kawasekit 0.3.0 → 0.4.0

package/dist/signer/index.d.cts

@@ -159,27 +159,28 @@ interface CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams {
 declare function createLocalPolicyGatedSigner(params: CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams): PolicyGatedSigner<"advisory">;
 
 /**
- * The `mpc-2p` cross-process **wire** — the versioned `CoSignFrame` control
+ * The `mpc-2p` cross-process **wire** (v2) — the versioned `CoSignFrame` control
  * envelope + the A3 canonical-request encoding, as TypeScript source-of-truth.
  *
  * This is the public, TS-interpreted half of the two-layer wire (RFC m6-3a §4.2):
  * a small, versioned envelope carries the decoded {@link PaymentIntent} (never a
- * digest — A4) plus the opaque DKLs round payloads (hex, produced/consumed only
- * by the WASM crypto agent). The shapes here mirror the deployed
- * `kawasekit-mpc-2p` Rust serde **byte-for-byte** (snake_case `wire_version`,
- * `session_id`, `auth_tag`; the string-encoded {@link WireIntent}), so a frame the
- * SDK builds round-trips through the backend's `serde_json`. The richer envelope
- * (ceremonyId / ssid / A3 freshness) is a later slice.
+ * digest — A4) + a per-ceremony id + ssid + a freshness element, plus the opaque
+ * DKLs round payloads (hex, produced/consumed only by the WASM crypto agent). The
+ * shapes here mirror the deployed `kawasekit-mpc-2p` Rust serde **byte-for-byte**
+ * (snake_case `wire_version`, `session_id`, `ceremony_id`, `ssid`, `freshness_ts`,
+ * `freshness_nonce`, `auth_tag`; the string-encoded {@link WireIntent}), so a frame
+ * the SDK builds round-trips through the backend's `serde_json`.
  *
- * `canonicalIntentBytes` is the A3 analog of the EIP-712 digest corpus: it
- * reproduces the backend's `auth::canonical_intent_bytes` exactly, so the
- * injected authenticator's HMAC equals what the co-signer verifies.
+ * `canonicalRequestBytes` is the A3 analog of the EIP-712 digest corpus: it
+ * reproduces the backend's `auth::canonical_request_bytes` exactly, so the injected
+ * authenticator's HMAC equals what the co-signer verifies (RFC §4.6:
+ * `HMAC_k(wireVersion ‖ ceremonyId ‖ ssid ‖ canonical(intent) ‖ freshness)`).
  *
  * @packageDocumentation
  */
 
 /** The wire protocol version. A frame whose `wire_version` differs is rejected. */
-declare const WIRE_VERSION: 1;
+declare const WIRE_VERSION: 2;
 /**
  * The string-encoded EIP-3009 intent as it crosses the wire — lowercase `0x`
  * addresses, **decimal** integer strings, `0x` hex nonce. Decoupled from any
@@ -198,6 +199,20 @@ interface WireIntent {
 }
 /** Encode a decoded {@link PaymentIntent} for the wire. */
 declare function toWireIntent(intent: PaymentIntent): WireIntent;
+/**
+ * The A3 request envelope the adapter generates per `sign()` and authenticates: a
+ * per-ceremony id + ssid (bound into the A3 tag) + the intent + a freshness element
+ * (a timestamp + a per-request nonce distinct from the EIP-3009 nonce).
+ */
+interface CoSignRequestEnvelope {
+    readonly ceremonyId: string;
+    readonly ssid: string;
+    readonly intent: PaymentIntent;
+    /** Unix seconds; the backend checks it against a clock-skew window. */
+    readonly freshnessTs: number;
+    /** `0x` hex, distinct from the EIP-3009 nonce — the anti-replay key. */
+    readonly freshnessNonce: Hex;
+}
 /**
  * A versioned control frame: the only cross-language content of the wire. The
  * DKLs round bytes ride opaque inside `payload`; everything else is the small,
@@ -208,8 +223,12 @@ type CoSignFrame = {
 } & ({
     readonly kind: "request";
     readonly session_id: string;
+    readonly ceremony_id: string;
+    readonly ssid: string;
     readonly intent: WireIntent;
-    /** A3 authenticator over {@link canonicalIntentBytes}, `0x`-hex. */
+    readonly freshness_ts: number;
+    readonly freshness_nonce: Hex;
+    /** A3 authenticator over {@link canonicalRequestBytes}, `0x`-hex. */
     readonly auth_tag: Hex;
 } | {
     readonly kind: "round";
@@ -228,13 +247,14 @@ type CoSignFrame = {
     readonly message: string;
 });
 /**
- * The A3 canonical encoding of an intent — a byte-exact mirror of the backend's
- * `auth::canonical_intent_bytes` (domain-tag `kawasekit-mpc-2p/cosign-request/v2`,
- * one `key=value\n` line per field, lowercase `0x` addresses, decimal integers,
- * `0x` hex nonce, trailing newline). The injected authenticator HMACs these bytes;
- * because the encoding is shared, the tag equals the co-signer's.
+ * The A3 canonical encoding of a request — a byte-exact mirror of the backend's
+ * `auth::canonical_request_bytes` (domain-tag `kawasekit-mpc-2p/cosign-request/v3`,
+ * one `key=value\n` line per field: `wireVersion ‖ ceremonyId ‖ ssid ‖
+ * canonical(intent) ‖ freshness`; lowercase `0x` addresses + freshness nonce,
+ * decimal integers, trailing newline). The injected authenticator HMACs these
+ * bytes; because the encoding is shared, the tag equals the co-signer's.
  */
-declare function canonicalIntentBytes(intent: PaymentIntent): Uint8Array;
+declare function canonicalRequestBytes(env: CoSignRequestEnvelope): Uint8Array;
 
