maka-agent 0.2.0-dev.4.20260830 → 0.2.0-dev.6.20260830

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Files changed (44) hide show
  1. package/dist/eval-bundle-path.js +1 -1
  2. package/dist/pi-tui-runner.js +3 -1
  3. package/dist/runtime-host-onboarding.js +10 -1
  4. package/dist/runtime-host-tui-context.js +2 -6
  5. package/native/runtime-host-peer/prebuilds/win32-x64/maka_runtime_host_peer.node +0 -0
  6. package/node_modules/@maka/eval/dist/external-subject.js +1 -1
  7. package/node_modules/@maka/eval/dist/harbor-external-subject.js +2 -2
  8. package/package.json +1 -2
  9. package/packages/eval/dist/attempt-store.js +0 -138
  10. package/packages/eval/dist/cli.js +0 -119
  11. package/packages/eval/dist/experiment-directory.js +0 -59
  12. package/packages/eval/dist/experiment.js +0 -49
  13. package/packages/eval/dist/external-subject.js +0 -488
  14. package/packages/eval/dist/harbor-external-subject.js +0 -929
  15. package/packages/eval/dist/harbor-maka-subject.js +0 -83
  16. package/packages/eval/dist/harness-environment.js +0 -80
  17. package/packages/eval/dist/harness-executor.js +0 -1013
  18. package/packages/eval/dist/index.js +0 -28
  19. package/packages/eval/dist/install-preflight.js +0 -201
  20. package/packages/eval/dist/maka-artifacts.js +0 -126
  21. package/packages/eval/dist/maka-runtime-policy.js +0 -42
  22. package/packages/eval/dist/maka-subject.js +0 -268
  23. package/packages/eval/dist/metering-checkpoint.js +0 -80
  24. package/packages/eval/dist/provider-admission.js +0 -39
  25. package/packages/eval/dist/provider-metering.js +0 -67
  26. package/packages/eval/dist/provider-web-tool-surface.js +0 -74
  27. package/packages/eval/dist/relay-result-frame.js +0 -38
  28. package/packages/eval/dist/result.js +0 -94
  29. package/packages/eval/dist/runner.js +0 -290
  30. package/packages/eval/dist/spec.js +0 -135
  31. package/packages/eval/dist/toolchain-verification.js +0 -130
  32. package/packages/eval/harbor/deepseek-codex-models.json +0 -69
  33. package/packages/eval/harbor/deepseek-harness-profile/cordis.patch.yml +0 -140
  34. package/packages/eval/harbor/deepseek-harness-profile/cordis.yml +0 -18
  35. package/packages/eval/harbor/deepseek-harness-profile/package.json +0 -10
  36. package/packages/eval/harbor/docker-compose-egress-proxy.yaml +0 -57
  37. package/packages/eval/harbor/egress-proxy/Dockerfile +0 -25
  38. package/packages/eval/harbor/egress-proxy/entrypoint.sh +0 -62
  39. package/packages/eval/harbor/egress-proxy/network-policy +0 -148
  40. package/packages/eval/harbor/egress_filter.py +0 -435
  41. package/packages/eval/harbor/eval_framework.py +0 -40
  42. package/packages/eval/harbor/relay_agent.py +0 -686
  43. package/packages/eval/harbor/run_trial.py +0 -223
  44. package/packages/eval/package.json +0 -20
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
1
- #!/bin/sh
2
- # Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one
3
- # or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file
4
- # distributed with this work for additional information
5
- # regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file
6
- # to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the
7
- # "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
8
- # with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
9
- #
10
- # http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
11
- #
12
- # Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
13
- # software distributed under the License is distributed on an
14
- # "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
15
- # KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
16
- # specific language governing permissions and limitations
17
- # under the License.
18
-
19
- set -eu
20
-
21
- STATE_DIR=/opt/maka-egress-state
22
- CERT_DIR=/opt/maka-egress
23
-
24
- mkdir -p "$STATE_DIR" "$CERT_DIR"
25
- # Create the audit log if this is the first start. Truncating here would erase
26
- # hits already written if the proxy restarts mid-trial, and the trial would
27
- # look like an honest zero-hit run.
