life-as-api 0.2.0

package/dist/agent/legal-agent.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/agent/medical-agent.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+import type { Clock, MintedContext } from "../auth/types.js";
+import type { QueryContractsInput, ContextQueryResult } from "../surface/evidence-backed-context-query.js";
+import type { TrustedAgentRegistryEntry } from "./trusted-agent-registry.js";
+export declare const MEDICAL_AGENT_ID = "life-as-api/medical-agent-v1";
+export declare const MEDICAL_AGENT_VERSION = "1.0.0";
+export declare const ALLOWED_MEDICAL_PURPOSES: readonly ["diagnosis", "treatment", "emergency"];
+export type MedicalPurpose = typeof ALLOWED_MEDICAL_PURPOSES[number];
+/**
+ * Builds the TrustedAgentRegistryEntry for the certified Medical Agent.
+ * MEDICAL_AGENT_REGISTRY_ENTRY_001: certifiedBy is always "life-as-api-foundation".
+ * Permissions include every allowed purpose (the minting boundary passes
+ * decision.purpose as the scope argument to isAgentTrusted) plus declarative
+ * read:* scopes for operator documentation.
+ */
+export declare function medicalAgentRegistryEntry(validUntilMs: number): TrustedAgentRegistryEntry;
+export interface MedicalAgentAuditEvent {
+    readonly at: string;
+    readonly agentId: string;
+    readonly reasonCode: "MEDICAL_AGENT_RUN_001";
+    readonly decision: "allowed" | "denied";
+    readonly declaredPurpose?: string;
+}
+export interface MedicalAgentOptions {
+    readonly query: (ctx: MintedContext, input: QueryContractsInput) => Promise<ContextQueryResult>;
+    readonly clock: Clock;
+    readonly onAudit?: (event: MedicalAgentAuditEvent) => void;
+}
+/**
+ * Certified first-party Medical Agent.
+ * MEDICAL_AGENT_READ_ONLY_001: query-capability only, no propose/write capability.
+ */
+export declare class MedicalAgent {
+    private readonly opts;
+    constructor(opts: MedicalAgentOptions);
+    /**
+     * MEDICAL_AGENT_SCOPE_ENFORCED_001 / MEDICAL_AGENT_PURPOSE_BOUND_001: run() only
+     * delegates to the configured query function when ctx.declaredPurpose is one of
+     * ALLOWED_MEDICAL_PURPOSES. Any other value, or an absent declaredPurpose, denies
+     * fail-closed before the query function is ever invoked.
+     * MEDICAL_AGENT_AUDIT_TRAIL_001: the onAudit hook (if configured) always fires,
+     * for both the allowed and denied outcome.
+     */
+    run(ctx: MintedContext, query: QueryContractsInput): Promise<ContextQueryResult>;
+}

