lnurlcash-conformance 0.2.2 → 0.2.3

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,16 @@ Semantic versioning. While the LUD-25 draft is unmerged, `0.x` minor bumps
 may add or tighten checks that a previously-passing mint now fails; pin an
 exact version if you gate CI on the grade.
 
+## 0.2.3 - 2026-08-22
+
+- **New check: `keeps signatures off the informational endpoint`.** LUD-25
+  says signatures are only ever delivered in the `withdrawSuccessResponse`
+  of a rotate, split or merge, and that the informational endpoint never
+  returns one. Nothing graded it. A mint that hands one out there lets
+  anyone holding a note's public URL mint an offline certificate for it,
+  and invites a wallet to treat an online answer as offline proof. Both
+  known mints pass; the check exists so a third cannot quietly not.
+
 ## 0.2.2 - 2026-08-22
 
 - The mock mint publishes `payLink` on a note's informational GET, as the

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lnurlcash-conformance",
-  "version": "0.2.2",
+  "version": "0.2.3",
   "description": "Language-neutral conformance vectors, an adversarial mock mint, and a grader for LNURLcash (LUD-25) implementations",
   "author": "TheCryptoDonkey",
   "license": "MIT",

package/runner/index.mjs

@@ -848,6 +848,22 @@ export const gradeNote = async (noteUrl, report, options = {}) => {
       : `verified offline against a previous signing key (${signedBy.slice(0, 16)}...)`
   })
 
+  await report.check('keeps signatures off the informational endpoint', async () => {
+    // LUD-25: "Signatures are only ever delivered in the
+    // withdrawSuccessResponse of a rotate, split or merge, the
+    // informational endpoint never returns one." A mint that hands one out
+    // here lets anyone holding only a note's PUBLIC url mint a certificate
+    // for it, and invites a wallet to treat the informational answer as an
+    // offline proof when it is an online one.
+    const here = new URL(url)
+    here.searchParams.set('k1', current)
+    const body = await get(here)
+    assert(body.status !== 'ERROR', `informational GET refused: ${body.reason}`)
+    assert(body.sig === undefined, 'the informational GET returned a sig')
+    assert(body.sig2 === undefined, 'the informational GET returned a sig2')
+    return 'no signature where the spec forbids one'
+  })
+
   // The still-alive probe the three adversarial checks below share: a
   // compliant refusal is ATOMIC, so the note it refused to touch must
   // still be spendable afterwards.