loki-mode 11.56.5 → 11.57.1

package/SKILL.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ name: loki-mode
 description: Runs an autonomous software factory that knows what it is supposed to deliver and proves it did, with a signed receipt. Use when the user says Loki Mode or asks to build, fix or verify software autonomously.
 ---
 
-# Loki Mode v11.56.5
+# Loki Mode v11.57.1
 
 **Current entry points (Loki 10 engine):** `loki "<task>"`, `loki owner/repo#N` and `loki quick "<task>"` run the Loki 10 engine and end with a signed receipt (`loki verify`). `loki backlog owner/repo --all` runs many issues in parallel. Guide: `docs/v10/GUIDE.md`. The skill instructions below, and `loki start`, describe the previous bash loop. PRD-file starts (`loki start ./prd.md`) and the opencode provider still run on it until FC38-SWEEP ports them; the legacy-engine command and the LOKI_ENGINE switch remain removed. Prefer `loki owner/repo#N` for issues.
 
@@ -476,4 +476,4 @@ Implemented, planned and deprecated items, with the version each landed in: `ski
 
 ---
 
-**v11.56.5 | [Autonomi](https://www.autonomi.dev/) flagship product | core skill**
+**v11.57.1 | [Autonomi](https://www.autonomi.dev/) flagship product | core skill**

