mcp-pacemaker 2.0.1

package/bin/mcp-bridge.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,2162 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+/**
+ * mcp-bridge.mjs — zero-dependency stdio/HTTP MCP bridge with pluggable auth.
+ * Part of mcp-pacemaker. MIT.
+ *
+ * WHY
+ *   Editor clients (VS Code, Cursor, Claude Desktop) spawn stdio MCP servers as children
+ *   of their extension host. When the host restarts or crashes, every stdio server dies at
+ *   once. This bridge runs the servers as children of a long-lived process and exposes each
+ *   over the MCP HTTP+SSE transport, so the client simply RECONNECTS after a host restart —
+ *   the servers keep running.
+ *
+ * ZERO DEPENDENCIES
+ *   Node built-ins only. Nothing is pulled from a package registry at runtime.
+ *
+ * AUTH (per http server)
+ *   "auth": { "type": "command", "command": "<cli that prints a token>", "refreshMinutes": 50 }
+ *   "auth": { "type": "env", "var": "MY_TOKEN" }
+ *   "auth": { "type": "static", "header": "Authorization", "value": "Bearer ..." }
+ *   "auth": { "type": "none" }
+ *   Back-compat: a bare "audience": "<res>" is treated as an `az account get-access-token` command.
+ *
+ * USAGE
+ *   node mcp-bridge.mjs [--port 8791] [--host 127.0.0.1] [--config servers.json] [--cwd <dir>]
+ */
+import http from 'node:http';
+import https from 'node:https';
+import { spawn, exec, execFile, execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
+import { createHash, randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
+import { readFileSync, existsSync, writeFileSync, appendFileSync, statSync, renameSync, watch } from 'node:fs';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+import { dirname, resolve, extname } from 'node:path';
+import { homedir } from 'node:os';
+import { createInterface } from 'node:readline';
+import { checkServerPaths, checkReservedName } from './config-checks.mjs';
+import { ServerMetrics } from './server-metrics.mjs';
+import { MAX_MIN_WARM, hasPoolingTransaction, recoverPoolingConfig } from './pooling-config.mjs';
+import { PoolingBatches } from './pooling-batches.mjs';
+import { POOLING_BUDGET_MS } from './pooling-execution.mjs';
+import { poolingTrace } from './pooling-trace.mjs';
+import { SharedSessionManager, SHARED_DEFAULTS } from './shared-sessions.mjs';
+
+const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
+const argv = process.argv.slice(2);
+const getArg = (name, def) => {
+  const i = argv.indexOf(name);
+  return i >= 0 && argv[i + 1] ? argv[i + 1] : def;
+};
+
+const HOME = resolve(homedir(), '.mcp-pacemaker');
+const localConfig = resolve(process.cwd(), 'servers.json');
+const defaultConfig = existsSync(localConfig) || hasPoolingTransaction(localConfig)
+  ? resolve(process.cwd(), 'servers.json')
+  : resolve(HOME, 'servers.json');
+const CONFIG = resolve(process.cwd(), getArg('--config', defaultConfig));
+const PORT = parseInt(getArg('--port', '8791'), 10);
+const HOST = getArg('--host', '127.0.0.1');
+const VERSION = (() => { try { return JSON.parse(readFileSync(resolve(__dirname, '..', 'package.json'), 'utf8')).version; } catch { return '0'; } })();
+// Base working directory for relative server commands/args. Defaults to the config's folder.
+const BASE_CWD = resolve(getArg('--cwd', dirname(CONFIG)));
+
+/** @type {Record<string, any>} */
+if (hasPoolingTransaction(CONFIG)) recoverPoolingConfig(CONFIG);
+const servers = JSON.parse(readFileSync(CONFIG, 'utf8'));
+const poolingConfig = new PoolingBatches({
+  configPath: CONFIG,
+  reload: reloadConfig,
+  revision: () => createHash('sha256').update(lastConfigText ?? '').digest('hex'),
+  notify: publishSnapshot,
+  captureSnapshot: richSnapshot,
+  onError: (error) => log(`pooling reload failed (${error.code || 'IO_ERROR'}); reread batch status`),
+});
+
+/* ----------------------------- dashboard backbone --------------------------- */
+const startedAt = Date.now();
+const instanceId = randomUUID();
+let snapshotVersion = 0;
+const serverMetrics = new ServerMetrics();
+const ADMIN_NONCE = randomUUID();
+const NONCE_FILE = resolve(dirname(CONFIG), 'admin.nonce');
+const logBuffer = [];
+const logClients = new Set();
+const snapClients = new Set();
+const stats = new Map(); // name -> see stat()
+const stat = (name) => {
+  let s = stats.get(name);
+  if (!s) { s = { requests: 0, lastError: null, lastErrorAt: 0, lastActivity: 0, lastSuccess: 0, consecutiveFailures: 0, lastProbe: 0 }; stats.set(name, s); }
+  return s;
+};
+
+/* ------------------------------- server health ------------------------------ */
+// `lastError` alone is not a health signal: it is sticky, so a server that failed once last week
+// looks identical to one that is failing right now, and one that recovered still shows the old
+// error. A server 401ing on every call sat that way for hours here while the dashboard showed
+// nothing wrong. Health is therefore a running verdict — did the last attempt work, and how many
+// in a row have not — rather than a string that only ever accumulates.
+function noteSuccess(name) {
+  const s = stat(name);
+  if (s.consecutiveFailures > 0) log(`[${name}] recovered after ${s.consecutiveFailures} consecutive failure(s)`);
+  s.consecutiveFailures = 0;
+  s.lastSuccess = Date.now();
+  s.lastError = null;
+}
+
+function noteFailure(name, detail) {
+  const s = stat(name);
+  if (s.consecutiveFailures === 0) log(`[${name}] now failing: ${detail}`);
+  s.consecutiveFailures++;
+  s.lastError = detail;
+  s.lastErrorAt = Date.now();
+}
+
+// 'unknown' is deliberately distinct from 'ok'. Reporting a server nobody has called as healthy
+// is the exact lie this feature exists to stop.
+function healthOf(name) {
+  const s = stat(name);
+  const state = s.consecutiveFailures > 0 ? 'failing' : (s.lastSuccess ? 'ok' : 'unknown');
+  return {
+    state,
+    consecutiveFailures: s.consecutiveFailures,
+    lastSuccessSec: s.lastSuccess ? Math.round((Date.now() - s.lastSuccess) / 1000) : null,
+    lastErrorSec: s.lastErrorAt ? Math.round((Date.now() - s.lastErrorAt) / 1000) : null,
+  };
+}
+
+// A durable log next to the config. The in-memory buffer is all the dashboard and `/api/logs`
+// have, and a single chatty client fills it in minutes — on a real setup a client polling every
+// 30s left roughly two minutes of history, which is useless for diagnosing something that
+// happened overnight. stderr alone does not help either: the supervisor starts the bridge
+// without redirecting it, and on Windows that output goes nowhere. So write here too, and roll
+// the file at a fixed size so it cannot grow without bound.
+const LOG_FILE = resolve(dirname(CONFIG), 'bridge.log');
+const LOG_MAX_BYTES = parseInt(process.env.MCP_LOG_MAX_BYTES || String(5 * 1024 * 1024), 10);
+let logBytes = -1; // -1 until the existing file has been measured once
+function appendLog(line) {
+  if (LOG_MAX_BYTES <= 0) return;
+  try {
+    if (logBytes < 0) logBytes = existsSync(LOG_FILE) ? statSync(LOG_FILE).size : 0;
+    if (logBytes >= LOG_MAX_BYTES) {
+      renameSync(LOG_FILE, LOG_FILE + '.1'); // keep one previous file, overwriting any older one
+      logBytes = 0;
+    }
+    const buf = line + '\n';
+    appendFileSync(LOG_FILE, buf);
+    logBytes += Buffer.byteLength(buf);
+  } catch { /* logging must never take the bridge down */ }
+}
+
+const log = (m) => {
+  const line = `[mcp-bridge] ${new Date().toISOString()} ${m}`;
+  process.stderr.write(line + '\n');
+  appendLog(line);
+  logBuffer.push(line); if (logBuffer.length > 500) logBuffer.shift();
+  for (const c of logClients) { try { c.write(`data: ${JSON.stringify(line)}\n\n`); } catch { /* gone */ } }
+};
+
+// Token expiry (seconds) for an http server's cached command/az token, if any — for the dashboard.
+//
+// A bare `audience` is shorthand for an Azure CLI token command. It is expanded in exactly one
+// place because the expanded string is also the token cache key: two copies that drift would
+// mint under one key and look it up under another, quietly disabling the cache.
+const azTokenCommand = (audience) =>
+  `az account get-access-token --resource ${audience} --query accessToken -o tsv`;
+function normalizedAuth(def) {
+  if (def.auth) return def.auth;
+  if (def.audience) return { type: 'command', command: azTokenCommand(def.audience), refreshMinutes: 50 };
+  return null;
+}
+function authCacheKey(def) {
+  const auth = normalizedAuth(def);
+  return auth && auth.type === 'command' ? auth.command : null;
+}
+function tokenExpiryFor(def) {
+  const key = authCacheKey(def);
+  if (!key) return null;
+  const c = tokenCache.get(key);
+  return c ? Math.max(0, Math.round((c.exp - Date.now()) / 1000)) : null;
+}
+
+// Rich per-server snapshot for the dashboard (/api/status, /api/events).
+function richSnapshot() {
+  const byName = {};
+  for (const name of Object.keys(servers)) {
+    const def = servers[name];
+    const st = stat(name);
+    byName[name] = { name, type: def.type === 'http' ? 'http' : 'stdio', sessions: 0, cappedSessions: 0, pids: [], clients: [], sharing: def.sharing || 'isolated', warm: (warmPool.get(name) || []).length, minWarm: poolTarget(name), recycleMinutes: recycleMinutesFor(name) || null, maxSessions: (def.maxSessions ?? MAX_SESSIONS_PER_SERVER) || null, requests: st.requests, lastError: st.lastError, lastActivitySec: st.lastActivity ? Math.round((Date.now() - st.lastActivity) / 1000) : null, health: healthOf(name), spawn: spawnStats(name), peakConcurrency: peakConcurrency(name), advice: poolAdvice(name) };
+    byName[name].prewarming = prewarmingState(name);
+    byName[name].shared = sharedManager.inspect(name);
+    if (byName[name].shared?.pid) byName[name].pids.push(byName[name].shared.pid);
+    byName[name].startingSessions = startingSessions.get(name) || 0;
+    byName[name].cappedSessions += byName[name].startingSessions;
+    if (def.type === 'http') { byName[name].url = def.url; byName[name].tokenExpiresIn = tokenExpiryFor(def); }
+  }
+  // `sessions` sums both transports for display, but `maxSessions` only governs the streamable
+  // pool — so a classic SSE session made the card read "33/32" as though the cap had been
+  // breached. Report the number the cap actually counts alongside it.
+  for (const s of sessions.values()) { const b = byName[s.name]; if (b) { b.sessions++; if (s.child?.pid) b.pids.push(s.child.pid); } }
+  for (const s of httpSessions.values()) { const b = byName[s.name]; if (b) { b.sessions++; b.cappedSessions++; if (s.child?.pid && !b.pids.includes(s.child.pid)) b.pids.push(s.child.pid); if (s.clientInfo && s.clientInfo.name && !b.clients.includes(s.clientInfo.name)) b.clients.push(s.clientInfo.name); } }
+  const prewarm = {
+    revision: createHash('sha256').update(lastConfigText ?? '').digest('hex'),
+    maxWarm: MAX_MIN_WARM, ...poolingConfig.snapshot(),
+  };
+  snapshotVersion++;
+  return { ok: true, service: 'mcp-pacemaker', version: VERSION, port: PORT, instanceId, snapshotVersion, startedAt: new Date(startedAt).toISOString(), prewarm, uptimeSec: Math.round((Date.now() - startedAt) / 1000), sessions: sessions.size + httpSessions.size, restart: restartStatus(), servers: Object.values(byName) };
+}
+
+function publishSnapshot() {
+  if (!snapClients.size) return;
+  const frame = `data: ${JSON.stringify(richSnapshot())}\n\n`;
+  for (const client of snapClients) {
+    try { client.write(frame); } catch { /* disconnected */ }
+  }
+}
+
+function prewarmingState(name) {
+  const def = servers[name];
+  let reason;
+  if (def.type === 'http' ||
+      !def.command ||
+      def.url) {
+    reason = 'HTTP proxies have no local child to pre-warm.';
+  } else if (def.sharing === 'shared') {
+    reason = 'Shared mode reuses initialized children; switch to isolated mode before enabling a warm pool.';
+  }
+  const desired = poolAdvice(name)?.suggest.minWarm ?? poolTarget(name) ?? 1;
+  return {
+    eligible: !reason,
+    reason,
+    suggestedMinWarm: Math.max(1, Math.min(MAX_MIN_WARM, desired || 1)),
+    configuredMinWarm: def.minWarm ?? null,
+  };
+}
+
+// After a restart, a client whose session the bridge is holding open for it but which has not
+// come back is very likely wedged: some clients treat one connection failure as permanent and
+// never retry, so the user has to reload them by hand. The bridge cannot fix that from here,
+// but it can stop the user having to guess.