 /**
  * The `mpc-2p` PolicyGatedSigner adapter — `enforcement: "cryptographic"`.
@@ -302,7 +322,7 @@ interface CoSignTransport {
 }
 /** The A3 request authenticator — HMAC (or signature) over the canonical request bytes. */
 interface CoSignRequestAuthenticator {
-    /** Authenticator tag over {@link canonicalIntentBytes}; the key stays inside. */
+    /** Authenticator tag over {@link canonicalRequestBytes}; the key stays inside. */
     tag(canonicalRequest: Uint8Array): Hex | Promise<Hex>;
 }
 /** Parameters for {@link createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner}. */
@@ -343,4 +363,4 @@ interface Mpc2pSignerParams {
  */
 declare function createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner(params: Mpc2pSignerParams): PolicyGatedSigner<"cryptographic">;
 
-export { type CoSignConnection, type CoSignFrame, type CoSignRequestAuthenticator, type CoSignTransport, CoSignUnavailableError, type CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams, type Mpc2pCoSignAgent, type Mpc2pSignerParams, type Mpc2pStepOutcome, NonBypassableEnforcement, PaymentIntent, PolicyGatedSigner, PolicyGatedSignerConfigError, WIRE_VERSION, type WireIntent, assertNonBypassable, canonicalIntentBytes, createLocalPolicyGatedSigner, createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner, requireNonBypassable, toWireIntent };
+export { type CoSignConnection, type CoSignFrame, type CoSignRequestAuthenticator, type CoSignRequestEnvelope, type CoSignTransport, CoSignUnavailableError, type CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams, type Mpc2pCoSignAgent, type Mpc2pSignerParams, type Mpc2pStepOutcome, NonBypassableEnforcement, PaymentIntent, PolicyGatedSigner, PolicyGatedSignerConfigError, WIRE_VERSION, type WireIntent, assertNonBypassable, canonicalRequestBytes, createLocalPolicyGatedSigner, createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner, requireNonBypassable, toWireIntent };

package/dist/signer/index.d.ts

@@ -159,27 +159,28 @@ interface CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams {
 declare function createLocalPolicyGatedSigner(params: CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams): PolicyGatedSigner<"advisory">;
 
 /**
- * The `mpc-2p` cross-process **wire** — the versioned `CoSignFrame` control
+ * The `mpc-2p` cross-process **wire** (v2) — the versioned `CoSignFrame` control
  * envelope + the A3 canonical-request encoding, as TypeScript source-of-truth.
  *
  * This is the public, TS-interpreted half of the two-layer wire (RFC m6-3a §4.2):
  * a small, versioned envelope carries the decoded {@link PaymentIntent} (never a
- * digest — A4) plus the opaque DKLs round payloads (hex, produced/consumed only
- * by the WASM crypto agent). The shapes here mirror the deployed
- * `kawasekit-mpc-2p` Rust serde **byte-for-byte** (snake_case `wire_version`,
- * `session_id`, `auth_tag`; the string-encoded {@link WireIntent}), so a frame the
- * SDK builds round-trips through the backend's `serde_json`. The richer envelope
- * (ceremonyId / ssid / A3 freshness) is a later slice.
+ * digest — A4) + a per-ceremony id + ssid + a freshness element, plus the opaque
+ * DKLs round payloads (hex, produced/consumed only by the WASM crypto agent). The
+ * shapes here mirror the deployed `kawasekit-mpc-2p` Rust serde **byte-for-byte**
+ * (snake_case `wire_version`, `session_id`, `ceremony_id`, `ssid`, `freshness_ts`,
+ * `freshness_nonce`, `auth_tag`; the string-encoded {@link WireIntent}), so a frame
+ * the SDK builds round-trips through the backend's `serde_json`.
  *
- * `canonicalIntentBytes` is the A3 analog of the EIP-712 digest corpus: it
- * reproduces the backend's `auth::canonical_intent_bytes` exactly, so the
- * injected authenticator's HMAC equals what the co-signer verifies.
+ * `canonicalRequestBytes` is the A3 analog of the EIP-712 digest corpus: it
+ * reproduces the backend's `auth::canonical_request_bytes` exactly, so the injected
+ * authenticator's HMAC equals what the co-signer verifies (RFC §4.6:
+ * `HMAC_k(wireVersion ‖ ceremonyId ‖ ssid ‖ canonical(intent) ‖ freshness)`).
  *
  * @packageDocumentation
  */
 