28
- touch "$STATE_DIR/hits.jsonl"
29
-
30
- # confdir holds the CA private key and this cell's audit log, so it stays
31
- # container-private and only the certificate reaches the volume the subject
32
- # mounts. Creating the CA here instead of letting mitmdump create it on startup
33
- # publishes the certificate before the proxy port opens, so the health gate
34
- # cannot release `main` against a missing or left-over certificate.
35
- python -c 'import sys
36
- from mitmproxy.certs import CertStore
37
- CertStore.from_store(sys.argv[1], "mitmproxy", 2048)' "$STATE_DIR"
38
- # Publish by rename so a restart cannot expose a truncated certificate to a
39
- # subject that is already running against the previous one.
40
- cp "$STATE_DIR/mitmproxy-ca-cert.pem" "$CERT_DIR/.mitmproxy-ca-cert.pem"
41
- mv "$CERT_DIR/.mitmproxy-ca-cert.pem" "$CERT_DIR/mitmproxy-ca-cert.pem"
42
-
43
- # The subject only needs this address so HTTPS_PROXY can keep using the
44
- # service hostname after the namespace policy refuses Docker DNS.
45
- ip="$(getent ahostsv4 "$(hostname)" | awk 'NR == 1 { print $1 }')"
46
- case "$ip" in
47
- "" | 127.*)
48
- echo "could not publish Eval egress proxy IPv4" >&2
49
- exit 1
50
- ;;
51
- esac
52
- printf '%s\n' "$ip" > "$CERT_DIR/.proxy-ipv4"
53
- mv "$CERT_DIR/.proxy-ipv4" "$CERT_DIR/proxy-ipv4"
54
-
55
- exec mitmdump \
56
- --quiet \
57
- --listen-host 0.0.0.0 \
58
- --listen-port 8080 \
59
- --set block_global=false \
60
- --set rawtcp=false \
61
- --set confdir="$STATE_DIR" \
62
- --scripts /opt/maka-eval/egress_filter.py
@@ -1,148 +0,0 @@
1
- #!/bin/sh
2
- # Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one
3
- # or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file
4
- # distributed with this work for additional information
5
- # regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file
6
- # to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the
7
- # "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
8
- # with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
9
- #
10
- # http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
11
- #
12
- # Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
13
- # software distributed under the License is distributed on an
14
- # "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
15
- # KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
16
- # specific language governing permissions and limitations
17
- # under the License.
18
-
19
- set -eu
20
-
21
- # gost's allowlist is never written here: the sidecar entrypoint empties it at
22
- # start and this policy only ever forwards through the audited proxy, so gost
23
- # forwards nothing on its own. That also removes the packet-mark exemption gost
24
- # needs when it does forward — the sidecar shares the subject's network
25
- # namespace, so a mark the sidecar can set is one the subject can set too.
26
- GOST_PORT=12345
27
- NFTABLES_RULESET_NAME=gost_egress
28
- PROXY_HOST=maka-eval-mitmproxy
29
- PROXY_PORT=8080
30
-
31
- remove_nftables() {
32
- nft delete table inet "$NFTABLES_RULESET_NAME" 2>/dev/null || true
33
- }
34
-
35
- PROXY_IPV4_PATH=/opt/maka-egress/proxy-ipv4
36
-
37
- resolve_proxy_ip() {
38
- # The proxy publishes this file before it is healthy. Reading it does not
39
- # depend on Docker DNS, so deny-all then allow still has an address.
40
- if [ ! -s "$PROXY_IPV4_PATH" ]; then
41
- return
42
- fi
43
- ip=$(tr -d ' \t\r\n' < "$PROXY_IPV4_PATH")
44
- case "$ip" in
45
- "" | *.*.*.*.* | *[!0-9.]*)
46
- return
47
- ;;
48
- esac
49
- # Same four-octet program as relay_agent.IPV4_OCTET_AWK.
50
- if ! printf '%s\n' "$ip" | awk '
51
- BEGIN { FS = "." }
52
- NF != 4 { exit 1 }
53
- {
54
- for (i = 1; i <= 4; i++) {
55
- if ($i !~ /^(0|[1-9][0-9]*)$/ || $i + 0 > 255) exit 1
56
- }
57
- }
58
- '; then
59
- return
60
- fi
61
- printf '%s\n' "$ip"
62
- }
63
-
64
- # The only difference between the two modes this policy installs is whether the
65
- # audited proxy is exempt, so they are one ruleset with one optional pair of
66
- # rules rather than two rulesets that have to be kept in step.