+const RESTART_NOTICE_MS = 30 * 60_000;
+// How far back a resume record still implies a live client. The resume file keeps a day of
+// records, most of which belong to sessions that ended normally long before the restart.
+const STALE_CLIENT_WINDOW_MS = 30 * 60_000;
+function restartStatus() {
+  const sinceSec = Math.round((Date.now() - startedAt) / 1000);
+  if (sinceSec * 1000 > RESTART_NOTICE_MS) return null;
+  let stale = 0;
+  for (const [id, r] of resumable) {
+    // A client that was live when the bridge went down: recorded before this process started,
+    // not seen since, and enough time has passed that an active one would have come back.
+    // Bounded to recently-active records, because the resume file holds a day of churn — one
+    // polling client here left hundreds of dead ids, and counting all of them reported 326
+    // stale clients where there were three.
+    const recordedBeforeRestart = (r.at || 0) < startedAt;
+    const activeNearTheRestart = (r.at || 0) > startedAt - STALE_CLIENT_WINDOW_MS;
+    const hasNotComeBack = !httpSessions.has(id);
+    const longEnoughToJudge = Date.now() - startedAt > 120_000;
+    if (recordedBeforeRestart &&
+        activeNearTheRestart &&
+        hasNotComeBack &&
+        longEnoughToJudge) {
+      stale++;
+    }
+  }
+  return { sinceSec, resumable: resumable.size, staleClients: stale };
+}
+
+// Health checks for the dashboard Health page (fast, no network).
+function runDoctor() {
+  const checks = [];
+  const major = parseInt(process.versions.node.split('.')[0], 10);
+  checks.push({ name: 'Node.js', status: major >= 20 ? 'ok' : 'bad', detail: process.versions.node });
+  const names = Object.keys(servers);
+  checks.push({ name: 'config', status: names.length ? 'ok' : 'warn', detail: `${names.length} server(s)` });
+  for (const n of names) {
+    const d = servers[n];
+    const reserved = checkReservedName(n);
+    if (reserved) { checks.push(reserved); continue; }
+    if (!d.command && !d.url) { checks.push({ name: n, status: 'bad', detail: 'missing command/url' }); continue; }
+    if (d.type === 'http' && !d.auth && !d.audience && !d.headers) { checks.push({ name: n, status: 'warn', detail: 'http server with no auth' }); continue; }
+    const pathCheck = checkServerPaths(n, d, BASE_CWD);
+    if (pathCheck) { checks.push(pathCheck); continue; }
+    const h = healthOf(n);
+    if (h.state === 'failing') { checks.push({ name: n, status: 'bad', detail: `failing — ${h.consecutiveFailures} in a row: ${stat(n).lastError}` }); continue; }
+    checks.push({ name: n, status: 'ok', detail: d.type === 'http' ? `http ${d.url}` : `stdio ${d.command}` });
+  }
+  checks.push({ name: 'admin nonce', status: existsSync(NONCE_FILE) ? 'ok' : 'warn', detail: NONCE_FILE });
+  return { ran: new Date().toISOString(), checks };
+}
+
+function handleApi(sub, req, res) {
+  if (sub === 'status') { res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }); res.end(JSON.stringify(richSnapshot())); return; }
+  if (sub === 'doctor') { res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }); res.end(JSON.stringify(runDoctor())); return; }
+  if (sub === 'events') {
+    res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/event-stream', 'Cache-Control': 'no-cache, no-transform', Connection: 'keep-alive' });
+    res.write(`data: ${JSON.stringify(richSnapshot())}\n\n`);
+    snapClients.add(res);
+    req.on('close', () => snapClients.delete(res));
+    return;
+  }
+  if (sub === 'logs') {
+    res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/event-stream', 'Cache-Control': 'no-cache, no-transform', Connection: 'keep-alive' });
+    for (const line of logBuffer.slice(-100)) res.write(`data: ${JSON.stringify(line)}\n\n`);
+    logClients.add(res);
+    req.on('close', () => logClients.delete(res));
+    return;
+  }
+  res.writeHead(404).end('unknown api');
+}
+
+// Loopback + nonce guarded control surface. The nonce is written to admin.nonce next to the
+// config, so only same-box tooling (the CLI, the served dashboard) can read it.
+function handleAdmin(url, req, res) {
+  const host = (req.headers.host || '').split(':')[0];
+  if (host !== '127.0.0.1' && host !== 'localhost') { res.writeHead(403).end('forbidden'); return; }
+  if (req.headers['x-mcp-nonce'] !== ADMIN_NONCE) { res.writeHead(401).end('bad nonce'); return; }
+  const parts = url.pathname.split('/').filter(Boolean); // ['admin','recycle'|'reload', <name>?]
+  if (req.method === 'POST' &&
+      parts.length === 4 &&
+      parts[1] === 'servers' &&
+      parts[3] === 'pooling') {
+    handlePoolingChange(parts[2], req, res);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (req.method === 'POST' && parts[1] === 'reload') {
+    poolingConfig.reloadNow().then((result) => {
+      if (res.destroyed) return;
+      res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+      res.end(JSON.stringify({ ...result, snapshot: richSnapshot() }));
+    }).catch((error) => {
+      if (res.destroyed) return;
+      res.writeHead(error.statusCode ?? 500, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+      res.end(JSON.stringify({
+        ok: false, error: error.statusCode ? error.message : 'Unable to reload the saved config.',
+        code: error.statusCode ? error.code : 'RELOAD_FAILED',
+        ...(error.commitState ? { commitState: error.commitState } : {}),
+        snapshot: richSnapshot(),
+      }));
+    });
+    return;
+  }
+  if (req.method === 'POST' && parts[1] === 'recycle') {
+    const target = parts[2];
+    const killed = recycleServer(target);
+    log(`admin: recycled ${killed} session(s)${target ? ` for ${target}` : ''}`);
+    res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }); res.end(JSON.stringify({ ok: true, recycled: killed }));
+    return;
+  }
+  res.writeHead(404).end('unknown admin action');
+}
+
+function handlePoolingChange(encodedName, req, res) {
+  let trace;
+  const reply = (status, body) => {
+    if (res.destroyed ||
+        res.writableEnded) return;
+    trace?.record('response', { status });
+    res.writeHead(status, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+    res.end(JSON.stringify(body));
+  };
+  if (shuttingDown) {
+    reply(503, { error: 'Bridge is shutting down.' });
+    req.resume();
+    return;
+  }
+  const origin = req.headers.origin;
+  if (origin &&
+      origin !== `http://${req.headers.host}`) {
+    reply(403, { error: 'Pooling changes require the dashboard origin.' });
+    req.resume();
+    return;
+  }
+  if (req.headers['x-mcp-pooling-batch'] !== '1') {
+    reply(409, { error: 'Reload the dashboard or update the CLI before changing pooling settings.' });
+    req.resume();
+    return;
+  }
+  const chunks = [];
+  let bytes = 0;
+  let rejected = false;
+  const controller = new AbortController();
+  const execution = {
+    signal: controller.signal,
+    deadline: process.hrtime.bigint() + BigInt(POOLING_BUDGET_MS) * 1000000n,
+  };
+  trace = poolingTrace.operation(execution.deadline);
+  execution.trace = trace;
+  trace?.record('request-start');
+  const bodyTimer = setTimeout(() => {
+    rejected = true;
+    chunks.length = 0;
+    controller.abort();
+    reply(408, { error: 'Pooling request body deadline exceeded. No change was submitted.' });
+  }, POOLING_BUDGET_MS);
+  res.on('close', () => {
+    clearTimeout(bodyTimer);
+    if (!res.writableFinished) controller.abort();
+  });
+  req.on('error', () => {
+    clearTimeout(bodyTimer);
+    controller.abort();
+    rejected = true;
+    chunks.length = 0;
+    log('pooling request interrupted before completion');
+  });
+  req.on('data', (chunk) => {
+    if (rejected) return;
+    bytes += chunk.length;
+    if (bytes > 4096) {
+      rejected = true;
+      chunks.length = 0;
+      reply(413, { error: 'Pooling request exceeds 4096 bytes.' });
+      return;
+    }
+    chunks.push(chunk);
+  });
+  req.on('end', async () => {
+    trace?.record('body-end', { bytes });
+    clearTimeout(bodyTimer);
+    if (rejected) return;
+    let body;
+    let name;
+    try {
+      body = JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8'));
+      name = decodeURIComponent(encodedName);
+    } catch {
+      reply(400, { error: 'Invalid JSON or server name.' });
+      return;
+    }
+    if (!body ||
+        typeof body !== 'object' ||
+        Array.isArray(body) ||
+        Object.hasOwn(body, 'name')) {
+      reply(400, { error: 'A pooling request object is required; the route selects the server.' });
+      return;
+    }
+    try {
+      const result = await poolingConfig.stage({ ...body, name }, execution);
+      log(`[${name}] pooling ${result.pending ? 'batch staged' : result.cancelled ? 'batch cancelled' : 'unchanged'}`);
+      reply(result.pending ? 202 : 200, result);
+    } catch (error) {
+      const status = Number.isInteger(error.statusCode) ? error.statusCode : 500;
+      log(`pooling action rejected (${error.code || 'IO_ERROR'})`);
+      reply(status, {
+        error: error.statusCode ? error.message : 'Unable to stage pooling settings.',
+        ...(error.commitState ? { commitState: error.commitState } : {}),
+      });
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------ static dashboard ---------------------------- */
+const UI_DIR = resolve(__dirname, '..', 'ui', 'dist');
+const UI_MIME = { '.html': 'text/html; charset=utf-8', '.js': 'text/javascript; charset=utf-8', '.css': 'text/css; charset=utf-8', '.json': 'application/json', '.svg': 'image/svg+xml', '.ico': 'image/x-icon', '.png': 'image/png', '.woff2': 'font/woff2', '.map': 'application/json' };
+function handleUi(pathname, res) {
+  let rel = pathname.replace(/^\/ui\/?/, '');
+  if (rel === '') rel = 'index.html';
+  let file = resolve(UI_DIR, rel);
+  // path-traversal guard + SPA fallback to index.html
+  if (!file.startsWith(UI_DIR) || !existsSync(file)) file = resolve(UI_DIR, 'index.html');
+  if (!existsSync(file)) { res.writeHead(404).end('dashboard not built (run: npm --prefix ui run build)'); return; }
+  const ext = extname(file);
+  if (ext === '.html') { res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': UI_MIME['.html'] }); res.end(readFileSync(file, 'utf8').replace('__MCP_NONCE__', ADMIN_NONCE)); return; }
+  res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': UI_MIME[ext] ?? 'application/octet-stream' });
+  res.end(readFileSync(file));
+}
+
+// Push snapshots to /api/events subscribers on an interval.
+setInterval(publishSnapshot, 2000).unref();
+
+/* ------------------------------ pluggable auth ------------------------------ */
+const tokenCache = new Map(); // key -> { value, exp }
+// key -> in-flight mint promise. On startup every server asks for its token at once; without
+// this, each one spawns its own `az` and the concurrent calls are what make az exit 0 with no
+// output. One mint per key, shared by all waiters.
+const tokenInFlight = new Map();
+
+// exec (not execFile with an explicit shell) so the command line is passed to the shell
+// verbatim. Building `cmd /c <command>` by hand re-escapes any embedded quotes, which breaks
+// every auth command that quotes an argument — a path containing spaces, for instance.
+function runCommand(cmd) {
+  return new Promise((res, rej) => {
+    exec(cmd, { maxBuffer: 8 * 1024 * 1024, windowsHide: true },
+      (err, stdout) => (err ? rej(err) : res(stdout.toString().trim())));
+  });
+}
+
+// How long a minted credential can be trusted.
+//
+// `refreshMinutes` is only a fallback. An auth command usually returns a JWT, and the command
+// often serves it from the provider's OWN cache — `az account get-access-token` hands back a
+// token it minted earlier, which may be most of the way through its life already. Caching that
+// for a fixed window serves an expired credential until the window is up, and every request in
+// between comes back 401 while the bridge reports a healthy token.
+//
+// So prefer the token's own `exp` claim when there is one. The payload is only read, never
+// trusted for authorization, so parsing it unverified is safe here: the upstream is what
+// validates the signature. Anything unparseable (an opaque token, an API key) falls back to
+// `refreshMinutes`. A safety margin covers clock skew and the request still in flight.
+const TOKEN_EXPIRY_MARGIN_MS = 60_000;
+function tokenLifetimeMs(value, fallbackMs) {
+  const parts = String(value).split('.');
+  if (parts.length !== 3) return fallbackMs; // not a JWT
+  try {
+    const pad = '='.repeat((4 - (parts[1].length % 4)) % 4);
+    const payload = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(parts[1].replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/') + pad, 'base64').toString('utf8'));
+    if (typeof payload.exp !== 'number') return fallbackMs;
+    const remaining = payload.exp * 1000 - Date.now() - TOKEN_EXPIRY_MARGIN_MS;
+    // A token already at or past its expiry is still returned to the caller — the upstream is
+    // the authority on that — but it must not be cached.