package/dist/agent/medical-agent.js

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+// Platform-05 — Certified First-Party Agents: Medical Agent.
+//
+// MEDICAL_AGENT_PURPOSE_BOUND_001: this agent acts ONLY when the caller's MintedContext
+//   carries declaredPurpose "diagnosis" | "treatment" | "emergency". Any other declared
+//   purpose (or none) is denied before the query function is invoked.
+// MEDICAL_AGENT_REGISTRY_ENTRY_001: medicalAgentRegistryEntry() returns a
+//   TrustedAgentRegistryEntry certifiedBy "life-as-api-foundation" so hosts can register
+//   this agent with a TrustedAgentRegistry (Platform-01) without hand-rolling the entry.
+// MEDICAL_AGENT_SCOPE_ENFORCED_001: run() throws MEDICAL_AGENT_SCOPE_DENIED_001 when
+//   declaredPurpose is absent or not in ALLOWED_MEDICAL_PURPOSES — fail-closed.
+// MEDICAL_AGENT_READ_ONLY_001: the agent has query-capability only. The constructor
+//   accepts exclusively a `query` function; there is no propose/write capability anywhere
+//   on this class.
+// MEDICAL_AGENT_AUDIT_TRAIL_001: every run() call invokes the optional onAudit hook with
+//   reasonCode "MEDICAL_AGENT_RUN_001" (allowed or denied). Actual audit persistence is a
+//   host responsibility — this hook is a notification point only.
+export const MEDICAL_AGENT_ID = "life-as-api/medical-agent-v1";
+export const MEDICAL_AGENT_VERSION = "1.0.0";
+export const ALLOWED_MEDICAL_PURPOSES = ["diagnosis", "treatment", "emergency"];
+// TRUSTED_AGENT_REGISTRY_PUBKEY_ENFORCEMENT_DEFERRED_001: placeholder public key —
+// cryptographic signature verification at mint time is not yet implemented.
+const MEDICAL_AGENT_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM_PLACEHOLDER = "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nPLACEHOLDER-MEDICAL-AGENT-KEY-NOT-YET-ENFORCED\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----";
+/**
+ * Builds the TrustedAgentRegistryEntry for the certified Medical Agent.
+ * MEDICAL_AGENT_REGISTRY_ENTRY_001: certifiedBy is always "life-as-api-foundation".
+ * Permissions include every allowed purpose (the minting boundary passes
+ * decision.purpose as the scope argument to isAgentTrusted) plus declarative
+ * read:* scopes for operator documentation.
+ */
+export function medicalAgentRegistryEntry(validUntilMs) {
+    return {
+        agentId: MEDICAL_AGENT_ID,
+        name: "Certified Medical Agent (first-party)",
+        permissions: [...ALLOWED_MEDICAL_PURPOSES, "read:health", "read:diagnosis", "read:treatment"],
+        certifiedBy: "life-as-api-foundation",
+        validUntil: new Date(validUntilMs).toISOString(),
+        publicKeyPem: MEDICAL_AGENT_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM_PLACEHOLDER,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Certified first-party Medical Agent.
+ * MEDICAL_AGENT_READ_ONLY_001: query-capability only, no propose/write capability.
+ */
+export class MedicalAgent {
+    opts;
+    constructor(opts) {
+        this.opts = opts;
+    }
+    /**
+     * MEDICAL_AGENT_SCOPE_ENFORCED_001 / MEDICAL_AGENT_PURPOSE_BOUND_001: run() only
+     * delegates to the configured query function when ctx.declaredPurpose is one of
+     * ALLOWED_MEDICAL_PURPOSES. Any other value, or an absent declaredPurpose, denies
+     * fail-closed before the query function is ever invoked.
+     * MEDICAL_AGENT_AUDIT_TRAIL_001: the onAudit hook (if configured) always fires,
+     * for both the allowed and denied outcome.
+     */
+    async run(ctx, query) {
+        const purpose = ctx.declaredPurpose;
+        const allowed = purpose !== undefined &&
+            ALLOWED_MEDICAL_PURPOSES.includes(purpose);
+        this.opts.onAudit?.({
+            at: this.opts.clock.now(),
+            agentId: MEDICAL_AGENT_ID,
+            reasonCode: "MEDICAL_AGENT_RUN_001",
+            decision: allowed ? "allowed" : "denied",
+            ...(purpose !== undefined ? { declaredPurpose: purpose } : {}),
+        });
+        if (!allowed) {
+            throw Object.assign(new Error("MEDICAL_AGENT_SCOPE_DENIED_001: MedicalAgent may only run with declaredPurpose " +
+                `"diagnosis" | "treatment" | "emergency" (got: ${purpose ?? "undefined"})`), { code: "MEDICAL_AGENT_SCOPE_DENIED_001" });
+        }
+        return this.opts.query(ctx, query);
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=medical-agent.js.map

