lacewing 1.0.0 → 1.0.2
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +43 -0
- package/GETTING-STARTED.md +654 -0
- package/README.md +151 -28
- package/SECURITY.md +21 -0
- package/dist/index.js +1 -0
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/src/http/bearer.js +6 -10
- package/dist/src/http/bearer.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/src/http/cookies.js +15 -12
- package/dist/src/http/cookies.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/src/http/source.js +49 -0
- package/dist/src/http/source.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/src/jwks/local.js +3 -2
- package/dist/src/jwks/local.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/src/jwks/remote.js +82 -13
- package/dist/src/jwks/remote.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/src/jwt/decrypt.js +10 -0
- package/dist/src/jwt/decrypt.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/src/jwt/decryption_profile.js +6 -0
- package/dist/src/jwt/decryption_profile.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/src/jwt/profile.js +7 -0
- package/dist/src/jwt/profile.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/src/lib/claims.js +12 -2
- package/dist/src/lib/claims.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/src/lib/entropy.js +7 -1
- package/dist/src/lib/entropy.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/src/lib/payload_hygiene.js +40 -6
- package/dist/src/lib/payload_hygiene.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/src/types.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/index.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/types/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/src/http/bearer.d.ts +6 -3
- package/dist/types/src/http/bearer.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/src/http/cookies.d.ts +7 -3
- package/dist/types/src/http/cookies.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/src/http/source.d.ts +27 -0
- package/dist/types/src/http/source.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/types/src/jwks/local.d.ts +9 -1
- package/dist/types/src/jwks/local.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/src/jwks/remote.d.ts +12 -1
- package/dist/types/src/jwks/remote.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/src/jwt/decrypt.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/src/jwt/decryption_profile.d.ts +3 -1
- package/dist/types/src/jwt/decryption_profile.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/src/jwt/profile.d.ts +7 -1
- package/dist/types/src/jwt/profile.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/src/lib/claims.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/src/lib/entropy.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/src/lib/payload_hygiene.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/src/types.d.ts +6 -0
- package/dist/types/src/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +5 -5
package/README.md
CHANGED
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@@ -3,15 +3,15 @@
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**Lacewing is an opinionated JWT library that makes common JWT security mistakes impossible by construction.**
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Instead of exposing low-level primitives and trusting you to compose them correctly, Lacewing provides secure verification profiles, safe defaults, mandatory claim validation, built-in revocation support, secure cookie helpers, and a curated algorithm set
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Instead of exposing low-level primitives and trusting you to compose them correctly, Lacewing provides secure verification profiles, safe defaults, mandatory claim validation, built-in revocation support, secure cookie helpers, and a curated algorithm set. Everything [RFC 8725 (JWT Best Current Practices)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8725) says an application MUST or SHOULD do is enforced by the type system, enforced at runtime, or impossible to express.
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**Batteries loaded (RFC 8725).** Out of the box:
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- **Verification profiles
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- **Remote JWKS** with caching, rotation handling,
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- **Token revocation
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- **Secure cookie + bearer helpers
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- **Access/refresh token presets
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- **Verification profiles**: the only way to verify; `typ`, issuer, audience, algorithm allowlist and key source are structurally mandatory
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- **Remote JWKS** with caching, rotation handling, `kid` hygiene, and a *bounded* stale-serving window when the endpoint goes down
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- **Token revocation**: unique `jti` on every token, pluggable `RevocationStore`, in-memory store included
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- **Secure cookie + bearer helpers**: `HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite` enforced, strict RFC 6750 parsing
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- **Access/refresh token presets**: mutually exclusive by `typ`, shipped rather than left as homework
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- **Encrypted JWTs (JWE)** with the same profile discipline
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- **Payload hygiene scanning** at sign time (passwords, card numbers, PEM keys never leave in plaintext)
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- **Typed errors** with machine-readable codes and no attacker-facing oracle
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npm install lacewing
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```
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[Getting started](./GETTING-STARTED.md) walks through adopting Lacewing in a
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real service: keys, profiles, transport, refresh tokens, revocation, key
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rotation, and a migration path from `jsonwebtoken`. The rest of this README is
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the pitch and the reference.
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## Quick start
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The complete lifecycle
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The complete lifecycle (generate a key, sign, define a profile once, verify everywhere):
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```ts
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import { SignJWT, defineProfile, jwtVerify, generateKeyPair } from "lacewing";
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maxTokenAge: "10m",
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});
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const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, profile); // VerifiedJwt
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const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, profile); // VerifiedJwt: every check passed
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```
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A runnable version of everything in this README ships with the repo: `npm run demo`.
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## Concepts
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**Profiles are the central abstraction.** Configuration is something you create once
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**Profiles are the central abstraction.** Configuration is something you create once, not something every endpoint reinvents. A profile names the expected `typ`, the trusted issuer, the required audience, an explicit algorithm allowlist, and the key source bound to that issuer. `jwtVerify(token, profile)` is the *only* verify path: there is no `decode()`, no `ignoreExpiration`, no "accept whatever the header says" mode. If any check fails you get a typed error (`JWTExpired`, `AlgorithmNotAllowed`, `JWTClaimValidationFailed`, ...) and no partial result.
