revocation).\n */\nexport interface CertificateRevocationStatus {\n\t/** The certificate that was evaluated. */\n\treadonly certificate: ParsedCertificate;\n\t/**\n\t * Revocation status determination.\n\t *\n\t * - `'good'`: evidence confirms certificate is not revoked\n\t * - `'revoked'`: evidence confirms certificate is revoked\n\t * - `'indeterminate'`: could not determine status (see {@linkcode indeterminateReasons})\n\t */\n\treadonly status: 'good' | 'revoked' | 'indeterminate';\n\t/** Evidence source when status is `'good'` or `'revoked'`. */\n\treadonly source?: RevocationSource;\n\t/** Why status could not be determined. Present when `status` is `'indeterminate'`. */\n\treadonly indeterminateReasons?: readonly RevocationIndeterminateReason[];\n\t/** Revocation details. Present when `status` is `'revoked'`. */\n\treadonly revocationInfo?: {\n\t\t/** When the certificate was revoked. */\n\t\treadonly date: Date;\n\t\t/** RFC 5280 CRLReason code, if provided by the CRL/OCSP response. */\n\t\treadonly reason?: RevocationReason;\n\t};\n}\n\n/**\n * Errors encountered while processing revocation evidence.\n *\n * Distinct from {@linkcode RevocationIndeterminateReason}: execution errors are\n * code failures (malformed CRL, unsupported extension) rather than evaluation\n * outcomes (CRL doesn't cover this certificate).\n *\n * Collected in {@linkcode CheckChainRevocationValue.executionErrors}.\n */\nexport interface RevocationExecutionError {\n\t/** Error category. */\n\treadonly kind: 'parse_error' | 'unsupported_extension' | 'internal_error';\n\t/** Human-readable error description. */\n\treadonly message: string;\n\t/** Which evidence caused the error (e.g., CRL issuer DN). */\n\treadonly evidenceIdentifier?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Detailed revocation check results.\n *\n * Returned as {@linkcode CheckChainRevocationResult.value} from\n * {@linkcode checkChainRevocation}. Contains both the policy decision and\n * detailed per-certificate findings for debugging.\n */\nexport interface CheckChainRevocationValue {\n\t/**\n\t * Final policy decision based on {@linkcode RevocationPolicy}.\n\t *\n\t * - `'allow'`: chain passes revocation check\n\t * - `'deny'`: chain fails (revoked certificate or hard-fail on indeterminate)\n\t */\n\treadonly decision: 'allow' | 'deny';\n\t/** Quick-access summary of problematic certificates. */\n\treadonly summary: {\n\t\t/** Certificates confirmed as revoked. */\n\t\treadonly revokedCertificates: readonly ParsedCertificate[];\n\t\t/** Certificates whose status could not be determined. */\n\t\treadonly indeterminateCertificates: readonly ParsedCertificate[];\n\t};\n\t/** Per-certificate evaluation results. See {@linkcode CertificateRevocationStatus}. */\n\treadonly certificates: readonly CertificateRevocationStatus[];\n\t/** Evidence that could not be processed. See {@linkcode RevocationExecutionError}. */\n\treadonly executionErrors?: readonly RevocationExecutionError[];\n}\n\n/** Result type for {@linkcode checkChainRevocation}. */\nexport type CheckChainRevocationResult = {\n\treadonly ok: true;\n\treadonly value: CheckChainRevocationValue;\n};\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Helpers\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Parses a CRL from various source formats.\n */\nfunction parseCrlFromSource(source: CrlSource): ParsedCertificateRevocationList {\n\tif (typeof source === 'object' && 'issuer' in source) {\n\t\treturn source;\n\t}\n\tif (typeof source === 'string') {\n\t\treturn parseCertificateRevocationListPem(source);\n\t}\n\treturn parseCertificateRevocationListDer(source);\n}\n\n/**\n * Parses a certificate from various source formats, returning undefined on failure.\n */\nfunction parseCertificateSafe(source: CertificateSource): ParsedCertificate | undefined {\n\ttry {\n\t\treturn parseCertificateFromSource(source);\n\t} catch {\n\t\treturn undefined;\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Compares two certificates by DER bytes for identity.\n * Reference equality fails when same cert is parsed from different sources.\n */\nfunction sameCertificate(a: ParsedCertificate, b: ParsedCertificate): boolean {\n\tif (a.der.length !== b.der.length) return false;\n\tfor (let i = 0; i < a.der.length; i++) {\n\t\tif (a.der[i] !== b.der[i]) return false;\n\t}\n\treturn true;\n}\n\n/**\n * Searches for a certificate that could have signed the given CRL.\n * Matches by AKI/SKI or issuer/subject DN.\n */\nfunction findIndirectCrlIssuer(\n\tcrl: ParsedCertificateRevocationList,\n\textraCertificates: readonly CertificateSource[],\n\tchain: readonly ParsedCertificate[],\n): ParsedCertificate | undefined {\n\t// Combine extra certs with chain certs for searching\n\t// Chain certs are already parsed; extra certs may need parsing\n\tconst parsedExtras: ParsedCertificate[] = [];\n\tfor (const source of extraCertificates) {\n\t\tconst parsed = parseCertificateSafe(source);\n\t\tif (parsed !== undefined) {\n\t\t\tparsedExtras.push(parsed);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tconst candidates = [...parsedExtras, ...chain];\n\n\t// First pass: prefer AKI/SKI match (more specific)\n\tif (crl.authorityKeyIdentifier !== undefined) {\n\t\tfor (const candidate of candidates) {\n\t\t\tif (\n\t\t\t\tcandidate.subjectKeyIdentifier !== undefined &&\n\t\t\t\tnormalizeHex(crl.authorityKeyIdentifier) === normalizeHex(candidate.subjectKeyIdentifier)\n\t\t\t) {\n\t\t\t\treturn candidate;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Second pass: fall back to DN match\n\tfor (const candidate of candidates) {\n\t\tif (crl.issuer.derHex === candidate.subject.derHex) {\n\t\t\treturn candidate;\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn undefined;\n}\n\n/** Lowercases a hex string for bytewise comparison. */\nfunction normalizeHex(value: string): string {\n\treturn value.toLowerCase();\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// CRL Signer Validation (RFC 5280 §6.3.3)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * State machine for CRL signer validation with memoization.\n * - `visiting`: Currently being checked (cycle detection)\n * - `resolved-valid`: Signer is not revoked\n * - `resolved-revoked`: Signer is revoked\n * - `resolved-indeterminate`: Can't determine signer status\n */\ntype SignerValidationState =\n\t| 'visiting'\n\t| 'resolved-valid'\n\t| 'resolved-revoked'\n\t| 'resolved-indeterminate';\n\n/** Context for CRL signer validation with memoization cache. */\ninterface SignerValidationContext {\n\treadonly cache: Map<string, SignerValidationState>;\n\treadonly chain: readonly ParsedCertificate[];\n\treadonly crls: readonly CrlSource[];\n\treadonly extraCertificates: readonly CertificateSource[];\n\treadonly at: Date;\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds a unique cache key for a certificate.