kawasekit 0.5.0 → 0.7.0

package/dist/{chunk-6CNAYQOL.js → chunk-7YKRKV6D.js}

@@ -1,5 +1,19 @@
 import { getAddress } from 'viem';
 
+// src/policy/spending-policy.ts
+function normalizeRecipientAllowlist(allowlist) {
+  const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  const normalized = [];
+  for (const entry of allowlist) {
+    const checksummed = getAddress(entry);
+    if (!seen.has(checksummed)) {
+      seen.add(checksummed);
+      normalized.push(checksummed);
+    }
+  }
+  return normalized;
+}
+
 // src/policy/spending-policy.ts
 var SpendingPolicyConfigError = class extends Error {
   field;
@@ -102,7 +116,7 @@ function createSpendingPolicy(params) {
     }
     return { token, maxPerSign: l.maxPerSign };
   });
-  const recipientAllowlist = params.recipientAllowlist === "any" ? "any" : params.recipientAllowlist.map((a) => getAddress(a));
+  const recipientAllowlist = params.recipientAllowlist === "any" ? "any" : normalizeRecipientAllowlist(params.recipientAllowlist);
   return {
     version: "1",
     session: { id: params.session.id, notAfter: params.session.notAfter },
@@ -120,6 +134,6 @@ function mergeSpendState(state, spend) {
   return { spentPerToken };
 }
 
-export { SpendingPolicyConfigError, createSpendingPolicy, evaluateSpendingPolicy, mergeSpendState };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-6CNAYQOL.js.map
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-6CNAYQOL.js.map
+export { SpendingPolicyConfigError, createSpendingPolicy, evaluateSpendingPolicy, mergeSpendState, normalizeRecipientAllowlist };
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-7YKRKV6D.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-7YKRKV6D.js.map

package/dist/chunk-7YKRKV6D.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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* Shared recipient-allowlist normalization for the two policy paths — the\n * off-chain {@link createSpendingPolicy} (`./spending-policy`) and the on-chain\n * {@link createJpycDailyLimitPolicies} (`./daily-limit`). Keeping one normalizer\n * means both agree on what \"the same allowlist\" is: a future change (e.g.\n * rejecting the zero address) lands in one place, not two that can drift.\n *\n * @packageDocumentation\n */\n\nimport type { Address } from \"viem\";\nimport { getAddress } from \"viem\";\n\n/**\n * Checksum-normalize ({@link getAddress}) and de-duplicate an address allowlist,\n * preserving first-seen order. `getAddress` rejects a malformed address.\n *\n * This does **not** decide what an empty list means — `[]` returns `[]`. Each\n * caller owns that policy: the off-chain `SpendingPolicy` treats `[]` as\n * deny-all, while the on-chain `createJpycDailyLimitPolicies` rejects it (an\n * on-chain allowlist cannot encode \"match nothing\").\n */\nexport function normalizeRecipientAllowlist(allowlist: readonly Address[]): Address[] {\n\tconst seen = new Set<Address>();\n\tconst normalized: Address[] = [];\n\tfor (const entry of allowlist) {\n\t\tconst checksummed = getAddress(entry);\n\t\tif (!seen.has(checksummed)) {\n\t\t\tseen.add(checksummed);\n\t\t\tnormalized.push(checksummed);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn normalized;\n}\n","/**\n * Spending policy — policy-as-data for the x402 / EIP-3009 PolicyGatedSigner\n * (M6). One declarative {@link SpendingPolicy} (session + expiry, per-token\n * `maxPerSign` + cumulative cap, recipient allowlist, `revoked`) and one pure,\n * deny-closed evaluator {@link evaluateSpendingPolicy}.\n *\n * The same specification is enforced SDK-side (the `local` adapter) and, for the\n * `mpc-2p` adapter, re-implemented backend-side in Rust (the `kawasekit-mpc-2p`\n * co-signer); a shared conformance corpus\n * (`__fixtures__/spending-policy.vectors.json`) keeps the two in lockstep.\n * The evaluator is **check-only** — it reads `SpendState` and never mutates it;\n * the cumulative-cap *commit* (folding a successful spend back in via\n * {@link mergeSpendState}) is the adapter's job, and atomic+authoritative\n * commit is a property of the `cryptographic` adapter only.\n *\n * This is the **x402-EOA** policy path. The smart-account / ZeroDev session-key\n * path is `createJpycDailyLimitPolicies` (`./daily-limit`) — a sibling, not a\n * replacement.\n *\n * @packageDocumentation\n */\n\nimport type { Address } from \"viem\";\nimport { getAddress } from \"viem\";\nimport type { PaymentIntent, PolicyRejection } from \"../signer/types\";\nimport { normalizeRecipientAllowlist } from \"./normalize-allowlist\";\n\n/** Per-token spend limits. A token absent from the policy's `perToken` is NOT allowed. */\nexport interface TokenLimit {\n\treadonly token: Address;\n\t/** Max value per single signature, token base units. Generalizes `maxAmountPerSign` (threat 1.14). */\n\treadonly maxPerSign: bigint;\n\t/** Optional total across the session. `undefined` = uncapped. MUST be `>= maxPerSign`. */\n\treadonly cumulativeCap?: bigint;\n}\n\n/**\n * Policy-as-data evaluated for every {@link PaymentIntent}. Deny-closed\n * throughout: a token not listed in `perToken` is rejected, and\n * `recipientAllowlist` is **required** — `\"any\"` (unrestricted) is a conscious,\n * greppable choice, never a silent default.\n */\nexport interface SpendingPolicy {\n\treadonly version: \"1\";\n\t/** Session id + expiry (unix seconds). An authorization may not outlive the session. */\n\treadonly session: { readonly id: string; readonly notAfter: bigint };\n\treadonly perToken: readonly TokenLimit[];\n\t/**\n\t * Recipient restriction (**required** — no silent allow-open default):\n\t * `\"any\"` = unrestricted, `[]` = deny-all, `[...]` = allowlist. Making\n\t * `\"any\"` explicit keeps the policy deny-closed like `perToken`.\n\t *\n\t * The on-chain {@link createJpycDailyLimitPolicies} takes the same\n\t * `Address[] | \"any\"` shape, with two on-chain-forced differences: it is\n\t * optional (omitted = `\"any\"`), and `[]` throws there (an on-chain allowlist\n\t * cannot encode deny-all).\n\t */\n\treadonly recipientAllowlist: readonly Address[] | \"any\";\n\treadonly revoked: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Cross-call cumulative spend, per token. Injected into the evaluator (never a\n * module global). For the `local` adapter this is a single-process, caller-managed\n * **read-only view**; the authoritative ledger lives in the `cryptographic`\n * adapter's backend.\n */\nexport interface SpendState {\n\treadonly spentPerToken: readonly { readonly token: Address; readonly spent: bigint }[];\n}\n\n/** The outcome of {@link evaluateSpendingPolicy}. */\nexport type PolicyDecision =\n\t| { readonly ok: true }\n\t| { readonly ok: false; readonly rejection: PolicyRejection };\n\n/** Thrown by {@link createSpendingPolicy} on a malformed policy. */\nexport class SpendingPolicyConfigError extends Error {\n\treadonly field: string;\n\treadonly reason: string;\n\n\tconstructor(field: string, reason: string, options?: { cause?: unknown }) {\n\t\tsuper(`Invalid SpendingPolicy (${field}): ${reason}`, options);\n\t\tthis.name = \"SpendingPolicyConfigError\";\n\t\tthis.field = field;\n\t\tthis.reason = reason;\n\t}\n}\n\nfunction deny(reason: PolicyRejection[\"reason\"], detail: string): PolicyDecision {\n\treturn { ok: false, rejection: { reason, detail } };\n}\n\n/**\n * Evaluate a {@link SpendingPolicy} against a decoded {@link PaymentIntent}.\n *\n * Pure, deterministic, no I/O. Deny-closed; the first failing check wins. All\n * amount comparisons are `bigint`; all address equality uses `getAddress()` on\n * both sides. **Reads `state`, never mutates it** — see {@link mergeSpendState}.\n * `detail` strings never contain the nonce or any signature.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const decision = evaluateSpendingPolicy(policy, intent, state, BigInt(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)));\n * if (!decision.ok) console.warn(decision.rejection.reason);\n * ```\n */\nexport function evaluateSpendingPolicy(\n\tpolicy: SpendingPolicy,\n\tintent: PaymentIntent,\n\tstate: SpendState,\n\tnowSeconds: bigint,\n): PolicyDecision {\n\tif (policy.revoked) {\n\t\treturn deny(\"revoked\", \"the spending policy has been revoked\");\n\t}\n\tif (nowSeconds > policy.session.notAfter) {\n\t\treturn deny(\"expired\", `session expired at ${policy.session.notAfter} (now ${nowSeconds})`);\n\t}\n\tif (intent.validBefore > policy.session.notAfter) {\n\t\treturn deny(\n\t\t\t\"expired\",\n\t\t\t`authorization validBefore ${intent.validBefore} outlives the session (notAfter ${policy.session.notAfter})`,\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\tconst intentToken = getAddress(intent.token);\n\tconst limit = policy.perToken.find((l) => getAddress(l.token) === intentToken);\n\tif (limit === undefined) {\n\t\treturn deny(\"token_not_allowed\", `token ${intentToken} is not in the policy`);\n\t}\n\n\tif (policy.recipientAllowlist !== \"any\") {\n\t\tconst to = getAddress(intent.to);\n\t\tconst allowed = policy.recipientAllowlist.some((a) => getAddress(a) === to);\n\t\tif (!allowed) {\n\t\t\treturn deny(\"recipient_not_allowed\", `recipient ${to} is not on the allowlist`);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\tif (intent.value > limit.maxPerSign) {\n\t\treturn deny(\n\t\t\t\"amount_exceeds_per_sign\",\n\t\t\t`value ${intent.value} exceeds maxPerSign ${limit.maxPerSign}`,\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\tif (limit.cumulativeCap !== undefined) {\n\t\tconst spent = state.spentPerToken.find((s) => getAddress(s.token) === intentToken)?.spent ?? 0n;\n\t\tif (spent + intent.value > limit.cumulativeCap) {\n\t\t\treturn deny(\n\t\t\t\t\"amount_exceeds_cumulative\",\n\t\t\t\t`spent ${spent} + value ${intent.value} exceeds cumulativeCap ${limit.cumulativeCap}`,\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn { ok: true };\n}\n\n/** Parameters for {@link createSpendingPolicy}. */\nexport interface CreateSpendingPolicyParams {\n\treadonly session: { readonly id: string; readonly notAfter: bigint };\n\treadonly perToken: readonly TokenLimit[];\n\t/** Required: `\"any\"` (unrestricted), `[]` (deny-all), or an allowlist. No silent default. */\n\treadonly recipientAllowlist: readonly Address[] | \"any\";\n\t/** Defaults to `false`. */\n\treadonly revoked?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate + normalize a {@link SpendingPolicy}. Checksums all addresses\n * (`getAddress`), de-dupes the recipient allowlist (shared\n * {@link normalizeRecipientAllowlist}; `[]` stays deny-all), rejects an empty\n * `perToken` (deny-closed), a non-positive `maxPerSign`/`cumulativeCap`, a\n * `cumulativeCap < maxPerSign`, and duplicate tokens. Throws\n * {@link SpendingPolicyConfigError} on violation.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const policy = createSpendingPolicy({\n *   session: { id: conversationId, notAfter: BigInt(deadline) },\n *   perToken: [{ token: JPYC, maxPerSign: 1_000n, cumulativeCap: 10_000n }],\n *   recipientAllowlist: [merchant],\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport function createSpendingPolicy(params: CreateSpendingPolicyParams): SpendingPolicy {\n\tif (typeof params.session.id !== \"string\" || params.session.id === \"\") {\n\t\tthrow new SpendingPolicyConfigError(\"session.id\", \"must be a non-empty string\");\n\t}\n\tif (params.session.notAfter <= 0n) {\n\t\tthrow new SpendingPolicyConfigError(\n\t\t\t\"session.notAfter\",\n\t\t\t`must be a positive unix-seconds bigint, got ${params.session.notAfter}`,\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\tif (params.perToken.length === 0) {\n\t\tthrow new SpendingPolicyConfigError(\n\t\t\t\"perToken\",\n\t\t\t\"must list at least one token (the policy is deny-closed)\",\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\tconst seen = new Set<string>();\n\tconst perToken: readonly TokenLimit[] = params.perToken.map((l) => {\n\t\tconst token = getAddress(l.token);\n\t\tif (seen.has(token)) {\n\t\t\tthrow new SpendingPolicyConfigError(\"perToken\", `duplicate token ${token}`);\n\t\t}\n\t\tseen.add(token);\n\t\tif (l.maxPerSign <= 0n) {\n\t\t\tthrow new SpendingPolicyConfigError(\n\t\t\t\t\"perToken.maxPerSign\",\n\t\t\t\t`must be positive, got ${l.maxPerSign} for ${token}`,\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (l.cumulativeCap !== undefined) {\n\t\t\tif (l.cumulativeCap <= 0n) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new SpendingPolicyConfigError(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"perToken.cumulativeCap\",\n\t\t\t\t\t`must be positive, got ${l.cumulativeCap} for ${token}`,\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (l.cumulativeCap < l.maxPerSign) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new SpendingPolicyConfigError(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"perToken.cumulativeCap\",\n\t\t\t\t\t`cumulativeCap (${l.cumulativeCap}) must be >= maxPerSign (${l.maxPerSign}) for ${token}`,\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn { token, maxPerSign: l.maxPerSign, cumulativeCap: l.cumulativeCap };\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn { token, maxPerSign: l.maxPerSign };\n\t});\n\n\t// Checksum-normalize + de-dupe the allowlist (shared with the on-chain\n\t// daily-limit path). `[]` stays `[]` — deny-all is a valid off-chain policy.\n\tconst recipientAllowlist =\n\t\tparams.recipientAllowlist === \"any\"\n\t\t\t? \"any\"\n\t\t\t: normalizeRecipientAllowlist(params.recipientAllowlist);\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tversion: \"1\",\n\t\tsession: { id: params.session.id, notAfter: params.session.notAfter },\n\t\tperToken,\n\t\trecipientAllowlist,\n\t\trevoked: params.revoked ?? false,\n\t};\n}\n\n/**\n * Fold a successful spend back into a {@link SpendState} (pure; returns a new\n * state). The caller of the `local` adapter uses this to keep `cumulativeCap`\n * meaningful across calls — `local` does not own an authoritative ledger.\n */\nexport function mergeSpendState(\n\tstate: SpendState,\n\tspend: { readonly token: Address; readonly value: bigint },\n): SpendState {\n\tconst token = getAddress(spend.token);\n\tconst exists = state.spentPerToken.some((s) => getAddress(s.token) === token);\n\tconst spentPerToken = exists\n\t\t? state.spentPerToken.map((s) =>\n\t\t\t\tgetAddress(s.token) === token ? { token, spent: s.spent + spend.value } : s,\n\t\t\t)\n\t\t: [...state.spentPerToken, { token, spent: spend.value }];\n\treturn { spentPerToken };\n}\n"]}