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**Built on jose.** Lacewing does not reimplement cryptography. It is a hardened policy layer over [jose](https://github.com/panva/jose)
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**Built on jose.** Lacewing does not reimplement cryptography. It is a hardened policy layer over [jose](https://github.com/panva/jose) (the audited, maintained, runtime-portable JOSE implementation), so the novel code is the policy, not the crypto. Tokens Lacewing signs or encrypts are standard JWTs/JWEs that jose (and any other conforming implementation) can consume, and the conformance suite proves it against the RFC 7515/7516/7519 worked examples plus tokens produced by OpenSSL and python-cryptography.
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## Usage
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maxTokenAge: "10m",
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});
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const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, accessToken); // VerifiedJwt
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const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, accessToken); // VerifiedJwt: every check passed
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```
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**When the endpoint goes down**, the last good keys keep serving for a bounded
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window (1h by default) and then verification **fails closed**. The bound is the
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whole point: keys that go stale forever mean a key you rotated out *because it
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was compromised* stays trusted for exactly as long as an attacker can keep your
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JWKS unreachable. Trade availability against freshness explicitly:
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```ts
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createRemoteJWKSet("https://auth.example.com/jwks", {
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cacheTtlSeconds: 300, // fallback when the response sends no Cache-Control
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cooldownSeconds: 30, // floor between fetch attempts
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staleWhileErrorSeconds: 3600, // how long a dead endpoint may coast; 0 = never
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});
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```
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Two more things that endpoint does not get to do. The response is read under a
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hard byte budget, checked against `Content-Length` and again on every chunk, so
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a hostile or broken endpoint cannot stream you out of memory. And symmetric
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(`oct`) entries are refused from a *remote* set: a JWKS endpoint is public, so a
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secret published there is one every reader could **mint** with, not merely
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verify with. A local JWKS may still carry them.
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### Verify: keys you already have
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Not everyone has a JWKS endpoint to point at. If the issuer handed you a raw
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public key, or you're pinning a single known one, the same `keys` field takes it
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directly. No URL, no fetch. `importKey` reads a PEM (SPKI public key), a JWK, or
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a `CryptoKey`, and binds it to exactly one algorithm:
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```ts
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import { defineProfile, importKey } from "lacewing";
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const publicKey = await importKey(spkiPem, "ES256"); // PEM string, JWK, or CryptoKey
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const profile = defineProfile({
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typ: "at+jwt",
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issuer: "https://auth.example.com",
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audience: "https://api.example.com",
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algorithms: ["ES256"],
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keys: publicKey, // one pinned key, nothing to fetch
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maxTokenAge: "10m",
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});
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```
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Hand it a private key by mistake and it refuses: profiles verify, they don't
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sign, and the error says exactly that. The key's algorithm has to be one you
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allowlisted too, so a key you imported for `ES256` won't quietly slip into an
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`EdDSA`-only profile.
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Got a handful of keys but still no endpoint to serve them from? Pass a JWKS
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document straight in, the same shape a `/jwks` URL would return, just inlined:
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```ts
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keys: {
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keys: [
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{ kty: "OKP", crv: "Ed25519", x: "...", kid: "2024-key" },
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{ kty: "EC", crv: "P-256", x: "...", y: "...", kid: "2025-key" },
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],
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},
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```
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Selection is exact: the token's `kid` (and its algorithm's key type and curve)
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has to single out one key. Two keys that both match with no `kid` to tell them
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apart is treated as your mistake, not something to guess at.
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And if your keys live somewhere less ordinary (an HSM, a secrets manager, a
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database), anything with a `getVerificationKey(header)` method is a valid `keys`
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value. That's the escape hatch; the two built-in sources are just the ones
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you'll reach for most.
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### Sign
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`typ` is a constructor argument, and `.sign()` refuses to run without
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`issuer`, `audience` and `expiresIn` (waivable only via grep-loud
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`unsafeAllowMissing*` calls). Every token gets a unique `jti`, lifetimes are
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capped (default 1h), and a hygiene scanner rejects payloads that contain
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things like passwords, card numbers, PEM keys, or other JWTs
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things like passwords, card numbers, PEM keys, or other JWTs, because **a
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JWS payload is base64url-encoded plaintext, readable by anyone who holds the
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token**. Never put secrets in it.
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A note on HMAC (`HS256/384/512`): it is supported, but every verifier of an
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HMAC token holds the same secret and can therefore also **mint** them. For
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anything beyond a single service, use asymmetric keys + JWKS. HMAC secrets
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`
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must meet the RFC 7518 length floor and are screened by an entropy
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heuristic, so `"my-secret"` will not import, ever. The heuristic catches
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short and low-entropy secrets, not every bad one a human can invent. PLEASE use
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`generateSecret()` and don't hand-write key material. Symmetric keys are
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also refused from a *remote* JWKS: that endpoint is public, so a secret
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published there is one anyone can mint with.
