kawasekit 0.3.0 → 0.5.0

package/dist/signer/index.d.cts

@@ -65,8 +65,16 @@ declare class PolicyGatedSignerConfigError extends Error {
  * ```
  */
 declare class CoSignUnavailableError extends Error {
+    /**
+     * `true` when the failure is the **transient transport class** (connect failed /
+     * connection dropped) — the only class the adapter's bounded retry replays
+     * (RFC m6-3a §4.7: never a delivered rejection, never a ban/identifiable-abort,
+     * never a protocol anomaly or timeout). Defaults to `false`.
+     */
+    readonly transient: boolean;
     constructor(message: string, options?: {
         cause?: unknown;
+        transient?: boolean;
     });
 }
 
@@ -159,27 +167,37 @@ interface CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams {
 declare function createLocalPolicyGatedSigner(params: CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams): PolicyGatedSigner<"advisory">;
 
 /**
- * The `mpc-2p` cross-process **wire** — the versioned `CoSignFrame` control
+ * The `mpc-2p` cross-process **wire** (v2) — the versioned `CoSignFrame` control
  * envelope + the A3 canonical-request encoding, as TypeScript source-of-truth.
  *
  * This is the public, TS-interpreted half of the two-layer wire (RFC m6-3a §4.2):
  * a small, versioned envelope carries the decoded {@link PaymentIntent} (never a
- * digest — A4) plus the opaque DKLs round payloads (hex, produced/consumed only
- * by the WASM crypto agent). The shapes here mirror the deployed
- * `kawasekit-mpc-2p` Rust serde **byte-for-byte** (snake_case `wire_version`,
- * `session_id`, `auth_tag`; the string-encoded {@link WireIntent}), so a frame the
- * SDK builds round-trips through the backend's `serde_json`. The richer envelope
- * (ceremonyId / ssid / A3 freshness) is a later slice.
+ * digest — A4) + a per-ceremony id + ssid + a freshness element, plus the opaque
+ * DKLs round payloads (hex, produced/consumed only by the WASM crypto agent). The
+ * shapes here mirror the deployed `kawasekit-mpc-2p` Rust serde **byte-for-byte**
+ * (snake_case `wire_version`, `session_id`, `ceremony_id`, `ssid`, `freshness_ts`,
+ * `freshness_nonce`, `auth_tag`; the string-encoded {@link WireIntent}), so a frame
+ * the SDK builds round-trips through the backend's `serde_json`.
  *
- * `canonicalIntentBytes` is the A3 analog of the EIP-712 digest corpus: it
- * reproduces the backend's `auth::canonical_intent_bytes` exactly, so the
- * injected authenticator's HMAC equals what the co-signer verifies.
+ * `canonicalRequestBytes` is the A3 analog of the EIP-712 digest corpus: it
+ * reproduces the backend's `auth::canonical_request_bytes` exactly, so the injected
+ * authenticator's HMAC equals what the co-signer verifies (RFC §4.6:
+ * `HMAC_k(wireVersion ‖ ceremonyId ‖ ssid ‖ canonical(intent) ‖ freshness)`).
  *
  * @packageDocumentation
  */
 
 /** The wire protocol version. A frame whose `wire_version` differs is rejected. */
-declare const WIRE_VERSION: 1;
+declare const WIRE_VERSION: 2;
+/**
+ * The inbound round-payload bound, in bytes — mirrors the backend's
+ * `crypto-core/src/transport.rs` `MAX_FRAME_BYTES` (8 MiB) so the agent side
+ * enforces the same pre-decode cap the backend does (RFC m6-3a §4.2/M3). The
+ * adapter refuses an over-bound `round` payload **before** hex-decoding it into
+ * the WASM boundary; the private transport should additionally cap raw
+ * websocket messages (e.g. the `ws` client's `maxPayload`).
+ */
+declare const MAX_FRAME_BYTES: number;
 /**
  * The string-encoded EIP-3009 intent as it crosses the wire — lowercase `0x`
  * addresses, **decimal** integer strings, `0x` hex nonce. Decoupled from any
@@ -198,6 +216,20 @@ interface WireIntent {
 }
 /** Encode a decoded {@link PaymentIntent} for the wire. */
 declare function toWireIntent(intent: PaymentIntent): WireIntent;
+/**
+ * The A3 request envelope the adapter generates per `sign()` and authenticates: a
+ * per-ceremony id + ssid (bound into the A3 tag) + the intent + a freshness element
+ * (a timestamp + a per-request nonce distinct from the EIP-3009 nonce).
