math-skill 2.1.0 → 3.0.1

package/skills/game-theory/SKILL.md

@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
----
-name: game-theory
-description: |
-  触发：当策略取决于他人选择、需计算纳什均衡、分析零和/非零和博弈、做机制设计；或为多智能体系统、对抗训练、路由博弈设计策略时调用。
-  English: Trigger when optimal strategy depends on others' choices, needing Nash equilibrium computation, zero-sum/non-zero-sum analysis, mechanism design; or designing strategies for multi-agent systems, adversarial training, routing games.
----
-
-> **语言路由**：若用户消息为英文，请读取并遵循同目录下的 `SKILL.en.md`，按其操作规程以英文输出；中文消息则继续使用本文件。
-
-# 🎯 博弈论思想 / Game Theory
-
-> "你的最优选择取决于他人的选择——思考不仅要深入，还要互动。"
-> "Your optimal choice depends on others' choices — thinking must be interactive, not just deep."
->
-> —— 博弈论、决策论、机制设计 / Game Theory, Decision Theory, Mechanism Design
-
-## 核心原则 / Core Principle
-
-**战略互动——你的最优行动取决于他人做什么，而他人的最优行动取决于你做什么。纳什均衡：无人能从单方面偏离中获益的策略组合。**
-
-**Strategic interaction — your best action depends on what others do, and theirs depend on what you do. Nash equilibrium: strategy profile where no player benefits from unilateral deviation.**
-
-关键概念：**支付矩阵（Payoff Matrix）**、**占优策略（Dominant Strategy）**、**混合策略（Mixed Strategy）**、**帕累托最优性（Pareto Optimality）**。分类维度：合作 vs 非合作、零和 vs 一般和、同时 vs 序列。
-
-> **数学形式化 / Mathematical Formalization**
->
-> 形式化定义：n 个参与者，每人有策略集 $S_i$ 和支付函数 $u_i: S_1 \times \cdots \times S_n \to \mathbb{R}$。
->
-> 纳什均衡：策略组合 $s^* = (s_1^*, \ldots, s_n^*)$ 满足 $u_i(s^*) \geq u_i(s_i, s^*_{-i})$ 对所有 $s_i \in S_i$、所有 $i$ 成立，其中 $s^*_{-i}$ 为除 $i$ 外所有人的策略。混合策略纳什均衡：概率分布 $\sigma^*$ 使 $u_i(\sigma^*) \geq u_i(s_i, \sigma^*_{-i})$。
->
-> 占优策略：严格 $u_i(s_i^*, s_{-i}) > u_i(s_i, s_{-i})$；弱占优 $\geq$ 且至少一处严格。
->
-> 零和 minimax：$\max_x \min_y f(x,y) = \min_y \max_x f(x,y)$。
-
-## GPU 友好性 / GPU-Friendliness（横切检查）
-
-博弈求解映射 GPU 的能力差异极大，过 `../../references/gpu-friendly-math.md` 八维门：
-
-- **矩阵博弈 / 双人零和（minimax）**：等价于线性规划（LP），支付矩阵运算可 GEMM 化、可批量并行——**友好**。
-- **混合策略均衡求解**：支撑集上的线性方程组/无差异方程，小规模可批量解；规模大时注意稀疏性与条件数。
-- **大规模多智能体均衡精确求解**：n 人纳什均衡 PPAD-complete，一般情形**不可算**→ **反模式**，改用近似/学习方法（fictitious play、虚拟自博、多智能体 RL、NFSP）。
-- **演化/重复博弈模拟**：群体与策略批量更新可并行；注意 agent 间通信与同步开销。
-
-八维最低判定（正式术语）：**张量化**看玩家/策略/回合是否能批量展开；**GEMM 可映射**看支付矩阵、minimax、LP/线性方程是否落矩阵运算；**复杂度**标注 Nash/机制求解的 PPAD/组合爆炸风险；**显存与 KV-Cache**看策略-状态笛卡尔积是否可压缩；**低精度稳定**看均衡求解、LP、soft best-response 是否条件数可控；**并行与通信**看多智能体 rollout 的同步成本；**稀疏结构**看交互图是否结构化；**算子融合**看收益、mask、best-response 更新能否融合。
-
-> 配合 `../../references/books/optimization-ml.md`（对偶/minimax、博弈学习算法）与 `../../references/books/matrix-analysis.md`（矩阵博弈、线性方程组）。
-
-## 不适用场景 / When NOT to Use
-
-- **单人决策问题，与他人无互动**——优化思想更适用，无需考虑他人策略响应。
-- **纯合作问题，无利益冲突**——参与者目标完全一致，无需战略分析。
-- **确定性问题，无战略不确定性**——结果由自身行动唯一决定，不涉及他人反应。
-- **纯粹运气决定的结果，各方无策略选择**——无策略集可分析，博弈论不适用。
-
-## 何时使用 / When to Use
-
-- 多个决策者相互影响，各自策略影响他人收益；最佳策略取决于他人响应，需预判他人行动。
-- 需设计激励机制，使自利行为导向社会最优结果；预测给定规则下的均衡稳定状态。
-- 分析竞争市场中的定价、进入、退出；谈判/讨价还价中的利益分配与威胁点。
-- **为多智能体系统、对抗训练（GAN/鲁棒学习）、路由博弈设计策略与均衡目标**。
-
-## 方法流程 / Method
-
-### 第一步：识别参与者与策略
-定义博弈基本要素：参与者 $N=\{1,\ldots,n\}$；策略集 $S_i$；支付函数 $u_i: S_1\times\cdots\times S_n\to\mathbb{R}$；信息结构（是否对称？是否不完全信息？行动是否序列？能否通信？）。核心是识别"互动结构"——谁的选择影响谁的结果，遗漏关键参与者是最常见错误。
-
-### 第二步：分析博弈类型
-先判定零和/一般和、同时/序列、合作/非合作、完全信息/不完全信息。类型决定方法：零和用 minimax/LP；序列博弈用逆向归纳与子博弈完美均衡；合作博弈用 Shapley 值按边际贡献分配：
-$$\phi_i(v)=\sum_{S\subseteq N\setminus\{i\}}\frac{|S|!(n-|S|-1)!}{n!}[v(S\cup\{i\})-v(S)]$$
-误判类型会直接导致均衡概念和求解方法错用。
-
-### 第三步：构建支付矩阵/函数
-2 人博弈用支付矩阵，单元格 $(u_1,u_2)$；n 人博弈用 $u_i(s_1,\ldots,s_n)$。验证完备性：是否遗漏参与者或策略？支付是否准确反映偏好？是否存在外部性？支付是分析根基，评估不准则后续全偏。
-
-### 第四步：寻找占优策略
-严格占优 $u_i(s_i^*,s_{-i}) > u_i(s_i,s_{-i})$ 对所有 $s_i\neq s_i^*$、所有 $s_{-i}$；弱占优 $\geq$ 且至少一处严格；**迭代消去劣策略**依次删去劣策略缩小空间。存在占优策略均衡是最强结论——无人有任何偏离动机；否则进入均衡分析。
-
-### 第五步：计算均衡
-按第二步的博弈类型选方法。纯策略纳什：对每个 $s_{-i}$ 找最优响应 $BR_i(s_{-i})$，交叉点即均衡。混合策略：求使他人无差异的概率分布 $u_j(s_j,\sigma^*_{-j})=u_j(s_j',\sigma^*_{-j})$ 对所有 $s_j,s_j'\in S_j$。零和矩阵博弈可走 minimax $\max_x\min_y f=\min_y\max_x f$；序列博弈用逆向归纳；合作博弈输出分配方案而非普通纳什。多重均衡做帕累托排序，标注最优与劣均衡。
-
-### 第六步：检查均衡稳定性
-颤抖手完美（微小失误下仍稳定，排除依赖"对手绝不犯错"的均衡）；演化稳定策略 ESS（重复互动中抵御入侵）；偏离均衡路径激励（序列博弈中是否有动机遵守承诺）。追问：均衡唯一还是多重？对微小扰动是否鲁棒？稳定均衡才是可信预测。
-
-### 第七步：设计机制与改进
-若不存在好的均衡，重新设计博弈：改变支付结构（奖惩）、增加可执行规则、引入通信与声誉、Vickrey 拍卖（报真实估值为占优策略）。机制设计形式化：
-$$\max\ \text{social welfare}\quad\text{s.t.}\quad\text{incentive compatibility + individual rationality}$$
