javascript-solid-server 0.0.172 → 0.0.174

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@@ -405,7 +405,12 @@
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  "Bash(ANDROID_HOME=/home/melvin/Android/Sdk ANDROID_SDK_ROOT=/home/melvin/Android/Sdk ./gradlew :app:compileDebugKotlin --no-daemon)",
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  "Bash(./scripts/fetch-libnode.sh v18.20.4)",
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  "Bash(ANDROID_HOME=/home/melvin/Android/Sdk ANDROID_SDK_ROOT=/home/melvin/Android/Sdk ./gradlew :app:assembleDebug --no-daemon)",
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- "Bash(/home/melvin/Android/Sdk/platform-tools/adb devices *)"
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+ "Bash(/home/melvin/Android/Sdk/platform-tools/adb devices *)",
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+ "Bash(command -v chromium chromium-browser google-chrome firefox playwright)",
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+ "Bash(/usr/bin/chromium-browser --headless --no-sandbox --disable-gpu --hide-scrollbars --window-size=480,800 --screenshot=/tmp/consent-preview.png file:///tmp/consent-preview.html)",
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+ "Bash(cp /tmp/consent-preview.html ~/consent-preview.html)",
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+ "Read(//home/melvin/**)",
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+ "Bash(/usr/bin/chromium-browser --headless --no-sandbox --disable-gpu --hide-scrollbars --window-size=520,900 --screenshot=consent.png file:///home/melvin/consent-preview.html)"
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  ]
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  }
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  }
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "javascript-solid-server",
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- "version": "0.0.172",
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+ "version": "0.0.174",
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  "description": "A minimal, fast Solid server",
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  "main": "src/index.js",
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  "type": "module",
package/src/idp/index.js CHANGED
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import {
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  handleLogin,
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  handleConsent,
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  handleAbort,
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+ handleSwitchAccount,
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  handleRegisterGet,
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  handleRegisterPost,
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  handlePasskeyComplete,
@@ -324,6 +325,13 @@ export async function idpPlugin(fastify, options) {
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  return handleAbort(request, reply, provider);
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  });
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328
+ // POST "Sign in as a different user" (#384) — destroys the OIDC
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+ // session and bounces back to the login prompt while preserving the
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+ // in-flight authz request.
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+ fastify.post('/idp/interaction/:uid/switch', async (request, reply) => {
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+ return handleSwitchAccount(request, reply, provider);
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+ });
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+
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  // Registration routes (disabled in single-user mode)
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  if (singleUser) {
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  // Single-user mode: registration disabled
@@ -297,6 +297,89 @@ export async function handleConsent(request, reply, provider) {
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  }
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  }
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+ /**
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+ * Handle POST /idp/interaction/:uid/switch
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+ *
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+ * "Sign in as a different user" from the consent page (#384). Destroys
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+ * the current OIDC session, mutates the in-flight interaction back to
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+ * the login prompt, and redirects the user to the same /idp/interaction
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+ * URL — which `handleInteractionGet` will render as the login page.
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+ *
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+ * Re-using the same interaction uid (rather than starting a fresh
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+ * /idp/auth flow) preserves the original authz request params so the
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+ * caller's redirect_uri / state / nonce all flow through unchanged.
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+ */
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+ export async function handleSwitchAccount(request, reply, provider) {
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+ const { uid } = request.params;
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+
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+ try {
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+ const interaction = await provider.Interaction.find(uid);
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+ if (!interaction) {
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+ return reply.code(404).type('text/html').send(errorPage('Interaction not found', 'This interaction may have expired. Try signing in again from your app.'));
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+ }
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+
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+ // The UI entrypoint is the consent page only. Refusing on other
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+ // prompt states (login, passkey, etc.) prevents a crafted request
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+ // from corrupting an in-flight non-consent interaction.
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+ if (interaction.prompt?.name !== 'consent') {
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+ return reply.code(400).type('text/html').send(errorPage('Cannot switch account here', 'Account switching is only available from the consent page.'));
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+ }
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+
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+ // Destroy the bound session so the new login starts cold. The cookie
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+ // becomes a stale reference; oidc-provider's Session.get treats a
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+ // missing session blob as "new browser", which is the shape we want.
