kinetex 1.3.0 → 1.4.0

package/dist/cjs/headers.js

@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ export const HeaderName = {
     TE: "te",
     /** HTTP header name for Expect */
     Expect: "expect",
+    /** HTTP header name for Idempotency-Key */
+    IdempotencyKey: "idempotency-key",
     /** HTTP header name for Max-Forwards */
     MaxForwards: "max-forwards",
     // ── Negotiation ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -726,9 +728,77 @@ _a = HttpHeaders;
  * // Map(2) { "charset" => "utf-8", "boundary" => "something" }
  * ```
  */
+/**
+ * Split a parameter list on `;`, ignoring separators inside a quoted-string
+ * and honouring `quoted-pair` (RFC 7230 §3.2.6).
+ *
+ * `String.prototype.split(";")` treated every semicolon as a separator, so a
+ * value containing one was shredded into extra parameters:
+ *
+ *   `boundary="a;b"`               → boundary = `"a`, then a stray `b"`
+ *   `filename="report; final.pdf"` → filename = `"report`, then `final.pdf"`
+ *
+ * The second is a `Content-Disposition` with a perfectly ordinary filename —
+ * semicolons are legal in filenames, and the multipart spec's own example
+ * uses one. The first appears in every `multipart/form-data` boundary. Both
+ * were parsed by `parseParams`, which is also what `parseContentType`,
+ * `parseContentDisposition`, `parseCacheControl` and `parseServerTiming` read
+ * their parameters through.
+ */
+function splitParamList(paramStr) {
+    const out = [];
+    let cur = "";
+    let inQuotes = false;
+    for (let i = 0; i < paramStr.length; i++) {
+        const c = paramStr[i];
+        if (inQuotes) {
+            // A backslash escapes the next character, including a closing quote.
+            if (c === "\\" && i + 1 < paramStr.length) {
+                cur += c + paramStr[++i];
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (c === '"')
+                inQuotes = false;
+            cur += c;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (c === '"') {
+            inQuotes = true;
+            cur += c;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (c === ";") {
+            out.push(cur);
+            cur = "";
+            continue;
+        }
+        cur += c;
+    }
+    out.push(cur);
+    return out;
+}
+/** Remove surrounding quotes from a parameter value and decode quoted-pairs. */
+function unquoteParam(v) {
+    if (v.length >= 2 && v.startsWith('"') && v.endsWith('"')) {
+        return v.slice(1, -1).replace(/\\(.)/g, "$1");
+    }
+    return v;
+}
+/**
+ * Wrap a parameter value in a `quoted-string`, escaping `\` and `"`.
+ *
+ * Every formatter in this module interpolated parameter values raw, so a
+ * value containing a double quote terminated its own string and the rest was
+ * read as further parameters: `formatLinkHeader` with `title: 'a "q" b'`
+ * emitted `title="a "q" b"`, and an unknown param `x` with value `v"w"`
+ * emitted `x="v"w""`. The same class of bug as an unescaped digest auth-param.
+ */
+function quoteParam(v) {
+    return `"${v.replace(/\\/g, "\\\\").replace(/"/g, '\\"')}"`;
+}
 export function parseParams(paramStr) {
     const map = new Map();
-    for (const part of paramStr.split(";")) {
+    for (const part of splitParamList(paramStr)) {
         const t = part.trim();
         if (!t)
             continue;
@@ -738,11 +808,7 @@ export function parseParams(paramStr) {
         }
         else {
             const k = t.slice(0, eq).trim().toLowerCase();
-            let v = t.slice(eq + 1).trim();
-            // Strip optional surrounding quotes
-            if (v.startsWith('"') && v.endsWith('"'))
-                v = v.slice(1, -1);
-            map.set(k, v);
+            map.set(k, unquoteParam(t.slice(eq + 1).trim()));
         }
     }
     return map;
@@ -762,8 +828,17 @@ function parseQualityList(header) {
                 continue;
             const k = seg.slice(0, eq).trim().toLowerCase();
             const v = seg.slice(eq + 1).trim();
-            if (k === "q")
-                quality = parseFloat(v) || 0;
+            if (k === "q") {
+                // RFC 9110 §12.4.2 bounds a qvalue to 0..1 with at most 3 decimals.
