jules-orchestrator-kit 0.70.0 → 0.72.0

package/src/engine.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-import { loadConfig, parseYaml, normalizeScope } from "./config.mjs";
+import { loadConfig, resolveTrustedPolicy } from "./config.mjs";
 import { isTestPath } from "./test-paths.mjs";
-import { isPlaceholderTestScript } from "./stack-detector.mjs";
+import { isPlaceholderTestScript, isSrcLayout } from "./stack-detector.mjs";
 import { checkCollectionFloor } from "./ops/test-collection.mjs";
 import { checkScope, scanDiff, scanBinaryPayloads, redactSecrets } from "./security.mjs";
-import { changedFiles, diffBytes, diffText, binaryDiffEntries, symlinkChanges, showFromOrigin, runCmd } from "./git.mjs";
+import { changedFiles, diffBytes, diffText, binaryDiffEntries, symlinkChanges, showFromOrigin, runCmd, materializeSnapshot } from "./git.mjs";
 import { createProvider, ProviderRateLimitError, ProviderUnavailableError } from "./provider.mjs";
 import { resolveRoutedProvider } from "./router.mjs";
 import { withBudget, appendLedger, getQueueDir, ensureDir, rollbackBudgetReservation, isConcurrencyGroupLocked, checkDailyBudget } from "./state.mjs";
@@ -152,13 +152,30 @@ export function fingerprintFailureState(failure = {}, root = process.cwd()) {
  */
 export async function gate(opts = {}) {
   const root = opts.root || process.cwd();
-  const config = opts.config || loadConfig(root);
-  const base = opts.base || config.baseBranch || "main";
   const mode = opts.mode || (opts.workingTree ? "working-tree" : (process.env.JULES_GATE_MODE || "working-tree"));
+  const config = opts.config || (mode === "working-tree" ? loadConfig(root) : null);
   const progressBus = opts.progressBus;
   const progressToken = opts.progressToken;
   const phases = [];
 
+  const policy = resolveTrustedPolicy(root, opts.base, mode, { ...opts, config });
+  if (!policy.ok) {
+    phases.push({
+      phase: "scope",
+      ok: false,
+      error: policy.error,
+      violations: [{ file: ".agent/config.yml", rule: "BUILTIN_PROTECT", reason: policy.error }],
+    });
+    appendTelemetry(root, "gate_finished", { ok: false, code: policy.code || 3, error: policy.error });
+    return { ok: false, code: policy.code || 3, phases, error: policy.error, base: policy.base };
+  }
+
+  const base = policy.base;
+  const trustedScope = policy.scope;
+  let trustedVerify = policy.verify;
+  const trustedDiffKb = policy.limits?.diffKb || 75;
+  const trustedEvidence = policy.evidence || { strictTestLock: true };
+
   appendTelemetry(root, "gate_started", { base, mode });
 
   let files = [];
@@ -172,73 +189,15 @@ export async function gate(opts = {}) {
   } catch (err) {
     phases.push({ phase: "git_resolution", ok: false, error: err.message });
     appendTelemetry(root, "gate_finished", { ok: false, code: 1, error: err.message });
-    return { ok: false, code: 1, phases, error: err.message };
+    return { ok: false, code: 1, phases, error: err.message, base };
   }
 