-显示原理：任何贝叶斯博弈均衡都可由直接机制实现——如实报告类型即均衡。机制设计是最实用分支——与其抱怨人不合作，不如改变规则让合作成为自利选择。
-
-## 常见错误 / Common Errors
-
-| 错误 / Error | 批评 / Critique | 正确做法 / Correct Approach |
-|---|---|---|
-| 假设他人像自己一样思考 | 他人支付函数/理性水平不同，$u_i\neq u_j$ | 明确各参与者支付函数与信念 |
-| 忽略混合策略 | 纯策略均衡可能不存在，混合均衡总存在（Nash, 1950） | 检查是否需混合策略分析 |
-| 混淆纳什均衡与帕累托最优 | 纳什均衡可帕累托劣（囚徒困境），两者独立 | 分别标注均衡性与效率性 |
-| 忽略信息不对称 | 不完全信息均衡与完全信息截然不同 | 区分贝叶斯博弈与完全信息博弈 |
-| 过度简化支付结构 | 遗漏关键支付维度使均衡失真 | 系统检查所有参与者完整支付 |
-| 忽略重复互动动态 | 单次均衡在重复博弈中可能改变（folk theorem） | 分析子博弈完美均衡 |
-| 大规模均衡精确求解不可算 | n 人纳什均衡 PPAD-complete，精确解不可行 | 过 GPU 八维门，改用近似/学习（虚拟自博、MARL） |
-
-## 操作规程 / Operating Procedure
-
-当本 skill 被触发时，输出必须包含：
-
-1. **[参与者]**：所有决策者及其类型（理性/有限理性/未知）。
-2. **[策略集]**：每个参与者的可选策略，标注有限/无限。
-3. **[支付矩阵]**：核心策略组合的支付值 $(u_1,u_2,\ldots)$ 或支付函数形式。
-4. **[博弈类型]**：零和/非零和/序列/合作，对应分析方法。
-5. **[均衡]**：所有适用均衡（纯策略、混合策略、子博弈完美、合作分配等），标注多重均衡。
-6. **[稳定性]**：颤抖手完美性、演化稳定性、偏离均衡路径激励。
-7. **[机制建议]**：若均衡不理想，提出机制设计建议（改变支付、增加规则、引入声誉等）。
-8. **[GPU 可行性]**：矩阵博弈/minimax→LP 可 GEMM；大规模多智能体均衡是否不可算→近似/学习方法，过八维门。
-
-**输出不得只给分析而无结论。**
-
-## 与其他 skill 的关系 / Relations to Other Skills
-
-- **优化思想**：纳什均衡是互相优化——每人在他人策略约束下优化自己支付，均衡是所有优化问题的共同解。
-- **概率与统计**：混合策略以概率分布选行动，贝叶斯博弈用概率处理类型不确定性，均衡依赖期望支付。
-- **信息论思想**：信息不对称与信号传递——Spence 信号博弈中信息结构直接影响均衡存在与性质。
-- **因果推断思想**：策略选择因果影响他人收益，战略互动中的因果链是双向的。
-- **算法思想**：纳什均衡计算复杂度（PPAD-complete）、Lemke-Howson 算法、演化博弈模拟。
-- **现代数学激活**：`../../references/books/optimization-ml.md`（对偶/minimax、博弈学习算法）、`../../references/books/matrix-analysis.md`（矩阵博弈、支付矩阵的线性代数结构）。

package/skills/game-theory/original-texts.en.md

@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
-# Mathematical Sources and Classic Texts
-
-## Zermelo's Theorem (1913)
-
-> Zermelo (1913) proved: in any finite two-player game of perfect information (such as chess), either the first player or the second player has a winning strategy, or both players have a drawing strategy. That is, the game is "determined."
-
-**Core thesis**: For any finite game of perfect information, $\exists$ a winning strategy for the first player $\lor$ $\exists$ a winning strategy for the second player $\lor$ $\exists$ a drawing strategy for both. This proves that no genuine "uncertainty" exists in such games — the source of uncertainty is computational complexity rather than logical structure.
-
-**Key ideas**: The outcome of a perfect-information game is logically predetermined — uncertainty arises from limitations in computational power, not from the game itself. Zermelo's proof employed backward induction, which later became the central tool for subgame perfect equilibrium. Mathematical context: in the same year, Zermelo also introduced the Axiom of Choice (AC) in set theory. Game theory and set theory share the logic that "finite choices can always be exhaustively enumerated."
-
-## von Neumann's Minimax Theorem (1928)
-
-> von Neumann (1928) proved: in a two-player zero-sum game, $\max_{x \in \Delta} \min_{y \in \Delta} \sum_{ij} a_{ij} x_i y_j = \min_{y \in \Delta} \max_{x \in \Delta} \sum_{ij} a_{ij} x_i y_j$. That is, the optimal outcome under a conservative strategy equals the optimal outcome under the opponent's conservative strategy — max-min = min-max.
-
-**Core theorem**: For any two-player zero-sum matrix game $A$, there exist mixed strategies $x^*$ and $y^*$ such that
-
-$$v^* = \max_x \min_y x^\top A y = \min_y \max_x x^\top A y$$
-
-$v^*$ is called the value of the game. The proof utilizes the convex set separation theorem (which later revealed deep connections with the Brouwer fixed-point theorem).
-
-**Key ideas**: The minimax theorem reveals the structural symmetry of zero-sum games — "my maximizing my gain" is equivalent to "the opponent minimizing my gain." The optimal mixed strategy renders the opponent indifferent among all pure strategies. This theorem foreshadowed the duality of linear programming: Dantzig (1947) discovered that LP duality is equivalent to minimax, and von Neumann independently found the same connection.
-
-## Existence of Nash Equilibrium (1950)
-
-> Nash (1950) proved: every finite game (any number of players, non-zero-sum) has at least one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. The proof uses the Brouwer fixed-point theorem — constructing a best-response mapping $BR: \Delta \to \Delta$ whose fixed point is a Nash equilibrium.