 /** The wire protocol version. A frame whose `wire_version` differs is rejected. */
-declare const WIRE_VERSION: 1;
+declare const WIRE_VERSION: 2;
 /**
  * The string-encoded EIP-3009 intent as it crosses the wire — lowercase `0x`
  * addresses, **decimal** integer strings, `0x` hex nonce. Decoupled from any
@@ -198,6 +199,20 @@ interface WireIntent {
 }
 /** Encode a decoded {@link PaymentIntent} for the wire. */
 declare function toWireIntent(intent: PaymentIntent): WireIntent;
+/**
+ * The A3 request envelope the adapter generates per `sign()` and authenticates: a
+ * per-ceremony id + ssid (bound into the A3 tag) + the intent + a freshness element
+ * (a timestamp + a per-request nonce distinct from the EIP-3009 nonce).
+ */
+interface CoSignRequestEnvelope {
+    readonly ceremonyId: string;
+    readonly ssid: string;
+    readonly intent: PaymentIntent;
+    /** Unix seconds; the backend checks it against a clock-skew window. */
+    readonly freshnessTs: number;
+    /** `0x` hex, distinct from the EIP-3009 nonce — the anti-replay key. */
+    readonly freshnessNonce: Hex;
+}
 /**
  * A versioned control frame: the only cross-language content of the wire. The
  * DKLs round bytes ride opaque inside `payload`; everything else is the small,
@@ -208,8 +223,12 @@ type CoSignFrame = {
 } & ({
     readonly kind: "request";
     readonly session_id: string;
+    readonly ceremony_id: string;
+    readonly ssid: string;
     readonly intent: WireIntent;
-    /** A3 authenticator over {@link canonicalIntentBytes}, `0x`-hex. */
+    readonly freshness_ts: number;
+    readonly freshness_nonce: Hex;
+    /** A3 authenticator over {@link canonicalRequestBytes}, `0x`-hex. */
     readonly auth_tag: Hex;
 } | {
     readonly kind: "round";
@@ -228,13 +247,14 @@ type CoSignFrame = {
     readonly message: string;
 });
 /**
- * The A3 canonical encoding of an intent — a byte-exact mirror of the backend's
- * `auth::canonical_intent_bytes` (domain-tag `kawasekit-mpc-2p/cosign-request/v2`,
- * one `key=value\n` line per field, lowercase `0x` addresses, decimal integers,
- * `0x` hex nonce, trailing newline). The injected authenticator HMACs these bytes;
- * because the encoding is shared, the tag equals the co-signer's.
+ * The A3 canonical encoding of a request — a byte-exact mirror of the backend's
+ * `auth::canonical_request_bytes` (domain-tag `kawasekit-mpc-2p/cosign-request/v3`,
+ * one `key=value\n` line per field: `wireVersion ‖ ceremonyId ‖ ssid ‖
+ * canonical(intent) ‖ freshness`; lowercase `0x` addresses + freshness nonce,
+ * decimal integers, trailing newline). The injected authenticator HMACs these
+ * bytes; because the encoding is shared, the tag equals the co-signer's.
  */
-declare function canonicalIntentBytes(intent: PaymentIntent): Uint8Array;
+declare function canonicalRequestBytes(env: CoSignRequestEnvelope): Uint8Array;
 
 /**
  * The `mpc-2p` PolicyGatedSigner adapter — `enforcement: "cryptographic"`.
@@ -302,7 +322,7 @@ interface CoSignTransport {
 }
 /** The A3 request authenticator — HMAC (or signature) over the canonical request bytes. */
 interface CoSignRequestAuthenticator {
-    /** Authenticator tag over {@link canonicalIntentBytes}; the key stays inside. */
+    /** Authenticator tag over {@link canonicalRequestBytes}; the key stays inside. */
     tag(canonicalRequest: Uint8Array): Hex | Promise<Hex>;
 }
 /** Parameters for {@link createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner}. */
@@ -343,4 +363,4 @@ interface Mpc2pSignerParams {
  */
 declare function createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner(params: Mpc2pSignerParams): PolicyGatedSigner<"cryptographic">;
 
-export { type CoSignConnection, type CoSignFrame, type CoSignRequestAuthenticator, type CoSignTransport, CoSignUnavailableError, type CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams, type Mpc2pCoSignAgent, type Mpc2pSignerParams, type Mpc2pStepOutcome, NonBypassableEnforcement, PaymentIntent, PolicyGatedSigner, PolicyGatedSignerConfigError, WIRE_VERSION, type WireIntent, assertNonBypassable, canonicalIntentBytes, createLocalPolicyGatedSigner, createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner, requireNonBypassable, toWireIntent };
+export { type CoSignConnection, type CoSignFrame, type CoSignRequestAuthenticator, type CoSignRequestEnvelope, type CoSignTransport, CoSignUnavailableError, type CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams, type Mpc2pCoSignAgent, type Mpc2pSignerParams, type Mpc2pStepOutcome, NonBypassableEnforcement, PaymentIntent, PolicyGatedSigner, PolicyGatedSignerConfigError, WIRE_VERSION, type WireIntent, assertNonBypassable, canonicalRequestBytes, createLocalPolicyGatedSigner, createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner, requireNonBypassable, toWireIntent };

package/dist/signer/index.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-export { WIRE_VERSION, canonicalIntentBytes, createLocalPolicyGatedSigner, createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner, toWireIntent } from '../chunk-EUW7AZ4P.js';
+export { WIRE_VERSION, canonicalRequestBytes, createLocalPolicyGatedSigner, createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner, toWireIntent } from '../chunk-FD6Q4NB2.js';
 export { CoSignUnavailableError, PolicyGatedSignerConfigError, assertNonBypassable, requireNonBypassable } from '../chunk-5TTOAVHE.js';
 import '../chunk-WMVJNPX2.js';
 import '../chunk-6CNAYQOL.js';