\n * Uses issuer DN + serial number which uniquely identifies a cert.\n */\nfunction certCacheKey(cert: ParsedCertificate): string {\n\treturn `${cert.issuer.derHex}:${cert.serialNumberHex}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Validates that a CRL signer certificate is not revoked.\n * Uses memoization to avoid redundant checks and detect cycles.\n */\nasync function validateCrlSigner(\n\tsigner: ParsedCertificate,\n\tctx: SignerValidationContext,\n): Promise<SignerValidationState> {\n\t// Use issuer+serial as cache key (unique per certificate)\n\tconst key = certCacheKey(signer);\n\tconst cached = ctx.cache.get(key);\n\n\t// Cycle detection: if we're already visiting this signer, it's indeterminate\n\tif (cached === 'visiting') {\n\t\treturn 'resolved-indeterminate';\n\t}\n\n\t// Return cached result if already resolved\n\tif (cached !== undefined) {\n\t\treturn cached;\n\t}\n\n\t// Mark as visiting before recursive checks\n\tctx.cache.set(key, 'visiting');\n\n\t// Trust anchor (last in chain) is trusted by definition\n\tconst trustAnchor = ctx.chain[ctx.chain.length - 1];\n\tif (trustAnchor !== undefined && sameCertificate(signer, trustAnchor)) {\n\t\tctx.cache.set(key, 'resolved-valid');\n\t\treturn 'resolved-valid';\n\t}\n\n\t// If signer is in the validated chain, it's trusted\n\t// (Chain was already validated before revocation checking)\n\tconst isInChain = ctx.chain.some((c) => sameCertificate(c, signer));\n\tif (isInChain) {\n\t\tctx.cache.set(key, 'resolved-valid');\n\t\treturn 'resolved-valid';\n\t}\n\n\t// Signer is not in chain — need to check its revocation status\n\t// Find signer's issuer to perform revocation check\n\tconst signerIssuer = findSignerIssuer(signer, ctx);\n\tif (signerIssuer === undefined) {\n\t\tctx.cache.set(key, 'resolved-indeterminate');\n\t\treturn 'resolved-indeterminate';\n\t}\n\n\t// Check signer's revocation status (recursive)\n\tconst signerRevocation = await checkSignerRevocation(signer, signerIssuer, ctx);\n\tctx.cache.set(key, signerRevocation);\n\treturn signerRevocation;\n}\n\n/**\n * Finds the issuer certificate for a CRL signer.\n * Searches the chain and extraCertificates by AKI/SKI or DN matching.\n */\nfunction findSignerIssuer(\n\tsigner: ParsedCertificate,\n\tctx: SignerValidationContext,\n): ParsedCertificate | undefined {\n\t// Parse extra certificates\n\tconst parsedExtras: ParsedCertificate[] = [];\n\tfor (const source of ctx.extraCertificates) {\n\t\tconst parsed = parseCertificateSafe(source);\n\t\tif (parsed !== undefined) {\n\t\t\tparsedExtras.push(parsed);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tconst candidates = [...ctx.chain, ...parsedExtras];\n\n\tfor (const candidate of candidates) {\n\t\t// Match by AKI → SKI (preferred, more specific)\n\t\tif (\n\t\t\tsigner.authorityKeyIdentifier !== undefined &&\n\t\t\tcandidate.subjectKeyIdentifier !== undefined &&\n\t\t\tnormalizeHex(signer.authorityKeyIdentifier) === normalizeHex(candidate.subjectKeyIdentifier)\n\t\t) {\n\t\t\treturn candidate;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Match by issuer DN → subject DN\n\t\tif (signer.issuer.derHex === candidate.subject.derHex) {\n\t\t\treturn candidate;\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Checks if a CRL signer certificate is revoked by examining available CRLs.\n * Recursively validates the CRL signer of any CRL used to check revocation.\n */\nasync function checkSignerRevocation(\n\tsigner: ParsedCertificate,\n\tissuer: ParsedCertificate,\n\tctx: SignerValidationContext,\n): Promise<SignerValidationState> {\n\t// If the signer's issuer is in the validated chain, the signer is trusted\n\t// by virtue of being issued by a trusted CA. We only need to check if\n\t// it's explicitly revoked, not prove \"good\" status.\n\tconst issuerInChain = ctx.chain.some((c) => sameCertificate(c, issuer));\n\n\t// Try each CRL to check signer's revocation\n\tfor (const crlSource of ctx.crls) {\n\t\tlet crl: ParsedCertificateRevocationList;\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tcrl = parseCrlFromSource(crlSource);\n\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\tcontinue;\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Check if this CRL can provide revocation info for the signer\n\t\tconst result = await checkCertificateRevocationAgainstCrl({\n\t\t\tcertificate: signer,\n\t\t\tissuerCertificate: issuer,\n\t\t\tcrl,\n\t\t\tat: ctx.at,\n\t\t});\n\n\t\tif (result.ok) {\n\t\t\tif (result.value.status === 'revoked') {\n\t\t\t\treturn 'resolved-revoked';\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (result.value.status === 'good') {\n\t\t\t\t// Before accepting this result, validate the CRL's signer\n\t\t\t\t// The CRL's signer is the issuer we just used\n\t\t\t\tconst crlSignerStatus = await validateCrlSigner(issuer, ctx);\n\t\t\t\tif (crlSignerStatus === 'resolved-valid') {\n\t\t\t\t\treturn 'resolved-valid';\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t// If CRL signer is revoked or indeterminate, can't trust this result\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// If the signer's issuer is in the chain and we found no revocation,\n\t// trust the signer (issued by trusted CA, no evidence of revocation)\n\tif (issuerInChain) {\n\t\treturn 'resolved-valid';\n\t}\n\n\treturn 'resolved-indeterminate';\n}\n\n/** Builds a CertificateRevocationStatus for a CRL check result. */\nfunction buildCrlStatus(\n\tcert: ParsedCertificate,\n\tsigner: ParsedCertificate,\n\tstatus: 'good' | 'revoked',\n\trevocationDate?: Date,\n\treasonCode?: RevocationReason,\n): CertificateRevocationStatus {\n\tif (status === 'revoked' && revocationDate !== undefined) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tcertificate: cert,\n\t\t\tstatus: 'revoked',\n\t\t\tsource: { type: 'crl', signerCertificate: signer },\n\t\t\trevocationInfo: {\n\t\t\t\tdate: revocationDate,\n\t\t\t\t...(reasonCode !== undefined ? { reason: reasonCode } : {}),\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\treturn {\n\t\tcertificate: cert,\n\t\tstatus: 'good',\n\t\tsource: { type: 'crl', signerCertificate: signer },\n\t};\n}\n\n/**\n * Evaluates revocation status for a single certificate using available CRLs.\n * Returns both status and any execution errors encountered.\n *\n * Tries the chain issuer first; if that fails, searches extraCertificates\n * and chain for an indirect CRL issuer that matches the CRL's AKI or issuer DN.