+ */
+interface CoSignRequestEnvelope {
+    readonly ceremonyId: string;
+    readonly ssid: string;
+    readonly intent: PaymentIntent;
+    /** Unix seconds; the backend checks it against a clock-skew window. */
+    readonly freshnessTs: number;
+    /** `0x` hex, distinct from the EIP-3009 nonce — the anti-replay key. */
+    readonly freshnessNonce: Hex;
+}
 /**
  * A versioned control frame: the only cross-language content of the wire. The
  * DKLs round bytes ride opaque inside `payload`; everything else is the small,
@@ -208,8 +240,12 @@ type CoSignFrame = {
 } & ({
     readonly kind: "request";
     readonly session_id: string;
+    readonly ceremony_id: string;
+    readonly ssid: string;
     readonly intent: WireIntent;
-    /** A3 authenticator over {@link canonicalIntentBytes}, `0x`-hex. */
+    readonly freshness_ts: number;
+    readonly freshness_nonce: Hex;
+    /** A3 authenticator over {@link canonicalRequestBytes}, `0x`-hex. */
     readonly auth_tag: Hex;
 } | {
     readonly kind: "round";
@@ -228,13 +264,14 @@ type CoSignFrame = {
     readonly message: string;
 });
 /**
- * The A3 canonical encoding of an intent — a byte-exact mirror of the backend's
- * `auth::canonical_intent_bytes` (domain-tag `kawasekit-mpc-2p/cosign-request/v2`,
- * one `key=value\n` line per field, lowercase `0x` addresses, decimal integers,
- * `0x` hex nonce, trailing newline). The injected authenticator HMACs these bytes;
- * because the encoding is shared, the tag equals the co-signer's.
+ * The A3 canonical encoding of a request — a byte-exact mirror of the backend's
+ * `auth::canonical_request_bytes` (domain-tag `kawasekit-mpc-2p/cosign-request/v3`,
+ * one `key=value\n` line per field: `wireVersion ‖ ceremonyId ‖ ssid ‖
+ * canonical(intent) ‖ freshness`; lowercase `0x` addresses + freshness nonce,
+ * decimal integers, trailing newline). The injected authenticator HMACs these
+ * bytes; because the encoding is shared, the tag equals the co-signer's.
  */
-declare function canonicalIntentBytes(intent: PaymentIntent): Uint8Array;
+declare function canonicalRequestBytes(env: CoSignRequestEnvelope): Uint8Array;
 
 /**
  * The `mpc-2p` PolicyGatedSigner adapter — `enforcement: "cryptographic"`.
@@ -265,6 +302,14 @@ declare function canonicalIntentBytes(intent: PaymentIntent): Uint8Array;
  * `{ ok: true }` and never a {@link PolicyRejection} (the no-silent-fallback
  * guarantee, RFC m6-3a constraint 3 / W8).
  *
+ * **Wire hardening (RFC §4.7/§4.8, Track C):** a bounded **transient-only retry**
+ * replays the byte-identical intent (nonce included — idempotency-by-nonce is the
+ * safety net) under a fresh A3 envelope and accepts the backend's **roundless
+ * idempotent-replay result** via an ecrecover/low-S self-check; the **ceremony
+ * deadline always fires before `validBefore`** (minus a clock-skew budget, W11),
+ * and inbound round payloads are **bounded** before the WASM boundary (M3). Tuning
+ * via {@link Mpc2pWireOptions}.
+ *
  * @packageDocumentation
  */
 
@@ -302,9 +347,38 @@ interface CoSignTransport {
 }
 /** The A3 request authenticator — HMAC (or signature) over the canonical request bytes. */
 interface CoSignRequestAuthenticator {
-    /** Authenticator tag over {@link canonicalIntentBytes}; the key stays inside. */
+    /** Authenticator tag over {@link canonicalRequestBytes}; the key stays inside. */
     tag(canonicalRequest: Uint8Array): Hex | Promise<Hex>;
 }
+/**
+ * Wire liveness / retry tuning (RFC m6-3a §4.7 + §4.8). Every field is optional
+ * with a safe default. The invariants these enforce:
+ *
+ * - **Retry (4b/H2):** only the **transient transport class** is retried (connect
+ *   failed / connection dropped), replaying the **byte-identical intent** — nonce
+ *   included, so the backend's idempotency-by-nonce is the safety net — under a
+ *   fresh A3 envelope (the freshness guard rejects a replayed envelope by design).