package/VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-11.56.5
+11.57.1

package/autonomy/lib/os_sandbox.py

@@ -0,0 +1,600 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""One OS confinement module: macOS Seatbelt and Linux bubblewrap.
+
+Owns the Seatbelt profile builder and kernel smoke probe (moved out of
+dashboard/build_supervisor.py) plus a provider-agnostic argv wrapper.
+Secret paths come from autonomy/lib/secret-paths.json, the same list
+src/policies/claude_permissions.js compiles into Claude read-deny rules.
+
+CLI:
+  python3 -m autonomy.lib.os_sandbox argv --workspace W --run-dir R --provider P
+prints {kind, argv_prefix, profile_sha256, kernel_probe_sha256, known_limitations}.
+LOKI_OS_SANDBOX=off|auto|on (default off). Under on, an unavailable sandbox or a
+failed kernel probe exits 2. auto falls back to kind none with a reason.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import shutil
+import socket
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Iterable
+
+SANDBOX_EXEC = Path("/usr/bin/sandbox-exec")
+SECRET_PATHS_FILE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "secret-paths.json"
+PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 15
+# Scratch space every provider CLI needs. A workspace inside one of these roots
+# cannot prove "write outside the workspace is denied" by sibling probe.
+TMP_ROOTS = {
+    "darwin": (Path("/private/tmp"), Path("/private/var/folders")),
+    "linux": (Path("/tmp"),),
+}
+WALK_SKIP_DIRS = frozenset({".git", "node_modules", ".venv", "__pycache__"})
+WALK_MAX_ENTRIES = 200000
+
+# Provider CLI state the confined process must be able to write. Each entry was
+# checked against a machine with the CLI installed (~/.claude, ~/.claude.json,
+# ~/.codex, ~/.config/opencode, ~/.local/share/opencode, ~/.cache/opencode,
+# ~/.cline, ~/.aider*). A trailing * is a prefix glob inside HOME.
+PROVIDER_WRITE_PATHS: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = {
+    "claude": ("~/.claude", "~/.claude.json"),
+    "codex": ("~/.codex",),
+    "opencode": (
+        "~/.config/opencode",
+        "~/.local/share/opencode",
+        "~/.cache/opencode",
+    ),
+    "cline": ("~/.cline",),
+    "aider": ("~/.aider*",),
+}
+
+INSTALL_HINT = {
+    "darwin": "sandbox-exec ships with macOS at /usr/bin/sandbox-exec",
+    "linux": "install bubblewrap (apt install bubblewrap, dnf install bubblewrap)",
+}
+
+
+class SandboxUnavailable(RuntimeError):
+    """Confinement was requested but cannot be provided."""
+
+
+def sha256_bytes(content: bytes) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest()
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------- secret list
+
+def load_secret_rules(path: Path = SECRET_PATHS_FILE) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
+    data = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+    rules = data["rules"]
+    for rule in rules:
+        if rule["kind"] == "file" and rule.get("glob"):
+            continue
+        if rule["kind"] == "dir" and rule.get("name"):
+            continue
+        raise ValueError(f"invalid secret-paths rule: {rule!r}")
+    return rules
+
+
+def _glob_to_regex(glob: str) -> str:
+    return "".join("[^/]*" if ch == "*" else re.escape(ch) for ch in glob)
+
+
+def secret_path_regexes(rules: Iterable[dict[str, str]]) -> list[str]:
+    """Regexes (POSIX ERE subset) matching a secret path anywhere on disk."""
+    out = []
+    for rule in rules:
+        if rule["kind"] == "file":
+            out.append(f"(^|/){_glob_to_regex(rule['glob'])}$")
+        else:
+            out.append(f"(^|/){_glob_to_regex(rule['name'])}(/|$)")
+    return out
+
+
+def _seatbelt_regex(regex: str) -> str:
+    # Seatbelt regex literal #"..." passes backslashes through to the regex
+    # engine; a double quote cannot occur in the rule alphabet.
+    return '(regex #"' + regex.replace('"', '\\"') + '")'
+
+
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------- Seatbelt
+
+def seatbelt_path_filter(path: Path) -> str:
+    kind = "subpath" if path.is_dir() else "literal"
+    return f"({kind} {json.dumps(str(path), ensure_ascii=True)})"
+
+
+def seatbelt_profile(
+    config: dict[str, Any],
+    secret_regexes: Iterable[str] = (),
+) -> bytes:
+    """Build the macOS local-acceptance sandbox profile for one workspace.
+
+    config keys: system_read_paths, runtime_read_paths, runtime_write_paths,
+    engine_source, workspace, spec, ports. secret_regexes appends kernel read
+    denies; the default (none) keeps the dashboard profile bytes unchanged.
+    """
+    quote = lambda value: json.dumps(str(value), ensure_ascii=True)
+    lines = [
+        "(version 1)",
+        "(deny default)",
+        "(allow process-fork process-exec*)",
+        "(allow signal (target same-sandbox))",
+        "(allow process-info* (target same-sandbox))",
+        "(allow sysctl-read)",
+        "(allow mach-lookup)",
+        "(allow ipc-posix-shm ipc-posix-sem)",
+        "(allow network-outbound (remote ip))",
+        "(allow network-bind (local ip))",
