mcp-expose 1.0.0 → 1.1.1

package/dist/oauth/index.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+"use strict";
+var __create = Object.create;
+var __defProp = Object.defineProperty;
+var __getOwnPropDesc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;
+var __getOwnPropNames = Object.getOwnPropertyNames;
+var __getProtoOf = Object.getPrototypeOf;
+var __hasOwnProp = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty;
+var __name = (target, value) => __defProp(target, "name", { value, configurable: true });
+var __export = (target, all) => {
+  for (var name in all)
+    __defProp(target, name, { get: all[name], enumerable: true });
+};
+var __copyProps = (to, from, except, desc) => {
+  if (from && typeof from === "object" || typeof from === "function") {
+    for (let key of __getOwnPropNames(from))
+      if (!__hasOwnProp.call(to, key) && key !== except)
+        __defProp(to, key, { get: () => from[key], enumerable: !(desc = __getOwnPropDesc(from, key)) || desc.enumerable });
+  }
+  return to;
+};
+var __toESM = (mod, isNodeMode, target) => (target = mod != null ? __create(__getProtoOf(mod)) : {}, __copyProps(
+  // If the importer is in node compatibility mode or this is not an ESM
+  // file that has been converted to a CommonJS file using a Babel-
+  // compatible transform (i.e. "__esModule" has not been set), then set
+  // "default" to the CommonJS "module.exports" for node compatibility.
+  isNodeMode || !mod || !mod.__esModule ? __defProp(target, "default", { value: mod, enumerable: true }) : target,
+  mod
+));
+var __toCommonJS = (mod) => __copyProps(__defProp({}, "__esModule", { value: true }), mod);
+
+// src/oauth/index.ts
+var oauth_exports = {};
+__export(oauth_exports, {
+  discoverAuthorizationServer: () => discoverAuthorizationServer,
+  introspectionVerifier: () => introspectionVerifier,
+  jwtVerifier: () => jwtVerifier
+});
+module.exports = __toCommonJS(oauth_exports);
+
+// src/core/oauth.ts
+function parseScopes(value) {
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map(String);
+  if (typeof value === "string") return value.split(" ").filter(Boolean);
+  return [];
+}
+__name(parseScopes, "parseScopes");
+
+// src/oauth/index.ts
+var ASYMMETRIC = [
+  "RS256",
+  "RS384",
+  "RS512",
+  "PS256",
+  "PS384",
+  "PS512",
+  "ES256",
+  "ES384",
+  "ES512",
+  "EdDSA",
+  "Ed25519"
+];
+var josePromise;
+function loadJose() {
+  josePromise ??= import("jose").catch((err) => {
+    josePromise = void 0;
+    throw new Error(`mcp-expose: jwtVerifier() needs the "jose" package. Run: npm install jose (${String(err)})`);
+  });
+  return josePromise;
+}
+__name(loadJose, "loadJose");
+async function discoverAuthorizationServer(issuer) {
+  const url = new URL(issuer);
+  const path = url.pathname.replace(/\/+$/, "");
+  const candidates = [
+    new URL(`/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server${path}`, url.origin).href,
+    new URL(`/.well-known/openid-configuration${path}`, url.origin).href,
+    ...path ? [
+      `${url.origin}${path}/.well-known/openid-configuration`
+    ] : []
+  ];
+  for (const candidate of candidates) {
+    try {
+      const res = await fetch(candidate, {
+        headers: {
+          accept: "application/json"
+        }
+      });
+      if (res.ok) return await res.json();
+    } catch {
+    }
+  }
+  throw new Error(`mcp-expose: could not load authorization server metadata for ${issuer}`);
+}
+__name(discoverAuthorizationServer, "discoverAuthorizationServer");
+function toAuthInfo(token, claims, scopeClaim) {
+  const scopes = scopeClaim ? parseScopes(claims[scopeClaim]) : parseScopes(claims.scope ?? claims.scp);
+  return {
+    token,
+    scopes,
+    subject: typeof claims.sub === "string" ? claims.sub : void 0,
+    clientId: [
+      claims.client_id,
+      claims.azp,
+      claims.cid
+    ].find((v) => typeof v === "string"),
+    expiresAt: typeof claims.exp === "number" ? claims.exp : void 0,
+    claims
+  };
+}
+__name(toAuthInfo, "toAuthInfo");
+function jwtVerifier(options) {
+  let keySet;
+  const getKeys = /* @__PURE__ */ __name(() => {
+    keySet ??= (async () => {
+      const jose = await loadJose();
+      if (options.jwks) return jose.createLocalJWKSet(options.jwks);
+      const jwksUri = options.jwksUri ?? (await discoverAuthorizationServer(options.issuer)).jwks_uri;
+      if (!jwksUri) throw new Error(`mcp-expose: no jwks_uri in the metadata of ${options.issuer}`);
+      return jose.createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(jwksUri));
+    })().catch((err) => {
+      keySet = void 0;
+      throw err;
+    });
+    return keySet;
+  }, "getKeys");
+  return async (token, ctx) => {
+    const jose = await loadJose();
+    const { payload } = await jose.jwtVerify(token, await getKeys(), {
+      issuer: options.issuer,
+      audience: options.audience ?? ctx.resource,
+      algorithms: options.algorithms ?? ASYMMETRIC,
+      clockTolerance: options.clockTolerance ?? 30
+    });
+    const claims = payload;
+    if (options.validate && !await options.validate(claims)) return void 0;
+    return toAuthInfo(token, claims, options.scopeClaim);
+  };
+}
+__name(jwtVerifier, "jwtVerifier");
+function introspectionVerifier(options) {
+  if (!options.introspectionEndpoint && !options.issuer) {
+    throw new Error("mcp-expose: introspectionVerifier needs introspectionEndpoint or issuer");
+  }
+  let endpoint;
+  const getEndpoint = /* @__PURE__ */ __name(() => {
+    endpoint ??= (async () => {
+      if (options.introspectionEndpoint) return options.introspectionEndpoint;
+      const meta = await discoverAuthorizationServer(options.issuer);
+      if (typeof meta.introspection_endpoint !== "string") {
+        throw new Error(`mcp-expose: no introspection_endpoint in the metadata of ${options.issuer}`);
+      }
+      return meta.introspection_endpoint;
+    })().catch((err) => {
+      endpoint = void 0;
+      throw err;
+    });
+    return endpoint;
+  }, "getEndpoint");
+  const cacheMs = (options.cacheSeconds ?? 60) * 1e3;
+  const cache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  return async (token, ctx) => {
+    const now = Date.now();
+    const hit = cache.get(token);
+    if (hit && hit.until > now) return hit.info;
+    cache.delete(token);
+    const headers = {
+      "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+      accept: "application/json",
+      ...options.headers
+    };
+    if (options.clientId) {
+      const basic = `${encodeURIComponent(options.clientId)}:${encodeURIComponent(options.clientSecret ?? "")}`;
+      headers.authorization = `Basic ${btoa(basic)}`;
+    }
+    const res = await fetch(await getEndpoint(), {
+      method: "POST",
+      headers,
+      body: new URLSearchParams({
+        token,
+        token_type_hint: "access_token"
+      }).toString()
+    });
+    if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`token introspection failed: HTTP ${res.status}`);
+    const data = await res.json();
+    if (data.active !== true) return void 0;