+ *   A delivered rejection, a ban/identifiable-abort, a protocol anomaly, or a
+ *   timeout is never retried.
+ * - **Liveness (4c/W11/M1+M3):** the ceremony deadline always fires **before**
+ *   `intent.validBefore − clockSkewBudgetSecs` (a co-signature must never be born
+ *   expired), and a `sign()` whose remaining window is under
+ *   `minWindowSecs + clockSkewBudgetSecs` is refused up front.
+ * - **Inbound bound (4c/M3):** a `round` payload over `maxFrameBytes` is refused
+ *   before it reaches the WASM boundary (mirrors the backend's bound).
+ */
+interface Mpc2pWireOptions {
+    /** Max ceremony attempts for transient transport failures (default 2 = one retry). */
+    readonly maxAttempts?: number;
+    /** Overall per-`sign()` budget in ms, across ALL attempts (default 30_000). */
+    readonly ceremonyTimeoutMs?: number;
+    /** Minimum remaining validity window required at `sign()` start, in seconds (default 30). */
+    readonly minWindowSecs?: number;
+    /** Max tolerated agent-host clock skew, in seconds (default 30). */
+    readonly clockSkewBudgetSecs?: number;
+    /** Inbound round-payload bound in bytes (default {@link MAX_FRAME_BYTES} = 8 MiB). */
+    readonly maxFrameBytes?: number;
+}
 /** Parameters for {@link createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner}. */
 interface Mpc2pSignerParams {
     /** The group 2-of-2 EOA; every `intent.from` must equal this (asserted vs the agent). */
@@ -322,6 +396,8 @@ interface Mpc2pSignerParams {
     readonly transport: CoSignTransport;
     /** The injected A3 authenticator (the pre-shared key never enters the SDK). */
     readonly authenticator: CoSignRequestAuthenticator;
+    /** Wire liveness / retry tuning (optional; safe defaults — {@link Mpc2pWireOptions}). */
+    readonly wire?: Mpc2pWireOptions;
 }
 /**
  * Construct an `mpc-2p` (cryptographic) PolicyGatedSigner over injected agent +
@@ -343,4 +419,4 @@ interface Mpc2pSignerParams {
  */
 declare function createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner(params: Mpc2pSignerParams): PolicyGatedSigner<"cryptographic">;
 
-export { type CoSignConnection, type CoSignFrame, type CoSignRequestAuthenticator, type CoSignTransport, CoSignUnavailableError, type CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams, type Mpc2pCoSignAgent, type Mpc2pSignerParams, type Mpc2pStepOutcome, NonBypassableEnforcement, PaymentIntent, PolicyGatedSigner, PolicyGatedSignerConfigError, WIRE_VERSION, type WireIntent, assertNonBypassable, canonicalIntentBytes, createLocalPolicyGatedSigner, createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner, requireNonBypassable, toWireIntent };
+export { type CoSignConnection, type CoSignFrame, type CoSignRequestAuthenticator, type CoSignRequestEnvelope, type CoSignTransport, CoSignUnavailableError, type CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams, MAX_FRAME_BYTES, type Mpc2pCoSignAgent, type Mpc2pSignerParams, type Mpc2pStepOutcome, type Mpc2pWireOptions, NonBypassableEnforcement, PaymentIntent, PolicyGatedSigner, PolicyGatedSignerConfigError, WIRE_VERSION, type WireIntent, assertNonBypassable, canonicalRequestBytes, createLocalPolicyGatedSigner, createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner, requireNonBypassable, toWireIntent };

package/dist/signer/index.d.ts

@@ -65,8 +65,16 @@ declare class PolicyGatedSignerConfigError extends Error {
  * ```
  */
 declare class CoSignUnavailableError extends Error {
+    /**
+     * `true` when the failure is the **transient transport class** (connect failed /
+     * connection dropped) — the only class the adapter's bounded retry replays
+     * (RFC m6-3a §4.7: never a delivered rejection, never a ban/identifiable-abort,
+     * never a protocol anomaly or timeout). Defaults to `false`.