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+ if (interaction.session?.uid) {
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+ const sess = await provider.Session.findByUid(interaction.session.uid);
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+ if (sess) await sess.destroy();
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+ }
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+
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+ // Reset the interaction back to the login prompt, dropping the
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+ // session reference and any prior `result` snapshot. `prompt`,
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+ // `session`, and `result` are all in the oidc-provider Interaction
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+ // IN_PAYLOAD allowlist, so the mutations persist through the
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+ // adapter. Original `params` (client_id, redirect_uri, state, etc.)
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+ // are untouched, so resume picks them up after login. Clearing
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+ // `result` prevents a stale `result.login` from a previous identity
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+ // influencing the next resume.
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+ interaction.session = undefined;
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+ interaction.result = undefined;
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+ interaction.prompt = { name: 'login', reasons: ['no_session'], details: {} };
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+ interaction.lastError = undefined;
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+ const ttl = Math.max(1, interaction.exp - Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));
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+ await interaction.save(ttl);
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+
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+ // Clear the user-agent's session cookie too. The IdP runs with
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+ // signed cookies (provider.js cookies.long.signed = true), so each
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+ // session cookie has a paired `.sig`. The `.legacy` variant is
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+ // created during identifier rotation and likewise has its own
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+ // `.sig`. Clearing all four keeps the browser fully tidy. JSS
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+ // doesn't register @fastify/cookie, so we emit Set-Cookie headers
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+ // directly with an expired Expires + Max-Age=0. Server-side state
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+ // is already gone via session.destroy() above — these expirations
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+ // are belt-and-suspenders.
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+ const expired = 'Path=/; Max-Age=0; Expires=Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT; HttpOnly';
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+ reply.header('Set-Cookie', [
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+ `_session=; ${expired}`,
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+ `_session.sig=; ${expired}`,
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+ `_session.legacy=; ${expired}`,
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+ `_session.legacy.sig=; ${expired}`,
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+ ]);
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+
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+ // 303 See Other — explicitly forces the UA to issue GET on the
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+ // Location target. 302 leaves it ambiguous (and some legacy UAs
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+ // repeat the POST), which would re-trigger this handler in a loop.
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+ // Status-then-URL arg order matches the rest of the codebase
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+ // (src/server.js:637, src/tunnel/index.js:222).
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+ return reply.redirect(303, `/idp/interaction/${uid}`);
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+ } catch (err) {
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+ request.log.error(err, 'Switch-account error');
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+ // Don't surface raw err.message — adapter errors and stack-leaking
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+ // strings on an auth endpoint are a soft info-leak. Full error is
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+ // already in the server log via request.log.error above.
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+ return reply.code(500).type('text/html').send(errorPage('Error', 'Something went wrong. Please try signing in again.'));
380
+ }
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+ }
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+
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  /**
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  * Handle POST /idp/interaction/:uid/abort
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385
  * User cancelled the flow
package/src/idp/views.js CHANGED
@@ -503,7 +503,15 @@ export function consentPage(uid, client, params, account) {
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  ${clientUri ? `<div class="client-uri">${escapeHtml(clientUri)}</div>` : ''}
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  </div>
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505
 
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- ${account ? `<p>Signed in as <strong>${escapeHtml(account.email)}</strong></p>` : ''}
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+ ${account ? `
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+ <div style="display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center; gap: 8px; flex-wrap: wrap; margin: 12px 0;">
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+ <span>Signed in as <strong>${escapeHtml(account.email)}</strong></span>
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+ <span style="color: #94a3b8;">·</span>
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+ <form method="POST" action="/idp/interaction/${uid}/switch" style="display: inline; margin: 0;">
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+ <button type="submit" style="background: none; border: 0; padding: 0; color: #2563eb; font: inherit; cursor: pointer; text-decoration: underline;">Sign in as a different user</button>
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+ </form>
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+ </div>
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+ ` : ''}
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515
 
508
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  <div class="scopes">
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  <label>This app is requesting access to:</label>
@@ -31,6 +31,12 @@ export function generateProfileJsonLd({ webId, name, podUri, issuer }) {
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  const docUrl = webId.split('#')[0];
32
32
 
33
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  return {
34
+ // CID v1 vocabulary is declared inline (rather than via an imported
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+ // context URL) so JSS's JSON-LD → Turtle conneg layer can expand
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+ // every term without fetching external contexts. Semantically
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+ // equivalent to importing https://www.w3.org/ns/cid/v1: the IRIs
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+ // each term expands to are the same. This keeps the profile a valid
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+ // W3C Controlled Identifier document per LWS 1.0 (#386 Phase A).