\n *\n * Also validates that CRL signers are not revoked (RFC 5280 §6.3.3).\n */\n// RFC 5280 ReasonFlags — all possible revocation reasons that CRLs can cover.\nconst ALL_REASON_FLAGS: readonly string[] = [\n\t'keyCompromise',\n\t'cACompromise',\n\t'affiliationChanged',\n\t'superseded',\n\t'cessationOfOperation',\n\t'certificateHold',\n\t'privilegeWithdrawn',\n\t'aACompromise',\n];\n\nasync function evaluateCertificateRevocation(\n\tcert: ParsedCertificate,\n\tissuer: ParsedCertificate,\n\tinput: CheckChainRevocationInput,\n\tsignerCtx: SignerValidationContext,\n): Promise<{\n\tstatus: CertificateRevocationStatus;\n\texecutionErrors: readonly RevocationExecutionError[];\n}> {\n\tconst { crls = [], extraCertificates = [], chain = [], at = new Date() } = input;\n\tconst executionErrors: RevocationExecutionError[] = [];\n\tlet sawCrlSignerRevoked = false;\n\tlet sawCrlSignerIndeterminate = false;\n\tlet sawGood = false;\n\tlet lastGoodSigner: ParsedCertificate | undefined;\n\tconst coveredReasons = new Set<string>();\n\n\t// Parse all CRLs and separate base CRLs from delta CRLs\n\tconst parsedCrls: ParsedCertificateRevocationList[] = [];\n\tfor (const crlSource of crls) {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tparsedCrls.push(parseCrlFromSource(crlSource));\n\t\t} catch (e) {\n\t\t\texecutionErrors.push({\n\t\t\t\tkind: 'parse_error',\n\t\t\t\tmessage: e instanceof Error ? e.message : 'CRL parse failed',\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tconst baseCrls = parsedCrls.filter((crl) => crl.baseCrlNumber === undefined);\n\tconst deltaCrls = parsedCrls.filter((crl) => crl.baseCrlNumber !== undefined);\n\n\t// Helper to check CRL with given issuer and optional delta\n\tconst checkWithIssuer = async (\n\t\tcrl: ParsedCertificateRevocationList,\n\t\tdeltaCrl: ParsedCertificateRevocationList | undefined,\n\t\tcrlIssuer: ParsedCertificate,\n\t) => {\n\t\treturn checkCertificateRevocationAgainstCrl({\n\t\t\tcertificate: cert,\n\t\t\tissuerCertificate: crlIssuer,\n\t\t\tcrl,\n\t\t\t...(deltaCrl !== undefined ? { deltaCrl } : {}),\n\t\t\tat,\n\t\t});\n\t};\n\n\t// Process base CRLs (optionally paired with delta CRLs)\n\tfor (const baseCrl of baseCrls) {\n\t\t// Find applicable delta CRL for this base CRL (if any)\n\t\t// Delta CRL applies if it has the same issuer and crlNumber matches baseCrlNumber\n\t\tconst applicableDelta = deltaCrls.find(\n\t\t\t(d) =>\n\t\t\t\td.issuer.derHex === baseCrl.issuer.derHex &&\n\t\t\t\td.baseCrlNumber !== undefined &&\n\t\t\t\tbaseCrl.crlNumber !== undefined &&\n\t\t\t\tBigInt(d.baseCrlNumber) <= BigInt(baseCrl.crlNumber),\n\t\t);\n\n\t\t// Try chain issuer first\n\t\tlet result = await checkWithIssuer(baseCrl, applicableDelta, issuer);\n\t\tlet effectiveSigner = issuer;\n\n\t\t// Chain issuer failed — try to find indirect CRL issuer\n\t\tif (!result.ok) {\n\t\t\tconst indirectIssuer = findIndirectCrlIssuer(baseCrl, extraCertificates, chain);\n\t\t\tif (indirectIssuer !== undefined && !sameCertificate(indirectIssuer, issuer)) {\n\t\t\t\tresult = await checkWithIssuer(baseCrl, applicableDelta, indirectIssuer);\n\t\t\t\teffectiveSigner = indirectIssuer;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif (!result.ok) {\n\t\t\tcontinue; // CRL doesn't apply to this certificate\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Validate CRL signer is not revoked before accepting result\n\t\tconst signerStatus = await validateCrlSigner(effectiveSigner, signerCtx);\n\t\tif (signerStatus === 'resolved-revoked') {\n\t\t\tsawCrlSignerRevoked = true;\n\t\t\tcontinue; // CRL signer revoked — can't trust this CRL\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (signerStatus === 'resolved-indeterminate') {\n\t\t\tsawCrlSignerIndeterminate = true;\n\t\t\tcontinue; // CRL signer status unknown — try other CRLs\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// CRL is valid — check result\n\t\tif (result.value.status === 'revoked') {\n\t\t\t// Immediately return revoked status\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tstatus: buildCrlStatus(\n\t\t\t\t\tcert,\n\t\t\t\t\teffectiveSigner,\n\t\t\t\t\t'revoked',\n\t\t\t\t\tresult.value.revocationDate,\n\t\t\t\t\tresult.value.reasonCode,\n\t\t\t\t),\n\t\t\t\texecutionErrors,\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Status is 'good' — track which reasons this CRL covers\n\t\tsawGood = true;\n\t\tlastGoodSigner = effectiveSigner;\n\t\tconst crlReasons = baseCrl.issuingDistributionPoint?.onlySomeReasons?.flags;\n\t\tif (crlReasons === undefined) {\n\t\t\t// CRL covers all reasons\n\t\t\tfor (const reason of ALL_REASON_FLAGS) {\n\t\t\t\tcoveredReasons.add(reason);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t// CRL only covers specific reasons\n\t\t\tfor (const reason of crlReasons) {\n\t\t\t\tcoveredReasons.add(reason);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Return 'good' only if we saw at least one good result AND all reasons are covered\n\tif (sawGood) {\n\t\tconst allReasonsCovered = ALL_REASON_FLAGS.every((r) => coveredReasons.has(r));\n\t\tif (allReasonsCovered) {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tstatus: {\n\t\t\t\t\tcertificate: cert,\n\t\t\t\t\tstatus: 'good',\n\t\t\t\t\t...(lastGoodSigner !== undefined\n\t\t\t\t\t\t? { source: { type: 'crl', signerCertificate: lastGoodSigner } }\n\t\t\t\t\t\t: {}),\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\texecutionErrors,\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t}\n\t\t// Not all reasons covered — indeterminate\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tstatus: {\n\t\t\t\tcertificate: cert,\n\t\t\t\tstatus: 'indeterminate',\n\t\t\t\tindeterminateReasons: ['reason_coverage_incomplete'],\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\texecutionErrors,\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\t// No applicable CRL found — determine most appropriate indeterminate reason\n\tconst reasons: RevocationIndeterminateReason[] = [];\n\tif (sawCrlSignerRevoked) {\n\t\treasons.push('crl_signer_revoked');\n\t} else if (sawCrlSignerIndeterminate) {\n\t\treasons.push('crl_signer_indeterminate');\n\t} else if (crls.length === 0) {\n\t\treasons.push('no_applicable_crl', 'no_applicable_ocsp');\n\t} else {\n\t\treasons.push('no_applicable_crl');\n\t}\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tstatus: {\n\t\t\tcertificate: cert,\n\t\t\tstatus: 'indeterminate',\n\t\t\tindeterminateReasons: reasons,\n\t\t},\n\t\texecutionErrors,\n\t};\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Function\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Checks revocation status for all certificates in a validated chain.