+     */
+    readonly transient: boolean;
     constructor(message: string, options?: {
         cause?: unknown;
+        transient?: boolean;
     });
 }
 
@@ -159,27 +167,37 @@ interface CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams {
 declare function createLocalPolicyGatedSigner(params: CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams): PolicyGatedSigner<"advisory">;
 
 /**
- * The `mpc-2p` cross-process **wire** — the versioned `CoSignFrame` control
+ * The `mpc-2p` cross-process **wire** (v2) — the versioned `CoSignFrame` control
  * envelope + the A3 canonical-request encoding, as TypeScript source-of-truth.
  *
  * This is the public, TS-interpreted half of the two-layer wire (RFC m6-3a §4.2):
  * a small, versioned envelope carries the decoded {@link PaymentIntent} (never a
- * digest — A4) plus the opaque DKLs round payloads (hex, produced/consumed only
- * by the WASM crypto agent). The shapes here mirror the deployed
- * `kawasekit-mpc-2p` Rust serde **byte-for-byte** (snake_case `wire_version`,
- * `session_id`, `auth_tag`; the string-encoded {@link WireIntent}), so a frame the
- * SDK builds round-trips through the backend's `serde_json`. The richer envelope
- * (ceremonyId / ssid / A3 freshness) is a later slice.
+ * digest — A4) + a per-ceremony id + ssid + a freshness element, plus the opaque
+ * DKLs round payloads (hex, produced/consumed only by the WASM crypto agent). The
+ * shapes here mirror the deployed `kawasekit-mpc-2p` Rust serde **byte-for-byte**
+ * (snake_case `wire_version`, `session_id`, `ceremony_id`, `ssid`, `freshness_ts`,
+ * `freshness_nonce`, `auth_tag`; the string-encoded {@link WireIntent}), so a frame
+ * the SDK builds round-trips through the backend's `serde_json`.
  *
- * `canonicalIntentBytes` is the A3 analog of the EIP-712 digest corpus: it
- * reproduces the backend's `auth::canonical_intent_bytes` exactly, so the
- * injected authenticator's HMAC equals what the co-signer verifies.
+ * `canonicalRequestBytes` is the A3 analog of the EIP-712 digest corpus: it
+ * reproduces the backend's `auth::canonical_request_bytes` exactly, so the injected
+ * authenticator's HMAC equals what the co-signer verifies (RFC §4.6:
+ * `HMAC_k(wireVersion ‖ ceremonyId ‖ ssid ‖ canonical(intent) ‖ freshness)`).
  *
  * @packageDocumentation
  */
 
 /** The wire protocol version. A frame whose `wire_version` differs is rejected. */
-declare const WIRE_VERSION: 1;
+declare const WIRE_VERSION: 2;
+/**
+ * The inbound round-payload bound, in bytes — mirrors the backend's
+ * `crypto-core/src/transport.rs` `MAX_FRAME_BYTES` (8 MiB) so the agent side
+ * enforces the same pre-decode cap the backend does (RFC m6-3a §4.2/M3). The
+ * adapter refuses an over-bound `round` payload **before** hex-decoding it into
+ * the WASM boundary; the private transport should additionally cap raw
+ * websocket messages (e.g. the `ws` client's `maxPayload`).
+ */
+declare const MAX_FRAME_BYTES: number;
 /**
  * The string-encoded EIP-3009 intent as it crosses the wire — lowercase `0x`
  * addresses, **decimal** integer strings, `0x` hex nonce. Decoupled from any
@@ -198,6 +216,20 @@ interface WireIntent {
 }
 /** Encode a decoded {@link PaymentIntent} for the wire. */
 declare function toWireIntent(intent: PaymentIntent): WireIntent;
+/**
+ * The A3 request envelope the adapter generates per `sign()` and authenticates: a
+ * per-ceremony id + ssid (bound into the A3 tag) + the intent + a freshness element
+ * (a timestamp + a per-request nonce distinct from the EIP-3009 nonce).