package/dist/{chunk-S2ZSX2VS.js → chunk-NY6VLXQB.js}

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { PolicyGatedSignerConfigError, resolveAssetParam, signTransferWithAuthorization, resolvedAssetToEip3009Domain, transferWithAuthorizationTypes, CoSignUnavailableError } from './chunk-VJUXTVSW.js';
-import { evaluateSpendingPolicy } from './chunk-6CNAYQOL.js';
+import { evaluateSpendingPolicy } from './chunk-7YKRKV6D.js';
 import { getAddress, hashTypedData, toHex, recoverAddress, serializeSignature } from 'viem';
 
 function createLocalPolicyGatedSigner(params) {
@@ -394,5 +394,5 @@ function assembleSignature(sig) {
 }
 
 export { MAX_FRAME_BYTES, WIRE_VERSION, canonicalRequestBytes, createLocalPolicyGatedSigner, createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner, toWireIntent };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-S2ZSX2VS.js.map
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-S2ZSX2VS.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-NY6VLXQB.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-NY6VLXQB.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-S2ZSX2VS.js.map → chunk-NY6VLXQB.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* The `local` PolicyGatedSigner adapter — `enforcement: \"advisory\"`.\n *\n * Wraps a viem {@link Account} + a {@link SpendingPolicy} + a pinned EIP-712\n * domain. `sign(intent)` evaluates the policy SDK-side and, on pass, produces a\n * real EIP-3009 authorization via {@link signTransferWithAuthorization}. It is\n * **advisory** because the wrapped key can still sign anything elsewhere — the\n * gate is only reached if the caller chooses to call *this* `sign()`. Use it for\n * dev, the A1 cross-language fallback, and any flow that is explicitly not\n * bounded/regulated; the type-gate (`requireNonBypassable`) keeps it out of\n * flows that require non-bypassable enforcement.\n *\n * @packageDocumentation\n */\n\nimport type { Account } from \"viem\";\nimport { getAddress } from \"viem\";\nimport type { SpendingPolicy, SpendState } from \"../policy/spending-policy\";\nimport { evaluateSpendingPolicy } from \"../policy/spending-policy\";\nimport type { X402AssetParam } from \"../tokens/asset-domain\";\nimport { resolveAssetParam, resolvedAssetToEip3009Domain } from \"../tokens/asset-domain\";\nimport { signTransferWithAuthorization } from \"../tokens/eip3009\";\nimport { PolicyGatedSignerConfigError } from \"./errors\";\nimport type { PaymentIntent, PolicyGatedSigner, SignerDescription, SignResult } from \"./types\";\n\n/** Parameters for {@link createLocalPolicyGatedSigner}. */\nexport interface CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams {\n\t/** EOA / LocalAccount that signs the EIP-3009 authorization. */\n\treadonly account: Account;\n\t/** The spending policy this signer enforces (SDK-side, advisory). */\n\treadonly policy: SpendingPolicy;\n\t/** Asset binding — pins the EIP-712 domain `name`/`version`/`verifyingContract`. */\n\treadonly asset: X402AssetParam;\n\t/**\n\t * Required literal acknowledgement that this signer is **advisory** (a\n\t * key-holder can bypass its policy). Omitting it is a compile error (TS) and\n\t * a construction-time throw (JS) — so constructing an advisory signer is a\n\t * conscious, greppable act. For bounded/regulated flows use a cryptographic\n\t * adapter instead.\n\t */\n\treadonly acknowledgeAdvisory: true;\n\t/**\n\t * Optional cumulative-spend view (read-only) the adapter evaluates\n\t * `cumulativeCap` against. `local` does not own an authoritative ledger; the\n\t * caller folds a successful spend back in (e.g. via `mergeSpendState`) before\n\t * the next call. Default: empty.\n\t */\n\treadonly spendState?: () => SpendState | Promise<SpendState>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Construct a `local` (advisory) PolicyGatedSigner.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const signer = createLocalPolicyGatedSigner({\n *   account,\n *   policy: createSpendingPolicy({ session: { id, notAfter }, perToken: [{ token: JPYC, maxPerSign: 1_000n }], recipientAllowlist: \"any\" }),\n *   asset: { kind: \"known\", id: \"jpyc-v2\" },\n *   acknowledgeAdvisory: true,\n * });\n * const result = await signer.sign(intent);\n * ```\n */\nexport function createLocalPolicyGatedSigner(\n\tparams: CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams,\n): PolicyGatedSigner<\"advisory\"> {\n\tif (params.acknowledgeAdvisory !== true) {\n\t\tthrow new PolicyGatedSignerConfigError(\n\t\t\t\"acknowledgeAdvisory\",\n\t\t\t\"a local signer is advisory (a key-holder can bypass its policy); pass `acknowledgeAdvisory: true` to construct one consciously, or use a cryptographic adapter for bounded/regulated flows\",\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\tconst { account, policy, spendState } = params;\n\tconst pinned = resolveAssetParam(params.asset);\n\tconst from = getAddress(account.address);\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tenforcement: \"advisory\",\n\t\tfrom,\n\t\tasync sign(intent: PaymentIntent): Promise<SignResult> {\n\t\t\tif (getAddress(intent.from) !== from) {\n\t\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\t\tok: false,\n\t\t\t\t\trejection: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treason: \"from_mismatch\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdetail: `intent.from ${getAddress(intent.from)} does not equal signer.from ${from}`,\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t};\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (getAddress(intent.token) !== pinned.verifyingContract) {\n\t\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\t\tok: false,\n\t\t\t\t\trejection: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treason: \"token_not_allowed\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdetail: `intent.token ${getAddress(intent.token)} does not equal the signer's pinned verifyingContract ${pinned.verifyingContract}`,\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t};\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tconst state: SpendState = (await spendState?.()) ?? { spentPerToken: [] };\n\t\t\tconst nowSeconds = BigInt(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));\n\t\t\tconst decision = evaluateSpendingPolicy(policy, intent, state, nowSeconds);\n\t\t\tif (!decision.ok) {\n\t\t\t\treturn { ok: false, rejection: decision.rejection };\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tconst signed = await signTransferWithAuthorization(\n\t\t\t\taccount,\n\t\t\t\tresolvedAssetToEip3009Domain(pinned, intent.chainId),\n\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\tfrom,\n\t\t\t\t\tto: intent.to,\n\t\t\t\t\tvalue: intent.value,\n\t\t\t\t\tvalidAfter: intent.validAfter,\n\t\t\t\t\tvalidBefore: intent.validBefore,\n\t\t\t\t\tnonce: intent.nonce,\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t\treturn { ok: true, signature: signed.signature, intent };\n\t\t},\n\t\tdescribe(): SignerDescription {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tenforcement: \"advisory\",\n\t\t\t\tfrom,\n\t\t\t\tpolicyId: policy.session.id,\n\t\t\t\tnotAfter: policy.session.notAfter,\n\t\t\t\trevoked: policy.revoked,\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n","/**\n * The `mpc-2p` cross-process **wire** (v2) — the versioned `CoSignFrame` control\n * envelope + the A3 canonical-request encoding, as TypeScript source-of-truth.\n *\n * This is the public, TS-interpreted half of the two-layer wire (RFC m6-3a §4.2):\n * a small, versioned envelope carries the decoded {@link PaymentIntent} (never a\n * digest — A4) + a per-ceremony id + ssid + a freshness element, plus the opaque\n * DKLs round payloads (hex, produced/consumed only by the WASM crypto agent). The\n * shapes here mirror the deployed `kawasekit-mpc-2p` Rust serde **byte-for-byte**\n * (snake_case `wire_version`, `session_id`, `ceremony_id`, `ssid`, `freshness_ts`,\n * `freshness_nonce`, `auth_tag`; the string-encoded {@link WireIntent}), so a frame\n * the SDK builds round-trips through the backend's `serde_json`.\n *\n * `canonicalRequestBytes` is the A3 analog of the EIP-712 digest corpus: it\n * reproduces the backend's `auth::canonical_request_bytes` exactly, so the injected\n * authenticator's HMAC equals what the co-signer verifies (RFC §4.6:\n * `HMAC_k(wireVersion ‖ ceremonyId ‖ ssid ‖ canonical(intent) ‖ freshness)`).\n *\n * @packageDocumentation\n */\n\nimport type { Hex } from \"viem\";\nimport type { PaymentIntent } from \"./types\";\n\n/** The wire protocol version. A frame whose `wire_version` differs is rejected. */\nexport const WIRE_VERSION = 2 as const;\n\n/**\n * The inbound round-payload bound, in bytes — mirrors the backend's\n * `crypto-core/src/transport.rs` `MAX_FRAME_BYTES` (8 MiB) so the agent side\n * enforces the same pre-decode cap the backend does (RFC m6-3a §4.2/M3). The\n * adapter refuses an over-bound `round` payload **before** hex-decoding it into\n * the WASM boundary; the private transport should additionally cap raw\n * websocket messages (e.g. the `ws` client's `maxPayload`).\n */\nexport const MAX_FRAME_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024;\n\n/**\n * The string-encoded EIP-3009 intent as it crosses the wire — lowercase `0x`\n * addresses, **decimal** integer strings, `0x` hex nonce. Decoupled from any\n * library's native serde so a stdlib client reproduces it trivially; matches the\n * Rust `WireIntent` field names + encoding exactly.\n */\nexport interface WireIntent {\n\treadonly token: string;\n\treadonly chain_id: number;\n\treadonly from: string;\n\treadonly to: string;\n\treadonly value: string;\n\treadonly valid_after: string;\n\treadonly valid_before: string;\n\treadonly nonce: string;\n}\n\n/** Encode a decoded {@link PaymentIntent} for the wire. */\nexport function toWireIntent(intent: PaymentIntent): WireIntent {\n\treturn {\n\t\ttoken: intent.token.toLowerCase(),\n\t\tchain_id: intent.chainId,\n\t\tfrom: intent.from.toLowerCase(),\n\t\tto: intent.to.toLowerCase(),\n\t\tvalue: intent.value.toString(),\n\t\tvalid_after: intent.validAfter.toString(),\n\t\tvalid_before: intent.validBefore.toString(),\n\t\tnonce: intent.nonce.toLowerCase(),\n\t};\n}\n\n/**\n * The A3 request envelope the adapter generates per `sign()` and authenticates: a\n * per-ceremony id + ssid (bound into the A3 tag) + the intent + a freshness element\n * (a timestamp + a per-request nonce distinct from the EIP-3009 nonce).\n */\nexport interface CoSignRequestEnvelope {\n\treadonly ceremonyId: string;\n\treadonly ssid: string;\n\treadonly intent: PaymentIntent;\n\t/** Unix seconds; the backend checks it against a clock-skew window. */\n\treadonly freshnessTs: number;\n\t/** `0x` hex, distinct from the EIP-3009 nonce — the anti-replay key. */\n\treadonly freshnessNonce: Hex;\n}\n\n/**\n * A versioned control frame: the only cross-language content of the wire. The\n * DKLs round bytes ride opaque inside `payload`; everything else is the small,\n * pinned envelope. Internally tagged by `kind` (matches the Rust serde).\n */\nexport type CoSignFrame = { readonly wire_version: typeof WIRE_VERSION } & (\n\t| {\n\t\t\treadonly kind: \"request\";\n\t\t\treadonly session_id: string;\n\t\t\treadonly ceremony_id: string;\n\t\t\treadonly ssid: string;\n\t\t\treadonly intent: WireIntent;\n\t\t\treadonly freshness_ts: number;\n\t\t\treadonly freshness_nonce: Hex;\n\t\t\t/** A3 authenticator over {@link canonicalRequestBytes}, `0x`-hex. */\n\t\t\treadonly auth_tag: Hex;\n\t  }\n\t| { readonly kind: \"round\"; readonly payload: Hex }\n\t| { readonly kind: \"result\"; readonly r: Hex; readonly s: Hex; readonly v: number }\n\t| { readonly kind: \"rejection\"; readonly reason: string; readonly detail: string }\n\t| { readonly kind: \"error\"; readonly message: string }\n);\n\n/**\n * The A3 canonical encoding of a request — a byte-exact mirror of the backend's\n * `auth::canonical_request_bytes` (domain-tag `kawasekit-mpc-2p/cosign-request/v3`,\n * one `key=value\\n` line per field: `wireVersion ‖ ceremonyId ‖ ssid ‖\n * canonical(intent) ‖ freshness`; lowercase `0x` addresses + freshness nonce,\n * decimal integers, trailing newline). The injected authenticator HMACs these\n * bytes; because the encoding is shared, the tag equals the co-signer's.\n */\nexport function canonicalRequestBytes(env: CoSignRequestEnvelope): Uint8Array {\n\tconst i = env.intent;\n\tconst lines = [\n\t\t\"kawasekit-mpc-2p/cosign-request/v3\",\n\t\t\"wireVersion=2\",\n\t\t`ceremonyId=${env.ceremonyId}`,\n\t\t`ssid=${env.ssid}`,\n\t\t`token=${i.token.toLowerCase()}`,\n\t\t`chainId=${i.chainId}`,\n\t\t`from=${i.from.toLowerCase()}`,\n\t\t`to=${i.to.toLowerCase()}`,\n\t\t`value=${i.value}`,\n\t\t`validAfter=${i.validAfter}`,\n\t\t`validBefore=${i.validBefore}`,\n\t\t`nonce=${i.nonce.toLowerCase()}`,\n\t\t`freshnessTs=${env.freshnessTs}`,\n\t\t`freshnessNonce=${env.freshnessNonce.toLowerCase()}`,\n\t];\n\treturn new TextEncoder().encode(lines.map((l) => `${l}\\n`).join(\"\"));\n}\n","/**\n * The `mpc-2p` PolicyGatedSigner adapter — `enforcement: \"cryptographic\"`.\n *\n * A 2-of-2 MPC co-signer: the agent holds ONE DKLs share, the owner backend holds\n * the other + the authoritative policy gate. No valid signature exists without a\n * **policy-passing co-sign**, so — unlike `local` — a single key-holder cannot\n * bypass the policy. That is what earns the non-bypassable `\"cryptographic\"` label\n * and lets the M6-0 type-gate (`requireNonBypassable`) reject an advisory signer at\n * compile time in bounded flows.\n *\n * **Open-core / thin adapter.** This module is pure orchestration over injected\n * interfaces — it ships in the public SDK with **no crypto, no socket, no key**:\n *\n * - {@link Mpc2pCoSignAgent} — the WASM DKLs share (the private package's compiled\n *   `crypto-core`); drives the agent's half of the ceremony round-by-round.\n * - {@link CoSignTransport} — the authenticated, encrypted (wss/mTLS) frame channel\n *   to the owner backend (the private package's transport).\n * - {@link CoSignRequestAuthenticator} — the A3 HMAC (the pre-shared key never\n *   enters this module).\n *\n * The adapter owns the protocol: it pins the EIP-712 domain, **re-derives the\n * digest from the intent (A4)** via the shared `transferWithAuthorizationTypes`\n * source-of-truth, computes the A3 canonical bytes, frames the versioned\n * {@link CoSignFrame} envelope, pumps the ceremony, and maps the terminal frame to\n * a {@link SignResult}. Crucially it has **no local-signing path**: any\n * transport/availability failure throws {@link CoSignUnavailableError}, never an\n * `{ ok: true }` and never a {@link PolicyRejection} (the no-silent-fallback\n * guarantee, RFC m6-3a constraint 3 / W8).