\n *\n * Evaluates CRL and OCSP evidence against each certificate (except the trust\n * anchor), applies the revocation policy, and returns a unified decision.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const result = await checkChainRevocation({\n *   chain: validatedChain,\n *   crls: [crl1, crl2],\n *   policy: { mode: 'hard-fail' },\n * });\n * if (result.value.decision === 'deny') {\n *   console.log('Revocation check failed');\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport async function checkChainRevocation(\n\tinput: CheckChainRevocationInput,\n): Promise<CheckChainRevocationResult> {\n\tconst { chain, policy, crls = [], extraCertificates = [], at = new Date() } = input;\n\tconst mode = policy?.mode ?? 'soft-fail';\n\n\t// Empty chain → allow\n\tif (chain.length === 0) {\n\t\treturn {\n\t\t\tok: true,\n\t\t\tvalue: {\n\t\t\t\tdecision: 'allow',\n\t\t\t\tsummary: { revokedCertificates: [], indeterminateCertificates: [] },\n\t\t\t\tcertificates: [],\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t};\n\t}\n\n\t// Create signer validation context with memoization cache\n\t// This cache is shared across all certificate checks in this chain evaluation\n\tconst signerCtx: SignerValidationContext = {\n\t\tcache: new Map(),\n\t\tchain,\n\t\tcrls,\n\t\textraCertificates,\n\t\tat,\n\t};\n\n\t// Skip trust anchor (last cert) — it's the trust base\n\tconst certsToCheck = chain.slice(0, -1);\n\tconst certificates: CertificateRevocationStatus[] = [];\n\tconst revokedCertificates: ParsedCertificate[] = [];\n\tconst indeterminateCertificates: ParsedCertificate[] = [];\n\tconst allExecutionErrors: RevocationExecutionError[] = [];\n\n\tfor (let i = 0; i < certsToCheck.length; i++) {\n\t\tconst cert = certsToCheck[i];\n\t\tconst issuer = chain[i + 1]; // Next cert in chain is the issuer\n\t\tif (cert === undefined || issuer === undefined) {\n\t\t\tcontinue; // Should never happen given loop bounds\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tconst { status, executionErrors } = await evaluateCertificateRevocation(\n\t\t\tcert,\n\t\t\tissuer,\n\t\t\tinput,\n\t\t\tsignerCtx,\n\t\t);\n\t\tcertificates.push(status);\n\t\tallExecutionErrors.push(...executionErrors);\n\n\t\tif (status.status === 'revoked') {\n\t\t\trevokedCertificates.push(cert);\n\t\t} else if (status.status === 'indeterminate') {\n\t\t\tindeterminateCertificates.push(cert);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// Apply policy\n\tconst hasRevoked = revokedCertificates.length > 0;\n\tconst hasIndeterminate = indeterminateCertificates.length > 0;\n\tconst decision: 'allow' | 'deny' = hasRevoked\n\t\t? 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package/dist/revocation/crl.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,316 @@
+import { ErrorResult, Micro509Error } from "../result/result.js";
+import { NameInput } from "../x509/name.js";
+import { DistributionPoint, GeneralName, IssuingDistributionPoint } from "../x509/extensions.js";
+import { ParsedCertificate, ParsedDistributionPoint, ParsedIssuingDistributionPoint, ParsedName } from "../x509/parse.js";
+
+//#region src/revocation/crl.d.ts
+/**
+* Single revoked certificate entry for {@linkcode createCertificateRevocationList}.
+*/
+interface RevokedCertificateInput {
+  /** DER-encoded certificate serial number to revoke. */
+  readonly serialNumber: Uint8Array;
+  /** When the certificate was revoked. Defaults to `thisUpdate` of the CRL. */
+  readonly revocationDate?: Date;
+  /** RFC 5280 CRLReason code. Omit for `unspecified`. */
+  readonly reasonCode?: RevocationReason;
+  /** When the key or certificate became suspect — may predate `revocationDate`. */
+  readonly invalidityDate?: Date;
+}
+/**
+* RFC 5280 §5.3.1 CRLReason code values.
+*
+* `removeFromCRL` is used in delta CRLs to un-hold a certificate.
+*/
+type RevocationReason = "unspecified" | "keyCompromise" | "cACompromise" | "affiliationChanged" | "superseded" | "cessationOfOperation" | "certificateHold" | "removeFromCRL" | "privilegeWithdrawn" | "aACompromise";
+/**
+* Input for {@linkcode createCertificateRevocationList}.
+*/
+interface CreateCertificateRevocationListInput {
+  /** Distinguished name of the CRL issuer (typically the signing CA). */
+  readonly issuer: NameInput;
+  /** Private key used to sign the CRL. Algorithm is inferred from the key. */
+  readonly signerPrivateKey: CryptoKey;
+  /** Issuer public key — used to embed an Authority Key Identifier extension. */
+  readonly issuerPublicKey?: CryptoKey;
+  /** Issuance timestamp. Defaults to `new Date()`. */
+  readonly thisUpdate?: Date;
+  /** Planned next issuance. Omit for an open-ended CRL. */
+  readonly nextUpdate?: Date;
+  /** Certificates to list as revoked in this CRL. */
+  readonly revokedCertificates?: readonly RevokedCertificateInput[];
+  /** Monotonically-increasing CRL sequence number (CRLNumber extension). */
+  readonly crlNumber?: number;
+  /** If set, marks this CRL as a delta CRL referencing the given base CRL number. */
+  readonly baseCrlNumber?: number;
+  /** Issuing distribution point extension — scopes this CRL to a subset of certificates. */
+  readonly issuingDistributionPoint?: IssuingDistributionPoint;
+  /** Freshest CRL distribution points — tells relying parties where to find delta CRLs. */
+  readonly freshestCrlDistributionPoints?: readonly DistributionPoint[];
+}
+/**
+* Encoded CRL in multiple serialisation formats, returned by {@linkcode createCertificateRevocationList}.
+*/
+interface CertificateRevocationListMaterial {
+  /** Raw DER bytes of the signed CRL. */
+  readonly der: Uint8Array;
+  /** PEM-encoded CRL (`-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----`). */
+  readonly pem: string;
+  /** Base64-encoded DER (no PEM armour). */
+  readonly base64: string;
+}
+/**
+* A single revoked-certificate entry decoded from a CRL.
+*/
+interface ParsedRevokedCertificate {
+  /** Hex-encoded serial number of the revoked certificate. */
+  readonly serialNumberHex: string;
+  /** When the CA declared this certificate revoked. */
+  readonly revocationDate: Date;
+  /** RFC 5280 CRLReason, if the entry carries one. */
+  readonly reasonCode?: RevocationReason;
+  /** When the key or certificate actually became suspect, if present. */
+  readonly invalidityDate?: Date;
+  /** Indirect-CRL certificate issuer override (RFC 5280 §5.3.3). */
+  readonly certificateIssuer?: readonly GeneralName[];
+}
+/**
+* Decoded X.509 CRL, returned by {@linkcode parseCertificateRevocationListDer}
+* and {@linkcode parseCertificateRevocationListPem}.
