jinaga-server 3.5.1 → 3.5.2
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/http/router.js +183 -24
- package/dist/http/router.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http/stream.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/http/stream.js +79 -5
- package/dist/http/stream.js.map +1 -1
- package/docs/analysis/DIAGNOSTIC_LOGGING_README.md +201 -0
- package/docs/analysis/security-audit-feeds-hash-handler.md +407 -0
- package/package.json +2 -2
- package/src/http/router.ts +232 -29
- package/src/http/stream.ts +97 -5
- package/test-concurrent-streams.js +219 -0
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# Diagnostic Logging for StreamFeed Push Notification Issues
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This document describes the comprehensive diagnostic logging system implemented to identify why some clients fail to receive push notifications when multiple clients are simultaneously connected to streaming feeds.
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## Overview
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The diagnostic logging has been added to track:
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1. **Listener Management** - Registration/deregistration of specification listeners
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2. **Event Broadcasting** - How events are distributed to listeners
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3. **Stream State Changes** - Stream lifecycle and data flow
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4. **Connection Management** - HTTP connection lifecycle and cleanup
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5. **Concurrent Access Patterns** - Race conditions and timing issues
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## Components Modified
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### 1. ObservableSource (`../jinaga.js/src/observable/observable.ts`)
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**Added logging for:**
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- Listener registration with counts and specification details
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- Listener removal with timing and race condition detection
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- Event notification sequences with performance metrics
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- Race condition detection during listener array modifications
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**Key log patterns to watch for:**
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```
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[ObservableSource] RACE CONDITION DETECTED - Listener count changed during snapshot
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[ObservableSource] Listener NOT FOUND during removal
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[ObservableSource] SLOW notification - Duration: >100ms
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```
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### 2. Stream Class (`src/http/stream.ts`)
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**Added logging for:**
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- Stream creation with unique IDs
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- Handler registration and data replay
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- Feed operations with performance tracking
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- Stream closure and cleanup
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- Error handling in handlers
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**Key log patterns to watch for:**
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```
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[Stream:ID] Attempted to feed data to closed stream
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[Stream:ID] SLOW handler - Duration: >50ms
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[Stream:ID] ERROR in handler
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```
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### 3. StreamFeed Function (`src/http/router.ts`)
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**Added logging for:**
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- Connection establishment with unique IDs
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- Initial data streaming progress
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- Real-time listener setup
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- Event processing and filtering
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- Connection cleanup and resource management
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**Key log patterns to watch for:**
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```
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[StreamFeed:ID] EVENT RECEIVED - Results: X
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[StreamFeed:ID] No matching results - skipping response
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[StreamFeed:ID] SLOW event processing - Duration: >100ms
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```
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### 4. HTTP Connection Management (`src/http/router.ts`)
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**Added logging for:**
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- Client connection/disconnection events
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- Message transmission with timing
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- Timeout handling
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- Socket management
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- Error conditions
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**Key log patterns to watch for:**
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```
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[HttpConnection:ID] CLIENT DISCONNECTED
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[HttpConnection:ID] TIMEOUT TRIGGERED
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[HttpConnection:ID] SLOW write operation - Duration: >50ms
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```
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## How to Use the Diagnostic Logging
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### 1. Enable Logging
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The logging uses both `console.log` and the existing `Trace` system. Ensure your application is configured to capture both:
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```javascript
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// For console logs
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process.env.NODE_ENV = 'development';
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// For Trace logs (if using structured logging)
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// Configure your trace system to capture info/warn/error levels
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```
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### 2. Run the Test Script
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Use the provided test script to simulate concurrent connections:
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```bash
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# Replace 'your-feed-hash' with an actual feed hash from your system
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node test-concurrent-streams.js your-feed-hash-here
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```
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The test script will:
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- Create 5 concurrent streaming connections
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- Stagger connections by 1 second each
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- Monitor message distribution for 30 seconds
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- Report statistics and detect potential issues
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### 3. Analyze the Logs
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Look for these critical patterns in the logs:
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#### Race Condition Indicators