\n *\n * **Wire hardening (RFC §4.7/§4.8, Track C):** a bounded **transient-only retry**\n * replays the byte-identical intent (nonce included — idempotency-by-nonce is the\n * safety net) under a fresh A3 envelope and accepts the backend's **roundless\n * idempotent-replay result** via an ecrecover/low-S self-check; the **ceremony\n * deadline always fires before `validBefore`** (minus a clock-skew budget, W11),\n * and inbound round payloads are **bounded** before the WASM boundary (M3). Tuning\n * via {@link Mpc2pWireOptions}.\n *\n * @packageDocumentation\n */\n\nimport type { Address, Hex } from \"viem\";\nimport { getAddress, hashTypedData, recoverAddress, serializeSignature, toHex } from \"viem\";\nimport type { X402AssetParam } from \"../tokens/asset-domain\";\nimport { resolveAssetParam, resolvedAssetToEip3009Domain } from \"../tokens/asset-domain\";\nimport { transferWithAuthorizationTypes } from \"../tokens/eip3009\";\nimport { CoSignUnavailableError, PolicyGatedSignerConfigError } from \"./errors\";\nimport type { CoSignFrame, CoSignRequestEnvelope } from \"./mpc-2p-wire\";\nimport { canonicalRequestBytes, MAX_FRAME_BYTES, toWireIntent, WIRE_VERSION } from \"./mpc-2p-wire\";\nimport type {\n\tPaymentIntent,\n\tPolicyGatedSigner,\n\tPolicyRejection,\n\tSignerDescription,\n\tSignResult,\n} from \"./types\";\n\n/** The agent's half of the 2-of-2 ceremony (the injected WASM DKLs share). */\nexport interface Mpc2pCoSignAgent {\n\t/** The group 2-of-2 EOA this share controls — must equal the signer's `from`. */\n\tgroupEoa(): Address;\n\t/** Begin signing the 32-byte EIP-712 `digest`; returns the first outbound round (hex). */\n\tstart(digest: Hex): Hex;\n\t/** Feed one inbound round (hex); returns the next outbound round, or the final signature. */\n\tstep(incoming: Hex): Mpc2pStepOutcome;\n}\n\n/** The result of one {@link Mpc2pCoSignAgent.step}. */\nexport type Mpc2pStepOutcome =\n\t| { readonly outbound: Hex }\n\t| { readonly signature: { readonly r: Hex; readonly s: Hex; readonly v: number } };\n\n/** One authenticated, encrypted ceremony connection to the owner backend. */\nexport interface CoSignConnection {\n\t/** Send one control frame. */\n\tsend(frame: CoSignFrame): Promise<void>;\n\t/** Receive the next control frame (resolves per round). */\n\trecv(): Promise<CoSignFrame>;\n\t/** Release the connection (best-effort; errors here are ignored). */\n\tclose(): void | Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/** Opens a wss/mTLS {@link CoSignConnection} for a single co-sign ceremony. */\nexport interface CoSignTransport {\n\tconnect(): Promise<CoSignConnection>;\n}\n\n/** The A3 request authenticator — HMAC (or signature) over the canonical request bytes. */\nexport interface CoSignRequestAuthenticator {\n\t/** Authenticator tag over {@link canonicalRequestBytes}; the key stays inside. */\n\ttag(canonicalRequest: Uint8Array): Hex | Promise<Hex>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Wire liveness / retry tuning (RFC m6-3a §4.7 + §4.8). Every field is optional\n * with a safe default. The invariants these enforce:\n *\n * - **Retry (4b/H2):** only the **transient transport class** is retried (connect\n *   failed / connection dropped), replaying the **byte-identical intent** — nonce\n *   included, so the backend's idempotency-by-nonce is the safety net — under a\n *   fresh A3 envelope (the freshness guard rejects a replayed envelope by design).\n *   A delivered rejection, a ban/identifiable-abort, a protocol anomaly, or a\n *   timeout is never retried.\n * - **Liveness (4c/W11/M1+M3):** the ceremony deadline always fires **before**\n *   `intent.validBefore − clockSkewBudgetSecs` (a co-signature must never be born\n *   expired), and a `sign()` whose remaining window is under\n *   `minWindowSecs + clockSkewBudgetSecs` is refused up front.\n * - **Inbound bound (4c/M3):** a `round` payload over `maxFrameBytes` is refused\n *   before it reaches the WASM boundary (mirrors the backend's bound).\n */\nexport interface Mpc2pWireOptions {\n\t/** Max ceremony attempts for transient transport failures (default 2 = one retry). */\n\treadonly maxAttempts?: number;\n\t/** Overall per-`sign()` budget in ms, across ALL attempts (default 30_000). */\n\treadonly ceremonyTimeoutMs?: number;\n\t/** Minimum remaining validity window required at `sign()` start, in seconds (default 30). */\n\treadonly minWindowSecs?: number;\n\t/** Max tolerated agent-host clock skew, in seconds (default 30). */\n\treadonly clockSkewBudgetSecs?: number;\n\t/** Inbound round-payload bound in bytes (default {@link MAX_FRAME_BYTES} = 8 MiB). */\n\treadonly maxFrameBytes?: number;\n}\n\n/** Parameters for {@link createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner}. */\nexport interface Mpc2pSignerParams {\n\t/** The group 2-of-2 EOA; every `intent.from` must equal this (asserted vs the agent). */\n\treadonly from: Address;\n\t/** Asset binding — pins the EIP-712 domain `name`/`version`/`verifyingContract` (A4). */\n\treadonly asset: X402AssetParam;\n\t/** The bound policy session, for `describe()` (the backend holds the authoritative policy). */\n\treadonly session: { readonly id: string; readonly notAfter: bigint };\n\t/** The injected WASM DKLs share (private package). */\n\treadonly agent: Mpc2pCoSignAgent;\n\t/** The injected wss/mTLS frame channel (private package). */\n\treadonly transport: CoSignTransport;\n\t/** The injected A3 authenticator (the pre-shared key never enters the SDK). */\n\treadonly authenticator: CoSignRequestAuthenticator;\n\t/** Wire liveness / retry tuning (optional; safe defaults — {@link Mpc2pWireOptions}). */\n\treadonly wire?: Mpc2pWireOptions;\n}\n\n/**\n * The backend `rejection` reasons that are genuine **policy denials** (the owner\n * decided \"no\" — audit-meaningful → `{ ok: false, rejection }`). Any other reason\n * on a rejection frame is treated as \"the owner did not cleanly decide\" and throws\n * {@link CoSignUnavailableError} (no-silent-fallback; never a misclassified denial).\n */\nconst POLICY_REASONS: ReadonlySet<PolicyRejection[\"reason\"]> = new Set([\n\t\"revoked\",\n\t\"expired\",\n\t\"token_not_allowed\",\n\t\"recipient_not_allowed\",\n\t\"amount_exceeds_per_sign\",\n\t\"amount_exceeds_cumulative\",\n\t\"intent_digest_mismatch\",\n\t\"unauthenticated\",\n\t\"from_mismatch\",\n\t\"nonce_reuse_conflict\",\n]);\n\nfunction rejection(reason: PolicyRejection[\"reason\"], detail: string): SignResult {\n\treturn { ok: false, rejection: { reason, detail } };\n}\n\n/**\n * Construct an `mpc-2p` (cryptographic) PolicyGatedSigner over injected agent +\n * transport + authenticator.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * // The agent, transport and authenticator come from the private `kawasekit-mpc-2p`\n * // package (the WASM share, the wss/mTLS client, the HMAC key) — never bundled here.\n * const signer = createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner({\n *   from: groupEoa,\n *   asset: { kind: \"known\", id: \"jpyc-v2\" },\n *   session: { id: \"sess-1\", notAfter: 2_000_000_000n },\n *   agent, transport, authenticator,\n * });\n * requireNonBypassable(signer); // ✓ \"cryptographic\" — passes the type-gate\n * const result = await signer.sign(intent);\n * ```\n */\nexport function createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner(\n\tparams: Mpc2pSignerParams,\n): PolicyGatedSigner<\"cryptographic\"> {\n\tconst { agent, transport, authenticator, session } = params;\n\tconst pinned = resolveAssetParam(params.asset);\n\tconst from = getAddress(params.from);\n\tconst wire = params.wire ?? {};\n\tconst maxAttempts = Math.max(1, wire.maxAttempts ?? 2);\n\tconst ceremonyTimeoutMs = wire.ceremonyTimeoutMs ?? 30_000;\n\tconst minWindowSecs = wire.minWindowSecs ?? 30;\n\tconst clockSkewBudgetSecs = wire.clockSkewBudgetSecs ?? 30;\n\tconst maxFrameBytes = wire.maxFrameBytes ?? MAX_FRAME_BYTES;\n\n\t// The injected share MUST control the declared group EOA, or every signature\n\t// would recover to the wrong address.\n\tconst agentEoa = getAddress(agent.groupEoa());\n\tif (agentEoa !== from) {\n\t\tthrow new PolicyGatedSignerConfigError(\n\t\t\t\"from\",\n\t\t\t`the agent share controls ${agentEoa} but params.from is ${from}`,\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tenforcement: \"cryptographic\",\n\t\tfrom,\n\t\tasync sign(intent: PaymentIntent): Promise<SignResult> {\n\t\t\t// Adapter-local pre-checks (cheap; no wire needed). Same shape as `local`.\n\t\t\tif (getAddress(intent.from) !== from) {\n\t\t\t\treturn rejection(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"from_mismatch\",\n\t\t\t\t\t`intent.from ${getAddress(intent.from)} does not equal signer.from ${from}`,\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (getAddress(intent.token) !== pinned.verifyingContract) {\n\t\t\t\treturn rejection(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"token_not_allowed\",\n\t\t\t\t\t`intent.token ${getAddress(intent.token)} does not equal the signer's pinned verifyingContract ${pinned.verifyingContract}`,\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// A4: re-derive the EIP-712 digest from the intent + the pinned domain (the\n\t\t\t// SDK's exported types are the cross-language source of truth). The agent and\n\t\t\t// the backend each sign THIS digest; the SoT keeps them byte-identical.\n\t\t\tconst digest = hashTypedData({\n\t\t\t\tdomain: resolvedAssetToEip3009Domain(pinned, intent.chainId),\n\t\t\t\ttypes: transferWithAuthorizationTypes,\n\t\t\t\tprimaryType: \"TransferWithAuthorization\",\n\t\t\t\tmessage: {\n\t\t\t\t\tfrom,\n\t\t\t\t\tto: intent.to,\n\t\t\t\t\tvalue: intent.value,\n\t\t\t\t\tvalidAfter: intent.validAfter,\n\t\t\t\t\tvalidBefore: intent.validBefore,\n\t\t\t\t\tnonce: intent.nonce,\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t});\n\n\t\t\t// 4c (W11/M1+M3) — the ceremony-liveness minimum-window invariant: the rounds +\n\t\t\t// the bounded retry budget must all complete BEFORE validBefore, and validity is\n\t\t\t// judged against chain time, so the agent host's clock-skew budget is part of the\n\t\t\t// bar. A window already too small risks a born-expired signature (wasted\n\t\t\t// facilitator gas + retry/cap pressure); the owner has not decided anything, so\n\t\t\t// this throws (never a rejection).\n\t\t\tconst validBeforeSecs = Number(intent.validBefore);\n\t\t\tconst nowSecs = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n\t\t\tif (validBeforeSecs - nowSecs < minWindowSecs + clockSkewBudgetSecs) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\n\t\t\t\t\t`intent.validBefore (${validBeforeSecs}) leaves under the minimum ceremony window (${minWindowSecs}s + ${clockSkewBudgetSecs}s clock-skew budget) — refusing a co-sign that risks being born expired (W11)`,\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// One deadline for the whole sign() — every attempt included — capped so the\n\t\t\t// ceremony timeout always fires before validBefore (minus the clock-skew budget).\n\t\t\tconst deadlineMs = Math.min(\n\t\t\t\tDate.now() + ceremonyTimeoutMs,\n\t\t\t\t(validBeforeSecs - clockSkewBudgetSecs) * 1000,\n\t\t\t);\n\n\t\t\t// 4b (RFC §4.7/H2) — bounded transient-only retry. Every attempt re-presents the\n\t\t\t// *byte-identical* `intent` (nonce included — the backend's idempotency-by-nonce\n\t\t\t// + atomic SpendState are the safety net) under a FRESH A3 envelope: the\n\t\t\t// ceremonyId/ssid/freshness are per-attempt BY DESIGN (the backend's freshness\n\t\t\t// guard rejects a replayed envelope, while idempotency keys on the unchanged\n\t\t\t// EIP-3009 nonce). Only the transient transport class retries — never a\n\t\t\t// delivered rejection, never a ban/identifiable-abort, never a timeout.\n\t\t\tlet lastTransient: CoSignUnavailableError | undefined;\n\t\t\tfor (let attempt = 1; attempt <= maxAttempts; attempt += 1) {\n\t\t\t\tif (Date.now() >= deadlineMs) break;\n\t\t\t\t// A3 (v2): a fresh per-ceremony id + ssid + freshness (a timestamp + a\n\t\t\t\t// per-request nonce, distinct from the EIP-3009 nonce), authenticated over the\n\t\t\t\t// canonical bytes (the shared SoT; the HMAC key lives inside the injected\n\t\t\t\t// authenticator). Web Crypto is isomorphic (Node 19+ / browsers).\n\t\t\t\tconst env: CoSignRequestEnvelope = {\n\t\t\t\t\tceremonyId: globalThis.crypto.randomUUID(),\n\t\t\t\t\tssid: globalThis.crypto.randomUUID(),\n\t\t\t\t\tintent,\n\t\t\t\t\tfreshnessTs: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),\n\t\t\t\t\tfreshnessNonce: toHex(globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16))),\n\t\t\t\t};\n\t\t\t\tconst authTag = await authenticator.tag(canonicalRequestBytes(env));\n\t\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\t\tconst conn = await openConnection(transport);\n\t\t\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn await runCeremony({\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tconn,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tagent,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tsessionId: session.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tenv,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tdigest,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tauthTag,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfrom,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tdeadlineMs,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tmaxFrameBytes,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\t\t} finally {\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tawait conn.close();\n\t\t\t\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t// best-effort cleanup; a close error must not mask the result/throw.\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t} catch (error) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif (error instanceof CoSignUnavailableError && error.transient && attempt < maxAttempts) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlastTransient = error;\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcontinue;\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\tthrow error;\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tthrow (\n\t\t\t\tlastTransient ??\n\t\t\t\tnew CoSignUnavailableError(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"co-sign ceremony budget exhausted before validBefore (W11) — no attempt could start\",\n\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t},\n\t\tdescribe(): SignerDescription {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tenforcement: \"cryptographic\",\n\t\t\t\tfrom,\n\t\t\t\tpolicyId: session.id,\n\t\t\t\tnotAfter: session.notAfter,\n\t\t\t\t// The backend owns authoritative revocation (a revoked session → a\n\t\t\t\t// rejection at sign time); this metadata field is best-effort.\n\t\t\t\trevoked: false,\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n\nasync function openConnection(transport: CoSignTransport): Promise<CoSignConnection> {\n\ttry {\n\t\treturn await transport.connect();\n\t} catch (cause) {\n\t\t// Connect failure = the transient transport class (the one retried, §4.7).