package/dist/agent/medical-agent.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/agent/trusted-agent-registry.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+/** A registry record for a certified agent. */
+export interface TrustedAgentRegistryEntry {
+    /** Stable agent identifier — matches VerifiedPrincipal.principalId for agent principals. */
+    readonly agentId: string;
+    /** Human-readable name for operator reference. */
+    readonly name: string;
+    /**
+     * Scope strings this agent is certified for. Vocabulary is host-defined.
+     * The minting boundary passes decision.purpose (a PurposeTag) as the scope argument
+     * to isAgentTrusted; entries should include the relevant PurposeTag values.
+     * Fine-grained data scopes (e.g. "read:emergency") belong in ConsentGrant.scope
+     * (predicate allow-list) and may additionally be declared here for documentation.
+     */
+    readonly permissions: ReadonlyArray<string>;
+    /** ID of the certifying authority (institution, CA, operator). */
+    readonly certifiedBy: string;
+    /** ISO-8601 instant after which this certification is no longer valid. */
+    readonly validUntil: string;
+    /**
+     * PEM public key for cryptographic agent identity proof (challenge-response).
+     * Declared now; enforcement (signature verification at mint time) is deferred.
+     * TRUSTED_AGENT_REGISTRY_PUBKEY_ENFORCEMENT_DEFERRED_001
+     */
+    readonly publicKeyPem: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Trust gate for agent-context minting.
+ * TRUSTED_AGENT_REGISTRY_GATES_GRANT_001: configured → checked before every AgentConsentContext.
+ * Implementations must be fail-closed: any exception → treated as untrusted.
+ */
+export interface TrustedAgentRegistry {
+    /** Returns true iff agentId is registered, not expired, and certified for scope. */
+    isAgentTrusted(agentId: string, scope: string): Promise<boolean>;
+}
+/** Development / test implementation of TrustedAgentRegistry. */
+export declare class InMemoryTrustedAgentRegistry implements TrustedAgentRegistry {
+    private readonly _entries;
+    private readonly _now;
+    constructor(opts?: {
+        readonly now?: () => string;
+    });
+    /** Register or replace an entry. Re-registering the same agentId overwrites. */
+    register(entry: TrustedAgentRegistryEntry): this;
+    /**
+     * TRUSTED_AGENT_REGISTRY_FAIL_CLOSED_001:
+     * - Unknown agentId → false
+     * - validUntil unparseable → false
+     * - validUntil instant <= now instant (epoch-ms comparison) → false
+     * - scope not in permissions → false
+     * - Never throws; caller catches and treats exception as untrusted anyway.
+     */
+    isAgentTrusted(agentId: string, scope: string): Promise<boolean>;
+}

package/dist/agent/trusted-agent-registry.js

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+// Platform-01 — Trusted Agent Registry.
+//
+// TRUSTED_AGENT_REGISTRY_GATES_GRANT_001: When a TrustedAgentRegistry is configured in
+//   the minting boundary, no AgentConsentContext is minted without isAgentTrusted(agentId,
+//   scope) returning true. Fail-closed: throws or unknown → denied.
+// AGENT_SCOPE_CHECKED_BEFORE_DATA_ACCESS_001: The registry scope-check fires in the
+//   minting boundary BEFORE issuer.mintAgent — no context exists that could access data
+//   if the check fails.
+// TRUSTED_AGENT_REGISTRY_FAIL_CLOSED_001: Any registry exception, unknown agentId,
+//   unrecognised scope, or expired certification → deny. Never fail-open.
+// TRUSTED_AGENT_REGISTRY_OPTIONAL_NO_CHECK_WHEN_ABSENT_001: Without a configured
+//   registry the agent-mint path is unchanged (backward-compatible).
+// TRUSTED_AGENT_REGISTRY_INTERFACE_AGENT_MODULE_ONLY_001: This interface is defined
+//   exclusively in src/agent/; auth/ imports type-only; no implementation is imported
+//   by production src code other than the re-export in src/index.ts.
+// ─── InMemory implementation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/** Development / test implementation of TrustedAgentRegistry. */
+export class InMemoryTrustedAgentRegistry {
+    _entries = new Map();
+    _now;
+    constructor(opts) {
+        this._now = opts?.now ?? (() => new Date().toISOString());
+    }
+    /** Register or replace an entry. Re-registering the same agentId overwrites. */
+    register(entry) {
+        this._entries.set(entry.agentId, entry);
+        return this;
+    }
+    /**
+     * TRUSTED_AGENT_REGISTRY_FAIL_CLOSED_001:
+     * - Unknown agentId → false
+     * - validUntil unparseable → false
+     * - validUntil instant <= now instant (epoch-ms comparison) → false
+     * - scope not in permissions → false
+     * - Never throws; caller catches and treats exception as untrusted anyway.
+     */
+    async isAgentTrusted(agentId, scope) {
+        const entry = this._entries.get(agentId);
+        if (entry === undefined)
+            return false;
+        // Expiry check via epoch-ms — handles UTC offsets correctly, not lexicographic.
+        const validUntilMs = Date.parse(entry.validUntil);
+        if (Number.isNaN(validUntilMs))
+            return false;
+        const nowMs = Date.parse(this._now());
+        if (Number.isNaN(nowMs))
+            return false;
+        // Expired: validUntil instant is in the past or exactly now.
+        if (validUntilMs <= nowMs)
+            return false;
+        // Scope check: exact match in permissions array.
+        if (!entry.permissions.includes(scope))
+            return false;
+        return true;
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=trusted-agent-registry.js.map