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```
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[ObservableSource] RACE CONDITION DETECTED - Listener count changed during snapshot
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[ObservableSource] Listener NOT FOUND during removal
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```
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#### Performance Issues
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```
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[StreamFeed:ID] SLOW event processing - Duration: >100ms
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[HttpConnection:ID] SLOW write operation - Duration: >50ms
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[Stream:ID] SLOW handler - Duration: >50ms
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```
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#### Connection Issues
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```
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[HttpConnection:ID] Attempted to write to disconnected client
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[Stream:ID] Attempted to feed data to closed stream
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```
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#### Event Distribution Problems
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```
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[StreamFeed:ID] No matching results - skipping response
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[ObservableSource] Processing spec X/Y - Listeners: 0
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```
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### 4. Expected Behavior vs Issues
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**Normal Operation:**
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- All clients should receive similar message counts
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- Event processing should be fast (<100ms)
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- No race condition warnings
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- Clean connection cleanup
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**Problem Indicators:**
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- Significant variance in message counts between clients
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- Race condition warnings in ObservableSource
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- Slow event processing times
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- Errors during listener removal
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- Messages sent to closed streams
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## Monitoring Recommendations
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### 1. Real-time Monitoring
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Set up log aggregation to monitor these patterns in production:
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```bash
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# Example: Monitor for race conditions
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tail -f application.log | grep "RACE CONDITION DETECTED"
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# Example: Monitor for slow operations
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tail -f application.log | grep "SLOW"
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# Example: Monitor connection issues
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tail -f application.log | grep "CLIENT DISCONNECTED\|TIMEOUT TRIGGERED"
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```
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### 2. Metrics to Track
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- **Message Distribution Variance**: Difference between max and min messages received by clients
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- **Event Processing Time**: Average time to process and distribute events
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- **Connection Cleanup Time**: Time taken to remove listeners during disconnection
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- **Race Condition Frequency**: Number of race condition warnings per hour
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### 3. Alerting Thresholds
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Consider setting up alerts for:
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- Race condition warnings (any occurrence)
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- Event processing time >500ms
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- Message distribution variance >10 messages
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- Connection cleanup time >1000ms
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## Next Steps
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After collecting diagnostic data:
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1. **Identify Root Cause**: Use the logs to confirm which of the suspected issues is occurring
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2. **Implement Fixes**: Based on findings, implement appropriate synchronization mechanisms
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3. **Validate Fixes**: Re-run tests to confirm issues are resolved
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4. **Performance Tuning**: Optimize any slow operations identified
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## Suspected Issues Being Tracked
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1. **Race Conditions in Listener Management**: ObservableSource listener array modifications during concurrent access
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2. **Shared State Corruption**: Event broadcasting while listeners are being modified
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3. **Stream State Management**: Race conditions between stream closure and data feeding
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4. **Connection Cleanup Timing**: Double cleanup or cleanup during active operations
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5. **Async Event Processing**: Out-of-order bookmark updates causing missed notifications
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The diagnostic logging will help confirm which of these issues is the primary cause of the selective push notification failures.
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# Security and Reliability Audit: `/feeds/:hash` Handler - Streaming Path
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## Executive Summary
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This document presents a comprehensive security and reliability audit of the `/feeds/:hash` handler in `src/http/router.ts`, specifically analyzing the execution path when the Accept header contains `application/x-jinaga-feed-stream`. The audit identifies critical security vulnerabilities, reliability issues, and provides detailed remediation strategies.
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## Scope of Analysis
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**Target Handler**: `/feeds/:hash` GET endpoint
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**Execution Path**: `application/x-jinaga-feed-stream` Accept header flow
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**Key Methods Analyzed**:
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- `getOrStream()` (lines 38-92)
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- `streamFeed()` (lines 468-509)
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- `streamAllInitialResults()` (lines 511-568)
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- `streamFeedResponse()` (lines 570-583)
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## Critical Security Findings
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### 1. Authentication Bypass Vulnerability
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**CVSS Score: 9.1 (Critical)**
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**CWE-287: Improper Authentication**
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**Location**: Lines 43, 468-472
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**Issue**: The handler accepts null users without explicit authentication validation.