+                // `parseFloat(v) || 0` made a *malformed* q read as 0 — "not
+                // acceptable" — so `Accept: text/html;q=abc` silently stopped
+                // matching text/html, and `q=1.5` or `q=-1` flowed out of here as
+                // out-of-range weights. A q that is not a number at all is treated
+                // as absent, which is what RFC 9110 §12.4.2 says it means.
+                const n = parseFloat(v);
+                if (Number.isFinite(n))
+                    quality = Math.min(1, Math.max(0, n));
+            }
             else
                 params.set(k, v);
         }
@@ -880,9 +955,9 @@ export function parseContentDisposition(value) {
 export function formatContentDisposition(cd) {
     let out = cd.type;
     if (cd.name)
-        out += `; name="${cd.name}"`;
+        out += `; name=${quoteParam(cd.name)}`;
     if (cd.filename) {
-        out += `; filename="${cd.filename}"`;
+        out += `; filename=${quoteParam(cd.filename)}`;
         // Also emit RFC 5987 encoded form
         const encoded = encodeURIComponent(cd.filename);
         if (encoded !== cd.filename) {
@@ -1230,20 +1305,54 @@ export function parseContentLanguage(value) {
  * @returns Best matching content type, or `null` if none match
  */
 export function negotiateContentType(acceptHeader, available) {
-    const accepted = parseAccept(acceptHeader);
-    for (const { value } of accepted) {
-        if (value === "*/*")
-            return available[0] ?? null;
-        const [type] = value.split("/");
-        if (value.endsWith("/*")) {
-            const match = available.find((a) => a.startsWith(type + "/"));
-            if (match)
-                return match;
-        }
-        if (available.includes(value))
-            return value;
-    }
-    return null;
+    if (available.length === 0)
+        return null;
+    // RFC 9110 §12.5.1: "A request without any Accept header field implies that
+    // the user agent will accept any media type in response." An absent or empty
+    // Accept therefore means *everything*, not nothing — the old loop over an
+    // empty list returned null, so a client that simply did not care got no
+    // match at all.
+    if (!acceptHeader.trim())
+        return available[0];
+    /** The `type/subtype` of an entry, lowercased, with parameters dropped. */
+    const essence = (v) => v.split(";")[0].trim().toLowerCase();
+    const ranges = parseAccept(acceptHeader)
+        .map((qv) => ({ essence: essence(qv.value), quality: qv.quality }))
+        .filter((r) => r.essence !== "");
+    // 0 = no match, 1 = type/*, 2 = exact type/subtype. RFC 9110 §12.5.1 gives
+    // precedence to the *most specific* matching range, so a type named with
+    // `q=0` stays refused even when a wildcard would otherwise admit it.
+    const specificity = (range, want) => {
+        if (range === want)
+            return 2;
+        if (range.endsWith("/*") && want.startsWith(range.slice(0, range.length - 1)))
+            return 1;
+        if (range === "*/*")
+            return 0;
+        return -1;
+    };
+    let best = null;
+    for (let i = 0; i < available.length; i++) {
+        const want = essence(available[i]);
+        let quality = null;
+        let spec = -1;
+        for (const range of ranges) {
+            const m = specificity(range.essence, want);
+            if (m < 0)
+                continue;
+            if (m > spec) {
+                spec = m;
+                quality = range.quality;
+            }
+        }
+        // Unmatched, or matched at q=0 — the client will not take it.
+        if (quality === null || quality <= 0)
+            continue;
+        if (best === null || quality > best.quality || (quality === best.quality && spec > best.spec)) {
+            best = { index: i, quality, spec };
+        }
+    }
+    return best === null ? null : available[best.index];
 }
 /**
  * Parse a Range header value (RFC 7233 §3.1).