34
40
  '@context': {
35
41
  'foaf': FOAF,
36
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  'solid': SOLID,
@@ -48,13 +54,39 @@ export function generateProfileJsonLd({ webId, name, podUri, issuer }) {
48
54
  'isPrimaryTopicOf': { '@id': 'foaf:isPrimaryTopicOf', '@type': '@id' },
49
55
  'mainEntityOfPage': { '@id': 'schema:mainEntityOfPage', '@type': '@id' },
50
56
  'service': { '@id': 'cid:service', '@container': '@set' },
51
- 'serviceEndpoint': { '@id': 'cid:serviceEndpoint', '@type': '@id' }
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+ 'serviceEndpoint': { '@id': 'cid:serviceEndpoint', '@type': '@id' },
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+ // CID v1 terms used by Phase A and prepped for Phase B (the
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+ // standalone "add my keys" app). Declaring these now means the
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+ // app can PATCH in verificationMethod entries without having to
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+ // also rewrite the @context.
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+ //
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+ // verificationMethod: NO @type:@id — values are inline verification
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+ // method *objects* (id/type/controller/publicKey…), not just IRI
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+ // references. @container:@set so a single entry stays an array.
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+ // authentication / assertionMethod: @type:@id — values reference a
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+ // verificationMethod entry by its IRI. @container:@set for arrays.
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+ // publicKeyJwk: @type:@json so the JWK object round-trips as a
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+ // literal JSON value (rdf:JSON datatype). Note: JSS's Turtle
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+ // conneg layer doesn't yet emit @type:@json literals (tracked as
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+ // a Phase B blocker in the PR description); declaring here is
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+ // forward-looking and spec-correct.
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+ 'controller': { '@id': 'cid:controller', '@type': '@id' },
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+ 'verificationMethod': { '@id': 'cid:verificationMethod', '@container': '@set' },
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+ 'authentication': { '@id': 'cid:authentication', '@type': '@id', '@container': '@set' },
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+ 'assertionMethod': { '@id': 'cid:assertionMethod', '@type': '@id', '@container': '@set' },
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+ 'publicKeyJwk': { '@id': 'cid:publicKeyJwk', '@type': '@json' },
78
+ 'publicKeyMultibase': { '@id': 'cid:publicKeyMultibase' }
52
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  },
53
80
  '@id': webId,
54
81
  '@type': ['foaf:Person', 'schema:Person'],
55
82
  'foaf:name': name,
56
83
  'isPrimaryTopicOf': '',
57
84
  'mainEntityOfPage': '',
85
+ // CID v1 self-control: the WebID is its own controller. Phase A of
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+ // #386 ships this triple even with no verificationMethods yet, so a
87
+ // future Phase B "add-keys" app PATCHing in verificationMethod
88
+ // entries doesn't have to also wire up controllership separately.
89
+ 'controller': webId,
58
90
  'inbox': `${pod}inbox/`,
59
91
  'storage': pod,
60
92
  'oidcIssuer': issuer,
package/test/idp.test.js CHANGED
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
4
4
 
5
5
  import { describe, it, before, after, beforeEach } from 'node:test';
6
6
  import assert from 'node:assert';
7
+ import http from 'node:http';
7
8
  import { createServer } from '../src/server.js';
8
9
  import fs from 'fs-extra';
9
10
  import path from 'path';
@@ -182,6 +183,122 @@ describe('Identity Provider', () => {
182
183
  });
183
184
  });
184
185
 
186
+ // Regression coverage for #384 — "Sign in as a different user" on consent
187
+ describe('Switch account on consent (#384)', () => {
188
+ // The IDP's filesystem adapter stores Interaction records as JSON at
189
+ // <DATA_ROOT>/.idp/interaction/<uid>.json (model name "Interaction"
190
+ // → dir "interaction" via the adapter's modelToDir camelCase split).
191
+ // Tests write a synthetic interaction directly so we don't have to
192
+ // walk a full OIDC client flow to set up state.