67
- apply_ruleset() {
68
- proxy_ip="${1:-}"
69
- nft --file - <<EOF
70
- add table inet $NFTABLES_RULESET_NAME
71
- flush table inet $NFTABLES_RULESET_NAME
72
-
73
- table inet $NFTABLES_RULESET_NAME {
74
- chain output {
75
- type nat hook output priority dstnat; policy accept;
76
-
77
- fib daddr type local return
78
- ${proxy_ip:+ ip daddr $proxy_ip tcp dport $PROXY_PORT return}
79
- meta l4proto tcp redirect to :$GOST_PORT
80
- }
81
-
82
- chain egress {
83
- type filter hook output priority filter; policy accept;
84
-
85
- # Docker DNATs 127.0.0.11:53 onto another local port before this hook.
86
- # Matching only dport 53 here misses, and the local exemption below
87
- # would then accept the rewritten packet.
88
- ip daddr 127.0.0.11 reject
89
- fib daddr type local accept
90
- ${proxy_ip:+ ip daddr $proxy_ip tcp dport $PROXY_PORT accept}
91
- # Rejecting everything else rather than only non-TCP: the nat chain above
92
- # rewrote every TCP destination this policy admits to a local one, so what
93
- # reaches here still carrying a public destination is traffic the nat hook
94
- # never saw — a connection conntrack established before the policy existed.
95
- reject
96
- }
97
- }
98
- EOF
99
- }
100
-
101
- setup_proxy_only() {
102
- proxy_ip="$(resolve_proxy_ip)"
103
- if [ -z "$proxy_ip" ]; then
104
- echo "could not resolve Eval egress proxy" >&2
105
- exit 1
106
- fi
107
- apply_ruleset "$proxy_ip"
108
- echo "ok: Eval proxy-only egress applied ($proxy_ip:$PROXY_PORT)"
109
- }
110
-
111
- case "${1:-}" in
112
- allow-all)
113
- remove_nftables
114
- echo "ok: allow all egress"
115
- ;;
116
- deny-all)
117
- # A phase that asked for no network gets none. Answering it with the
118
- # proxy-only ruleset would hand it a route this override invented, which
119
- # Harbor's own deny-all does not grant either.
120
- apply_ruleset
121
- echo "ok: Eval no-network egress applied"
122
- ;;
123
- allow)
124
- shift
125
- if [ "$#" -ne 1 ] || [ "$1" != "$PROXY_HOST" ]; then
126
- echo "Eval egress policy accepts only $PROXY_HOST" >&2
127
- exit 2
128
- fi
129
- setup_proxy_only
130
- ;;
131
- show)
132
- if ! rules="$(nft list table inet "$NFTABLES_RULESET_NAME" 2>/dev/null)"; then
133
- echo "mode: allow-all"
134
- elif printf '%s' "$rules" | grep -q "dport $PROXY_PORT"; then
135
- echo "mode: Eval proxy-only"
136
- echo "proxy: $PROXY_HOST:$PROXY_PORT"
137
- else
138
- echo "mode: Eval no-network"
139
- fi
140
- ;;
141
- rules)
142
- nft list table inet "$NFTABLES_RULESET_NAME" 2>/dev/null || echo "mode: allow-all"
143
- ;;
144
- *)
145
- echo "Usage: network-policy {show|allow-all|deny-all|allow|rules}" >&2
146
- exit 2
147
- ;;
148
- esac
@@ -1,435 +0,0 @@
1
- # Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one
2
- # or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file
3
- # distributed with this work for additional information
4
- # regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file
5
- # to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the
6
- # "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
7
- # with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
8
- #
9
- # http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
10
- #
11
- # Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
12
- # software distributed under the License is distributed on an
13
- # "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
14
- # KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
15
- # specific language governing permissions and limitations
16
- # under the License.
17
-
18
- """Fail-closed URL contamination filter for Eval subject egress."""
