mailauth 7.2.0 → 7.3.1

package/lib/dkim2/dkim2-verifier.js

@@ -0,0 +1,572 @@
+'use strict';
+
+// DKIM2 verifier (draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-06 sections 10 and 11)
+
+const { Buffer } = require('node:buffer');
+const crypto = require('node:crypto');
+const { formatAuthHeaderRow, getCurTime, isSameOrSubdomain } = require('../tools');
+const { MI_KEY, SIG_KEY, HASH_ALGORITHMS, parseMessageInstance, parseSignature, parsePath, continuesCustody, buildSignatureInput } = require('./fields');
+const { Dkim2Parser } = require('./dkim2-parser');
+const { createKeyLookup, KeyError, ALGORITHM_KEY_TYPES, signatureData } = require('./key');
+
+// draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-bcp-01 section 7.5 recommends a local ceiling on the number of
+// Message-Instance and DKIM2-Signature header fields, with a PERMERROR above it
+const DEFAULT_MAX_INSTANCES = 20;
+// section 11.3: a failure when a signature is more than 14 days old
+const DEFAULT_MAX_SIGNATURE_AGE = 14 * 24 * 3600;
+// section 8.4: signatures from the future MAY be ignored. Five minutes allows for clock skew
+const DEFAULT_MAX_FUTURE_TIME = 5 * 60;
+
+// the order in which a result wins over the others, FAIL first so that a cryptographic failure is
+// never reported as a TEMPERROR (section 10.4)
+const RESULT_ORDER = ['fail', 'permerror', 'temperror', 'pass'];
+
+const pickResult = results => RESULT_ORDER.find(result => results.includes(result)) || 'pass';
+
+// a number from a header field for an error string, "?" when it could not be read
+const ordinal = value => (Number.isSafeInteger(value) ? value : '?');
+
+const verifySignature = (algorithm, input, publicKey, signature) => {
+    try {
+        return crypto.verify(...signatureData(algorithm, input), publicKey, signature);
+    } catch (err) {
+        return false;
+    }
+};
+
+// the first index from 1 that is missing from a map keyed by numbers
+const firstGap = map => {
+    let pos = 1;
+    while (map.has(pos)) {
+        pos++;
+    }
+    return pos;
+};
+
+class Dkim2Verifier extends Dkim2Parser {
+    /**
+     * @param {Object} [options]
+     * @param {Function} [options.resolver] DNS resolver
+     * @param {String} [options.mailFrom] SMTP MAIL FROM of the delivery, "" for the null path. When
+     *        set, it is checked against the mf= of the highest DKIM2-Signature (section 11.4)
+     * @param {String|String[]} [options.rcptTo] SMTP RCPT TO addresses of the delivery, each of
+     *        which has to be listed in rt= of the highest DKIM2-Signature
+     * @param {Number|Boolean} [options.maxSignatureAge=1209600] Seconds after t= when a signature
+     *        expires (section 11.3), false to not check
+     * @param {Number|Boolean} [options.maxFutureTime=300] Seconds a t= may be ahead of the current
+     *        time (section 8.4), false to not check
+     * @param {Date|Number|String} [options.curTime] Time to verify against, defaults to now
+     * @param {Number} [options.maxInstances=20] Most Message-Instance, and most DKIM2-Signature,
+     *        header fields processed for one message
+     * @param {Function} [options.checkReplay] async ({ key, exploded }) => true when a message with
+     *        the same m=1 hashes was seen before (section 11.9)
+     */
+    constructor(options) {
+        super();
+        this.options = options || {};
+        this.result = null;
+
+        this.maxInstances = this.options.maxInstances || DEFAULT_MAX_INSTANCES;
+        this.instanceRows = [];
+        this.signatureRows = [];
+    }
+
+    // too many DKIM2 header fields to process, which verify() reports
+    get overLimit() {
+        return this.instanceRows.length > this.maxInstances || this.signatureRows.length > this.maxInstances;
+    }
+
+    async messageHeaders(headers) {
+        let rows = headers.parsed;
+        this.instanceRows = rows.filter(row => row.key === MI_KEY).map(row => ({ line: row.line }));
+        this.signatureRows = rows.filter(row => row.key === SIG_KEY).map(row => ({ line: row.line }));
+
+        if ((!this.instanceRows.length && !this.signatureRows.length) || this.overLimit) {
+            // nothing to verify, or nothing that will be verified, so the body is not hashed at all