-
-**Core theorem**: For any finite game $(N, \{S_i\}, \{u_i\})$, $\exists \sigma^* \in \Delta_1 \times \cdots \times \Delta_n$ such that for all $i$ and $s_i \in S_i$,
-
-$$u_i(\sigma^*) \geq u_i(s_i, \sigma^*_{-i})$$
-
-Nash's proof applies the Brouwer fixed-point theorem to the best-response mapping: $F(\sigma) = (BR_1(\sigma_{-1}), \ldots, BR_n(\sigma_{-n}))$, where the fixed point of $F$ is an equilibrium. Subsequent proofs also use the Kakutani fixed-point theorem (for set-valued correspondences).
-
-**Key ideas**: The existence of Nash equilibrium does not depend on the "goodwill" or "cooperative intent" of the players — it is a logical necessity of self-interested behavior in strategic interaction. The Nash equilibrium generalizes the minimax theorem from zero-sum games to non-zero-sum games, and from two-player adversarial settings to multi-player interaction. Mathematical context: the Brouwer fixed-point theorem (1911) is a central result in topology — every continuous map has a fixed point — and game theory and topology converge here.
-
-## Prisoner's Dilemma
-
-> The Prisoner's Dilemma is the most classic example in game theory: two players each have "cooperate" and "defect" strategies. Defection is the dominant strategy, yet (Defect, Defect) is Pareto-dominated by (Cooperate, Cooperate) — individual rationality leads to collective irrationalality.
-
-**Payoff matrix**:
-
-| | Cooperate (C) | Defect (D) |
-|---|---|---|
-| Cooperate (C) | (3, 3) | (0, 5) |
-| Defect (D) | (5, 0) | (1, 1) |
-
-Strictly dominant strategy analysis: for each player, defection strictly dominates cooperation ($5 > 3$ and $1 > 0$). The unique Nash equilibrium (D, D) yields payoff (1, 1), which is Pareto-dominated by (C, C) with payoff (3, 3).
-
-**Key ideas**: The Prisoner's Dilemma reveals the fundamental tension between individual and collective rationality — Nash equilibrium does not guarantee Pareto optimality. This dilemma is ubiquitous in reality: arms races, the tragedy of the commons, price wars, carbon emissions. Axelrod (1984) showed through computer tournaments that in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, the "Tit-for-Tat" strategy can sustain cooperation — repeated interaction changes the equilibrium structure.
-
-## Backward Induction & Subgame Perfection
-
-> Backward induction is the central analytical tool for sequential games: starting from terminal nodes and working backward, choosing the optimal action at each step. Selten (1965) defined the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE): a strategy profile that constitutes a Nash equilibrium in every subgame — eliminating equilibria based on non-credible threats.
-
-**Core concept**: Nash equilibrium permits "non-credible threats" — a player claims they will take a certain action, but when that node is reached, deviation is more profitable. SPE requires the equilibrium to hold in every subgame, thereby eliminating non-credible threats. Backward induction is the standard method for computing SPE.
-
-**Key ideas**: In sequential games, the temporal structure introduces commitment and credibility issues — a "threat" must be rational to be effective. Backward induction decomposes multi-stage decisions into single-stage subproblems, in the spirit of Bellman's principle of optimality. Mathematical context: Zermelo's (1913) theorem used backward induction, and Selten (1965) systematized it into the SPE concept. Selten shared the 1994 Nobel Prize in Economics with Nash and Harsanyi.
-
-## Shapley Value & Cooperative Game Theory (1953)
-
-> Shapley (1953) proposed the unique allocation rule in cooperative games satisfying efficiency, symmetry, dummy player, and additivity — the Shapley value $\phi_i(v)$. It allocates coalition payoffs according to average marginal contributions.
-
-$$\phi_i(v) = \sum_{S \subseteq N \setminus \{i\}} \frac{|S|!(n - |S| - 1)!}{n!} [v(S \cup \{i\}) - v(S)]$$
-
-The Shapley value is the unique allocation satisfying the following four axioms:
-1. **Efficiency**: $\sum_i \phi_i(v) = v(N)$
-2. **Symmetry**: if $i$ and $j$ contribute equally in all coalitions, then $\phi_i = \phi_j$
-3. **Dummy player**: if $i$ contributes zero marginal value to every coalition, then $\phi_i = 0$
-4. **Additivity**: $\phi_i(v + w) = \phi_i(v) + \phi_i(w)$
-
-**Key ideas**: The Shapley value translates "fairness" into mathematical axioms — fairness is not subjective judgment but logical necessity. The central question of cooperative game theory: how should the total payoff generated by a coalition be distributed? The Shapley value provides the unique axiomatically justified answer. The core is another solution concept — no coalition receives less than its standalone value — but the core may be empty.
-
-## Nash Bargaining Solution (1950)
-
-> Nash (1950) proposed the unique bargaining solution satisfying Pareto optimality, symmetry, scale invariance, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Given a disagreement point $d = (d_1, d_2)$ and a feasible set $S \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2$, the Nash solution maximizes $(u_1 - d_1)(u_2 - d_2)$.
-
-$$\max_{(u_1, u_2) \in S, u_i \geq d_i} (u_1 - d_1)(u_2 - d_2)$$
-
-Nash proved that this solution is the unique allocation satisfying the four axioms. The disagreement point $d$ is each party's payoff when negotiations break down — the more favorable the disagreement point, the more favorable the bargaining outcome.
-
-**Key ideas**: The bargaining problem translates "negotiation" into mathematical optimization — maximizing joint surplus subject to the feasible set and disagreement point constraints. The symmetry and Pareto optimality of the Nash solution make it a natural benchmark for fair negotiation. Mathematical context: this model connects cooperative and non-cooperative game theory — the Nash program asserts that all cooperative game solutions should be derived through non-cooperative game models.
-
-## Evolutionary Game Theory (Maynard Smith, 1973)
-
-> Maynard Smith (1973) proposed the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS): a strategy $\sigma^*$ is an ESS if for any invading strategy $\sigma \neq \sigma^*$, either $u(\sigma^*, \sigma^*) > u(\sigma, \sigma^*)$, or $u(\sigma^*, \sigma^*) = u(\sigma, \sigma^*)$ and $u(\sigma^*, \sigma) > u(\sigma, \sigma)$.
-
-**Core definition**: ESS is a stronger stability concept than Nash equilibrium — it requires not only "no incentive to deviate" but also "resistance to invasion." Nash equilibrium is a necessary condition for ESS, but ESS adds a stability requirement.
-
-**Key ideas**: Evolutionary game theory extends game theory from "rational choice" to "adaptive dynamics" — players need not be rational, they only need to adjust strategies through repeated interaction. Biological applications: sex-ratio games, Hawk-Dove games, resource competition. Economic applications: formation of market conventions, diffusion of technology standards. Mathematical context: ESS is connected to replicator dynamics — an ESS is a locally stable fixed point of the replicator dynamics.
-
-## Vickrey Auction & Auction Theory (1961)
-
-> Vickrey (1961) proposed the second-price sealed-bid auction: the highest bidder wins but pays the second-highest bid. Bidding one's true valuation is a dominant strategy — a foundational work in mechanism design.