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### Transport: the paved road
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Do **not** put tokens in `localStorage` or `sessionStorage
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Do **not** put tokens in `localStorage` or `sessionStorage`: both are
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readable by any script on the page, so one XSS means token theft. Use an
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`HttpOnly` cookie (browsers) or an in-memory bearer token (services):
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```ts
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import { setTokenCookie, readTokenCookie, parseBearer } from "lacewing";
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setTokenCookie(response.headers, token); // always HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite
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setTokenCookie(response.headers, token); // always HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite, weaker is unrepresentable
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const fromCookie = readTokenCookie(request);
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const fromHeader = parseBearer(request); // strict RFC 6750; no query-string tokens, ever
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```
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Both readers refuse ambiguity rather than resolving it. `parseBearer` rejects
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the `", "`-joined value `Headers` produces when a request carried two
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`Authorization` headers, and `readTokenCookie` returns `undefined` when the
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cookie name appears twice, the servers disagree about whether the first or the
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last duplicate wins, and cookie shadowing is built on that disagreement.
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Both readers take WHATWG `Headers` (or anything carrying them, like `Request`),
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or the raw header string. Node-style frameworks - Express, Fastify, Koa - hand
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you a plain object instead, so convert once at the edge; a shape the readers
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don't accept throws rather than reading as "no token":
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```ts
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const headers = new Headers(req.headers as Record<string, string>);
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const fromCookie = readTokenCookie(headers);
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res.setHeader("Set-Cookie", buildTokenCookie(token)); // the response side is just a string
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```
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### Access vs refresh (the cookbook)
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The single most common token-confusion bug is letting a refresh token buy API
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access, or an access token mint new sessions. Lacewing **ships** the two
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profiles rather than leaving them as homework
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profiles rather than leaving them as homework. They are mutually exclusive by
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`typ` (RFC 8725 §3.12), so presenting one where the other is expected fails,
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even with identical keys, claims and audience:
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## Advanced
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### Age vs lifetime: two different caps
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`maxTokenAge` and `maxTokenLifetime` sound alike and do different jobs.
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**`maxTokenAge`** (required) bounds how long after issuance a token still works
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*here* (`now - iat`). It is enforced independently of `exp`, so a token minted
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with a decade-long `exp` stops being accepted once it is older than your cap,
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no matter what the issuer wrote.
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**`maxTokenLifetime`** (optional) bounds the span the issuer *declared*
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(`exp - iat`). Note what `maxTokenAge` alone does with that decade-long token:
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it accepts it, right up until the age window closes. That is usually fine, since
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the age window is what actually governs. But an `exp` wildly beyond your own
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policy is a misissuance signal, and this refuses it on sight instead of
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tolerating it for the length of the window:
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```ts
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const profile = defineProfile({
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/* ...as above... */
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maxTokenAge: "10m", // unusable 10m after iat, whatever exp claims
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maxTokenLifetime: "1h", // and refuse anything declaring a span beyond 1h
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});
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```
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It is opt-in because plenty of legitimate issuers set a generous `exp` and
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expect the verifier's own window to do the limiting.
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### Revocation is not replay protection
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Be precise about what revocation buys you: it lets you kill a
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token you *know about* (logout, compromise). It does **not** stop replay
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token you *know about* (logout, compromise). It does **not** stop replay: a
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valid, non-revoked token that leaks can be replayed by anyone who holds it
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until `exp`. That is the deliberate cost of stateless verification, and no
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JWT library can remove it without becoming a session store.
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@@ -225,10 +348,10 @@ Your levers, in order of cheapness:
|
|
|
225
348
|
### Encrypting (JWE): when the payload really is a secret
|
|
226
349
|
|
|
227
350
|
A signed JWT is readable plaintext. When you genuinely need the payload
|
|
228
|
-
*hidden
|
|
351
|
+
*hidden*, not just tamper-evident, use an encrypted JWT. Same discipline as
|
|
229
352
|
signing (mandatory `typ`, required `iss`/`aud`/`exp`, unique `jti`, capped
|
|
230
353
|
lifetime), but with a curated set of encryption algorithms and no `none`. The
|
|
231
|
-
sign-time hygiene scanner is deliberately off here
|
|
354
|
+
sign-time hygiene scanner is deliberately off here, since hiding secrets is the
|
|
232
355
|
whole point:
|
|
233
356
|
|
|
234
357
|
```ts
|
|
@@ -242,7 +365,7 @@ const token = await new EncryptJWT("at+jwt", { contentEncryption: "A256GCM" })
|
|
|
242
365
|
.issuer("https://auth.example.com")
|
|
243
366
|
.audience("https://api.example.com")
|
|
244
367
|
.subject("user-42")
|
|
245
|
-
.claim("ssn", "123-45-6789") // fine
|
|
368
|
+
.claim("ssn", "123-45-6789") // fine: it's encrypted, not just encoded
|
|
246
369
|
.expiresIn("10m")
|
|
247
370
|
.encrypt(publicKey);
|
|
248
371
|
|
|
@@ -256,24 +379,24 @@ const profile = defineDecryptionProfile({
|
|
|
256
379
|
maxTokenAge: "10m",
|
|
257
380
|
});
|
|
258
381
|
|
|
259
|
-
const { payload } = await jwtDecrypt(token, profile); // DecryptedJwt
|
|
382
|
+
const { payload } = await jwtDecrypt(token, profile); // DecryptedJwt, distinct from VerifiedJwt
|
|
260
383
|
```
|
|
261
384
|
|
|
262
385
|
`none`, `RSA1_5`, `RSA-OAEP` (SHA-1) and the password-based `PBES2*` family are
|
|
263
386
|
absent by construction. A JWS handed to `jwtDecrypt` (or a JWE handed to
|
|
264
|
-
`jwtVerify`) is rejected
|
|
387
|
+
`jwtVerify`) is rejected: the two formats never cross over.