+    return remaining > 0 ? Math.min(remaining, fallbackMs) : 0;
+  } catch { return fallbackMs; }
+}
+
+// Drop a server's cached credential so the next request mints a fresh one. Used when the
+// upstream rejects it: continuing to serve a credential known to be refused just repeats the
+// failure for the rest of its cache window.
+function invalidateToken(def) {
+  const key = authCacheKey(def);
+  if (key) tokenCache.delete(key);
+}
+
+// Normalize a server's auth config into { header, getValue() } or null.
+function resolveAuth(def) {
+  const auth = normalizedAuth(def);
+  if (!auth || auth.type === 'none') return null;
+
+  const header = auth.header || 'Authorization';
+  const prefix = auth.prefix != null ? auth.prefix : (header.toLowerCase() === 'authorization' ? 'Bearer ' : '');
+
+  if (auth.type === 'static') return { header, getValue: async () => prefix + (auth.value ?? '') };
+  if (auth.type === 'env') {
+    return { header, getValue: async () => {
+      const v = process.env[auth.var];
+      if (!v) throw new Error(`env var ${auth.var} is not set`);
+      return prefix + v;
+    } };
+  }
+  if (auth.type === 'command') {
+    const key = auth.command;
+    const ttl = (auth.refreshMinutes ?? 50) * 60 * 1000;
+    return { header, getValue: async () => {
+      const c = tokenCache.get(key);
+      if (c && c.exp > Date.now()) return prefix + c.value;
+      const pending = tokenInFlight.get(key);
+      if (pending) return prefix + (await pending);
+      const mint = (async () => {
+        const value = await runCommand(auth.command);
+        // An auth command can exit 0 and print nothing. Caching that would serve an empty
+        // credential for the whole TTL, so every upstream request 401s until it expires.
+        if (!value) throw new Error(`auth command returned an empty value: ${auth.command}`);
+        const life = tokenLifetimeMs(value, ttl);
+        if (life > 0) tokenCache.set(key, { value, exp: Date.now() + life });
+        else tokenCache.delete(key); // already expired on arrival — re-mint next time
+        return value;
+      })();
+      const tracked = mint.finally(() => tokenInFlight.delete(key));
+      tokenInFlight.set(key, tracked);
+      return prefix + (await tracked);
+    } };
+  }
+  throw new Error(`unknown auth.type "${auth.type}"`);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------- stdio servers (HTTP+SSE transport) ------------------ */
+const sessions = new Map(); // sessionId -> { child, res, name }
+
+// Quote one argument for a Windows `cmd /d /s /c` line using MSVCRT / CommandLineToArgvW
+// rules, wrapping in double quotes to also neutralize cmd metacharacters. (`%` and `!` can't
+// be escaped inside `cmd /c`; server commands come from the user's own trusted config.)
+function quoteWinArg(s) {
+  s = String(s);
+  if (s !== '' && !/[\s"&|<>()^%!]/.test(s)) return s;
+  let out = '"';
+  let bs = 0;
+  for (const c of s) {
+    if (c === '\\') { bs++; }
+    else if (c === '"') { out += '\\'.repeat(bs * 2 + 1) + '"'; bs = 0; }
+    else { out += '\\'.repeat(bs) + c; bs = 0; }
+  }
+  return out + '\\'.repeat(bs * 2) + '"';
+}
+
+// Spawn a stdio server child. Bare Windows command names (npx/uvx/dnx `.cmd` shims) must run
+// through cmd.exe; we build the command line ourselves and pass windowsVerbatimArguments so
+// Node doesn't re-quote it. This avoids `shell:true` (and its DEP0190 deprecation + arg-
+// injection footgun) while still resolving `.cmd` shims via PATHEXT. Absolute/`.exe` paths
+// and every non-Windows platform spawn the command directly with shell disabled.
+function spawnServer(name, def) {
+  const args = def.args ?? [];
+  const opts = {
+    cwd: def.cwd ? resolve(BASE_CWD, def.cwd) : BASE_CWD,
+    env: { ...process.env, ...(def.env ?? {}) },
+    stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
+  };
+  const bareWin = process.platform === 'win32' && !/[\\/]/.test(def.command) && !/\.(exe|com)$/i.test(def.command);
+  serverMetrics.attemptingSpawn(name);
+  let child;
+  try {
+    child = bareWin
+      ? spawn(process.env.ComSpec || 'cmd.exe', ['/d', '/s', '/c', '"' + [def.command, ...args].map(quoteWinArg).join(' ') + '"'], { ...opts, windowsVerbatimArguments: true })
+      : spawn(def.command, args, opts);
+  } catch (error) {
+    serverMetrics.failedSpawn(name);
+    throw error;
+  }
+  let spawned = false;
+  child.once('spawn', () => {
+    spawned = true;
+    serverMetrics.spawned(name);
+  });
+  child.once('error', () => {
+    if (!spawned) serverMetrics.failedSpawn(name);
+  });
+  child.__spawnedAt = Date.now(); // start of the cold-start clock; stopped when initialize lands
+  return child;
+}
+
+/* --------------------------- child failure reporting ------------------------ */
+// Remember the tail of a child's stderr so a non-zero exit can be reported with its reason.
+// Without this, a server that starts and then crashes leaves lastError empty: /api/status and
+// `doctor` look healthy while every session dies on spawn.
+const stderrTails = new Map(); // child -> recent stderr text
+function pipeStderr(name, child) {
+  child.stderr.on('data', (d) => {
+    const s = d.toString();
+    stderrTails.set(child, ((stderrTails.get(child) ?? '') + s).slice(-2000));
+    log(`[${name}] (stderr) ${s.trimEnd()}`);
+  });
+}
+function noteExit(name, child, code) {
+  // Only an exit we did not cause is a failure worth reporting.
+  if (code && !child.__bridgeKilled) {
+    const tail = (stderrTails.get(child) ?? '').trim().split(/\r?\n/).filter(Boolean).slice(-3).join(' | ');
+    noteFailure(name, `exited code ${code}${tail ? `: ${tail}` : ''}`);
+  }
+  stderrTails.delete(child);
+}
+
+// Terminate a server child and everything it spawned.
+//
+// On Windows a bare command runs under a cmd.exe wrapper (see spawnServer), and child.kill()
+// signals only that wrapper — the real server process survives, keeps its port/token, and is
+// reparented. That orphans a process on every recycle, idle reap, session close and shutdown.
+// `taskkill /T` takes down the whole tree instead. POSIX spawns the command directly, so
+// kill() already targets the server itself.
+function killTree(child, sync = false) {
+  if (!child) return;
+  if (child.__sharedSession) {
+    child.detach();
+    return;
+  }
+  if (child.exitCode != null ||
+      child.signalCode != null) return;
+  // Teardown we initiated. taskkill /F reports exit code 1, so without this every recycle,
+  // idle reap and session close would be recorded as a crash.
+  child.__bridgeKilled = true;
+  const pid = child.pid;
+  if (process.platform !== 'win32' || !pid) {
+    try { child.kill(); } catch { /* already gone */ }
+    return;
+  }
+  const args = ['/PID', String(pid), '/T', '/F'];
+  // Shutdown exits the process immediately, so it can't wait on an async callback.
+  if (sync) {
+    try { execFileSync('taskkill', args, { stdio: 'ignore' }); } catch { /* already gone */ }
+    return;
+  }
+  execFile('taskkill', args, () => {
+    // taskkill exits non-zero when the tree is already gone; kill() is a harmless backstop
+    // for the case where taskkill itself is unavailable.
+    try { child.kill(); } catch { /* already gone */ }
+  });
+}
+
+function startChild(name, res) {
+  const def = servers[name];
+  const sessionId = randomUUID();
+  const child = spawnServer(name, def);
+  serverMetrics.openedSession(name);
+  sessions.set(sessionId, { child, res, name });
+  log(`[${name}] session ${sessionId.slice(0, 8)} started (pid ${child.pid ?? '?'})`);
+
+  const rl = createInterface({ input: child.stdout });
+  rl.on('line', (line) => {
+    const t = line.trim();
+    if (!t) return;
+    try { JSON.parse(t); } catch { log(`[${name}] (non-json stdout) ${t}`); return; }
+    noteSuccess(name); // the classic transport is fire-and-forget, so a reply is the only signal
+    try { res.write(`event: message\ndata: ${t}\n\n`); } catch { /* client gone */ }
+  });
+  pipeStderr(name, child);
+  child.on('error', (e) => { noteFailure(name, e.message); log(`[${name}] spawn error: ${e.message}`); });
+  child.on('exit', (code) => {
+    noteExit(name, child, code);
+    log(`[${name}] session ${sessionId.slice(0, 8)} exited (code ${code})`);
+    try { res.end(); } catch { /* noop */ }
+    sessions.delete(sessionId);
+  });
+  return sessionId;
+}
+
+/* ---------------- stdio servers (Streamable HTTP transport) ------------------ */
+// Newer MCP clients speak Streamable HTTP: POST /<name>/mcp for JSON-RPC, GET for a
+// server->client SSE stream, DELETE to end. Unlike the SSE transport, one child persists
+// ACROSS posts (keyed by Mcp-Session-Id), so we route responses back by JSON-RPC id.
+const httpSessions = new Map(); // sessionId -> { child, name, pending, sseRes, lastActivity, clientInfo }
+const bridgeReplies = new WeakMap();
+function bridgeReply(id, code, message, kind) {
+  const reply = { jsonrpc: '2.0', id, error: { code, message } };
+  bridgeReplies.set(reply, kind);
+  return reply;
+}
+
+// How long the bridge waits for an upstream JSON-RPC response. `initialize` is separate
+// because it also pays for spawning the server: a cold start that downloads the server on
+// first run can take minutes, while a steady-state call that slow is a hang.
+const REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = parseInt(process.env.MCP_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS || '30000', 10);
+const INIT_TIMEOUT_MS = parseInt(process.env.MCP_INIT_TIMEOUT_MS || '180000', 10);
+
+// Idle reaper: kill Streamable HTTP children idle longer than MCP_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS (0 = off).
+// On by default. Clients are not obliged to send DELETE, and some never do — one observed
+// client opened a session per run and left 241 servers running in an hour. A service that
+// stays up for weeks cannot rely on clients tidying up after themselves. Reaping is safe here
+// because a reaped session is transparently re-established if that client comes back, so the
+// only cost of reaping too eagerly is one server restart.
+const IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS = parseInt(process.env.MCP_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS || String(30 * 60 * 1000), 10);
+// Optional per-server concurrency cap (0 = unlimited). Env default; per-server def.maxSessions overrides.
+const MAX_SESSIONS_PER_SERVER = parseInt(process.env.MCP_MAX_SESSIONS_PER_SERVER || '0', 10);
+// When at the cap, wait this long for a slot before giving up. A cap alone turns a burst into
+// failed requests; a short wait absorbs the burst, while still refusing rather than queueing
+// without limit. 0 disables waiting and rejects immediately.
+const QUEUE_TIMEOUT_MS = parseInt(process.env.MCP_QUEUE_TIMEOUT_MS || '10000', 10);
+const sessionCount = (name) => { let n = 0; for (const s of httpSessions.values()) if (s.name === name) n++; return n; };
+const startingSessions = new Map();
+
+function reserveSession(name, cap) {
+  const starting = startingSessions.get(name) || 0;
+  if (sessionCount(name) + starting >= cap) return false;
+  startingSessions.set(name, starting + 1);
+  return true;
+}
+
+function releaseSessionReservation(name) {
+  const remaining = (startingSessions.get(name) || 0) - 1;
+  if (remaining > 0) startingSessions.set(name, remaining);
+  else startingSessions.delete(name);
+  slotFreed(name);
+}
+
+// Resolve when a session slot is free for `name`, or false if the wait ran out.
+const waiters = new Map(); // name -> [resolve, ...]
+function slotFreed(name) {
+  const q = waiters.get(name);
+  if (q &&
+      q.length) q[0](true);
+}
+function awaitSlot(name, cap) {
+  if (reserveSession(name, cap)) return Promise.resolve(true);
+  if (QUEUE_TIMEOUT_MS <= 0) return Promise.resolve(false);
+  return new Promise((res) => {
+    if (!waiters.has(name)) waiters.set(name, []);
+    const q = waiters.get(name);
+    const done = (ok) => {
+      if (ok &&
+          !reserveSession(name, cap)) return;
+      const i = q.indexOf(done);
+      if (i >= 0) q.splice(i, 1);
+      clearTimeout(timer);
+      res(ok);
+    };
+    const timer = setTimeout(() => done(false), QUEUE_TIMEOUT_MS);
+    q.push(done);
+  });
+}
+if (IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS > 0) {
+  setInterval(() => {
+    const now = Date.now();
+    for (const [sid, s] of httpSessions) {
+      // A session with a request in flight is working, not idle. `lastActivity` is stamped when
+      // a request arrives, so a call that runs longer than the timeout would otherwise have its
+      // server killed mid-request and the caller left waiting for a reply that can never come.