+            return;
+        }
+
+        for (let row of this.signatureRows) {
+            row.parsed = parseSignature(row.line);
+        }
+
+        for (let row of this.instanceRows) {
+            row.parsed = parseMessageInstance(row.line);
+            // hash the body with every algorithm a Message-Instance uses
+            for (let { algorithm } of row.parsed.hashes) {
+                if (HASH_ALGORITHMS.has(algorithm)) {
+                    this.hashBodyWith(algorithm);
+                }
+            }
+            if (Array.isArray(row.parsed.recipe?.b)) {
+                // a body Recipe copies lines from the body, so the body has to be kept
+                this.keepBody();
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    async finalChunk() {
+        this.result = await this.verify();
+    }
+
+    async verify() {
+        let errors = [];
+        let instances = new Map();
+        let signatures = new Map();
+        let instanceResults = [];
+        let signatureResults = new Map();
+
+        // the DKIM2-Signature a failure of a Message-Instance is reported against, the one with
+        // the lowest i= that covers it (draft-gondwana-dkim2-authres-00 section 3.2.2)
+        const signatureFor = m => {
+            for (let i = 1; signatures.has(i); i++) {
+                if (signatures.get(i).m === m) {
+                    return i;
+                }
+            }
+            return undefined;
+        };
+
+        const addError = (result, message, ref) => {
+            let entry = { result, message };
+            if (Number.isSafeInteger(ref?.i)) {
+                entry.i = ref.i;
+            }
+            if (Number.isSafeInteger(ref?.m)) {
+                entry.m = ref.m;
+                let i = signatureFor(ref.m);
+                if (i) {
+                    entry.i = i;
+                }
+            }
+            errors.push(entry);
+        };
+
+        const finish = replay => this.formatResult({ errors, signatures, signatureResults, instanceResults, replay });
+
+        if (!this.instanceRows.length && !this.signatureRows.length) {
+            return this.formatResult({ none: true });
+        }
+
+        if (this.overLimit) {
+            addError('permerror', `Message has more than ${this.maxInstances} Message-Instance or DKIM2-Signature header fields`);
+            return finish();
+        }
+
+        // section 11.2: every field is valid, numbered without gaps, and every instance is signed
+        for (let { line, parsed } of this.instanceRows) {
+            if (parsed.error) {
+                addError('permerror', `Message-Instance m=${ordinal(parsed.m)} ${parsed.error}`);
+            } else if (instances.has(parsed.m)) {
+                addError('permerror', `Message-Instance m=${parsed.m} appears more than once`);
+            } else {
+                instances.set(parsed.m, Object.assign({ line }, parsed));
+            }
+        }
+
+        for (let { line, parsed } of this.signatureRows) {
+            if (parsed.error) {
+                addError('permerror', `DKIM2-Signature i=${ordinal(parsed.i)} ${parsed.error}`, { i: parsed.i });
+            } else if (signatures.has(parsed.i)) {
+                addError('permerror', `DKIM2-Signature i=${parsed.i} appears more than once`, { i: parsed.i });
+            } else {
+                signatures.set(parsed.i, Object.assign({ line }, parsed));
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (errors.length) {
+            return finish();
+        }
+
+        let maxM = Math.max(0, ...instances.keys());
+        let maxI = Math.max(0, ...signatures.keys());
+
+        let missingM = firstGap(instances);
+        if (missingM <= maxM || !maxM) {
+            addError('permerror', `Message-Instance m=${missingM} missing`);
+        }
+
+        let missingI = firstGap(signatures);
+        if (missingI <= maxI || !maxI) {
+            addError('permerror', `DKIM2-Signature i=${missingI} missing`);
+        }
+
+        if (errors.length) {
+            return finish();
+        }
+
+        for (let [i, signature] of signatures) {
+            if (signature.m > maxM) {