+    if (options.issuer && typeof data.iss === "string" && data.iss !== options.issuer) return void 0;
+    const expected = [
+      options.audience ?? ctx.resource
+    ].flat();
+    const aud = data.aud === void 0 ? void 0 : [
+      data.aud
+    ].flat().map(String);
+    if (aud ? !aud.some((a) => expected.includes(a)) : options.requireAudience) return void 0;
+    if (options.validate && !await options.validate(data)) return void 0;
+    const info = toAuthInfo(token, data);
+    if (cacheMs > 0) {
+      const until = Math.min(now + cacheMs, info.expiresAt ? info.expiresAt * 1e3 : Infinity);
+      if (cache.size > 1e4) cache.clear();
+      cache.set(token, {
+        info,
+        until
+      });
+    }
+    return info;
+  };
+}
+__name(introspectionVerifier, "introspectionVerifier");
+// Annotate the CommonJS export names for ESM import in node:
+0 && (module.exports = {
+  discoverAuthorizationServer,
+  introspectionVerifier,
+  jwtVerifier
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.cjs.map

package/dist/oauth/index.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/oauth/index.ts","../../src/core/oauth.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Ready-made token verifiers for the `oauth` option:\n *\n *   - `jwtVerifier()`           JWT access tokens, checked against the issuer's JWKS\n *                               (Auth0, Okta, Keycloak, Entra ID, Clerk, Cognito, WorkOS, ...).\n *                               Needs the `jose` package.\n *   - `introspectionVerifier()` opaque tokens, checked with RFC 7662 token introspection.\n *\n * Both check the audience: a token is only accepted when it was issued for this\n * MCP server (`oauth.resource`), so tokens meant for other services are refused.\n */\nimport { parseScopes } from '../core/oauth.js';\nimport type { AuthInfo, TokenVerifier } from '../core/oauth.js';\nimport type * as JoseModule from 'jose';\n\nexport type { AuthInfo, TokenVerifier, VerifyTokenContext } from '../core/oauth.js';\n\nexport interface JwtVerifierOptions {\n  /** Expected `iss` claim, e.g. `https://your-tenant.auth0.com/`. */\n  issuer: string;\n  /**\n   * Expected `aud` claim(s). Defaults to `oauth.resource`, the URL of your MCP endpoint,\n   * as the MCP spec requires. Set it when your authorization server uses a different\n   * audience identifier (e.g. an Auth0 API identifier).\n   */\n  audience?: string | string[];\n  /** JWKS URL. Discovered from the issuer's metadata when omitted. */\n  jwksUri?: string;\n  /** A static JWKS (`{ keys: [...] }`) instead of fetching one. */\n  jwks?: { keys: Record<string, unknown>[] };\n  /** Allowed signing algorithms. @default asymmetric algorithms only (RS*, PS*, ES*, EdDSA) */\n  algorithms?: string[];\n  /** Allowed clock skew in seconds. @default 30 */\n  clockTolerance?: number;\n  /** Claim that holds the scopes. @default 'scope', then 'scp' */\n  scopeClaim?: string;\n  /** Extra checks on the verified claims; return false to reject the token. */\n  validate?: (claims: Record<string, unknown>) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;\n}\n\nconst ASYMMETRIC = [\n  'RS256',\n  'RS384',\n  'RS512',\n  'PS256',\n  'PS384',\n  'PS512',\n  'ES256',\n  'ES384',\n  'ES512',\n  'EdDSA',\n  'Ed25519',\n];\n\ntype Jose = typeof JoseModule;\nlet josePromise: Promise<Jose> | undefined;\nfunction loadJose(): Promise<Jose> {\n  josePromise ??= import('jose').catch((err: unknown) => {\n    josePromise = undefined;\n    throw new Error(`mcp-expose: jwtVerifier() needs the \"jose\" package. Run: npm install jose (${String(err)})`);\n  });\n  return josePromise;\n}\n\n/**\n * Authorization server metadata (RFC 8414), falling back to OpenID Connect discovery.\n * Tries the path-inserted and appended forms, as MCP clients do.\n */\nexport async function discoverAuthorizationServer(issuer: string): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {\n  const url = new URL(issuer);\n  const path = url.pathname.replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n  const candidates = [\n    new URL(`/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server${path}`, url.origin).href,\n    new URL(`/.well-known/openid-configuration${path}`, url.origin).href,\n    ...(path ? [`${url.origin}${path}/.well-known/openid-configuration`] : []),\n  ];\n  for (const candidate of candidates) {\n    try {\n      const res = await fetch(candidate, { headers: { accept: 'application/json' } });\n      if (res.ok) return (await res.json()) as Record<string, unknown>;\n    } catch {\n      /* try the next one */\n    }\n  }\n  throw new Error(`mcp-expose: could not load authorization server metadata for ${issuer}`);\n}\n\nfunction toAuthInfo(token: string, claims: Record<string, unknown>, scopeClaim?: string): AuthInfo {\n  const scopes = scopeClaim ? parseScopes(claims[scopeClaim]) : parseScopes(claims.scope ?? claims.scp);\n  return {\n    token,\n    scopes,\n    subject: typeof claims.sub === 'string' ? claims.sub : undefined,\n    clientId: [claims.client_id, claims.azp, claims.cid].find((v): v is string => typeof v === 'string'),\n    expiresAt: typeof claims.exp === 'number' ? claims.exp : undefined,\n    claims,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify JWT access tokens with the issuer's public keys:\n *\n *   oauth: {\n *     resource: 'https://api.example.com/mcp',\n *     authorizationServers: ['https://example.auth0.com/'],\n *     verifyToken: jwtVerifier({ issuer: 'https://example.auth0.com/' }),\n *   }\n *\n * Checks signature, `iss`, `aud` (defaults to the resource), `exp` and `nbf`.\n */\nexport function jwtVerifier(options: JwtVerifierOptions): TokenVerifier {\n  let keySet: Promise<Parameters<Jose['jwtVerify']>[1]> | undefined;\n  const getKeys = () => {\n    keySet ??= (async () => {\n      const jose = await loadJose();\n      if (options.jwks) return jose.createLocalJWKSet(options.jwks as Parameters<Jose['createLocalJWKSet']>[0]);\n      const jwksUri = options.jwksUri ?? ((await discoverAuthorizationServer(options.issuer)).jwks_uri as string);\n      if (!jwksUri) throw new Error(`mcp-expose: no jwks_uri in the metadata of ${options.issuer}`);\n      return jose.createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(jwksUri));\n    })().catch((err: unknown) => {\n      keySet = undefined; // retry discovery on the next request\n      throw err;\n    });\n    return keySet;\n  };\n\n  return async (token, ctx) => {\n    const jose = await loadJose();\n    const { payload } = await jose.jwtVerify(token, await getKeys(), {\n      issuer: options.issuer,\n      audience: options.audience ?? ctx.resource,\n      algorithms: options.algorithms ?? ASYMMETRIC,\n      clockTolerance: options.clockTolerance ?? 30,\n    });\n    const claims = payload as Record<string, unknown>;\n    if (options.validate && !