kawasekit 0.4.0 → 0.5.0

package/dist/signer/index.d.cts

@@ -65,8 +65,16 @@ declare class PolicyGatedSignerConfigError extends Error {
  * ```
  */
 declare class CoSignUnavailableError extends Error {
+    /**
+     * `true` when the failure is the **transient transport class** (connect failed /
+     * connection dropped) — the only class the adapter's bounded retry replays
+     * (RFC m6-3a §4.7: never a delivered rejection, never a ban/identifiable-abort,
+     * never a protocol anomaly or timeout). Defaults to `false`.
+     */
+    readonly transient: boolean;
     constructor(message: string, options?: {
         cause?: unknown;
+        transient?: boolean;
     });
 }
 
@@ -181,6 +189,15 @@ declare function createLocalPolicyGatedSigner(params: CreateLocalPolicyGatedSign
 
 /** The wire protocol version. A frame whose `wire_version` differs is rejected. */
 declare const WIRE_VERSION: 2;
+/**
+ * The inbound round-payload bound, in bytes — mirrors the backend's
+ * `crypto-core/src/transport.rs` `MAX_FRAME_BYTES` (8 MiB) so the agent side
+ * enforces the same pre-decode cap the backend does (RFC m6-3a §4.2/M3). The
+ * adapter refuses an over-bound `round` payload **before** hex-decoding it into
+ * the WASM boundary; the private transport should additionally cap raw
+ * websocket messages (e.g. the `ws` client's `maxPayload`).
+ */
+declare const MAX_FRAME_BYTES: number;
 /**
  * The string-encoded EIP-3009 intent as it crosses the wire — lowercase `0x`
  * addresses, **decimal** integer strings, `0x` hex nonce. Decoupled from any
@@ -285,6 +302,14 @@ declare function canonicalRequestBytes(env: CoSignRequestEnvelope): Uint8Array;
  * `{ ok: true }` and never a {@link PolicyRejection} (the no-silent-fallback
  * guarantee, RFC m6-3a constraint 3 / W8).
  *
+ * **Wire hardening (RFC §4.7/§4.8, Track C):** a bounded **transient-only retry**
+ * replays the byte-identical intent (nonce included — idempotency-by-nonce is the
+ * safety net) under a fresh A3 envelope and accepts the backend's **roundless
+ * idempotent-replay result** via an ecrecover/low-S self-check; the **ceremony
+ * deadline always fires before `validBefore`** (minus a clock-skew budget, W11),
+ * and inbound round payloads are **bounded** before the WASM boundary (M3). Tuning
+ * via {@link Mpc2pWireOptions}.
+ *
  * @packageDocumentation
  */
 
@@ -325,6 +350,35 @@ interface CoSignRequestAuthenticator {
     /** Authenticator tag over {@link canonicalRequestBytes}; the key stays inside. */
     tag(canonicalRequest: Uint8Array): Hex | Promise<Hex>;
 }
+/**
+ * Wire liveness / retry tuning (RFC m6-3a §4.7 + §4.8). Every field is optional
+ * with a safe default. The invariants these enforce:
+ *
+ * - **Retry (4b/H2):** only the **transient transport class** is retried (connect
+ *   failed / connection dropped), replaying the **byte-identical intent** — nonce
+ *   included, so the backend's idempotency-by-nonce is the safety net — under a
+ *   fresh A3 envelope (the freshness guard rejects a replayed envelope by design).
+ *   A delivered rejection, a ban/identifiable-abort, a protocol anomaly, or a
+ *   timeout is never retried.
+ * - **Liveness (4c/W11/M1+M3):** the ceremony deadline always fires **before**
+ *   `intent.validBefore − clockSkewBudgetSecs` (a co-signature must never be born
+ *   expired), and a `sign()` whose remaining window is under
+ *   `minWindowSecs + clockSkewBudgetSecs` is refused up front.
+ * - **Inbound bound (4c/M3):** a `round` payload over `maxFrameBytes` is refused
+ *   before it reaches the WASM boundary (mirrors the backend's bound).
+ */
+interface Mpc2pWireOptions {
+    /** Max ceremony attempts for transient transport failures (default 2 = one retry). */
+    readonly maxAttempts?: number;
+    /** Overall per-`sign()` budget in ms, across ALL attempts (default 30_000). */
+    readonly ceremonyTimeoutMs?: number;
+    /** Minimum remaining validity window required at `sign()` start, in seconds (default 30). */
+    readonly minWindowSecs?: number;
+    /** Max tolerated agent-host clock skew, in seconds (default 30). */
+    readonly clockSkewBudgetSecs?: number;
+    /** Inbound round-payload bound in bytes (default {@link MAX_FRAME_BYTES} = 8 MiB). */
+    readonly maxFrameBytes?: number;
+}
 /** Parameters for {@link createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner}. */
 interface Mpc2pSignerParams {
     /** The group 2-of-2 EOA; every `intent.from` must equal this (asserted vs the agent). */
@@ -342,6 +396,8 @@ interface Mpc2pSignerParams {
     readonly transport: CoSignTransport;
     /** The injected A3 authenticator (the pre-shared key never enters the SDK). */
     readonly authenticator: CoSignRequestAuthenticator;
+    /** Wire liveness / retry tuning (optional; safe defaults — {@link Mpc2pWireOptions}). */
+    readonly wire?: Mpc2pWireOptions;
 }
 /**
  * Construct an `mpc-2p` (cryptographic) PolicyGatedSigner over injected agent +
@@ -363,4 +419,4 @@ interface Mpc2pSignerParams {
  */
 declare function createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner(params: Mpc2pSignerParams): PolicyGatedSigner<"cryptographic">;
 
-export { type CoSignConnection, type CoSignFrame, type CoSignRequestAuthenticator, type CoSignRequestEnvelope, type CoSignTransport, CoSignUnavailableError, type CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams, type Mpc2pCoSignAgent, type Mpc2pSignerParams, type Mpc2pStepOutcome, NonBypassableEnforcement, PaymentIntent, PolicyGatedSigner, PolicyGatedSignerConfigError, WIRE_VERSION, type WireIntent, assertNonBypassable, canonicalRequestBytes, createLocalPolicyGatedSigner, createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner, requireNonBypassable, toWireIntent };
+export { type CoSignConnection, type CoSignFrame, type CoSignRequestAuthenticator, type CoSignRequestEnvelope, type CoSignTransport, CoSignUnavailableError, type CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams, MAX_FRAME_BYTES, type Mpc2pCoSignAgent, type Mpc2pSignerParams, type Mpc2pStepOutcome, type Mpc2pWireOptions, NonBypassableEnforcement, PaymentIntent, PolicyGatedSigner, PolicyGatedSignerConfigError, WIRE_VERSION, type WireIntent, assertNonBypassable, canonicalRequestBytes, createLocalPolicyGatedSigner, createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner, requireNonBypassable, toWireIntent };

package/dist/signer/index.d.ts

@@ -65,8 +65,16 @@ declare class PolicyGatedSignerConfigError extends Error {
  * ```
  */
 declare class CoSignUnavailableError extends Error {
+    /**
+     * `true` when the failure is the **transient transport class** (connect failed /
+     * connection dropped) — the only class the adapter's bounded retry replays
+     * (RFC m6-3a §4.7: never a delivered rejection, never a ban/identifiable-abort,
+     * never a protocol anomaly or timeout). Defaults to `false`.
+     */
+    readonly transient: boolean;
     constructor(message: string, options?: {
         cause?: unknown;
+        transient?: boolean;
     });
 }
 
