mailparser 3.9.38 → 3.9.39
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/.release-please-manifest.json +1 -1
- package/CHANGELOG.md +7 -0
- package/SECURITY.md +120 -44
- package/package.json +5 -5
package/CHANGELOG.md
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# Changelog
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## [3.9.39](https://github.com/nodemailer/mailparser/compare/v3.9.38...v3.9.39) (2026-10-14)
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### Bug Fixes
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* **deps:** update nodemailer to 10.1.1, libmime to 5.4.8 and mailsplit to 5.4.21 ([43ddf3e](https://github.com/nodemailer/mailparser/commit/43ddf3e9214b2a14b20319d1679ffe001a3a6889))
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## [3.9.38](https://github.com/nodemailer/mailparser/compare/v3.9.37...v3.9.38) (2026-10-10)
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package/SECURITY.md
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mailparser is an email parsing library for Node.js. It is routinely pointed at
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untrusted, adversarial, and malformed messages, so parser robustness is a
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security concern: a crafted message should never be able to crash the host
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process, exhaust memory or CPU, pollute prototypes, or
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process, exhaust memory or CPU through amplification, pollute prototypes, or
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leak data across parses. We welcome responsible reports of vulnerabilities that
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present a credible security risk to users. Please distinguish security
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vulnerabilities from ordinary bugs, unusual edge cases, and hardening
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suggestions.
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## Supported Versions
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Security fixes are released only against the latest version. We do not
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patches to older
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supported way to receive security updates.
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Security fixes are released only against the latest major version. We do not
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backport patches to older majors, so upgrading to the current release line is
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the supported way to receive security updates.
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| Version | Supported |
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| ------- | ------------------ |
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| 3.x | :white_check_mark: |
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| < 3.0 | :x: |
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If you are on an older
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If you are on an older major, please upgrade. See the release notes at
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<https://github.com/nodemailer/mailparser/releases> before updating.
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> [!NOTE]
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> [PostalMime](https://github.com/postalsys/postal-mime), which works in both
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> Node.js and browser environments.
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##
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## What Qualifies as a Security Vulnerability
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A security report should identify a realistic way for an attacker to cross a
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security boundary in a supported version of mailparser. Unexpected behavior, a
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failing test, or a technically correct proof of concept is not sufficient on its
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own to establish security impact.
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In particular, explain:
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- **Attacker capabilities:** Who is the attacker, and what inputs, systems, or
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responses can they control _without_ already having the privileges or secrets
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they are trying to gain?
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- **Attack path:** How does attacker-controlled input reach the affected code
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through a supported public API or a realistic application integration?
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- **Prerequisites:** What configuration and user actions are required? If the
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attack depends on unusual options or deliberately malformed input, explain why
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those conditions could arise in a real application.
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- **Impact:** What confidentiality, integrity, or availability boundary is
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crossed, and what can the attacker achieve as a result?
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A vulnerability involving an optional or less common feature can still qualify
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if these conditions are met. Conversely, the existence of a defensive check in
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the code does not, by itself, establish that every bypass of that check has a
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realistic security impact.
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-
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OS).
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- A clear description of the issue and its impact (e.g. denial of service via
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CPU or memory exhaustion, ReDoS, prototype pollution, unhandled exception that
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crashes the process, information disclosure between parses).
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- A minimal proof of concept - ideally the raw `.eml` sample or a short script
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that reproduces the issue.
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- Any suggested remediation, if you have one.
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## Reporting a Vulnerability
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reporters who wish to be named are credited.
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**Do not disclose suspected exploitable vulnerabilities through public GitHub
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issues, pull requests, or discussions before coordinating with the
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maintainers.**
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Report privately through one of the following channels:
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1. **GitHub Security Advisories (preferred):**
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<https://github.com/nodemailer/mailparser/security/advisories/new>.
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2. **Email:** **andris@postalsys.com**, as listed in
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[`SECURITY.txt`](SECURITY.txt). Encrypt sensitive details if possible.
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### Required Information
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Please provide enough information to evaluate both the defect and its security
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impact. Reports should include:
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1. The affected mailparser version or commit, Node.js version, and relevant
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configuration.
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2. A concise description of the issue and the affected public API or code path
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(`MailParser` or `simpleParser`. The raw `.eml` sample that triggers the
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issue is the most useful reproduction).
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3. A minimal, tested reproduction, including steps to run it, expected behavior,
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and observed behavior.
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4. A concrete threat model: attacker control, prerequisites, trust boundary, and
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resulting impact. Clearly distinguish what your reproduction proves from what
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you believe might be possible.
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5. An explanation of why the issue affects real deployments beyond a
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deliberately constructed test setup, where this is not obvious.