-
-**Core theorem**: In a Vickrey auction, bidding one's true valuation $b_i = v_i$ is a weakly dominant strategy for every bidder. Proof: let $v_i$ be the true valuation and $p$ the second-highest bid. If $v_i > p$, bidding $b_i = v_i$ wins with payoff $v_i - p > 0$; if $b_i > v_i > p$, one still wins with the same payoff; if $b_i < v_i$, one may forgo positive surplus. Hence truthful reporting is optimal.
-
-Vickrey proved that for symmetric risk-neutral bidders, the four standard auctions (English, Dutch, first-price sealed-bid, second-price sealed-bid) yield equal expected revenue — the **Revenue Equivalence Theorem**. Milgrom & Weber (1982) generalized this to affiliated values, finding that the English auction yields the highest revenue.
-
-**Key ideas**: The Vickrey auction is the paradigm of an incentive-compatible mechanism — through clever design of the payment rule, self-interested behavior automatically leads to efficient outcomes. Auction theory applies game theory to market design: how can rules be designed to guide rational agents toward optimal outcomes? Mathematical context: Vickrey shared the 1996 Nobel Prize in Economics.
-
-## Mechanism Design (Hurwicz, Myerson, Maskin — Nobel 2007)
-
-> Mechanism design is the "reverse engineering" of game theory — given a desired outcome, design the rules of the game so that rational agents' self-interested behavior automatically achieves that goal. Hurwicz, Myerson, and Maskin received the 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics for this work.
-
-**Core concepts**:
-- **Incentive Compatibility**: truthful type reporting is an equilibrium strategy — agents have no incentive to misreport
-- **Revelation Principle**: any equilibrium of a Bayesian game can be implemented by a direct mechanism — agents truthfully report types in equilibrium, eliminating the need for complex strategies
-- **Myerson's optimal auction**: under the independent private values model, the mechanism maximizing the seller's expected revenue allocates to the bidder with the highest virtual valuation $v_i - (1 - F_i(v_i))/f_i(v_i)$
-
-$$\text{Virtual valuation: } \varphi_i(v_i) = v_i - \frac{1 - F_i(v_i)}{f_i(v_i)}$$
-
-- **Maskin Monotonicity**: a necessary condition for a social choice function to be Nash-implementable — monotonicity of preferences
-
-**Key ideas**: Mechanism design answers "how to design the rules" rather than "how to act under given rules" — working backward from the desired outcome to the structure of the game. The revelation principle simplifies mechanism design: one need only consider direct mechanisms. Incentive compatibility ensures alignment between rules and incentives — institutional design is not wishful thinking but mathematically verifiable engineering. Mathematical context: Hurwicz (1960s) introduced the concept of incentive compatibility; Myerson (1981) developed optimal auction theory; Maskin (1977/1999) developed Nash implementability theory.
-
-## Signaling Games (Spence, 1973)
-
-> Spence (1973) proposed the signaling model: under asymmetric information, a sender with private information communicates information to a receiver through observable actions (signals). Classic application: education as a signal of ability — high-ability individuals face lower costs of acquiring education, so educational investment conveys information about ability.
-
-**Core model**: The sender has type $t \in \{H, L\}$ (high/low ability), chooses signal $s \in \{e, 0\}$ (educated/uneducated), and the receiver observes $s$ and then chooses response $a$. Separating equilibrium: $H$ chooses $e$, $L$ chooses $0$ — the signal perfectly reveals type. Pooling equilibrium: both types choose the same signal — the signal carries no information.
-
-**Key ideas**: Signaling games reveal the economics of information transmission — signals must have differential costs to convey information (otherwise everyone would imitate). In the Spence model, the social value of education may be entirely signaling value rather than productivity enhancement — this sparked a profound discussion about the nature of education. Spence shared the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics. Mathematical context: signaling games are a subclass of Bayesian games — type is private information, and strategies are type-dependent.
-
-## Repeated Games & Folk Theorem
-
-> Folk Theorem (informally circulated in the 1970s, systematized by Aumann 1981): in an infinitely repeated game, any individually rational payoff $v_i \geq \min_{s_{-i}} \max_{s_i} u_i(s_i, s_{-i})$ (the minimax payoff) can be sustained as the average payoff of a subgame perfect equilibrium.
-
-**Core theorem**: Let $v = (v_1, \ldots, v_n)$ be a feasible and individually rational payoff vector ($v_i \geq \underline{v}_i$, where $\underline{v}_i$ is $i$'s minimax value). Then, when the discount factor $\delta$ is sufficiently close to 1, $v$ can be realized as the average payoff of a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game.
-
-Implementation mechanism: punishment strategy — a deviator is "punished" back to the minimax payoff level, so the short-term gain from deviation is offset by the long-term punishment.
-
-**Key ideas**: The Folk Theorem is the central result in repeated games — it explains why cooperation can be sustained in long-run interactions: the short-term gain from deviation is outweighed by the long-term loss from punishment. The theorem also explains why repeated games have infinitely many equilibria — virtually any feasible payoff can be realized. Aumann (2005 Nobel Prize) systematized this theory. Mathematical context: the discount factor $\delta$ approaching 1 makes future punishment sufficiently severe — $\delta \geq \frac{g}{g + l}$, where $g$ is the gain from deviation and $l$ is the punishment loss.