@@ -181,6 +189,15 @@ declare function createLocalPolicyGatedSigner(params: CreateLocalPolicyGatedSign
 
 /** The wire protocol version. A frame whose `wire_version` differs is rejected. */
 declare const WIRE_VERSION: 2;
+/**
+ * The inbound round-payload bound, in bytes — mirrors the backend's
+ * `crypto-core/src/transport.rs` `MAX_FRAME_BYTES` (8 MiB) so the agent side
+ * enforces the same pre-decode cap the backend does (RFC m6-3a §4.2/M3). The
+ * adapter refuses an over-bound `round` payload **before** hex-decoding it into
+ * the WASM boundary; the private transport should additionally cap raw
+ * websocket messages (e.g. the `ws` client's `maxPayload`).
+ */
+declare const MAX_FRAME_BYTES: number;
 /**
  * The string-encoded EIP-3009 intent as it crosses the wire — lowercase `0x`
  * addresses, **decimal** integer strings, `0x` hex nonce. Decoupled from any
@@ -285,6 +302,14 @@ declare function canonicalRequestBytes(env: CoSignRequestEnvelope): Uint8Array;
  * `{ ok: true }` and never a {@link PolicyRejection} (the no-silent-fallback
  * guarantee, RFC m6-3a constraint 3 / W8).
  *
+ * **Wire hardening (RFC §4.7/§4.8, Track C):** a bounded **transient-only retry**
+ * replays the byte-identical intent (nonce included — idempotency-by-nonce is the
+ * safety net) under a fresh A3 envelope and accepts the backend's **roundless
+ * idempotent-replay result** via an ecrecover/low-S self-check; the **ceremony
+ * deadline always fires before `validBefore`** (minus a clock-skew budget, W11),
+ * and inbound round payloads are **bounded** before the WASM boundary (M3). Tuning
+ * via {@link Mpc2pWireOptions}.
+ *
  * @packageDocumentation
  */
 