+        "(deny network-outbound (remote unix-socket))",
+        '(allow network-outbound (literal "/private/var/run/mDNSResponder"))',
+        ";; Preexisting cross-boundary hardlinks share one kernel inode.",
+        ";; This path policy cannot prove which directory originally created it.",
+    ]
+    read_paths = {
+        *config["system_read_paths"],
+        *config["runtime_read_paths"],
+        config["engine_source"],
+        config["workspace"],
+        config["spec"],
+    }
+    metadata_paths = {Path("/"), Path("/var"), Path("/tmp"), Path("/etc"), Path("/dev")}
+    for path in (*read_paths, *config["runtime_write_paths"]):
+        metadata_paths.update(path.parents)
+    lines.append('(allow file-read-metadata file-read-data (literal "/"))')
+    for path in sorted(metadata_paths - {Path("/")}, key=str):
+        lines.append(
+            f"(allow file-read-metadata (literal {quote(path)}))"
+        )
+    for path in sorted(read_paths, key=str):
+        lines.append(
+            f"(allow file-read* file-map-executable {seatbelt_path_filter(path)})"
+        )
+    write_paths = {*config["runtime_write_paths"], config["workspace"]}
+    for path in sorted(write_paths, key=str):
+        lines.append(
+            f"(allow file-read* file-write* file-map-executable "
+            f"{seatbelt_path_filter(path)})"
+        )
+    for device in ("/dev/null", "/dev/random", "/dev/urandom", "/dev/zero"):
+        if Path(device).exists():
+            lines.append(
+                f"(allow file-read* file-write* (literal {quote(device)}))"
+            )
+    if Path("/dev/fd").exists():
+        lines.append('(allow file-read* file-write* (subpath "/dev/fd"))')
+    for port in config["ports"]:
+        lines.append(
+            f'(deny network-outbound (remote tcp "*:{port}"))'
+        )
+        # network-bind uses "tcp4", not "tcp": confirmed on macOS 27.0 (26A428)
+        # that sandbox-exec's (local tcp "*:PORT") filter on network-bind never
+        # matches an actual bind (a bind to 127.0.0.1 or 0.0.0.0 on the denied
+        # port succeeds), while (local tcp4 "*:PORT") correctly denies it with
+        # a clean PermissionError. network-outbound's "tcp" filter above is
+        # unaffected (verified separately: an outbound connect to a denied
+        # port is still refused), so only this line changes.
+        #
+        # Known residual gap, same platform bug family, found while fixing
+        # the above (not introduced by it -- reproduced identically against
+        # the un-patched "tcp" rule too): on this same macOS 27.0 build, EVERY
+        # port-qualified network-bind filter for IPv6 ("tcp6 \"*:PORT\"" and
+        # "ip6 \"*:PORT\"") also fails to match, so an IPv6 bind to the
+        # reserved port (e.g. "::1"/"::") still succeeds even with a "tcp6"
+        # deny added. Only a port-unqualified "(deny network-bind (local
+        # ip6))" was confirmed to actually block IPv6 binds, which would deny
+        # ALL IPv6 binding (not just the reserved ports) -- a materially wider
+        # behavior change than this port-scoping fix, and nothing in this
+        # codebase binds IPv6 today (grepped: no AF_INET6/IPv6 usage). Left
+        # unfixed here to keep this change scoped to the failing test; the
+        # reserved ports remain enforced for IPv4 (the only family in active
+        # use), and a confined build could still self-expose a reserved port
+        # over IPv6 loopback/wildcard. Tracked as a follow-up, not silently
+        # closed.
+        lines.append(f'(deny network-bind (local tcp4 "*:{port}"))')
+    for regex in secret_regexes:
+        # Deny write as well: a rename or hardlink of a secret would otherwise
+        # move it to a name the read-deny regex does not match.
+        lines.append(f"(deny file-read-data {_seatbelt_regex(regex)})")
+        lines.append(f"(deny file-write* {_seatbelt_regex(regex)})")
+    return ("\n".join(lines) + "\n").encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def provider_write_paths(provider: str, home: Path | None = None) -> list[Path]:
+    """Existing provider config and credential paths the CLI must write."""
+    home = home or Path(os.path.expanduser("~"))
+    found: list[Path] = []
+    for entry in PROVIDER_WRITE_PATHS.get(provider, ()):
+        rel = entry[2:] if entry.startswith("~/") else entry
+        if rel.endswith("*"):
+            found.extend(sorted(home.glob(rel)))
+        elif (home / rel).exists():
+            found.append(home / rel)
+    return [p.resolve() for p in found]
+
+
+def seatbelt_provider_profile(
+    workspace: Path,
+    run_dir: Path,
+    provider: str,
+    secret_regexes: Iterable[str],
+    home: Path | None = None,
+) -> bytes:
+    """Provider-CLI profile: reads open, writes confined, secrets denied."""
+    quote = lambda value: json.dumps(str(value), ensure_ascii=True)
+    writable = [workspace, run_dir, *provider_write_paths(provider, home)]
+    lines = [
+        "(version 1)",
+        "(deny default)",