\n\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\"co-signer connection failed\", { cause, transient: true });\n\t}\n}\n\n/** Everything one ceremony attempt needs (one connection, one A3 envelope). */\ninterface CeremonyContext {\n\treadonly conn: CoSignConnection;\n\treadonly agent: Mpc2pCoSignAgent;\n\treadonly sessionId: string;\n\treadonly env: CoSignRequestEnvelope;\n\treadonly digest: Hex;\n\treadonly authTag: Hex;\n\t/** The group EOA every result must recover to (the §4.4 self-check). */\n\treadonly from: Address;\n\t/** Absolute epoch-ms the ceremony must finish by (fires before validBefore — W11). */\n\treadonly deadlineMs: number;\n\t/** Inbound round-payload bound in bytes (mirrors the backend's MAX_FRAME_BYTES). */\n\treadonly maxFrameBytes: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Drive one full ceremony attempt over `ctx.conn`: send the authenticated request +\n * the agent's first round, then pump rounds until a terminal frame. Returns a\n * {@link SignResult} (success or a policy denial) or throws\n * {@link CoSignUnavailableError}. 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There is no agent-derived signature to cross-check,\n\t\t\t\t\t// so the self-check is recovery: low-S + ecrecover(digest) == from (§4.4).\n\t\t\t\t\tawait verifyRecovers(digest, signature, frame.s, from, \"idempotent-replay\");\n\t\t\t\t\treturn { ok: true, signature, intent: env.intent };\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tif (\n\t\t\t\t\tframe.r.toLowerCase() !== agentSig.r.toLowerCase() ||\n\t\t\t\t\tframe.s.toLowerCase() !== agentSig.s.toLowerCase() ||\n\t\t\t\t\tframe.v !== agentSig.v\n\t\t\t\t) {\n\t\t\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\"the backend and agent derived different signatures\");\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t// The §4.4 ecrecover/low-S self-check: agent/backend agreement alone does not\n\t\t\t\t// prove the signature recovers to the group EOA over OUR digest — recovery does.\n\t\t\t\tawait verifyRecovers(digest, signature, frame.s, from, \"co-signed\");\n\t\t\t\treturn { ok: true, signature, intent: env.intent };\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcase \"rejection\": {\n\t\t\t\t// A genuine policy denial → typed rejection. A non-policy \"rejection\"\n\t\t\t\t// (transient/internal/ban) is \"the owner did not decide\" → no-fallback throw,\n\t\t\t\t// and it is NOT the transient transport class (never retried — a ban or an\n\t\t\t\t// in-flight duplicate must surface, not silently re-spin).\n\t\t\t\tif (POLICY_REASONS.has(frame.reason as PolicyRejection[\"reason\"])) {\n\t\t\t\t\t// reason membership verified against POLICY_REASONS above.\n\t\t\t\t\treturn rejection(frame.reason as PolicyRejection[\"reason\"], frame.detail);\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\n\t\t\t\t\t`co-signer returned a non-policy rejection (${frame.reason}): ${frame.detail}`,\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcase \"error\": {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(`co-signer error: ${frame.message}`);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdefault: {\n\t\t\t\t// Unknown frame kind — never a silent success.\n\t\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\"co-signer sent an unexpected frame\");\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Race `promise` against the ceremony deadline (W11: the timeout must fire before\n * `validBefore`). A deadline strike throws a NON-transient\n * {@link CoSignUnavailableError} — the retry budget is spent, never re-spun.\n */\nfunction withDeadline<T>(promise: Promise<T>, deadlineMs: number): Promise<T> {\n\tconst remaining = deadlineMs - Date.now();\n\tif (remaining <= 0) {\n\t\treturn Promise.reject(\n\t\t\tnew CoSignUnavailableError(\n\t\t\t\t\"co-sign ceremony timed out (the deadline fires before validBefore — W11)\",\n\t\t\t),\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\treturn new Promise<T>((resolve, reject) => {\n\t\tconst timer = setTimeout(() => {\n\t\t\treject(\n\t\t\t\tnew CoSignUnavailableError(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"co-sign ceremony timed out (the deadline fires before validBefore — W11)\",\n\t\t\t\t),\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t}, remaining);\n\t\tpromise.then(\n\t\t\t(value) => {\n\t\t\t\tclearTimeout(timer);\n\t\t\t\tresolve(value);\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t(cause) => {\n\t\t\t\tclearTimeout(timer);\n\t\t\t\treject(cause);\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t);\n\t});\n}\n\n/** secp256k1 n/2 — the EIP-2 low-S bound. */\nconst SECP256K1_HALF_N = 0x7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff5d576e7357a4501ddfe92f46681b20a0n;\n\n/**\n * The RFC §4.4 result self-check: the signature is low-S (EIP-2) and recovers to\n * the group EOA over the adapter's OWN re-derived digest — the exact check the\n * token contract's `ecrecover` will repeat on-chain.\n */\nasync function verifyRecovers(\n\tdigest: Hex,\n\tsignature: Hex,\n\ts: Hex,\n\tfrom: Address,\n\twhat: string,\n): Promise<void> {\n\tif (BigInt(s) > SECP256K1_HALF_N) {\n\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(`the ${what} signature is not low-S (EIP-2)`);\n\t}\n\tlet recovered: Address;\n\ttry {\n\t\trecovered = await recoverAddress({ hash: digest, signature });\n\t} catch (cause) {\n\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(`the ${what} signature failed to recover`, { cause });\n\t}\n\tif (getAddress(recovered) !== from) {\n\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\n\t\t\t`the ${what} signature recovers to ${getAddress(recovered)}, not the group EOA ${from}`,\n\t\t);\n\t}\n}\n\n/** Assemble a 65-byte EIP-3009 signature from the agent's `{ r, s, v }` (v = recovery_id + 27). */\nfunction assembleSignature(sig: { r: Hex; s: Hex; v: number }): Hex {\n\tconst yParity = sig.v - 27;\n\tif (yParity !== 0 && yParity !== 1) {\n\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(`malformed recovery id v=${sig.v} (expected 27 or 28)`);\n\t}\n\treturn serializeSignature({ r: sig.r, s: sig.s, yParity });\n}\n"]}
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* The `local` PolicyGatedSigner adapter — `enforcement: \"advisory\"`.\n *\n * Wraps a viem {@link Account} + a {@link SpendingPolicy} + a pinned EIP-712\n * domain. `sign(intent)` evaluates the policy SDK-side and, on pass, produces a\n * real EIP-3009 authorization via {@link signTransferWithAuthorization}. It is\n * **advisory** because the wrapped key can still sign anything elsewhere — the\n * gate is only reached if the caller chooses to call *this* `sign()`. Use it for\n * dev, the A1 cross-language fallback, and any flow that is explicitly not\n * bounded/regulated; the type-gate (`requireNonBypassable`) keeps it out of\n * flows that require non-bypassable enforcement.\n *\n * @packageDocumentation\n */\n\nimport type { Account } from \"viem\";\nimport { getAddress } from \"viem\";\nimport type { SpendingPolicy, SpendState } from \"../policy/spending-policy\";\nimport { evaluateSpendingPolicy } from \"../policy/spending-policy\";\nimport type { X402AssetParam } from \"../tokens/asset-domain\";\nimport { resolveAssetParam, resolvedAssetToEip3009Domain } from \"../tokens/asset-domain\";\nimport { signTransferWithAuthorization } from \"../tokens/eip3009\";\nimport { PolicyGatedSignerConfigError } from \"./errors\";\nimport type { PaymentIntent, PolicyGatedSigner, SignerDescription, SignResult } from \"./types\";\n\n/** Parameters for {@link createLocalPolicyGatedSigner}. */\nexport interface CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams {\n\t/** EOA / LocalAccount that signs the EIP-3009 authorization. */\n\treadonly account: Account;\n\t/** The spending policy this signer enforces (SDK-side, advisory). */\n\treadonly policy: SpendingPolicy;\n\t/** Asset binding — pins the EIP-712 domain `name`/`version`/`verifyingContract`. */\n\treadonly asset: X402AssetParam;\n\t/**\n\t * Required literal acknowledgement that this signer is **advisory** (a\n\t * key-holder can bypass its policy). Omitting it is a compile error (TS) and\n\t * a construction-time throw (JS) — so constructing an advisory signer is a\n\t * conscious, greppable act. For bounded/regulated flows use a cryptographic\n\t * adapter instead.\n\t */\n\treadonly acknowledgeAdvisory: true;\n\t/**\n\t * Optional cumulative-spend view (read-only) the adapter evaluates\n\t * `cumulativeCap` against. `local` does not own an authoritative ledger; the\n\t * caller folds a successful spend back in (e.g. via `mergeSpendState`) before\n\t * the next call. Default: empty.\n\t */\n\treadonly spendState?: () => SpendState | Promise<SpendState>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Construct a `local` (advisory) PolicyGatedSigner.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const signer = createLocalPolicyGatedSigner({\n *   account,\n *   policy: createSpendingPolicy({ session: { id, notAfter }, perToken: [{ token: JPYC, maxPerSign: 1_000n }], recipientAllowlist: \"any\" }),\n *   asset: { kind: \"known\", id: \"jpyc-v2\" },\n *   acknowledgeAdvisory: true,\n * });\n * const result = await signer.sign(intent);\n * ```\n */\nexport function createLocalPolicyGatedSigner(\n\tparams: CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams,\n): PolicyGatedSigner<\"advisory\"> {\n\tif (params.acknowledgeAdvisory !== true) {\n\t\tthrow new PolicyGatedSignerConfigError(\n\t\t\t\"acknowledgeAdvisory\",\n\t\t\t\"a local signer is advisory (a key-holder can bypass its policy); pass `acknowledgeAdvisory: true` to construct one consciously, or use a cryptographic adapter for bounded/regulated flows\",\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\tconst { account, policy, spendState } = params;\n\tconst pinned = resolveAssetParam(params.asset);\n\tconst from = getAddress(account.address);\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tenforcement: \"advisory\",\n\t\tfrom,\n\t\tasync sign(intent: PaymentIntent): Promise<SignResult> {\n\t\t\tif (getAddress(intent.from) !== from) {\n\t\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\t\tok: false,\n\t\t\t\t\trejection: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treason: \"from_mismatch\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdetail: `intent.from ${getAddress(intent.from)} does not equal signer.from ${from}`,\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t};\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (getAddress(intent.token) !== pinned.verifyingContract) {\n\t\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\t\tok: false,\n\t\t\t\t\trejection: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treason: \"token_not_allowed\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdetail: `intent.token ${getAddress(intent.token)} does not equal the signer's pinned verifyingContract ${pinned.verifyingContract}`,\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t};\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tconst state: SpendState = (await spendState?.()) ?? { spentPerToken: [] };\n\t\t\tconst nowSeconds = BigInt(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));\n\t\t\tconst decision = evaluateSpendingPolicy(policy, intent, state, nowSeconds);\n\t\t\tif (!decision.ok) {\n\t\t\t\treturn { ok: false, rejection: decision.rejection };\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tconst signed = await signTransferWithAuthorization(\n\t\t\t\taccount,\n\t\t\t\tresolvedAssetToEip3009Domain(pinned, intent.chainId),\n\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\tfrom,\n\t\t\t\t\tto: intent.to,\n\t\t\t\t\tvalue: intent.value,\n\t\t\t\t\tvalidAfter: intent.validAfter,\n\t\t\t\t\tvalidBefore: intent.validBefore,\n\t\t\t\t\tnonce: intent.nonce,\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t\treturn { ok: true, signature: signed.signature, intent };\n\t\t},\n\t\tdescribe(): SignerDescription {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tenforcement: \"advisory\",\n\t\t\t\tfrom,\n\t\t\t\tpolicyId: policy.session.id,\n\t\t\t\tnotAfter: policy.session.notAfter,\n\t\t\t\trevoked: policy.revoked,\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n","/**\n * The `mpc-2p` cross-process **wire** (v2) — the versioned `CoSignFrame` control\n * envelope + the A3 canonical-request encoding, as TypeScript source-of-truth.\n *\n * This is the public, TS-interpreted half of the two-layer wire (RFC m6-3a §4.2):\n * a small, versioned envelope carries the decoded {@link PaymentIntent} (never a\n * digest — A4) + a per-ceremony id + ssid + a freshness element, plus the opaque\n * DKLs round payloads (hex, produced/consumed only by the WASM crypto agent). The\n * shapes here mirror the deployed `kawasekit-mpc-2p` Rust serde **byte-for-byte**\n * (snake_case `wire_version`, `session_id`, `ceremony_id`, `ssid`, `freshness_ts`,\n * `freshness_nonce`, `auth_tag`; the string-encoded {@link WireIntent}), so a frame\n * the SDK builds round-trips through the backend's `serde_json`.\n *\n * `canonicalRequestBytes` is the A3 analog of the EIP-712 digest corpus: it\n * reproduces the backend's `auth::canonical_request_bytes` exactly, so the injected\n * authenticator's HMAC equals what the co-signer verifies (RFC §4.6:\n * `HMAC_k(wireVersion ‖ ceremonyId ‖ ssid ‖ canonical(intent) ‖ freshness)`).\n *\n * @packageDocumentation\n */\n\nimport type { Hex } from \"viem\";\nimport type { PaymentIntent } from \"./types\";\n\n/** The wire protocol version. A frame whose `wire_version` differs is rejected. */\nexport const WIRE_VERSION = 2 as const;\n\n/**\n * The inbound round-payload bound, in bytes — mirrors the backend's\n * `crypto-core/src/transport.rs` `MAX_FRAME_BYTES` (8 MiB) so the agent side\n * enforces the same pre-decode cap the backend does (RFC m6-3a §4.2/M3). The\n * adapter refuses an over-bound `round` payload **before** hex-decoding it into\n * the WASM boundary; the private transport should additionally cap raw\n * websocket messages (e.g. the `ws` client's `maxPayload`).\n */\nexport const MAX_FRAME_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024;\n\n/**\n * The string-encoded EIP-3009 intent as it crosses the wire — lowercase `0x`\n * addresses, **decimal** integer strings, `0x` hex nonce. Decoupled from any\n * library's native serde so a stdlib client reproduces it trivially; matches the\n * Rust `WireIntent` field names + encoding exactly.\n */\nexport interface WireIntent {\n\treadonly token: string;\n\treadonly chain_id: number;\n\treadonly from: string;\n\treadonly to: string;\n\treadonly value: string;\n\treadonly valid_after: string;\n\treadonly valid_before: string;\n\treadonly nonce: string;\n}\n\n/** Encode a decoded {@link PaymentIntent} for the wire. */\nexport function toWireIntent(intent: PaymentIntent): WireIntent {\n\treturn {\n\t\ttoken: intent.token.toLowerCase(),\n\t\tchain_id: intent.chainId,\n\t\tfrom: intent.from.toLowerCase(),\n\t\tto: intent.to.toLowerCase(),\n\t\tvalue: intent.value.toString(),\n\t\tvalid_after: intent.validAfter.toString(),\n\t\tvalid_before: intent.validBefore.toString(),\n\t\tnonce: intent.nonce.toLowerCase(),\n\t};\n}\n\n/**\n * The A3 request envelope the adapter generates per `sign()` and authenticates: a\n * per-ceremony id + ssid (bound into the A3 tag) + the intent + a freshness element\n * (a timestamp + a per-request nonce distinct from the EIP-3009 nonce).