package/dist/agent/trusted-agent-registry.js.map

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package/dist/audit/audit-chain-verifier.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+import type { Database } from "better-sqlite3";
+export type AuditChainInvalidReason = "sequence_gap" | "event_hash_mismatch" | "prev_hash_mismatch" | "event_hash_and_prev_hash_mismatch";
+export type AuditChainVerifyResult = {
+    readonly valid: true;
+} | {
+    readonly valid: false;
+    readonly firstInvalidSequence: number;
+    readonly reason: AuditChainInvalidReason;
+};
+export declare function verifyAuditChain(db: Database): AuditChainVerifyResult;

package/dist/audit/audit-chain-verifier.js

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+// Audit chain verifier — Audit Hardening C4 (Local Hash Chain).
+//
+// PRODUCTION_AUDIT_C4_VERIFIER_SANITIZED_001: result carries only `valid`, an integer
+//   `firstInvalidSequence`, and a closed-enum `reason`. NO event payload, actor, selector,
+//   reason_code values, IDs, hash values, Error.message, or stack trace ever appear.
+// PRODUCTION_AUDIT_C4_LOCAL_ONLY_NOT_COURT_GRADE_001: this is a lightweight LOCAL consistency
+//   check. It detects row deletion, reordering, and naive field modification after the fact.
+//   It is a local-only integrity check, NOT external tamper evidence — a privileged attacker
+//   with DB write access and SHA-256 can reconstruct a valid chain.
+//
+// Internal utility (Q1): named export from this module ONLY. NOT root-exported from
+// src/index.ts, NOT on ProductionApiBundle / ProductionScopedLifeApi, NOT wired into the
+// bundle's health-check path (offline operator use only).
+import { sha256hexSync } from "../crypto/sha256.js";
+import { buildChainCanonical } from "./sqlite-audit-log.js";
+export function verifyAuditChain(db) {
+    const rows = db
+        .prepare(`SELECT sequence, prev_hash, event_hash,
+              id, recorded_at, actor, grant_id, purpose, decision, reason_code,
+              selector_fingerprint, result_count, result_claim_ids, contract_ids
+         FROM audit_events ORDER BY sequence ASC`)
+        .all();
+    if (rows.length === 0)
+        return { valid: true };
+    for (let i = 0; i < rows.length; i++) {
+        const row = rows[i];
+        const expectedSeq = i + 1;
+        // Sequence continuity (1-indexed, no gaps). Catches deletion / insertion / reorder.
+        if (row.sequence !== expectedSeq) {
+            return { valid: false, firstInvalidSequence: row.sequence, reason: "sequence_gap" };
+        }
+        const canonical = buildChainCanonical({
+            actor: row.actor,
+            contract_ids: row.contract_ids,
+            decision: row.decision,
+            grant_id: row.grant_id,
+            id: row.id,
+            prev_hash: row.prev_hash,
+            purpose: row.purpose,
+            reason_code: row.reason_code,
+            recorded_at: row.recorded_at,
+            result_claim_ids: row.result_claim_ids,
+            result_count: row.result_count,
+            selector_fingerprint: row.selector_fingerprint,
+            sequence: row.sequence,
+        });
+        const recomputedHash = sha256hexSync(canonical);
+        const hashOk = recomputedHash === row.event_hash;
+        // Genesis (i === 0): prev_hash must be null. Otherwise: link to prior row's event_hash.
+        const linkOk = i === 0 ? row.prev_hash === null : row.prev_hash === rows[i - 1].event_hash;
+        if (!hashOk && !linkOk) {
+            return {
+                valid: false,
+                firstInvalidSequence: row.sequence,
+                reason: "event_hash_and_prev_hash_mismatch",
+            };
+        }
+        if (!hashOk) {
+            return { valid: false, firstInvalidSequence: row.sequence, reason: "event_hash_mismatch" };
+        }
+        if (!linkOk) {
+            return { valid: false, firstInvalidSequence: row.sequence, reason: "prev_hash_mismatch" };
+        }
+    }
+    return { valid: true };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=audit-chain-verifier.js.map