-  // Phase 1: Scope Guard (Fetch trusted config strictly from origin/base using single normalizeScope)
-  let trustedScope = config.scope;
-  let trustedVerify = config.verify;
-  let trustedDiffKb = 75;
-
-  const trustedConfigRaw = showFromOrigin(root, base, ".agent/config.yml") || showFromOrigin(root, base, ".agent/jules.yml");
-  if (trustedConfigRaw) {
-    try {
-      const parsed = parseYaml(trustedConfigRaw);
-      // CRITICAL B1 FIX: normalizeScope ensures BUILTIN_DENY is ALWAYS merged with user deny rules
-      trustedScope = normalizeScope(parsed);
-      if (parsed.limits?.diff_kb || parsed.limits?.diffKb) {
-        trustedDiffKb = Number(parsed.limits.diff_kb || parsed.limits.diffKb) || 75;
-      }
-      if (parsed.verify || parsed.test_cmd || parsed.build_cmd) {
-        trustedVerify = {
-          setup: parsed.verify?.setup || config.verify.setup,
-          lint: parsed.verify?.lint || parsed.lint_cmd || config.verify.lint,
-          test: parsed.verify?.test || parsed.test_cmd || config.verify.test,
-          unit: parsed.verify?.unit || config.verify.unit || parsed.verify?.test || parsed.test_cmd || config.verify.test,
-          fuzz: parsed.verify?.fuzz || parsed.fuzz_cmd || config.verify.fuzz,
-          invariant: parsed.verify?.invariant || parsed.invariant_cmd || config.verify.invariant,
-          e2e: parsed.verify?.e2e || parsed.e2e_cmd || config.verify.e2e,
-          teardown: parsed.verify?.teardown || config.verify.teardown,
-          build: parsed.verify?.build || parsed.build_cmd || config.verify.build,
-          stages: parsed.verify?.stages || config.verify.stages,
-          policy: parsed.verify?.policy || config.verify.policy,
-          // Read from the base commit like every other trusted field: an
-          // uncommitted `required: false` must not be able to switch the gate off.
-          required: parsed.verify?.required !== undefined ? parsed.verify.required !== false : config.verify.required !== false,
-          // The floor the collection check applies. Omitting it here meant
-          // `verify.minTests` was silently dropped and always defaulted to 1
-          // — while the failure message told the operator to set exactly
-          // that. A remediation hint that does nothing is worse than none.
-          minTests:
-            parsed.verify?.minTests !== undefined
-              ? parsed.verify.minTests
-              : parsed.verify?.min_tests !== undefined
-                ? parsed.verify.min_tests
-                : config.verify.minTests,
-          tamperGuard: parsed.verify?.tamperGuard || parsed.verify?.tamper_guard || config.verify.tamperGuard,
-          scope: parsed.verify?.scope || config.verify.scope || "global",
-          timeoutMs: parsed.verify?.timeoutMs || parsed.verify?.timeout_ms || config.verify.timeoutMs,
-        };
-      }
-    } catch (_) {}
-  } else {
-    // CRITICAL H-c FIX: Fall back strictly to normalizeScope({}) (built-ins only), never HEAD config
-    trustedScope = normalizeScope({});
-    if (opts.config?.limits?.diffKb || opts.config?.limits?.diff_kb) {
-      trustedDiffKb = Number(opts.config.limits.diffKb || opts.config.limits.diff_kb) || 75;
-    }
-  }
-
-  // A symlink is judged by its own name, so `notes.md -> .agent/config.yml`
-  // walked straight past a deny list that names the target. Judge both: the
-  // link because it is what the diff adds, and the path it resolves to because
-  // that is what it grants reach to.
+  // Phase 1: Scope Guard
   let symlinks = [];
   try {
     symlinks = symlinkChanges(root, base, mode);
   } catch (_) {
-    // Scope must still be enforced on the ordinary file list if git cannot
-    // describe the links.
+    // Scope must still be enforced on the ordinary file list if git cannot describe the links.
   }
   const scopeCandidates = [...files];
   const symlinkTargetOf = new Map();
@@ -249,7 +208,12 @@ export async function gate(opts = {}) {
   }
 
   const scopeResult = checkScope(scopeCandidates, trustedScope, {
-    allowProtected: opts.allowProtected || process.env.JULES_ALLOW_COMMAND_FILE_CHANGES === "true",
+    allowProtected:
+      opts.allowProtected ||
+      process.env.JULES_ALLOW_COMMAND_FILE_CHANGES === "true" ||
+      process.env.JULES_ALLOW_COMMAND_FILE_CHANGES === "1" ||
+      process.env.AGENT_ALLOW_COMMAND_FILE_CHANGES === "true" ||
+      process.env.AGENT_ALLOW_COMMAND_FILE_CHANGES === "1",
   });
   // Report the violation against the link the change actually introduced, not
   // against a path the diff never names — the operator has to be able to find it.
@@ -263,23 +227,8 @@ export async function gate(opts = {}) {
 