\n */\nexport interface CoSignRequestEnvelope {\n\treadonly ceremonyId: string;\n\treadonly ssid: string;\n\treadonly intent: PaymentIntent;\n\t/** Unix seconds; the backend checks it against a clock-skew window. */\n\treadonly freshnessTs: number;\n\t/** `0x` hex, distinct from the EIP-3009 nonce — the anti-replay key. */\n\treadonly freshnessNonce: Hex;\n}\n\n/**\n * A versioned control frame: the only cross-language content of the wire. The\n * DKLs round bytes ride opaque inside `payload`; everything else is the small,\n * pinned envelope. Internally tagged by `kind` (matches the Rust serde).\n */\nexport type CoSignFrame = { readonly wire_version: typeof WIRE_VERSION } & (\n\t| {\n\t\t\treadonly kind: \"request\";\n\t\t\treadonly session_id: string;\n\t\t\treadonly ceremony_id: string;\n\t\t\treadonly ssid: string;\n\t\t\treadonly intent: WireIntent;\n\t\t\treadonly freshness_ts: number;\n\t\t\treadonly freshness_nonce: Hex;\n\t\t\t/** A3 authenticator over {@link canonicalRequestBytes}, `0x`-hex. */\n\t\t\treadonly auth_tag: Hex;\n\t  }\n\t| { readonly kind: \"round\"; readonly payload: Hex }\n\t| { readonly kind: \"result\"; readonly r: Hex; readonly s: Hex; readonly v: number }\n\t| { readonly kind: \"rejection\"; readonly reason: string; readonly detail: string }\n\t| { readonly kind: \"error\"; readonly message: string }\n);\n\n/**\n * The A3 canonical encoding of a request — a byte-exact mirror of the backend's\n * `auth::canonical_request_bytes` (domain-tag `kawasekit-mpc-2p/cosign-request/v3`,\n * one `key=value\\n` line per field: `wireVersion ‖ ceremonyId ‖ ssid ‖\n * canonical(intent) ‖ freshness`; lowercase `0x` addresses + freshness nonce,\n * decimal integers, trailing newline). The injected authenticator HMACs these\n * bytes; because the encoding is shared, the tag equals the co-signer's.\n */\nexport function canonicalRequestBytes(env: CoSignRequestEnvelope): Uint8Array {\n\tconst i = env.intent;\n\tconst lines = [\n\t\t\"kawasekit-mpc-2p/cosign-request/v3\",\n\t\t\"wireVersion=2\",\n\t\t`ceremonyId=${env.ceremonyId}`,\n\t\t`ssid=${env.ssid}`,\n\t\t`token=${i.token.toLowerCase()}`,\n\t\t`chainId=${i.chainId}`,\n\t\t`from=${i.from.toLowerCase()}`,\n\t\t`to=${i.to.toLowerCase()}`,\n\t\t`value=${i.value}`,\n\t\t`validAfter=${i.validAfter}`,\n\t\t`validBefore=${i.validBefore}`,\n\t\t`nonce=${i.nonce.toLowerCase()}`,\n\t\t`freshnessTs=${env.freshnessTs}`,\n\t\t`freshnessNonce=${env.freshnessNonce.toLowerCase()}`,\n\t];\n\treturn new TextEncoder().encode(lines.map((l) => `${l}\\n`).join(\"\"));\n}\n","/**\n * The `mpc-2p` PolicyGatedSigner adapter — `enforcement: \"cryptographic\"`.\n *\n * A 2-of-2 MPC co-signer: the agent holds ONE DKLs share, the owner backend holds\n * the other + the authoritative policy gate. No valid signature exists without a\n * **policy-passing co-sign**, so — unlike `local` — a single key-holder cannot\n * bypass the policy. That is what earns the non-bypassable `\"cryptographic\"` label\n * and lets the M6-0 type-gate (`requireNonBypassable`) reject an advisory signer at\n * compile time in bounded flows.\n *\n * **Open-core / thin adapter.** This module is pure orchestration over injected\n * interfaces — it ships in the public SDK with **no crypto, no socket, no key**:\n *\n * - {@link Mpc2pCoSignAgent} — the WASM DKLs share (the private package's compiled\n *   `crypto-core`); drives the agent's half of the ceremony round-by-round.\n * - {@link CoSignTransport} — the authenticated, encrypted (wss/mTLS) frame channel\n *   to the owner backend (the private package's transport).\n * - {@link CoSignRequestAuthenticator} — the A3 HMAC (the pre-shared key never\n *   enters this module).\n *\n * The adapter owns the protocol: it pins the EIP-712 domain, **re-derives the\n * digest from the intent (A4)** via the shared `transferWithAuthorizationTypes`\n * source-of-truth, computes the A3 canonical bytes, frames the versioned\n * {@link CoSignFrame} envelope, pumps the ceremony, and maps the terminal frame to\n * a {@link SignResult}. Crucially it has **no local-signing path**: any\n * transport/availability failure throws {@link CoSignUnavailableError}, never an\n * `{ ok: true }` and never a {@link PolicyRejection} (the no-silent-fallback\n * guarantee, RFC m6-3a constraint 3 / W8).\n *\n * **Wire hardening (RFC §4.7/§4.8, Track C):** a bounded **transient-only retry**\n * replays the byte-identical intent (nonce included — idempotency-by-nonce is the\n * safety net) under a fresh A3 envelope and accepts the backend's **roundless\n * idempotent-replay result** via an ecrecover/low-S self-check; the **ceremony\n * deadline always fires before `validBefore`** (minus a clock-skew budget, W11),\n * and inbound round payloads are **bounded** before the WASM boundary (M3). Tuning\n * via {@link Mpc2pWireOptions}.\n *\n * @packageDocumentation\n */\n\nimport type { Address, Hex } from \"viem\";\nimport { getAddress, hashTypedData, recoverAddress, serializeSignature, toHex } from \"viem\";\nimport type { X402AssetParam } from \"../tokens/asset-domain\";\nimport { resolveAssetParam, resolvedAssetToEip3009Domain } from \"../tokens/asset-domain\";\nimport { transferWithAuthorizationTypes } from \"../tokens/eip3009\";\nimport { CoSignUnavailableError, PolicyGatedSignerConfigError } from \"./errors\";\nimport type { CoSignFrame, CoSignRequestEnvelope } from \"./mpc-2p-wire\";\nimport { canonicalRequestBytes, MAX_FRAME_BYTES, toWireIntent, WIRE_VERSION } from \"./mpc-2p-wire\";\nimport type {\n\tPaymentIntent,\n\tPolicyGatedSigner,\n\tPolicyRejection,\n\tSignerDescription,\n\tSignResult,\n} from \"./types\";\n\n/** The agent's half of the 2-of-2 ceremony (the injected WASM DKLs share). */\nexport interface Mpc2pCoSignAgent {\n\t/** The group 2-of-2 EOA this share controls — must equal the signer's `from`. */\n\tgroupEoa(): Address;\n\t/** Begin signing the 32-byte EIP-712 `digest`; returns the first outbound round (hex). */\n\tstart(digest: Hex): Hex;\n\t/** Feed one inbound round (hex); returns the next outbound round, or the final signature. */\n\tstep(incoming: Hex): Mpc2pStepOutcome;\n}\n\n/** The result of one {@link Mpc2pCoSignAgent.step}. */\nexport type Mpc2pStepOutcome =\n\t| { readonly outbound: Hex }\n\t| { readonly signature: { readonly r: Hex; readonly s: Hex; readonly v: number } };\n\n/** One authenticated, encrypted ceremony connection to the owner backend. */\nexport interface CoSignConnection {\n\t/** Send one control frame. */\n\tsend(frame: CoSignFrame): Promise<void>;\n\t/** Receive the next control frame (resolves per round). */\n\trecv(): Promise<CoSignFrame>;\n\t/** Release the connection (best-effort; errors here are ignored). */\n\tclose(): void | Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/** Opens a wss/mTLS {@link CoSignConnection} for a single co-sign ceremony. */\nexport interface CoSignTransport {\n\tconnect(): Promise<CoSignConnection>;\n}\n\n/** The A3 request authenticator — HMAC (or signature) over the canonical request bytes. */\nexport interface CoSignRequestAuthenticator {\n\t/** Authenticator tag over {@link canonicalRequestBytes}; the key stays inside. */\n\ttag(canonicalRequest: Uint8Array): Hex | Promise<Hex>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Wire liveness / retry tuning (RFC m6-3a §4.7 + §4.8). Every field is optional\n * with a safe default. The invariants these enforce:\n *\n * - **Retry (4b/H2):** only the **transient transport class** is retried (connect\n *   failed / connection dropped), replaying the **byte-identical intent** — nonce\n *   included, so the backend's idempotency-by-nonce is the safety net — under a\n *   fresh A3 envelope (the freshness guard rejects a replayed envelope by design).\n *   A delivered rejection, a ban/identifiable-abort, a protocol anomaly, or a\n *   timeout is never retried.\n * - **Liveness (4c/W11/M1+M3):** the ceremony deadline always fires **before**\n *   `intent.validBefore − clockSkewBudgetSecs` (a co-signature must never be born\n *   expired), and a `sign()` whose remaining window is under\n *   `minWindowSecs + clockSkewBudgetSecs` is refused up front.\n * - **Inbound bound (4c/M3):** a `round` payload over `maxFrameBytes` is refused\n *   before it reaches the WASM boundary (mirrors the backend's bound).\n */\nexport interface Mpc2pWireOptions {\n\t/** Max ceremony attempts for transient transport failures (default 2 = one retry). */\n\treadonly maxAttempts?: number;\n\t/** Overall per-`sign()` budget in ms, across ALL attempts (default 30_000). */\n\treadonly ceremonyTimeoutMs?: number;\n\t/** Minimum remaining validity window required at `sign()` start, in seconds (default 30). */\n\treadonly minWindowSecs?: number;\n\t/** Max tolerated agent-host clock skew, in seconds (default 30). */\n\treadonly clockSkewBudgetSecs?: number;\n\t/** Inbound round-payload bound in bytes (default {@link MAX_FRAME_BYTES} = 8 MiB). */\n\treadonly maxFrameBytes?: number;\n}\n\n/** Parameters for {@link createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner}. */\nexport interface Mpc2pSignerParams {\n\t/** The group 2-of-2 EOA; every `intent.from` must equal this (asserted vs the agent). */\n\treadonly from: Address;\n\t/** Asset binding — pins the EIP-712 domain `name`/`version`/`verifyingContract` (A4). */\n\treadonly asset: X402AssetParam;\n\t/** The bound policy session, for `describe()` (the backend holds the authoritative policy). */\n\treadonly session: { readonly id: string; readonly notAfter: bigint };\n\t/** The injected WASM DKLs share (private package). */\n\treadonly agent: Mpc2pCoSignAgent;\n\t/** The injected wss/mTLS frame channel (private package). */\n\treadonly transport: CoSignTransport;\n\t/** The injected A3 authenticator (the pre-shared key never enters the SDK). */\n\treadonly authenticator: CoSignRequestAuthenticator;\n\t/** Wire liveness / retry tuning (optional; safe defaults — {@link Mpc2pWireOptions}). */\n\treadonly wire?: Mpc2pWireOptions;\n}\n\n/**\n * The backend `rejection` reasons that are genuine **policy denials** (the owner\n * decided \"no\" — audit-meaningful → `{ ok: false, rejection }`). Any other reason\n * on a rejection frame is treated as \"the owner did not cleanly decide\" and throws\n * {@link CoSignUnavailableError} (no-silent-fallback; never a misclassified denial).\n */\nconst POLICY_REASONS: ReadonlySet<PolicyRejection[\"reason\"]> = new Set([\n\t\"revoked\",\n\t\"expired\",\n\t\"token_not_allowed\",\n\t\"recipient_not_allowed\",\n\t\"amount_exceeds_per_sign\",\n\t\"amount_exceeds_cumulative\",\n\t\"intent_digest_mismatch\",\n\t\"unauthenticated\",\n\t\"from_mismatch\",\n\t\"nonce_reuse_conflict\",\n]);\n\nfunction rejection(reason: PolicyRejection[\"reason\"], detail: string): SignResult {\n\treturn { ok: false, rejection: { reason, detail } };\n}\n\n/**\n * Construct an `mpc-2p` (cryptographic) PolicyGatedSigner over injected agent +\n * transport + authenticator.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * // The agent, transport and authenticator come from the private `kawasekit-mpc-2p`\n * // package (the WASM share, the wss/mTLS client, the HMAC key) — never bundled here.\n * const signer = createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner({\n *   from: groupEoa,\n *   asset: { kind: \"known\", id: \"jpyc-v2\" },\n *   session: { id: \"sess-1\", notAfter: 2_000_000_000n },\n *   agent, transport, authenticator,\n * });\n * requireNonBypassable(signer); // ✓ \"cryptographic\" — passes the type-gate\n * const result = await signer.sign(intent);\n * ```\n */\nexport function createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner(\n\tparams: Mpc2pSignerParams,\n): PolicyGatedSigner<\"cryptographic\"> {\n\tconst { agent, transport, authenticator, session } = params;\n\tconst pinned = resolveAssetParam(params.asset);\n\tconst from = getAddress(params.from);\n\tconst wire = params.wire ?? {};\n\tconst maxAttempts = Math.max(1, wire.maxAttempts ?? 2);\n\tconst ceremonyTimeoutMs = wire.ceremonyTimeoutMs ?? 30_000;\n\tconst minWindowSecs = wire.minWindowSecs ?? 30;\n\tconst clockSkewBudgetSecs = wire.clockSkewBudgetSecs ?? 30;\n\tconst maxFrameBytes = wire.maxFrameBytes ?? MAX_FRAME_BYTES;\n\n\t// The injected share MUST control the declared group EOA, or every signature\n\t// would recover to the wrong address.\n\tconst agentEoa = getAddress(agent.groupEoa());\n\tif (agentEoa !== from) {\n\t\tthrow new PolicyGatedSignerConfigError(\n\t\t\t\"from\",\n\t\t\t`the agent share controls ${agentEoa} but params.from is ${from}`,\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tenforcement: \"cryptographic\",\n\t\tfrom,\n\t\tasync sign(intent: PaymentIntent): Promise<SignResult> {\n\t\t\t// Adapter-local pre-checks (cheap; no wire needed). Same shape as `local`.\n\t\t\tif (getAddress(intent.from) !== from) {\n\t\t\t\treturn rejection(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"from_mismatch\",\n\t\t\t\t\t`intent.from ${getAddress(intent.from)} does not equal signer.from ${from}`,\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (getAddress(intent.token) !== pinned.verifyingContract) {\n\t\t\t\treturn rejection(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"token_not_allowed\",\n\t\t\t\t\t`intent.token ${getAddress(intent.token)} does not equal the signer's pinned verifyingContract ${pinned.verifyingContract}`,\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// A4: re-derive the EIP-712 digest from the intent + the pinned domain (the\n\t\t\t// SDK's exported types are the cross-language source of truth). The agent and\n\t\t\t// the backend each sign THIS digest; the SoT keeps them byte-identical.\n\t\t\tconst digest = hashTypedData({\n\t\t\t\tdomain: resolvedAssetToEip3009Domain(pinned, intent.chainId),\n\t\t\t\ttypes: transferWithAuthorizationTypes,\n\t\t\t\tprimaryType: \"TransferWithAuthorization\",\n\t\t\t\tmessage: {\n\t\t\t\t\tfrom,\n\t\t\t\t\tto: intent.to,\n\t\t\t\t\tvalue: intent.value,\n\t\t\t\t\tvalidAfter: intent.validAfter,\n\t\t\t\t\tvalidBefore: intent.validBefore,\n\t\t\t\t\tnonce: intent.nonce,\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t});\n\n\t\t\t// 4c (W11/M1+M3) — the ceremony-liveness minimum-window invariant: the rounds +\n\t\t\t// the bounded retry budget must all complete BEFORE validBefore, and validity is\n\t\t\t// judged against chain time, so the agent host's clock-skew budget is part of the\n\t\t\t// bar. A window already too small risks a born-expired signature (wasted\n\t\t\t// facilitator gas + retry/cap pressure); the owner has not decided anything, so\n\t\t\t// this throws (never a rejection).