+      if (s.pending.size > 0) continue;
+      if (s.lastActivity && now - s.lastActivity > IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS) {
+        log(`[${s.name}] reaping idle session ${sid.slice(0, 8)} (idle ${Math.round((now - s.lastActivity) / 1000)}s)`);
+        killTree(s.child);
+        httpSessions.delete(sid);
+      }
+    }
+  }, Math.min(IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS, 15000)).unref();
+}
+
+function writeSessionMessage(session, message) {
+  if (session.child.__sharedSession) {
+    session.child.writeMessage(message);
+  } else {
+    session.child.stdin.write(JSON.stringify(message) + '\n');
+  }
+}
+
+function writeSharedEvent(session, response, message) {
+  if (response.destroyed) return false;
+  const frame = `event: message\ndata: ${JSON.stringify(message)}\n\n`;
+  if (response.writableLength + Buffer.byteLength(frame) > session.sharedBufferLimit) {
+    log(`[${session.name}] shared response stream exceeded its buffer limit`);
+    response.destroy();
+    return false;
+  }
+  response.write(frame);
+  return true;
+}
+
+function startStreamableChild(name, warmChild, forcedSessionId) {
+  const def = servers[name];
+  const sessionId = forcedSessionId || randomUUID();
+  const child = warmChild || spawnServer(name, def);
+  serverMetrics.openedSession(name, Boolean(forcedSessionId));
+  const session = { child, name, pending: new Map(), sseRes: null, lastActivity: Date.now(), clientInfo: null };
+  session.sharedBufferLimit = def.sharedMaxBufferBytes ?? SHARED_DEFAULTS.sharedMaxBufferBytes;
+  httpSessions.set(sessionId, session);
+  const rl = createInterface({ input: child.stdout });
+  rl.on('line', (line) => {
+    const t = line.trim();
+    if (!t) return;
+    let msg;
+    try { msg = JSON.parse(t); } catch { log(`[${name}] (non-json stdout) ${t}`); return; }
+    if (!msg ||
+        typeof msg !== 'object') {
+      log(`[${name}] ignored invalid upstream message`);
+      return;
+    }
+    const id = msg.method === undefined ? msg.id : undefined;
+    const p = id != null ? session.pending.get(id) : undefined;
+    if (p) { session.pending.delete(id); clearTimeout(p.timer); p.resolve(msg); }
+    else if (session.sseRes) {
+      if (child.__sharedSession) {
+        if (msg.method !== undefined) writeSharedEvent(session, session.sseRes, msg);
+      } else {
+        try { session.sseRes.write(`event: message\ndata: ${t}\n\n`); } catch { /* noop */ }
+      }
+    }
+  });
+  if (!warmChild) pipeStderr(name, child);
+  if (child.__sharedSession) {
+    child.on('sharedFailure', (detail) => { session.sharedFailure = detail; });
+    child.on('sharedProgress', ({ requestId, message }) => {
+      const pending = session.pending.get(requestId);
+      if (!pending?.stream ||
+          pending.stream.destroyed) return;
+      writeSharedEvent(session, pending.stream, message);
+    });
+  }
+  child.on('error', (e) => { noteFailure(name, e.message); log(`[${name}] spawn error: ${e.message}`); });
+  child.on('exit', (code) => {
+    if (!child.__sharedSession) noteExit(name, child, code);
+    log(`[${name}] streamable session ${sessionId.slice(0, 8)} exited (code ${code})`);
+    // A child that dies with requests in flight must fail them now. Nothing did, so the caller
+    // waited out the full budget — 180s for an initialize — for an answer that could never come.
+    // A config reload recycling a server mid-request hits this exactly, and it surfaced as a
+    // three-minute CI hang rather than as the immediate failure it is.
+    for (const [id, p] of session.pending) {
+      clearTimeout(p.timer);
+      const reply = bridgeReply(id, -32000, `bridge: server exited (code ${code}) before answering`, 'exit');
+      if (session.sharedFailure) {
+        reply.error.data = { ...session.sharedFailure, phase: 'execution', execution: 'potentially-executed' };
+      }
+      p.resolve(reply);
+    }
+    session.pending.clear();
+    if (session.sseRes) { try { session.sseRes.end(); } catch { /* noop */ } }
+    // The same session id may already have been re-established on a fresh child by the time this
+    // fires: `taskkill /F /T` takes about a second on Windows, so a reap followed by a resume
+    // lands the replacement first. Only drop the mapping if it still points at this child, or a
+    // late exit tears down the session that replaced it.
+    if (httpSessions.get(sessionId) === session) httpSessions.delete(sessionId);
+    slotFreed(name); // a capped server may have a request waiting for this slot
+  });
+  log(`[${name}] streamable session ${sessionId.slice(0, 8)} ${child.__sharedSession ? 'attached to shared child' : 'started'} (pid ${child.pid ?? '?'})`);
+  return sessionId;
+}
+
+/* ------------------- cold-start cost, concurrency, spawn gating ------------- */
+// The bridge spawns every child, so it is the only component positioned to know what a cold
+// start actually costs — and it was discarding that. Without it there is no way to tell a server
+// that starts in 200ms from one that shells out to a package manager and takes 20s, which is why
+// the pool ended up full for a fast server and empty for the slow one that needed it.
+function noteSpawnCost(name, ms) {
+  serverMetrics.initialized(name, ms);
+}
+function spawnStats(name) {
+  if (servers[name]?.type === 'http') return null;
+  return serverMetrics.snapshot(name);
+}
+
+// Rolling peak concurrency, so a pool can be sized from what a server is actually asked to do
+// rather than from a number the user had to guess. Bucketed by 5 minutes over the last hour: a
+// single burst should still size the pool, but yesterday's burst should not hold it open forever.
+const CONCURRENCY_BUCKET_MS = 5 * 60_000;
+const CONCURRENCY_BUCKETS = 12;
+const concurrency = new Map(); // name -> [{ slot, peak }, ...]
+function noteConcurrency(name, n) {
+  const slot = Math.floor(Date.now() / CONCURRENCY_BUCKET_MS);
+  const arr = concurrency.get(name) || [];
+  if (arr[0] && arr[0].slot === slot) arr[0].peak = Math.max(arr[0].peak, n);
+  else arr.unshift({ slot, peak: n });
+  if (arr.length > CONCURRENCY_BUCKETS) arr.length = CONCURRENCY_BUCKETS;
+  concurrency.set(name, arr);
+}
+const peakConcurrency = (name) => {
+  const arr = concurrency.get(name);
+  return arr && arr.length ? Math.max(...arr.map((b) => b.peak)) : 0;
+};
+
+// Running many package-manager-backed servers at once is how a shared npm/uv cache gets
+// corrupted: 17 simultaneous `npx` invocations on one machine produced
+// `npm error code ECOMPROMISED / Lock compromised`, and every one of those sessions failed. No
+// server definition can fix that — it is a property of the concurrency, not of any one command —
+// so the bridge has to own it. Global rather than per-server, because the cache is shared across
+// servers.
+//
+// Two limits on how far this is allowed to go, both learned by getting it wrong:
+//
+// 1. Only commands that actually go through a package manager are gated. A plain `node server.js`
+//    shares no cache and was never at risk, and gating it put a global semaphore in front of every
+//    cold start — including a test that opens 60 sessions in a loop, which then took the full
+//    180s init budget and failed on CI.
+// 2. Waiting for a slot is bounded. If one does not come free in time the spawn proceeds anyway:
+//    a corrupted cache is a risk, but hanging a client request is a certainty, and the whole
+//    point of this bridge is that a client request does not hang.
+const MAX_CONCURRENT_SPAWNS = Number(process.env.MCP_MAX_CONCURRENT_SPAWNS ?? 2);
+const SPAWN_GATE_WAIT_MS = Number(process.env.MCP_SPAWN_GATE_WAIT_MS ?? 15_000);
+const PACKAGE_RUNNERS = /(^|[\\/])(npx|pnpx|bunx|uvx|pipx|dnx)(\.cmd|\.exe|\.ps1)?$/i;
+function usesSharedPackageCache(def) {
+  if (!def || !def.command) return false;
+  // Explicit wins: a wrapper script that shells out to a package manager is invisible to the
+  // heuristic below, and its author is the only one who knows.
+  if (typeof def.sharedPackageCache === 'boolean') return def.sharedPackageCache;
+  if (PACKAGE_RUNNERS.test(def.command)) return true;
+  // `npm exec`, `pnpm dlx`, `yarn dlx`, `uv run` — the runner is the first argument.
+  const first = (def.args && def.args[0]) || '';
+  return /^(npm|pnpm|yarn|uv|pip)$/i.test(def.command) && /^(exec|dlx|run|x)$/i.test(first);
+}
+
+const spawnGate = { active: 0, queue: [] };
+// One release per acquisition, idempotent, so a double call cannot inflate the pool and a
+// throw between acquire and release cannot strand a slot forever.
+function makeRelease() {
+  let done = false;
+  return () => {
+    if (done) return;
+    done = true;
+    const next = spawnGate.queue.shift();
+    if (next) next(); // hand the slot straight over rather than dropping and re-taking it
+    else spawnGate.active = Math.max(0, spawnGate.active - 1);
+  };
+}
+const NOOP_RELEASE = () => {};
+function acquireSpawn() {
+  if (MAX_CONCURRENT_SPAWNS <= 0) return Promise.resolve(NOOP_RELEASE);
+  if (spawnGate.active < MAX_CONCURRENT_SPAWNS) {
+    spawnGate.active++;
+    return Promise.resolve(makeRelease());
+  }
+  return new Promise((resolve) => {
+    let settled = false;
+    const waiter = () => {
+      if (settled) return;
+      settled = true;
+      clearTimeout(timer);
+      resolve(makeRelease());
+    };
+    spawnGate.queue.push(waiter);
+    const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+      if (settled) return;
+      settled = true;
+      const i = spawnGate.queue.indexOf(waiter);
+      if (i >= 0) spawnGate.queue.splice(i, 1);
+      resolve(NOOP_RELEASE); // proceed ungated rather than hold the caller any longer
+    }, SPAWN_GATE_WAIT_MS);
+    timer.unref?.();
+  });
+}
+
+// Pooling stays opt-in: the bridge says what it would cost and what it would size to, and the
+// user decides. Turning it on automatically would spend a resident process per warm slot on
+// someone's machine without asking.
+const POOL_ADVICE_MS = Number(process.env.MCP_POOL_ADVICE_MS ?? 2000);
+const WARM_MAX_PER_SERVER = Number(process.env.MCP_WARM_MAX ?? 8);
+function poolAdvice(name) {
+  const def = servers[name];
+  if (!def ||
+      def.sharing === 'pool' ||
+      def.sharing === 'shared' ||
+      def.type === 'http') {
+    return null;
+  }
+  const st = spawnStats(name);
+  const enoughSamples = st && st.samples >= 3;
+  if (!enoughSamples ||
+      st.p50Ms < POOL_ADVICE_MS) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  return {
+    reason: `cold start p50 ${(st.p50Ms / 1000).toFixed(1)}s over ${st.samples} spawns`,
+    suggest: { sharing: 'pool', minWarm: Math.max(1, Math.min(peakConcurrency(name) || 1, WARM_MAX_PER_SERVER)) },
+  };
+}
+
+/* --------------------- keep-warm pool (sharing: "pool") --------------------- */
+// For servers marked sharing:"pool", keep `minWarm` pre-spawned (un-initialized) children ready
+// so a new session adopts a warm child (process already started + imports loaded) instead of a
+// cold spawn. The warm child receives its FIRST initialize from the real client (safe — no
+// re-initialize). Shared mode instead retains one initialized child.
+const warmPool = new Map(); // name -> [child, ...]
+const warmPending = new Map(); // name -> spawns in flight, so a refill pass cannot double-order
+// Explicit minWarm always wins. Without one, size from observed peak concurrency — the number a
+// user cannot reasonably know and the bridge measures for free. Opting into pooling and still
+// getting a pool of one is how a burst of 17 sessions ended up with 16 cold starts.
+const poolTarget = (name) => {
+  const def = servers[name];
+  if (!def ||
+      def.sharing !== 'pool') {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (def.minWarm != null) return def.minWarm;
+  return Math.max(1, Math.min(peakConcurrency(name) || 1, WARM_MAX_PER_SERVER));
+};
+// Hold a spawn-gate slot until the child looks alive rather than until spawn() returns: the cost
+// being serialized is the package manager's, which happens after the process exists and before
+// it says anything. First output is the cheapest available proxy for "the expensive part is
+// over"; the timeout stops a silent child from wedging the gate.