package/skills/game-theory/original-texts.md

@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
-# 数学出处与经典文献 / Mathematical Sources and Classic Texts
-
-## Zermelo 定理 / Zermelo's Theorem (1913)
-
-> Zermelo（1913）证明：在有限完美信息二人博弈中（如国际象棋），先手或后手必有一方有必胜策略或双方有必和策略。即博弈是"确定的"（determined）。
-
-**核心论点**：对任何有限完美信息博弈，$\exists$ 先手必胜策略 $\lor$ $\exists$ 后手必胜策略 $\lor$ $\exists$ 双方必和策略。证明了此类博弈不存在真正的"不确定性"——不确定性的来源是计算复杂度而非逻辑结构。
-
-**思想**：完美信息博弈的结局在逻辑上是预定的——不确定性来自计算能力的限制而非博弈本身。Zermelo 的证明使用逆向归纳法（backward induction），这在后来成为子博弈完美均衡的核心工具。数学背景：Zermelo 同年也在集合论中提出选择公理（AC），博弈论与集合论共享"有限选择必可穷尽"的逻辑。
-
-## von Neumann Minimax 定理 / von Neumann's Minimax Theorem (1928)
-
-> von Neumann（1928）证明：在二人零和博弈中，$\max_{x \in \Delta} \min_{y \in \Delta} \sum_{ij} a_{ij} x_i y_j = \min_{y \in \Delta} \max_{x \in \Delta} \sum_{ij} a_{ij} x_i y_j$。即保守策略的最优结果等于对手保守策略下的最优结果——max-min = min-max。
-
-**核心定理**：对任何二人零和矩阵博弈 $A$，存在混合策略 $x^*$ 和 $y^*$ 使得
-
-$$v^* = \max_x \min_y x^\top A y = \min_y \max_x x^\top A y$$
-
-$v^*$ 称为博弈的值（value of the game）。证明利用了凸集分离定理（后与 Brouwer 不动点定理有深层联系）。
-
-**思想**：minimax 定理揭示了零和博弈的结构对称性——"我尽可能赢"等价于"对手尽可能防"。最优混合策略使对手对所有纯策略无差异。此定理是线性规划对偶性的先声：Dantzig（1947）发现 LP 对偶与 minimax 等价，von Neumann 独立发现了同样联系。
-
-## Nash 均衡的存在性 / Existence of Nash Equilibrium (1950)
-
-> Nash（1950）证明：每个有限博弈（任意人数、非零和）至少存在一个混合策略纳什均衡。证明使用 Brouwer 不动点定理——构造最优响应映射 $BR: \Delta \to \Delta$，其不动点即为纳什均衡。
-
-**核心定理**：对任何有限博弈 $(N, \{S_i\}, \{u_i\})$，$\exists \sigma^* \in \Delta_1 \times \cdots \times \Delta_n$ 使得对所有 $i$ 和 $s_i \in S_i$，
-
-$$u_i(\sigma^*) \geq u_i(s_i, \sigma^*_{-i})$$
-
-Nash 的证明将 Brouwer 不动点定理应用于最优响应映射：$F(\sigma) = (BR_1(\sigma_{-1}), \ldots, BR_n(\sigma_{-n}))$，$F$ 的不动点即均衡。后续证明也用 Kakutani 不动点定理（对应集值映射）。
-
-**思想**：纳什均衡的存在性不依赖参与者的"善意"或"合作意愿"——它是自私行为在战略互动中的逻辑必然。Nash 均衡推广了 minimax 定理到非零和博弈，从二人对抗到多人互动。数学背景：Brouwer 不动点定理（1911）是拓扑学核心定理——连续映射必有不动点，博弈论与拓扑学在此交汇。
-
-## 囚徒困境 / Prisoner's Dilemma
-
-> 囚徒困境是博弈论最经典的范例：两个参与者各自有"合作"和"背叛"策略。背叛是占优策略，但（背叛, 背叛）是帕累托劣于（合作, 合作）——个体理性导致集体非理性。
-
-**支付矩阵**：
-
-| | 合作 (C) | 背叛 (D) |
-|---|---|---|
-| 合作 (C) | (3, 3) | (0, 5) |
-| 背叛 (D) | (5, 0) | (1, 1) |
-
-严格占优策略分析：对每个参与者，背叛严格优于合作（$5 > 3$ 且 $1 > 0$）。唯一纳什均衡 (D, D) 支付 (1, 1)，帕累托劣于 (C, C) 支付 (3, 3)。
-
-**思想**：囚徒困境揭示了个体理性与集体理性的根本张力——纳什均衡不保证帕累托最优。此困境在现实中无处不在：军备竞赛、公地悲剧、价格战、碳排放。Axelrod（1984）的计算机竞赛表明：在重复囚徒困境中，"一报还一报"（Tit-for-Tat）策略可维持合作——重复互动改变均衡结构。
-
-## 逆向归纳法与子博弈完美 / Backward Induction & Subgame Perfection
-
-> 逆向归纳法（backward induction）是序列博弈的核心分析工具：从终端节点向前回溯，每步选择最优行动。Selten（1965）定义子博弈完美均衡（subgame perfect equilibrium, SPE）：在每个子博弈上都构成纳什均衡的策略组合——排除基于不可信威胁的均衡。
-
-**核心概念**：纳什均衡允许"不可信威胁"——参与者声称将采取某行动，但到达该节点时偏离更有利。SPE 要求均衡在每个子博弈上都成立，因此排除了不可信威胁。逆向归纳法是求解 SPE 的标准方法。
-
-**思想**：序列博弈中，时间结构引入了承诺与可信性问题——"威胁"必须是理性的才有效。逆向归纳法将多阶段决策分解为单阶段子问题，与 Bellman 最优性原理一脉相承。数学背景：Zermelo（1913）的定理使用逆向归纳法，Selten（1965）将其系统化为 SPE 概念。Selten 与 Nash、Harsanyi 共获 1994 年诺贝尔经济学奖。
-
-## Shapley 值与合作博弈 / Shapley Value & Cooperative Game Theory (1953)
-
-> Shapley（1953）提出合作博弈中唯一满足效率、对称性、哑元性和可加性的分配规则——Shapley 值 $\phi_i(v)$。它按边际贡献的平均值分配联盟收益。
-
-$$\phi_i(v) = \sum_{S \subseteq N \setminus \{i\}} \frac{|S|!(n - |S| - 1)!}{n!} [v(S \cup \{i\}) - v(S)]$$
-
-Shapley 值是唯一满足以下四条公理的分配：
-1. **效率性**：$\sum_i \phi_i(v) = v(N)$
-2. **对称性**：若 $i$ 和 $j$ 在所有联盟中贡献相同，则 $\phi_i = \phi_j$
-3. **哑元性**：若 $i$ 对所有联盟无边际贡献，则 $\phi_i = 0$
-4. **可加性**：$\phi_i(v + w) = \phi_i(v) + \phi_i(w)$
-
-**思想**：Shapley 值将"公平"转化为数学公理——公平不是主观判断，而是逻辑必然。合作博弈的核心问题：联盟产生的总收益如何分配？Shapley 值给出唯一满足公理的答案。核心（core）是另一种解概念——任何联盟的分配不低于其自身价值，但核心可能为空集。
-
-## Nash 讨价还价解 / Nash Bargaining Solution (1950)
-
-> Nash（1950）提出满足帕累托最优性、对称性、尺度无关性和独立性缩减的唯二讨价还价解。设威胁点 $d = (d_1, d_2)$，可行集 $S \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2$，Nash 解最大化 $(u_1 - d_1)(u_2 - d_2)$。
-
-$$\max_{(u_1, u_2) \in S, u_i \geq d_i} (u_1 - d_1)(u_2 - d_2)$$
-
-Nash 证明此解是满足四条公理的唯一分配。威胁点 $d$ 是谈判失败时各方的收益——威胁点越有利，谈判结果越有利。
-
-**思想**：讨价还价问题将"谈判"转化为数学优化——在可行集和威胁点约束下最大化联合收益。Nash 解的对称性与帕累托最优性使其成为公平谈判的自然基准。数学背景：此模型将合作博弈与非合作博弈联系起来——Nash 程序（Nash program）主张所有合作博弈解都应通过非合作博弈模型推导。
-
-## 演化博弈论 / Evolutionary Game Theory (Maynard Smith, 1973)
-
-> Maynard Smith（1973）提出演化稳定策略（Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, ESS）：策略 $\sigma^*$ 是 ESS，若对任何入侵策略 $\sigma \neq \sigma^*$，要么 $u(\sigma^*, \sigma^*) > u(\sigma, \sigma^*)$，要么 $u(\sigma^*, \sigma^*) = u(\sigma, \sigma^*)$ 且 $u(\sigma^*, \sigma) > u(\sigma, \sigma)$。