   // Bootstrap: the files that bring a repository under the gate are not agent
   // edits to the gate.
-  //
-  // `init` writes `.agent/**` and then tells the user to commit it. Doing
-  // exactly that produced Exit 3 on the very first run, because the base
-  // branch does not have the commit yet and every scaffolded path matches
-  // BUILTIN_PROTECT or BUILTIN_DENY. The advice printed alongside it was
-  // `--allow-protected` — so a newcomer's first lesson was how to switch the
-  // scope guard off. A gate that refuses its own installation is not strict,
-  // it is broken.
-  //
-  // Narrow on purpose, and only where it cannot weaken anything: the base
-  // commit must have no gate config at all — in which case `trustedScope` is
-  // already built-ins only and nothing in the added files is trusted — and
-  // every violating path must be scaffold that the base does not have. A
-  // repository already under the gate keeps the full rule, so an agent still
-  // cannot touch the policy it is governed by.
   let acceptedScaffold = [];
-  if (!scopeResult.ok && !trustedConfigRaw) {
+  if (!scopeResult.ok && policy.isBootstrap) {
     const violations = scopeResult.violations || [];
     const isScaffold = (f) => typeof f === "string" && f.replace(/\\/g, "/").startsWith(".agent/");
     if (
@@ -307,7 +256,7 @@ export async function gate(opts = {}) {
 
   if (!scopeResult.ok) {
     appendTelemetry(root, "gate_finished", { ok: false, code: 3 });
-    return { ok: false, code: 3, phases };
+    return { ok: false, code: 3, phases, base };
   }
 
   // Phase 2: Diff Payload Governor
@@ -359,12 +308,18 @@ export async function gate(opts = {}) {
     return { ok: false, code: 6, phases };
   }
 
-  // Pre-verification: compute test directory integrity hash
-  const preTestHashResult = computeDirectoryHash(root, { testOnly: true });
-  const preTestHash = preTestHashResult.treeHash;
-  const executionRecords = [];
-
   // Phase 4: Automated Test & Build Verification (Uses trusted verify commands only)
+  let snapshot = { cwd: root, cleanup: () => {}, mode };
+  try {
+    if (mode === "staged" || mode === "committed") {
+      snapshot = materializeSnapshot(root, mode, base);
+    }
+  } catch (snapErr) {
+    phases.push({ phase: "verify", ok: false, error: snapErr.message });
+    appendTelemetry(root, "gate_finished", { ok: false, code: snapErr.code || 1, error: snapErr.message });
+    return { ok: false, code: snapErr.code || 1, phases, error: snapErr.message, base };
+  }
+
   let testResult = { ok: true, status: 0 };
   let buildResult = { ok: true, status: 0 };
   let serverResult = { ok: true, status: 0 };
@@ -400,21 +355,10 @@ export async function gate(opts = {}) {
   const verifyTimeout = trustedVerify.timeoutMs || 300_000;
 
   // Monorepo scoping: run the suites the change can actually break.
-  //
-  // `resolveWorkspaceBoundary()` shipped, was drawn in the architecture
-  // diagrams and documented as a headline feature — and was called by nothing.
-  // Every change in a monorepo ran the root suite, so a one-package edit was
-  // gated on every other package's tests. It resolves the changed files to
-  // their sub-projects and composes the per-project commands.
-  //
-  // It stays opt-in (`verify.scope: affected`) because narrowing what runs is
-  // only safe when someone asked for it, and it yields to the global command
-  // whenever a shared file is touched or no sub-project command is found — a
-  // narrower run that misses the breakage is worse than a slow one.
   let boundary = null;
   if (trustedVerify.scope === "affected" && !(Array.isArray(trustedVerify.stages) && trustedVerify.stages.length > 0)) {
     try {
-      boundary = resolveWorkspaceBoundary(files, root);
+      boundary = resolveWorkspaceBoundary(files, snapshot.cwd);
     } catch (_) {
       boundary = null;
     }
@@ -440,6 +384,13 @@ export async function gate(opts = {}) {
     stagesToRun.push(...buildDefaultStages(trustedVerify));
   }
 