|
|
265
388
|
|
|
266
|
-
**Portability caveat
|
|
389
|
+
**Portability caveat (192-bit AES):** the registry includes the `A192*`
|
|
267
390
|
algorithms (`A192KW`, `A192GCMKW`, `A192GCM`, `A192CBC-HS384`) for JOSE
|
|
268
391
|
completeness, and they work on Node ≥ 24 (Lacewing's floor). But WebCrypto
|
|
269
392
|
implementations in browsers and some edge runtimes do not implement 192-bit
|
|
270
393
|
AES at all. If tokens must be decrypted outside Node, stick to the `A128*` /
|
|
271
|
-
`A256*` variants
|
|
394
|
+
`A256*` variants. There is no security reason to prefer 192-bit anyway.
|
|
272
395
|
|
|
273
396
|
### Debugging
|
|
274
397
|
|
|
275
398
|
`unsafeDecode(token)` parses without verifying and returns an `UntrustedJwt`
|
|
276
|
-
that is type-incompatible with `VerifiedJwt
|
|
399
|
+
that is type-incompatible with `VerifiedJwt`: useful for inspecting expired
|
|
277
400
|
tokens, useless (by design) for auth logic.
|
|
278
401
|
|
|
279
402
|
### Legacy interop
|
|
@@ -304,9 +427,9 @@ The other reason is irritation. Generic JWT libraries are fine, but they leave e
|
|
|
304
427
|
- No way to revoke stateless JWTs
|
|
305
428
|
- Storing tokens in `localStorage` or `sessionStorage`
|
|
306
429
|
- Not configuring `iss` or `aud`
|
|
307
|
-
- Over-caching a JWKS when an endpoint goes down
|
|
430
|
+
- Over-caching a JWKS when an endpoint goes down (stale keys serve for a bounded window, then verification fails closed)
|
|
308
431
|
|
|
309
|
-
Insecure usage is still *possible
|
|
432
|
+
Insecure usage is still *possible*, but only unmistakably deliberate, through `unsafe*`-prefixed escape hatches that are easy to grep for in code review. Secure usage is the path of least resistance.
|
|
310
433
|
|
|
311
434
|
## Attribution
|
|
312
435
|
|
package/SECURITY.md
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
# Security Policy
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
## Supported Versions
|
|
4
|
+
|
|
5
|
+
Use this section to tell people about which versions of your project are
|
|
6
|
+
currently being supported with security updates.
|
|
7
|
+
|
|
8
|
+
| Version | Supported |
|
|
9
|
+
| ------- | ------------------ |
|
|
10
|
+
| 5.1.x | :white_check_mark: |
|
|
11
|
+
| 5.0.x | :x: |
|
|
12
|
+
| 4.0.x | :white_check_mark: |
|
|
13
|
+
| < 4.0 | :x: |
|
|
14
|
+
|
|
15
|
+
## Reporting a Vulnerability
|
|
16
|
+
|
|
17
|
+
Use this section to tell people how to report a vulnerability.
|
|
18
|
+
|
|
19
|
+
Tell them where to go, how often they can expect to get an update on a
|
|
20
|
+
reported vulnerability, what to expect if the vulnerability is accepted or
|
|
21
|
+
declined, etc.