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```typescript
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const user = <RequestUser>(req as any).user; // Line 43
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// No authentication check before proceeding
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```
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**Proof of Concept**:
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```bash
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curl -H "Accept: application/x-jinaga-feed-stream" \
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http://target/feeds/arbitrary_hash
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```
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**Business Impact**:
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- Unauthorized access to sensitive feed data
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- Potential data exfiltration
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- Compliance violations (GDPR, HIPAA)
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**Remediation**:
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```typescript
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// Add explicit authentication check
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if (!user && requiresAuthentication(feedHash)) {
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res.sendStatus(401);
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return;
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}
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```
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### 2. Hash Parameter Injection Vulnerability
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**CVSS Score: 8.2 (High)**
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**CWE-20: Improper Input Validation**
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**Location**: Lines 469, 441
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**Issue**: Hash parameter lacks validation and sanitization.
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```typescript
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const feedHash = params["hash"]; // No validation
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if (!feedHash) {
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return null; // Only checks for existence
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}
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```
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**Attack Vectors**:
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- Path traversal: `../../../sensitive_data`
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- SQL injection via hash lookup
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- Hash collision attacks
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- Enumeration attacks
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**Proof of Concept**:
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```bash
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# Path traversal attempt
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curl -H "Accept: application/x-jinaga-feed-stream" \
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"http://target/feeds/../../../etc/passwd"
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# Hash enumeration
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for i in {1..1000}; do
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curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
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"http://target/feeds/hash_$i" | grep -v 404
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done
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```
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**Remediation**:
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```typescript
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// Add hash validation
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const HASH_PATTERN = /^[a-fA-F0-9]{64}$/;
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if (!feedHash || !HASH_PATTERN.test(feedHash)) {
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res.sendStatus(400);
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return;
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}
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```
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### 3. Timing Attack Vulnerability
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**CVSS Score: 6.5 (Medium)**
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**CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy**
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**Location**: Lines 474-477
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**Issue**: Feed lookup timing reveals hash existence.
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```typescript
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const feedDefinition = await this.feedCache.getFeed(feedHash);
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if (!feedDefinition) {
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return null; // Different timing for valid vs invalid hashes
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}
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```
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**Remediation**:
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```typescript
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// Constant-time hash validation
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const [feedDefinition, _] = await Promise.all([
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this.feedCache.getFeed(feedHash),
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this.addConstantTimeDelay()
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]);
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```
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### 4. Denial of Service Vulnerabilities
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**CVSS Score: 7.5 (High)**
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**CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption**
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#### 4.1 Memory Exhaustion
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**Location**: Lines 485-509, 511-568
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**Issue**: Unbounded stream creation and memory usage.
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```typescript
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const stream = new Stream<FeedResponse>(); // No memory limits
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// Continuous streaming without backpressure management
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```
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#### 4.2 Connection Exhaustion
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**Location**: Lines 58-60, 61-63
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**Issue**: Inadequate connection management.
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```typescript
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const timeout = setTimeout(() => {
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response.close();
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}, 5 * 60 * 1000); // 5-minute timeout may be too long
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```
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|
|
140
|
+
**Attack Scenario**:
|
|
141
|
+
```bash
|
|
142
|
+
# Connection exhaustion attack
|
|
143
|
+
for i in {1..10000}; do
|
|
144
|
+
curl -H "Accept: application/x-jinaga-feed-stream" \
|
|
145
|
+
"http://target/feeds/valid_hash" &
|
|
146
|
+
done
|
|
147
|
+
```
|
|
148
|
+
|
|
149
|
+
**Remediation**:
|
|
150
|
+
```typescript
|
|
151
|
+
// Add connection limits and backpressure
|
|
152
|
+
const MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS = 100;