@@ -325,6 +350,35 @@ interface CoSignRequestAuthenticator {
     /** Authenticator tag over {@link canonicalRequestBytes}; the key stays inside. */
     tag(canonicalRequest: Uint8Array): Hex | Promise<Hex>;
 }
+/**
+ * Wire liveness / retry tuning (RFC m6-3a §4.7 + §4.8). Every field is optional
+ * with a safe default. The invariants these enforce:
+ *
+ * - **Retry (4b/H2):** only the **transient transport class** is retried (connect
+ *   failed / connection dropped), replaying the **byte-identical intent** — nonce
+ *   included, so the backend's idempotency-by-nonce is the safety net — under a
+ *   fresh A3 envelope (the freshness guard rejects a replayed envelope by design).
+ *   A delivered rejection, a ban/identifiable-abort, a protocol anomaly, or a
+ *   timeout is never retried.
+ * - **Liveness (4c/W11/M1+M3):** the ceremony deadline always fires **before**
+ *   `intent.validBefore − clockSkewBudgetSecs` (a co-signature must never be born
+ *   expired), and a `sign()` whose remaining window is under
+ *   `minWindowSecs + clockSkewBudgetSecs` is refused up front.
+ * - **Inbound bound (4c/M3):** a `round` payload over `maxFrameBytes` is refused
+ *   before it reaches the WASM boundary (mirrors the backend's bound).
+ */
+interface Mpc2pWireOptions {
+    /** Max ceremony attempts for transient transport failures (default 2 = one retry). */
+    readonly maxAttempts?: number;
+    /** Overall per-`sign()` budget in ms, across ALL attempts (default 30_000). */
+    readonly ceremonyTimeoutMs?: number;
+    /** Minimum remaining validity window required at `sign()` start, in seconds (default 30). */
+    readonly minWindowSecs?: number;
+    /** Max tolerated agent-host clock skew, in seconds (default 30). */
+    readonly clockSkewBudgetSecs?: number;
+    /** Inbound round-payload bound in bytes (default {@link MAX_FRAME_BYTES} = 8 MiB). */
+    readonly maxFrameBytes?: number;
+}
 /** Parameters for {@link createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner}. */
 interface Mpc2pSignerParams {
     /** The group 2-of-2 EOA; every `intent.from` must equal this (asserted vs the agent). */
@@ -342,6 +396,8 @@ interface Mpc2pSignerParams {
     readonly transport: CoSignTransport;
     /** The injected A3 authenticator (the pre-shared key never enters the SDK). */
     readonly authenticator: CoSignRequestAuthenticator;
+    /** Wire liveness / retry tuning (optional; safe defaults — {@link Mpc2pWireOptions}). */
+    readonly wire?: Mpc2pWireOptions;
 }
 /**
  * Construct an `mpc-2p` (cryptographic) PolicyGatedSigner over injected agent +
@@ -363,4 +419,4 @@ interface Mpc2pSignerParams {
  */
 declare function createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner(params: Mpc2pSignerParams): PolicyGatedSigner<"cryptographic">;
 
-export { type CoSignConnection, type CoSignFrame, type CoSignRequestAuthenticator, type CoSignRequestEnvelope, type CoSignTransport, CoSignUnavailableError, type CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams, type Mpc2pCoSignAgent, type Mpc2pSignerParams, type Mpc2pStepOutcome, NonBypassableEnforcement, PaymentIntent, PolicyGatedSigner, PolicyGatedSignerConfigError, WIRE_VERSION, type WireIntent, assertNonBypassable, canonicalRequestBytes, createLocalPolicyGatedSigner, createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner, requireNonBypassable, toWireIntent };
+export { type CoSignConnection, type CoSignFrame, type CoSignRequestAuthenticator, type CoSignRequestEnvelope, type CoSignTransport, CoSignUnavailableError, type CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams, MAX_FRAME_BYTES, type Mpc2pCoSignAgent, type Mpc2pSignerParams, type Mpc2pStepOutcome, type Mpc2pWireOptions, NonBypassableEnforcement, PaymentIntent, PolicyGatedSigner, PolicyGatedSignerConfigError, WIRE_VERSION, type WireIntent, assertNonBypassable, canonicalRequestBytes, createLocalPolicyGatedSigner, createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner, requireNonBypassable, toWireIntent };

package/dist/signer/index.js

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-export { WIRE_VERSION, canonicalRequestBytes, createLocalPolicyGatedSigner, createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner, toWireIntent } from '../chunk-FD6Q4NB2.js';
-export { CoSignUnavailableError, PolicyGatedSignerConfigError, assertNonBypassable, requireNonBypassable } from '../chunk-5TTOAVHE.js';
+export { MAX_FRAME_BYTES, WIRE_VERSION, canonicalRequestBytes, createLocalPolicyGatedSigner, createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner, toWireIntent } from '../chunk-S2ZSX2VS.js';
+export { CoSignUnavailableError, PolicyGatedSignerConfigError, assertNonBypassable, requireNonBypassable } from '../chunk-VJUXTVSW.js';
 import '../chunk-WMVJNPX2.js';
 import '../chunk-6CNAYQOL.js';
 import '../chunk-KT7XDT2T.js';