|
package/dist/index.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ export { MemoryRevocationStore } from "./src/revocation/memory.js";
|
|
|
31
31
|
// HTTP transport helpers (the paved road: no localStorage, ever)
|
|
32
32
|
export { buildTokenCookie, setTokenCookie, clearTokenCookie, readTokenCookie, } from "./src/http/cookies.js";
|
|
33
33
|
export { parseBearer } from "./src/http/bearer.js";
|
|
34
|
+
export {} from "./src/http/source.js";
|
|
34
35
|
// Debugging escape hatch - branded untrusted, incompatible with VerifiedJwt
|
|
35
36
|
export { unsafeDecode } from "./src/util/unsafe-decode.js";
|
|
36
37
|
// Typed errors
|
package/dist/index.js.map
CHANGED
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;GAOG;AAEH,oDAAoD;AACpD,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,EAAuB,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAC1E,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,qBAAqB,CAAC;AAEhD,UAAU;AACV,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAuB,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAEjE,4DAA4D;AAC5D,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAA0B,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAC1E,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAClD,OAAO,EACN,uBAAuB,GAEvB,MAAM,iCAAiC,CAAC;AACzC,OAAO,EACN,yBAAyB,EACzB,wBAAwB,EACxB,iBAAiB,EACjB,mBAAmB,GAGnB,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC;AAEjC,8EAA8E;AAC9E,OAAO,EACN,kBAAkB,EAClB,mBAAmB,EACnB,cAAc,EACd,eAAe,EACf,gBAAgB,EAChB,iBAAiB,GAEjB,MAAM,kCAAkC,CAAC;AAE1C,OAAO;AACP,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAoB,MAAM,qBAAqB,CAAC;AAClE,OAAO,EACN,eAAe,EACf,cAAc,GAEd,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAC/B,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,qBAAqB,CAAC;AAEjE,mBAAmB;AACnB,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,qBAAqB,CAAC;AACxD,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAA4B,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAEpF,aAAa;AACb,OAAO,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,2BAA2B,CAAC;AACnE,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,4BAA4B,CAAC;AAEnE,iEAAiE;AACjE,OAAO,EACN,gBAAgB,EAChB,cAAc,EACd,gBAAgB,EAChB,eAAe,GAEf,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAC/B,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;GAOG;AAEH,oDAAoD;AACpD,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,EAAuB,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAC1E,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,qBAAqB,CAAC;AAEhD,UAAU;AACV,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAuB,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAEjE,4DAA4D;AAC5D,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAA0B,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAC1E,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAClD,OAAO,EACN,uBAAuB,GAEvB,MAAM,iCAAiC,CAAC;AACzC,OAAO,EACN,yBAAyB,EACzB,wBAAwB,EACxB,iBAAiB,EACjB,mBAAmB,GAGnB,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC;AAEjC,8EAA8E;AAC9E,OAAO,EACN,kBAAkB,EAClB,mBAAmB,EACnB,cAAc,EACd,eAAe,EACf,gBAAgB,EAChB,iBAAiB,GAEjB,MAAM,kCAAkC,CAAC;AAE1C,OAAO;AACP,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAoB,MAAM,qBAAqB,CAAC;AAClE,OAAO,EACN,eAAe,EACf,cAAc,GAEd,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAC/B,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,qBAAqB,CAAC;AAEjE,mBAAmB;AACnB,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,qBAAqB,CAAC;AACxD,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAA4B,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAEpF,aAAa;AACb,OAAO,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,2BAA2B,CAAC;AACnE,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,4BAA4B,CAAC;AAEnE,iEAAiE;AACjE,OAAO,EACN,gBAAgB,EAChB,cAAc,EACd,gBAAgB,EAChB,eAAe,GAEf,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAC/B,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AACnD,OAAO,EAAqB,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAEzD,4EAA4E;AAC5E,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,6BAA6B,CAAC;AAE3D,eAAe;AACf,OAAO,EACN,QAAQ,EACR,UAAU,EACV,UAAU,EACV,wBAAwB,EACxB,YAAY,EACZ,mBAAmB,EACnB,eAAe,EACf,eAAe,EACf,eAAe,EACf,kBAAkB,EAClB,eAAe,EACf,iBAAiB,EACjB,UAAU,EACV,qBAAqB,EACrB,uBAAuB,EACvB,mBAAmB,EACnB,iBAAiB,GACjB,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAE9B,eAAe;AACf,OAAO,EACN,SAAS,GAuBT,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC"}
|
package/dist/src/http/bearer.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
|
|
|
6
6
|
* whitespace tricks. One header, one scheme, one token.
|
|
7
7
|
*/
|
|
8
8
|
import { BearerParseFailed } from "../util/errors.js";
|
|
9
|
+
import { readHeaderValue } from "./source.js";
|
|
9
10
|
// RFC 6750 credentials: exact-case scheme, a single SP, one token68.
|
|
10
11
|
const BEARER = /^Bearer ([A-Za-z0-9\-._~+/]+=*)$/;
|
|
11
12
|
const MAX_HEADER_LENGTH = 16384;
|
|
@@ -17,18 +18,13 @@ const MAX_HEADER_LENGTH = 16384;
|
|
|
17
18
|
*
|
|
18
19
|
* Note: when multiple `Authorization` headers were sent, `Headers`
|
|
19
20
|
* joins them with `", "` - which this parser rejects, by design.
|
|
21
|
+
*
|
|
22
|
+
* A shape this library does not accept - notably a Node/Express
|
|
23
|
+
* request, whose `headers` is a plain record - throws {@link TypeError}
|
|
24
|
+
* rather than the misleading "missing header" it used to report.