|
|
153
|
+
const STREAM_TIMEOUT = 30000; // 30 seconds
|
|
154
|
+
const MAX_MEMORY_PER_STREAM = 10 * 1024 * 1024; // 10MB
|
|
155
|
+
```
|
|
156
|
+
|
|
157
|
+
### 5. Race Condition Vulnerabilities
|
|
158
|
+
**CVSS Score: 6.8 (Medium)**
|
|
159
|
+
**CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource**
|
|
160
|
+
|
|
161
|
+
**Location**: Lines 492-502, 523-565
|
|
162
|
+
**Issue**: Concurrent access to shared resources without proper synchronization.
|
|
163
|
+
|
|
164
|
+
```typescript
|
|
165
|
+
// Multiple async operations without proper coordination
|
|
166
|
+
const listeners = inverses.map(inverse => this.factManager.addSpecificationListener(
|
|
167
|
+
inverse.inverseSpecification,
|
|
168
|
+
async (results) => {
|
|
169
|
+
// Race condition: bookmark updates
|
|
170
|
+
bookmark = await this.streamFeedResponse(...);
|
|
171
|
+
}
|
|
172
|
+
));
|
|
173
|
+
```
|
|
174
|
+
|
|
175
|
+
### 6. Information Disclosure Vulnerabilities
|
|
176
|
+
**CVSS Score: 5.3 (Medium)**
|
|
177
|
+
**CWE-200: Information Exposure**
|
|
178
|
+
|
|
179
|
+
#### 6.1 Error Information Leakage
|
|
180
|
+
**Location**: Lines 722-738
|
|
181
|
+
**Issue**: Detailed error messages expose internal system information.
|
|
182
|
+
|
|
183
|
+
```typescript
|
|
184
|
+
res.status(500).send(error.message); // Exposes internal errors
|
|
185
|
+
```
|
|
186
|
+
|
|
187
|
+
#### 6.2 Timing-Based Information Disclosure
|
|
188
|
+
**Location**: Lines 523-565
|
|
189
|
+
**Issue**: Processing time reveals data characteristics.
|
|
190
|
+
|
|
191
|
+
## Reliability and Performance Issues
|
|
192
|
+
|
|
193
|
+
### 1. Infinite Loop Vulnerability
|
|
194
|
+
**Severity: High**
|
|
195
|
+
**Location**: Lines 523-565
|
|
196
|
+
|
|
197
|
+
```typescript
|
|
198
|
+
while (hasMoreResults && pageCount < maxPages) {
|
|
199
|
+
// Potential infinite loop if bookmark doesn't change
|
|
200
|
+
if (newBookmark === bookmark) {
|
|
201
|
+
hasMoreResults = false; // Mitigation exists but insufficient
|
|
202
|
+
}
|
|
203
|
+
}
|
|
204
|
+
```
|
|
205
|
+
|
|
206
|
+
**Issue**: Insufficient loop termination conditions.
|
|
207
|
+
|
|
208
|
+
### 2. Resource Leak Vulnerabilities
|
|
209
|
+
**Severity: High**
|
|
210
|
+
**Location**: Lines 503-507
|
|
211
|
+
|
|
212
|
+
```typescript
|
|
213
|
+
stream.done(() => {
|
|
214
|
+
for (const listener of listeners) {
|
|
215
|
+
this.factManager.removeSpecificationListener(listener);
|
|
216
|
+
}
|
|
217
|
+
});
|
|
218
|
+
```
|
|
219
|
+
|
|
220
|
+
**Issue**: Listeners may not be cleaned up if stream.done() is not called.
|
|
221
|
+
|
|
222
|
+
### 3. Database Connection Pool Exhaustion
|
|
223
|
+
**Severity: Medium**
|
|
224
|
+
**Location**: Lines 524, 571
|
|
225
|
+
|
|
226
|
+
Multiple concurrent database calls without connection pooling limits.
|
|
227
|
+
|
|
228
|
+
## Detailed Remediation Strategy
|
|
229
|
+
|
|
230
|
+
### Priority 1: Critical Security Fixes
|
|
231
|
+
|
|
232
|
+
1. **Implement Authentication Validation**
|
|
233
|
+
```typescript
|
|
234
|
+
// Add to getOrStream function
|
|
235
|
+
if (requiresAuth && !user) {
|
|
236
|
+
res.sendStatus(401);
|
|
237
|
+
return;
|
|
238
|
+
}
|
|
239
|
+
```
|
|
240
|
+
|
|
241
|
+
2. **Add Hash Parameter Validation**
|
|
242
|
+
```typescript
|
|
243
|
+
const validateHash = (hash: string): boolean => {
|
|
244
|
+