193
+ const interactionDir = `${DATA_DIR}/.idp/interaction`;
194
+
195
+ function writeInteraction(uid, payload) {
196
+ const ttlSec = 3600;
197
+ const data = {
198
+ ...payload,
199
+ kind: 'Interaction',
200
+ jti: uid,
201
+ exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + ttlSec,
202
+ iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
203
+ _id: uid,
204
+ _expiresAt: Date.now() + ttlSec * 1000,
205
+ };
206
+ return fs.outputJson(`${interactionDir}/${uid}.json`, data, { spaces: 2 });
207
+ }
208
+
209
+ // Use node:http directly for the cookie-clearing assertion. fetch's
210
+ // Headers.getSetCookie() is only available on Node 19.7+, but the
211
+ // package declares engines.node >= 18. http.request gives us
212
+ // res.headers['set-cookie'] as a real array on every supported
213
+ // Node version, no version-gated branches needed.
214
+ function rawPost(urlString) {
215
+ return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
216
+ const u = new URL(urlString);
217
+ const req = http.request({
218
+ method: 'POST',
219
+ hostname: u.hostname,
220
+ port: u.port,
221
+ path: u.pathname + u.search,
222
+ }, (res) => {
223
+ let body = '';
224
+ res.on('data', (c) => body += c);
225
+ res.on('end', () => resolve({
226
+ statusCode: res.statusCode,
227
+ headers: res.headers,
228
+ body,
229
+ }));
230
+ });
231
+ req.on('error', reject);
232
+ req.end();
233
+ });
234
+ }
235
+
236
+ it('redirects back to /idp/interaction/:uid and resets the prompt to login', async () => {
237
+ const uid = 'test-switch-' + Math.random().toString(36).slice(2);
238
+ await writeInteraction(uid, {
239
+ prompt: { name: 'consent', reasons: [], details: {} },
240
+ session: { uid: 'fake-session-uid', accountId: 'acct-foo' },
241
+ params: { client_id: 'test-client', redirect_uri: 'http://localhost', state: 'xyz' },
242
+ });
243
+
244
+ const res = await rawPost(`${baseUrl}/idp/interaction/${uid}/switch`);
245
+
246
+ // 303 See Other — forces UA to GET the Location target so a
247
+ // (broken) UA can't loop by re-POSTing to /switch.
248
+ assert.strictEqual(res.statusCode, 303);
249
+ assert.strictEqual(res.headers.location, `/idp/interaction/${uid}`);
250
+
251
+ // Verify the interaction was mutated as expected.
252
+ const saved = await fs.readJson(`${interactionDir}/${uid}.json`);
253
+ assert.strictEqual(saved.prompt.name, 'login');
254
+ assert.ok(saved.session === undefined || saved.session === null,
255
+ 'session should be cleared');
256
+ // Original params survive so resume can continue the authz request.
257
+ assert.strictEqual(saved.params.client_id, 'test-client');
258
+ assert.strictEqual(saved.params.state, 'xyz');
259
+
260
+ // Cookies should be cleared so the user's UA forgets the prior
261
+ // session. Node's http module gives Set-Cookie as an array on
262
+ // every supported version, so no Node 19.7+ gating needed.
263
+ const setCookies = Array.isArray(res.headers['set-cookie']) ? res.headers['set-cookie'] : [];
264
+ assert.ok(setCookies.length >= 4, `expected at least 4 Set-Cookie headers, got ${setCookies.length}`);
265
+ // All four signed-cookie names should be cleared:
266
+ // _session + _session.sig + _session.legacy + _session.legacy.sig.
267
+ for (const name of ['_session=', '_session.sig=', '_session.legacy=', '_session.legacy.sig=']) {
268
+ assert.ok(setCookies.some(c => c.startsWith(name)),
269
+ `should clear ${name.slice(0, -1)}`);
270
+ }
271
+ assert.ok(setCookies.every(c => /Max-Age=0|Expires=Thu, 01 Jan 1970/.test(c)),
272
+ 'all Set-Cookies should be expirations');
273
+ });
274
+
275
+ it('returns 400 when the interaction is not on the consent prompt', async () => {
276
+ const uid = 'test-switch-bad-' + Math.random().toString(36).slice(2);
277
+ await writeInteraction(uid, {
278
+ prompt: { name: 'login', reasons: ['no_session'], details: {} },
279
+ params: { client_id: 'test-client' },
280
+ });
281
+
282
+ const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/idp/interaction/${uid}/switch`, {
283
+ method: 'POST',
284
+ redirect: 'manual',
285
+ });
286
+
287
+ assert.strictEqual(res.status, 400);
288
+ // Original interaction should be untouched.