-
-**核心定义**：ESS 是比纳什均衡更强的稳定性概念——不仅要"不被偏离"，还要"不被入侵"。纳什均衡是 ESS 的必要条件，但 ESS 附加了稳定性要求。
-
-**思想**：演化博弈论将博弈论从"理性选择"推广到"适应性动态"——参与者不必理性，只需在重复互动中调整策略。生物学应用：性别比例博弈、鹰鸽博弈（Hawk-Dove）、资源竞争。经济学应用：市场惯例的形成、技术标准的扩散。数学背景：ESS 与复制者动态（replicator dynamics）联系——ESS 是复制者动态的局部稳定点。
-
-## Vickrey 拍卖与拍卖理论 / Vickrey Auction & Auction Theory (1961)
-
-> Vickrey（1961）提出第二价格拍卖（second-price sealed-bid auction）：出价最高者获胜，但支付第二高出价。报真实估值是占优策略——机制设计的奠基之作。
-
-**核心定理**：在 Vickrey 拍卖中，报真实估值 $b_i = v_i$ 是每个投标者的弱占优策略。证明：设真实估值 $v_i$，第二高出价 $p$。若 $v_i > p$，报 $b_i = v_i$ 获胜支付 $p$，收益 $v_i - p > 0$；若 $b_i > v_i > p$ 同样获胜但收益不变；若 $b_i < v_i$ 可能失去正收益。因此如实报告最优。
-
-Vickrey 证明了对称风险中性投标者，四种标准拍卖（英式、荷式、第一价格密封、第二价格密封）的期望收入相等——**收入等价定理（Revenue Equivalence Theorem）**。Milgrom & Weber（1982）推广到关联估值（affiliated values），发现英式拍卖收入最高。
-
-**思想**：Vickrey 拍卖是激励相容（incentive-compatible）机制的典范——通过巧妙设计支付规则，使自利行为自动导向效率最优。拍卖理论将博弈论应用于市场设计：如何通过规则引导理性参与者产生最优结果？数学背景：Vickrey 共获 1996 年诺贝尔经济学奖。
-
-## 机制设计 / Mechanism Design (Hurwicz, Myerson, Maskin — Nobel 2007)
-
-> 机制设计是博弈论的"逆向工程"——给定目标结果，设计博弈规则使理性参与者的自利行为自动实现该目标。Hurwicz、Myerson、Maskin 因此获 2007 年诺贝尔经济学奖。
-
-**核心概念**：
-- **激励相容性（Incentive Compatibility）**：如实报告类型是均衡策略——参与者没有动机谎报
-- **显示原理（Revelation Principle）**：任何贝叶斯博弈的均衡都可由直接机制实现——参与者如实报告类型即达均衡，无需复杂策略
-- **Myerson 最优拍卖**：在独立私人估值模型下，最大化卖家期望收入的最优机制——虚拟估值 $v_i - (1 - F_i(v_i))/f_i(v_i)$ 最高者获胜
-
-$$\text{Virtual valuation: } \varphi_i(v_i) = v_i - \frac{1 - F_i(v_i)}{f_i(v_i)}$$
-
-- **Maskin 可实施性（Maskin Monotonicity）**：社会选择函数可被纳什实施的必要条件——偏好单调性
-
-**思想**：机制设计回答"如何设计规则"而非"给定规则下如何行动"——从博弈的结果反推博弈的结构。显示原理简化了机制设计：只需考虑直接机制。激励相容性保证了规则与动机的一致——制度设计不是空想，而是可被数学验证的工程。数学背景：Hurwicz（1960s）引入激励相容性概念；Myerson（1981）发展最优拍卖理论；Maskin（1977/1999）发展纳什可实施性理论。
-
-## 信号博弈 / Signaling Games (Spence, 1973)
-
-> Spence（1973）提出信号传递模型：在信息不对称下，拥有私人信息的发送者通过可观察的行动（信号）向接收者传递信息。经典应用：教育作为能力信号——高能力者获得教育的成本更低，因此教育投资传递了能力信息。
-
-**核心模型**：发送者有类型 $t \in \{H, L\}$（高/低能力），选择信号 $s \in \{e, 0\}$（受教育/不受教育），接收者观测 $s$ 后选择响应 $a$。分离均衡：$H$ 选 $e$，$L$ 选 $0$——信号完美传递类型。混同均衡：两者都选相同信号——信号无信息量。
-
-**思想**：信号博弈揭示了信息传递的经济学——信号必须有成本差异才能传递信息（否则人人都会模仿）。Spence 模型中，教育的社会价值可能完全是信号价值而非生产力提升——这引发了关于教育本质的深刻讨论。Spence 共获 2001 年诺贝尔经济学奖。数学背景：信号博弈是贝叶斯博弈的子类——类型是私人信息，策略是类型依赖的。
-
-## 重复博弈与 Folk 定理 / Repeated Games & Folk Theorem
-
-> Folk 定理（民间定理，1970s 非正式流传，Aumann 1981 系统化）：在无限重复博弈中，任何个体理性支付 $v_i \geq \min_{s_{-i}} \max_{s_i} u_i(s_i, s_{-i})$（minimax 支付）都可以作为子博弈完美均衡的平均支付被实现。
-
-**核心定理**：设 $v = (v_1, \ldots, v_n)$ 为可行且个体理性的支付向量（$v_i \geq \underline{v}_i$，$\underline{v}_i$ 为 $i$ 的 minimax 值），则在贴现因子 $\delta$ 足够接近 1 时，$v$ 可作为无限重复博弈的子博弈完美均衡的平均支付被实现。
-
-实现机制：惩罚策略（punishment strategy）——偏离者将被"惩罚"回 minimax 支付水平，偏离的短期收益被长期惩罚抵消。
-
-**思想**：Folk 定理是重复博弈的核心结果——它解释了为什么合作在长期互动中可能维持：偏离的短期收益小于长期惩罚的损失。此定理也解释了为什么重复博弈有无数个均衡——几乎任何可行支付都可被实现。Aumann（2005 年诺贝尔奖）系统化了此理论。数学背景：贴现因子 $\delta$ 趋近 1 使得未来惩罚足够重——$\delta \geq \frac{g}{g + l}$，$g$ 为偏离收益，$l$ 为惩罚损失。

package/skills/induction-analogy/SKILL.en.md

@@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
----
-name: induction-analogy
-description: |
-  Trigger when finding patterns from data/experience, specific→general, known→unknown, mathematical induction proofs (weak/strong/structural/transfinite), cross-domain analogical transfer of structures, or borrowing structures from other fields for algorithm/operator design.
----
-
-# 📈 Induction & Analogy
-
-> "From the specific to the general, from the known to the unknown — induction discovers patterns, analogy transfers experience, but neither equals proof."
->
-> — Pólya, *Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning*; Lakatos, *Proofs and Refutations*
-
-## Core Principle
-
-**Induction discovers general patterns from limited instances — the engine of new knowledge; analogy transfers understanding across domains. Neither is rigorous proof, but both are fundamental to discovering theorems, proposing hypotheses, and generating innovation. Rigor is a tool of verification, not of discovery — Pólya.**
-
-The distinction between induction and analogy: **Induction** moves from N specific cases → a general rule (vertical deepening); **analogy** moves from the structure of domain A → the structure of domain B (lateral transfer); both produce hypotheses rather than theorems and require subsequent verification.