+        "(allow process-fork process-exec*)",
+        "(allow signal (target same-sandbox))",
+        "(allow process-info* (target same-sandbox))",
+        "(allow sysctl-read sysctl-write)",
+        "(allow mach-lookup)",
+        "(allow ipc-posix-shm ipc-posix-sem)",
+        "(allow network*)",
+        "(allow user-preference-read)",
+        "(allow file-read*)",
+        "(allow file-map-executable)",
+    ]
+    for path in sorted({*writable}, key=str):
+        lines.append(f"(allow file-write* {seatbelt_path_filter(path)})")
+    for tmp in TMP_ROOTS["darwin"]:
+        if tmp.exists():
+            lines.append(f"(allow file-write* (subpath {quote(tmp)}))")
+    lines.append(
+        '(allow file-write* (literal "/dev/null") (literal "/dev/tty") '
+        '(regex #"^/dev/ttys[0-9]+$"))'
+    )
+    for regex in secret_regexes:
+        # Deny write as well: a rename or hardlink of a secret would otherwise
+        # move it to a name the read-deny regex does not match.
+        lines.append(f"(deny file-read-data {_seatbelt_regex(regex)})")
+        lines.append(f"(deny file-write* {_seatbelt_regex(regex)})")
+    return ("\n".join(lines) + "\n").encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def seatbelt_smoke_probe(
+    workspace_root: Path,
+    profile_for: Any,
+    ports: Iterable[int],
+    child_path: str,
+) -> str:
+    """Prove the kernel profile before advertising confinement.
+
+    profile_for(workspace, spec) returns the profile bytes for a scratch
+    workspace created under workspace_root. Returns the profile sha256.
+    """
+    if sys.platform != "darwin":
+        raise RuntimeError("LOKI host Seatbelt is available only on macOS")
+    if not SANDBOX_EXEC.is_file() or not os.access(SANDBOX_EXEC, os.X_OK):
+        raise RuntimeError("LOKI host Seatbelt requires /usr/bin/sandbox-exec")
+
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(
+        prefix=".seatbelt-probe-workspace-", dir=workspace_root
+    ) as workspace_raw, tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(
+        prefix=".seatbelt-probe-sibling-", dir=workspace_root
+    ) as sibling_raw:
+        workspace = Path(workspace_raw).resolve()
+        sibling = Path(sibling_raw).resolve()
+        spec = workspace / "spec.md"
+        spec.write_text("seatbelt probe", encoding="utf-8")
+        secret = sibling / "secret.txt"
+        secret.write_text("must remain unreadable", encoding="utf-8")
+        unix_socket_path = workspace / "probe.sock"
+
+        probe_port = 0
+        for port in ports:
+            with socket.socket() as candidate:
+                try:
+                    candidate.bind(("127.0.0.1", port))
+                except OSError:
+                    continue
+                probe_port = port
+                break
+        if not probe_port:
+            raise RuntimeError("no reserved port was free for the Seatbelt probe")
+
+        profile = profile_for(workspace, spec)
+        profile_path = workspace / "probe.sb"
+        profile_path.write_bytes(profile)
+        output_path = workspace / "probe.txt"
+        probe_code = """
+import errno
+import os
+import signal
+import socket
+import subprocess
+import sys
+
+output, sibling, unix_path, port = sys.argv[1:]
+open(output, "w", encoding="utf-8").write("confined")
+open("/etc/hosts", encoding="utf-8").read(1)
+child = subprocess.Popen(
+    ["/bin/sh", "-c", "/bin/sleep 5 & wait"],
+    stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+    stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+    stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+    preexec_fn=os.setpgrp,
+)
+os.killpg(child.pid, signal.SIGKILL)
+child.wait(timeout=2)
+try:
+    open(sibling, encoding="utf-8").read(1)
+except OSError:
+    pass
+else:
+    raise SystemExit(41)
+with socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX) as client:
+    try:
+        client.connect(unix_path)
+    except OSError:
+        pass
+    else:
+        raise SystemExit(42)
+with socket.socket() as listener:
+    try:
+        listener.bind(("127.0.0.1", int(port)))
+    except OSError as exc:
+        if exc.errno not in (errno.EACCES, errno.EPERM):
+            raise
+    else:
+        raise SystemExit(43)
+"""
+        with socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX) as unix_server:
+            unix_server.bind(str(unix_socket_path))
+            unix_server.listen(1)
+            try:
+                result = subprocess.run(
+                    [
+                        str(SANDBOX_EXEC),
+                        "-f",
+                        str(profile_path),
+                        "/usr/bin/python3",
+                        "-c",
+                        probe_code,
+                        str(output_path),
+                        str(secret),
+                        str(unix_socket_path),
+                        str(probe_port),
+                    ],
+                    cwd=str(workspace),
+                    env={
+                        "HOME": os.environ.get("HOME", "/var/empty"),