@@ -1264,14 +1373,33 @@ export function parseRange(value) {
         const dash = t.indexOf("-");
         if (dash === -1)
             return null;
-        const start = t.slice(0, dash).trim();
-        const end = t.slice(dash + 1).trim();
-        return {
-            start: start === "" ? null : parseInt(start, 10),
-            end: end === "" ? null : parseInt(end, 10),
-        };
+        const startStr = t.slice(0, dash).trim();
+        const endStr = t.slice(dash + 1).trim();
+        const start = startStr === "" ? null : parseInt(startStr, 10);
+        const end = endStr === "" ? null : parseInt(endStr, 10);
+        // `bytes=abc-def` used to yield `{ start: NaN, end: NaN }` — `parseInt`
+        // returns NaN and nothing filtered it, so a caller arithmetic-ing on the
+        // bounds got NaN rather than a rejection.
+        if (start !== null && !Number.isFinite(start))
+            return null;
+        if (end !== null && !Number.isFinite(end))
+            return null;
+        // RFC 9110 §14.1.1: byte-range-spec is `first-pos "-" [last-pos]` or
+        // `"-" suffix-length`, with first-pos <= last-pos and both non-negative.
+        if (start === null && end === null)
+            return null; // neither form given
+        if (start !== null && start < 0)
+            return null;
+        if (end !== null && end < 0)
+            return null;
+        if (start !== null && end !== null && start > end)
+            return null;
+        return { start, end };
     })
         .filter((r) => r !== null);
+    // `Range: bytes=` and a list of nothing but invalid specs are not ranges.
+    if (ranges.length === 0)
+        return null;
     return { unit, ranges };
 }
 /**
@@ -1340,20 +1468,20 @@ export function formatLinkHeader(links) {
         .map((l) => {
         let s = `<${l.uri}>`;
         if (l.rel)
-            s += `; rel="${l.rel}"`;
+            s += `; rel=${quoteParam(l.rel)}`;
         if (l.type)
-            s += `; type="${l.type}"`;
+            s += `; type=${quoteParam(l.type)}`;
         if (l.hreflang)
-            s += `; hreflang="${l.hreflang}"`;
+            s += `; hreflang=${quoteParam(l.hreflang)}`;
         if (l.title)
-            s += `; title="${l.title}"`;
+            s += `; title=${quoteParam(l.title)}`;
         if (l.media)
-            s += `; media="${l.media}"`;
+            s += `; media=${quoteParam(l.media)}`;
         const paramEntries = l.params instanceof Map ? [...l.params.entries()] : Object.entries(l.params ?? {});
         for (const [k, v] of paramEntries) {
             if (["rel", "type", "hreflang", "title", "media"].includes(k))
                 continue;
-            s += `; ${k}="${v}"`;
+            s += `; ${k}=${quoteParam(String(v))}`;
         }
         return s;
     })
@@ -1415,18 +1543,61 @@ export function normalizeForwardedHeaders(headers) {
  * @param options - Trust configuration
  * @returns The selected client IP, or `null` if none present
  */
+/** A dotted-quad IPv4 literal, or a syntactically plausible IPv6 literal. */
+function isIPLiteral(v) {
+    if (/^\d{1,3}(\.\d{1,3}){3}$/.test(v)) {
+        return v.split(".").every((o) => Number(o) <= 255 && (o === "0" || !o.startsWith("0")));
+    }
+    if (!v.includes(":"))
+        return false;
+    // An IPv6 literal is hex groups, colons, and at most one `::`. At most one
+    // `::` is what rejects prose like "not:an:ip:address:here" while accepting
+    // the compressed and IPv4-mapped forms real proxies emit.
+    if (!/^[0-9a-f:.]+$/i.test(v))
+        return false;
+    return (v.match(/::/g) ?? []).length <= 1;
+}
+/**
+ * RFC 7239 permits an obfuscated identifier in place of an address, and
+ * `unknown` is the de-facto placeholder that nginx, HAProxy and several CDNs
+ * emit when they cannot determine the client. Neither is an IP address.