19
-
20
- from __future__ import annotations
21
-
22
- import json
23
- import os
24
- import re
25
- import time
26
- from pathlib import Path
27
- from urllib.parse import unquote, urlsplit
28
-
29
- PINNED_REVISION = "d49e28f1e4ddd13d289e85a5f312a66750951932"
30
- MAX_DECODE_PASSES = 4
31
- MAX_AUDIT_BYTES = 1024 * 1024
32
- AUDIT_PATH = Path(
33
- os.environ.get("MAKA_EVAL_EGRESS_AUDIT", "/opt/maka-egress-state/hits.jsonl")
34
- )
35
- PERCENT_ESCAPE = re.compile(r"%(?![0-9a-fA-F]{2})")
36
- TERMINAL_BENCH = re.compile(r"terminal[-_.%/+\s]*bench", re.IGNORECASE)
37
-
38
-
39
- def contamination_rule(raw_url: str) -> tuple[str, str, str] | None:
40
- normalized = normalize_url(raw_url)
41
- url = urlsplit(normalized)
42
- host = (url.hostname or "").lower().rstrip(".")
43
- path_query = f"{url.path}?{url.query}" if url.query else url.path
44
- lowered = path_query.lower()
45
-
46
- # Search the host and the path separately. A benchmark name in the hostname
47
- # is a contamination surface, and searching the two fields joined would let
48
- # a rule match across their boundary.
49
- def anywhere(needle: str) -> bool:
50
- return needle in host or needle in lowered
51
-
52
- if host == "r.jina.ai":
53
- inner = unquote(url.path.lstrip("/"))
54
- if inner.startswith(("http://", "https://")):
55
- nested = contamination_rule(inner)
56
- if nested:
57
- return (f"jina_recursive:{nested[0]}", host, path_query)
58
-
59
- if anywhere(PINNED_REVISION):
60
- return ("pinned_revision", host, path_query)
61
- if host == "tbench.ai" or host.endswith(".tbench.ai"):
62
- return ("tbench_domain", host, path_query)
63
- if host == "hub.harborframework.com" and "/tasks/terminal-bench" in lowered:
64
- return ("harbor_task_registry", host, path_query)
65
- if benchmark_repository(host, lowered):
66
- return ("benchmark_repository", host, path_query)
67
- if public_trajectory_repository(host, lowered):
68
- return ("public_trajectory", host, path_query)
69
- if anywhere("patches-terminalbench-"):
70
- return ("known_patch_artifact", host, path_query)
71
- if TERMINAL_BENCH.search(host) or TERMINAL_BENCH.search(lowered):
72
- return ("terminal_bench_url", host, path_query)
73
- return None
74
-
75
-
76
- def normalize_url(raw_url: str) -> str:
77
- value = raw_url.strip()
78
- if not value:
79
- raise ValueError("empty URL")
80
- for _ in range(MAX_DECODE_PASSES):
81
- if PERCENT_ESCAPE.search(value):
82
- raise ValueError("malformed percent escape")
83
- decoded = unquote(value)
84
- if decoded == value:
85
- break
86
- value = decoded
87
- else:
88
- raise ValueError("URL exceeded decode limit")
89
- parsed = urlsplit(value)
90
- if parsed.scheme.lower() not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed.hostname:
91
- raise ValueError("unsupported URL")
92
- return value
93
-
94
-
95
- def benchmark_repository(host: str, path_query: str) -> bool:
96
- repositories = (
97
- "harbor-framework/terminal-bench",
98
- "terminal-benchmarks/terminal-bench",
99
- "tbench-ai/terminal-bench",
100
- )
101
- return host in {
102
- "github.com",
103
- "api.github.com",
104
- "raw.githubusercontent.com",
105
- "codeload.github.com",
106
- } and any(repository in path_query for repository in repositories)
107
-
108
-
109
- def public_trajectory_repository(host: str, path_query: str) -> bool:
110
- return (
111
- host in {"github.com", "api.github.com", "raw.githubusercontent.com", "huggingface.co"}
112
- and "hqeric/maka-eval-trajectories" in path_query
113
- )
114
-
115
-
116
- try:
117
- from mitmproxy import http
118
- except ImportError:
119
- http = None
120
-
121
- try:
122
- from mitmproxy.proxy import commands as proxy_commands
123
- from mitmproxy.proxy.layer import Layer
124
- from mitmproxy.proxy.layers import ClientTLSLayer, ServerTLSLayer
125
- from mitmproxy.proxy.layers.tcp import TCPLayer
126
- except ImportError:
127
- proxy_commands = None
128
- Layer = object
129
- ClientTLSLayer = None
130
- ServerTLSLayer = None
131
- TCPLayer = None
132
-
133
- try:
134
- from mitmproxy.net.tls import starts_like_tls_record
135
- except ImportError:
136
- def starts_like_tls_record(data: bytes) -> bool:
137
- return len(data) >= 3 and data[0] == 0x16 and data[1] == 0x03
138
-
139
-
140
- def configure(updated: object) -> None:
141
- # HTTP 101 upgrades construct TCPLayer inside the HTTP layer without
142
- # another next_layer hook. rawtcp=false makes that path CloseConnection
143
- # itself; WebSocket upgrades stay on the websocket layer.