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "kawasekit",
-  "version": "0.3.0",
+  "version": "0.4.0",
   "description": "TypeScript SDK for stablecoin payments by AI agents. Japan-first, JPYC-native.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "k0yote",

package/dist/chunk-EUW7AZ4P.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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* The `local` PolicyGatedSigner adapter — `enforcement: \"advisory\"`.\n *\n * Wraps a viem {@link Account} + a {@link SpendingPolicy} + a pinned EIP-712\n * domain. `sign(intent)` evaluates the policy SDK-side and, on pass, produces a\n * real EIP-3009 authorization via {@link signTransferWithAuthorization}. It is\n * **advisory** because the wrapped key can still sign anything elsewhere — the\n * gate is only reached if the caller chooses to call *this* `sign()`. Use it for\n * dev, the A1 cross-language fallback, and any flow that is explicitly not\n * bounded/regulated; the type-gate (`requireNonBypassable`) keeps it out of\n * flows that require non-bypassable enforcement.\n *\n * @packageDocumentation\n */\n\nimport type { Account } from \"viem\";\nimport { getAddress } from \"viem\";\nimport type { SpendingPolicy, SpendState } from \"../policy/spending-policy\";\nimport { evaluateSpendingPolicy } from \"../policy/spending-policy\";\nimport type { X402AssetParam } from \"../tokens/asset-domain\";\nimport { resolveAssetParam, resolvedAssetToEip3009Domain } from \"../tokens/asset-domain\";\nimport { signTransferWithAuthorization } from \"../tokens/eip3009\";\nimport { PolicyGatedSignerConfigError } from \"./errors\";\nimport type { PaymentIntent, PolicyGatedSigner, SignerDescription, SignResult } from \"./types\";\n\n/** Parameters for {@link createLocalPolicyGatedSigner}. */\nexport interface CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams {\n\t/** EOA / LocalAccount that signs the EIP-3009 authorization. */\n\treadonly account: Account;\n\t/** The spending policy this signer enforces (SDK-side, advisory). */\n\treadonly policy: SpendingPolicy;\n\t/** Asset binding — pins the EIP-712 domain `name`/`version`/`verifyingContract`. */\n\treadonly asset: X402AssetParam;\n\t/**\n\t * Required literal acknowledgement that this signer is **advisory** (a\n\t * key-holder can bypass its policy). Omitting it is a compile error (TS) and\n\t * a construction-time throw (JS) — so constructing an advisory signer is a\n\t * conscious, greppable act. For bounded/regulated flows use a cryptographic\n\t * adapter instead.\n\t */\n\treadonly acknowledgeAdvisory: true;\n\t/**\n\t * Optional cumulative-spend view (read-only) the adapter evaluates\n\t * `cumulativeCap` against. `local` does not own an authoritative ledger; the\n\t * caller folds a successful spend back in (e.g. via `mergeSpendState`) before\n\t * the next call. Default: empty.\n\t */\n\treadonly spendState?: () => SpendState | Promise<SpendState>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Construct a `local` (advisory) PolicyGatedSigner.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const signer = createLocalPolicyGatedSigner({\n *   account,\n *   policy: createSpendingPolicy({ session: { id, notAfter }, perToken: [{ token: JPYC, maxPerSign: 1_000n }], recipientAllowlist: \"any\" }),\n *   asset: { kind: \"known\", id: \"jpyc-v2\" },\n *   acknowledgeAdvisory: true,\n * });\n * const result = await signer.sign(intent);\n * ```\n */\nexport function createLocalPolicyGatedSigner(\n\tparams: CreateLocalPolicyGatedSignerParams,\n): PolicyGatedSigner<\"advisory\"> {\n\tif (params.acknowledgeAdvisory !== true) {\n\t\tthrow new PolicyGatedSignerConfigError(\n\t\t\t\"acknowledgeAdvisory\",\n\t\t\t\"a local signer is advisory (a key-holder can bypass its policy); pass `acknowledgeAdvisory: true` to construct one consciously, or use a cryptographic adapter for bounded/regulated flows\",\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\tconst { account, policy, spendState } = params;\n\tconst pinned = resolveAssetParam(params.asset);\n\tconst from = getAddress(account.address);\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tenforcement: \"advisory\",\n\t\tfrom,\n\t\tasync sign(intent: PaymentIntent): Promise<SignResult> {\n\t\t\tif (getAddress(intent.from) !== from) {\n\t\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\t\tok: false,\n\t\t\t\t\trejection: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treason: \"from_mismatch\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdetail: `intent.from ${getAddress(intent.from)} does not equal signer.from ${from}`,\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t};\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (getAddress(intent.token) !== pinned.verifyingContract) {\n\t\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\t\tok: false,\n\t\t\t\t\trejection: {\n\t\t\t\t\t\treason: \"token_not_allowed\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdetail: `intent.token ${getAddress(intent.token)} does not equal the signer's pinned verifyingContract ${pinned.verifyingContract}`,\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t};\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tconst state: SpendState = (await spendState?.