+function releaseOnReady(child, release, maxMs = 30_000) {
+  let done = false;
+  const rel = () => {
+    if (done) return;
+    done = true;
+    clearTimeout(timer);
+    release();
+  };
+  const timer = setTimeout(rel, maxMs);
+  timer.unref?.();
+  child.stdout?.once('data', rel);
+  child.stderr?.once('data', rel);
+  child.once('exit', rel);
+}
+
+const sharedManager = new SharedSessionManager({
+  async spawn(name, definition) {
+    const release = usesSharedPackageCache(definition) ? await acquireSpawn() : NOOP_RELEASE;
+    try {
+      if (shuttingDown ||
+          sharedManager.inspect(name)?.state !== 'starting') {
+        throw sharedManager.error('SHARED_RETIRED', 'spawn', 'unsent');
+      }
+      const child = spawnServer(name, definition);
+      pipeStderr(name, child);
+      releaseOnReady(child, release);
+      child.once('close', () => stderrTails.delete(child));
+      return child;
+    } catch (error) {
+      release();
+      throw error;
+    }
+  },
+  kill: (child) => killTree(child, shuttingDown),
+  onFailure: (name, detail) => noteFailure(name, `shared: ${detail.kind}`),
+  onInitialized: (name, ms) => { noteSpawnCost(name, ms); noteSuccess(name); },
+  onResponse: (name) => noteSuccess(name),
+  log: (name, text) => log(`[${name}] ${text}`),
+  initTimeoutMs: INIT_TIMEOUT_MS,
+  requestTimeoutMs: REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS,
+});
+sharedManager.on('draining', ({ name, generation, reason }) => log(`[${name}] shared generation ${generation} draining (${reason})`));
+sharedManager.on('retired', ({ name, generation, reason }) => log(`[${name}] shared generation ${generation} retired (${reason})`));
+
+async function startAdmittedSession(name, initializeParams, forcedSessionId, stillWanted) {
+  const definition = servers[name];
+  if (!definition) throw Object.assign(new Error('server was removed'), { statusCode: 404 });
+  const cap = definition.maxSessions ?? MAX_SESSIONS_PER_SERVER;
+  if (cap > 0 &&
+      !(await awaitSlot(name, cap))) {
+    noteFailure(name, `bridge refused a session: max sessions (${cap}) reached`);
+    throw Object.assign(new Error(`bridge: max sessions (${cap}) reached for ${name}`), { statusCode: 503 });
+  }
+  let candidate = null;
+  let release = NOOP_RELEASE;
+  try {
+    if (shuttingDown ||
+        servers[name] !== definition) {
+      throw Object.assign(new Error('server configuration changed while waiting for capacity; retry'), { statusCode: 409 });
+    }
+    if (!stillWanted()) return null;
+    if (definition.sharing === 'shared') {
+      candidate = await sharedManager.acquire(name, definition, initializeParams);
+    } else {
+      candidate = takeWarm(name);
+      if (!candidate &&
+          usesSharedPackageCache(definition)) release = await acquireSpawn();
+    }
+    if (shuttingDown ||
+        servers[name] !== definition) {
+      if (candidate) killTree(candidate);
+      throw Object.assign(new Error('server configuration changed while starting; retry'), { statusCode: 409 });
+    }
+    if (!stillWanted()) {
+      if (candidate) killTree(candidate);
+      return null;
+    }
+    const id = startStreamableChild(name, candidate, forcedSessionId);
+    const session = httpSessions.get(id);
+    session.cold = !candidate;
+    releaseOnReady(session.child, release);
+    release = NOOP_RELEASE;
+    noteConcurrency(name, sessionCount(name));
+    return { id, session };
+  } finally {
+    release();
+    if (cap > 0) releaseSessionReservation(name);
+  }
+}
+// A warm child can die on its own: a server that self-exits when idle, a crash, a laptop sleep.
+// The exit handler used to remove the corpse and stop there, and nothing else refilled — the pool
+// only grew on boot, on take, on recycle and on reload. So a pooled server silently degraded to
+// cold-start-every-session, which is the exact failure pooling exists to prevent, and it looked
+// like nothing was wrong because an empty pool is indistinguishable from one that has simply not
+// been asked for anything yet. Seen on ev2: warm sat at 0 for three hours while kusto stayed full
+// purely because kusto is taken often enough that every take triggered a refill.
+//
+// Refilling on an unattended exit needs a brake, or a child that dies instantly becomes a spawn
+// loop. Children that die quickly back off exponentially; one that lived a while refills at once.
+const WARM_MIN_LIFETIME_MS = 5000;
+const WARM_BACKOFF_CAP_MS = 60_000;
+const warmFastExits = new Map(); // name -> consecutive too-fast exits
+let shuttingDown = false;
+function spawnWarm(name) {
+  const child = spawnServer(name, servers[name]);
+  const bornAt = Date.now();
+  pipeStderr(name, child);
+  child.on('exit', (code) => {
+    // Once taken, the child belongs to its session, which registers its own exit handler. Both
+    // used to run, so every failing child of a pooled server was counted as two failures and
+    // drove that server's health down twice as fast as an identical unpooled one.
+    if (child.__warmTaken) return;
+    noteExit(name, child, code);
+    const arr = warmPool.get(name); if (arr) { const i = arr.indexOf(child); if (i >= 0) arr.splice(i, 1); }
+    // Deliberate kills refill themselves (recycle) or are meant to leave the pool empty (reload
+    // removing a server, shutdown). Only an exit we did not ask for needs replacing here.
+    const weAskedForThis = child.__bridgeKilled || shuttingDown;
+    if (weAskedForThis ||
+        !poolTarget(name)) {
+      return;
+    }
+    const lived = Date.now() - bornAt;
+    const fast = lived < WARM_MIN_LIFETIME_MS;
+    const strikes = fast ? (warmFastExits.get(name) || 0) + 1 : 0;
+    warmFastExits.set(name, strikes);
+    const delay = strikes ? Math.min(WARM_BACKOFF_CAP_MS, 1000 * 2 ** (strikes - 1)) : 0;
+    log(`[${name}] warm child exited after ${lived}ms (code ${code})${strikes ? `; ${strikes} fast exits, refilling in ${delay}ms` : '; refilling'}`);
+    setTimeout(() => refillPool(name), delay).unref();
+  });
+  return child;
+}
+function refillPool(name) {
+  const target = poolTarget(name);
+  if (!target ||
+      shuttingDown) {
+    return;
+  }
+  if (!warmPool.has(name)) warmPool.set(name, []);
+  const arr = warmPool.get(name);
+  // Refill toward the target in one pass instead of one child per take. Reactive single-child
+  // refill meant a burst that emptied the pool recovered long after the burst was over, which is
+  // the window pooling exists to cover. The spawn gate decides how many actually start at once.
+  while (arr.length + (warmPending.get(name) || 0) < target) {
+    warmPending.set(name, (warmPending.get(name) || 0) + 1);
+    const gated = usesSharedPackageCache(servers[name]);
+    const slot = gated ? acquireSpawn() : Promise.resolve(NOOP_RELEASE);
+    slot.then((release) => {
+      warmPending.set(name, Math.max(0, (warmPending.get(name) || 1) - 1));
+      const want = poolTarget(name);
+      const cur = warmPool.get(name);
+      // The wait for a slot can be long enough for the answer to change: a reload removed the
+      // server, a shutdown started, or other refills already met the target.
+      const noLongerWanted = shuttingDown || !want || !cur;
+      const alreadyMet = cur && cur.length >= want;
+      if (noLongerWanted ||
+          alreadyMet) {
+        release();
+        return;
+      }
+      const child = spawnWarm(name);
+      cur.push(child);
+      log(`[${name}] pre-warmed pool child (${cur.length}/${want})`);
+      releaseOnReady(child, release);
+    });
+  }
+}
+function takeWarm(name) {
+  const arr = warmPool.get(name);
+  if (arr && arr.length) {
+    const c = arr.shift();
+    serverMetrics.adoptedWarmChild(name);
+    c.__warmTaken = true; // hand ownership to the session; the warm exit handler stands down
+    warmFastExits.delete(name); // a child that survived to be used clears the backoff
+    setImmediate(() => refillPool(name));
+    return c;
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+for (const poolName of Object.keys(servers)) refillPool(poolName); // pre-warm pool servers at boot
+
+/* --------------------- resumable sessions (survive a restart) --------------- */
+// Streamable HTTP session ids live only in memory, so restarting the bridge — or recycling a
+// server — made every live client session 404. The spec says a client should then re-initialize,
+// but in practice clients surface the failure instead, which is exactly the outage this project
+// exists to prevent: a keep-alive service must survive its own restart.
+//
+// The client's initialize request is recorded, so an id this process has never seen can still be
+// re-established: spawn the server, replay that initialize, then serve the request that arrived.
+// Only the handshake is replayed. Any state the server accumulated is genuinely gone, so this
+// restores the session, not its history.
+const RESUME_ENABLED = process.env.MCP_RESUME !== '0';
+const RESUME_TTL_MS = parseInt(process.env.MCP_RESUME_TTL_MS || String(24 * 60 * 60 * 1000), 10);
+const RESUME_FILE = resolve(dirname(CONFIG), 'sessions.json');
+const resumable = new Map(); // sessionId -> { server, initialize, at }
+const resuming = new Map(); // sessionId -> handshake promise, before any asynchronous admission
+
+function saveResumable() {
+  if (!RESUME_ENABLED) return;
+  try { writeFileSync(RESUME_FILE, JSON.stringify(Object.fromEntries(resumable))); } catch { /* best effort */ }
+}
+// Records past the TTL are dropped. Without this the window was only ever applied when the file
+// was loaded at startup, so a long-running bridge kept honouring — and re-persisting — records
+// far older than the retention window it documents. Returns true if anything was removed.
+// Session ids we know existed and can no longer honour. Every released revision that has
+// sessions (2025-03-26 through 2025-11-25, Streamable HTTP / Session Management §3) requires 404
+// for a terminated session, and §4 makes re-initializing on 404 a client MUST — so the status
+// code stays 404. A 410 would read better to a human but would put a compliant client into
+// undefined territory and lose the one recovery path the spec defines. (The draft revision drops
+// sessions from this transport altogether, so 404 is also the last word on the subject.)
+// We keep the set purely to tell "known-gone" from "never existed" in the log, which is what
+// actually distinguishes a stale client after a restart from a misconfigured one.
+const GONE_MAX = 500;
+const goneSessions = new Set();
+function markGone(sessionId) {
+  goneSessions.add(sessionId);
+  if (goneSessions.size > GONE_MAX) goneSessions.delete(goneSessions.values().next().value);
+}
+
+function pruneResumable(now = Date.now()) {
+  let dropped = false;
+  for (const [id, r] of resumable) {
+    if (now - (r.at || 0) >= RESUME_TTL_MS) { resumable.delete(id); markGone(id); dropped = true; }
+  }
+  return dropped;
+}
+function rememberSession(sessionId, name, initMsg) {
+  if (!RESUME_ENABLED || !initMsg) return;
+  resumable.set(sessionId, { server: name, initialize: initMsg.params ?? {}, at: Date.now() });
+  goneSessions.delete(sessionId); // a live id again
+  pruneResumable();
+  saveResumable();
+}
+function forgetSession(sessionId) {
+  if (resumable.delete(sessionId)) saveResumable();
+  markGone(sessionId); // an explicit DELETE is gone for good, not "never existed"
+}
+if (RESUME_ENABLED) {
+  try {
+    const raw = JSON.parse(readFileSync(RESUME_FILE, 'utf8'));
+    const now = Date.now();
+    for (const [id, r] of Object.entries(raw)) {
+      // Drop records for servers that no longer exist, and anything past the TTL.
+      if (r && r.server && servers[r.server] && now - (r.at || 0) < RESUME_TTL_MS) resumable.set(id, r);
+    }
+    if (resumable.size) log(`${resumable.size} session(s) resumable after restart`);
+  } catch { /* no prior state */ }
+}
+
+// Re-establish a session the client still believes in.
+async function resumeSession(name, sessionId) {
+  const rec = resumable.get(sessionId);
+  if (!rec || rec.server !== name) return null;
+  if (resuming.has(sessionId)) return resuming.get(sessionId);
+  // The retention window is a promise about how long a session id stays valid, so it has to be
+  // checked here too — not only when the file is read at startup.
+  if (Date.now() - (rec.at || 0) >= RESUME_TTL_MS) {
+    resumable.delete(sessionId);
+    markGone(sessionId);
+    saveResumable();
+    return null;
+  }
+  const pending = restoreSession(name, sessionId, rec);
+  resuming.set(sessionId, pending);
+  try {
+    return await pending;
+  } finally {
+    if (resuming.get(sessionId) === pending) resuming.delete(sessionId);
+  }
+}
+
+async function restoreSession(name, sessionId, rec) {
+  const stillWanted = () => resumable.get(sessionId) === rec && !goneSessions.has(sessionId);
+  const restored = await startAdmittedSession(name, rec.initialize, sessionId, stillWanted);
+  if (!restored) return null;
+  const { session } = restored;
+  const initId = `bridge-resume-${randomUUID()}`;
+  const reply = await new Promise((resolveWait) => {
+    const timer = setTimeout(() => { session.pending.delete(initId); resolveWait(null); }, INIT_TIMEOUT_MS);
+    session.pending.set(initId, { resolve: resolveWait, timer });
+    try {
+      writeSessionMessage(session, { jsonrpc: '2.0', id: initId, method: 'initialize', params: rec.initialize });
+    } catch { clearTimeout(timer); session.pending.delete(initId); resolveWait(null); }
+  });
+  if (!reply ||
+      reply.error ||
+      !stillWanted()) {
+    killTree(session.child);
+    if (httpSessions.get(sessionId) === session) httpSessions.delete(sessionId);
+    slotFreed(name);
+    log(`[${name}] could not resume session ${sessionId.slice(0, 8)}`);
+    if (!stillWanted()) return null;
+    throw Object.assign(new Error('bridge: session initialization failed'), { upstreamError: reply?.error, statusCode: 502 });
+  }
+  writeSessionMessage(session, { jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'notifications/initialized' });
+  session.clientInfo = rec.initialize.clientInfo ?? null;
+  session.protocolVersion = reply.result.protocolVersion;
+  if (session.cold) {
+    noteSpawnCost(name, Date.now() - session.child.__spawnedAt);
+    session.cold = false;
+  }
+  rec.at = Date.now();
+  saveResumable();
+  log(`[${name}] resumed session ${sessionId.slice(0, 8)}`);
+  return session;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------ scheduled recycle --------------------------- */
+// Some servers hold a credential they can only refresh interactively, so they have to be
+// restarted periodically. Now that an unknown session id is transparently re-established, a
+// recycle is invisible to connected clients, so the bridge can do it itself rather than needing
+// anything driving it from inside an editor. Per-server `recycleMinutes`, or MCP_RECYCLE_MINUTES
+// for all.