144
- try:
145
- from mitmproxy import ctx
146
- except ImportError:
147
- return
148
- if getattr(ctx.options, "rawtcp", False):
149
- ctx.options.rawtcp = False
150
-
151
-
152
- def request(flow: object) -> None:
153
- apply_http_policy(flow, flow.request.pretty_url)
154
-
155
-
156
- def response(flow: object) -> None:
157
- response = getattr(flow, "response", None)
158
- if getattr(response, "status_code", None) != 101:
159
- return
160
- # mitmproxy 12.2.3 sets flow.websocket before HttpResponseHook only when
161
- # the 101 is a real WebSocket upgrade (Upgrade + version 13 + option on).
162
- # A websocket Upgrade header alone still falls through to CloseConnection
163
- # under rawtcp=false and must be audited.
164
- if getattr(flow, "websocket", None) is not None:
165
- return
166
- record_raw_tunnel(flow)
167
-
168
-
169
- def http_connect(flow: object) -> None:
170
- try:
171
- raw_url = connect_target_url(flow)
172
- except Exception:
173
- raw_url = ""
174
- apply_http_policy(flow, raw_url)
175
-
176
-
177
- def tcp_start(flow: object) -> None:
178
- # Last resort if a TCPLayer is still admitted (tcp_hosts / ignore).
179
- # CONNECT raw is closed by next_layer → CloseRawLayer; HTTP 101 raw is
180
- # closed by rawtcp=false. Neither of those paths starts a TCPLayer.
181
- record_raw_tunnel(flow)
182
- kill_flow(flow)
183
-
184
-
185
- def tcp_message(flow: object) -> None:
186
- messages = getattr(flow, "messages", None)
187
- if messages:
188
- messages[-1].content = b""
189
- kill_flow(flow)
190
-
191
-
192
- def next_layer(nextlayer: object) -> None:
193
- # Script addons run before the built-in classifier assigns layer. If we
194
- # set CloseRawLayer here, NextLayer leaves it in place. Waiting for
195
- # isinstance(..., TCPLayer) never fires on the production CONNECT path.
196
- current = getattr(nextlayer, "layer", None)
197
- context = getattr(nextlayer, "context", None)
198
- if current is None:
199
- data_client = _next_layer_bytes(nextlayer, "data_client")
200
- if _is_fragmented_tls_record_prefix(data_client):
201
- if ClientTLSLayer is None or ServerTLSLayer is None:
202
- return
203
- server_tls = ServerTLSLayer(context)
204
- server_tls.child_layer = ClientTLSLayer(context)
205
- nextlayer.layer = server_tls
206
- return
207
- if not looks_like_raw_tcp(nextlayer):
208
- return
209
- record_raw_tunnel(context)
210
- nextlayer.layer = CloseRawLayer(context)
211
- return
212
- if TCPLayer is None or not isinstance(current, TCPLayer):
213
- return
214
- record_raw_tunnel(context)
215
- closer = CloseRawLayer(context)
216
- replace_layer(context, current, closer)
217
- nextlayer.layer = closer
218
-
219
-
220
- def apply_http_policy(flow: object, raw_url: str) -> None:
221
- if http is None:
222
- raise RuntimeError("mitmproxy is required to run the Eval egress filter")
223
- try:
224
- matched = contamination_rule(raw_url)
225
- if not matched:
226
- return
227
- rule_id, host, normalized_path = matched
228
- append_audit(rule_id, host, normalized_path)
229
- flow.response = blocked_response(rule_id)
230
- except Exception as error:
231
- flow.response = http.Response.make(
232
- 503,
233
- b"Eval egress policy could not classify this request.\n",
234
- {
235
- "Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8",
236
- "X-Maka-Eval-Egress-Rule": "policy_error",
237
- },
238
- )
239
- try:
240
- append_audit("policy_error", "", type(error).__name__)
241
- except Exception:
242
- pass
243
-
244
-
245
- def connect_target_url(flow: object) -> str:
246
- request = flow.request
247
- host = (getattr(request, "pretty_host", None) or getattr(request, "host", "") or "").strip()
248
- if not host:
249
- raise ValueError("empty CONNECT host")
250
- if ":" in host and not host.startswith("["):
251
- host = f"[{host}]"
252
- port = getattr(request, "port", None)
253
- if port in (None, 443):
254
- return f"https://{host}/"
255
- if port == 80:
256
- return f"http://{host}/"
257
- return f"https://{host}:{port}/"
258
-
259
-
260
- def looks_like_raw_tcp(nextlayer: object) -> bool:
261
- """Close only when the bytes cannot still become HTTP or TLS.