package/dist/audit/audit-chain-verifier.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/audit/audit-log.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+import type { AuditId, ClaimId, ContractId, GrantId, ISOTime } from "../types/ids.js";
+import type { PurposeTag } from "../types/access-context.js";
+import type { ConsentDenyReason } from "../types/consent.js";
+export type AuditReasonCode = "ALLOWED" | "GRANT_NOT_FOUND" | "GRANT_EXPIRED" | "GRANT_NOT_YET_ACTIVE" | "GRANT_REVOKED" | "PURPOSE_MISMATCH" | "CAPABILITY_NOT_GRANTED" | "SCOPE_INTERSECTION_EMPTY" | "SUBJECT_NOT_GRANTED" | "PROPOSAL_ALLOWED" | "PROPOSAL_CROSS_SUBJECT_DENIED" | "PROPOSAL_BROAD_GRANT_DENIED" | "PROPOSAL_UNSUPPORTED_CONTEXT_DENIED" | "PROPOSAL_MULTI_SUBJECT_DENIED" | "PROPOSAL_EMPTY_CANDIDATES_DENIED" | "PROPOSAL_NOT_FOUND" | "ERASURE_AGENT_DENIED" | "ERASURE_CROSS_SUBJECT_DENIED" | "PROPOSAL_READ_ALLOWED" | "PROPOSAL_READ_SAFE_NOT_FOUND" | "PROPOSAL_READ_AGENT_DENIED" | "PROPOSAL_READ_UNSUPPORTED_CONTEXT_DENIED" | "ERASURE_STATUS_ALLOWED" | "PROPOSAL_AUTO_ACCEPTED_BY_POLICY" | "PROPOSAL_AUTO_REJECTED_BY_POLICY" | "PROPOSAL_AUTO_ACCEPT_FAILED_MANUAL_FALLBACK" | "GUARDIAN_PROPOSAL_ACCEPTED" | "GUARDIAN_GRANT_CREATED" | "GUARDIAN_ACTION_UNAUTHORIZED";
+export declare function denyReasonToAuditCode(r: ConsentDenyReason): AuditReasonCode;
+export interface AuditEvent {
+    readonly id: AuditId;
+    readonly recordedAt: ISOTime;
+    readonly actor: string;
+    readonly grantId?: GrantId;
+    readonly purpose?: PurposeTag;
+    readonly decision: "allow" | "deny";
+    readonly reasonCode: AuditReasonCode;
+    readonly selectorFingerprint: string;
+    readonly resultCount: number;
+    readonly resultClaimIds: ReadonlyArray<ClaimId>;
+    readonly contractIds?: ReadonlyArray<ContractId>;
+    readonly actingAsGuardian?: true;
+    readonly wardId?: string;
+}
+export interface AuditLog {
+    write(event: AuditEvent): Promise<void>;
+    readAll(): ReadonlyArray<AuditEvent>;
+}
+export declare class InMemoryAuditLog implements AuditLog {
+    private readonly _events;
+    private _failOnWrite;
+    simulateWriteFailure(fail: boolean): void;
+    write(event: AuditEvent): Promise<void>;
+    readAll(): ReadonlyArray<AuditEvent>;
+}
+export declare function buildAuditEvent(params: {
+    actor: string;
+    grantId?: GrantId;
+    purpose?: PurposeTag;
+    decision: "allow" | "deny";
+    reasonCode: AuditReasonCode;
+    selectorFingerprint: string;
+    resultCount: number;
+    resultClaimIds: ReadonlyArray<ClaimId>;
+    contractIds?: ReadonlyArray<ContractId>;
+    now: ISOTime;
+    actingAsGuardian?: true;
+    wardId?: string;
+}): AuditEvent;
+export interface FactoryCompatibleAuditLog extends AuditLog {
+    readonly factoryCompatible: "durable-audit-log";
+}