\n\t\t\tconst validBeforeSecs = Number(intent.validBefore);\n\t\t\tconst nowSecs = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n\t\t\tif (validBeforeSecs - nowSecs < minWindowSecs + clockSkewBudgetSecs) {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\n\t\t\t\t\t`intent.validBefore (${validBeforeSecs}) leaves under the minimum ceremony window (${minWindowSecs}s + ${clockSkewBudgetSecs}s clock-skew budget) — refusing a co-sign that risks being born expired (W11)`,\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t// One deadline for the whole sign() — every attempt included — capped so the\n\t\t\t// ceremony timeout always fires before validBefore (minus the clock-skew budget).\n\t\t\tconst deadlineMs = Math.min(\n\t\t\t\tDate.now() + ceremonyTimeoutMs,\n\t\t\t\t(validBeforeSecs - clockSkewBudgetSecs) * 1000,\n\t\t\t);\n\n\t\t\t// 4b (RFC §4.7/H2) — bounded transient-only retry. Every attempt re-presents the\n\t\t\t// *byte-identical* `intent` (nonce included — the backend's idempotency-by-nonce\n\t\t\t// + atomic SpendState are the safety net) under a FRESH A3 envelope: the\n\t\t\t// ceremonyId/ssid/freshness are per-attempt BY DESIGN (the backend's freshness\n\t\t\t// guard rejects a replayed envelope, while idempotency keys on the unchanged\n\t\t\t// EIP-3009 nonce). Only the transient transport class retries — never a\n\t\t\t// delivered rejection, never a ban/identifiable-abort, never a timeout.\n\t\t\tlet lastTransient: CoSignUnavailableError | undefined;\n\t\t\tfor (let attempt = 1; attempt <= maxAttempts; attempt += 1) {\n\t\t\t\tif (Date.now() >= deadlineMs) break;\n\t\t\t\t// A3 (v2): a fresh per-ceremony id + ssid + freshness (a timestamp + a\n\t\t\t\t// per-request nonce, distinct from the EIP-3009 nonce), authenticated over the\n\t\t\t\t// canonical bytes (the shared SoT; the HMAC key lives inside the injected\n\t\t\t\t// authenticator). Web Crypto is isomorphic (Node 19+ / browsers).\n\t\t\t\tconst env: CoSignRequestEnvelope = {\n\t\t\t\t\tceremonyId: globalThis.crypto.randomUUID(),\n\t\t\t\t\tssid: globalThis.crypto.randomUUID(),\n\t\t\t\t\tintent,\n\t\t\t\t\tfreshnessTs: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),\n\t\t\t\t\tfreshnessNonce: toHex(globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16))),\n\t\t\t\t};\n\t\t\t\tconst authTag = await authenticator.tag(canonicalRequestBytes(env));\n\t\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\t\tconst conn = await openConnection(transport);\n\t\t\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treturn await runCeremony({\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tconn,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tagent,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tsessionId: session.id,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tenv,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tdigest,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tauthTag,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfrom,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tdeadlineMs,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tmaxFrameBytes,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t});\n\t\t\t\t\t} finally {\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tawait conn.close();\n\t\t\t\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t// best-effort cleanup; a close error must not mask the result/throw.\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t} catch (error) {\n\t\t\t\t\tif (error instanceof CoSignUnavailableError && error.transient && attempt < maxAttempts) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlastTransient = error;\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcontinue;\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\tthrow error;\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tthrow (\n\t\t\t\tlastTransient ??\n\t\t\t\tnew CoSignUnavailableError(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"co-sign ceremony budget exhausted before validBefore (W11) — no attempt could start\",\n\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t},\n\t\tdescribe(): SignerDescription {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tenforcement: \"cryptographic\",\n\t\t\t\tfrom,\n\t\t\t\tpolicyId: session.id,\n\t\t\t\tnotAfter: session.notAfter,\n\t\t\t\t// The backend owns authoritative revocation (a revoked session → a\n\t\t\t\t// rejection at sign time); this metadata field is best-effort.\n\t\t\t\trevoked: false,\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n\nasync function openConnection(transport: CoSignTransport): Promise<CoSignConnection> {\n\ttry {\n\t\treturn await transport.connect();\n\t} catch (cause) {\n\t\t// Connect failure = the transient transport class (the one retried, §4.7).\n\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\"co-signer connection failed\", { cause, transient: true });\n\t}\n}\n\n/** Everything one ceremony attempt needs (one connection, one A3 envelope). */\ninterface CeremonyContext {\n\treadonly conn: CoSignConnection;\n\treadonly agent: Mpc2pCoSignAgent;\n\treadonly sessionId: string;\n\treadonly env: CoSignRequestEnvelope;\n\treadonly digest: Hex;\n\treadonly authTag: Hex;\n\t/** The group EOA every result must recover to (the §4.4 self-check). */\n\treadonly from: Address;\n\t/** Absolute epoch-ms the ceremony must finish by (fires before validBefore — W11). */\n\treadonly deadlineMs: number;\n\t/** Inbound round-payload bound in bytes (mirrors the backend's MAX_FRAME_BYTES). */\n\treadonly maxFrameBytes: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Drive one full ceremony attempt over `ctx.conn`: send the authenticated request +\n * the agent's first round, then pump rounds until a terminal frame. Returns a\n * {@link SignResult} (success or a policy denial) or throws\n * {@link CoSignUnavailableError}. There is no path that returns `{ ok: true }`\n * without a backend `result` frame that passes the ecrecover/low-S self-check.\n */\nasync function runCeremony(ctx: CeremonyContext): Promise<SignResult> {\n\tconst { conn, agent, env, digest, from } = ctx;\n\tconst send = async (frame: CoSignFrame): Promise<void> => {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tawait withDeadline(conn.send(frame), ctx.deadlineMs);\n\t\t} catch (cause) {\n\t\t\tif (cause instanceof CoSignUnavailableError) throw cause; // the deadline (never retried)\n\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\"co-sign connection dropped while sending\", {\n\t\t\t\tcause,\n\t\t\t\ttransient: true,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t}\n\t};\n\tconst recv = async (): Promise<CoSignFrame> => {\n\t\tlet frame: CoSignFrame;\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tframe = await withDeadline(conn.recv(), ctx.deadlineMs);\n\t\t} catch (cause) {\n\t\t\tif (cause instanceof CoSignUnavailableError) throw cause; // the deadline (never retried)\n\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\"co-sign connection dropped mid-ceremony\", {\n\t\t\t\tcause,\n\t\t\t\ttransient: true,\n\t\t\t});\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (frame.wire_version !== WIRE_VERSION) {\n\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\n\t\t\t\t`co-signer spoke wire_version ${frame.wire_version}, expected ${WIRE_VERSION}`,\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn frame;\n\t};\n\n\tawait send({\n\t\twire_version: WIRE_VERSION,\n\t\tkind: \"request\",\n\t\tsession_id: ctx.sessionId,\n\t\tceremony_id: env.ceremonyId,\n\t\tssid: env.ssid,\n\t\tintent: toWireIntent(env.intent),\n\t\tfreshness_ts: env.freshnessTs,\n\t\tfreshness_nonce: env.freshnessNonce,\n\t\tauth_tag: ctx.authTag,\n\t});\n\n\tlet first: Hex;\n\ttry {\n\t\tfirst = agent.start(digest);\n\t} catch (cause) {\n\t\t// A protocol-level failure, not a transport loss — restart-not-resume classifies\n\t\t// only the transient transport class as retry-safe (§4.7), so this never retries.\n\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\"the agent failed to start the ceremony\", { cause });\n\t}\n\tawait send({ wire_version: WIRE_VERSION, kind: \"round\", payload: first });\n\n\tlet agentSig: { r: Hex; s: Hex; v: number } | null = null;\n\tfor (;;) {\n\t\tconst frame = await recv();\n\t\tswitch (frame.kind) {\n\t\t\tcase \"round\": {\n\t\t\t\t// 4c (M3) — the agent-side inbound bound, mirroring the backend's\n\t\t\t\t// MAX_FRAME_BYTES: an over-bound payload is refused BEFORE hex-decode and\n\t\t\t\t// before it crosses the WASM boundary.\n\t\t\t\tconst payloadBytes = (frame.payload.length - 2) / 2;\n\t\t\t\tif (payloadBytes > ctx.maxFrameBytes) {\n\t\t\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\n\t\t\t\t\t\t`co-signer sent a ${payloadBytes}-byte round frame (bound ${ctx.maxFrameBytes}) — refused pre-decode`,\n\t\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tlet step: Mpc2pStepOutcome;\n\t\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\t\tstep = agent.step(frame.payload);\n\t\t\t\t} catch (cause) {\n\t\t\t\t\t// Protocol abort (possibly a cheating peer) — never retried (§4.7).\n\t\t\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\"the agent rejected a round frame\", { cause });\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tif (\"outbound\" in step) {\n\t\t\t\t\tawait send({ wire_version: WIRE_VERSION, kind: \"round\", payload: step.outbound });\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\tagentSig = step.signature;\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcase \"result\": {\n\t\t\t\tconst signature = assembleSignature({ r: frame.r, s: frame.s, v: frame.v });\n\t\t\t\tif (agentSig === null) {\n\t\t\t\t\t// A ROUNDLESS result = the backend's idempotent replay (§4.7): a retry hit\n\t\t\t\t\t// a nonce whose ceremony already committed, and the CACHED signature came\n\t\t\t\t\t// back with zero rounds. There is no agent-derived signature to cross-check,\n\t\t\t\t\t// so the self-check is recovery: low-S + ecrecover(digest) == from (§4.4).\n\t\t\t\t\tawait verifyRecovers(digest, signature, frame.s, from, \"idempotent-replay\");\n\t\t\t\t\treturn { ok: true, signature, intent: env.intent };\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tif (\n\t\t\t\t\tframe.r.toLowerCase() !== agentSig.r.toLowerCase() ||\n\t\t\t\t\tframe.s.toLowerCase() !== agentSig.s.toLowerCase() ||\n\t\t\t\t\tframe.v !== agentSig.v\n\t\t\t\t) {\n\t\t\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\"the backend and agent derived different signatures\");\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t// The §4.4 ecrecover/low-S self-check: agent/backend agreement alone does not\n\t\t\t\t// prove the signature recovers to the group EOA over OUR digest — recovery does.\n\t\t\t\tawait verifyRecovers(digest, signature, frame.s, from, \"co-signed\");\n\t\t\t\treturn { ok: true, signature, intent: env.intent };\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcase \"rejection\": {\n\t\t\t\t// A genuine policy denial → typed rejection. A non-policy \"rejection\"\n\t\t\t\t// (transient/internal/ban) is \"the owner did not decide\" → no-fallback throw,\n\t\t\t\t// and it is NOT the transient transport class (never retried — a ban or an\n\t\t\t\t// in-flight duplicate must surface, not silently re-spin).\n\t\t\t\tif (POLICY_REASONS.has(frame.reason as PolicyRejection[\"reason\"])) {\n\t\t\t\t\t// reason membership verified against POLICY_REASONS above.\n\t\t\t\t\treturn rejection(frame.reason as PolicyRejection[\"reason\"], frame.detail);\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\n\t\t\t\t\t`co-signer returned a non-policy rejection (${frame.reason}): ${frame.detail}`,\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcase \"error\": {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(`co-signer error: ${frame.message}`);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdefault: {\n\t\t\t\t// Unknown frame kind — never a silent success.\n\t\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\"co-signer sent an unexpected frame\");\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Race `promise` against the ceremony deadline (W11: the timeout must fire before\n * `validBefore`). A deadline strike throws a NON-transient\n * {@link CoSignUnavailableError} — the retry budget is spent, never re-spun.\n */\nfunction withDeadline<T>(promise: Promise<T>, deadlineMs: number): Promise<T> {\n\tconst remaining = deadlineMs - Date.now();\n\tif (remaining <= 0) {\n\t\treturn Promise.reject(\n\t\t\tnew CoSignUnavailableError(\n\t\t\t\t\"co-sign ceremony timed out (the deadline fires before validBefore — W11)\",\n\t\t\t),\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\treturn new Promise<T>((resolve, reject) => {\n\t\tconst timer = setTimeout(() => {\n\t\t\treject(\n\t\t\t\tnew CoSignUnavailableError(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"co-sign ceremony timed out (the deadline fires before validBefore — W11)\",\n\t\t\t\t),\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t}, remaining);\n\t\tpromise.then(\n\t\t\t(value) => {\n\t\t\t\tclearTimeout(timer);\n\t\t\t\tresolve(value);\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t(cause) => {\n\t\t\t\tclearTimeout(timer);\n\t\t\t\treject(cause);\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t);\n\t});\n}\n\n/** secp256k1 n/2 — the EIP-2 low-S bound. */\nconst SECP256K1_HALF_N = 0x7fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff5d576e7357a4501ddfe92f46681b20a0n;\n\n/**\n * The RFC §4.4 result self-check: the signature is low-S (EIP-2) and recovers to\n * the group EOA over the adapter's OWN re-derived digest — the exact check the\n * token contract's `ecrecover` will repeat on-chain.\n */\nasync function verifyRecovers(\n\tdigest: Hex,\n\tsignature: Hex,\n\ts: Hex,\n\tfrom: Address,\n\twhat: string,\n): Promise<void> {\n\tif (BigInt(s) > SECP256K1_HALF_N) {\n\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(`the ${what} signature is not low-S (EIP-2)`);\n\t}\n\tlet recovered: Address;\n\ttry {\n\t\trecovered = await recoverAddress({ hash: digest, signature });\n\t} catch (cause) {\n\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(`the ${what} signature failed to recover`, { cause });\n\t}\n\tif (getAddress(recovered) !== from) {\n\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\n\t\t\t`the ${what} signature recovers to ${getAddress(recovered)}, not the group EOA ${from}`,\n\t\t);\n\t}\n}\n\n/** Assemble a 65-byte EIP-3009 signature from the agent's `{ r, s, v }` (v = recovery_id + 27). */\nfunction assembleSignature(sig: { r: Hex; s: Hex; v: number }): Hex {\n\tconst yParity = sig.v - 27;\n\tif (yParity !== 0 && yParity !== 1) {\n\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(`malformed recovery id v=${sig.v} (expected 27 or 28)`);\n\t}\n\treturn serializeSignature({ r: sig.r, s: sig.s, yParity });\n}\n"]}