+                addError('permerror', `Message-Instance m=${signature.m} missing`, { i });
+                return finish();
+            }
+        }
+
+        let maxSignedM = Math.max(...Array.from(signatures.values()).map(signature => signature.m));
+        if (maxM > maxSignedM) {
+            addError('permerror', `Message-Instance m=${maxM} is not signed`);
+            return finish();
+        }
+
+        // recreate every instance of the message by applying the Recipes from the top down
+        let current = this.currentState();
+
+        let states = new Map([[maxM, current]]);
+        for (let m = maxM; m > 1; m--) {
+            let state = states.get(m);
+            let recipe = instances.get(m).recipe;
+            if (recipe) {
+                try {
+                    state = state.previous(recipe);
+                } catch (err) {
+                    addError('permerror', `Message-Instance m=${m} contains invalid JSON: ${err.message}`, { m });
+                    return finish();
+                }
+            }
+            states.set(m - 1, state);
+        }
+
+        // section 11.7: the hashes of every instance
+        for (let m = 1; m <= maxM; m++) {
+            let instance = instances.get(m);
+            let state = states.get(m);
+            let hashResults = [];
+
+            for (let { algorithm, headerHash, bodyHash } of instance.hashes) {
+                if (!HASH_ALGORITHMS.has(algorithm)) {
+                    // section 3.4: hashes with an unknown algorithm are ignored
+                    continue;
+                }
+
+                let headerResult = state.headerHash(algorithm) === headerHash ? 'pass' : 'fail';
+                if (headerResult === 'fail') {
+                    addError('fail', `Message Instance m=${m} header hash ${algorithm} mismatch`, { m });
+                }
+
+                // a body before a null body Recipe can not be checked
+                let computedBodyHash = state.bodyHash(algorithm);
+                let bodyResult = computedBodyHash === null ? 'unknown' : computedBodyHash === bodyHash ? 'pass' : 'fail';
+                if (bodyResult === 'fail') {
+                    addError('fail', `Message Instance m=${m} body hash ${algorithm} mismatch`, { m });
+                }
+
+                hashResults.push({ algorithm, header: headerResult, body: bodyResult });
+            }
+
+            if (!hashResults.length) {
+                addError('permerror', `Message-Instance m=${m} has no supported hash algorithm`, { m });
+            }
+
+            let entry = { m, hashes: hashResults };
+            if (instance.recipe) {
+                entry.recipe = {
+                    headers: Array.from(instance.recipe.h.keys()),
+                    body: instance.recipe.b === undefined ? 'unchanged' : instance.recipe.b === null ? 'unrecoverable' : 'recipe'
+                };
+            }
+            instanceResults.push(entry);
+        }
+
+        // section 11.3
+        let maxAge = this.options.maxSignatureAge === undefined ? DEFAULT_MAX_SIGNATURE_AGE : this.options.maxSignatureAge;
+        let now = Math.floor(getCurTime(this.options.curTime).getTime() / 1000);
+        let maxFuture = this.options.maxFutureTime === undefined ? DEFAULT_MAX_FUTURE_TIME : this.options.maxFutureTime;
+        for (let [i, signature] of signatures) {
+            if (maxAge && now - signature.t > maxAge) {
+                addError('permerror', `DKIM2-Signature i=${i} signature expired`, { i });
+            }
+            // section 8.4: signatures from the future MAY be ignored, and draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-bcp-01
+            // section 3.6 lets verifiers treat them with suspicion
+            if (typeof maxFuture === 'number' && signature.t - now > maxFuture) {
+                addError('permerror', `DKIM2-Signature i=${i} signature timestamp is in the future`, { i });
+            }
+        }
+
+        this.checkCustody(signatures, maxI, addError);
+
+        // sections 11.5 and 11.6, from the most recent signature down (section 10.1)
+        // the key lookups of every hop run at the same time, the results are recorded in order
+        let keyLookup = createKeyLookup(this.options.resolver);