package/dist/audit/audit-log.js

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+// Slice-03: AuditLog — every agent query attempt produces an AuditEvent.
+// AUDIT_EVERY_QUERY_001  — written for allow, deny, empty, expired, revoked
+// AUDIT_FAIL_CLOSED_001  — if write fails, caller must return no data
+// AUDIT_NO_PAYLOADS_001  — AuditEvent contains no claim payload values
+//
+// C1 Audit Coverage codes (Post-MVP Audit Hardening):
+// PRODUCTION_AUDIT_PROPOSAL_MUTATION_RECORDED_001 — allow/deny for createProposal/acceptProposal/rejectProposal
+// PRODUCTION_AUDIT_PROPOSAL_DENIAL_RECORDED_001   — pre-fetch + scope denials
+// PRODUCTION_AUDIT_FACADE_DENIAL_RECORDED_001     — unsupported-context/broad-grant denials
+// PRODUCTION_AUDIT_ERASURE_DENIAL_RECORDED_001    — erasure deny paths
+//
+// C3 Audit Coverage codes (Read Allow-Path Audit):
+// PRODUCTION_AUDIT_READ_ALLOW_PATH_RECORDED_001 — allow paths for getProposal/listProposals/getErasureStatus (fail-closed)
+// PRODUCTION_AUDIT_READ_SAFE_NOT_FOUND_RECORDED_001 — safe-not-found paths for getProposal (best-effort)
+//
+// Platform-02 (PolicyAwareProposalQueue) codes:
+// PROPOSAL_AUTO_ACCEPTED_BY_POLICY_001 — auto-accepted proposals produce a durable audit
+//   event with reasonCode PROPOSAL_AUTO_ACCEPTED_BY_POLICY and the resulting claim ids.
+// PROPOSAL_AUTO_REJECTED_BY_POLICY_001 — same for auto-reject, decision "deny".
+// PROPOSAL_POLICY_AUTO_ACCEPT_FAILURE_FALLS_BACK_TO_MANUAL_001 — accept-path failure writes
+//   a best-effort deny audit event with reasonCode PROPOSAL_AUTO_ACCEPT_FAILED_MANUAL_FALLBACK.
+import { asAuditId } from "../types/ids.js";
+export function denyReasonToAuditCode(r) {
+    const map = {
+        grant_not_found: "GRANT_NOT_FOUND",
+        grant_expired: "GRANT_EXPIRED",
+        grant_not_yet_active: "GRANT_NOT_YET_ACTIVE",
+        grant_revoked: "GRANT_REVOKED",
+        purpose_mismatch: "PURPOSE_MISMATCH",
+        capability_not_granted: "CAPABILITY_NOT_GRANTED",
+        scope_empty: "SCOPE_INTERSECTION_EMPTY",
+        subject_not_granted: "SUBJECT_NOT_GRANTED",
+    };
+    return map[r];
+}
+// InMemoryAuditLog — for Slice-03 in-memory tests.
+// Can be configured to throw on write (for AUDIT_FAIL_CLOSED_001 tests).
+export class InMemoryAuditLog {
+    _events = [];
+    _failOnWrite = false;
+    // Test hook: make the next N writes fail
+    simulateWriteFailure(fail) {
+        this._failOnWrite = fail;
+    }
+    async write(event) {
+        if (this._failOnWrite) {
+            throw new Error("InMemoryAuditLog: simulated write failure (AUDIT_FAIL_CLOSED_001 test)");
+        }
+        this._events.push(event);
+    }
+    readAll() {
+        return [...this._events];
+    }
+}
+// AuditEvent factory — ensures consistent shape and prevents payload leakage
+export function buildAuditEvent(params) {
+    return {
+        id: asAuditId(globalThis.crypto.randomUUID()),
+        recordedAt: params.now,
+        actor: params.actor,
+        decision: params.decision,
+        reasonCode: params.reasonCode,
+        selectorFingerprint: params.selectorFingerprint,
+        resultCount: params.resultCount,
+        resultClaimIds: params.resultClaimIds,
+        // exactOptionalPropertyTypes: only set optional fields when present
+        ...(params.grantId !== undefined ? { grantId: params.grantId } : {}),
+        ...(params.purpose !== undefined ? { purpose: params.purpose } : {}),
+        ...(params.contractIds !== undefined ? { contractIds: params.contractIds } : {}),
+        ...(params.actingAsGuardian === true ? { actingAsGuardian: true } : {}),
+        ...(params.wardId !== undefined ? { wardId: params.wardId } : {}),
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=audit-log.js.map

package/dist/audit/audit-log.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/audit/sqlite-audit-log.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+import Database from "better-sqlite3";
+import type { AuditEvent, FactoryCompatibleAuditLog } from "./audit-log.js";
+export interface ChainCanonicalFields {
+    readonly actor: string;
+    readonly contract_ids: string | null;
+    readonly decision: "allow" | "deny";
+    readonly grant_id: string | null;
+    readonly id: string;
+    readonly prev_hash: string | null;
+    readonly purpose: string | null;
+    readonly reason_code: string;
+    readonly recorded_at: string;
+    readonly result_claim_ids: string;
+    readonly result_count: number;
+    readonly selector_fingerprint: string;
+    readonly sequence: number;
+    readonly acting_as_guardian?: number | null;
+    readonly ward_id?: string | null;
+}
+export declare function buildChainCanonical(fields: ChainCanonicalFields): string;
+export declare class SQLiteAuditLog implements FactoryCompatibleAuditLog {
+    readonly factoryCompatible: "durable-audit-log";
+    private readonly _db;
+    private readonly _ownsConnection;
+    constructor(dbPathOrDb: string | Database.Database);
+    close(): void;
+    write(event: AuditEvent): Promise<void>;
+    readAll(): ReadonlyArray<AuditEvent>;
+}