(await options.validate(claims))) return undefined;\n    return toAuthInfo(token, claims, options.scopeClaim);\n  };\n}\n\nexport interface IntrospectionVerifierOptions {\n  /** Token introspection endpoint. Discovered from `issuer` when omitted. */\n  introspectionEndpoint?: string;\n  /** Issuer URL, used to discover the endpoint and to check `iss` when present. */\n  issuer?: string;\n  /** Credentials of this resource server at the authorization server (HTTP Basic). */\n  clientId?: string;\n  clientSecret?: string;\n  /** Or any headers, e.g. `{ authorization: 'Bearer <token>' }`. */\n  headers?: Record<string, string>;\n  /**\n   * Expected audience. Defaults to `oauth.resource`. Checked when the response\n   * has an `aud` field; set `requireAudience: true` to reject responses without one.\n   */\n  audience?: string | string[];\n  requireAudience?: boolean;\n  /** Cache positive results for this many seconds (never past the token expiry). @default 60 */\n  cacheSeconds?: number;\n  /** Extra checks on the introspection response; return false to reject. */\n  validate?: (response: Record<string, unknown>) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;\n}\n\n/** Verify opaque (or any) tokens with RFC 7662 token introspection. */\nexport function introspectionVerifier(options: IntrospectionVerifierOptions): TokenVerifier {\n  if (!options.introspectionEndpoint && !options.issuer) {\n    throw new Error('mcp-expose: introspectionVerifier needs introspectionEndpoint or issuer');\n  }\n  let endpoint: Promise<string> | undefined;\n  const getEndpoint = () => {\n    endpoint ??= (async () => {\n      if (options.introspectionEndpoint) return options.introspectionEndpoint;\n      const meta = await discoverAuthorizationServer(options.issuer!);\n      if (typeof meta.introspection_endpoint !== 'string') {\n        throw new Error(`mcp-expose: no introspection_endpoint in the metadata of ${options.issuer}`);\n      }\n      return meta.introspection_endpoint;\n    })().catch((err: unknown) => {\n      endpoint = undefined;\n      throw err;\n    });\n    return endpoint;\n  };\n\n  const cacheMs = (options.cacheSeconds ?? 60) * 1000;\n  const cache = new Map<string, { info: AuthInfo; until: number }>();\n\n  return async (token, ctx) => {\n    const now = Date.now();\n    const hit = cache.get(token);\n    if (hit && hit.until > now) return hit.info;\n    cache.delete(token);\n\n    const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n      'content-type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',\n      accept: 'application/json',\n      ...options.headers,\n    };\n    if (options.clientId) {\n      const basic = `${encodeURIComponent(options.clientId)}:${encodeURIComponent(options.clientSecret ?? '')}`;\n      headers.authorization = `Basic ${btoa(basic)}`;\n    }\n    const res = await fetch(await getEndpoint(), {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers,\n      body: new URLSearchParams({ token, token_type_hint: 'access_token' }).toString(),\n    });\n    if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`token introspection failed: HTTP ${res.status}`);\n    const data = (await res.json()) as Record<string, unknown>;\n    if (data.active !== true) return undefined;\n\n    if (options.issuer && typeof data.iss === 'string' && data.iss !== options.issuer) return undefined;\n    const expected = [options.audience ?? ctx.resource].flat();\n    const aud = data.aud === undefined ? undefined : [data.aud].flat().map(String);\n    if (aud ? !aud.some((a) => expected.includes(a)) : options.requireAudience) return undefined;\n    if (options.validate && !(await options.validate(data))) return undefined;\n\n    const info = toAuthInfo(token, data);\n    if (cacheMs > 0) {\n      const until = Math.min(now + cacheMs, info.expiresAt ? info.expiresAt * 1000 : Infinity);\n      if (cache.size > 10_000) cache.clear();\n      cache.set(token, { info, until });\n    }\n    return info;\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * OAuth 2.1 support per the MCP authorization spec: the MCP endpoint acts as an\n * OAuth *resource server*. It publishes Protected Resource Metadata (RFC 9728),\n * answers unauthenticated requests with a `WWW-Authenticate` challenge that\n * tells the client where to log in, and checks bearer tokens with a verifier\n * you provide (see `jwtVerifier` / `introspectionVerifier` in `mcp-expose/oauth`).\n *\n * Runtime-agnostic: no `node:*` imports.\n */\n\n/** Who the access token belongs to and what it allows. Available to tools as `ctx.auth`. */\nexport interface AuthInfo {\n  /** The raw access token. */\n  token: string;\n  /** Scopes granted to the token. */\n  scopes: string[];\n  /** Subject (user id), e.g. the JWT `sub` claim. */\n  subject?: string;\n  /** OAuth client the token was issued to. */\n  clientId?: string;\n  /** Expiry, in seconds since the epoch. Expired tokens are rejected. */\n  expiresAt?: number;\n  /** All claims / introspection fields. */\n  claims?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyTokenContext {\n  /** The canonical resource URL (`oauth.resource`). Tokens must be issued for it (audience). */\n  resource: string;\n  /** Lower-cased headers of the MCP request. */\n  headers: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Checks an access token. Return its AuthInfo, or `undefined` / throw when the\n * token is invalid. It MUST check that the token was issued for this server\n * (audience = `ctx.resource`), or tokens meant for other services would be accepted.\n */\nexport type TokenVerifier = (\n  token: string,\n  ctx: VerifyTokenContext,\n) => AuthInfo | undefined | null | Promise<AuthInfo | undefined | null>;\n\nexport interface OAuthOptions {\n  /**\n   * Canonical, public URL of the MCP endpoint, e.g. `https://api.example.com/mcp`.\n   * Clients request tokens for this resource, and it must match the URL they connect to.\n   */\n  resource: string;\n  /** Issuer URLs of the authorization servers that issue tokens for this server. */\n  authorizationServers: string[];\n  /** Checks bearer tokens. */\n  verifyToken: TokenVerifier;\n  /** Scopes every token needs to use the MCP endpoint at all. */\n  requiredScopes?: string[];\n  /** Scopes advertised in the metadata. @default requiredScopes plus every tool's `scopes` */\n  scopesSupported?: string[];\n  /** Human-readable name shown by clients. */\n  resourceName?: string;\n  /** URL of documentation for developers. */\n  resourceDocumentation?: string;\n  /** Extra fields merged into the Protected Resource Metadata document. */\n  metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\nexport const PROTECTED_RESOURCE_WELL_KNOWN = '/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource';\n\n/**\n * Paths the metadata is served on, per RFC 9728: the well-known prefix with the\n * resource path appended (`/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp`), plus the\n * bare well-known path that older clients fall back to.