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A suggested fix is welcome but does not replace an explanation of
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exploitability. A complete real-world exploit is not always necessary, but the
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report must make a credible security impact clear.
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### Reports That May Be Treated as Ordinary Bugs
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The following generally do **not** qualify for private security handling unless
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you can demonstrate an additional, meaningful security boundary crossing:
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- Issues that require the attacker to control trusted application code,
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administrator-only configuration, or the secret they supposedly extract.
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- Problems caused solely by application-level misuse, exposed credentials, or
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insecure deployment choices outside mailparser's control.
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- Contrived proof-of-concept setups where the tester controls both sides of a
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request, without explaining how a separate attacker could trigger the issue.
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- Parser quirks, unexpected behavior, and bypasses of internal checks with no
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demonstrated security impact.
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- Speculative findings based only on static analysis or an automated tool's
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assessment, without a verified reproduction and credible attack scenario.
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These may still be valid bugs and may be considered through the normal issue
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tracker. Please coordinate before making any potentially exploitable details
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public. Classification as a bug does not guarantee a fix or a particular
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priority.
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### Automated and AI-Assisted Reports
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Automated analysis and AI tools are welcome as research aids, but the person
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submitting a report is responsible for verifying its claims. **Do not submit
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bulk, unverified, or speculative AI-generated findings.** Test each finding
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against a supported release and establish the actual security impact. Reports
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that do not meet the requirements above may be closed without further
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investigation or individual feedback; they can be resubmitted with stronger
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evidence.
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## Triage and Disclosure
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mailparser is maintained by a small team, and there is **no guaranteed response
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or resolution time**. Reports are prioritized based on demonstrated impact,
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exploitability, affected usage, and available maintenance resources.
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A private report does not automatically become a security advisory. Confirmed
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vulnerabilities may be fixed and disclosed through GitHub Security Advisories;
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other findings may be closed, deferred, or handled as ordinary bugs. Please do
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not disclose details of an unresolved, potentially exploitable issue publicly
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without coordinating with the maintainers.
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## CVEs and Credit
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We do not request or manage CVE identifiers. A report being acknowledged, a bug
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being fixed, or a pull request being merged does **not** mean that mailparser
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has confirmed a security vulnerability or endorsed a CVE assignment. We do not
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guarantee advisories, CVE identifiers, or public credit for reports. For
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confirmed vulnerabilities disclosed through an advisory, substantive reporters
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may be credited if they wish.
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## Scope
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In scope: the mailparser library source in this repository
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In scope: the mailparser library source in this repository: the streaming MIME
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parser (`MailParser`), the convenience parser (`simpleParser`), header and
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address decoding, charset
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text extraction. Of particular interest are inputs that cause
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consumption, catastrophic regular-expression backtracking,
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or process crashes.
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address decoding, charset and transfer-encoding handling, and attachment and
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HTML/text extraction. Of particular interest are small crafted inputs that cause
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amplified resource consumption, catastrophic regular-expression backtracking,
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prototype pollution, or process crashes.
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Out of scope:
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Parsed email content is attacker-controlled data; you must sanitize and escape
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it before rendering, storing, or executing it. In particular, the `html` field
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is not sanitized for safe display in a browser.
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- Vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies that are already tracked and fixed
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upstream - report those to the respective project (we will still bump the
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dependency once a fix is available).
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- Issues that require an already-compromised host or a malicious local
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environment.
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- Resource consumption that is proportional to a legitimately large input (for
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example, parsing a genuine 100MB message uses memory) rather than amplified by
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a crafted small input.
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- Vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies that are already tracked upstream
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(we will still bump the dependency once a fix is available).
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- Social-engineering reports.
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Thank you for helping keep mailparser and its users safe.
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package/package.json
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"name": "mailparser",
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"version": "3.9.
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"version": "3.9.39",
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"description": "Parse e-mails",
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"main": "index.js",
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"scripts": {
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"he": "1.2.0",
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"html-to-text": "10.0.1",
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"iconv-lite": "0.7.3",
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"libmime": "5.4.
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"libmime": "5.4.8",
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"linkify-it": "5.0.2",
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"@zone-eu/mailsplit": "5.4.
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"nodemailer": "10.1.
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"@zone-eu/mailsplit": "5.4.21",
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"nodemailer": "10.1.1",
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"punycode.js": "2.3.1",
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"tlds": "1.261.0"
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},
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"grunt-contrib-nodeunit": "5.0.0",
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"grunt-eslint": "27.0.0",
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"iconv": "3.0.1",
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"prettier": "3.9.
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"prettier": "3.9.10",
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"random-message": "1.1.0"
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},
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"repository": {
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