package/dist/audit/sqlite-audit-log.js

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+// SQLiteAuditLog — Slice-17 durable audit sink.
+//
+// AUDIT_DURABLE_SINK_EXISTS_001: implements AuditLog with durable SQLite storage.
+// AUDIT_SQLITE_PERSISTS_EVENTS_001: events survive process exit — stored in the DB file.
+// AUDIT_SQLITE_REOPEN_ROUND_TRIP_001: closing and reopening the DB restores all events.
+// AUDIT_EVENTS_APPEND_ONLY_001: INSERT only — no UPDATE or DELETE methods exist.
+// AUDIT_EVENT_NO_PAYLOAD_VALUES_001: no column in audit_events carries claim payload data.
+// AUDIT_EVENT_NO_RAW_DOCUMENT_BYTES_001: no column carries raw document bytes or decrypted content.
+// AUDIT_EVENT_SELECTOR_FINGERPRINT_ONLY_001: selector_fingerprint is a string summary, not the full selector.
+// AUDIT_SINK_NO_CRYPTO_PRIMITIVES_001: no direct low-level crypto primitive usage here — SHA-256
+//   is delegated to the src/crypto/sha256.js helper (CRYPTO_BOUNDARY_ONLY_001).
+// AUDIT_SINK_NO_DOMAIN_MUTATION_001: writes only to audit_events — no FactStore, SourceRegistry, or RawDocumentStore calls.
+//
+// PRODUCTION_AUDIT_C4_HASH_CHAIN_SEQUENCE_001: each write computes a monotonically increasing
+//   sequence, a prev_hash link, and a SHA-256 event_hash over the canonical encoding.
+// PRODUCTION_AUDIT_C4_WRITE_ATOMIC_BEGIN_IMMEDIATE_001: write() runs in a BEGIN IMMEDIATE
+//   transaction so the read-tip / compute / insert is atomic against concurrent writers.
+import Database from "better-sqlite3";
+import { asAuditId, asClaimId, asContractId, asGrantId, asISOTime } from "../types/ids.js";
+import { initializeSchema } from "../persistence/sqlite/schema.js";
+import { sha256hexSync } from "../crypto/sha256.js";
+export function buildChainCanonical(fields) {
+    // Object literal written in alphabetical key order; JSON.stringify preserves insertion order.
+    // GUARDIAN_AUDIT_HASH_CHAIN_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_001: acting_as_guardian and ward_id are
+    // included only when non-null — pre-guardian events produce byte-identical hashes.
+    const obj = {
+        ...(fields.acting_as_guardian != null ? { acting_as_guardian: fields.acting_as_guardian } : {}),
+        actor: fields.actor,
+        contract_ids: fields.contract_ids,
+        decision: fields.decision,
+        grant_id: fields.grant_id,
+        id: fields.id,
+        prev_hash: fields.prev_hash,
+        purpose: fields.purpose,
+        reason_code: fields.reason_code,
+        recorded_at: fields.recorded_at,
+        result_claim_ids: fields.result_claim_ids,
+        result_count: fields.result_count,
+        selector_fingerprint: fields.selector_fingerprint,
+        sequence: fields.sequence,
+        ...(fields.ward_id != null ? { ward_id: fields.ward_id } : {}),
+    };
+    return JSON.stringify(obj);
+}
+function rowToAuditEvent(row) {
+    return {
+        id: asAuditId(row.id),
+        recordedAt: asISOTime(row.recorded_at),
+        actor: row.actor,
+        decision: row.decision,
+        reasonCode: row.reason_code,
+        selectorFingerprint: row.selector_fingerprint,
+        resultCount: row.result_count,
+        resultClaimIds: JSON.parse(row.result_claim_ids).map(id => asClaimId(id)),
+        ...(row.grant_id != null ? { grantId: asGrantId(row.grant_id) } : {}),
+        ...(row.purpose != null ? { purpose: row.purpose } : {}),
+        ...(row.contract_ids != null ? { contractIds: JSON.parse(row.contract_ids).map(id => asContractId(id)) } : {}),
+        ...(row.acting_as_guardian === 1 ? { actingAsGuardian: true } : {}),
+        ...(row.ward_id != null ? { wardId: row.ward_id } : {}),
+    };
+}
+export class SQLiteAuditLog {
+    // AUDIT_LOG_FACTORY_COMPATIBLE_REQUIRED_001 / AUDIT_LOG_DURABLE_REQUIRED_001
+    factoryCompatible = "durable-audit-log";
+    _db;