262
-
263
- Script next_layer runs before mitmproxy 12.2.3's classifier. Copying its
264
- `probably_no_http` test here would treat `GET` / `GET ` as raw and assign
265
- CloseRawLayer while the request line is still arriving. With rawtcp=false
266
- the built-in path would have kept waiting for HttpLayer.
267
- """
268
- data_client = _next_layer_bytes(nextlayer, "data_client")
269
- data_server = _next_layer_bytes(nextlayer, "data_server")
270
- if _could_start_tls_record(data_client):
271
- return False
272
- if not data_client and not data_server:
273
- return False
274
- if data_server or data_client.startswith(b"SSH"):
275
- return True
276
- return not _still_could_be_http(data_client)
277
-
278
-
279
- def _could_start_tls_record(data: bytes) -> bool:
280
- """Keep a fragmented ClientHello undecided until its 3-byte prefix exists."""
281
- if starts_like_tls_record(data):
282
- return True
283
- return _is_fragmented_tls_record_prefix(data)
284
-
285
-
286
- def _is_fragmented_tls_record_prefix(data: bytes) -> bool:
287
- return 0 < len(data) < 3 and b"\x16\x03".startswith(data)
288
-
289
-
290
- def _still_could_be_http(data: bytes) -> bool:
291
- first_line, newline, _rest = data.partition(b"\n")
292
- line = first_line.rstrip(b"\r")
293
- method, space, _remainder = line.partition(b" ")
294
- if not method.isascii() or not method.isalpha():
295
- return False
296
- if newline and not space:
297
- return False
298
- return True
299
-
300
-
301
- def _next_layer_bytes(nextlayer: object, name: str) -> bytes:
302
- getter = getattr(nextlayer, name, None)
303
- if not callable(getter):
304
- return b""
305
- try:
306
- data = getter()
307
- except Exception:
308
- return b""
309
- return bytes(data) if isinstance(data, (bytes, bytearray)) else b""
310
-
311
-
312
- def tcp_peer(flow: object) -> tuple[str, str]:
313
- server = getattr(flow, "server_conn", None) or getattr(flow, "server", None)
314
- address = getattr(server, "address", None) if server is not None else None
315
- if isinstance(address, (tuple, list)) and address:
316
- host = str(address[0])[:255]
317
- port = address[1] if len(address) > 1 else ""
318
- return host, f":{port}" if port != "" else ""
319
- return "", ""
320
-
321
-
322
- def record_raw_tunnel(flow: object) -> None:
323
- host, path = tcp_peer(flow)
324
- try:
325
- append_audit("raw_tunnel", host, path)
326
- except Exception:
327
- pass
328
-
329
-
330
- def kill_flow(flow: object) -> None:
331
- kill = getattr(flow, "kill", None)
332
- if callable(kill) and getattr(flow, "killable", True):
333
- try:
334
- kill()
335
- except Exception:
336
- pass
337
-
338
-
339
- def replace_layer(context: object, current: object, closer: object) -> None:
340
- layers = getattr(context, "layers", None)
341
- if not isinstance(layers, list):
342
- return
343
- try:
344
- index = layers.index(current)
345
- except ValueError:
346
- index = len(layers)
347
- if closer in layers:
348
- layers.remove(closer)
349
- if current in layers:
350
- layers.remove(current)
351
- layers.insert(min(index, len(layers)), closer)
352
-
353
-
354
- class CloseRawLayer(Layer):
355
- def __init__(self, context: object) -> None:
356
- if Layer is object:
357
- self.context = context
358
- return
359
- if getattr(context, "layers", None) is None:
360
- context.layers = []
361
- if getattr(context, "options", None) is None:
362
- context.options = type("Options", (), {"proxy_debug": False})()
363
- super().__init__(context)
364
-
365
- def handle_event(self, event: object):
366
- if proxy_commands is None:
367
- return
368
- yield
369
- for name in ("client", "server"):
370
- connection = getattr(self.context, name, None)
371
- if connection is not None:
372
- yield proxy_commands.CloseConnection(connection)
373
-
374
-
375
- def blocked_response(rule_id: str):