-
-> **Mathematical Formalization**
->
-> The critical distinction between inductive reasoning and inductive proof:
-> - Inductive reasoning: empirical, proposing hypotheses from observations
-> - Inductive proof: logical, mathematical induction is a rigorous deductive proof scheme
-> - Key: inductive reasoning generates conjectures; inductive proof verifies them — the two must not be conflated
->
-> Variants of inductive proof and their applicable scenarios:
-> - **Weak Induction**: Prove P(1) holds + prove ∀k(P(k)→P(k+1)) → conclude ∀n P(n); applicable when P(k+1) depends only on P(k)
-> - **Strong / Complete Induction**: Assume P(1), P(2), …, P(k) all hold, prove P(k+1); applicable when P(k+1) depends on multiple predecessors
-> - **Structural Induction**: Prove P(base) holds + P(composite) follows from P(components); applicable to recursively defined structures (trees, lists, expressions)
-> - **Transfinite Induction**: For a well-ordered set (W, <), prove ∀α∈W(∀β<α P(β) → P(α)) → ∀α∈W P(α); applicable to well-ordered sets indexed beyond the natural numbers
->
-> Formal description of Lakatos's methodology:
-> - **Monster-barring**: Treating a counterexample as an object outside the intended scope of the hypothesis and explicitly excluding it — the simplest form of revision, but one must guard against over-exclusion that renders the hypothesis vacuous
-> - **Lemma-incorporation**: Incorporating the hidden condition exposed by the counterexample into the hypothesis as a new lemma — makes the hypothesis more precise
-> - **Proof-strategy revision**: The counterexample reveals a fundamental flaw in the original proof approach, requiring a different proof framework — the most profound form of revision
->
-> Structural similarity measure for analogies:
-> - Structural similarity = (number of successfully mapped relations + number of successfully mapped components) / (total source relations + total source components)
-> - High validity (homomorphism): most structures have correspondents, key relations are preserved
-> - Medium validity (partial homomorphism): some structures and relations are preserved, some are distorted
-> - Low validity (surface similarity): only appearance or terminology is similar; deep structures differ
-
-## GPU-Friendliness (Cross-Cutting Check)
-
-Induction and analogy are inherently **meta-heuristic** — they generate conjectures and transfer structures, but do not directly prescribe computations. What must actually pass the GPU eight-dimension gate is their **product**: the structure being transferred into algorithm/operator design. If the analogically transferred structure is intractable, it must be adapted.
-
-- **Friendly**: The transferred structure can be expressed as dense GEMM chains or low-rank linear maps — e.g., structural induction ideas mapped to fusable implementations of recursive operators, algebraic homomorphism analogies mapped to low-rank GEMM (dimensions 1/2/4).
-- **Adaptable**: Transferred global/serial structures (naive cohomology computations, unstructured graph traversals, naive RNN-style recurrence) → adapt via block sparsification, low-rank projection, or tropical semiring relaxation (see adaptation techniques in `../../references/gpu-friendly-math.md`).
-- **Anti-pattern**: Adopting a structure solely because it is isomorphic/homomorphic and elegant, while ignoring O(n²) memory, fp64 dependence, or long serial recurrences — "mathematical beauty ≠ tractability"; an analogical conclusion may be mathematically correct yet hardware-infeasible.
-
-Eight-dimension minimum criteria (formal terms): **Tensorization** checks batch-expressibility of the transferred structure; **GEMM-mappability** checks whether the core operator after analogy maps to matrix multiplication; **complexity** checks whether global constructions brought from the source domain explode; **memory and KV-cache** checks whether large tables or long caches are introduced; **low-precision stability** checks whether the analogical structure depends on exact symbolic or high-precision computation; **parallelism and communication** checks whether recurrences or interactions can be chunked; **sparse structure** checks whether sparsity is regular; **operator fusion** checks whether the transferred structure can be realized as a small number of fused ops.
-
-> Used together with `../../references/gpu-friendly-math.md` (eight-dimension gate), `../../references/books/abstract-algebra.md` (homomorphism/isomorphism structures), `../../references/books/algebraic-geometry-rising-sea.md` (cross-domain structure transfer and compression).
-
-## When NOT to Use
-
-- **Rigorous proof is required** — inductive reasoning and analogy can only produce hypotheses, not proofs; however, mathematical induction itself is a proof method.
-- **There is only one or very few samples** — inductive reasoning needs a sufficient number of instances for support.
-- **The two domains are too different** — analogy requires structural similarity, not mere surface resemblance.
-- **The conclusion must have zero error** — inductive reasoning carries uncertainty; analogy carries distortion risk.
-- **The problem can be solved directly by deduction** — there is no need to detour through induction.
-
-## When to Use
-
-- Multiple cases have been observed sharing a common pattern, and one wishes to propose a general hypothesis.
-- Attempting to discover new theorems or new regularities in research.
-- Properties of recursively defined structures (trees, lists, expressions) need to be proved — use structural induction.
-- Propositions involving decomposition (e.g., prime factorization of integers) need to be proved — use strong induction.
-- Arguments over well-ordered sets beyond the natural numbers are needed — use transfinite induction.
-- Cross-disciplinary borrowing — can methods from other fields be applied to one's own problem?
-- **Borrowing structures from other fields for algorithm/operator design** — cross-domain analogical transfer of structures (e.g., algebraic homomorphism → low-rank mapping, sheaf diffusion → block summary), passing the GPU eight-dimension gate before adoption.
-
-## Method
-
-### Step 1: Collect Concrete Cases
-Systematically collect and observe concrete instances: extract key cases from the literature, gather patterns from experimental data, and organize known theorems. Ensure cases cover boundary values, typical values, and extreme values. The diversity and coverage of cases determine the quality of induction — too few or too homogeneous cases will be misleading.
-
-### Step 2: Identify Patterns
-Compare commonalities and differences across cases: what features appear in all (or most) cases? What appears only in some? Are the differences themselves patterned? Be aware that patterns may suddenly break after a number of cases (as in the Borwein integral phenomenon) — focusing only on commonalities can cause one to miss counterexamples.
-
-### Step 3: Formulate a Hypothesis
-Based on the observed pattern, formulate a general hypothesis: **strong hypothesis** ∀n P(n) (holds in all cases); **weak hypothesis** P(n) holds for sufficiently large n (with exceptions); **conditional hypothesis** ∀n∈S P(n) (on a specific subset). Selection principle: try the strong hypothesis first, then weaken it stepwise with counterexamples. The hypothesis must be specific enough to be falsifiable.
-
-### Step 4: Search for Counterexamples
-Actively seek counterexamples that falsify the hypothesis — the hallmark distinguishing science from pseudoscience. If a counterexample is found, revise (weaken or add conditions); if none is found, the hypothesis stands provisionally. Pay special attention to boundary conditions, extreme values, and whether the pattern suddenly fails when parameters change.
-
-### Step 5: Attempt a Proof
-For mathematical hypotheses, attempt a rigorous proof; selecting the correct induction variant is key:
-
-- **Weak Induction**: Prove P(1) + ∀k(P(k)→P(k+1)) → ∀n P(n); applicable when P(k+1) depends only on P(k) (summation formulas, simple recurrences); example: 1+2+…+n = n(n+1)/2.