\n */\nexport function protectedResourceMetadataPaths(resource: string): string[] {\n  const pathname = new URL(resource).pathname.replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n  return pathname\n    ? [PROTECTED_RESOURCE_WELL_KNOWN + pathname, PROTECTED_RESOURCE_WELL_KNOWN]\n    : [PROTECTED_RESOURCE_WELL_KNOWN];\n}\n\n/** Absolute URL of the metadata document, used in `WWW-Authenticate`. */\nexport function protectedResourceMetadataUrl(resource: string): string {\n  return new URL(protectedResourceMetadataPaths(resource)[0] as string, resource).href;\n}\n\nexport function validateOAuthOptions(o: OAuthOptions): void {\n  let url: URL;\n  try {\n    url = new URL(o.resource);\n  } catch {\n    throw new Error(`mcp-expose: oauth.resource must be an absolute URL, got ${JSON.stringify(o.resource)}`);\n  }\n  if (url.hash) throw new Error('mcp-expose: oauth.resource must not contain a fragment');\n  if (!o.authorizationServers?.length) throw new Error('mcp-expose: oauth.authorizationServers must not be empty');\n  if (typeof o.verifyToken !== 'function') throw new Error('mcp-expose: oauth.verifyToken is required');\n}\n\nconst quote = (v: string) => `\"${v.replace(/[\"\\\\]/g, '\\\\$&')}\"`;\n\n/** Build a `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer ...` challenge (RFC 6750 + RFC 9728). */\nexport function bearerChallenge(\n  resource: string,\n  params: { error?: string; errorDescription?: string; scope?: string[] } = {},\n): string {\n  const parts: string[] = [];\n  if (params.error) parts.push(`error=${quote(params.error)}`);\n  if (params.errorDescription) parts.push(`error_description=${quote(params.errorDescription)}`);\n  if (params.scope?.length) parts.push(`scope=${quote(params.scope.join(' '))}`);\n  parts.push(`resource_metadata=${quote(protectedResourceMetadataUrl(resource))}`);\n  return `Bearer ${parts.join(', ')}`;\n}\n\n/** Extract the token from `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. Tokens in the query string are never accepted. */\nexport function bearerToken(headers: Record<string, string>): string | undefined {\n  const m = /^Bearer[ ]+([^\\s,]+)\\s*$/i.exec(headers.authorization ?? '');\n  return m?.[1];\n}\n\nexport type AuthOutcome =\n  | { ok: true; auth: AuthInfo }\n  | { ok: false; status: 401 | 403; challenge: string; error: string; description: string };\n\n/** Authenticate one MCP request. */\nexport async function authenticate(o: OAuthOptions, headers: Record<string, string>): Promise<AuthOutcome> {\n  const token = bearerToken(headers);\n  if (!token) {\n    // No credentials: a bare challenge pointing at the metadata starts the client's login flow.\n    return {\n      ok: false,\n      status: 401,\n      error: 'unauthorized',\n      description: 'Authorization required',\n      challenge: bearerChallenge(o.resource, { scope: o.requiredScopes }),\n    };\n  }\n\n  let auth: AuthInfo | undefined | null;\n  try {\n    auth = await o.verifyToken(token, { resource: o.resource, headers });\n  } catch {\n    auth = undefined;\n  }\n  if (!auth) return deny(o, 401, 'invalid_token', 'The access token is invalid');\n  if (auth.expiresAt !== undefined && auth.expiresAt * 1000 <= Date.now()) {\n    return deny(o, 401, 'invalid_token', 'The access token has expired');\n  }\n  const missing = missingScopes(auth, o.requiredScopes);\n  if (missing.length) {\n    // Keep the scopes already granted in the challenge, so re-authorizing never drops access.\n    const scope = [...new Set([...(auth.scopes ?? []), ...(o.requiredScopes ?? [])])];\n    return deny(o, 403, 'insufficient_scope', `Missing scope: ${missing.join(' ')}`, scope);\n  }\n  return { ok: true, auth: { ...auth, scopes: auth.scopes ?? [] } };\n}\n\n/** A failed AuthOutcome with an RFC 6750 error challenge. */\nexport function deny(\n  o: OAuthOptions,\n  status: 401 | 403,\n  error: string,\n  description: string,\n  scope?: string[],\n): AuthOutcome & { ok: false } {\n  return {\n    ok: false,\n    status,\n    error,\n    description,\n    challenge: bearerChallenge(o.resource, { error, errorDescription: description, scope }),\n  };\n}\n\nexport function missingScopes(auth: AuthInfo | undefined, required: string[] | undefined): string[] {\n  if (!required?.length) return [];\n  const granted = new Set(auth?.scopes ?? []);\n  return required.filter((s) => !granted.has(s));\n}\n\n/** Parse a space-separated `scope` string or an array of scopes. */\nexport function parseScopes(value: unknown): string[] {\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map(String);\n  if (typeof value === 'string') return value.split(' ').filter(Boolean);\n  return 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package/dist/oauth/index.d.cts

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+import { T as TokenVerifier } from '../oauth-8RmQamGP.cjs';
+export { A as AuthInfo, V as VerifyTokenContext } from '../oauth-8RmQamGP.cjs';
+
+interface JwtVerifierOptions {
+    /** Expected `iss` claim, e.g. `https://your-tenant.auth0.com/`. */
+    issuer: string;
+    /**
+     * Expected `aud` claim(s). Defaults to `oauth.resource`, the URL of your MCP endpoint,
+     * as the MCP spec requires. Set it when your authorization server uses a different
+     * audience identifier (e.g. an Auth0 API identifier).
+     */
+    audience?: string | string[];
+    /** JWKS URL. Discovered from the issuer's metadata when omitted. */
+    jwksUri?: string;
+    /** A static JWKS (`{ keys: [...] }`) instead of fetching one. */
+    jwks?: {
+        keys: Record<string, unknown>[];
+    };
+    /** Allowed signing algorithms. @default asymmetric algorithms only (RS*, PS*, ES*, EdDSA) */
+    algorithms?: string[];
+    /** Allowed clock skew in seconds. @default 30 */
+    clockTolerance?: number;
+    /** Claim that holds the scopes. @default 'scope', then 'scp' */
+    scopeClaim?: string;
+    /** Extra checks on the verified claims; return false to reject the token. */
+    validate?: (claims: Record<string, unknown>) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;
+}
+/**
+ * Authorization server metadata (RFC 8414), falling back to OpenID Connect discovery.
+ * Tries the path-inserted and appended forms, as MCP clients do.
+ */
+declare function discoverAuthorizationServer(issuer: string): Promise<Record<string, unknown>>;
+/**
+ * Verify JWT access tokens with the issuer's public keys:
+ *
+ *   oauth: {
+ *     resource: 'https://api.example.com/mcp',
+ *     authorizationServers: ['https://example.auth0.com/'],
+ *     verifyToken: jwtVerifier({ issuer: 'https://example.auth0.com/' }),
+ *   }
+ *
+ * Checks signature, `iss`, `aud` (defaults to the resource), `exp` and `nbf`.
+ */
+declare function jwtVerifier(options: JwtVerifierOptions): TokenVerifier;
+interface IntrospectionVerifierOptions {
+    /** Token introspection endpoint. Discovered from `issuer` when omitted. */
+    introspectionEndpoint?: string;
+    /** Issuer URL, used to discover the endpoint and to check `iss` when present. */
+    issuer?: string;
+    /** Credentials of this resource server at the authorization server (HTTP Basic). */
+    clientId?: string;
+    clientSecret?: string;
+    /** Or any headers, e.g. `{ authorization: 'Bearer <token>' }`. */
+    headers?: Record<string, string>;
+    /**
+     * Expected audience. Defaults to `oauth.resource`. Checked when the response
+     * has an `aud` field; set `requireAudience: true` to reject responses without one.