+ */
+interface CoSignRequestEnvelope {
+    readonly ceremonyId: string;
+    readonly ssid: string;
+    readonly intent: PaymentIntent;
+    /** Unix seconds; the backend checks it against a clock-skew window. */
+    readonly freshnessTs: number;
+    /** `0x` hex, distinct from the EIP-3009 nonce — the anti-replay key. */
+    readonly freshnessNonce: Hex;
+}
 /**
  * A versioned control frame: the only cross-language content of the wire. The
  * DKLs round bytes ride opaque inside `payload`; everything else is the small,
@@ -208,8 +240,12 @@ type CoSignFrame = {
 } & ({
     readonly kind: "request";
     readonly session_id: string;
+    readonly ceremony_id: string;
+    readonly ssid: string;
     readonly intent: WireIntent;
-    /** A3 authenticator over {@link canonicalIntentBytes}, `0x`-hex. */
+    readonly freshness_ts: number;
+    readonly freshness_nonce: Hex;
+    /** A3 authenticator over {@link canonicalRequestBytes}, `0x`-hex. */
     readonly auth_tag: Hex;
 } | {
     readonly kind: "round";
@@ -228,13 +264,14 @@ type CoSignFrame = {
     readonly message: string;
 });
 /**
- * The A3 canonical encoding of an intent — a byte-exact mirror of the backend's
- * `auth::canonical_intent_bytes` (domain-tag `kawasekit-mpc-2p/cosign-request/v2`,
- * one `key=value\n` line per field, lowercase `0x` addresses, decimal integers,
- * `0x` hex nonce, trailing newline). The injected authenticator HMACs these bytes;
- * because the encoding is shared, the tag equals the co-signer's.
+ * The A3 canonical encoding of a request — a byte-exact mirror of the backend's
+ * `auth::canonical_request_bytes` (domain-tag `kawasekit-mpc-2p/cosign-request/v3`,
+ * one `key=value\n` line per field: `wireVersion ‖ ceremonyId ‖ ssid ‖
+ * canonical(intent) ‖ freshness`; lowercase `0x` addresses + freshness nonce,
+ * decimal integers, trailing newline). The injected authenticator HMACs these
+ * bytes; because the encoding is shared, the tag equals the co-signer's.
  */
-declare function canonicalIntentBytes(intent: PaymentIntent): Uint8Array;
+declare function canonicalRequestBytes(env: CoSignRequestEnvelope): Uint8Array;
 
 /**
  * The `mpc-2p` PolicyGatedSigner adapter — `enforcement: "cryptographic"`.
@@ -265,6 +302,14 @@ declare function canonicalIntentBytes(intent: PaymentIntent): Uint8Array;
  * `{ ok: true }` and never a {@link PolicyRejection} (the no-silent-fallback
  * guarantee, RFC m6-3a constraint 3 / W8).
  *
+ * **Wire hardening (RFC §4.7/§4.8, Track C):** a bounded **transient-only retry**
+ * replays the byte-identical intent (nonce included — idempotency-by-nonce is the
+ * safety net) under a fresh A3 envelope and accepts the backend's **roundless
+ * idempotent-replay result** via an ecrecover/low-S self-check; the **ceremony
+ * deadline always fires before `validBefore`** (minus a clock-skew budget, W11),
+ * and inbound round payloads are **bounded** before the WASM boundary (M3). Tuning
+ * via {@link Mpc2pWireOptions}.
+ *
  * @packageDocumentation
  */
 
@@ -302,9 +347,38 @@ interface CoSignTransport {
 }
 /** The A3 request authenticator — HMAC (or signature) over the canonical request bytes. */
 interface CoSignRequestAuthenticator {
-    /** Authenticator tag over {@link canonicalIntentBytes}; the key stays inside. */
+    /** Authenticator tag over {@link canonicalRequestBytes}; the key stays inside. */
     tag(canonicalRequest: Uint8Array): Hex | Promise<Hex>;
 }
+/**
+ * Wire liveness / retry tuning (RFC m6-3a §4.7 + §4.8). Every field is optional
+ * with a safe default. The invariants these enforce:
+ *
+ * - **Retry (4b/H2):** only the **transient transport class** is retried (connect
+ *   failed / connection dropped), replaying the **byte-identical intent** — nonce
+ *   included, so the backend's idempotency-by-nonce is the safety net — under a
+ *   fresh A3 envelope (the freshness guard rejects a replayed envelope by design).
+ *   A delivered rejection, a ban/identifiable-abort, a protocol anomaly, or a
+ *   timeout is never retried.