+                        "LANG": os.environ.get("LANG", "C"),
+                        "PATH": child_path,
+                        "TMPDIR": str(workspace),
+                    },
+                    capture_output=True,
+                    text=True,
+                    timeout=PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+                )
+            except subprocess.SubprocessError as exc:
+                raise RuntimeError("Seatbelt kernel smoke probe did not finish") from exc
+        if result.returncode != 0 or output_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") != "confined":
+            raise RuntimeError(
+                f"Seatbelt kernel smoke probe failed with exit {result.returncode}"
+            )
+        return sha256_bytes(profile)
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------- bwrap
+
+def _find_secret_files(roots: Iterable[Path], rules: list[dict[str, str]]) -> list[Path]:
+    """Existing secret files and dirs under roots, bounded, skipping vendored trees."""
+    regexes = [re.compile(r) for r in secret_path_regexes(rules)]
+    hits: list[Path] = []
+    seen = 0
+    for root in roots:
+        for dirpath, dirnames, filenames in os.walk(root):
+            dirnames[:] = [d for d in dirnames if d not in WALK_SKIP_DIRS]
+            for name in [*dirnames, *filenames]:
+                seen += 1
+                full = os.path.join(dirpath, name)
+                if any(r.search(full) for r in regexes):
+                    hits.append(Path(full))
+                    if name in dirnames:
+                        dirnames.remove(name)
+            if seen > WALK_MAX_ENTRIES:
+                break
+    return hits
+
+
+def bwrap_argv_prefix(
+    workspace: Path,
+    run_dir: Path,
+    provider: str,
+    rules: list[dict[str, str]],
+    home: Path | None = None,
+    bwrap: str = "bwrap",
+) -> list[str]:
+    home = home or Path(os.path.expanduser("~"))
+    argv = [bwrap, "--ro-bind", "/", "/", "--dev", "/dev", "--proc", "/proc",
+            "--tmpfs", "/tmp"]
+    writable = [workspace, run_dir, *provider_write_paths(provider, home)]
+    seen: set[str] = set()
+    for path in writable:
+        if str(path) not in seen:
+            seen.add(str(path))
+            argv += ["--bind", str(path), str(path)]
+    masked: set[str] = set()
+    candidates = [
+        *(home / r["name"] for r in rules if r["kind"] == "dir"),
+        *_find_secret_files([workspace, run_dir], rules),
+    ]
+    for path in candidates:
+        if str(path) in masked or not path.exists():
+            continue
+        masked.add(str(path))
+        if path.is_dir():
+            argv += ["--tmpfs", str(path)]
+        else:
+            argv += ["--ro-bind", "/dev/null", str(path)]
+    argv += ["--die-with-parent", "--"]
+    return argv
+
+
+# ------------------------------------------------------------- kernel probes
+
+_PROBE_SCRIPT = (
+    'cat "$1/.env" >/dev/null 2>&1 && exit 41; '
+    'cat "$1/plain.txt" >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 42; '
+    ': > "$1/w.txt" 2>/dev/null || exit 43; '
+    '[ -z "$2" ] || { : > "$2" 2>/dev/null && exit 44; }; '
+    'exit 0'
+)
+
+
+def _outside_probe_dir(workspace: Path, platform: str) -> Path | None:
+    """A writable-by-user dir outside the workspace that the sandbox must refuse."""
+    roots = TMP_ROOTS.get(platform, ())
+    for candidate in (workspace.parent, Path(os.path.expanduser("~"))):
+        if candidate.is_dir() and os.access(candidate, os.W_OK) and not any(
+            candidate == r or r in candidate.parents for r in roots
+        ):
+            return candidate
+    return None
+
+
+def kernel_probe(argv_builder: Any, workspace: Path, run_dir: Path,
+                 platform: str | None = None) -> tuple[bool, str]:
+    """Run the four probes (secret read denied, normal read, write in, write out)."""
+    probe_dir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=".os-sandbox-probe-", dir=run_dir))
+    outside_parent = _outside_probe_dir(workspace, platform or sys.platform)
+    outside = (
+        Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=".os-sandbox-probe-out-", dir=outside_parent)) / "escape.txt"
+        if outside_parent else None
+    )
+    try:
+        (probe_dir / ".env").write_text("SECRET=1\n", encoding="utf-8")
+        (probe_dir / "plain.txt").write_text("ok\n", encoding="utf-8")
+        prefix = argv_builder()
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            [*prefix, "/bin/sh", "-c", _PROBE_SCRIPT, "probe", str(probe_dir), str(outside or "")],
+            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=PROBE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+        )
+        detail = {
+            0: "ok",
+            41: "secret .env was readable",
+            42: "a normal file was not readable",
+            43: "a write inside the run dir failed",
+            44: "a write outside the workspace succeeded",
+        }.get(result.returncode, f"probe exited {result.returncode}: {result.stderr.strip()[:200]}")