|
|
20
25
|
*/
|
|
21
26
|
export function parseBearer(source) {
|
|
22
|
-
|
|
23
|
-
if (typeof source === "string") {
|
|
24
|
-
value = source;
|
|
25
|
-
}
|
|
26
|
-
else if (source instanceof Headers) {
|
|
27
|
-
value = source.get("authorization");
|
|
28
|
-
}
|
|
29
|
-
else if (typeof source === "object" && source !== null && source.headers instanceof Headers) {
|
|
30
|
-
value = source.headers.get("authorization");
|
|
31
|
-
}
|
|
27
|
+
const value = readHeaderValue(source, "authorization", "parseBearer");
|
|
32
28
|
if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length === 0) {
|
|
33
29
|
throw new BearerParseFailed("Missing Authorization header");
|
|
34
30
|
}
|
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"bearer.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/http/bearer.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;GAMG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"bearer.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/http/bearer.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;GAMG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AACtD,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAEjE,qEAAqE;AACrE,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,kCAAkC,CAAC;AAClD,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC;AAEhC;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,WAAW,CAAC,MAAoB;IAC/C,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,eAAe,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC;IACtE,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACrD,MAAM,IAAI,iBAAiB,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC,CAAC;IAC7D,CAAC;IACD,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,iBAAiB,EAAE,CAAC;QACtC,MAAM,IAAI,iBAAiB,CAAC,iDAAiD,CAAC,CAAC;IAChF,CAAC;IACD,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;IACjC,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;QACpB,MAAM,IAAI,iBAAiB,CAC1B,yFAAyF,CACzF,CAAC;IACH,CAAC;IACD,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAW,CAAC;AAC3B,CAAC"}
|
package/dist/src/http/cookies.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
|
|
|
9
9
|
* Framework-agnostic: works on WHATWG `Headers` (and anything exposing
|
|
10
10
|
* them, e.g. `Request`/`Response`).
|
|
11
11
|
*/
|
|
12
|
+
import { readHeaderValue } from "./source.js";
|
|
12
13
|
// RFC 6265 cookie-name token; value charset covers compact JWTs.
|
|
13
14
|
const COOKIE_NAME = /^[!#$%&'*+\-.^_`|~A-Za-z0-9]+$/;
|
|
14
15
|
const COOKIE_VALUE = /^[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]*$/;
|
|
@@ -67,30 +68,32 @@ export function clearTokenCookie(headers, options = {}) {
|
|
|
67
68
|
* Read a token cookie from a request. Accepts a `Headers` object,
|
|
68
69
|
* anything with a `.headers` (e.g. `Request`), or the raw `Cookie`
|
|
69
70
|
* header string. Returns `undefined` when absent or malformed.
|
|
71
|
+
*
|
|
72
|
+
* Throws {@link TypeError} on a shape it does not accept - notably a
|
|
73
|
+
* Node/Express request, whose `headers` is a plain record. "I was
|
|
74
|
+
* handed something I don't understand" must not be indistinguishable
|
|
75
|
+
* from "this request carried no token".
|
|
70
76
|
*/
|
|
71
77
|
export function readTokenCookie(source, name = DEFAULT_COOKIE_NAME) {
|
|
72
|
-
|
|
73
|
-
if (typeof source === "string") {
|
|
74
|
-
cookieHeader = source;
|
|
75
|
-
}
|
|
76
|
-
else if (source instanceof Headers) {
|
|
77
|
-
cookieHeader = source.get("cookie");
|
|
78
|
-
}
|
|
79
|
-
else if (typeof source === "object" && source !== null && source.headers instanceof Headers) {
|
|
80
|
-
cookieHeader = source.headers.get("cookie");
|
|
81
|
-
}
|
|
78
|
+
const cookieHeader = readHeaderValue(source, "cookie", "readTokenCookie");
|
|
82
79
|
if (typeof cookieHeader !== "string" || cookieHeader.length > 16384) {
|
|
83
80
|
return undefined;
|
|
84
81
|
}
|
|
82
|
+
let found;
|
|
85
83
|
for (const pair of cookieHeader.split(";")) {
|
|
86
84
|
const eq = pair.indexOf("=");
|
|
87
85
|
if (eq === -1)
|
|
88
86
|
continue;
|
|
89
87
|
if (pair.slice(0, eq).trim() !== name)
|
|
90
88
|
continue;
|
|
89
|
+
// Cookie shadowing: servers disagree about whether the first or last
|
|
90
|
+
// duplicate wins, so a header carrying the name twice is ambiguous.
|
|
91
|
+
// Ambiguous input is refused rather than guessed at.