+    _ownsConnection;
+    // Accepts a file path (opens own connection) or a shared Database instance.
+    // Mirrors SQLiteRawDocumentStore dual-mode pattern (Production-06c).
+    constructor(dbPathOrDb) {
+        if (typeof dbPathOrDb === "string") {
+            this._db = new Database(dbPathOrDb);
+            this._ownsConnection = true;
+            initializeSchema(this._db);
+        }
+        else {
+            this._db = dbPathOrDb;
+            this._ownsConnection = false;
+        }
+    }
+    close() {
+        if (this._ownsConnection)
+            this._db.close();
+    }
+    // AUDIT_EVENTS_APPEND_ONLY_001: INSERT only — no UPDATE or DELETE.
+    // PRODUCTION_AUDIT_C4_HASH_CHAIN_SEQUENCE_001 / PRODUCTION_AUDIT_C4_PREV_HASH_LINKAGE_001 /
+    // PRODUCTION_AUDIT_C4_WRITE_ATOMIC_BEGIN_IMMEDIATE_001: read tip → compute seq/prev/hash →
+    // INSERT, all inside one BEGIN IMMEDIATE transaction (synchronous better-sqlite3 callback).
+    async write(event) {
+        const grantId = event.grantId ?? null;
+        const purpose = event.purpose ?? null;
+        const resultClaims = JSON.stringify([...event.resultClaimIds]);
+        const contractIds = event.contractIds != null ? JSON.stringify([...event.contractIds]) : null;
+        // Platform-03 — Guardian columns (GUARDIAN_AUDIT_MARKED_001)
+        const actingAsGuardian = event.actingAsGuardian === true ? 1 : null;
+        const wardId = event.wardId ?? null;
+        const insertChained = this._db.transaction(() => {
+            const tip = this._db
+                .prepare(`SELECT sequence AS prev_seq, event_hash AS prev_event_hash
+             FROM audit_events
+            WHERE sequence = (SELECT MAX(sequence) FROM audit_events)`)
+                .get();
+            const nextSeq = (tip?.prev_seq ?? 0) + 1;
+            const prevHash = tip?.prev_event_hash ?? null;
+            const canonical = buildChainCanonical({
+                actor: event.actor,
+                contract_ids: contractIds,
+                decision: event.decision,
+                grant_id: grantId,
+                id: event.id,
+                prev_hash: prevHash,
+                purpose: purpose,
+                reason_code: event.reasonCode,
+                recorded_at: event.recordedAt,
+                result_claim_ids: resultClaims,
+                result_count: event.resultCount,
+                selector_fingerprint: event.selectorFingerprint,
+                sequence: nextSeq,
+                // Guardian fields — null entries omitted from canonical (GUARDIAN_AUDIT_HASH_CHAIN_BACKWARD_COMPATIBLE_001)
+                acting_as_guardian: actingAsGuardian,
+                ward_id: wardId,
+            });
+            const eventHash = sha256hexSync(canonical);
+            this._db.prepare(`
+        INSERT INTO audit_events
+          (id, recorded_at, actor, grant_id, purpose, decision, reason_code,
+           selector_fingerprint, result_count, result_claim_ids, contract_ids,
+           sequence, prev_hash, event_hash, acting_as_guardian, ward_id)
+        VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+      `).run(event.id, event.recordedAt, event.actor, grantId, purpose, event.decision, event.reasonCode, event.selectorFingerprint, event.resultCount, resultClaims, contractIds, nextSeq, prevHash, eventHash, actingAsGuardian, wardId);
+        });
+        // BEGIN IMMEDIATE: reserve the write lock up front so two writers cannot both read the
+        // same MAX(sequence). The unique index on sequence is the second safety net.
+        insertChained.immediate();
+    }
+    readAll() {
+        return this._db
+            .prepare("SELECT * FROM audit_events ORDER BY rowid ASC")
+            .all()
+            .map(rowToAuditEvent);
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=sqlite-audit-log.js.map