()) ?? { spentPerToken: [] };\n\t\t\tconst nowSeconds = BigInt(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));\n\t\t\tconst decision = evaluateSpendingPolicy(policy, intent, state, nowSeconds);\n\t\t\tif (!decision.ok) {\n\t\t\t\treturn { ok: false, rejection: decision.rejection };\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\tconst signed = await signTransferWithAuthorization(\n\t\t\t\taccount,\n\t\t\t\tresolvedAssetToEip3009Domain(pinned, intent.chainId),\n\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\tfrom,\n\t\t\t\t\tto: intent.to,\n\t\t\t\t\tvalue: intent.value,\n\t\t\t\t\tvalidAfter: intent.validAfter,\n\t\t\t\t\tvalidBefore: intent.validBefore,\n\t\t\t\t\tnonce: intent.nonce,\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t\treturn { ok: true, signature: signed.signature, intent };\n\t\t},\n\t\tdescribe(): SignerDescription {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tenforcement: \"advisory\",\n\t\t\t\tfrom,\n\t\t\t\tpolicyId: policy.session.id,\n\t\t\t\tnotAfter: policy.session.notAfter,\n\t\t\t\trevoked: policy.revoked,\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n","/**\n * The `mpc-2p` cross-process **wire** — the versioned `CoSignFrame` control\n * envelope + the A3 canonical-request encoding, as TypeScript source-of-truth.\n *\n * This is the public, TS-interpreted half of the two-layer wire (RFC m6-3a §4.2):\n * a small, versioned envelope carries the decoded {@link PaymentIntent} (never a\n * digest — A4) plus the opaque DKLs round payloads (hex, produced/consumed only\n * by the WASM crypto agent). The shapes here mirror the deployed\n * `kawasekit-mpc-2p` Rust serde **byte-for-byte** (snake_case `wire_version`,\n * `session_id`, `auth_tag`; the string-encoded {@link WireIntent}), so a frame the\n * SDK builds round-trips through the backend's `serde_json`. The richer envelope\n * (ceremonyId / ssid / A3 freshness) is a later slice.\n *\n * `canonicalIntentBytes` is the A3 analog of the EIP-712 digest corpus: it\n * reproduces the backend's `auth::canonical_intent_bytes` exactly, so the\n * injected authenticator's HMAC equals what the co-signer verifies.\n *\n * @packageDocumentation\n */\n\nimport type { Hex } from \"viem\";\nimport type { PaymentIntent } from \"./types\";\n\n/** The wire protocol version. A frame whose `wire_version` differs is rejected. */\nexport const WIRE_VERSION = 1 as const;\n\n/**\n * The string-encoded EIP-3009 intent as it crosses the wire — lowercase `0x`\n * addresses, **decimal** integer strings, `0x` hex nonce. Decoupled from any\n * library's native serde so a stdlib client reproduces it trivially; matches the\n * Rust `WireIntent` field names + encoding exactly.\n */\nexport interface WireIntent {\n\treadonly token: string;\n\treadonly chain_id: number;\n\treadonly from: string;\n\treadonly to: string;\n\treadonly value: string;\n\treadonly valid_after: string;\n\treadonly valid_before: string;\n\treadonly nonce: string;\n}\n\n/** Encode a decoded {@link PaymentIntent} for the wire. */\nexport function toWireIntent(intent: PaymentIntent): WireIntent {\n\treturn {\n\t\ttoken: intent.token.toLowerCase(),\n\t\tchain_id: intent.chainId,\n\t\tfrom: intent.from.toLowerCase(),\n\t\tto: intent.to.toLowerCase(),\n\t\tvalue: intent.value.toString(),\n\t\tvalid_after: intent.validAfter.toString(),\n\t\tvalid_before: intent.validBefore.toString(),\n\t\tnonce: intent.nonce.toLowerCase(),\n\t};\n}\n\n/**\n * A versioned control frame: the only cross-language content of the wire. The\n * DKLs round bytes ride opaque inside `payload`; everything else is the small,\n * pinned envelope. Internally tagged by `kind` (matches the Rust serde).\n */\nexport type CoSignFrame = { readonly wire_version: typeof WIRE_VERSION } & (\n\t| {\n\t\t\treadonly kind: \"request\";\n\t\t\treadonly session_id: string;\n\t\t\treadonly intent: WireIntent;\n\t\t\t/** A3 authenticator over {@link canonicalIntentBytes}, `0x`-hex. */\n\t\t\treadonly auth_tag: Hex;\n\t  }\n\t| { readonly kind: \"round\"; readonly payload: Hex }\n\t| { readonly kind: \"result\"; readonly r: Hex; readonly s: Hex; readonly v: number }\n\t| { readonly kind: \"rejection\"; readonly reason: string; readonly detail: string }\n\t| { readonly kind: \"error\"; readonly message: string }\n);\n\n/**\n * The A3 canonical encoding of an intent — a byte-exact mirror of the backend's\n * `auth::canonical_intent_bytes` (domain-tag `kawasekit-mpc-2p/cosign-request/v2`,\n * one `key=value\\n` line per field, lowercase `0x` addresses, decimal integers,\n * `0x` hex nonce, trailing newline). The injected authenticator HMACs these bytes;\n * because the encoding is shared, the tag equals the co-signer's.