+        return result.returncode == 0, detail
+    except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError) as exc:
+        return False, f"probe did not run: {exc}"
+    finally:
+        shutil.rmtree(probe_dir, ignore_errors=True)
+        if outside:
+            shutil.rmtree(outside.parent, ignore_errors=True)
+
+
+# ----------------------------------------------------------------- front door
+
+def resolve_mode(raw: str | None = None) -> str:
+    mode = (raw if raw is not None else os.environ.get("LOKI_OS_SANDBOX", "off")).strip().lower()
+    if mode not in {"off", "auto", "on"}:
+        raise ValueError(f"LOKI_OS_SANDBOX must be off, auto or on (got {mode!r})")
+    return mode
+
+
+def build_confinement(
+    workspace: Path,
+    run_dir: Path,
+    provider: str,
+    mode: str | None = None,
+    home: Path | None = None,
+    platform: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Return the typed confinement status for wrapping a provider CLI argv.
+
+    Raises SandboxUnavailable only under mode on (fail closed).
+    """
+    mode = resolve_mode(mode)
+    platform = platform or sys.platform
+    none = lambda reason: {
+        "kind": "none", "reason": reason, "argv_prefix": [],
+        "profile_sha256": None, "kernel_probe_sha256": None,
+        "known_limitations": ["unconfined"],
+    }
+    if mode == "off":
+        return none("LOKI_OS_SANDBOX=off")
+    workspace = workspace.resolve(strict=True)
+    run_dir = run_dir.resolve(strict=True)
+    rules = load_secret_rules()
+    regexes = secret_path_regexes(rules)
+    limitations = ["unrestricted-outbound-network",
+                   "reads-outside-workspace-allowed-except-secret-paths"]
+
+    def unavailable(reason: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        if mode == "on":
+            raise SandboxUnavailable(reason)
+        return none(reason)
+
+    if platform == "darwin":
+        if not SANDBOX_EXEC.is_file() or not os.access(SANDBOX_EXEC, os.X_OK):
+            return unavailable(f"/usr/bin/sandbox-exec missing; {INSTALL_HINT['darwin']}")
+        profile = seatbelt_provider_profile(workspace, run_dir, provider, regexes, home)
+        profile_path = run_dir / "os-sandbox.sb"
+        profile_path.write_bytes(profile)
+        prefix = [str(SANDBOX_EXEC), "-f", str(profile_path)]
+        kind = "macos-seatbelt"
+        limitations.append("deprecated-macos-sandbox-exec")
+        builder = lambda: prefix
+    elif platform.startswith("linux"):
+        bwrap = shutil.which("bwrap")
+        if not bwrap:
+            return unavailable(f"bwrap not found; {INSTALL_HINT['linux']}")
+        kind = "linux-bwrap"
+        limitations.append("secret-files-created-after-launch-not-masked")
+        builder = lambda: bwrap_argv_prefix(workspace, run_dir, provider, rules, home, bwrap)
+        profile = " ".join(builder()).encode("utf-8")
+        prefix = None
+    else:
+        return unavailable(f"no OS sandbox for platform {platform}")
+
+    ok, detail = kernel_probe(builder, workspace, run_dir)
+    if not ok:
+        return unavailable(f"kernel probe failed: {detail}")
+    if prefix is None:
+        prefix = builder()
+        profile = " ".join(prefix).encode("utf-8")
+    sha = sha256_bytes(profile)
+    return {
+        "kind": kind, "argv_prefix": prefix, "profile_sha256": sha,
+        "kernel_probe_sha256": sha, "known_limitations": limitations,
+    }
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="python3 -m autonomy.lib.os_sandbox")
+    sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command", required=True)
+    p = sub.add_parser("argv")
+    p.add_argument("--workspace", required=True)
+    p.add_argument("--run-dir", required=True)
+    p.add_argument("--provider", required=True)
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+    try:
+        status = build_confinement(Path(args.workspace), Path(args.run_dir), args.provider)
+    except SandboxUnavailable as exc:
+        print(f"os_sandbox: LOKI_OS_SANDBOX=on but confinement is unavailable: {exc}",
+              file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
+    except (ValueError, OSError) as exc:
+        print(f"os_sandbox: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
+    if status["kind"] == "none" and status.get("reason") != "LOKI_OS_SANDBOX=off":
+        print(f"os_sandbox: running unconfined: {status['reason']}", file=sys.stderr)
+    print(json.dumps(status, sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())

package/autonomy/lib/secret-paths.json

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "version": 1,
+  "rules": [
+    {"kind": "file", "glob": ".env*"},
+    {"kind": "dir", "name": ".aws"},
+    {"kind": "dir", "name": ".ssh"},
+    {"kind": "file", "glob": "*.pem"}
+  ]
+}

package/dashboard/__init__.py

@@ -7,6 +7,6 @@ Modules:
     control: Session control helpers (status, atomic writes, origin check)
 """
 
-__version__ = "11.56.5"
+__version__ = "11.57.1"
 
 __all__ = ["__version__"]