return /^[a-fA-F0-9]{64}$/.test(hash) && hash.length === 64;
|
|
245
|
+
};
|
|
246
|
+
```
|
|
247
|
+
|
|
248
|
+
3. **Implement Rate Limiting**
|
|
249
|
+
```typescript
|
|
250
|
+
const rateLimiter = rateLimit({
|
|
251
|
+
windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, // 15 minutes
|
|
252
|
+
max: 100 // limit each IP to 100 requests per windowMs
|
|
253
|
+
});
|
|
254
|
+
```
|
|
255
|
+
|
|
256
|
+
### Priority 2: DoS Prevention
|
|
257
|
+
|
|
258
|
+
1. **Connection Management**
|
|
259
|
+
```typescript
|
|
260
|
+
const connectionManager = new ConnectionManager({
|
|
261
|
+
maxConcurrentStreams: 100,
|
|
262
|
+
maxStreamDuration: 30000,
|
|
263
|
+
maxMemoryPerStream: 10 * 1024 * 1024
|
|
264
|
+
});
|
|
265
|
+
```
|
|
266
|
+
|
|
267
|
+
2. **Backpressure Implementation**
|
|
268
|
+
```typescript
|
|
269
|
+
class BackpressureStream<T> extends Stream<T> {
|
|
270
|
+
private buffer: T[] = [];
|
|
271
|
+
private maxBufferSize = 1000;
|
|
272
|
+
|
|
273
|
+
feed(data: T) {
|
|
274
|
+
if (this.buffer.length >= this.maxBufferSize) {
|
|
275
|
+
this.pause();
|
|
276
|
+
}
|
|
277
|
+
super.feed(data);
|
|
278
|
+
}
|
|
279
|
+
}
|
|
280
|
+
```
|
|
281
|
+
|
|
282
|
+
### Priority 3: Monitoring and Logging
|
|
283
|
+
|
|
284
|
+
1. **Security Event Logging**
|
|
285
|
+
```typescript
|
|
286
|
+
const securityLogger = {
|
|
287
|
+
logSuspiciousActivity: (event: SecurityEvent) => {
|
|
288
|
+
// Log to SIEM system
|
|
289
|
+
},
|
|
290
|
+
logAccessAttempt: (user: string, resource: string, success: boolean) => {
|
|
291
|
+
// Audit trail
|
|
292
|
+
}
|
|
293
|
+
};
|
|
294
|
+
```
|
|
295
|
+
|
|
296
|
+
2. **Performance Monitoring**
|
|
297
|
+
```typescript
|
|
298
|
+
const performanceMonitor = {
|
|
299
|
+
trackStreamDuration: (streamId: string, duration: number) => {},
|
|
300
|
+
trackMemoryUsage: (streamId: string, usage: number) => {},
|
|
301
|
+
trackConcurrentConnections: (count: number) => {}
|
|
302
|
+
};
|
|
303
|
+
```
|
|
304
|
+
|
|
305
|
+
## Supply Chain Security Analysis
|
|
306
|
+
|
|
307
|
+
### Dependencies Review
|
|
308
|
+
- **express**: Check for known CVEs in routing
|
|
309
|
+
- **jinaga**: Internal dependency - requires separate audit
|
|
310
|
+
- **Stream class**: Custom implementation needs security review
|
|
311
|
+
|
|
312
|
+
### Recommended Actions
|
|
313
|
+
1. Implement dependency scanning in CI/CD
|
|
314
|
+
2. Regular security updates
|
|
315
|
+
3. Vendor security assessment for jinaga library
|
|
316
|
+
|
|
317
|
+
## Compliance Considerations
|
|
318
|
+
|
|
319
|
+
### GDPR Compliance
|
|
320
|
+
- Data minimization in streams
|
|
321
|
+
- Right to erasure implementation
|
|
322
|
+
- Consent management for streaming data
|
|
323
|
+
|
|
324
|
+
### SOC 2 Compliance
|
|
325
|
+
- Access logging and monitoring
|
|
326
|
+
- Data encryption in transit
|
|
327
|
+
- Incident response procedures
|
|
328
|
+
|
|
329
|
+
## Testing Strategy
|
|
330
|
+
|
|
331
|
+
### Security Testing
|
|
332
|
+
1. **Penetration Testing**
|
|
333
|
+
- Authentication bypass attempts
|
|
334
|
+
- Input validation testing
|
|
335
|
+
- DoS attack simulation
|
|
336
|
+
|
|
337
|
+
2. **Automated Security Scanning**
|
|
338
|
+
- SAST tools integration
|
|
339
|
+
- Dependency vulnerability scanning
|
|
340
|
+
- Runtime security monitoring
|
|
341
|
+
|
|
342
|
+
### Performance Testing
|
|
343
|
+