+ */
+function usableClientAddress(raw) {
+    if (!raw)
+        return null;
+    const v = stripIPPortAndBrackets(raw);
+    if (!v)
+        return null;
+    if (/^_/.test(v))
+        return v; // RFC 7239 obfuscated identifier
+    return isIPLiteral(v) ? v : null;
+}
 export function getClientIP(headers, options = {}) {
     const trustedHops = Math.max(0, Math.trunc(options.trustedHops ?? 0));
     const fwd = normalizeForwardedHeaders(headers);
     if (fwd.for.length > 0) {
-        const list = fwd.for;
         // Right-most entry is the closest hop. trustedHops = 1 → the entry the
         // nearest trusted proxy appended; index = length - trustedHops.
-        const index = trustedHops === 0 ? 0 : list.length - trustedHops;
-        const value = list[index] ?? list[0];
-        return stripIPPortAndBrackets(value);
+        const index = trustedHops === 0 ? 0 : fwd.for.length - trustedHops;
+        // Walk outwards from the chosen hop, skipping placeholders. Returning
+        // `unknown` as a client address, or any non-address the header happened
+        // to contain, meant a caller rate-limiting, logging or geo-locating on
+        // the literal string "unknown" or "garbage".
+        for (let i = index; i >= 0; i--) {
+            const found = usableClientAddress(fwd.for[i]);
+            if (found)
+                return found;
+        }
+        for (const entry of fwd.for) {
+            const found = usableClientAddress(entry);
+            if (found)
+                return found;
+        }
+        return null;
     }
-    return stripIPPortAndBrackets(headers.get(HeaderName.XRealIP) ?? "") || null;
+    // The old fallback returned `stripIPPortAndBrackets("")` — the empty string —
+    // for an empty `x-real-ip`, breaking the documented `string | null` contract.
+    return usableClientAddress(headers.get(HeaderName.XRealIP));
 }
 /**
  * Normalize a Forwarded/XFF entry to a bare host: strip `for="…"` quoting,
@@ -1447,6 +1618,30 @@ function stripIPPortAndBrackets(value) {
         return m[1];
     return v;
 }
+/** RFC 7231 §7.1.1.1 IMF-fixdate, e.g. `Sun, 06 Nov 1994 08:49:37 GMT`. */
+const IMF_FIXDATE_RE = /^(?:Mon|Tue|Wed|Thu|Fri|Sat|Sun), \d{2} (?:Jan|Feb|Mar|Apr|May|Jun|Jul|Aug|Sep|Oct|Nov|Dec) \d{4} \d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2} GMT$/;
+/** RFC 7231 §7.1.1.1 obsolete RFC 850 date, e.g. `Sunday, 06-Nov-94 08:49:37 GMT`. */
+const RFC850_DATE_RE = /^(?:Monday|Tuesday|Wednesday|Thursday|Friday|Saturday|Sunday), \d{2}-(?:Jan|Feb|Mar|Apr|May|Jun|Jul|Aug|Sep|Oct|Nov|Dec)-\d{2,4} \d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2} GMT$/;
+/** RFC 7231 §7.1.1.1 obsolete asctime date, e.g. `Sun Nov  6 08:49:37 1994`. */
+const ASCTIME_DATE_RE = /^(?:Mon|Tue|Wed|Thu|Fri|Sat|Sun) (?:Jan|Feb|Mar|Apr|May|Jun|Jul|Aug|Sep|Oct|Nov|Dec) [ \d]\d \d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2} \d{4}$/;
+/**
+ * Parse a string that must be an HTTP-date in one of the three formats
+ * RFC 7231 §7.1.1.1 allows a recipient to accept.
+ *
+ * Unlike `Date.parse`, this never invents a date out of a bare number, a
+ * signed value or a floating-point one.
+ *
+ * @param value - Candidate HTTP-date (already trimmed)
+ * @returns Epoch milliseconds, or `null` when the value is not an HTTP-date
+ */
+export function parseHTTPDate(value) {
+    const t = value.trim();
+    if (!IMF_FIXDATE_RE.test(t) && !RFC850_DATE_RE.test(t) && !ASCTIME_DATE_RE.test(t)) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    const ms = Date.parse(t);
+    return isNaN(ms) ? null : ms;
+}
 /**
  * Parse a Retry-After header which may be either delta-seconds or an
  * HTTP-date.