+const RECYCLE_MINUTES = parseFloat(process.env.MCP_RECYCLE_MINUTES || '0');
+const recycleMinutesFor = (name) => (servers[name] && servers[name].recycleMinutes) || RECYCLE_MINUTES;
+const lastRecycle = new Map();
+
+function recycleServer(name) {
+  let killed = 0;
+  // A session with a request in flight is left alone, the same rule the idle reaper already
+  // follows: killing the child underneath a caller means it waits for a reply that can never
+  // arrive. Its credential is replaced on the next request instead, which is a moment later.
+  const busy = (s) => s.pending && s.pending.size > 0;
+  for (const s of sessions.values()) if ((!name || s.name === name) && !busy(s)) { killTree(s.child); killed++; }
+  for (const s of httpSessions.values()) {
+    if ((!name || s.name === name) &&
+        !s.child.__sharedSession &&
+        !busy(s)) { killTree(s.child); killed++; }
+  }
+  // Warm children hold the same stale credential, so they have to go too, or a recycled server
+  // is immediately replaced by a pre-spawned copy of what was just discarded.
+  for (const n of (name ? [name] : Object.keys(servers))) {
+    if (sharedManager.recycle(n).found) killed++;
+    for (const c of (warmPool.get(n) || []).slice()) killTree(c);
+    setTimeout(() => refillPool(n), 1000).unref();
+  }
+  return killed;
+}
+
+// The tick adapts to the shortest configured period, so it has to be rebuilt whenever the config
+// changes: a reload can introduce the first `recycleMinutes` on a bridge that had none, or
+// shorten the interval below the current tick.
+let recycleTimer = null;
+function ensureRecycleTimer() {
+  const periods = Object.keys(servers).map(recycleMinutesFor).filter((m) => m > 0);
+  if (recycleTimer) { clearInterval(recycleTimer); recycleTimer = null; }
+  if (!periods.length) return;
+  // Check often enough to honour the shortest configured period, but never busier than needed.
+  const tick = Math.max(200, Math.min(30_000, (Math.min(...periods) * 60_000) / 2));
+  recycleTimer = setInterval(() => {
+    const now = Date.now();
+    for (const name of Object.keys(servers)) {
+      const mins = recycleMinutesFor(name);
+      if (!mins) continue;
+      const last = lastRecycle.get(name) || startedAt;
+      if (now - last < mins * 60_000) continue;
+      const killed = recycleServer(name);
+      lastRecycle.set(name, now);
+      log(`[${name}] scheduled recycle after ${mins}m (${killed} session(s))`);
+    }
+  }, tick);
+  recycleTimer.unref();
+}
+ensureRecycleTimer();
+
+/* ------------------------------- config reload ------------------------------ */
+// Apply an edited servers.json without restarting.
+//
+// A restart is the blunt alternative, and it costs every live session on every server — adding
+// one server should not disturb the fourteen that were working. So the reload is a diff: servers
+// whose definition is unchanged are left completely alone, and only the ones that actually
+// changed are torn down so the next request picks up the new definition.
+//
+// `servers` is mutated in place rather than rebound, because the rest of the bridge closes over
+// that object; rebinding it would leave timers and handlers reading the old config forever.
+function diffConfig(next) {
+  const before = Object.keys(servers);
+  const after = Object.keys(next);
+  return {
+    added: after.filter((n) => !before.includes(n)),
+    removed: before.filter((n) => !after.includes(n)),
+    changed: after.filter((n) => before.includes(n) && JSON.stringify(servers[n]) !== JSON.stringify(next[n])),
+  };
+}
+
+function applyConfig(next) {
+  const { added, removed, changed } = diffConfig(next);
+  let restarted = 0;
+  // A changed or removed server's children were started from the old definition, so they are
+  // stale. Untouched servers are deliberately not disturbed.
+  for (const name of [...removed, ...changed]) {
+    if (next[name] &&
+        onlyPoolingPolicyChanged(servers[name], next[name])) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    invalidateToken(servers[name]);
+    restarted += recycleServer(name);
+  }
+  for (const name of removed) {
+    sharedManager.remove(name);
+    delete servers[name];
+    warmPool.delete(name); // recycleServer queued a refill; it must not resurrect a deleted server
+  }
+  for (const name of [...added, ...changed]) servers[name] = next[name];
+  for (const name of [...added, ...changed]) {
+    const pool = warmPool.get(name);
+    const target = poolTarget(name);
+    while (pool &&
+           pool.length > 0 &&
+           pool.length > target) {
+      killTree(pool.pop());
+    }
+    refillPool(name);
+  }
+  ensureRecycleTimer(); // a reload can add the first recycleMinutes, or shorten the interval
+  return { added, removed, changed, restarted };
+}
+
+function onlyPoolingPolicyChanged(before, after) {
+  if (before.sharing === 'shared' ||
+      after.sharing === 'shared') {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const withoutPolicy = ({ sharing, minWarm, ...rest }) => rest;
+  return JSON.stringify(withoutPolicy(before)) === JSON.stringify(withoutPolicy(after));
+}
+
+let lastConfigText = (() => { try { return readFileSync(CONFIG, 'utf8'); } catch { return null; } })();
+
+function reloadConfig(reason) {
+  let text;
+  try { text = readFileSync(CONFIG, 'utf8'); }
+  catch {
+    return { ok: false, statusCode: 500, code: 'CONFIG_READ_FAILED',
+      publicError: 'Unable to read the saved configuration.' };
+  }
+  if (text === lastConfigText) return { ok: true, unchanged: true, added: [], removed: [], changed: [], restarted: 0 };
+
+  // An invalid file must never take working servers down — a half-written save from an editor
+  // looks exactly like this. Keep serving what is already in memory and report the problem.
+  let next;
+  try { next = JSON.parse(text); }
+  catch {
+    log('config reload rejected: invalid JSON');
+    return { ok: false, statusCode: 400, code: 'INVALID_CONFIG_JSON',
+      publicError: 'Saved config contains invalid JSON.' };
+  }
+  if (!next ||
+      typeof next !== 'object' ||
+      Array.isArray(next)) {
+    log('config reload rejected: top level must be an object of server definitions');
+    return { ok: false, statusCode: 400, code: 'INVALID_CONFIG_ROOT',
+      publicError: 'Config top level must be an object of server definitions.' };
+  }
+  for (const d of Object.values(next)) {
+    if (!d ||
+        typeof d !== 'object' ||
+        (!d.command &&
+         !d.url)) {
+      log('config reload rejected: a server has neither "command" nor "url"');
+      return { ok: false, statusCode: 400, code: 'INVALID_SERVER_DEFINITION',
+        publicError: 'A server definition has neither "command" nor "url".' };
+    }
+  }
+
+  lastConfigText = text;
+  const r = applyConfig(next);
+  const summary = [
+    r.added.length ? `+${r.added.join(', ')}` : null,
+    r.removed.length ? `-${r.removed.join(', ')}` : null,
+    r.changed.length ? `~${r.changed.join(', ')}` : null,
+  ].filter(Boolean).join('  ');
+  log(summary
+    ? `config reloaded (${reason}): ${summary} — ${r.restarted} session(s) restarted`
+    : `config reloaded (${reason}): no server definitions changed`);
+  return { ok: true, ...r };
+}
+
+// Watching the file makes an edit take effect on its own, which is the point: the config exists
+// to be edited. Debounced because editors save in bursts (write, rename, truncate), and re-armed
+// after each burst because an atomic save replaces the inode the watcher was holding.
+if (process.env.MCP_CONFIG_WATCH !== '0') {
+  let timer = null;
+  let watcher = null;
+  const arm = () => {
+    try {
+      watcher = watch(CONFIG, () => {
+        clearTimeout(timer);
+        timer = setTimeout(() => {
+          poolingConfig.reloadSaved('file changed')
+            .catch(() => log('config watcher could not reload the saved configuration'))
+            .finally(rearm);
+        }, 300);
+      });
+      watcher.unref?.();
+    } catch { /* watching is best effort; /admin/reload still works */ }
+  };
+  const rearm = () => { try { watcher?.close(); } catch { /* noop */ } arm(); };
+  arm();
+}
+
+/* --------------------------- active health probing -------------------------- */
+// Passive health above only learns anything when somebody makes a request. A server nobody has
+// called today therefore reads 'unknown' indefinitely — which is honest, but it also means a
+// credential can expire overnight and you find out from a failed tool call rather than the
+// dashboard. Probing closes that gap for HTTP servers, where the failure is a silent 401.
+//
+// Off by default: a probe is a real request to somebody else's service, and how often that is
+// acceptable is not the bridge's call to make. stdio servers are not probed — a probe would mean
+// spawning a process, which costs more than the request it is meant to pre-empt, and their
+// failures (spawn error, non-zero exit) are already observed for free.
+const HEALTH_INTERVAL_MS = Number(process.env.MCP_HEALTH_INTERVAL_MS || 0);
+
+function probeServer(name) {
+  const def = servers[name];
+  if (!def || def.type !== 'http' || !def.url) return;
+  // A server the client authenticates cannot be probed usefully: the bridge holds no credential
+  // for it, so every probe would 401 and report a working server as broken.
+  if (!resolveAuth(def) && !def.headers) return;
+  stat(name).lastProbe = Date.now();
+  const body = JSON.stringify({
+    jsonrpc: '2.0', id: `probe-${Date.now()}`, method: 'initialize',
+    params: { protocolVersion: '2025-06-18', capabilities: {}, clientInfo: { name: 'mcp-pacemaker-health', version: VERSION } },
+  });
+  (async () => {
+    const headers = { 'content-type': 'application/json', accept: 'application/json, text/event-stream', 'content-length': Buffer.byteLength(body) };
+    const a = resolveAuth(def);
+    if (a) headers[a.header.toLowerCase()] = await a.getValue();
+    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(def.headers ?? {})) headers[k] = v;
+    const target = new URL(def.url);
+    const lib = target.protocol === 'https:' ? https : http;
+    return new Promise((done) => {
+      const r = lib.request(target, { method: 'POST', headers }, (resp) => {
+        const code = resp.statusCode ?? 502;
+        resp.resume();
+        if (code === 401 || code === 403 || code >= 500) noteFailure(name, `health probe: upstream returned ${code}`);
+        else noteSuccess(name);
+        done();      });
+      r.on('error', (e) => { noteFailure(name, `health probe: ${e.message}`); done(); });
+      r.setTimeout(10_000, () => { r.destroy(new Error('timed out')); });
+      r.end(body);
+    });
+  })().catch((e) => noteFailure(name, `health probe: ${e.message}`));
+}
+
+if (HEALTH_INTERVAL_MS > 0) {
+  const tick = Math.max(1000, Math.min(HEALTH_INTERVAL_MS, 60_000));
+  setInterval(() => {
+    const now = Date.now();
+    for (const name of Object.keys(servers)) {
+      const def = servers[name];
+      if (def.type !== 'http') continue;
+      // A per-server interval of 0 opts one server out of an otherwise global schedule.
+      const every = def.healthIntervalMinutes != null ? def.healthIntervalMinutes * 60_000 : HEALTH_INTERVAL_MS;
+      if (!every) continue;
+      const s = stat(name);
+      // A server that just served a real request has already proven itself; probing it as well
+      // is pure extra load on the upstream.
+      if (now - Math.max(s.lastProbe, s.lastSuccess, s.lastErrorAt) < every) continue;
+      probeServer(name);
+    }
+  }, tick).unref();
+  log(`health probing every ${Math.round(HEALTH_INTERVAL_MS / 1000)}s (http servers only)`);
+}
+
+/* --------------------------- proactive token refresh ------------------------ */
+// Renew a cached credential shortly before it expires instead of discovering the expiry on a
+// request. A bridge that stays up for days would otherwise sit on a dead token until the next
+// call, which then pays the mint cost or fails outright.
+const TOKEN_REFRESH_LEAD_MS = parseInt(process.env.MCP_TOKEN_REFRESH_LEAD_MS || String(5 * 60 * 1000), 10);
+if (TOKEN_REFRESH_LEAD_MS > 0) {
+  // Check often enough to act inside the lead window, but no busier than that requires.