\n */\nexport function canonicalIntentBytes(intent: PaymentIntent): Uint8Array {\n\tconst lines = [\n\t\t\"kawasekit-mpc-2p/cosign-request/v2\",\n\t\t`token=${intent.token.toLowerCase()}`,\n\t\t`chainId=${intent.chainId}`,\n\t\t`from=${intent.from.toLowerCase()}`,\n\t\t`to=${intent.to.toLowerCase()}`,\n\t\t`value=${intent.value}`,\n\t\t`validAfter=${intent.validAfter}`,\n\t\t`validBefore=${intent.validBefore}`,\n\t\t`nonce=${intent.nonce.toLowerCase()}`,\n\t];\n\treturn new TextEncoder().encode(lines.map((l) => `${l}\\n`).join(\"\"));\n}\n","/**\n * The `mpc-2p` PolicyGatedSigner adapter — `enforcement: \"cryptographic\"`.\n *\n * A 2-of-2 MPC co-signer: the agent holds ONE DKLs share, the owner backend holds\n * the other + the authoritative policy gate. No valid signature exists without a\n * **policy-passing co-sign**, so — unlike `local` — a single key-holder cannot\n * bypass the policy. That is what earns the non-bypassable `\"cryptographic\"` label\n * and lets the M6-0 type-gate (`requireNonBypassable`) reject an advisory signer at\n * compile time in bounded flows.\n *\n * **Open-core / thin adapter.** This module is pure orchestration over injected\n * interfaces — it ships in the public SDK with **no crypto, no socket, no key**:\n *\n * - {@link Mpc2pCoSignAgent} — the WASM DKLs share (the private package's compiled\n *   `crypto-core`); drives the agent's half of the ceremony round-by-round.\n * - {@link CoSignTransport} — the authenticated, encrypted (wss/mTLS) frame channel\n *   to the owner backend (the private package's transport).\n * - {@link CoSignRequestAuthenticator} — the A3 HMAC (the pre-shared key never\n *   enters this module).\n *\n * The adapter owns the protocol: it pins the EIP-712 domain, **re-derives the\n * digest from the intent (A4)** via the shared `transferWithAuthorizationTypes`\n * source-of-truth, computes the A3 canonical bytes, frames the versioned\n * {@link CoSignFrame} envelope, pumps the ceremony, and maps the terminal frame to\n * a {@link SignResult}. Crucially it has **no local-signing path**: any\n * transport/availability failure throws {@link CoSignUnavailableError}, never an\n * `{ ok: true }` and never a {@link PolicyRejection} (the no-silent-fallback\n * guarantee, RFC m6-3a constraint 3 / W8).\n *\n * @packageDocumentation\n */\n\nimport type { Address, Hex } from \"viem\";\nimport { getAddress, hashTypedData, serializeSignature } from \"viem\";\nimport type { X402AssetParam } from \"../tokens/asset-domain\";\nimport { resolveAssetParam, resolvedAssetToEip3009Domain } from \"../tokens/asset-domain\";\nimport { transferWithAuthorizationTypes } from \"../tokens/eip3009\";\nimport { CoSignUnavailableError, PolicyGatedSignerConfigError } from \"./errors\";\nimport type { CoSignFrame } from \"./mpc-2p-wire\";\nimport { canonicalIntentBytes, toWireIntent, WIRE_VERSION } from \"./mpc-2p-wire\";\nimport type {\n\tPaymentIntent,\n\tPolicyGatedSigner,\n\tPolicyRejection,\n\tSignerDescription,\n\tSignResult,\n} from \"./types\";\n\n/** The agent's half of the 2-of-2 ceremony (the injected WASM DKLs share). */\nexport interface Mpc2pCoSignAgent {\n\t/** The group 2-of-2 EOA this share controls — must equal the signer's `from`. */\n\tgroupEoa(): Address;\n\t/** Begin signing the 32-byte EIP-712 `digest`; returns the first outbound round (hex). */\n\tstart(digest: Hex): Hex;\n\t/** Feed one inbound round (hex); returns the next outbound round, or the final signature. */\n\tstep(incoming: Hex): Mpc2pStepOutcome;\n}\n\n/** The result of one {@link Mpc2pCoSignAgent.step}. */\nexport type Mpc2pStepOutcome =\n\t| { readonly outbound: Hex }\n\t| { readonly signature: { readonly r: Hex; readonly s: Hex; readonly v: number } };\n\n/** One authenticated, encrypted ceremony connection to the owner backend. */\nexport interface CoSignConnection {\n\t/** Send one control frame. */\n\tsend(frame: CoSignFrame): Promise<void>;\n\t/** Receive the next control frame (resolves per round). */\n\trecv(): Promise<CoSignFrame>;\n\t/** Release the connection (best-effort; errors here are ignored). */\n\tclose(): void | Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/** Opens a wss/mTLS {@link CoSignConnection} for a single co-sign ceremony. */\nexport interface CoSignTransport {\n\tconnect(): Promise<CoSignConnection>;\n}\n\n/** The A3 request authenticator — HMAC (or signature) over the canonical request bytes. */\nexport interface CoSignRequestAuthenticator {\n\t/** Authenticator tag over {@link canonicalIntentBytes}; the key stays inside. */\n\ttag(canonicalRequest: Uint8Array): Hex | Promise<Hex>;\n}\n\n/** Parameters for {@link createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner}. */\nexport interface Mpc2pSignerParams {\n\t/** The group 2-of-2 EOA; every `intent.from` must equal this (asserted vs the agent). */\n\treadonly from: Address;\n\t/** Asset binding — pins the EIP-712 domain `name`/`version`/`verifyingContract` (A4). */\n\treadonly asset: X402AssetParam;\n\t/** The bound policy session, for `describe()` (the backend holds the authoritative policy). */\n\treadonly session: { readonly id: string; readonly notAfter: bigint };\n\t/** The injected WASM DKLs share (private package). */\n\treadonly agent: Mpc2pCoSignAgent;\n\t/** The injected wss/mTLS frame channel (private package). */\n\treadonly transport: CoSignTransport;\n\t/** The injected A3 authenticator (the pre-shared key never enters the SDK). */\n\treadonly authenticator: CoSignRequestAuthenticator;\n}\n\n/**\n * The backend `rejection` reasons that are genuine **policy denials** (the owner\n * decided \"no\" — audit-meaningful → `{ ok: false, rejection }`). Any other reason\n * on a rejection frame is treated as \"the owner did not cleanly decide\" and throws\n * {@link CoSignUnavailableError} (no-silent-fallback; never a misclassified denial).