+*/
+interface ParsedCertificateRevocationList {
+  /** Original DER bytes when this object came from {@linkcode parseCertificateRevocationListDer} or PEM parsing. */
+  readonly der?: Uint8Array;
+  /** CRL version (1 = v1, 2 = v2 with extensions). */
+  readonly version: number;
+  /** DER-encoded TBSCertList — the signed payload for signature verification. */
+  readonly tbsCertListDer: Uint8Array;
+  /** Raw signature bytes from the CRL outer wrapper. */
+  readonly signatureValue: Uint8Array;
+  /** CRL issuer distinguished name. */
+  readonly issuer: ParsedName;
+  /** Start of the CRL validity window. */
+  readonly thisUpdate: Date;
+  /** End of the CRL validity window. Absent if the CA does not commit to a schedule. */
+  readonly nextUpdate?: Date;
+  /** OID of the algorithm used to sign this CRL. */
+  readonly signatureAlgorithmOid: string;
+  /** Human-readable signature algorithm name (e.g. `"ECDSA with SHA-256"`). */
+  readonly signatureAlgorithmName: string;
+  /** DER-encoded signature algorithm parameters (e.g. DER NULL for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5). */
+  readonly signatureAlgorithmParametersDer?: Uint8Array;
+  /** OID of the issuer's public key algorithm, when available. */
+  readonly issuerPublicKeyAlgorithmOid?: string;
+  /** OID of the issuer's public key parameters (e.g. named curve), when available. */
+  readonly issuerPublicKeyParametersOid?: string;
+  /** Hex-encoded Authority Key Identifier, if the extension is present. */
+  readonly authorityKeyIdentifier?: string;
+  /** CRLNumber extension value — monotonically increasing sequence number. */
+  readonly crlNumber?: number;
+  /** Delta CRL indicator — present only on delta CRLs, referencing the base CRL number. */
+  readonly baseCrlNumber?: number;
+  /** Issuing distribution point extension — scopes this CRL to a certificate subset. */
+  readonly issuingDistributionPoint?: ParsedIssuingDistributionPoint;
+  /** Freshest CRL extension — points to delta CRL locations. */
+  readonly freshestCrlDistributionPoints?: readonly ParsedDistributionPoint[];
+  /** All revoked certificate entries (empty array if none). */
+  readonly revokedCertificates: readonly ParsedRevokedCertificate[];
+}
+/** PEM string, DER bytes, or already-parsed CRL. */
+type CrlSource = string | Uint8Array | ParsedCertificateRevocationList;
+/** PEM string, DER bytes, or already-parsed certificate. */
+type CrlCertificateSource = string | Uint8Array | ParsedCertificate;
+/** Failure detail when CRL signature verification fails. */
+interface VerifyCertificateRevocationListFailure extends Micro509Error<"signature_invalid"> {
+  /** Always `false` for failures. */
+  readonly ok: false;
+}
+/**
+* Result of {@linkcode verifyCertificateRevocationList}.
+*
+* On success, `value` is the parsed CRL whose signature has been verified.
+*/
+type VerifyCertificateRevocationListResult = {
+  readonly ok: true; /** Parsed CRL with a verified signature. */
+  readonly value: ParsedCertificateRevocationList;
+} | ErrorResult<"signature_invalid", Record<never, never>, VerifyCertificateRevocationListFailure>;
+/**
+* Input for {@linkcode validateCertificateRevocationList}.
+*/
+interface ValidateCertificateRevocationListInput {
+  /** The CRL to validate. */
+  readonly crl: CrlSource;
+  /** Certificate of the CA that should have signed the CRL. */
+  readonly issuerCertificate: CrlCertificateSource;
+  /** Evaluation time for freshness checks. Defaults to `new Date()`. */
+  readonly at?: Date;
+  /** Tolerance in milliseconds for clock skew when checking `thisUpdate`/`nextUpdate`. */
+  readonly clockSkewMs?: number;
+}
+/**
+* Failure detail for {@linkcode validateCertificateRevocationList}.
+*
+* Possible codes: `signature_invalid`, `issuer_mismatch`, `stale_crl`, `crl_sign_not_permitted`.
+*/
+interface ValidateCertificateRevocationListFailure extends Micro509Error<"signature_invalid" | "issuer_mismatch" | "stale_crl" | "crl_sign_not_permitted"> {
+  /** Always `false` for failures. */
+  readonly ok: false;
+}
+/**
+* Result of {@linkcode validateCertificateRevocationList}.
+*
+* On success, the CRL has passed signature, issuer, key-usage, and freshness checks.
+*/
+type ValidateCertificateRevocationListResult = {
+  readonly ok: true; /** Validated and parsed CRL. */
+  readonly value: ParsedCertificateRevocationList;
+} | ErrorResult<"signature_invalid" | "issuer_mismatch" | "stale_crl" | "crl_sign_not_permitted", Record<never, never>, ValidateCertificateRevocationListFailure>;
+/**
+* Input for {@linkcode checkCertificateRevocationAgainstCrl}.
+*/
+interface CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlInput {
+  /** Certificate whose revocation status to check. */
+  readonly certificate: CrlCertificateSource;
+  /** Issuer of `certificate` — also expected signer of the CRL. */
+  readonly issuerCertificate: CrlCertificateSource;
+  /** Complete (base) CRL to check against. */
+  readonly crl: CrlSource;
+  /** Optional delta CRL for more recent revocation information. */
+  readonly deltaCrl?: CrlSource;
+  /** Evaluation time. Defaults to `new Date()`. */
+  readonly at?: Date;
+  /** Clock-skew tolerance in milliseconds for freshness checks. */
+  readonly clockSkewMs?: number;
+}
+/** Error codes that {@linkcode checkCertificateRevocationAgainstCrl} may return. */
+type CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlErrorCode = "signature_invalid" | "issuer_mismatch" | "stale_crl" | "crl_sign_not_permitted" | "non_applicable";
+/** Structured reason why a CRL was deemed non-applicable to a given certificate. */
+type CrlApplicabilityFailureReason = "certificate_scope_mismatch" | "delta_crl_incompatible" | "delta_crl_unsupported" | "distribution_point_mismatch" | "indirect_crl_unsupported" | "issuer_mismatch" | "reasons_mismatch";
+/** Structured details attached to a {@linkcode CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlFailure}. */
+interface CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlFailureDetails {
+  /** Why the CRL was non-applicable, when the error code is `non_applicable`. */
+  readonly reason?: CrlApplicabilityFailureReason;
+}
+/** Failure detail for {@linkcode checkCertificateRevocationAgainstCrl}. */
+interface CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlFailure extends Micro509Error<CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlErrorCode, CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlFailureDetails> {
+  /** Always `false` for failures. */
+  readonly ok: false;
+}
+/** Success value when the certificate is not found in the CRL. */
+interface CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlGoodValue {
+  /** Certificate is not revoked. */
+  readonly status: "good";
+  /** The validated CRL that was checked. */
+  readonly crl: ParsedCertificateRevocationList;
+}
+/** Success value when the certificate is found as revoked in the CRL. */
+interface CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlRevokedValue {
+  /** Certificate is revoked. */
+  readonly status: "revoked";
+  /** The validated CRL that contained the revocation entry. */
+  readonly crl: ParsedCertificateRevocationList;
+  /** When the CA declared this certificate revoked. */
+  readonly revocationDate: Date;
+  /** CRLReason from the entry, if present. */
+  readonly reasonCode?: RevocationReason;
+}
+/** Discriminated union of `good` and `revoked` outcomes. */
+type CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlValue = CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlGoodValue | CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlRevokedValue;
+/**
+* Result of {@linkcode checkCertificateRevocationAgainstCrl}.
+*
+* On success `value.status` is `'good'` or `'revoked'`.
+* On failure the CRL could not be validated or was non-applicable.
+*/
+type CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlResult = {
+  readonly ok: true;
+  readonly value: CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlValue;
+} | ErrorResult<CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlErrorCode, CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlFailureDetails, CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlFailure>;
+/**
+* Signs and encodes an X.509 v2 CRL.
+*
+* Embeds Authority Key Identifier, CRLNumber, delta CRL indicator,
+* issuing distribution point, and freshest-CRL extensions as configured.
+*
+* @example
+* ```ts
+* import { createCertificateRevocationList } from 'micro509';
+*
+* const crl = await createCertificateRevocationList({
+*   issuer: { commonName: 'Example CA' },
+*   signerPrivateKey: caPrivateKey,
+*   issuerPublicKey: caPublicKey,
+*   thisUpdate: new Date('2025-01-01'),
+*   nextUpdate: new Date('2025-02-01'),
+*   crlNumber: 42,
+*   revokedCertificates: [
+*     { serialNumber: revokedSerial, reasonCode: 'keyCompromise' },
+*   ],
+* });
+* // crl.pem, crl.der, crl.base64
+* ```
+*/
+declare function createCertificateRevocationList(input: CreateCertificateRevocationListInput): Promise<CertificateRevocationListMaterial>;
+/**
+* Decodes a DER-encoded X.509 CRL into a structured {@linkcode ParsedCertificateRevocationList}.