+     */
+    audience?: string | string[];
+    requireAudience?: boolean;
+    /** Cache positive results for this many seconds (never past the token expiry). @default 60 */
+    cacheSeconds?: number;
+    /** Extra checks on the introspection response; return false to reject. */
+    validate?: (response: Record<string, unknown>) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;
+}
+/** Verify opaque (or any) tokens with RFC 7662 token introspection. */
+declare function introspectionVerifier(options: IntrospectionVerifierOptions): TokenVerifier;
+
+export { type IntrospectionVerifierOptions, type JwtVerifierOptions, TokenVerifier, discoverAuthorizationServer, introspectionVerifier, jwtVerifier };

package/dist/oauth/index.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+import { T as TokenVerifier } from '../oauth-8RmQamGP.js';
+export { A as AuthInfo, V as VerifyTokenContext } from '../oauth-8RmQamGP.js';
+
+interface JwtVerifierOptions {
+    /** Expected `iss` claim, e.g. `https://your-tenant.auth0.com/`. */
+    issuer: string;
+    /**
+     * Expected `aud` claim(s). Defaults to `oauth.resource`, the URL of your MCP endpoint,
+     * as the MCP spec requires. Set it when your authorization server uses a different
+     * audience identifier (e.g. an Auth0 API identifier).
+     */
+    audience?: string | string[];
+    /** JWKS URL. Discovered from the issuer's metadata when omitted. */
+    jwksUri?: string;
+    /** A static JWKS (`{ keys: [...] }`) instead of fetching one. */
+    jwks?: {
+        keys: Record<string, unknown>[];
+    };
+    /** Allowed signing algorithms. @default asymmetric algorithms only (RS*, PS*, ES*, EdDSA) */
+    algorithms?: string[];
+    /** Allowed clock skew in seconds. @default 30 */
+    clockTolerance?: number;
+    /** Claim that holds the scopes. @default 'scope', then 'scp' */
+    scopeClaim?: string;
+    /** Extra checks on the verified claims; return false to reject the token. */
+    validate?: (claims: Record<string, unknown>) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;
+}
+/**
+ * Authorization server metadata (RFC 8414), falling back to OpenID Connect discovery.
+ * Tries the path-inserted and appended forms, as MCP clients do.
+ */
+declare function discoverAuthorizationServer(issuer: string): Promise<Record<string, unknown>>;
+/**
+ * Verify JWT access tokens with the issuer's public keys:
+ *
+ *   oauth: {
+ *     resource: 'https://api.example.com/mcp',
+ *     authorizationServers: ['https://example.auth0.com/'],
+ *     verifyToken: jwtVerifier({ issuer: 'https://example.auth0.com/' }),
+ *   }
+ *
+ * Checks signature, `iss`, `aud` (defaults to the resource), `exp` and `nbf`.
+ */
+declare function jwtVerifier(options: JwtVerifierOptions): TokenVerifier;
+interface IntrospectionVerifierOptions {
+    /** Token introspection endpoint. Discovered from `issuer` when omitted. */
+    introspectionEndpoint?: string;
+    /** Issuer URL, used to discover the endpoint and to check `iss` when present. */
+    issuer?: string;
+    /** Credentials of this resource server at the authorization server (HTTP Basic). */
+    clientId?: string;
+    clientSecret?: string;
+    /** Or any headers, e.g. `{ authorization: 'Bearer <token>' }`. */
+    headers?: Record<string, string>;
+    /**
+     * Expected audience. Defaults to `oauth.resource`. Checked when the response
+     * has an `aud` field; set `requireAudience: true` to reject responses without one.
+     */
+    audience?: string | string[];
+    requireAudience?: boolean;
+    /** Cache positive results for this many seconds (never past the token expiry). @default 60 */
+    cacheSeconds?: number;
+    /** Extra checks on the introspection response; return false to reject. */
+    validate?: (response: Record<string, unknown>) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;
+}
+/** Verify opaque (or any) tokens with RFC 7662 token introspection. */
+declare function introspectionVerifier(options: IntrospectionVerifierOptions): TokenVerifier;
+
+export { type IntrospectionVerifierOptions, type JwtVerifierOptions, TokenVerifier, discoverAuthorizationServer, introspectionVerifier, jwtVerifier };

package/dist/oauth/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+var __defProp = Object.defineProperty;
+var __name = (target, value) => __defProp(target, "name", { value, configurable: true });
+
+// src/core/oauth.ts
+function parseScopes(value) {
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map(String);
+  if (typeof value === "string") return value.split(" ").filter(Boolean);
+  return [];
+}
+__name(parseScopes, "parseScopes");
+
+// src/oauth/index.ts
+var ASYMMETRIC = [
+  "RS256",
+  "RS384",
+  "RS512",
+  "PS256",
+  "PS384",
+  "PS512",
+  "ES256",
+  "ES384",
+  "ES512",
+  "EdDSA",
+  "Ed25519"
+];
+var josePromise;
+function loadJose() {
+  josePromise ??= import("jose").catch((err) => {
+    josePromise = void 0;
+    throw new Error(`mcp-expose: jwtVerifier() needs the "jose" package. Run: npm install jose (${String(err)})`);
+  });
+  return josePromise;
+}
+__name(loadJose, "loadJose");
+async function discoverAuthorizationServer(issuer) {
+  const url = new URL(issuer);
+  const path = url.pathname.replace(/\/+$/, "");
+  const candidates = [
+    new URL(`/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server${path}`, url.origin).href,
+    new URL(`/.well-known/openid-configuration${path}`, url.origin).href,
+    ...path ? [
+      `${url.origin}${path}/.well-known/openid-configuration`
+    ] : []
+  ];
+  for (const candidate of candidates) {
+    try {
+      const res = await fetch(candidate, {
+        headers: {
+          accept: "application/json"
+        }
+      });
+      if (res.ok) return await res.json();
+    } catch {
+    }
+  }
+  throw new Error(`mcp-expose: could not load authorization server metadata for ${issuer}`);
+}
+__name(discoverAuthorizationServer, "discoverAuthorizationServer");
+function toAuthInfo(token, claims, scopeClaim) {
+  const scopes = scopeClaim ? parseScopes(claims[scopeClaim]) : parseScopes(claims.scope ?? claims.scp);
+  return {
+    token,
+    scopes,
+    subject: typeof claims.sub === "string" ? claims.sub : void 0,
+    clientId: [
+      claims.client_id,
+      claims.azp,
+      claims.cid
+    ].find((v) => typeof v === "string"),
+    expiresAt: typeof claims.exp === "number" ? claims.exp : void 0,
+    claims
+  };
+}
+__name(toAuthInfo, "toAuthInfo");
+function jwtVerifier(options) {
+  let keySet;
+  const getKeys = /* @__PURE__ */ __name(() => {
+    keySet ??= (async () => {
+      const jose = await loadJose();
+      if (options.jwks) return jose.createLocalJWKSet(options.jwks);
+      const jwksUri = options.jwksUri ?? (await discoverAuthorizationServer(options.issuer)).jwks_uri;
+      if (!jwksUri) throw new Error(`mcp-expose: no jwks_uri in the metadata of ${options.issuer}`);
+      return jose.createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(jwksUri));