\n */\nconst POLICY_REASONS: ReadonlySet<PolicyRejection[\"reason\"]> = new Set([\n\t\"revoked\",\n\t\"expired\",\n\t\"token_not_allowed\",\n\t\"recipient_not_allowed\",\n\t\"amount_exceeds_per_sign\",\n\t\"amount_exceeds_cumulative\",\n\t\"intent_digest_mismatch\",\n\t\"unauthenticated\",\n\t\"from_mismatch\",\n\t\"nonce_reuse_conflict\",\n]);\n\nfunction rejection(reason: PolicyRejection[\"reason\"], detail: string): SignResult {\n\treturn { ok: false, rejection: { reason, detail } };\n}\n\n/**\n * Construct an `mpc-2p` (cryptographic) PolicyGatedSigner over injected agent +\n * transport + authenticator.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * // The agent, transport and authenticator come from the private `kawasekit-mpc-2p`\n * // package (the WASM share, the wss/mTLS client, the HMAC key) — never bundled here.\n * const signer = createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner({\n *   from: groupEoa,\n *   asset: { kind: \"known\", id: \"jpyc-v2\" },\n *   session: { id: \"sess-1\", notAfter: 2_000_000_000n },\n *   agent, transport, authenticator,\n * });\n * requireNonBypassable(signer); // ✓ \"cryptographic\" — passes the type-gate\n * const result = await signer.sign(intent);\n * ```\n */\nexport function createMpc2pPolicyGatedSigner(\n\tparams: Mpc2pSignerParams,\n): PolicyGatedSigner<\"cryptographic\"> {\n\tconst { agent, transport, authenticator, session } = params;\n\tconst pinned = resolveAssetParam(params.asset);\n\tconst from = getAddress(params.from);\n\n\t// The injected share MUST control the declared group EOA, or every signature\n\t// would recover to the wrong address.\n\tconst agentEoa = getAddress(agent.groupEoa());\n\tif (agentEoa !== from) {\n\t\tthrow new PolicyGatedSignerConfigError(\n\t\t\t\"from\",\n\t\t\t`the agent share controls ${agentEoa} but params.from is ${from}`,\n\t\t);\n\t}\n\n\treturn {\n\t\tenforcement: \"cryptographic\",\n\t\tfrom,\n\t\tasync sign(intent: PaymentIntent): Promise<SignResult> {\n\t\t\t// Adapter-local pre-checks (cheap; no wire needed). Same shape as `local`.\n\t\t\tif (getAddress(intent.from) !== from) {\n\t\t\t\treturn rejection(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"from_mismatch\",\n\t\t\t\t\t`intent.from ${getAddress(intent.from)} does not equal signer.from ${from}`,\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tif (getAddress(intent.token) !== pinned.verifyingContract) {\n\t\t\t\treturn rejection(\n\t\t\t\t\t\"token_not_allowed\",\n\t\t\t\t\t`intent.token ${getAddress(intent.token)} does not equal the signer's pinned verifyingContract ${pinned.verifyingContract}`,\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t// A4: re-derive the EIP-712 digest from the intent + the pinned domain (the\n\t\t\t// SDK's exported types are the cross-language source of truth). The agent and\n\t\t\t// the backend each sign THIS digest; the SoT keeps them byte-identical.\n\t\t\tconst digest = hashTypedData({\n\t\t\t\tdomain: resolvedAssetToEip3009Domain(pinned, intent.chainId),\n\t\t\t\ttypes: transferWithAuthorizationTypes,\n\t\t\t\tprimaryType: \"TransferWithAuthorization\",\n\t\t\t\tmessage: {\n\t\t\t\t\tfrom,\n\t\t\t\t\tto: intent.to,\n\t\t\t\t\tvalue: intent.value,\n\t\t\t\t\tvalidAfter: intent.validAfter,\n\t\t\t\t\tvalidBefore: intent.validBefore,\n\t\t\t\t\tnonce: intent.nonce,\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t});\n\n\t\t\t// A3: authenticate the request (the canonical bytes are the shared SoT; the\n\t\t\t// HMAC key lives inside the injected authenticator).\n\t\t\tconst authTag = await authenticator.tag(canonicalIntentBytes(intent));\n\n\t\t\tconst conn = await openConnection(transport);\n\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\treturn await runCeremony(conn, agent, session.id, intent, digest, authTag);\n\t\t\t} finally {\n\t\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\t\tawait conn.close();\n\t\t\t\t} catch {\n\t\t\t\t\t// best-effort cleanup; a close error must not mask the result/throw.\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\t\tdescribe(): SignerDescription {\n\t\t\treturn {\n\t\t\t\tenforcement: \"cryptographic\",\n\t\t\t\tfrom,\n\t\t\t\tpolicyId: session.id,\n\t\t\t\tnotAfter: session.notAfter,\n\t\t\t\t// The backend owns authoritative revocation (a revoked session → a\n\t\t\t\t// rejection at sign time); this metadata field is best-effort.