+*
+* Does not verify the signature — call {@linkcode verifyCertificateRevocationList} or
+* {@linkcode validateCertificateRevocationList} for that.
+*/
+declare function parseCertificateRevocationListDer(der: Uint8Array): ParsedCertificateRevocationList;
+/**
+* Decodes a PEM-encoded X.509 CRL (`-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----`).
+*
+* @example
+* ```ts
+* import { parseCertificateRevocationListPem } from 'micro509';
+*
+* const crl = parseCertificateRevocationListPem(pemString);
+* console.log(crl.issuer.values.commonName, crl.revokedCertificates.length);
+* ```
+*/
+declare function parseCertificateRevocationListPem(pem: string): ParsedCertificateRevocationList;
+/**
+* Verifies the CRL signature against the issuer certificate's public key.
+*
+* Does **not** check issuer name match, key-usage, or freshness — use
+* {@linkcode validateCertificateRevocationList} for full validation.
+*/
+declare function verifyCertificateRevocationList(crl: string | Uint8Array, issuerCertificate: string | Uint8Array): Promise<VerifyCertificateRevocationListResult>;
+/**
+* Full CRL validation: issuer name match, authority key identifier match,
+* cRLSign key-usage check, signature verification, and `thisUpdate`/`nextUpdate`
+* freshness check (with optional clock-skew tolerance).
+*/
+declare function validateCertificateRevocationList(input: ValidateCertificateRevocationListInput): Promise<ValidateCertificateRevocationListResult>;
+/**
+* End-to-end revocation check: validates the CRL (and optional delta CRL),
+* verifies applicability via distribution-point and scope matching, then
+* resolves the certificate's revocation status.
+*
+* Returns `good` if the serial is absent, `revoked` with date/reason if present,
+* or an error if the CRL cannot be validated or is non-applicable.
+*
+* @example
+* ```ts
+* import { checkCertificateRevocationAgainstCrl } from 'micro509';
+*
+* const result = await checkCertificateRevocationAgainstCrl({
+*   certificate: leafPem,
+*   issuerCertificate: caPem,
+*   crl: crlPem,
+* });
+* if (result.ok && result.value.status === 'revoked') {
+*   console.log('revoked on', result.value.revocationDate);
+* }
+* ```
+*/
+declare function checkCertificateRevocationAgainstCrl(input: CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlInput): Promise<CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlResult>;
+/**
+* Quick serial-number lookup — returns `true` if the serial appears in the
+* CRL's revoked entries. Does **not** validate the CRL or check applicability.
+*/
+declare function isCertificateRevoked(certificateSerialNumber: Uint8Array | string, crl: ParsedCertificateRevocationList): boolean;
+//#endregion
+export { CertificateRevocationListMaterial, CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlErrorCode, CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlFailure, CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlFailureDetails, CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlGoodValue, CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlInput, CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlResult, CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlRevokedValue, CheckCertificateRevocationAgainstCrlValue, CreateCertificateRevocationListInput, CrlApplicabilityFailureReason, CrlCertificateSource, CrlSource, ParsedCertificateRevocationList, ParsedRevokedCertificate, RevocationReason, RevokedCertificateInput, ValidateCertificateRevocationListFailure, ValidateCertificateRevocationListInput, ValidateCertificateRevocationListResult, VerifyCertificateRevocationListFailure, VerifyCertificateRevocationListResult, checkCertificateRevocationAgainstCrl, createCertificateRevocationList, isCertificateRevoked, parseCertificateRevocationListDer, parseCertificateRevocationListPem, validateCertificateRevocationList, verifyCertificateRevocationList };
+//# sourceMappingURL=crl.d.ts.map

package/dist/revocation/crl.js

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import{bitString as e,concatBytes as t,explicitContext as n,generalizedTime as r,implicitConstructedContext as i,implicitPrimitiveContext as a,integer as o,integerFromNumber as s,readElement as c,readRootElement as l,readSequenceChildren as u,sequence as d,time as f,tlv as p}from"../internal/asn1/der.js";import{childrenOf as m,decodeBoolean as ee,decodeIntegerNumber as h,decodeObjectIdentifier as g,decodeString as _,extractBitStringValue as v,hexToBytes as y,parseTime as b,requireElement as x,toHex as S}from"../internal/asn1/asn1.js";import{OIDS as C}from"../internal/asn1/oids.js";import{base64Encode as w}from"../internal/shared/base64.js";import{pemDecode as T,pemEncode as E}from"../pem/pem.js";import{exportSpkiDer as D}from"../keys/keys.js";import{describeSignatureAlgorithm as te}from"../internal/crypto/algorithm-names.js";import{decodeIpAddress as ne}from"../internal/shared/ip.js";import{encodeDistributionPointReasonFlagsContent as re,parseDistributionPointReasonFlagsContent as O}from"../internal/x509/extension-bits.js";import{nameFieldKeyFromOid as k}from"../internal/x509/name-fields.js";import{encodeName as ie,encodeRelativeDistinguishedName as ae}from"../x509/name.js";import{buildSubjectKeyIdentifier as oe,encodeCrlDistributionPoints as se,encodeExtension as A,encodeSubjectAltName as ce}from"../x509/extensions.js";import{parseCertificateDer as le,parseCertificateFromSource as j}from"../x509/parse.js";import{verifySignedDataDetailed as ue}from"../internal/crypto/sig-verify.js";import{compareDistinguishedNames as M,compareNameAttributeValue as de}from"../internal/shared/dn.js";import{encodeAlgorithmIdentifier as fe,getSignatureAlgorithm as pe,signBytes as me}from"../internal/crypto/signing.js";const he={unspecified:0,keyCompromise:1,cACompromise:2,affiliationChanged:3,superseded:4,cessationOfOperation:5,certificateHold:6,removeFromCRL:8,privilegeWithdrawn:9,aACompromise:10};async function ge(t){let r=pe(t.signerPrivateKey),i=t.thisUpdate??new Date,a=t.nextUpdate,o=await Me(t.issuerPublicKey,t.crlNumber,t.baseCrlNumber,t.issuingDistributionPoint,t.freshestCrlDistributionPoints),c=t.revokedCertificates??[],l=c.length===0?[]:[d(c.map(e=>Ne(e,i)))],u=d([s(1),fe(r),ie(t.issuer),f(i),...a===void 0?[]:[f(a)],...l,...o.length===0?