+  // Pre-verification: compute test directory integrity hash on snapshot under test
+  const preTestHashResult = computeDirectoryHash(snapshot.cwd, { testOnly: true });
+  let preTestHash = preTestHashResult.treeHash;
+  let postTestHash = preTestHash;
+  const executionRecords = [];
+  let testTampered = false;
+
   try {
     for (const stage of stagesToRun) {
       const isAssertion = Boolean(
@@ -459,7 +410,16 @@ export async function gate(opts = {}) {
       let assertMetrics = {};
 
       if (isAssertion) {
-        const assertRes = runAssertion(stage, root);
+        const assertRes = runAssertion(
+          {
+            ...stage,
+            allowTestModifications: opts.allowTestModifications === true,
+            allowTestChanges: opts.allowTestChanges,
+            tamperGuard: trustedVerify.tamperGuard,
+            allowUnreadableTests: opts.allowUnreadableTests === true,
+          },
+          snapshot.cwd
+        );
         durationMs = assertRes.metrics?.durationMs ?? (Date.now() - startTime);
         stdoutRedacted = assertRes.stdout || "";
         stderrRedacted = assertRes.stderr || "";
@@ -470,9 +430,16 @@ export async function gate(opts = {}) {
       } else {
         const stageEnv = stage.networkAccess === "forbidden" || trustedVerify.policy?.offline
           ? { ...testEnv, JULES_SANDBOX_OFFLINE: "1" }
-          : testEnv;
+          : { ...testEnv };
+
+        // F11: Prepend src/ to PYTHONPATH for Python src-layout repositories
+        if (isSrcLayout(snapshot.cwd)) {
+          const currentPypath = stageEnv.PYTHONPATH || "";
+          const srcDir = join(snapshot.cwd, "src");
+          stageEnv.PYTHONPATH = currentPypath ? `${srcDir}:${currentPypath}` : srcDir;
+        }
 
-        res = runCmd(stage.cmd, { cwd: root, ignoreError: true, env: stageEnv, timeout: stage.timeoutMs || verifyTimeout });
+        res = runCmd(stage.cmd, { cwd: snapshot.cwd, ignoreError: true, env: stageEnv, timeout: stage.timeoutMs || verifyTimeout });
         durationMs = Date.now() - startTime;
         stdoutRedacted = redactSecrets(res.stdout || "");
         stderrRedacted = redactSecrets(res.stderr || "");
@@ -493,7 +460,7 @@ export async function gate(opts = {}) {
 