+    })().catch((err) => {
+      keySet = void 0;
+      throw err;
+    });
+    return keySet;
+  }, "getKeys");
+  return async (token, ctx) => {
+    const jose = await loadJose();
+    const { payload } = await jose.jwtVerify(token, await getKeys(), {
+      issuer: options.issuer,
+      audience: options.audience ?? ctx.resource,
+      algorithms: options.algorithms ?? ASYMMETRIC,
+      clockTolerance: options.clockTolerance ?? 30
+    });
+    const claims = payload;
+    if (options.validate && !await options.validate(claims)) return void 0;
+    return toAuthInfo(token, claims, options.scopeClaim);
+  };
+}
+__name(jwtVerifier, "jwtVerifier");
+function introspectionVerifier(options) {
+  if (!options.introspectionEndpoint && !options.issuer) {
+    throw new Error("mcp-expose: introspectionVerifier needs introspectionEndpoint or issuer");
+  }
+  let endpoint;
+  const getEndpoint = /* @__PURE__ */ __name(() => {
+    endpoint ??= (async () => {
+      if (options.introspectionEndpoint) return options.introspectionEndpoint;
+      const meta = await discoverAuthorizationServer(options.issuer);
+      if (typeof meta.introspection_endpoint !== "string") {
+        throw new Error(`mcp-expose: no introspection_endpoint in the metadata of ${options.issuer}`);
+      }
+      return meta.introspection_endpoint;
+    })().catch((err) => {
+      endpoint = void 0;
+      throw err;
+    });
+    return endpoint;
+  }, "getEndpoint");
+  const cacheMs = (options.cacheSeconds ?? 60) * 1e3;
+  const cache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  return async (token, ctx) => {
+    const now = Date.now();
+    const hit = cache.get(token);
+    if (hit && hit.until > now) return hit.info;
+    cache.delete(token);
+    const headers = {
+      "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+      accept: "application/json",
+      ...options.headers
+    };
+    if (options.clientId) {
+      const basic = `${encodeURIComponent(options.clientId)}:${encodeURIComponent(options.clientSecret ?? "")}`;
+      headers.authorization = `Basic ${btoa(basic)}`;
+    }
+    const res = await fetch(await getEndpoint(), {
+      method: "POST",
+      headers,
+      body: new URLSearchParams({
+        token,
+        token_type_hint: "access_token"
+      }).toString()
+    });
+    if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`token introspection failed: HTTP ${res.status}`);
+    const data = await res.json();
+    if (data.active !== true) return void 0;
+    if (options.issuer && typeof data.iss === "string" && data.iss !== options.issuer) return void 0;
+    const expected = [
+      options.audience ?? ctx.resource
+    ].flat();
+    const aud = data.aud === void 0 ? void 0 : [
+      data.aud
+    ].flat().map(String);
+    if (aud ? !aud.some((a) => expected.includes(a)) : options.requireAudience) return void 0;
+    if (options.validate && !await options.validate(data)) return void 0;
+    const info = toAuthInfo(token, data);
+    if (cacheMs > 0) {
+      const until = Math.min(now + cacheMs, info.expiresAt ? info.expiresAt * 1e3 : Infinity);
+      if (cache.size > 1e4) cache.clear();
+      cache.set(token, {
+        info,
+        until
+      });
+    }
+    return info;
+  };
+}
+__name(introspectionVerifier, "introspectionVerifier");
+export {
+  discoverAuthorizationServer,
+  introspectionVerifier,
+  jwtVerifier
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/oauth/index.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/core/oauth.ts","../../src/oauth/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * OAuth 2.1 support per the MCP authorization spec: the MCP endpoint acts as an\n * OAuth *resource server*. It publishes Protected Resource Metadata (RFC 9728),\n * answers unauthenticated requests with a `WWW-Authenticate` challenge that\n * tells the client where to log in, and checks bearer tokens with a verifier\n * you provide (see `jwtVerifier` / `introspectionVerifier` in `mcp-expose/oauth`).\n *\n * Runtime-agnostic: no `node:*` imports.\n */\n\n/** Who the access token belongs to and what it allows. Available to tools as `ctx.auth`. */\nexport interface AuthInfo {\n  /** The raw access token. */\n  token: string;\n  /** Scopes granted to the token. */\n  scopes: string[];\n  /** Subject (user id), e.g. the JWT `sub` claim. */\n  subject?: string;\n  /** OAuth client the token was issued to. */\n  clientId?: string;\n  /** Expiry, in seconds since the epoch. Expired tokens are rejected. */\n  expiresAt?: number;\n  /** All claims / introspection fields. */\n  claims?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyTokenContext {\n  /** The canonical resource URL (`oauth.resource`). Tokens must be issued for it (audience). */\n  resource: string;\n  /** Lower-cased headers of the MCP request. */\n  headers: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Checks an access token. Return its AuthInfo, or `undefined` / throw when the\n * token is invalid. It MUST check that the token was issued for this server\n * (audience = `ctx.resource`), or tokens meant for other services would be accepted.\n */\nexport type TokenVerifier = (\n  token: string,\n  ctx: VerifyTokenContext,\n) => AuthInfo | undefined | null | Promise<AuthInfo | undefined | null>;\n\nexport interface OAuthOptions {\n  /**\n   * Canonical, public URL of the MCP endpoint, e.g. `https://api.example.com/mcp`.\n   * Clients request tokens for this resource, and it must match the URL they connect to.\n   */\n  resource: string;\n  /** Issuer URLs of the authorization servers that issue tokens for this server. */\n  authorizationServers: string[];\n  /** Checks bearer tokens. */\n  verifyToken: TokenVerifier;\n  /** Scopes every token needs to use the MCP endpoint at all. */\n  requiredScopes?: string[];\n  /** Scopes advertised in the metadata. @default requiredScopes plus every tool's `scopes` */\n  scopesSupported?: string[];\n  /** Human-readable name shown by clients. */\n  resourceName?: string;\n  /** URL of documentation for developers. */\n  resourceDocumentation?: string;\n  /** Extra fields merged into the Protected Resource Metadata document. */\n  metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\nexport const PROTECTED_RESOURCE_WELL_KNOWN = '/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource';\n\n/**\n * Paths the metadata is served on, per RFC 9728: the well-known prefix with the\n * resource path appended (`/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp`), plus the\n * bare well-known path that older clients fall back to.