+  const tick = Math.max(500, Math.min(60_000, TOKEN_REFRESH_LEAD_MS / 2));
+  setInterval(() => {
+    const now = Date.now();
+    for (const [name, def] of Object.entries(servers)) {
+      const key = authCacheKey(def);
+      if (!key) continue;
+      const cached = tokenCache.get(key);
+      // Only refresh credentials already in use; never mint for a server nobody has touched.
+      if (!cached || cached.exp - now > TOKEN_REFRESH_LEAD_MS) continue;
+      tokenCache.delete(key);
+      const auth = resolveAuth(def);
+      if (!auth) continue;
+      auth.getValue()
+        .then(() => log(`[${name}] refreshed credential ahead of expiry`))
+        .catch((e) => { noteFailure(name, `token refresh failed: ${e.message}`); log(`[${name}] token refresh failed: ${e.message}`); });
+    }
+  }, tick).unref();
+}
+
+function handleStreamable(name, req, res) {
+  const sid = req.headers['mcp-session-id'];
+  const boundName = httpSessions.get(sid)?.name ?? resumable.get(sid)?.server;
+  if (boundName &&
+      boundName !== name) {
+    res.writeHead(404).end('no such session');
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (req.method === 'GET') {
+    const session = sid ? httpSessions.get(sid) : null;
+    if (!session) { res.writeHead(404).end('no such session'); return; }
+    res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/event-stream', 'Cache-Control': 'no-cache, no-transform', Connection: 'keep-alive' });
+    session.sseRes = res;
+    const ka = setInterval(() => { try { res.write(': keepalive\n\n'); } catch { /* noop */ } }, 15000);
+    req.on('close', () => { clearInterval(ka); if (session.sseRes === res) session.sseRes = null; });
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (req.method === 'DELETE') {
+    const session = sid ? httpSessions.get(sid) : null;
+    if (session) { killTree(session.child); httpSessions.delete(sid); slotFreed(name); }
+    // An explicit DELETE ends the session for good; it must not come back on the next request.
+    if (sid) forgetSession(sid);
+    res.writeHead(204).end();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (req.method === 'POST') {
+    const definition = servers[name];
+    const chunks = [];
+    let bytes = 0;
+    let tooLarge = false;
+    const shared = servers[name].sharing === 'shared';
+    const configuredLimit = servers[name].sharedMaxLineBytes;
+    const validLimit = Number.isSafeInteger(configuredLimit) && configuredLimit > 0;
+    const bodyLimit = shared ? Math.min(validLimit ? configuredLimit : SHARED_DEFAULTS.sharedMaxLineBytes, 16_777_216) : Infinity;
+    req.on('data', (chunk) => {
+      if (tooLarge) return;
+      bytes += chunk.length;
+      if (bytes > bodyLimit) {
+        tooLarge = true;
+        chunks.length = 0;
+        res.writeHead(413).end('shared request exceeds the input limit');
+        return;
+      }
+      chunks.push(chunk);
+    });
+    req.on('end', async () => {
+      if (tooLarge ||
+          res.destroyed) return;
+      if (servers[name] !== definition) {
+        res.writeHead(409).end('server configuration changed while receiving request; retry');
+        return;
+      }
+      let parsed;
+      try { parsed = JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString() || 'null'); } catch { res.writeHead(400).end('invalid json'); return; }
+      const messages = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : (parsed == null ? [] : [parsed]);
+      const isInit = messages.some((m) => m && m.method === 'initialize');
+      const initMessage = messages.find((m) => m && m.method === 'initialize');
+      if (shared) {
+        const invalidMessage = messages.some((message) => !message ||
+          typeof message !== 'object' || Array.isArray(message) ||
+          message.jsonrpc !== '2.0' || typeof message.method !== 'string' ||
+          (Object.hasOwn(message, 'id') && !sharedManager.validId(message.id)));
+        const invalidInitialize = isInit && (Array.isArray(parsed) || messages.length !== 1 || !Object.hasOwn(initMessage, 'id'));
+        if (!messages.length ||
+            invalidMessage ||
+            invalidInitialize) {
+          res.writeHead(400).end('invalid shared JSON-RPC request');
+          return;
+        }
+      }
+      try {
+        let sessionId = sid;
+        let session = sid ? httpSessions.get(sid) : null;
+        if (sid &&
+            (!session || resuming.has(sid))) {
+          // An id this process has not seen: it may predate a restart or a recycle.
+          session = await resumeSession(name, sid);
+          if (session) sessionId = sid;
+        }
+        if (!session) {
+          if (!isInit) {
+            // Both cases are 404 because the spec requires it, but they mean different things to
+            // an operator: a known-gone id is a client that outlived a restart, an unknown id is a
+            // client that never initialized here. Say which in the body and the log.
+            if (sid &&
+                goneSessions.has(sid)) {
+              log(`${name}: rejecting known-gone session ${sid} (client predates a restart; it must re-initialize)`);
+              res.writeHead(404).end('session terminated (re-initialize)');
+              return;
+            }
+            res.writeHead(404).end('no session (send initialize first)');
+            return;
+          }
+          const started = await startAdmittedSession(name, initMessage.params, undefined, () => !res.destroyed);
+          if (!started) return;
+          ({ id: sessionId, session } = started);
+        }
+        session.lastActivity = Date.now();
+        if (session.child.__sharedSession) {
+          const wrongVersion = !isInit && req.headers['mcp-protocol-version'] &&
+            req.headers['mcp-protocol-version'] !== session.protocolVersion;
+          const unsupportedBatch = Array.isArray(parsed) && session.protocolVersion !== '2025-03-26';
+          if (wrongVersion ||
+              unsupportedBatch) {
+            res.writeHead(400).end('request does not match the negotiated shared protocol version');
+            return;
+          }
+        }
+        if (isInit) {
+          const im = messages.find((m) => m && m.method === 'initialize');
+          const ci = im && im.params && im.params.clientInfo;
+          if (ci) session.clientInfo = { name: ci.name, version: ci.version };
+        }
+        const requestIds = messages.filter((m) => m && m.id != null && m.method).map((m) => m.id);
+        if (new Set(requestIds).size !== requestIds.length ||
+            requestIds.some((id) => session.pending.has(id))) {
+          res.writeHead(400).end('duplicate pending JSON-RPC request id');
+          return;
+        }
+        const headers = { 'Mcp-Session-Id': sessionId };
+        const hasProgress = messages.some((message) => message?.params?._meta &&
+          Object.hasOwn(message.params._meta, 'progressToken'));
+        const stream = session.child.__sharedSession && requestIds.length > 0 && hasProgress;
+        const arrayResponse = requestIds.length > 1 || (session.child.__sharedSession && Array.isArray(parsed));
+        let resultBytes = arrayResponse ? 1 : 0;
+        let responseOverflow = false;
+        const collect = (resolveWait, reply) => {
+          if (responseOverflow) { resolveWait(null); return; }
+          if (session.child.__sharedSession) {
+            try {
+              resultBytes += Buffer.byteLength(JSON.stringify(reply)) + (arrayResponse ? 1 : 0);
+            } catch (error) {
+              if (!(error instanceof RangeError)) throw error;
+              resultBytes = Infinity;
+            }
+            if (resultBytes > session.sharedBufferLimit) {
+              responseOverflow = true;
+              noteFailure(name, 'shared response exceeds the output limit');
+              if (res.headersSent) res.destroy();
+              else res.writeHead(502, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }).end(JSON.stringify({
+                error: {
+                  code: -32002, message: 'shared response exceeds the output limit; calls were not replayed',
+                  data: { execution: 'potentially-executed' },
+                },
+              }));
+              for (const id of requestIds) {
+                const pending = session.pending.get(id);
+                if (!pending) continue;
+                clearTimeout(pending.timer);
+                session.pending.delete(id);
+                pending.resolve(null);
+                if (session.child.stdin.writable) {
+                  writeSessionMessage(session, {
+                    jsonrpc: '2.0', method: 'notifications/cancelled', params: { requestId: id },
+                  });
+                }
+              }
+              resolveWait(null);
+              return;
+            }
+          }
+          resolveWait(reply);
+        };
+        if (stream) {
+          res.writeHead(200, { ...headers, 'Content-Type': 'text/event-stream', 'Cache-Control': 'no-cache, no-transform' });
+          res.flushHeaders();
+        }
+        // initialize is the request that pays for spawning the server, and a cold start can be
+        // slow (a package manager fetching the server on first run), so it gets a longer budget
+        // than steady-state calls.
+        const budget = isInit ? INIT_TIMEOUT_MS : REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS;
+        const waits = requestIds.map((id) => new Promise((resolveWait) => {
+          const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+            if (session.pending.has(id)) {
+              session.pending.delete(id);
+              resolveWait(bridgeReply(id, -32001, 'bridge: upstream timeout', 'timeout'));
+            }
+          }, budget);
+          if (session.child.__sharedSession) clearTimeout(timer);
+          session.pending.set(id, { resolve: (reply) => collect(resolveWait, reply), timer, stream: stream ? res : null });
+        }));
+        try {
+          for (const message of messages) {
+            if (responseOverflow) break;
+            writeSessionMessage(session, message);
+          }
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+          for (const id of requestIds) {
+            const pending = session.pending.get(id);
+            if (!pending) continue;
+            clearTimeout(pending.timer);
+            session.pending.delete(id);
+            pending.resolve(bridgeReply(id, -32000, 'bridge: upstream write failed', 'write'));
+          }
+          throw error;
+        }
+        if (!requestIds.length) { res.writeHead(202, headers).end(); return; }
+        const results = await Promise.all(waits);
+        if (responseOverflow) return;
+        // A JSON-RPC error from the server is the server working — it answered. Only the bridge's
+        // own synthetic errors mean the server is unhealthy, and even then a timeout is worth
+        // recording only while the child is alive: if it already exited, its exit code and stderr
+        // are the actual reason and must not be overwritten by the symptom.
+        if (results.some((reply) => bridgeReplies.get(reply) === 'timeout')) {
+          if (session.child.exitCode === null &&
+              session.child.signalCode === null) noteFailure(name, 'upstream timeout');
+        } else if (results.some((reply) => bridgeReplies.get(reply) === 'exit')) {
+          // The child exited mid-request. Its exit handler already recorded the real reason with
+          // the stderr tail, so counting it again here would report one dead child as two failures.
+        } else if (!session.child.__sharedSession) {
+          noteSuccess(name);
+          // A cold start is only measurable once the server has answered: spawn() returning tells
+          // us nothing about the package manager work that follows it. Recorded once per child.
+          const initialized = results.some((reply) => reply.result &&
+            messages.some((message) => message && message.method === 'initialize' && message.id === reply.id));
+          const measurableColdStart = session.cold && initialized && session.child.__spawnedAt;
+          if (measurableColdStart) {
+            noteSpawnCost(name, Date.now() - session.child.__spawnedAt);
+            session.cold = false;
+          }
+        }
+        const initialized = isInit && results.some((reply) => reply?.result && reply.id === initMessage.id);
+        if (initialized) {
+          session.protocolVersion = results.find((reply) => reply.id === initMessage.id).result.protocolVersion;
+          rememberSession(sessionId, name, initMessage);
+        }
+        // Stamp again on completion: the idle clock should measure time since the request finished,
+        // not since it started, or a call slower than the timeout is reapable the moment it returns.
+        session.lastActivity = Date.now();
+        if (stream) {
+          for (const result of results) {
+            if (!writeSharedEvent(session, res, result)) return;
+          }
+          res.end();
+        } else {
+          headers['Content-Type'] = 'application/json';
+          res.writeHead(200, headers);
+          res.end(JSON.stringify(arrayResponse ? results : results[0]));
+        }
+      } catch (error) {
+        log(`[${name}] session request failed: ${error.message}`);
+        if (res.headersSent) { res.destroy(); return; }
+        const rpcError = error.upstreamError ?? (error.data
+          ? { code: -32002, message: error.message, data: error.data } : null);
+        if (rpcError) {
+          const request = messages.find((message) => message?.id != null);
+          res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+          res.end(JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: request?.id ?? null, error: rpcError }));
+        } else {
+          res.writeHead(error.statusCode ?? 502).end(error.message);
+        }
+      }
+    });
+    return;
+  }
+
+  res.writeHead(405).end('method not allowed');
+}
+
+/* ---------------------- http servers (reverse proxy + auth) ----------------- */
+// OAuth discovery for proxied servers.
+//
+// A client authenticating against http://127.0.0.1:<port>/<name> derives the metadata URL from
+// the bridge's own origin — /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/<name> — not from the upstream
+// it is eventually talking to. Without an answer here the client fails at "could not discover
+// authorization server metadata" and can never reach the real login.
+//
+// The upstream document is relayed with one change, made in `handleWellKnown` below: `resource`
+// is rewritten to this bridge's URL. RFC 9728 requires the client to check that field against
+// the resource it is actually addressing, so the upstream's own identifier is rejected. The
+// authorization server and scopes are relayed untouched, and those are what determine the
+// audience of the issued token, so it stays valid for the upstream behind this bridge.
+// Hop-by-hop headers are connection-scoped and must not cross a proxy (RFC 9110 §7.6.1).
+// Relaying them leaks connection-scoped state to the client: a header the upstream named in its
+// own `Connection` header, or a `trailer` it announced, is meaningful only on that hop and is
+// misleading or invalid on the next one.