[]:[n(0,d(o))]]),p=await me(t.signerPrivateKey,r,u),m=d([u,fe(r),e(p)]);return{der:m,pem:E(`X509 CRL`,m),base64:w(m)}}function N(e){let t=u(e,{maxDepth:64});if(t.length!==3)throw Error(`Malformed CRL`);let n=x(t[0],`TBSCertList`),r=x(t[1],`signatureAlgorithm`),i=x(t[2],`signatureValue`),a=tt(e.slice(n.start-n.headerLength,n.end)),o=Xe(e,r);return{der:new Uint8Array(e),version:a.version,tbsCertListDer:e.slice(n.start-n.headerLength,n.end),signatureValue:v(i),issuer:a.issuer,thisUpdate:a.thisUpdate,...a.nextUpdate===void 0?{}:{nextUpdate:a.nextUpdate},signatureAlgorithmOid:o.oid,signatureAlgorithmName:te(o.oid,o.parametersDer),...o.parametersDer===void 0?{}:{signatureAlgorithmParametersDer:o.parametersDer},...a.authorityKeyIdentifier===void 0?{}:{authorityKeyIdentifier:a.authorityKeyIdentifier},...a.crlNumber===void 0?{}:{crlNumber:a.crlNumber},...a.baseCrlNumber===void 0?{}:{baseCrlNumber:a.baseCrlNumber},...a.issuingDistributionPoint===void 0?{}:{issuingDistributionPoint:a.issuingDistributionPoint},...a.freshestCrlDistributionPoints===void 0?{}:{freshestCrlDistributionPoints:a.freshestCrlDistributionPoints},revokedCertificates:a.revokedCertificates}}function P(e){return N(T(`X509 CRL`,e))}async function _e(e,t){let n,r;try{n=typeof e==`string`?P(e):N(new Uint8Array(e)),r=typeof t==`string`?$e(t):Qe(new Uint8Array(t))}catch{return I(`signature_invalid`,`certificate revocation list or issuer certificate input is malformed`)}let i;try{i=await ue(n.signatureAlgorithmOid,n.signatureAlgorithmParametersDer,r.publicKeyAlgorithmOid,r.publicKeyParametersOid,r.subjectPublicKeyInfoDer,n.signatureValue,n.tbsCertListDer)}catch{return I(`signature_invalid`,`certificate revocation list signature verification failed`)}return i.ok?i.valid?{ok:!0,value:n}:I(`signature_invalid`,`certificate revocation list signature does not verify`):i.code===`verification_error`?I(`signature_invalid`,`certificate revocation list signature verification failed`):I(`signature_invalid`,`certificate revocation list signature uses unsupported algorithm parameters`)}async function F(e){let t;try{t=et(e.crl)}catch{return L(`signature_invalid`,`certificate revocation list signed content is malformed`)}let n;try{n=Q(e.issuerCertificate)}catch{return L(`signature_invalid`,`issuer certificate input is malformed`)}if(!M(t.issuer,n.subject))return L(`issuer_mismatch`,`CRL issuer name does not match certificate subject`);if(t.authorityKeyIdentifier!==void 0&&n.subjectKeyIdentifier!==void 0&&t.authorityKeyIdentifier!==n.subjectKeyIdentifier)return L(`issuer_mismatch`,`CRL authority key identifier does not match issuer subject key identifier`);if(n.keyUsage!==void 0&&!n.keyUsage.flags.includes(`cRLSign`))return L(`crl_sign_not_permitted`,`issuer certificate key usage does not permit CRL signing`);let r;try{r=await ue(t.signatureAlgorithmOid,t.signatureAlgorithmParametersDer,n.publicKeyAlgorithmOid,n.publicKeyParametersOid,n.subjectPublicKeyInfoDer,t.signatureValue,t.tbsCertListDer)}catch{return L(`signature_invalid`,`certificate revocation list signature verification failed`)}if(!r.ok)return r.code===`verification_error`?L(`signature_invalid`,`certificate revocation list signature verification failed`):L(`signature_invalid`,`certificate revocation list signature uses unsupported algorithm parameters`);if(!r.valid)return L(`signature_invalid`,`certificate revocation list signature does not verify`);let i=e.at??new Date,a=e.clockSkewMs??0;return t.thisUpdate.getTime()-a>i.getTime()||t.nextUpdate!==void 0&&t.nextUpdate.getTime()+a<i.getTime()?L(`stale_crl`,`CRL is not valid at requested time`):{ok:!0,value:t}}async function ve(e){let t;try{t=Q(e.certificate)}catch{return R(`non_applicable`,`certificate input is malformed`)}let n=await F({crl:e.crl,issuerCertificate:e.issuerCertificate,...e.at===void 0?{}:{at:e.at},...e.clockSkewMs===void 0?{}:{clockSkewMs:e.clockSkewMs}});if(!n.ok)return R(n.code,n.message);let r;if(e.deltaCrl!==void 0){let t=await F({crl:e.deltaCrl,issuerCertificate:e.issuerCertificate,...e.at===void 0?{}:{at:e.at},...e.clockSkewMs===void 0?{}:{clockSkewMs:e.clockSkewMs}});if(!t.ok)return R(t.code,t.message);let i=be(n.value,t.value);if(i!==void 0)return i;r=t.value}let i=V(t,n.value);if(i!==void 0)return i;if(r!==void 0){let e=V(t,r,!0);if(e!==void 0)return e}let a=B(t,n.value);if(!a.ok)return a;let o;if(r!==void 0){let e=B(t,r);if(!e.ok)return e;o=e.entry}return Ce(t,e.at??new Date,n.value,a.entry,o)}function I(e,t){return{ok:!1,error:{ok:!1,code:e,message:t},code:e,message:t}}function L(e,t){return{ok:!1,error:{ok:!1,code:e,message:t},code:e,message:t}}function R(e,t,n){return{ok:!1,error:{ok:!1,code:e,message:t,...n===void 0?{}:{details:n}},code:e,message:t,...n===void 0?{}:{details:n}}}function z(e){return{ok:!0,value:e}}function ye(e,t){let n=typeof e==`string`?Z(e):S(e);return t.revokedCertificates.some(e=>Z(e.serialNumberHex)===n)}function B(e,t){let n=Z(e.serialNumberHex),r,i=!1,a;for(let o of t.revokedCertificates){if(o.certificateIssuer!==void 0&&(r=o.certificateIssuer),Z(o.serialNumberHex)!==n)continue;let s=Se(e,t,r);if(s===`match`){if(a!==void 0)return R(`signature_invalid`,`CRL contains multiple revoked entries for certificate`);a=o;continue}s===`unsupported`&&(i=!0)}return a===void 0?i?H(`indirect_crl_unsupported`,`indirect CRL entry certificateIssuer must include a directoryName`):{ok:!0}:{ok:!0,entry:a}}function V(e,t,n=!1){if(!n&&t.baseCrlNumber!==void 0)return H(`delta_crl_unsupported`,`a delta CRL cannot be used as the primary complete CRL input`);let r=t.issuingDistributionPoint,i=r?.indirectCrl===!0;if(!i&&!M(e.issuer,t.issuer))return H(`issuer_mismatch`,`CRL issuer does not match certificate issuer for direct CRL processing`);if(r?.onlyContainsAttributeCerts===!0)return H(`certificate_scope_mismatch`,`attribute-certificate-only CRLs are not applicable to public-key certificates`);let a=e.basicConstraints?.ca===!0;if(r?.onlyContainsUserCerts===!0&&a)return H(`certificate_scope_mismatch`,`CRL only applies to end-entity certificates`);if(r?.onlyContainsCACerts===!0&&!a)return H(`certificate_scope_mismatch`,`CRL only applies to CA certificates`);let o=e.crlDistributionPoints??[];if(o.length===0)return r?.distributionPoint===void 0?i&&!M(e.issuer,t.issuer)?H(`issuer_mismatch`,`indirect CRLs for alternate certificate issuers require matching CRLIssuer distribution points`):void 0:H(`distribution_point_mismatch`,`certificates without CRL distribution points only accept full-scope CRLs`);let s=!1,c=!1,l=!1,u=!1,d=!1;for(let n of o){if(!i&&n.crlIssuer!