       if (stage.kind === "test" || stage.kind === "unit") {
         testResult = { ok: stageOk, status: res.status, stdout: stdoutRedacted, stderr: stderrRedacted, command: stage.cmd };
-        const fingerprint = !stageOk ? fingerprintFailureState(testResult, root) : null;
+        const fingerprint = !stageOk ? fingerprintFailureState(testResult, snapshot.cwd) : null;
         if (stage.cmd) recordVerifyRun(root, stage.cmd, stageOk, fingerprint, durationMs);
         if (!stageOk && stage.cmd) {
           const runs = readVerifyRuns(root, stage.cmd);
@@ -517,7 +484,7 @@ export async function gate(opts = {}) {
             });
             appendTelemetry(root, "gate_phase", { phase: "verify", ok: false, quarantined: true });
             appendTelemetry(root, "gate_finished", { ok: false, code: 8 });
-            return { ok: false, code: 8, phases, flakyVerdict: flakyVerdictResult };
+            return { ok: false, code: 8, phases, flakyVerdict: flakyVerdictResult, base };
           }
         }
       } else if (stage.kind === "build") {
@@ -539,30 +506,30 @@ export async function gate(opts = {}) {
         break;
       }
     }
+
+    if (!failingCmd && trustedVerify.server && trustedVerify.server.command) {
+      serverResult = await probeDevServer(trustedVerify.server, snapshot.cwd);
+      if (!serverResult.ok) {
+        failingCmd = serverResult;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Post-verification test integrity check (No Test Weakening Invariant)
+    const postTestHashResult = computeDirectoryHash(snapshot.cwd, { testOnly: true });
+    postTestHash = postTestHashResult.treeHash;
+    if (trustedEvidence.strictTestLock && !opts.allowTestModifications && preTestHashResult.fileCount > 0) {
+      const changedTestFile = files.find((f) => isTestPath(f));
+      if (changedTestFile && preTestHash !== postTestHash) {
+        testTampered = true;
+      }
+    }
   } finally {
     if (trustedVerify.teardown) {
       try {
-        runCmd(trustedVerify.teardown, { cwd: root, ignoreError: true, env: testEnv });
+        runCmd(trustedVerify.teardown, { cwd: snapshot.cwd, ignoreError: true, env: testEnv });
       } catch (_) {}
     }
-  }
-
-  if (!failingCmd && trustedVerify.server && trustedVerify.server.command) {
-    serverResult = await probeDevServer(trustedVerify.server, root);
-    if (!serverResult.ok) {
-      failingCmd = serverResult;
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Post-verification test integrity check (No Test Weakening Invariant)
-  const postTestHashResult = computeDirectoryHash(root, { testOnly: true });
-  const postTestHash = postTestHashResult.treeHash;
-  let testTampered = false;
-  if (config.evidence?.strictTestLock && !opts.allowTestModifications && preTestHashResult.fileCount > 0) {
-    const changedTestFile = files.find((f) => isTestPath(f));
-    if (changedTestFile && preTestHash !== postTestHash) {
-      testTampered = true;
-    }
+    snapshot.cleanup();
   }
 
   // A gate that ran no verification at all must not report APPROVED.
@@ -696,9 +663,9 @@ export async function gate(opts = {}) {
     executionRecords,
     secretScanOk: secretResult.ok,
     diffKb: Math.round(bytes / 1024),
-    maxDiffKb: config.limits.diffKb || 75,
+    maxDiffKb: trustedDiffKb,
     protectedScopeOk: scopeResult.ok,
-    repository: config.provider || "jules",
+    repository: policy.provider || config?.provider || "jules",
     failedStage: failingCmd?.stageId || failingCmd?.phase || null,
     diagnostics: failingCmd?.diagnostics?.length ? failingCmd.diagnostics : (failingCmd?.stderr ? [failingCmd.stderr] : []),
     metrics: failingCmd?.metrics || {},
@@ -709,9 +676,18 @@ export async function gate(opts = {}) {
     evidenceManifest.testIntegrity.tamperDetected = true;
   }
   let evidencePath = null;
-  try {
-    evidencePath = writeEvidenceManifest(root, evidenceManifest);
-  } catch (_) {}
+  const shouldPersistEvidence =
+    !opts.dryRun &&
+    !opts["dry-run"] &&
+    process.env.JULES_DRY_RUN !== "1" &&
+    process.env.AGENT_DRY_RUN !== "1" &&
+    trustedEvidence.enabled !== false &&
+    config?.evidence?.enabled !== false;
+  if (shouldPersistEvidence) {
+    try {
+      evidencePath = writeEvidenceManifest(root, evidenceManifest);
+    } catch (_) {}
+  }
 
   // Export structured JSON report if requested
   const jsonReportPath = opts.jsonReport || opts.jsonReportPath || process.env.JULES_JSON_REPORT || null;

package/src/git.mjs

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import { execFileSync, execSync } from "node:child_process";
-import { readFileSync, existsSync, statSync, lstatSync, readlinkSync } from "node:fs";
+import { readFileSync, existsSync, statSync, lstatSync, readlinkSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync, symlinkSync } from "node:fs";
 import { join, delimiter } from "node:path";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
 import { normalizePath, canonicalizePath } from "./config.mjs";
 