\n */\nexport function protectedResourceMetadataPaths(resource: string): string[] {\n  const pathname = new URL(resource).pathname.replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n  return pathname\n    ? [PROTECTED_RESOURCE_WELL_KNOWN + pathname, PROTECTED_RESOURCE_WELL_KNOWN]\n    : [PROTECTED_RESOURCE_WELL_KNOWN];\n}\n\n/** Absolute URL of the metadata document, used in `WWW-Authenticate`. */\nexport function protectedResourceMetadataUrl(resource: string): string {\n  return new URL(protectedResourceMetadataPaths(resource)[0] as string, resource).href;\n}\n\nexport function validateOAuthOptions(o: OAuthOptions): void {\n  let url: URL;\n  try {\n    url = new URL(o.resource);\n  } catch {\n    throw new Error(`mcp-expose: oauth.resource must be an absolute URL, got ${JSON.stringify(o.resource)}`);\n  }\n  if (url.hash) throw new Error('mcp-expose: oauth.resource must not contain a fragment');\n  if (!o.authorizationServers?.length) throw new Error('mcp-expose: oauth.authorizationServers must not be empty');\n  if (typeof o.verifyToken !== 'function') throw new Error('mcp-expose: oauth.verifyToken is required');\n}\n\nconst quote = (v: string) => `\"${v.replace(/[\"\\\\]/g, '\\\\$&')}\"`;\n\n/** Build a `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer ...` challenge (RFC 6750 + RFC 9728). */\nexport function bearerChallenge(\n  resource: string,\n  params: { error?: string; errorDescription?: string; scope?: string[] } = {},\n): string {\n  const parts: string[] = [];\n  if (params.error) parts.push(`error=${quote(params.error)}`);\n  if (params.errorDescription) parts.push(`error_description=${quote(params.errorDescription)}`);\n  if (params.scope?.length) parts.push(`scope=${quote(params.scope.join(' '))}`);\n  parts.push(`resource_metadata=${quote(protectedResourceMetadataUrl(resource))}`);\n  return `Bearer ${parts.join(', ')}`;\n}\n\n/** Extract the token from `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. Tokens in the query string are never accepted. */\nexport function bearerToken(headers: Record<string, string>): string | undefined {\n  const m = /^Bearer[ ]+([^\\s,]+)\\s*$/i.exec(headers.authorization ?? '');\n  return m?.[1];\n}\n\nexport type AuthOutcome =\n  | { ok: true; auth: AuthInfo }\n  | { ok: false; status: 401 | 403; challenge: string; error: string; description: string };\n\n/** Authenticate one MCP request. */\nexport async function authenticate(o: OAuthOptions, headers: Record<string, string>): Promise<AuthOutcome> {\n  const token = bearerToken(headers);\n  if (!token) {\n    // No credentials: a bare challenge pointing at the metadata starts the client's login flow.\n    return {\n      ok: false,\n      status: 401,\n      error: 'unauthorized',\n      description: 'Authorization required',\n      challenge: bearerChallenge(o.resource, { scope: o.requiredScopes }),\n    };\n  }\n\n  let auth: AuthInfo | undefined | null;\n  try {\n    auth = await o.verifyToken(token, { resource: o.resource, headers });\n  } catch {\n    auth = undefined;\n  }\n  if (!auth) return deny(o, 401, 'invalid_token', 'The access token is invalid');\n  if (auth.expiresAt !== undefined && auth.expiresAt * 1000 <= Date.now()) {\n    return deny(o, 401, 'invalid_token', 'The access token has expired');\n  }\n  const missing = missingScopes(auth, o.requiredScopes);\n  if (missing.length) {\n    // Keep the scopes already granted in the challenge, so re-authorizing never drops access.\n    const scope = [...new Set([...(auth.scopes ?? []), ...(o.requiredScopes ?? [])])];\n    return deny(o, 403, 'insufficient_scope', `Missing scope: ${missing.join(' ')}`, scope);\n  }\n  return { ok: true, auth: { ...auth, scopes: auth.scopes ?? [] } };\n}\n\n/** A failed AuthOutcome with an RFC 6750 error challenge. */\nexport function deny(\n  o: OAuthOptions,\n  status: 401 | 403,\n  error: string,\n  description: string,\n  scope?: string[],\n): AuthOutcome & { ok: false } {\n  return {\n    ok: false,\n    status,\n    error,\n    description,\n    challenge: bearerChallenge(o.resource, { error, errorDescription: description, scope }),\n  };\n}\n\nexport function missingScopes(auth: AuthInfo | undefined, required: string[] | undefined): string[] {\n  if (!required?.length) return [];\n  const granted = new Set(auth?.scopes ?? []);\n  return required.filter((s) => !granted.has(s));\n}\n\n/** Parse a space-separated `scope` string or an array of scopes. */\nexport function parseScopes(value: unknown): string[] {\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map(String);\n  if (typeof value === 'string') return value.split(' ').filter(Boolean);\n  return [];\n}\n","/**\n * Ready-made token verifiers for the `oauth` option:\n *\n *   - `jwtVerifier()`           JWT access tokens, checked against the issuer's JWKS\n *                               (Auth0, Okta, Keycloak, Entra ID, Clerk, Cognito, WorkOS, ...).\n *                               Needs the `jose` package.\n *   - `introspectionVerifier()` opaque tokens, checked with RFC 7662 token introspection.\n *\n * Both check the audience: a token is only accepted when it was issued for this\n * MCP server (`oauth.resource`), so tokens meant for other services are refused.\n */\nimport { parseScopes } from '../core/oauth.js';\nimport type { AuthInfo, TokenVerifier } from '../core/oauth.js';\nimport type * as JoseModule from 'jose';\n\nexport type { AuthInfo, TokenVerifier, VerifyTokenContext } from '../core/oauth.js';\n\nexport interface JwtVerifierOptions {\n  /** Expected `iss` claim, e.g. `https://your-tenant.auth0.com/`. */\n  issuer: string;\n  /**\n   * Expected `aud` claim(s). Defaults to `oauth.resource`, the URL of your MCP endpoint,\n   * as the MCP spec requires. Set it when your authorization server uses a different\n   * audience identifier (e.g. an Auth0 API identifier).\n   */\n  audience?: string | string[];\n  /** JWKS URL. Discovered from the issuer's metadata when omitted. */\n  jwksUri?: string;\n  /** A static JWKS (`{ keys: [...] }`) instead of fetching one. */\n  jwks?: { keys: Record<string, unknown>[] };\n  /** Allowed signing algorithms. @default asymmetric algorithms only (RS*, PS*, ES*, EdDSA) */\n  algorithms?: string[];\n  /** Allowed clock skew in seconds. @default 30 */\n  clockTolerance?: number;\n  /** Claim that holds the scopes. @default 'scope', then 'scp' */\n  scopeClaim?: string;\n  /** Extra checks on the verified claims; return false to reject the token. */\n  validate?: (claims: Record<string, unknown>) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;\n}\n\nconst ASYMMETRIC = [\n  'RS256',\n  'RS384',\n  'RS512',\n  'PS256',\n  'PS384',\n  'PS512',\n  'ES256',\n  'ES384',\n  'ES512',\n  'EdDSA',\n  'Ed25519',\n];\n\ntype Jose = typeof JoseModule;\nlet josePromise: Promise<Jose> | undefined;\nfunction loadJose(): Promise<Jose> {\n  josePromise ??= import('jose').catch((err: unknown) => {\n    josePromise = undefined;\n    throw new Error(`mcp-expose: jwtVerifier() needs the \"jose\" package. Run: npm install jose (${String(err)})`);\n  });\n  return josePromise;\n}\n\n/**\n * Authorization server metadata (RFC 8414), falling back to OpenID Connect discovery.\n * Tries the path-inserted and appended forms, as MCP clients do.