package/dist/chunk-UIDDRHLW.js

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+import { normalizeRecipientAllowlist } from './chunk-7YKRKV6D.js';
+import { jpycAbi } from './chunk-KT7XDT2T.js';
+import { CallPolicyVersion, toCallPolicy, ParamCondition, toRateLimitPolicy } from '@zerodev/permissions/policies';
+
+function buildJpycTransferCallPolicy(params) {
+  if (params.maxPerTransfer <= 0n) {
+    throw new Error(`maxPerTransfer must be positive, got ${params.maxPerTransfer}.`);
+  }
+  const recipients = params.recipientAllowlist === void 0 || params.recipientAllowlist === "any" ? null : normalizeRecipientAllowlist(params.recipientAllowlist);
+  if (recipients !== null && recipients.length === 0) {
+    throw new Error(
+      'recipientAllowlist must not be empty \u2014 omit it or pass "any" to allow any recipient.'
+    );
+  }
+  if (recipients !== null && params.callPolicyVersion === CallPolicyVersion.V0_0_1) {
+    throw new Error(
+      "recipientAllowlist requires callPolicyVersion V0_0_2 or later (the ONE_OF condition is unsupported on V0_0_1)."
+    );
+  }
+  return toCallPolicy({
+    policyVersion: params.callPolicyVersion ?? CallPolicyVersion.V0_0_4,
+    permissions: [
+      {
+        target: params.jpycAddress,
+        abi: jpycAbi,
+        functionName: "transfer",
+        args: [
+          // Recipient (`to`): unrestricted (`null`) unless an allowlist resolved
+          // above, in which case it is constrained via the ONE_OF condition.
+          recipients === null ? null : { condition: ParamCondition.ONE_OF, value: recipients },
+          // value: must be ≤ maxPerTransfer.
+          {
+            condition: ParamCondition.LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL,
+            value: params.maxPerTransfer
+          }
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
+  });
+}
+
+// src/policy/daily-limit.ts
+var ONE_DAY_SECONDS = 86400;
+function createJpycDailyLimitPolicies(params) {
+  if (!Number.isInteger(params.maxTransfersPerDay) || params.maxTransfersPerDay < 1) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `createJpycDailyLimitPolicies: maxTransfersPerDay must be a positive integer, got ${params.maxTransfersPerDay}.`
+    );
+  }
+  const callPolicy = buildJpycTransferCallPolicy({
+    jpycAddress: params.jpycAddress,
+    maxPerTransfer: params.maxPerTransfer,
+    recipientAllowlist: params.recipientAllowlist,
+    callPolicyVersion: params.callPolicyVersion
+  });
+  const rateLimitPolicy = toRateLimitPolicy({
+    interval: ONE_DAY_SECONDS,
+    count: params.maxTransfersPerDay
+  });
+  return [callPolicy, rateLimitPolicy];
+}
+
+export { ONE_DAY_SECONDS, buildJpycTransferCallPolicy, createJpycDailyLimitPolicies };
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-UIDDRHLW.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-UIDDRHLW.js.map

package/dist/chunk-UIDDRHLW.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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Used by BOTH {@link createJpycDailyLimitPolicies} (`./daily-limit`)\n * and {@link createBuyListPolicies} (`./buy-list`) so the recipient/amount\n * constraint is built identically; each caller composes its own rate-limit /\n * timestamp policy on top.\n *\n * @packageDocumentation\n */\n\nimport type { Policy } from \"@zerodev/permissions\";\nimport { CallPolicyVersion, ParamCondition, toCallPolicy } from \"@zerodev/permissions/policies\";\nimport type { Address } from \"viem\";\nimport { jpycAbi } from \"../tokens/jpyc\";\nimport { normalizeRecipientAllowlist } from \"./normalize-allowlist\";\n\n/** Parameters for {@link buildJpycTransferCallPolicy}. */\nexport interface JpycTransferCallPolicyParams {\n\t/** JPYC contract address on the target chain. */\n\treadonly jpycAddress: Address;\n\t/** Maximum JPYC (raw units) per single `transfer`. Must be positive. */\n\treadonly maxPerTransfer: bigint;\n\t/**\n\t * Recipient restriction. An address list constrains `to` to those recipients\n\t * (`ONE_OF`); `\"any\"` (or `undefined`) leaves it unrestricted. Entries are\n\t * checksum-normalized + de-duplicated ({@link normalizeRecipientAllowlist}).\n\t * An **empty** array throws (an on-chain allowlist cannot encode \"match\n\t * nothing\"). An address list requires `callPolicyVersion` ≥ `V0_0_2`.\n\t */\n\treadonly recipientAllowlist?: readonly Address[] | \"any\" | undefined;\n\t/** ZeroDev callPolicy on-chain version. Defaults to V0_0_4. */\n\treadonly callPolicyVersion?: CallPolicyVersion | undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the single ZeroDev callPolicy for a JPYC `transfer`, enforcing the\n * per-transfer amount cap and (optionally) the recipient allowlist. Throws on a\n * non-positive `maxPerTransfer`, an empty allowlist, or an allowlist combined\n * with `callPolicyVersion` `V0_0_1` (which lacks `ONE_OF`).\n */\nexport function buildJpycTransferCallPolicy(params: JpycTransferCallPolicyParams): Policy {\n\tif (params.maxPerTransfer <= 0n) {\n\t\tthrow new Error(`maxPerTransfer must be positive, got ${params.maxPerTransfer}.`);\n\t}\n\t// Resolve the recipient constraint up-front. Omitted or \"any\" => unrestricted\n\t// (a `null` arg); an address list => checksum-normalized + de-duped (shared\n\t// with the off-chain SpendingPolicy). Unlike off-chain, an empty list is a\n\t// caller bug here — an on-chain allowlist cannot encode \"deny all\".\n\tconst recipients =\n\t\tparams.recipientAllowlist === undefined || params.recipientAllowlist === \"any\"\n\t\t\t? null\n\t\t\t: normalizeRecipientAllowlist(params.recipientAllowlist);\n\tif (recipients !== null && recipients.length === 0) {\n\t\tthrow new Error(\n\t\t\t'recipientAllowlist must not be empty — omit it or pass \"any\" to allow any recipient.',\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\t// The ONE_OF condition (used to encode an address list) is only supported by\n\t// the V0_0_2+ CallPolicy contract; catch the incompatible combination here\n\t// with a typed message rather than a bare error from deep inside toCallPolicy.\n\tif (recipients !== null && params.callPolicyVersion === CallPolicyVersion.V0_0_1) {\n\t\tthrow new Error(\n\t\t\t\"recipientAllowlist requires callPolicyVersion V0_0_2 or later (the ONE_OF condition is unsupported on V0_0_1).\",\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\treturn toCallPolicy({\n\t\tpolicyVersion: params.callPolicyVersion ?? CallPolicyVersion.V0_0_4,\n\t\tpermissions: [\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\ttarget: params.jpycAddress,\n\t\t\t\tabi: jpycAbi,\n\t\t\t\tfunctionName: \"transfer\",\n\t\t\t\targs: [\n\t\t\t\t\t// Recipient (`to`): unrestricted (`null`) unless an allowlist resolved\n\t\t\t\t\t// above, in which case it is constrained via the ONE_OF condition.\n\t\t\t\t\trecipients === null ? null : { condition: ParamCondition.ONE_OF, value: recipients },\n\t\t\t\t\t// value: must be ≤ maxPerTransfer.\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcondition: ParamCondition.LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL,\n\t\t\t\t\t\tvalue: params.maxPerTransfer,\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t],\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t],\n\t});\n}\n","/**\n * Daily-limit spending policy for JPYC, built on ZeroDev's Permission System.\n *\n * Composes two ZeroDev policies:\n * 1. **callPolicy** — locks the session key to `JPYC.transfer(to, value)`\n *    with `value ≤ maxPerTransfer`, and — when {@link\n *    CreateJpycDailyLimitPoliciesParams.recipientAllowlist} is provided —\n *    restricts `to` to the allowlisted recipients (otherwise any recipient is\n *    allowed). This is the on-chain enforcement behind the \"pay only registered\n *    merchants\" model: a buy-list resolves to its merchants' addresses, which\n *    are baked into a disposable session key here.\n * 2. **rateLimitPolicy** — caps userOp count to `maxTransfersPerDay` in any\n *    24-hour rolling window.\n *\n * Effective daily cap = `maxPerTransfer × maxTransfersPerDay`. This is not a\n * cumulative-amount tracker (ZeroDev doesn't ship one), but the agent cannot\n * exceed either dimension, so the spirit of \"daily limit\" holds.\n *\n * @packageDocumentation\n */\n\nimport type { Policy } from \"@zerodev/permissions\";\nimport { type CallPolicyVersion, toRateLimitPolicy } from \"@zerodev/permissions/policies\";\nimport type { Address } from \"viem\";\nimport { buildJpycTransferCallPolicy } from \"./jpyc-call-policy\";\n\n/** One day in seconds — the period for {@link createJpycDailyLimitPolicies}. */\nexport const ONE_DAY_SECONDS = 86_400;\n\n/** Parameters for {@link createJpycDailyLimitPolicies}. */\nexport interface CreateJpycDailyLimitPoliciesParams {\n\t/** JPYC contract address on the target chain. */\n\treadonly jpycAddress: Address;\n\t/** Maximum JPYC (in raw units) the session key may move in one transfer. */\n\treadonly maxPerTransfer: bigint;\n\t/** Maximum number of transfer userOps the session key may submit per day. */\n\treadonly maxTransfersPerDay: number;\n\t/**\n\t * ZeroDev callPolicy on-chain version. Defaults to V0_0_4 (latest at the\n\t * time of writing). Bump only after auditing the new version's semantics.\n\t */\n\treadonly callPolicyVersion?: CallPolicyVersion;\n\t/**\n\t * Recipient restriction. An address list restricts the session key to\n\t * `transfer` JPYC only to those recipients (enforced on-chain via the\n\t * callPolicy `to` argument, condition `ONE_OF`); every other recipient is\n\t * rejected before any funds move. `\"any\"` (or omitting the field) leaves the\n\t * recipient unrestricted.\n\t *\n\t * The type mirrors the off-chain {@link SpendingPolicy.recipientAllowlist}\n\t * (`Address[] | \"any\"`) so a buy-list's resolved allowlist can feed both the\n\t * off-chain and on-chain policy paths unchanged. Two **deliberate** differences\n\t * from that sibling, forced by on-chain semantics:\n\t * - it is **optional** here (omitted = `\"any\"`) for backward compatibility —\n\t *   the pre-allowlist policy left the recipient unrestricted;\n\t * - an **empty** array `[]` **throws** (rather than meaning deny-all as it does\n\t *   off-chain) — an on-chain allowlist cannot encode \"match nothing\"; omit it\n\t *   or pass `\"any\"` for unrestricted, or list ≥1 recipient.\n\t *\n\t * Entries are checksum-normalized and de-duplicated (shared with the off-chain\n\t * path via {@link normalizeRecipientAllowlist}). An address list requires\n\t * `callPolicyVersion` ≥ `V0_0_2` (the `ONE_OF` condition is unsupported on\n\t * `V0_0_1`); the default `V0_0_4` is fine.\n\t */\n\treadonly recipientAllowlist?: readonly Address[] | \"any\";\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds the ZeroDev policy bundle that enforces a JPYC daily spend limit.\n *\n * Plug the returned policies into `toPermissionValidator({ policies, … })`\n * — see {@link createAgentSmartAccount} for the common wiring.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * import { parseUnits } from \"viem\";\n * import {\n *   createJpycDailyLimitPolicies,\n *   getJpycAddress,\n *   JPYC_DECIMALS,\n *   polygonAmoy,\n * } from \"kawasekit\";\n *\n * const policies = createJpycDailyLimitPolicies({\n *   jpycAddress: getJpycAddress(polygonAmoy.id),\n *   maxPerTransfer: parseUnits(\"100\", JPYC_DECIMALS), // 100 JPYC / tx\n *   maxTransfersPerDay: 10,                            // 10 tx / day\n *   // effective daily cap = 1000 JPYC\n * });\n * ```\n *\n * @example Restrict the session key to a buy-list's merchants only\n * ```ts\n * const policies = createJpycDailyLimitPolicies({\n *   jpycAddress: getJpycAddress(polygonAmoy.id),\n *   maxPerTransfer: parseUnits(\"100\", JPYC_DECIMALS),\n *   maxTransfersPerDay: 5,\n *   // on-chain: any transfer to a non-allowlisted address reverts before funds move\n *   recipientAllowlist: [merchantA, merchantB],\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport function createJpycDailyLimitPolicies(\n\tparams: CreateJpycDailyLimitPoliciesParams,\n): readonly [Policy, Policy] {\n\tif (!Number.isInteger(params.maxTransfersPerDay) || params.maxTransfersPerDay < 1) {\n\t\tthrow new Error(\n\t\t\t`createJpycDailyLimitPolicies: maxTransfersPerDay must be a positive integer, got ${params.maxTransfersPerDay}.`,\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\t// callPolicy (amount cap + optional recipient allowlist) is the shared builder;\n\t// this function adds the daily-window rate limit on top.\n\tconst callPolicy = buildJpycTransferCallPolicy({\n\t\tjpycAddress: params.jpycAddress,\n\t\tmaxPerTransfer: params.maxPerTransfer,\n\t\trecipientAllowlist: params.recipientAllowlist,\n\t\tcallPolicyVersion: params.callPolicyVersion,\n\t});\n\n\tconst rateLimitPolicy = toRateLimitPolicy({\n\t\tinterval: ONE_DAY_SECONDS,\n\t\tcount: params.maxTransfersPerDay,\n\t});\n\n\treturn [callPolicy, rateLimitPolicy] as const;\n}\n"]}