-- **Strong Induction**: Assume P(1)..P(k) all hold and prove P(k+1); applicable when P(k+1) depends on multiple predecessors (decomposition, partition propositions); example: every integer greater than 1 is a product of primes, Fibonacci properties. Key: when P(k+1) must invoke P(j) for j<k, strong induction is required.
-- **Structural Induction**: Prove P(base) + P(composite) follows from P(components); applicable to recursively defined structures (trees, lists, expressions, formulas, program semantics); example: the number of leaf nodes in a binary tree equals the number of internal nodes plus 1. It is the natural extension of mathematical induction to recursive structures.
-- **Transfinite Induction**: For a well-ordered set (W,<), prove ∀α∈W(∀β<α P(β)→P(α)) → ∀α∈W P(α); applicable to well-ordered sets indexed beyond the natural numbers (ordinals, partially ordered sets, topological transitive closures); example: applications of Zorn's lemma, recursive constructions in set theory.
-- **Well-ordering principle equivalence**: Every non-empty subset has a least element ↔ natural number induction ↔ strong induction ↔ transfinite induction on well-ordered sets. Practical implication: choose the most natural formulation.
-
-### Step 6: Analogical Transfer
-Using analogy requires quantitative evaluation rather than relying solely on intuition:
-
-- **Structural similarity measure**: Structural similarity = (number of successfully mapped relations + number of successfully mapped components) / (total source relations + total source components).
-- **Analogy validity grading**: **High validity (homomorphism)** — most structures have correspondents, key relations are preserved, conclusions have high credibility; **Medium validity (partial homomorphism)** — some are preserved and some are distorted, conclusions must be revised before use; **Low validity (surface similarity)** — only appearance/terminology is similar, deep structures differ, conclusions are essentially unreliable.
-- **Systematic verification checklist**: (i) Does every component in the source domain have a correspondent in the target domain? (ii) Does every relation hold in the target domain? (iii) Is every operation defined in the target domain? (iv) Mapping consistency: if a↦a', b↦b', does R(a,b) imply R'(a',b')?
-
-### Step 7: Hypothesis Revision
-Revise the hypothesis based on counterexamples and proof attempts, following Lakatos's methodology: **Monster-barring** — treating the counterexample as outside the intended scope and explicitly excluding it (simplest; guard against over-exclusion leading to vacuity); **Lemma-incorporation** — incorporating the hidden condition exposed by the counterexample as a new lemma (makes the hypothesis more precise); **Proof-strategy revision** — the counterexample reveals a fundamental flaw in the original proof approach, requiring a different proof framework (most profound). After revision, return to Step 4 and iterate until the hypothesis stabilizes.
-
-## Common Errors
-
-| Error | Critique | Correct Approach |
-|-------|----------|-----------------|
-| Induction from insufficient samples | "Patterns" induced from 2–3 cases are extremely unreliable | Sample size must be large enough and cover diverse cases |
-| Treating inductive reasoning as proof | Inductive reasoning only produces hypotheses, not proofs; mathematical induction is a proof method | Distinguish inductive reasoning from inductive proof: the former generates conjectures, the latter verifies them |
-| Confirmation bias | Only seeing cases that support the hypothesis while ignoring counterexamples | Actively search for counterexamples — the most critical step |
-| Surface analogy | Analogy based on surface similarity rather than structural similarity | The basis of analogy is structural isomorphism/homomorphism, not surface resemblance |
-| Overextending analogy | Two domains are not fully isomorphic; analogical conclusions are not fully valid | Quantitatively evaluate analogy strength using structural similarity |
-| Failing to verify after induction | Proposing a hypothesis without testing it | The hypothesis must be tested against counterexamples and/or proved |
-| Using weak induction when strong induction is needed | When P(k+1) depends on multiple predecessors, weak induction cannot complete the inductive step | Identify the dependency structure: if P(k+1) must invoke P(j) for j<k, use strong induction |
-| Evaluating analogy by surface features alone | Surface feature similarity does not imply structural similarity; conclusions may be entirely wrong | Use systematic mapping to compare components, relations, and operations one by one |
-| Conflating inductive reasoning with inductive proof | Inductive reasoning is empirical; inductive proof is deductive — they are fundamentally different in nature | Distinguish clearly: reasoning → hypothesis; proof → theorem |
-| Ignoring pattern disruption (Borwein integrals) | Patterns that hold for the first several cases may suddenly break down; inductive reasoning has blind spots | Check sufficiently many cases; watch for sudden pattern changes at boundaries and under parameter variations |
-| Transferring intractable structures via analogy | Adopting a structure solely because the isomorphism is elegant, while ignoring O(n²) memory or fp64 dependence — "mathematical beauty ≠ tractability" | Run the transferred structure through the GPU eight-dimension gate first; if intractable, adapt (low-rank / block-sparse / relaxation) before adoption |
-
-## Operating Procedure
-
-When this skill is triggered, the output must include:
-
-1. **Case inventory**: `[Case N]: [description] [key features]`, ensuring coverage of boundary and extreme values.
-2. **Pattern identification**: `[Common pattern]: [description] [frequency: N/M] [Difference pattern]: [description]`, noting whether Borwein-type sudden disruption occurs.
-3. **Hypothesis statement**: `[Hypothesis]: [content] [type: strong/weak/conditional]`, trying the strong hypothesis first.
-4. **Counterexample search**: `[Counterexample]: [found/not found]. If found: [description], hypothesis revision: [new statement]`.
-5. **Proof direction**: `[Induction type: weak/strong/structural/transfinite]` with a proof outline; explain why this variant was chosen.
-6. **Analogy mapping**: `[Source domain A] → [Target domain B]: [correspondence] [structural similarity: X/Y] [validity: high/medium/low]`, verifying components, relations, and operations item by item.
-7. **Hypothesis revision**: `[Revision method: monster-barring/lemma-incorporation/strategy revision] [Revised hypothesis]`.
-8. **[GPU feasibility]** (if the transferred structure is used for algorithm/operator design) — run the transferred structure through `../../references/gpu-friendly-math.md` eight-dimension gate, annotate as friendly / retrofittable / unfriendly + adaptation suggestions.
-
-**The output must not present analysis alone without a conclusion; when further execution is needed, state in one sentence at the end what will be done next.**
-
-## Relations to Other Skills
-
-- **Logical deduction**: Induction generates hypotheses; deduction proves them — the two wings of discovery and verification.
-- **Abstraction thinking**: Analogy is essentially identifying the common abstract structure of two domains.
-- **Probability and statistics**: The probabilistic version of inductive reasoning is statistical inference.
-- **Modeling thinking**: The inductive process of discovering patterns from data is also part of modeling.
-- **Algorithmic thinking**: Induction as a correctness proof paradigm — loop invariants are induction hypotheses, and the correctness of recursive programs relies on structural induction.
-- **Discrete / Combinatorial thinking**: Combinatorial induction — inductive arguments on combinatorial objects, such as graph-theoretic induction and inductive recurrences in generating function methods.
-- **Modern mathematics activation**: `../../references/books/abstract-algebra.md` (structural analogy: homomorphism/isomorphism as formalization of analogy), `../../references/books/algebraic-geometry-rising-sea.md` (cross-domain structure transfer: sheaves/restriction maps/Plücker compression).