\n */\nexport async function discoverAuthorizationServer(issuer: string): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {\n  const url = new URL(issuer);\n  const path = url.pathname.replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n  const candidates = [\n    new URL(`/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server${path}`, url.origin).href,\n    new URL(`/.well-known/openid-configuration${path}`, url.origin).href,\n    ...(path ? [`${url.origin}${path}/.well-known/openid-configuration`] : []),\n  ];\n  for (const candidate of candidates) {\n    try {\n      const res = await fetch(candidate, { headers: { accept: 'application/json' } });\n      if (res.ok) return (await res.json()) as Record<string, unknown>;\n    } catch {\n      /* try the next one */\n    }\n  }\n  throw new Error(`mcp-expose: could not load authorization server metadata for ${issuer}`);\n}\n\nfunction toAuthInfo(token: string, claims: Record<string, unknown>, scopeClaim?: string): AuthInfo {\n  const scopes = scopeClaim ? parseScopes(claims[scopeClaim]) : parseScopes(claims.scope ?? claims.scp);\n  return {\n    token,\n    scopes,\n    subject: typeof claims.sub === 'string' ? claims.sub : undefined,\n    clientId: [claims.client_id, claims.azp, claims.cid].find((v): v is string => typeof v === 'string'),\n    expiresAt: typeof claims.exp === 'number' ? claims.exp : undefined,\n    claims,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify JWT access tokens with the issuer's public keys:\n *\n *   oauth: {\n *     resource: 'https://api.example.com/mcp',\n *     authorizationServers: ['https://example.auth0.com/'],\n *     verifyToken: jwtVerifier({ issuer: 'https://example.auth0.com/' }),\n *   }\n *\n * Checks signature, `iss`, `aud` (defaults to the resource), `exp` and `nbf`.\n */\nexport function jwtVerifier(options: JwtVerifierOptions): TokenVerifier {\n  let keySet: Promise<Parameters<Jose['jwtVerify']>[1]> | undefined;\n  const getKeys = () => {\n    keySet ??= (async () => {\n      const jose = await loadJose();\n      if (options.jwks) return jose.createLocalJWKSet(options.jwks as Parameters<Jose['createLocalJWKSet']>[0]);\n      const jwksUri = options.jwksUri ?? ((await discoverAuthorizationServer(options.issuer)).jwks_uri as string);\n      if (!jwksUri) throw new Error(`mcp-expose: no jwks_uri in the metadata of ${options.issuer}`);\n      return jose.createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(jwksUri));\n    })().catch((err: unknown) => {\n      keySet = undefined; // retry discovery on the next request\n      throw err;\n    });\n    return keySet;\n  };\n\n  return async (token, ctx) => {\n    const jose = await loadJose();\n    const { payload } = await jose.jwtVerify(token, await getKeys(), {\n      issuer: options.issuer,\n      audience: options.audience ?? ctx.resource,\n      algorithms: options.algorithms ?? ASYMMETRIC,\n      clockTolerance: options.clockTolerance ?? 30,\n    });\n    const claims = payload as Record<string, unknown>;\n    if (options.validate && !(await options.validate(claims))) return undefined;\n    return toAuthInfo(token, claims, options.scopeClaim);\n  };\n}\n\nexport interface IntrospectionVerifierOptions {\n  /** Token introspection endpoint. Discovered from `issuer` when omitted. */\n  introspectionEndpoint?: string;\n  /** Issuer URL, used to discover the endpoint and to check `iss` when present. */\n  issuer?: string;\n  /** Credentials of this resource server at the authorization server (HTTP Basic). */\n  clientId?: string;\n  clientSecret?: string;\n  /** Or any headers, e.g. `{ authorization: 'Bearer <token>' }`. */\n  headers?: Record<string, string>;\n  /**\n   * Expected audience. Defaults to `oauth.resource`. Checked when the response\n   * has an `aud` field; set `requireAudience: true` to reject responses without one.\n   */\n  audience?: string | string[];\n  requireAudience?: boolean;\n  /** Cache positive results for this many seconds (never past the token expiry). @default 60 */\n  cacheSeconds?: number;\n  /** Extra checks on the introspection response; return false to reject. */\n  validate?: (response: Record<string, unknown>) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;\n}\n\n/** Verify opaque (or any) tokens with RFC 7662 token introspection. */\nexport function introspectionVerifier(options: IntrospectionVerifierOptions): TokenVerifier {\n  if (!options.introspectionEndpoint && !options.issuer) {\n    throw new Error('mcp-expose: introspectionVerifier needs introspectionEndpoint or issuer');\n  }\n  let endpoint: Promise<string> | undefined;\n  const getEndpoint = () => {\n    endpoint ??= (async () => {\n      if (options.introspectionEndpoint) return options.introspectionEndpoint;\n      const meta = await discoverAuthorizationServer(options.issuer!);\n      if (typeof meta.introspection_endpoint !== 'string') {\n        throw new Error(`mcp-expose: no introspection_endpoint in the metadata of ${options.issuer}`);\n      }\n      return meta.introspection_endpoint;\n    })().catch((err: unknown) => {\n      endpoint = undefined;\n      throw err;\n    });\n    return endpoint;\n  };\n\n  const cacheMs = (options.cacheSeconds ?? 60) * 1000;\n  const cache = new Map<string, { info: AuthInfo; until: number }>();\n\n  return async (token, ctx) => {\n    const now = Date.now();\n    const hit = cache.get(token);\n    if (hit && hit.until > now) return hit.info;\n    cache.delete(token);\n\n    const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n      'content-type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',\n      accept: 'application/json',\n      ...options.headers,\n    };\n    if (options.clientId) {\n      const basic = `${encodeURIComponent(options.clientId)}:${encodeURIComponent(options.clientSecret ?? '')}`;\n      headers.authorization = `Basic ${btoa(basic)}`;\n    }\n    const res = await fetch(await getEndpoint(), {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers,\n      body: new URLSearchParams({ token, token_type_hint: 'access_token' }).toString(),\n    });\n    if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`token introspection failed: HTTP ${res.status}`);\n    const data = (await res.json()) as Record<string, unknown>;\n    if (data.active !== true) return undefined;\n\n    if (options.issuer && typeof data.iss === 'string' && data.iss !== options.issuer) return undefined;\n    const expected = [options.audience ?? ctx.resource].flat();\n    const aud = data.aud === undefined ? undefined : [data.aud].flat().map(String);\n    if (aud ? !aud.some((a) => expected.includes(a)) : options.requireAudience) return undefined;\n    if (options.validate && !(await options.validate(data))) return undefined;\n\n    const info = toAuthInfo(token, data);\n    if (cacheMs > 0) {\n      const until = Math.min(now + cacheMs, info.expiresAt ? info.expiresAt * 1000 : Infinity);\n      if (cache.size > 10_000) cache.clear();\n      cache.set(token, { info, until });\n    }\n    return info;\n  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