+        let hopOrder = Array.from({ length: maxI }, (v, index) => maxI - index);
+        let hopResults = await Promise.all(hopOrder.map(i => this.verifyHop(signatures.get(i), instances, signatures, keyLookup)));
+        hopOrder.forEach((i, index) => {
+            let result = hopResults[index];
+            signatureResults.set(i, result);
+            if (result.status.result !== 'pass') {
+                addError(result.status.result, result.status.comment, { i });
+            }
+        });
+
+        // section 11.8
+        let compareAlgorithm = this.bodyHashers.keys().next().value;
+        let lastExploded = 0;
+        for (let [i, signature] of signatures) {
+            if (signature.flags.includes('exploded')) {
+                lastExploded = Math.max(lastExploded, i);
+            }
+        }
+
+        let donotmodify = Array.from(signatures.values()).filter(signature => signature.flags.includes('donotmodify'));
+        if (compareAlgorithm && donotmodify.some(signature => !states.get(signature.m).isPreservedIn(current, compareAlgorithm))) {
+            addError('fail', 'Message has been modified despite a donotmodify request');
+        }
+
+        if (Array.from(signatures.values()).some(signature => signature.flags.includes('donotexplode') && signature.i < lastExploded)) {
+            addError('fail', 'Message has been exploded despite a donotexplode request');
+        }
+
+        // section 11.9: the m=1 hashes identify the message, the exploded flag allows copies
+        let firstHashes = instances.get(1).hashes;
+        let replayHash = firstHashes.find(hash => HASH_ALGORITHMS.has(hash.algorithm)) || firstHashes[0];
+        let replay = {
+            key: `${replayHash.algorithm}:${replayHash.headerHash}:${replayHash.bodyHash}`,
+            exploded: lastExploded > 0
+        };
+
+        if (typeof this.options.checkReplay === 'function') {
+            let duplicate = await this.options.checkReplay(Object.assign({}, replay));
+            if (duplicate && !replay.exploded) {
+                addError('fail', 'Duplicate message with no exploded flag');
+            }
+        }
+
+        return finish(replay);
+    }
+
+    // Section 11.4 and the links between the signatures described in section 9.4
+    checkCustody(signatures, maxI, addError) {
+        for (let i = 1; i <= maxI; i++) {
+            let signature = signatures.get(i);
+
+            // section 8.8: the d= domain is the mf= domain or a parent of it, unless mf= is null
+            if (signature.mailFrom && signature.mailFrom !== '<>' && !isSameOrSubdomain(parsePath(signature.mailFrom).domain, signature.signingDomain)) {
+                addError('permerror', `DKIM2-Signature i=${i} MAIL FROM and d= do not match`, { i });
+            }
+
+            // section 8.7: nd= names the d= of the next signature exactly
+            let next = signatures.get(i + 1);
+            if (signature.nextDomain && next && next.signingDomain !== signature.nextDomain) {
+                addError('permerror', `DKIM2-Signature i=${i} MAIL nd= does not match`, { i });
+            }
+
+            // section 9.4: the MAIL FROM of every hop matches a RCPT TO of the hop before it
+            if (!continuesCustody(signatures.get(i - 1), signature.mailFrom, signature.signingDomain)) {
+                addError(
+                    'permerror',
+                    `DKIM2-Signature i=${i} MAIL FROM ${signature.mailFrom && signature.mailFrom !== '<>' ? signature.mailFrom : signature.signingDomain} did not match`,
+                    { i }
+                );
+            }
+        }
+
+        let { mailFrom, rcptList, hasMailFrom } = this.envelope();
+        if (!hasMailFrom && !rcptList.length) {
+            // the delivery is not known, so it can not be compared
+            return;
+        }
+
+        let top = signatures.get(maxI);
+        if (top.nextDomain) {
+            // section 9.3: without mf= and rt= the delivery can only be accepted on out-of-band information
+            addError('permerror', `DKIM2-Signature i=${maxI} unexpected nd= tag`, { i: maxI });
+            return;
+        }
+
+        // section 11.4: an exact match, domains in lower case, local parts as they are