|
|
92
|
+
if (found !== undefined)
|
|
93
|
+
return undefined;
|
|
91
94
|
const value = pair.slice(eq + 1).trim();
|
|
92
|
-
|
|
95
|
+
found = COOKIE_VALUE.test(value) && value.length > 0 ? value : "";
|
|
93
96
|
}
|
|
94
|
-
return undefined;
|
|
97
|
+
return found === undefined || found === "" ? undefined : found;
|
|
95
98
|
}
|
|
96
99
|
//# sourceMappingURL=cookies.js.map
|
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"cookies.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/http/cookies.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AAEH,iEAAiE;AACjE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,gCAAgC,CAAC;AACrD,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAE7C,MAAM,mBAAmB,GAAG,cAAc,CAAC;AAe3C,0EAA0E;AAC1E,MAAM,UAAU,gBAAgB,CAAC,KAAa,EAAE,UAA8B,EAAE;IAC/E,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAClF,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,6DAA6D,CAAC,CAAC;IACpF,CAAC;IACD,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI,mBAAmB,CAAC;IACjD,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC7B,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5C,CAAC;IACD,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC;IAC3C,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;QACjD,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,oEAAoE,CAAC,CAAC;IAC3F,CAAC;IACD,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC;IACjC,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACjD,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5C,CAAC;IACD,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAChC,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YAClC,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,uCAAuC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC9D,CAAC;QACD,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;YAClB,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,gCAAgC,CAAC,CAAC;QACvD,CAAC;IACF,CAAC;IACD,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IACnD,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;QAClC,IAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YAC9C,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,uBAAuB,CAAC,CAAC;QAC9C,CAAC;QACD,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IACxC,CAAC;IACD,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;QACzC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YAC3E,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,8CAA8C,CAAC,CAAC;QACrE,CAAC;QACD,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IAChD,CAAC;IACD,kEAAkE;IAClE,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,YAAY,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IACzD,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;AACzB,CAAC;AAED,8DAA8D;AAC9D,MAAM,UAAU,cAAc,CAC7B,OAAgB,EAChB,KAAa,EACb,UAA8B,EAAE;IAEhC,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAChE,CAAC;AAED,4CAA4C;AAC5C,MAAM,UAAU,gBAAgB,CAC/B,OAAgB,EAChB,UAAgE,EAAE;IAElE,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CACb,YAAY,EACZ,gBAAgB,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,GAAG,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CACtF,CAAC;AACH,CAAC;AAED
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"cookies.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/http/cookies.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAEjE,iEAAiE;AACjE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,gCAAgC,CAAC;AACrD,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAE7C,MAAM,mBAAmB,GAAG,cAAc,CAAC;AAe3C,0EAA0E;AAC1E,MAAM,UAAU,gBAAgB,CAAC,KAAa,EAAE,UAA8B,EAAE;IAC/E,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAClF,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,6DAA6D,CAAC,CAAC;IACpF,CAAC;IACD,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI,mBAAmB,CAAC;IACjD,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC7B,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5C,CAAC;IACD,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC;IAC3C,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;QACjD,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,oEAAoE,CAAC,CAAC;IAC3F,CAAC;IACD,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC;IACjC,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACjD,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5C,CAAC;IACD,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAChC,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YAClC,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,uCAAuC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC9D,CAAC;QACD,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;YAClB,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,gCAAgC,CAAC,CAAC;QACvD,CAAC;IACF,CAAC;IACD,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IACnD,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;QAClC,IAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YAC9C,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,uBAAuB,CAAC,CAAC;QAC9C,CAAC;QACD,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IACxC,CAAC;IACD,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;QACzC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YAC3E,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,8CAA8C,CAAC,CAAC;QACrE,CAAC;QACD,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IAChD,CAAC;IACD,kEAAkE;IAClE,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,YAAY,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IACzD,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;AACzB,CAAC;AAED,8DAA8D;AAC9D,MAAM,UAAU,cAAc,CAC7B,OAAgB,EAChB,KAAa,EACb,UAA8B,EAAE;IAEhC,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,YAAY,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAChE,CAAC;AAED,4CAA4C;AAC5C,MAAM,UAAU,gBAAgB,CAC/B,OAAgB,EAChB,UAAgE,EAAE;IAElE,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CACb,YAAY,EACZ,gBAAgB,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,GAAG,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CACtF,CAAC;AACH,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,eAAe,CAC9B,MAAoB,EACpB,OAAe,mBAAmB;IAElC,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG,eAAe,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC;IAC1E,IAAI,OAAO,YAAY,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,YAAY,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QACrE,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;IAClB,CAAC;IACD,IAAI,KAAyB,CAAC;IAC9B,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,YAAY,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC5C,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;QAC7B,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;YAAE,SAAS;QACxB,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI;YAAE,SAAS;QAChD,qEAAqE;QACrE,oEAAoE;QACpE,qDAAqD;QACrD,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS;YAAE,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;QAC1C,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;QACxC,KAAK,GAAG,YAAY,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;IACnE,CAAC;IACD,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC;AAChE,CAAC"}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
/**
|
|
2
|
+
* Header-source narrowing shared by the cookie and bearer readers.
|
|
3
|
+
*
|
|
4
|
+
* The contract is deliberately narrow: WHATWG `Headers` (or anything
|
|
5
|
+
* carrying them, e.g. `Request`) or the raw header string. Node's
|
|
6
|
+
* `IncomingMessage.headers` is a plain record, not `Headers`, and is
|
|
7
|
+
* *not* accepted - callers on Express/Fastify/Koa convert once at the
|
|
8
|
+
* edge rather than making every reader here carry a second shape.
|
|
9
|
+
*
|
|
10
|
+
* What matters is that an unrecognized shape throws instead of reading
|
|
11
|
+
* as "header absent". A helper that silently returns nothing for an
|
|
12
|
+
* argument it never understood is one people route around, and the
|
|
13
|
+
* hand-rolled replacement has none of the ambiguity refusals below.