376
- return http.Response.make(
377
- 451,
378
- b"Benchmark source or public solution access is blocked during evaluation.\n",
379
- {
380
- "Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8",
381
- "X-Maka-Eval-Egress-Rule": rule_id,
382
- },
383
- )
384
-
385
-
386
- def append_audit(rule_id: str, host: str, normalized_path: str) -> None:
387
- AUDIT_PATH.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
388
- if AUDIT_PATH.exists() and AUDIT_PATH.stat().st_size >= MAX_AUDIT_BYTES:
389
- write_truncation_marker()
390
- return
391
- record = {
392
- "ts": int(time.time() * 1000),
393
- "ruleId": rule_id,
394
- "host": host[:255],
395
- "normalizedPath": normalized_path[:4096],
396
- }
397
- with AUDIT_PATH.open("a", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
398
- stream.write(json.dumps(record, ensure_ascii=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n")
399
-
400
-
401
- def write_truncation_marker() -> None:
402
- if audit_already_truncated():
403
- return
404
- record = {
405
- "ts": int(time.time() * 1000),
406
- "ruleId": "audit_truncated",
407
- "host": "",
408
- "normalizedPath": "",
409
- }
410
- prefix = ""
411
- if AUDIT_PATH.exists() and AUDIT_PATH.stat().st_size > 0:
412
- with AUDIT_PATH.open("rb") as stream:
413
- stream.seek(-1, os.SEEK_END)
414
- if stream.read(1) != b"\n":
415
- prefix = "\n"
416
- with AUDIT_PATH.open("a", encoding="utf-8") as stream:
417
- stream.write(prefix + json.dumps(record, ensure_ascii=True, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n")
418
-
419
-
420
- def audit_already_truncated() -> bool:
421
- if not AUDIT_PATH.exists():
422
- return False
423
- with AUDIT_PATH.open("rb") as stream:
424
- stream.seek(0, os.SEEK_END)
425
- size = stream.tell()
426
- stream.seek(max(0, size - 4096))
427
- tail = stream.read().decode("utf-8", errors="ignore")
428
- lines = [line for line in tail.splitlines() if line.strip()]
429
- if not lines:
430
- return False
431
- try:
432
- parsed = json.loads(lines[-1])
433
- except json.JSONDecodeError:
434
- return False
435
- return isinstance(parsed, dict) and parsed.get("ruleId") == "audit_truncated"
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
1
- # Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one
2
- # or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file
3
- # distributed with this work for additional information
4
- # regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file
5
- # to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the
6
- # "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
7
- # with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
8
- #
9
- # http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
10
- #
11
- # Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
12
- # software distributed under the License is distributed on an
13
- # "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
14
- # KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
15
- # specific language governing permissions and limitations
16
- # under the License.
17
-
18
- """Authoritative Eval harness framework selection.
19
-
20
- `run_trial.py` validates the argv framework and installs it here before Harbor,
21
- Pier, or the shared relay can import. The relay must not read the environment.
22
- """
23
-
24
- from __future__ import annotations
25
-
26
- _FRAMEWORKS = frozenset({"harbor", "pier"})
27
- _framework: str | None = None
28
-
29
-
30
- def install(framework: str) -> None:
31
- if framework not in _FRAMEWORKS:
32
- raise RuntimeError("framework must be harbor or pier")
33
- global _framework
34
- _framework = framework
35
-
36
-
37
- def selected() -> str:
38
- if _framework not in _FRAMEWORKS:
39
- raise RuntimeError("Eval framework selection is not installed")
40
- return _framework