+        if (hasMailFrom && parsePath(mailFrom).address !== parsePath(top.mailFrom).address) {
+            addError('permerror', `DKIM2-Signature i=${maxI} MAIL FROM ${mailFrom} did not match`, { i: maxI });
+        }
+
+        let listed = new Set(top.rcptTo.map(path => parsePath(path).address));
+        for (let rcpt of rcptList) {
+            if (!listed.has(parsePath(rcpt).address)) {
+                addError('permerror', `DKIM2-Signature i=${maxI} RCPT TO ${rcpt} did not match`, { i: maxI });
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    // the SMTP envelope of the delivery, as far as the caller gave it
+    envelope() {
+        let { mailFrom, rcptTo } = this.options;
+        return {
+            mailFrom,
+            hasMailFrom: typeof mailFrom === 'string',
+            rcptList: [].concat(rcptTo || []).filter(value => typeof value === 'string')
+        };
+    }
+
+    // Without the envelope the highest DKIM2-Signature can not be compared with the delivery
+    // (section 11.4), and an unchanged copy of the message sent to anyone else passes as well
+    envelopeWarnings() {
+        let { hasMailFrom, rcptList } = this.envelope();
+        let warnings = [];
+        if (!hasMailFrom) {
+            warnings.push('mail-from-not-checked');
+        }
+        if (!rcptList.length) {
+            warnings.push('rcpt-to-not-checked');
+        }
+        return warnings;
+    }
+
+    // Sections 9.6, 11.5 and 11.6 for one DKIM2-Signature
+    async verifyHop(signature, instances, signatures, keyLookup) {
+        let i = signature.i;
+
+        // the instances it covers, the signatures before it, and itself with the values emptied
+        let input = buildSignatureInput(
+            Array.from({ length: signature.m }, (v, index) => instances.get(index + 1).line),
+            Array.from({ length: i - 1 }, (v, index) => signatures.get(index + 1).line),
+            signature.line
+        );
+
+        // start every key lookup before waiting for any of them
+        let lookups = signature.signatures.map(({ selector, algorithm }) =>
+            ALGORITHM_KEY_TYPES.has(algorithm) ? keyLookup(signature.signingDomain, selector, algorithm) : null
+        );
+        lookups.forEach(lookup => lookup?.catch(() => false));
+
+        let values = [];
+        for (let [index, { selector, algorithm, signature: value }] of signature.signatures.entries()) {
+            let entry = { selector, algorithm };
+            values.push(entry);
+
+            if (!lookups[index]) {
+                // section 3.4: unknown algorithms are ignored
+                entry.result = 'none';
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            let key;
+            try {
+                key = await lookups[index];
+            } catch (err) {
+                if (!(err instanceof KeyError)) {
+                    throw err;
+                }
+                entry.result = err.result;
+                entry.comment = `public key ${selector} ${err.message}`;
+                if (err.rr) {
+                    entry.rr = err.rr;
+                }
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            entry.result = verifySignature(algorithm, input, key.publicKey, Buffer.from(value, 'base64')) ? 'pass' : 'fail';
+            entry.rr = key.rr;
+            if (key.modulusLength) {
+                entry.modulusLength = key.modulusLength;
+            }
+            if (key.testing) {
+                // draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-dns-00 section 3.4.1 t=y: the signer is testing DKIM2
+                entry.testing = true;
+            }
+        }
+
+        let selectorsWith = result =>
+            values
+                .filter(entry => entry.result === result)
+                .map(entry => entry.selector)
+                .join(', ');
+
+        let status;
+        let passed = selectorsWith('pass');
+        let failed = selectorsWith('fail');
+        let keyErrors = values.filter(entry => ['permerror', 'temperror'].includes(entry.result));
+
+        if (failed) {
+            // section 11.6: every signature that can be checked is checked, and any failure fails