@@ -1459,9 +1654,12 @@ export function parseRetryAfter(value) {
     // Delta-seconds: pure integer
     if (/^\d+$/.test(t))
         return { date: null, delay: parseInt(t, 10) };
-    // HTTP-date
-    const ms = Date.parse(t);
-    if (!isNaN(ms))
+    // HTTP-date. Date.parse() is far more permissive than RFC 7231 §7.1.1.1 and
+    // happily reads "-5" as 2001-05-01, "1.5" as 2001-01-05 and "+5" as
+    // 2001-05-01, so a malformed header was silently turned into a *delay*.
+    // Gate on the three legal HTTP-date shapes before parsing.
+    const ms = parseHTTPDate(t);
+    if (ms !== null)
         return { date: new Date(ms), delay: null };
     return { date: null, delay: null };
 }
@@ -1627,7 +1825,7 @@ export function formatServerTiming(entries) {
         if (e.duration !== null)
             s += `;dur=${e.duration}`;
         if (e.description !== null)
-            s += `;desc="${e.description}"`;
+            s += `;desc=${quoteParam(e.description)}`;
         return s;
     })
         .join(", ");
@@ -2300,6 +2498,66 @@ export function createHeaders(init) {
 export function createRequestHeaders(init) {
     return new RichHeaders(init, "request");
 }
+/**
+ * Generate a random Idempotency-Key value.
+ *
+ * Uses `crypto.getRandomValues`, available in every runtime kinetex targets
+ * (Node 18+, Deno, Bun, browsers, Workers) — no dependency, and not
+ * `Math.random`.
+ *
+ * Format is a RFC 9562 v4 UUID: 122 random bits, hyphenated, with the
+ * version and variant bits set. Servers that require an opaque string are
+ * equally satisfied; UUID is the form Stripe and most others document.
+ *
+ * @returns A fresh key, e.g. `"3f2a9c1e-7b4d-4a8f-9c2e-1d5b6f7a8c90"`.
+ * @throws {Error} If the runtime exposes no CSPRNG.
+ *
+ * @example
+ * ```ts
+ * client.post("/charges", body, { headers: { "idempotency-key": generateIdempotencyKey() } });
+ * ```
+ */
+export function generateIdempotencyKey() {
+    if (typeof crypto === "undefined" || typeof crypto.getRandomValues !== "function") {
+        throw new Error("generateIdempotencyKey: no CSPRNG available in this runtime — crypto.getRandomValues is required");
+    }
+    const bytes = new Uint8Array(16);
+    crypto.getRandomValues(bytes);
+    // RFC 9562 §5.4: set the version (4) and variant (10xx) bits.
+    // `noUncheckedIndexedAccess` makes these reads `number | undefined`; the
+    // buffer is a fixed 16 bytes so they are always present.
+    bytes[6] = ((bytes[6] ?? 0) & 0x0f) | 0x40;
+    bytes[8] = ((bytes[8] ?? 0) & 0x3f) | 0x80;
+    const hex = [];
+    for (const b of bytes)
+        hex.push(b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"));
+    return [
+        hex.slice(0, 4).join(""),
+        hex.slice(4, 6).join(""),
+        hex.slice(6, 8).join(""),
+        hex.slice(8, 10).join(""),
+        hex.slice(10, 16).join(""),
+    ].join("-");
+}
+/**
+ * Validate an Idempotency-Key value.
+ *
+ * The header is opaque to the client, but it travels in a request header, so
+ * it must not be able to smuggle CR/LF into the request line or headers.
+ * Servers commonly cap the length (Stripe: 255 chars).
+ *
+ * @param key - Candidate value.
+ * @param maxLength - Maximum accepted length. Default: 255.
+ * @returns True when the value is safe to send.
+ */
+export function isValidIdempotencyKey(key, maxLength = 255) {
+    if (typeof key !== "string")
+        return false;
+    if (key.length === 0 || key.length > maxLength)
+        return false;
+    // Visible ASCII only: rejects CR, LF, NUL, and any non-ASCII byte.
+    return /^[\x21-\x7e]+$/.test(key);
+}
 /**
  * Create a new RichHeaders instance with "response" guard.
  * Response guard forbids Set-Cookie headers.