+const HOP_BY_HOP = new Set([
+  'connection', 'keep-alive', 'proxy-authenticate', 'proxy-authorization',
+  'te', 'trailer', 'transfer-encoding', 'upgrade',
+]);
+function stripHopByHop(headers) {
+  const out = {};
+  // Anything named in `Connection` is also hop-by-hop for this message.
+  const listed = String(headers.connection ?? '').split(',').map((s) => s.trim().toLowerCase()).filter(Boolean);
+  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(headers)) {
+    const key = k.toLowerCase();
+    if (HOP_BY_HOP.has(key) || listed.includes(key)) continue;
+    out[k] = v;
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+// The upstream document is relayed with one change: `resource` is rewritten to this bridge's URL
+// for the server. RFC 9728 requires the client to check that field against the resource it is
+// actually addressing; left as the upstream's own identifier, the client rejects the document and
+// reports that discovery failed. The authorization server and scopes are untouched, and those
+// determine the audience of the issued token, so it stays valid for the upstream behind this
+// bridge.
+function handleWellKnown(url, req, res) {
+  const m = url.pathname.match(/^\/\.well-known\/([^/]+)\/(.+)$/);
+  if (!m) return false;
+  const [, metadata, rest] = m;
+  const name = rest.split('/')[0];
+  const def = servers[name];
+  if (!def || def.type !== 'http') return false;
+
+  const upstream = new URL(def.url);
+  const target = new URL(`/.well-known/${metadata}${upstream.pathname}`, upstream.origin);
+  const lib = target.protocol === 'https:' ? https : http;
+  const headers = stripHopByHop(req.headers);
+  delete headers.host;
+  delete headers['content-length'];
+  delete headers['accept-encoding']; // keep the body readable so `resource` can be rewritten
+  const upReq = lib.request(target, { method: 'GET', headers }, (upRes) => {
+    const chunks = [];
+    upRes.on('data', (c) => chunks.push(c));
+    upRes.on('end', () => {
+      const outHeaders = stripHopByHop(upRes.headers);
+      let body = Buffer.concat(chunks);
+      try {
+        const doc = JSON.parse(body.toString('utf8'));
+        if (doc && typeof doc === 'object' && doc.resource) {
+          doc.resource = `http://${req.headers.host}/${name}`;
+          body = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(doc));
+        }
+      } catch { /* not JSON — relay untouched */ }
+      outHeaders['content-length'] = String(body.length);
+      res.writeHead(upRes.statusCode ?? 502, outHeaders);
+      res.end(body);
+    });
+  });
+  upReq.on('error', (e) => {
+    log(`[${name}] oauth metadata error: ${e.message}`);
+    try { res.writeHead(502).end('oauth metadata error'); } catch { /* noop */ }
+  });
+  upReq.end();
+  return true;
+}
+
+function proxyHttp(name, def, req, res) {
+  const chunks = [];
+  req.on('data', (c) => chunks.push(c));
+  req.on('end', async () => {
+    const body = Buffer.concat(chunks);
+    const headers = stripHopByHop(req.headers);
+    delete headers.host;
+    delete headers['content-length'];
+    let bridgeAuthenticates = false;
+    try {
+      const a = resolveAuth(def);
+      if (a) { headers[a.header.toLowerCase()] = await a.getValue(); bridgeAuthenticates = true; }
+    } catch (e) {
+      noteFailure(name, e.message);
+      log(`[${name}] auth error: ${e.message}`);
+      try { res.writeHead(502).end('auth error'); } catch { /* noop */ }
+      return;
+    }
+    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(def.headers ?? {})) headers[k] = v;
+    // A static credential in `headers` makes the bridge the authenticating party just as much as
+    // an auth command does. Without this, a 401 on such a server counted as neither success nor
+    // failure, and its challenge was relayed to a client that cannot act on it.
+    if (Object.keys(def.headers ?? {}).some((k) => k.toLowerCase() === 'authorization')) bridgeAuthenticates = true;
+
+    const remainder = req.url.substring(('/' + name).length);
+    const target = new URL(remainder ? def.url.replace(/\/$/, '') + remainder : def.url);
+    const lib = target.protocol === 'https:' ? https : http;
+    const upReq = lib.request(target, { method: req.method, headers }, (upRes) => {
+      const outHeaders = stripHopByHop(upRes.headers);
+      const wwwKey = Object.keys(outHeaders).find((k) => k.toLowerCase() === 'www-authenticate');
+      let healthCounted = false;
+      if (upRes.statusCode === 401 && wwwKey) {
+        if (bridgeAuthenticates) {
+          // The bridge supplied the credential, so a 401 is the bridge's problem, not the
+          // client's. Relaying a challenge here starts a login the client cannot win: whatever
+          // token it comes back with is overwritten by the bridge's own on the next request, so
+          // it 401s again and the client is sent back to the browser, forever. Drop the
+          // challenge and surface the failure where an operator will see it instead.
+          delete outHeaders[wwwKey];
+          const source = def.audience ? `audience ${def.audience}`
+            : (def.auth && def.auth.command) ? 'auth.command'
+            : 'the configured authorization header';
+          const detail = `upstream rejected the credential from ${source} (401)`;
+          noteFailure(name, detail);
+          healthCounted = true; // this response is already recorded; do not count it twice below
+          log(`[${name}] ${detail} — the cached credential is being discarded`);
+          // Whatever is cached is not working, so do not keep serving it for the rest of its TTL.
+          invalidateToken(def);
+        } else {
+          // The client authenticates for this server, and it derives the metadata URL from the
+          // bridge origin it is addressing. The upstream names its own origin, which the client
+          // cannot match, so point it at the bridge's copy — the one that answers with a
+          // matching `resource`.
+          outHeaders[wwwKey] = String(outHeaders[wwwKey]).replace(
+            /resource_metadata="[^"]*"/i,
+            `resource_metadata="http://${req.headers.host}/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/${name}"`,
+          );
+        }
+      }
+      res.writeHead(upRes.statusCode ?? 502, outHeaders);
+      // Health means "did the client's command work". A 401 challenge on a server the client
+      // authenticates is not a failure — it is the first half of the OAuth handshake and the
+      // client is about to complete it. Counting those marked a healthy server as failing for
+      // the three seconds of every handshake, which is most of what the dashboard showed.
+      const code = upRes.statusCode ?? 502;
+      const bridgeCredentialRejected = (code === 401 || code === 403) && bridgeAuthenticates;
+      if (healthCounted) { /* the challenge branch above already recorded this response */ }
+      else if (code >= 500) noteFailure(name, `upstream returned ${code}`);
+      else if (bridgeCredentialRejected) noteFailure(name, `upstream rejected the bridge credential (${code})`);
+      else if (code < 400) noteSuccess(name);
+      upRes.pipe(res);
+    });
+    upReq.on('error', (e) => {
+      noteFailure(name, e.message);
+      log(`[${name}] upstream error: ${e.message}`);
+      try { res.writeHead(502).end('upstream error'); } catch { /* noop */ }
+    });
+    if (body.length) upReq.write(body);
+    upReq.end();
+  });
+}
+
+/* --------------------------------- server ---------------------------------- */
+const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
+  const url = new URL(req.url, `http://${req.headers.host}`);
+  const [name, kind] = url.pathname.split('/').filter(Boolean);
+
+  if (name === 'status' && !kind) {
+    res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
+    res.end(JSON.stringify({ ok: true, service: 'mcp-pacemaker', version: VERSION, port: PORT, servers: Object.keys(servers), sessions: sessions.size }));
+    return;
+  }
+  if (name === 'api') { handleApi(kind, req, res); return; }
+  if (name === 'admin') { handleAdmin(url, req, res); return; }
+  if (name === 'ui') { handleUi(url.pathname, res); return; }
+  // Must precede the server lookup: ".well-known" is not a server name.
+  if (name === '.well-known' && handleWellKnown(url, req, res)) return;
+  if (!name || !servers[name]) { res.writeHead(404).end('unknown server'); return; }
+
+  stat(name).requests++; stat(name).lastActivity = Date.now();
+  const def = servers[name];
+  if (def.type === 'http') { proxyHttp(name, def, req, res); return; }
+
+  if (kind === 'mcp') { handleStreamable(name, req, res); return; }
+  if (def.sharing === 'shared') {
+    res.writeHead(400).end('shared mode requires Streamable HTTP; use /' + name + '/mcp');
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (req.method === 'GET' && kind === 'sse') {
+    res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/event-stream', 'Cache-Control': 'no-cache, no-transform', Connection: 'keep-alive' });
+    const sessionId = startChild(name, res);
+    res.write(`event: endpoint\ndata: http://${req.headers.host}/${name}/message?sessionId=${sessionId}\n\n`);
+    const keepAlive = setInterval(() => { try { res.write(': keepalive\n\n'); } catch { /* noop */ } }, 15000);
+    req.on('close', () => {
+      clearInterval(keepAlive);
+      const s = sessions.get(sessionId);
+      if (s) { killTree(s.child); sessions.delete(sessionId); }
+    });
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (req.method === 'POST' && kind === 'message') {
+    const s = sessions.get(url.searchParams.get('sessionId'));
+    if (!s ||
+        s.name !== name) { res.writeHead(404).end('no such session'); return; }
+    let body = '';
+    req.on('data', (c) => { body += c; });
+    req.on('end', () => {
+      let parsed;
+      try { parsed = JSON.parse(body); } catch { res.writeHead(400).end('invalid json'); return; }
+      const messages = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : [parsed];
+      try {
+        for (const m of messages) s.child.stdin.write(JSON.stringify(m) + '\n');
+        res.writeHead(202).end('accepted');
+      } catch (e) {
+        log(`[${s.name}] stdin write failed: ${e.message}`);
+        res.writeHead(500).end('write failed');
+      }
+    });
+    return;
+  }
+
+  res.writeHead(404).end('not found');
+});
+
+server.on('error', (e) => {
+  if (e.code === 'EADDRINUSE') {
+    // P5: classify what already holds the port — a pacemaker peer (adopt) vs a foreign service (collision).
+    const probe = http.get({ host: HOST, port: PORT, path: '/status', timeout: 1500 }, (resp) => {
+      let d = ''; resp.on('data', (c) => (d += c));
+      resp.on('end', () => {
+        let sig = null; try { sig = JSON.parse(d); } catch { /* not json */ }
+        if (sig && sig.service === 'mcp-pacemaker') log(`port ${PORT} already served by mcp-pacemaker v${sig.version ?? '?'} — adopting existing bridge; exiting.`);
+        else log(`port ${PORT} is held by a non-pacemaker service — choose another --port or migrate; exiting.`);
+        process.exit(3);
+      });
+    });
+    probe.on('error', () => { log(`port ${PORT} in use (status probe failed) — exiting.`); process.exit(3); });
+    probe.on('timeout', () => { probe.destroy(); log(`port ${PORT} in use (status probe timeout) — exiting.`); process.exit(3); });
+    return;
+  }
+  log(`server error: ${e.message}`); process.exit(1);
+});
+
+// Node closes idle keep-alive sockets after 5s by default. MCP clients pool connections and
+// routinely idle far longer than that between tool calls, so the socket is closed underneath
+// them and the next request fails with ECONNRESET. Hold sockets open past typical think time;
+// headersTimeout must stay above keepAliveTimeout or the two race.
+server.keepAliveTimeout = 65_000;
+server.headersTimeout = 70_000;
+
+server.listen(PORT, HOST, () => {
+  try { writeFileSync(NONCE_FILE, ADMIN_NONCE); } catch { /* noop */ }
+  log(`listening on http://${HOST}:${PORT}  (config ${CONFIG}, base cwd ${BASE_CWD})`);
+  log(`dashboard: http://${HOST}:${PORT}/ui  ·  api /api/status|/api/events|/api/logs  ·  admin nonce -> ${NONCE_FILE}`);
+  for (const [n, d] of Object.entries(servers)) {
+    log(`  ${n}  ->  ${d.type === 'http' ? `http proxy ${d.url}` : `stdio  /${n}/sse | /${n}/mcp`}`);
+  }
+});
+
+// Ending the streams before exiting matters: a client that sees its SSE stream close cleanly
+// treats it as "reconnect", while a dropped TCP connection reads as a transport fault and some
+// clients latch on that permanently. This only helps a graceful stop — a force-kill runs no
+// handler at all, which is why the supervisor should ask rather than kill.
+async function shutdown() {
+  if (shuttingDown) return;
+  shuttingDown = true; // stop warm-pool refills racing the exit
+  await poolingConfig.close();
+  sharedManager.shutdown();
+  for (const s of sessions.values()) { try { s.res?.end(); } catch { /* already gone */ } }
+  for (const s of httpSessions.values()) { try { s.sseRes?.end(); } catch { /* already gone */ } }
+  for (const s of sessions.values()) killTree(s.child, true);
+  for (const s of httpSessions.values()) killTree(s.child, true);
+  for (const arr of warmPool.values()) for (const c of arr) killTree(c, true);
+  try { server.close(); } catch { /* noop */ }
+  process.exit(0);
+}
+process.on('SIGINT', shutdown);
+process.on('SIGTERM', shutdown);