1. **Load Testing**
|
|
344
|
+
- Concurrent stream handling
|
|
345
|
+
- Memory usage under load
|
|
346
|
+
- Database connection pooling
|
|
347
|
+
|
|
348
|
+
2. **Chaos Engineering**
|
|
349
|
+
- Network partition simulation
|
|
350
|
+
- Database failure scenarios
|
|
351
|
+
- Memory pressure testing
|
|
352
|
+
|
|
353
|
+
## Implementation Timeline
|
|
354
|
+
|
|
355
|
+
### Phase 1 (Immediate - 1 week)
|
|
356
|
+
- Critical authentication fixes
|
|
357
|
+
- Input validation implementation
|
|
358
|
+
- Basic rate limiting
|
|
359
|
+
|
|
360
|
+
### Phase 2 (Short-term - 2-4 weeks)
|
|
361
|
+
- DoS prevention measures
|
|
362
|
+
- Enhanced monitoring
|
|
363
|
+
- Security logging
|
|
364
|
+
|
|
365
|
+
### Phase 3 (Medium-term - 1-3 months)
|
|
366
|
+
- Comprehensive testing
|
|
367
|
+
- Performance optimization
|
|
368
|
+
- Compliance implementation
|
|
369
|
+
|
|
370
|
+
## Conclusion
|
|
371
|
+
|
|
372
|
+
The `/feeds/:hash` handler contains multiple critical security vulnerabilities that require immediate attention. The streaming functionality, while providing real-time capabilities, introduces significant attack surface that must be properly secured. Implementation of the recommended remediation strategies will significantly improve the security posture and reliability of the system.
|
|
373
|
+
|
|
374
|
+
**Risk Assessment**: **HIGH** - Immediate action required
|
|
375
|
+
**Business Impact**: **CRITICAL** - Potential for data breach and service disruption
|
|
376
|
+
**Remediation Complexity**: **MEDIUM** - Requires coordinated development effort
|
|
377
|
+
|
|
378
|
+
## Appendix A: Security Checklist
|
|
379
|
+
|
|
380
|
+
- [ ] Authentication validation implemented
|
|
381
|
+
- [ ] Input sanitization and validation
|
|
382
|
+
- [ ] Rate limiting configured
|
|
383
|
+
- [ ] Connection management implemented
|
|
384
|
+
- [ ] Error handling sanitized
|
|
385
|
+
- [ ] Logging and monitoring deployed
|
|
386
|
+
- [ ] Security testing completed
|
|
387
|
+
- [ ] Performance testing completed
|
|
388
|
+
- [ ] Documentation updated
|
|
389
|
+
- [ ] Team training conducted
|
|
390
|
+
|
|
391
|
+
## Appendix B: Monitoring Queries
|
|
392
|
+
|
|
393
|
+
```sql
|
|
394
|
+
-- Suspicious hash access patterns
|
|
395
|
+
SELECT hash, COUNT(*), MIN(timestamp), MAX(timestamp)
|
|
396
|
+
FROM feed_access_log
|
|
397
|
+
WHERE timestamp > NOW() - INTERVAL '1 hour'
|
|
398
|
+
GROUP BY hash
|
|
399
|
+
HAVING COUNT(*) > 100;
|
|
400
|
+
|
|
401
|
+
-- Failed authentication attempts
|
|
402
|
+
SELECT ip_address, COUNT(*)
|
|
403
|
+
FROM security_events
|
|
404
|
+
WHERE event_type = 'auth_failure'
|
|
405
|
+
AND timestamp > NOW() - INTERVAL '1 hour'
|
|
406
|
+
GROUP BY ip_address
|
|
407
|
+
HAVING COUNT(*) > 10;
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "jinaga-server",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "3.5.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "3.5.2",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Data management for web and mobile applications.",
|
|
5
5
|
"main": "dist/index.js",
|
|
6
6
|
"types": "dist/index.d.ts",
|
|
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
|
|
|
48
48
|
},
|
|
49
49
|
"dependencies": {
|
|
50
50
|
"express": "^4.21.2",
|
|
51
|
-
"jinaga": "^6.7.
|
|
51
|
+
"jinaga": "^6.7.9",
|
|
52
52
|
"pg": "^8.13.1"
|
|
53
53
|
}
|
|
54
54
|
}
|