\n\t\t\t\trevoked: false,\n\t\t\t};\n\t\t},\n\t};\n}\n\nasync function openConnection(transport: CoSignTransport): Promise<CoSignConnection> {\n\ttry {\n\t\treturn await transport.connect();\n\t} catch (cause) {\n\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\"co-signer connection failed\", { cause });\n\t}\n}\n\n/**\n * Drive the full ceremony over `conn`: send the authenticated request + the agent's\n * first round, then pump rounds until a terminal frame. Returns a {@link SignResult}\n * (success or a policy denial) or throws {@link CoSignUnavailableError}. There is no\n * path that returns `{ ok: true }` without a backend `result` frame.\n */\nasync function runCeremony(\n\tconn: CoSignConnection,\n\tagent: Mpc2pCoSignAgent,\n\tsessionId: string,\n\tintent: PaymentIntent,\n\tdigest: Hex,\n\tauthTag: Hex,\n): Promise<SignResult> {\n\tconst send = async (frame: CoSignFrame): Promise<void> => {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tawait conn.send(frame);\n\t\t} catch (cause) {\n\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\"co-sign connection dropped while sending\", { cause });\n\t\t}\n\t};\n\tconst recv = async (): Promise<CoSignFrame> => {\n\t\tlet frame: CoSignFrame;\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tframe = await conn.recv();\n\t\t} catch (cause) {\n\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\"co-sign connection dropped mid-ceremony\", { cause });\n\t\t}\n\t\tif (frame.wire_version !== WIRE_VERSION) {\n\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\n\t\t\t\t`co-signer spoke wire_version ${frame.wire_version}, expected ${WIRE_VERSION}`,\n\t\t\t);\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn frame;\n\t};\n\n\tawait send({\n\t\twire_version: WIRE_VERSION,\n\t\tkind: \"request\",\n\t\tsession_id: sessionId,\n\t\tintent: toWireIntent(intent),\n\t\tauth_tag: authTag,\n\t});\n\n\tlet first: Hex;\n\ttry {\n\t\tfirst = agent.start(digest);\n\t} catch (cause) {\n\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\"the agent failed to start the ceremony\", { cause });\n\t}\n\tawait send({ wire_version: WIRE_VERSION, kind: \"round\", payload: first });\n\n\tlet agentSig: { r: Hex; s: Hex; v: number } | null = null;\n\tfor (;;) {\n\t\tconst frame = await recv();\n\t\tswitch (frame.kind) {\n\t\t\tcase \"round\": {\n\t\t\t\tlet step: Mpc2pStepOutcome;\n\t\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\t\tstep = agent.step(frame.payload);\n\t\t\t\t} catch (cause) {\n\t\t\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\"the agent rejected a round frame\", { cause });\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tif (\"outbound\" in step) {\n\t\t\t\t\tawait send({ wire_version: WIRE_VERSION, kind: \"round\", payload: step.outbound });\n\t\t\t\t} else {\n\t\t\t\t\tagentSig = step.signature;\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tbreak;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcase \"result\": {\n\t\t\t\tif (agentSig === null) {\n\t\t\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"the backend returned a result before the agent derived a signature\",\n\t\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tif (\n\t\t\t\t\tframe.r.toLowerCase() !== agentSig.r.toLowerCase() ||\n\t\t\t\t\tframe.s.toLowerCase() !== agentSig.s.toLowerCase() ||\n\t\t\t\t\tframe.v !== agentSig.v\n\t\t\t\t) {\n\t\t\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\"the backend and agent derived different signatures\");\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\treturn { ok: true, signature: assembleSignature(agentSig), intent };\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcase \"rejection\": {\n\t\t\t\t// A genuine policy denial → typed rejection. A non-policy \"rejection\"\n\t\t\t\t// (transient/internal) is \"the owner did not decide\" → no-fallback throw.\n\t\t\t\tif (POLICY_REASONS.has(frame.reason as PolicyRejection[\"reason\"])) {\n\t\t\t\t\t// reason membership verified against POLICY_REASONS above.\n\t\t\t\t\treturn rejection(frame.reason as PolicyRejection[\"reason\"], frame.detail);\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\n\t\t\t\t\t`co-signer returned a non-policy rejection (${frame.reason}): ${frame.detail}`,\n\t\t\t\t);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tcase \"error\": {\n\t\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(`co-signer error: ${frame.message}`);\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tdefault: {\n\t\t\t\t// Unknown frame kind — never a silent success.\n\t\t\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(\"co-signer sent an unexpected frame\");\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n}\n\n/** Assemble a 65-byte EIP-3009 signature from the agent's `{ r, s, v }` (v = recovery_id + 27). */\nfunction assembleSignature(sig: { r: Hex; s: Hex; v: number }): Hex {\n\tconst yParity = sig.v - 27;\n\tif (yParity !== 0 && yParity !== 1) {\n\t\tthrow new CoSignUnavailableError(`malformed recovery id v=${sig.v} (expected 27 or 28)`);\n\t}\n\treturn serializeSignature({ r: sig.r, s: sig.s, yParity });\n}\n"]}