package/dist/chunk-Y2LOACWO.js

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+import { buildJpycTransferCallPolicy } from './chunk-UIDDRHLW.js';
+import { getJpycAddress, jpycAbi } from './chunk-KT7XDT2T.js';
+import { isSupportedChainId } from './chunk-SOTYGX67.js';
+import { isAddress, encodeFunctionData } from 'viem';
+import { toRateLimitPolicy, toTimestampPolicy } from '@zerodev/permissions/policies';
+
+var TransferJpycInputError = class extends Error {
+  constructor(message) {
+    super(`transferJpyc: ${message}`);
+    this.name = "TransferJpycInputError";
+  }
+};
+async function transferJpyc(kernelClient, params) {
+  if (!isAddress(params.to, { strict: false })) {
+    throw new TransferJpycInputError(`\`to\` is not a valid address: ${params.to}`);
+  }
+  if (params.amount <= 0n) {
+    throw new TransferJpycInputError(`\`amount\` must be positive, got ${params.amount}.`);
+  }
+  const chainId = kernelClient.chain.id;
+  if (!isSupportedChainId(chainId)) {
+    throw new TransferJpycInputError(`Chain ID ${chainId} is not a kawasekit-supported chain.`);
+  }
+  const jpycAddress = getJpycAddress(chainId);
+  const data = encodeFunctionData({
+    abi: jpycAbi,
+    functionName: "transfer",
+    args: [params.to, params.amount]
+  });
+  const callData = await kernelClient.account.encodeCalls([{ to: jpycAddress, value: 0n, data }]);
+  const userOpHash = await kernelClient.sendUserOperation({ callData });
+  if (params.waitForReceipt === false) {
+    return { userOpHash, transactionHash: null, success: null };
+  }
+  const receipt = await kernelClient.waitForUserOperationReceipt({ hash: userOpHash });
+  return {
+    userOpHash,
+    transactionHash: receipt.receipt.transactionHash,
+    success: receipt.success
+  };
+}
+function createBuyListPolicies(params) {
+  if (params.merchants.length === 0) {
+    throw new Error(
+      "createBuyListPolicies: merchants must not be empty \u2014 a buy-list must target at least one merchant."
+    );
+  }
+  if (!Number.isInteger(params.maxTransfers) || params.maxTransfers < 1) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `createBuyListPolicies: maxTransfers must be a positive integer, got ${params.maxTransfers}.`
+    );
+  }
+  if (!Number.isInteger(params.validUntil) || params.validUntil <= 0) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `createBuyListPolicies: validUntil must be a positive unix-seconds integer, got ${params.validUntil}.`
+    );
+  }
+  const validAfter = params.validAfter ?? 0;
+  if (!Number.isInteger(validAfter) || validAfter < 0) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `createBuyListPolicies: validAfter must be a non-negative unix-seconds integer, got ${params.validAfter}.`
+    );
+  }
+  if (validAfter >= params.validUntil) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `createBuyListPolicies: validAfter (${validAfter}) must be before validUntil (${params.validUntil}).`
+    );
+  }
+  const callPolicy = buildJpycTransferCallPolicy({
+    jpycAddress: params.jpycAddress,
+    maxPerTransfer: params.maxPerTransfer,
+    recipientAllowlist: params.merchants,
+    callPolicyVersion: params.callPolicyVersion
+  });
+  const rateLimitPolicy = toRateLimitPolicy({
+    interval: params.validUntil - validAfter,
+    count: params.maxTransfers,
+    startAt: validAfter
+  });
+  const timestampPolicy = toTimestampPolicy(
+    params.validAfter === void 0 ? { validUntil: params.validUntil } : { validAfter: params.validAfter, validUntil: params.validUntil }
+  );
+  return [callPolicy, rateLimitPolicy, timestampPolicy];
+}
+
+export { TransferJpycInputError, createBuyListPolicies, transferJpyc };
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-Y2LOACWO.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-Y2LOACWO.js.map

package/dist/chunk-Y2LOACWO.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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The flow:\n * 1. Resolve the JPYC contract address for `kernelClient.chain`.\n * 2. Encode `JPYC.transfer(to, amount)` calldata.\n * 3. Wrap it as a Kernel call and submit via `sendUserOperation`.\n * 4. Wait for the bundler receipt and return both hashes.\n *\n * EIP-3009 `transferWithAuthorization` cannot be used here: JPYC's signature\n * verification is pure `ecrecover`, so a smart account cannot be `from`. See\n * `src/tokens/eip3009.ts` for the EOA-payer path.\n *\n * @packageDocumentation\n */\n\nimport type { KernelAccountClient } from \"@zerodev/sdk\";\nimport type { Address, Chain, Hex, Transport } from \"viem\";\nimport { encodeFunctionData, isAddress } from \"viem\";\nimport type { SmartAccount } from \"viem/account-abstraction\";\nimport { isSupportedChainId, type SupportedChainId } from \"../chains\";\nimport { getJpycAddress, jpycAbi } from \"../tokens/jpyc\";\n\n/** A {@link KernelAccountClient} that is fully configured (chain + account). */\nexport type ConfiguredKernelClient = KernelAccountClient<Transport, Chain, SmartAccount>;\n\n/** Parameters for {@link transferJpyc}. */\nexport interface TransferJpycParams {\n\t/** Recipient address. */\n\treadonly to: Address;\n\t/**\n\t * Raw token amount in the token's smallest unit (JPYC has 18 decimals).\n\t *\n\t * @example\n\t * ```ts\n\t * import { parseUnits } from \"viem\";\n\t * import { JPYC_DECIMALS } from \"kawasekit\";\n\t *\n\t * parseUnits(\"100\", JPYC_DECIMALS); // 100 JPYC\n\t * ```\n\t */\n\treadonly amount: bigint;\n\t/**\n\t * Optional. Defaults to waiting for the bundler receipt before returning.\n\t * Set to `false` to return after the UserOp is submitted but before it\n\t * lands on chain — useful when the caller wants to do its own polling.\n\t */\n\treadonly waitForReceipt?: boolean;\n}\n\n/** Result of a {@link transferJpyc} call. */\nexport interface TransferJpycResult {\n\treadonly userOpHash: Hex;\n\t/** `null` when `waitForReceipt: false` was requested. */\n\treadonly transactionHash: Hex | null;\n\t/** `true` if the bundler receipt reported success; `null` if not awaited. */\n\treadonly success: boolean | null;\n}\n\n/** Thrown when {@link transferJpyc} is called with invalid arguments. */\nexport class TransferJpycInputError extends Error {\n\tconstructor(message: string) {\n\t\tsuper(`transferJpyc: ${message}`);\n\t\tthis.name = \"TransferJpycInputError\";\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Transfer JPYC from the Kernel smart account to `to` via a sponsored UserOp.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * import { parseUnits } from \"viem\";\n * import { JPYC_DECIMALS, transferJpyc } from \"kawasekit\";\n *\n * const { userOpHash, transactionHash } = await transferJpyc(kernelClient, {\n *   to: \"0xBeef0000000000000000000000000000DEADBEEF\",\n *   amount: parseUnits(\"100\", JPYC_DECIMALS),\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport async function transferJpyc(\n\tkernelClient: ConfiguredKernelClient,\n\tparams: TransferJpycParams,\n): Promise<TransferJpycResult> {\n\tif (!isAddress(params.to, { strict: false })) {\n\t\tthrow new TransferJpycInputError(`\\`to\\` is not a valid address: ${params.to}`);\n\t}\n\tif (params.amount <= 0n) {\n\t\tthrow new TransferJpycInputError(`\\`amount\\` must be positive, got ${params.amount}.`);\n\t}\n\n\tconst chainId = kernelClient.chain.id;\n\tif (!isSupportedChainId(chainId)) {\n\t\tthrow new TransferJpycInputError(`Chain ID ${chainId} is not a kawasekit-supported chain.`);\n\t}\n\tconst jpycAddress = getJpycAddress(chainId satisfies SupportedChainId);\n\n\tconst data = encodeFunctionData({\n\t\tabi: jpycAbi,\n\t\tfunctionName: \"transfer\",\n\t\targs: [params.to, params.amount],\n\t});\n\n\tconst callData = await kernelClient.account.encodeCalls([{ to: jpycAddress, value: 0n, data }]);\n\n\tconst userOpHash = await kernelClient.sendUserOperation({ callData });\n\n\tif (params.waitForReceipt === false) {\n\t\treturn { userOpHash, transactionHash: null, success: null };\n\t}\n\n\tconst receipt = await kernelClient.waitForUserOperationReceipt({ hash: userOpHash });\n\treturn {\n\t\tuserOpHash,\n\t\ttransactionHash: receipt.receipt.transactionHash,\n\t\tsuccess: receipt.success,\n\t};\n}\n","/**\n * Buy-list → ZeroDev policy bundle for a **disposable, scoped session key**\n * (the Agent Commerce Hub authorization flow).\n *\n * A user's resolved buy-list (its merchants + a per-transfer cap + a total\n * transfer count + a schedule window) is baked into a single-use session key by\n * composing three on-chain policies:\n * 1. **callPolicy** — `JPYC.transfer(to, value)` with `value ≤ maxPerTransfer`\n *    and `to ∈ merchants` (the allowlist; shared with\n *    {@link createJpycDailyLimitPolicies} via {@link buildJpycTransferCallPolicy}).\n * 2. **rateLimitPolicy** — a **total** cap of `maxTransfers` over the whole\n *    schedule window (the rate window is set to span `[validAfter, validUntil]`,\n *    so `count` does NOT reset within the session — it is a session total, not a\n *    per-day limit).\n * 3. **timestampPolicy** — the session key is only valid within\n *    `[validAfter, validUntil]`.\n *\n * Cumulative budget (\"spend ≤ ¥X total\") is NOT a policy field — it is the\n * amount the user funds the account with (funding is the user's responsibility,\n * out of the SDK's scope). These policies bound *who* (allowlist), *how much per\n * transfer* (cap), *how many* (count), and *when* (window).\n *\n * @packageDocumentation\n */\n\nimport type { Policy } from \"@zerodev/permissions\";\nimport {\n\ttype CallPolicyVersion,\n\ttoRateLimitPolicy,\n\ttoTimestampPolicy,\n} from \"@zerodev/permissions/policies\";\nimport type { Address } from \"viem\";\nimport { buildJpycTransferCallPolicy } from \"./jpyc-call-policy\";\n\n/** Parameters for {@link createBuyListPolicies}. */\nexport interface CreateBuyListPoliciesParams {\n\t/** JPYC contract address on the target chain. */\n\treadonly jpycAddress: Address;\n\t/**\n\t * The buy-list's resolved merchant recipient addresses — the allowlist the\n\t * session key may pay. **Required and non-empty** (a buy-list always targets\n\t * specific merchants); checksum-normalized + de-duplicated.\n\t */\n\treadonly merchants: readonly Address[];\n\t/** Maximum JPYC (raw units) per single transfer. Must be positive. */\n\treadonly maxPerTransfer: bigint;\n\t/**\n\t * Maximum number of transfers over the WHOLE window — a session total, not a\n\t * per-day limit. Must be a positive integer.\n\t */\n\treadonly maxTransfers: number;\n\t/** Schedule-window end (unix seconds); the key is invalid after this. Must be a positive integer. */\n\treadonly validUntil: number;\n\t/**\n\t * Optional schedule-window start (unix seconds); the key is invalid before\n\t * this. Defaults to 0 (valid immediately). Must be `< validUntil`.\n\t */\n\treadonly validAfter?: number;\n\t/** ZeroDev callPolicy on-chain version. Defaults to V0_0_4. */\n\treadonly callPolicyVersion?: CallPolicyVersion;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the ZeroDev policy bundle for a buy-list-scoped, single-use session key.\n *\n * Plug the returned policies into `toPermissionValidator({ policies, … })` and\n * issue the session key via {@link issueSessionKey}.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * import { parseUnits } from \"viem\";\n * import { createBuyListPolicies, getJpycAddress, JPYC_DECIMALS, polygonAmoy } from \"kawasekit\";\n *\n * const policies = createBuyListPolicies({\n *   jpycAddress: getJpycAddress(polygonAmoy.id),\n *   merchants: [merchantA, merchantB],          // pay ONLY these (allowlist)\n *   maxPerTransfer: parseUnits(\"500\", JPYC_DECIMALS),\n *   maxTransfers: 3,                             // at most 3 transfers, total\n *   validUntil: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 3 * 86_400, // valid 3 days\n * });\n * // user funds the account with their budget; the policies bound who/how-much/how-many/when.\n * ```\n */\nexport function createBuyListPolicies(\n\tparams: CreateBuyListPoliciesParams,\n): readonly [Policy, Policy, Policy] {\n\tif (params.merchants.length === 0) {\n\t\tthrow new Error(\n\t\t\t\"createBuyListPolicies: merchants must not be empty — a buy-list must target at least one merchant.\",\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\tif (!Number.isInteger(params.maxTransfers) || params.maxTransfers < 1) {\n\t\tthrow new Error(\n\t\t\t`createBuyListPolicies: maxTransfers must be a positive integer, got ${params.maxTransfers}.`,\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\tif (!Number.isInteger(params.validUntil) || params.validUntil <= 0) {\n\t\tthrow new Error(\n\t\t\t`createBuyListPolicies: validUntil must be a positive unix-seconds integer, got ${params.validUntil}.`,\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\tconst validAfter = params.validAfter ?? 0;\n\tif (!Number.isInteger(validAfter) || validAfter < 0) {\n\t\tthrow new Error(\n\t\t\t`createBuyListPolicies: validAfter must be a non-negative unix-seconds integer, got ${params.validAfter}.`,\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\tif (validAfter >= params.validUntil) {\n\t\tthrow new Error(\n\t\t\t`createBuyListPolicies: validAfter (${validAfter}) must be before validUntil (${params.validUntil}).`,\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\t// callPolicy: amount cap + merchant allowlist (shared with daily-limit).\n\tconst callPolicy = buildJpycTransferCallPolicy({\n\t\tjpycAddress: params.jpycAddress,\n\t\tmaxPerTransfer: params.maxPerTransfer,\n\t\trecipientAllowlist: params.merchants,\n\t\tcallPolicyVersion: params.callPolicyVersion,\n\t});\n\n\t// rateLimitPolicy: a TOTAL cap of maxTransfers over the window. Setting the\n\t// rate window to span exactly [validAfter, validUntil] (interval = the window\n\t// length, startAt = validAfter) keeps the whole session in one rate bucket, so\n\t// `count` is a session total — NOT a per-day limit that could reset and let\n\t// more than maxTransfers through over a multi-day window.\n\tconst rateLimitPolicy = toRateLimitPolicy({\n\t\tinterval: params.validUntil - validAfter,\n\t\tcount: params.maxTransfers,\n\t\tstartAt: validAfter,\n\t});\n\n\t// timestampPolicy: the key is only valid within the schedule window. Omit\n\t// validAfter when not given (exactOptionalPropertyTypes: don't pass undefined).\n\tconst timestampPolicy = toTimestampPolicy(\n\t\tparams.validAfter === undefined\n\t\t\t? { validUntil: params.validUntil }\n\t\t\t: { validAfter: params.validAfter, validUntil: params.validUntil },\n\t);\n\n\treturn [callPolicy, rateLimitPolicy, timestampPolicy] as const;\n}\n"]}