+            status = {
+                result: 'fail',
+                comment: passed
+                    ? `DKIM2-Signature i=${i} ${passed} signature passed, ${failed} signature failed`
+                    : `DKIM2-Signature i=${i} ${failed} incorrect signature`
+            };
+        } else if (passed) {
+            status = { result: 'pass' };
+        } else if (keyErrors.length) {
+            // a TEMPERROR may pass on a later attempt, so it is reported before a PERMERROR
+            let keyError = keyErrors.find(entry => entry.result === 'temperror') || keyErrors[0];
+            status = { result: keyError.result, comment: `DKIM2-Signature i=${i} ${keyError.comment}` };
+        } else {
+            // Section 3.4 has the unknown algorithms ignored, so nothing could be verified and nothing
+            // was found incorrect: a PERMERROR by the definitions of section 11.1. The FAIL of section
+            // 11.6 step 3 is about the signatures that can be checked
+            status = { result: 'permerror', comment: `DKIM2-Signature i=${i} has no supported signature algorithm` };
+        }
+
+        return { status, values };
+    }
+
+    formatResult({ none, errors, signatures, signatureResults, instanceResults, replay }) {
+        if (none) {
+            let status = { result: 'none' };
+            return { status, info: formatAuthHeaderRow('dkim2', status), errors: [], instances: [], signatures: [] };
+        }
+
+        let result = pickResult(errors.map(error => error.result));
+        let reported = errors.find(error => error.result === result);
+
+        let signatureList = [];
+        let hops = [];
+        for (let i = 1; signatures.has(i); i++) {
+            let signature = signatures.get(i);
+            let hop = signatureResults.get(i);
+
+            // the outcome of a hop includes the errors that are reported against it
+            let hopResult = hop ? pickResult([hop.status.result, ...errors.filter(error => error.i === i).map(error => error.result)]) : 'skipped';
+            hops.push(`i=${i} ${signature.signingDomain} ${hopResult}`);
+
+            let entry = {
+                i,
+                m: signature.m,
+                signingDomain: signature.signingDomain,
+                timestamp: signature.t,
+                signTime: new Date(signature.t * 1000).toISOString(),
+                flags: signature.flags,
+                status: hop ? { result: hopResult, comment: hop.status.comment } : { result: 'skipped' },
+                values: hop ? hop.values : signature.signatures.map(({ selector, algorithm }) => ({ selector, algorithm }))
+            };
+            for (let key of ['mailFrom', 'rcptTo', 'nextDomain', 'nonce']) {
+                if (signature[key] !== undefined) {
+                    entry[key] = signature[key];
+                }
+            }
+            signatureList.push(entry);
+        }
+
+        let status = { result };
+        if (reported) {
+            status.comment = reported.message;
+        }
+
+        let warnings = this.envelopeWarnings();
+        if (warnings.length) {
+            // like the DKIM1 warnings, only present when there is something to report and never
+            // written into the Authentication-Results text
+            status.warnings = warnings;
+        }
+
+        // draft-gondwana-dkim2-authres-00 section 3: one resinfo for the message, the hops and the
+        // diagnostic in a comment, header.d of the originator, header.i of the failing signature
+        let header = {};
+        if (signatures.has(1)) {
+            header.d = signatures.get(1).signingDomain;
+        }
+        if (result !== 'pass' && typeof reported?.i === 'number') {
+            header.i = reported.i;
+        }
+        status.header = header;
+
+        let comment = [hops.join(', '), reported?.message].filter(value => value).join('; ');
+        let info = formatAuthHeaderRow('dkim2', { result, comment, header });
+
+        let output = { status, info, errors, instances: instanceResults, signatures: signatureList };
+        if (replay) {
+            output.replay = replay;
+        }
+        return output;
+    }
+}
+
+module.exports = { Dkim2Verifier };