289
+ const saved = await fs.readJson(`${interactionDir}/${uid}.json`);
290
+ assert.strictEqual(saved.prompt.name, 'login');
291
+ });
292
+
293
+ it('returns 404 for an unknown interaction uid', async () => {
294
+ const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/idp/interaction/does-not-exist-${Date.now()}/switch`, {
295
+ method: 'POST',
296
+ redirect: 'manual',
297
+ });
298
+ assert.strictEqual(res.status, 404);
299
+ });
300
+ });
301
+
185
302
  // Regression coverage for #286 — friendly /idp landing + /idp/auth guard.
186
303
  describe('Landing page', () => {
187
304
  it('GET /idp returns the landing HTML', async () => {
@@ -47,6 +47,53 @@ describe('WebID Profile', () => {
47
47
  assert.ok(jsonLd['@id'], 'Should have @id');
48
48
  });
49
49
 
50
+ // LWS-CID document conformance, Phase A of #386. The profile must be
51
+ // structurally a W3C Controlled Identifier document so a future
52
+ // PATCH-in-keys app (or server migration) can drop verificationMethod
53
+ // entries in without further plumbing. CID v1 vocabulary is declared
54
+ // inline rather than via context URL so JSS's conneg layer can
55
+ // expand every term without fetching external contexts — the IRIs
56
+ // are the same either way.
57
+ it('declares all six CID v1 terms in @context (#386 Phase A)', async () => {
58
+ const res = await request(profilePath);
59
+ const jsonLd = await res.json();
60
+ const ctx = jsonLd['@context'];
61
+ assert.ok(ctx, '@context required');
62
+
63
+ // All six CID terms must be declared and expand to the CID v1
64
+ // namespace. Accept either prefixed (cid:term) or full-URI
65
+ // (https://www.w3.org/ns/cid/v1#term) form.
66
+ const cidTerms = ['controller', 'verificationMethod', 'authentication', 'assertionMethod', 'publicKeyJwk', 'publicKeyMultibase'];
67
+ for (const term of cidTerms) {
68
+ const mapping = ctx[term];
69
+ assert.ok(mapping, `@context must define \`${term}\``);
70
+ const id = typeof mapping === 'string' ? mapping : mapping['@id'];
71
+ assert.match(id, new RegExp(`^(cid:${term}|https://www\\.w3\\.org/ns/cid/v1#${term})$`),
72
+ `${term} must map to the CID v1 namespace`);
73
+ }
74
+
75
+ // Container/type flags Phase B relies on:
76
+ // verificationMethod values are inline objects, NOT IRIs — must
77
+ // NOT have @type:@id (would force string-only) and SHOULD have
78
+ // @container:@set so a single entry is still an array.
79
+ assert.notStrictEqual(ctx.verificationMethod['@type'], '@id',
80
+ 'verificationMethod values are objects, not IRIs');
81
+ assert.strictEqual(ctx.verificationMethod['@container'], '@set');
82
+ // authentication / assertionMethod reference verificationMethod
83
+ // entries by IRI, so @type:@id is correct.
84
+ assert.strictEqual(ctx.authentication['@type'], '@id');
85
+ assert.strictEqual(ctx.assertionMethod['@type'], '@id');
86
+ // JWK is a literal JSON value (rdf:JSON datatype) per JSON-LD 1.1.
87
+ assert.strictEqual(ctx.publicKeyJwk['@type'], '@json');
88
+ });
89
+
90
+ it('declares self-control via controller === @id (#386 Phase A)', async () => {
91
+ const res = await request(profilePath);
92
+ const jsonLd = await res.json();
93
+ assert.strictEqual(jsonLd.controller, jsonLd['@id'],
94
+ 'profile must declare itself as its own controller per CID v1');
95
+ });
96
+
50
97
  it('should have correct WebID URI', async () => {
51
98
  const res = await request(profilePath);
52
99
  const jsonLd = await res.json();