+ * - **Liveness (4c/W11/M1+M3):** the ceremony deadline always fires **before**
+ *   `intent.validBefore − clockSkewBudgetSecs` (a co-signature must never be born
+ *   expired), and a `sign()` whose remaining window is under
+ *   `minWindowSecs + clockSkewBudgetSecs` is refused up front.
+ * - **Inbound bound (4c/M3):** a `round` payload over `maxFrameBytes` is refused
+ *   before it reaches the WASM boundary (mirrors the backend's bound).
+ */
+interface Mpc2pWireOptions {
+    /** Max ceremony attempts for transient transport failures (default 2 = one retry). */
+    readonly maxAttempts?: number;
+    /** Overall per-`sign()` budget in ms, across ALL attempts (default 30_000). */
+    readonly ceremonyTimeoutMs?: number;
+    /** Minimum remaining validity window required at `sign()` start, in seconds (default 30). */
+    readonly minWindowSecs?: number;
+    /** Max tolerated agent-host clock skew, in seconds (default 30). */
+    readonly clockSkewBudgetSecs?: number;
+    /** Inbound round-payload bound in bytes (default {@link MAX_FRAME_BYTES} = 8 MiB). */
+    readonly maxFrameBytes?: number;
+}
 /** Parameters for {@link createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner}. */
 interface Mpc2pSignerParams {
     /** The group 2-of-2 EOA; every `intent.from` must equal this (asserted vs the agent). */
@@ -322,6 +396,8 @@ interface Mpc2pSignerParams {
     readonly transport: CoSignTransport;
     /** The injected A3 authenticator (the pre-shared key never enters the SDK). */
     readonly authenticator: CoSignRequestAuthenticator;
+    /** Wire liveness / retry tuning (optional; safe defaults — {@link Mpc2pWireOptions}). */
+    readonly wire?: Mpc2pWireOptions;
 }
 /**
  * Construct an `mpc-2p` (cryptographic) PolicyGatedSigner over injected agent +
@@ -343,4 +419,4 @@ interface Mpc2pSignerParams {
  */
 declare function createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner(params: Mpc2pSignerParams): PolicyGatedSigner<"cryptographic">;
 
-export { type CoSignConnection, type CoSignFrame, type CoSignRequestAuthenticator, type CoSignTransport, CoSignUnavailableError, type CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams, type Mpc2pCoSignAgent, type Mpc2pSignerParams, type Mpc2pStepOutcome, NonBypassableEnforcement, PaymentIntent, PolicyGatedSigner, PolicyGatedSignerConfigError, WIRE_VERSION, type WireIntent, assertNonBypassable, canonicalIntentBytes, createLocalPolicyGatedSigner, createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner, requireNonBypassable, toWireIntent };
+export { type CoSignConnection, type CoSignFrame, type CoSignRequestAuthenticator, type CoSignRequestEnvelope, type CoSignTransport, CoSignUnavailableError, type CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams, MAX_FRAME_BYTES, type Mpc2pCoSignAgent, type Mpc2pSignerParams, type Mpc2pStepOutcome, type Mpc2pWireOptions, NonBypassableEnforcement, PaymentIntent, PolicyGatedSigner, PolicyGatedSignerConfigError, WIRE_VERSION, type WireIntent, assertNonBypassable, canonicalRequestBytes, createLocalPolicyGatedSigner, createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner, requireNonBypassable, toWireIntent };

package/dist/signer/index.js

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-export { WIRE_VERSION, canonicalIntentBytes, createLocalPolicyGatedSigner, createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner, toWireIntent } from '../chunk-EUW7AZ4P.js';
-export { CoSignUnavailableError, PolicyGatedSignerConfigError, assertNonBypassable, requireNonBypassable } from '../chunk-5TTOAVHE.js';
+export { MAX_FRAME_BYTES, WIRE_VERSION, canonicalRequestBytes, createLocalPolicyGatedSigner, createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner, toWireIntent } from '../chunk-S2ZSX2VS.js';
+export { CoSignUnavailableError, PolicyGatedSignerConfigError, assertNonBypassable, requireNonBypassable } from '../chunk-VJUXTVSW.js';
 import '../chunk-WMVJNPX2.js';
 import '../chunk-6CNAYQOL.js';
 import '../chunk-KT7XDT2T.js';