==void 0){s=!0;continue}if(i&&(!M(e.issuer,t.issuer)||n.crlIssuer!==void 0)){let e=xe(n.crlIssuer,t);if(e===`unsupported`){u=!0;continue}if(!e){l=!0;continue}}if(!we(n.distributionPoint,r?.distributionPoint,t.issuer)){c=!0;continue}if(!Ae(n.reasons,r?.onlySomeReasons)){d=!0;continue}return}return d?H(`reasons_mismatch`,`certificate distribution point reasons do not overlap the CRL reason scope`):u?H(`indirect_crl_unsupported`,`indirect CRL distribution points must identify the CRL issuer with directoryName`):l?H(`issuer_mismatch`,`certificate distribution points do not authorize this indirect CRL issuer`):c?H(`distribution_point_mismatch`,`certificate distribution points do not match the CRL issuing distribution point`):s?H(`indirect_crl_unsupported`,`certificate distribution points that name alternate CRL issuers are not supported yet`):H(`distribution_point_mismatch`,`certificate distribution points do not match the CRL scope`)}function be(e,t){if(e.baseCrlNumber!==void 0)return H(`delta_crl_incompatible`,`complete CRL input must not itself be a delta CRL`);if(t.baseCrlNumber===void 0)return H(`delta_crl_incompatible`,`delta CRL input must include a delta CRL indicator`);if(!M(e.issuer,t.issuer))return H(`delta_crl_incompatible`,`complete and delta CRLs must share the same issuer`);if(e.authorityKeyIdentifier!==t.authorityKeyIdentifier)return H(`delta_crl_incompatible`,`complete and delta CRLs must share the same authority key identifier`);if(!Ee(e.issuingDistributionPoint,t.issuingDistributionPoint))return H(`delta_crl_incompatible`,`complete and delta CRLs must share the same issuing distribution point scope`);if(e.crlNumber===void 0||t.crlNumber===void 0)return H(`delta_crl_incompatible`,`complete and delta CRLs must both carry CRL numbers for delta processing`);if(e.crlNumber<t.baseCrlNumber)return H(`delta_crl_incompatible`,`delta CRL base number must not exceed the complete CRL 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t=m(e,r);if(t.length===0)throw Error(`distributionPointName fullName must not be empty`);for(let e of t)if((e.tag&192)!=128)throw Error(`distributionPointName fullName must contain GeneralName entries`);return{fullName:t.map(e=>ze(e))}}if(r.tag===161)return{relativeName:Be(e,r)};throw Error(`Unsupported distributionPointName tag: ${String(r.tag)}`)}function Re(e,t){if(t.tag!==48)throw Error(`DistributionPoint must use SEQUENCE`);let n,r,i;for(let a of m(e,t))if(a.tag===160){if(n!==void 0)throw Error(`DistributionPoint distributionPoint must not repeat`);let t=K(e,a);t!==void 0&&(n=t)}else if(a.tag===129){if(r!==void 0)throw Error(`DistributionPoint reasons must not repeat`);r=O(a.value)}else if(a.tag===162){if(i!==void 0)throw Error(`DistributionPoint crlIssuer must not repeat`);i=q(e,a)}else throw Error(`Unsupported DistributionPoint field tag: ${String(a.tag)}`);if(n===void 0&&i===void 0)throw Error(`DistributionPoint must include distributionPoint or crlIssuer`);return{...n===void 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5:return`cessationOfOperation`;case 6:return`certificateHold`;case 8:return`removeFromCRL`;case 9:return`privilegeWithdrawn`;case 10:return`aACompromise`}}function Qe(e){return j(e)}function $e(e){return j(e)}function et(e){if(typeof e==`string`)return P(e);if(e instanceof Uint8Array)return N(new Uint8Array(e));if(rt(e))return N(new Uint8Array(e.der));throw Error(`certificate revocation list input is malformed`)}function tt(e){let t=m(e,l(e,{maxDepth:64})),n=0,r=1,i=t[n];if(i!==void 0&&i.tag!==2&&i.tag!==48)throw Error(`version must use INTEGER`);if(i?.tag===2){let e=x(t[n],`version`);if(e.tag!==2)throw Error(`version must use INTEGER`);if(r=h(e.value)+1,r!==2)throw Error(`Unsupported CRL version: ${String(r)}`);n+=1}n+=1;let a=x(t[n],`issuer`),o=x(t[n+1],`thisUpdate`),s=n+2,d=t[s],f=d!==void 0&&(d.tag===23||d.tag===24)?b(d):void 0;f!==void 0&&(s+=1);let p=[],_=t[s];_?.tag===48&&(p=m(e,_).map(t=>{let n=e.slice(t.start-t.headerLength,t.end),i=u(n),a=x(i[0],`revoked serialNumber`);if(a.tag!==2)throw Error(`revoked serialNumber must use INTEGER`);let o=i[2];if(o!==void 0&&r!==2)throw Error(`revoked certificate extensions require CRL version 2`);let s=Fe(n,o);return{serialNumberHex:S(a.value),revocationDate:b(x(i[1],`revocationDate`)),...s.reasonCode===void 0?{}:{reasonCode:s.reasonCode},...s.invalidityDate===void 0?{}:{invalidityDate:s.invalidityDate},...s.certificateIssuer===void 0?{}:{certificateIssuer:s.certificateIssuer}}}),s+=1);let v,y,w,T,E,D=t[s];if(D?.tag===160){if(r!==2)throw Error(`CRL extensions require version 2`);let t=new Set,n=x(m(e,D)[0],`crl extensions`);for(let r of m(e,n)){let n=m(e,r);if(n.length<2||n.length>3||n.length===3&&n[1]?.tag!==1)throw Error(`Malformed CRL extension`);let i=g(x(n[0],`extension OID`).value);if(t.has(i))throw Error(`Duplicate CRL extension OID: ${i}`);t.add(i);let a=n.length===3?ee(x(n[1],`extension critical`).value):!1,o=x(n[n.length-1],`extension value`);if(o.tag!==4)throw Error(`CRL extension value must use OCTET STRING`);if(i!==C.authorityKeyIdentifier&&i!==C.cRLNumber&&i!==C.deltaCRLIndicator&&i!==C.issuingDistributionPoint&&i!==C.freshestCRL&&a)throw Error(`Unsupported critical CRL extension OID: ${i}`);i===C.authorityKeyIdentifier&&(v=Je(o.value)),i===C.cRLNumber&&(y=h(c(o.value).value)),i===C.deltaCRLIndicator&&(w=h(c(o.value).value)),i===C.issuingDistributionPoint&&(T=Ie(o.value)),i===C.freshestCRL&&(E=Le(o.value))}}return{version:r,issuer:Ke(e,a),thisUpdate:b(o),...f===void 0?{}:{nextUpdate:f},...v===void 0?{}:{authorityKeyIdentifier:v},...y===void 0?{}:{crlNumber:y},...w===void 0?{}:{baseCrlNumber:w},...T===void 0?{}:{issuingDistributionPoint:T},...E===void 0?{}:{freshestCrlDistributionPoints:E},revokedCertificates:p}}function Q(e){return nt(e)?le(new Uint8Array(e.der)):j(e)}function nt(e){return typeof e!=`string`&&`subjectPublicKeyInfoDer`in e}function rt(e){return`der`in e&&e.der instanceof Uint8Array}const $=new TextDecoder;export{ve as checkCertificateRevocationAgainstCrl,ge as createCertificateRevocationList,ye as isCertificateRevoked,N as parseCertificateRevocationListDer,P as parseCertificateRevocationListPem,F as validateCertificateRevocationList,_e as verifyCertificateRevocationList};
+//# sourceMappingURL=crl.js.map