|
|
14
|
+
*/
|
|
15
|
+
// Duck-typed rather than `instanceof`: a `Headers` from another realm
|
|
16
|
+
// (undici's own copy, a vm context, an edge/node boundary) is still a
|
|
17
|
+
// `Headers`, and `instanceof` would reject it. This widens nothing -
|
|
18
|
+
// a plain Node header record has no `.get` and still fails.
|
|
19
|
+
function isHeadersLike(value) {
|
|
20
|
+
return (typeof value === "object" && value !== null && typeof value.get === "function");
|
|
21
|
+
}
|
|
22
|
+
/**
|
|
23
|
+
* Read one header from an accepted source. Returns `undefined` when the
|
|
24
|
+
* header is absent; throws {@link TypeError} when `source` is a shape
|
|
25
|
+
* this library does not accept.
|
|
26
|
+
*
|
|
27
|
+
* @param helper - calling helper's name, used in the error message.
|
|
28
|
+
*/
|
|
29
|
+
export function readHeaderValue(source, header, helper) {
|
|
30
|
+
// An explicit nothing - including the `null` that `Headers.get` itself
|
|
31
|
+
// returns - is a legitimate "no such header", not a caller mistake.
|
|
32
|
+
if (source === null || source === undefined)
|
|
33
|
+
return undefined;
|
|
34
|
+
if (typeof source === "string")
|
|
35
|
+
return source;
|
|
36
|
+
if (isHeadersLike(source)) {
|
|
37
|
+
const value = source.get(header);
|
|
38
|
+
return typeof value === "string" ? value : undefined;
|
|
39
|
+
}
|
|
40
|
+
if (typeof source === "object" && isHeadersLike(source.headers)) {
|
|
41
|
+
const value = source.headers.get(header);
|
|
42
|
+
return typeof value === "string" ? value : undefined;
|
|
43
|
+
}
|
|
44
|
+
throw new TypeError(`${helper}() expects a Headers, an object with a .headers (e.g. Request), a raw ` +
|
|
45
|
+
"header string, or null/undefined. Node-style requests (Express, Fastify, Koa) " +
|
|
46
|
+
"expose a plain object instead - convert it first: " +
|
|
47
|
+
"new Headers(req.headers as Record<string, string>)");
|
|
48
|
+
}
|
|
49
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=source.js.map
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"source.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/http/source.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AAKH,sEAAsE;AACtE,sEAAsE;AACtE,qEAAqE;AACrE,4DAA4D;AAC5D,SAAS,aAAa,CAAC,KAAc;IACpC,OAAO,CACN,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,OAAQ,KAAiB,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,UAAU,CAC3F,CAAC;AACH,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,eAAe,CAC9B,MAAoB,EACpB,MAAc,EACd,MAAc;IAEd,uEAAuE;IACvE,oEAAoE;IACpE,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS;QAAE,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;IAC9D,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ;QAAE,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC;IAC9C,IAAI,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC3B,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;QACjC,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;IACtD,CAAC;IACD,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,aAAa,CAAE,MAAgC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC5F,MAAM,KAAK,GAAI,MAA+B,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;QACnE,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;IACtD,CAAC;IACD,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAClB,GAAG,MAAM,wEAAwE;QAChF,gFAAgF;QAChF,oDAAoD;QACpD,oDAAoD,CACrD,CAAC;AACH,CAAC"}
|
package/dist/src/jwks/local.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -26,8 +26,9 @@ function isCandidate(jwk, header) {
|
|
|
26
26
|
return true;
|
|
27
27
|
}
|
|
28
28
|
/** Shared selection + import used by both local and remote sets. */
|
|
29
|
-
export async function resolveFromJwks(keys, header) {
|
|
30
|
-
const
|
|
29
|
+
export async function resolveFromJwks(keys, header, options = {}) {
|
|
30
|
+
const allowSymmetric = options.allowSymmetric ?? true;
|
|
31
|
+
const candidates = keys.filter((jwk) => isCandidate(jwk, header) && (allowSymmetric || jwk.kty !== "oct"));
|
|
31
32
|
if (candidates.length === 0) {
|
|
32
33
|
throw new JWKSNoMatchingKey("No key in the JWKS matches this token");
|
|
33
34
|
}
|
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"local.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/jwks/local.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;GAOG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC;AACjC,OAAO,EACN,kBAAkB,EAClB,iBAAiB,EACjB,eAAe,GACf,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAC3B,OAAO,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAChF,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,qBAAqB,CAAC;AACtD,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AASvD,SAAS,WAAW,CAAC,GAAc,EAAE,MAAiB;IACrD,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,sBAAsB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;IAChD,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG;QAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IACvC,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,KAAK;QAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IAC7D,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,KAAM,MAAM,CAAC,GAAc;QAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IAC9E,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG;QAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IACjE,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG;QAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IACrE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;AACb,CAAC;
|
|
1
|
+
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