 
@@ -676,6 +677,108 @@ export function worktreePrune(root = process.cwd()) {
   return git(["worktree", "prune"], { cwd: root });
 }
 
+/**
+ * Materialize the revision under review into an isolated execution directory (F10).
+ *
+ * In working-tree mode, verification executes against the live tree (`root`).
+ * In staged or committed mode, the verification command must execute against the
+ * snapshot being judged, rather than the working copy — attesting a revision
+ * you did not execute is the failure this tool exists to refuse.
+ *
+ * @param {string} root - repository root
+ * @param {string} mode - "working-tree" | "staged" | "committed"
+ * @param {string} [targetRef="HEAD"] - commit reference for committed mode
+ * @returns {{ cwd: string, cleanup: () => void, mode: string }}
+ */
+export function materializeSnapshot(root = process.cwd(), mode = "working-tree", targetRef = "HEAD") {
+  if (mode === "working-tree" || mode === "working") {
+    return {
+      cwd: root,
+      cleanup: () => {},
+      mode,
+    };
+  }
+
+  const prefix = `jules-${mode}-snapshot-`;
+  const tmpDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), prefix));
+  let worktreeAdded = false;
+
+  try {
+    if (mode === "staged" || mode === "index") {
+      execFileSync("git", ["-c", "core.quotePath=false", "checkout-index", "--all", `--prefix=${tmpDir}/`], {
+        cwd: root,
+        encoding: "utf-8",
+        stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"],
+      });
+    } else {
+      // committed mode
+      try {
+        execFileSync("git", ["worktree", "add", "--detach", tmpDir, targetRef || "HEAD"], {
+          cwd: root,
+          stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"],
+        });
+        worktreeAdded = true;
+      } catch (_) {
+        // Fallback: git archive piped to tar when worktree cannot be created (e.g. read-only .git)
+        try {
+          const tar = execFileSync("git", ["archive", targetRef || "HEAD"], {
+            cwd: root,
+            maxBuffer: 50 * 1024 * 1024,
+          });
+          execFileSync("tar", ["-x", "-C", tmpDir], { input: tar, stdio: ["pipe", "ignore", "pipe"] });
+        } catch (tarErr) {
+          throw new Error(`Failed to extract snapshot for ${targetRef || "HEAD"}: ${tarErr.message}`);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Preserve local runtime dependencies in snapshot so offline/sandboxed verification can run:
+    const ignoredDeps = ["node_modules", ".venv", "venv", "target", ".pytest_cache"];
+    for (const dep of ignoredDeps) {
+      const srcDep = join(root, dep);
+      const dstDep = join(tmpDir, dep);
+      if (existsSync(srcDep) && !existsSync(dstDep)) {
+        try {
+          symlinkSync(srcDep, dstDep, "junction");
+        } catch (_) {}
+      }
+    }
+
+    const cleanup = () => {
+      if (worktreeAdded) {
+        try {
+          execFileSync("git", ["worktree", "remove", "--force", tmpDir], {
+            cwd: root,
+            stdio: ["ignore", "ignore", "ignore"],
+          });
+        } catch (_) {}
+      }
+      try {
+        rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+      } catch (_) {}
+    };
+
+    return {
+      cwd: tmpDir,
+      cleanup,
+      mode,
+    };
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (worktreeAdded) {
+      try {
+        execFileSync("git", ["worktree", "remove", "--force", tmpDir], {
+          cwd: root,
+          stdio: ["ignore", "ignore", "ignore"],
+        });
+      } catch (_) {}
+    }
+    try {
+      rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    } catch (_) {}
+    throw new GateError(`Failed to materialize ${mode} snapshot for verification: ${err.message}`, { code: 1 });
+  }
+}
+
 /**
  * Extract 'owner/repo' from a git remote URL if it points to GitHub.
  * Handles SSH (git@github.com:owner/repo.git), HTTPS (https://github.com/owner/repo.git),